The Fight for Yongdungpo
_Three Hills Taken by 1/5--Enemy Minefields Encountered--NKPA
Counterattacks of 20 September--Recapture of Hills 80 and 85--1st
Marines in Position--Assault of Yongdungpo--Able Company on a
Limb--Yongdungpo Secured_
“If Yongdungpo is lost, Seoul also will fall.” This was the warning
note sounded during the conferences of the Red Korean military leaders
in Seoul. So important did they consider the industrial suburb that a
regiment of the 18th NKPA Division was assigned to the defense of the
built-up area on the south bank of the Han.[317]
[317] 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal, 15–20 Sep 50_.
Slogans of this sort were a favorite form of Communist inspirational
literature, and they may have served to buck up the defenders. From the
tactical standpoint, however, the quoted catch phrase was illogical.
Yongdungpo was untenable. Squatting on the low ground at the confluence
of the Kalchon and Han Rivers, the town was an isolated landmark of
only symbolic significance. It was separated from Seoul by two miles
of sand and water, and the only connecting links, the old railroad and
highway bridges, had long since been destroyed. Thus, what had once
been a vital communications hub south of the Han was now a veritable
dead end.
While the Reds in Seoul were able to ferry troops and materiel
across the exposed river and sand spit by night, they could not hope
by this primitive method to meet the logistical requirements of a
regimental garrison confronted by a modern juggernaut of combined
arms. Nevertheless, the North Koreans chose to make a fight of it, and
in addition to the hundreds of troops in Yongdungpo, they sent over
considerable artillery and armor that could have been put to better use
in the defensible terrain around Seoul.
_Three Hills Taken by 1/5_
Hill 118 was the principal terrain feature between Kimpo Airfield and
Yongdungpo, the dominating peak being about three miles from the former
and two from the latter. Giant spurs from the main ridge extended
northward toward the Han and eastward to the bed of the Kalchon, beyond
which lay Yongdungpo. At the end of one easterly projection were the
twin caps, Hills 80 and 85. Paralleling the Han River, a modern highway
led from Kimpo, passed north of Hill 118, skirted 80 and 85, then
bridged the Kalchon to enter Yongdungpo from the northwest.
It will be recalled that the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, occupied high
ground generally east of Kimpo Airfield at the close of 18 September.
During the night, Lieutenant Colonel Murray ordered the unit to seize
Hills 80 and 85 the next day. To gain these gates to Yongdungpo, it
would be necessary to take Hill 118; and the battalion commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Newton, formulated his plan accordingly.[318]
Company B would leave its positions on old Objective EASY at dawn and
envelop Hill 118 from the south. Company C would attack frontally
from Objective FOX, assist the enveloping force by taking one of
118’s spurs, then continue eastward to seize 80 and 85. Company A was
to remain behind an Objective EASY for the purpose of guarding the
approaches to the airfield.
[318] Unless otherwise noted, the story of 1/5’s fight is
derived from 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
At dawn of 19 September, Company C atop Objective FOX was greeted
by a hail of mortar and small-arms fire. Under this shield part of
a 500-man enemy force attacked the Marine position from the east,
while the remainder attempted to move along the Yongdungpo-Kimpo
Highway, obviously bent on reaching the airfield. Other large NKPA
concentrations were spotted at the base of Hill 118.
Charlie Company’s organic weapons roared into action along with the
battalion 81s. While the Marine fire cut swaths through the exposed
enemy ranks, Baker Company lunged forward to envelop Hill 118 according
to plan. Air and artillery paved the way so effectively that Captain
Fenton’s unit gained the commanding peak about 1100 without suffering a
casualty. This left the North Korean attackers, who had been contained
by Charlie Company, trapped between Objective Fox and Hill 118. After
losses of 300 dead and 100 prisoners, the Red Force broke into a few
small bands that fled across the highway to the fields and villages
bordering the Han. Company C’s casualties in stopping the attack
and moving forward to its spur on Hill 118 were two killed and six
wounded.[319]
[319] _Ibid._; and Capt. P. F. Pedersen memo to authors, 30
May 55.
[Illustration: ACTION ON 19 SEPTEMBER
SHOWING ATTACKS BY 1/5, 2/1, & 3/1]
As the two assault companies reorganized on the newly won ridge, Fenton
spotted a large number of Red troops on Hill 80, now about 1,000 yards
away. He directed an air strike from his advance position, and the
Corsairs not only cut down many of the North Koreans but completely
routed the survivors. While the planes worked over the enemy positions
on the high ground, the Marines of Company B observed a growing throng
of NKPA soldiers in the vicinity of the Kalchon Bridge leading to
Yongdungpo. Some of the Reds were milling around, but others were
filing across the undamaged span and disappearing into a knot of
warehouses and huts at the far end. Fenton radioed for artillery fire
just as Communist machine guns and an AT weapon opened up on Baker
Company from positions across the bridge. Four times firing for effect
with “battery four rounds,” the Marine howitzers sent a total of 96
shells crashing into the enemy positions within the space of a few
minutes. The explosions neutralized the bridge area, but the span
itself was badly damaged in the process.[320]
[320] Maj F. I. Fenton, Jr., memo to authors, 1 Jun 55.
First Lieutenant Pedersen led Company C along the highway toward Hills
80 and 85 at 1430. Owing to the press of time, the area between the
road and the Han River was not cleared, with the result that small
bands of enemy were left free to roam the fields and make their
presence felt later. The 3d Platoon, under Second Lieutenant Harold L.
Dawe, Jr., peeled off the column and attacked Hill 80 shortly after
1500. Following at an interval of 500 yards, Second Lieutenant Robert
H. Corbet’s 1st Platoon continued along the pavement toward Hill 85. A
platoon of A/Tanks supported the two-pronged assault along with Charlie
Company’s mortars and machine guns, and by 1650 the two heights were
secured. In the wake of the air strike called down by Fenton, the
attacking infantry had encountered practically no opposition.
Yongdungpo, bristling with Communist armament, rumbled its challenge
from the low ground 500 yards east of Hill 85. Taken under heavy fire
by artillery, mortars, and small arms, Company C was forced to dig in
on the reverse slopes of its high ground, there to await the expected
counterattack after nightfall.
_Enemy Minefields Encountered_
As noted previously, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, spent
the night of 18–19 September astride the Inchon-Seoul Highway a mile
east of Sosa. The 1st Battalion, deployed over a broad front in the
hills south of the road, was to be relieved in the morning by the
32d Infantry, so that Colonel Puller could shift his regiment to the
left. Since the relief did not take place as early as expected, Puller
ordered his 2d and 3d Battalions to attack at 1030, leaving 1/1 in
position to await replacement by the Army unit.[321]
[321] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
On the left of the highway, 3/1 jumped off from Hill 123 with Companies
H and I in the assault. The battalion’s mission was to clear a rambling
ridge complex that extended more than three miles before stopping short
of Hill 118. Assigned as a final objective was the terminal height,
Lookout Hill, facing western Yongdungpo across the wide bottomland of
the Kalchon.[322]
[322] _Ibid._; and 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal, 15–20 Sep 50_.
Considering the formidable cross-compartment approach, the assault
companies led by the battalion S-3, Major Joseph D. Trompeter, made
good progress against enemy resistance described as “light but
stubborn.” At a cost of two killed and 15 wounded, the Marines combed
the vertical wilderness and seized Lookout Hill late in the evening.
The attack was almost too successful, for the battalion was now out on
a limb. The closest friendly forces were on Hill 118, several hundred
yards to the north, and along the Inchon-Seoul Highway, about a mile to
the south, as will be shown.[323]
[323] _Ibid._; and Myers interv, 1 Feb 55.
The 2d Battalion could boast comparable success along the highway in
the course of 19 September, but gains were made under far different
circumstances. Spearheaded by Charlie Company Tanks commanded by
Captain Richard M. Taylor, the battalion had advanced only 500
yards in the morning when the lead M-26 was enveloped in a violent
explosion. With one track and two road wheels destroyed, the steel
monster settled into the crater left by the detonation of a wooden box
mine.[324]
[324] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe.
Simultaneously, the infantrymen of Company F came under heavy
small-arms fire from Hill 72 to the right front. In an attempt to sight
in on the enemy positions, other tanks tried to bypass the mine field
in the highway, only to discover that explosives were concealed in both
road shoulders as well. Howitzers of the 11th Marines registered on
Hill 72, and during the ensuing bombardment a VMF-214 flight appeared
overhead to lend further assistance.[325]
[325] 2/1 _SAR_; 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig; Easy; and Cunliffe
interv, 24 Aug 54.
Despite his generous use of supporting arms, Lieutenant Colonel Sutter
was forced to commit all three rifle companies to the fight. Tank
gunners tried to detonate mines embedded in the road with machine-gun
fire, but without success.[326] It remained for First Lieutenant
George A. Babe’s 2d Platoon, Charlie Company Engineers, to remove the
obstacles under fire. Darting forward on the bullet-swept highway, the
engineers placed “snowball” charges of C-3 on the wooden boxes, then
took cover while the mines exploded.[327]
[326] Owing to the crude design, the top of the wooden box
mine must protrude above the road for best effect.
Although the Communists sometimes concealed the
projections with debris, Marines usually had no
difficulty in spotting them.
[327] Capt G. A. Babe--1stLt P. Paolino interv, 15 Nov 54.
After 2/1 had driven the enemy from the area with the assistance
of Marine air and artillery, the job of clearing the 250-yard mine
field proceeded under less hair-raising conditions. To get the armor
back into the fight as soon as possible, Babe ignored the explosives
embedded in the highway shoulders. Word was passed back to this effect,
but several jeeps and trucks were lost later when drivers failed to
heed the warning.[328]
[328] _Ibid._; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
While the tanks remained on the sideline, Companies D and F punched
about a mile down the highway against continuing resistance, which
gradually solidified at Hill 146. Like 72, this ridge was on the right
side of the road, in the 32d Infantry’s zone of action. Since the Army
unit had yet to enter the picture, the Marine flank was becoming more
and more exposed with each forward bound by 2/1.[329]
[329] 2/1 _SAR_; and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55.
Sutter had no choice but to commit troops beyond his zone. Not only
were the Reds entrenched on Hill 146 with machine guns and field
pieces, but they had blocked the highway with trees and other
encumbrances. Thus, while Fox Company seized a knoll on the left, Dog
Company invaded Army territory and battled its way to the top of Hill
146’s western spur. VMF-214 plastered the peak itself, and the 11th
Marines shelled enemy positions across the whole battalion front.[330]
[330] _Ibid._; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
It was 1300 when the mine field to the rear was finally cleared,
enabling Charlie Company Tanks to move forward in an attempt to
overtake Sutter’s infantry. Within sight of the fighting around Hill
146, the armor ground to a halt before the roadblock of trees, rice
bags, and other debris.[331] A dozer tank rumbled ahead, smashed
through the first obstruction, then went up in a cloud of smoke. Under
the litter on the road lay a second mine field, 75 yards long.[332]
[331] Rice bags filled with dirt commonly were used by the
NKPA for barriers in place of sandbags.
[332] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe.
Again the tank men watched from behind as engineers cleared the highway
and 2/1 drove forward out of sight. By 1730, the Marine infantry had
completely smashed the main enemy concentration on the highway. When
the surviving Reds fled, they exhibited the same determination that had
characterized their stand throughout the day. Weapons and equipment
were strewn along the road, and the Marines captured a truck loaded
with mines as further evidence of the hasty retreat.[333]
[333] _Ibid._; and 2/1 _SAR_.
Sutter ordered 2/1 to hold up at 1900 and dig in astride the highway.
The 4,800-yard advance had cost the Marine unit four killed and 18
wounded, against 350 casualties and five prisoners for the North
Koreans. Since all written and personal accounts agree that 19
September amounted to almost one continuous fire fight for the 2d
Battalion, the amazing contrast in friendly-enemy loss figures must be
attributed to the sound employment of Marine supporting arms.[334]
[334] 2/1 _SAR_; Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and
Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
As mentioned earlier, 2/1’s positions for the night were a mile
southeast of the 3d Battalion on Lookout Hill. Company E entrenched
on high ground to the left of the highway--4,000 yards from
Yongdungpo--while D and F manned a long, low hill on the right. Because
the latter height ran parallel to the road, the line formed by Dog and
Fox was at a right angle to that held by Easy. Sutter’s choice of this
L-shaped defense would shortly prove to be an extremely wise one.
_NKPA Counterattacks of 20 September_
The right flank of the 1st Marines was bare. Not until 1200, 19
September, did the 32d Infantry begin relieving 1/1 in its old
positions southeast of Sosa. Liaison between the Marine and Army units
at this time was weak. Apparently many of the Marines were unaware that
General Barr’s OpnO No. 2,[335] for the 7th Infantry Division did not
call for a jump-off by the 32d until 0630 on the 20th. At that time
the Army regiment would attack a series of objectives which included
Hill 146 and other high ground above the road.[336] Thus, the schedules
north and south of the highway were running one day apart, and it would
take the enemy himself to straighten the line when he slammed the gates
of Yongdungpo.
[335] Issued at 2000, 19 September.
[336] 7th InfDiv (USA) _Opn Rpt_, in Inclusions to 7th InfDiv
War Diary for Sep 50.
Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, entrucked below Sosa for its
circuitous journey from the right flank of the regiment to the left,
where it was to relieve the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, on Hills 118,
80, and 85. The 11-mile trip via Sosa and Wonjong-ni was uneventful,
except that the troops had to dismount at the latter village and
proceed on foot over the primitive road. With the first increment to
arrive at Wonjong-ni, Captain Robert H. Barrow, commanding Company A
of 1/1, set a rugged pace to get his troops on top of Hill 118 before
dark. Relieving Company B of 1/5, he expected Charlie Company to pass
through and replace its opposite of the 5th Marines on Hills 80 and 85.
It was dusk, and Companies B and C were still on the move when Hawkins
of 1/1 met Newton of 1/5. They briefly discussed the lay of the
land, the latter’s tactical disposition, and the requirement that
1/5 assemble at Kimpo within a matter of hours to prepare for the
river-crossing next day. Time, space, and terrain factors were too
great, Hawkins concluded, for his battalion to assume all positions
then occupied by the other. To facilitate the rest of the relief, which
now would take place in darkness, he ordered Charlie Company to occupy
Hill 118 with Able and directed Baker to dig in on a southern extension
of the big ridge.[337]
[337] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Maj R. H. Barrow
interv, 17 Aug 54; and LtCol J. Hawkins ltr to CMC, 21
May 55.
Having relieved Fenton on Hill 118 before nightfall, Barrow enjoyed
the opportunity to reconnoiter 1/5’s area and to realize the tactical
significance of Hills 80 and 85. When it became apparent that
Company C would not arrive before dark, he radioed the battalion S-3
for permission to move his company to the twin peaks immediately,
explaining that Charlie Company of 1/5 could remain in position no
later than 2100. Since Hawkins had already decided against taking over
too much unfamiliar ground after daylight, Major Bridges turned down
the request. Thus, at 2100, with no relief in sight, the 5th Marines’
unit withdrew from the two heights as ordered. Company C of 1/1
reached Hill 118 at 2200 and went into position with Barrow’s outfit
for the night. Unknown to the enemy, Hills 80 and 85 had become a
no-man’s-land.[338]
[338] _Ibid._; and Fenton ltr, 1 Jun 55.
While the battalions of the 1st Marines settled down for the night in
a three-mile arc facing western Yongdungpo, the North Korean commander
within the town organized part of his garrison for two separate thrusts
against the closing vise. In one case he would win by default; in the
other he would see more of his limited resources go down the drain.
Just before dawn of 20 September, the Marines on Hill 118 were alerted
by a furious clatter of small arms and automatic weapons far out to the
east. Daylight disclosed that the enemy was “assaulting” Hills 80 and
85. When the North Koreans finally discovered that their objectives
were unoccupied, they abruptly ceased firing, surged over both crests,
and entrenched in about company strength. An attempt was made to extend
the counterattack to Hill 118, but Companies A and C, backed by a
flight of VMF-323, threw the Reds back with ease.[339]
[339] _Ibid._; and Bates interv, 27 Aug 51.
During the early morning blackness which found the enemy filling the
vacuum on Hills 80 and 85, a stronger North Korean force--estimated at
a battalion--marched out of Yongdungpo toward 2/1’s positions astride
the Inchon-Seoul Highway.[340] In the van of the Red column were five
T-34 tanks preceded, oddly enough, by a truck loaded with ammunition.
Other vehicles, laden with less sensitive supplies, were safely
interspersed among the infantry in the long file.
[340] The account of this counterattack is taken from:
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; 2/1 _SAR_;
Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; Cunliffe interv, 24
Aug 54; and CMH Citation for PFC W. C. Monegan, Jr.
It will be remembered that Companies D and F, the latter in the
fore, occupied high ground positions parallel to and south of the
highway. Farther back, Easy Company’s line tied in at a right angle
and extended to the north of the road. The troops of Fox Company,
tense with anticipation in their advance deployment, heard the first
distant sounds of clanking armor and racing engines sometime before
0400. The noise grew steadily louder until, at 0430, the shadows of
the ammunition truck and T-34s passed beneath the Marine defenses and
continued along the road toward Easy Company’s lines. At the latter,
Private Oliver O’Neil, Jr., rose from behind his machine gun and
shouted a challenge to the truck, which by this time was well out in
front of the enemy tanks. O’Neil was cut down by automatic fire in
answer, and pandemonium broke out on the highway.
Obviously the North Koreans had stumbled into it again, just as they
had done at Ascom City. Two T-34s stopped short of Easy Company’s front
and opened up wildly. Companies D and F in turn exploded with machine
guns, small arms, grenades, and mortars against the flank of the enemy
column, while E fought to deny further passage along the road. Under
the hail of fire from above, the Red soldiers milled about in panic and
were slaughtered. Some flung themselves into roadside ditches, where
the crowding only increased the odds of destruction. Others sought
escape by scrambling up the slopes--into the very muzzles of Dog and
Fox Company weapons.
The T-34s began to lurch back and forth like trapped animals. Owing
either to mines laid by Marine engineers or a grenade thrown from
above, the ammunition truck exploded in a brilliant spectacle of
pyrotechnics. In the midst of the furor, Private First Class Monegan
moved across the hillside from Company F’s front with his rocket
launcher. Observing his progress against the backdrop of flames from
the truck, his comrades either held or shifted their fire to protect
him.
Monegan closed on the lead tank and wrecked it with one 3.5-inch
projectile. Approaching the second T-34 under intense fire, he paused
and took aim with imperturbability. Again his rocket connected with a
roar, and the black hulk on the road turned into a blazing furnace.
Silhouetted against the hillside, the Marine leveled his weapon at a
third armored vehicle just as it was pivoting around to retreat. But at
this moment an enemy machine gun found the mark, and Monegan--killer of
tanks--fell dead.
Although the North Korean attack was thus smashed at the outset,
fighting along the highway continued until daylight. In addition to the
two T-34s destroyed, another was captured intact with its crew. The
11th Marines closed the “back door” of the highway with a curtain of
high explosive, thereby sealing the fate of the Red battalion.
Dawn of 20 September revealed a scene of utter ruin across the Marine
front. The highway was littered with burnt NKPA trucks, tanks, and
equipment. Heaped on the road, in ditches, and along hillsides were 300
enemy dead.[341]
[341] Marine losses were surprisingly small, although the
exact number cannot be determined. In the whole course
of 20 September, 2/1 sustained four KIA and 32 WIA, but
these figures included losses during the Marine advance
after the NKPA counterattack.
_Recapture of Hills 80 and 85_
For the most part, fighting around Yongdungpo on 20 September was a
contest of the giants. Supporting arms of both sides exchanged heavy
blows, and the 1st Marines reported with business-like frankness that
it was “... leveling the southern part of Yongdungpo, which is infested
with enemy.” North Korean mortars, tanks, and field pieces pumped
hundreds of rounds out of positions in the center of town and the
eastern outskirts. Marine planes and howitzers replied by smothering
Red concentrations and emplacements with literally thousands of
missiles of all types.
The 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, commanded by Major William McReynolds,
fired 28 concentrations in the course of the day; and Lieutenant
Colonel Merritt Adelman’s 2d Battalion expended 1,656 rounds in 21
missions. It was the precision firing of these two units which had
supported 2/1 so effectively during the pre-dawn counterattack.[342]
[342] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Sugar Sugar.
Battery C, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battalion, FMF, moved to advance
positions in the morning to increase the pressure on the Yongdungpo
garrison. Land counterpart of the LSMRs which rocked the Inchon
waterfront on D-day, this unit had seen little action to date, owing
to the lack of M48 fuses for its missiles. Banking on substitute
detonating devices (M51 for 105mm and 155mm Howitzer shells), First
Lieutenant Eugene A. Bushe ordered his gunners to fire a test salvo
of 24 rockets. No visible effect being noticeable from his OP, the
battery commander then called for a full ripple of 144--enough high
explosive to flatten a good portion of the town. Again the big missiles
plowed into the target area with a dull thud, and Bushe withdrew his
battery to the rear. The M48 fuses did not arrive until 28 September,
with the result that the potent Marine rocket artillery was sidelined
until the closing days of the operation.[343]
[343] _Ibid._; and Capt D. A. Rapp interv, 18 Nov 54, with
comments by Capt E. A. Bushe.
Colonel Puller’s tactics during the bombardment on 20 September were
designed to align the 1st Marines for the actual assault of Yongdungpo,
planned for the next day. It was necessary to occupy in strength all
the final approaches to the town, so that the full weight of the
regiment could be brought to bear against the defending garrison. From
left to right, therefore, the schedule of operations on the 20th was as
follows: (1) 1st Battalion to seize Hills 80 and 85; (2) 3d Battalion
to remain in position on Lookout Hill; and (3) 2d Battalion to advance
to the first of two highway bridges which spanned branches of the
Kalchon just outside of Yongdungpo.
These limited attacks would also provide time for the 32d Infantry
to catch up on the right. The day’s mission for the Army unit was
to attack over a six-mile front and secure, among other objectives,
towering Tongdok Mountain south of the MSR and two miles from
Yongdungpo.[344]
[344] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; and 7th InfDiv
_OpnO 2_.
Shortly after first light, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins reached the
crest of Hill 118 and established his OP. He was in time to see Able
and Charlie Companies repulse disconnected Red elements moving on the
Marine lines from Hills 80 and 85. While the battalion commander issued
his order for the attack, Major William L. Bates, Jr., commander of
1/1’s Weapons Company, set up his “supporting arms center” to cover the
impending assault.[345]
[345] Though not provided for in Fleet Marine Force T/O, the
“supporting arms center,” a provisional facility for
coordination modeled after the regimental SAC, was a
favorite with many battalion commanders in the field.
Hawkins gave Company C the mission of taking Hills 80 and 85.[346]
Deciding on a southerly approach, the company commander Captain Robert
P. Wray ordered his 2d Platoon to lead off by clearing a village
sprawled across the route to the lower peak. Second Lieutenant John N.
Guild moved out at the head of the skirmishers and led them over 500
yards of intervening low ground. Nearing a knoll which topped the clump
of thatched huts, the platoon came under heavy small-arms fire and was
stalled.
[346] The following narrative is taken from: Bates interv, 27
Aug 51; Barrow interv, 17 Aug 54; and Captains F. B.
Carlon and J. M. McGee interv, 9 Feb 55; Hawkins ltr 21
May 55; and Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 30 May 55.
Wray immediately committed the rest of his company in a two-pronged
attack which wrapped around the flanks of Guild’s line and smashed
through the North Korean resistance. After a hot fire fight, the
surviving Reds fled to Hill 80, and Company C occupied the village and
knoll by early afternoon. The executive officer, First Lieutenant James
M. McGee, led a six-man patrol eastward to clean out a small nest of
holdouts, while Wray reorganized the company for the assault on the
twin caps.
Charlie Company’s tactics in advancing on the enemy’s southern flank
were ideal from the standpoint of Weapons and Able Companies, which
supported the attack from Hill 118. The two units could actually
witness the progress of the assault troops across the 1st Battalion’s
front, so that mortars and machine guns at the base of fire had only to
shift gradually leftward to support the Marine advance.
Late in the afternoon, Wray launched a double envelopment of Hill 80.
Second Lieutenant Henry A. Commiskey led his 3d Platoon around to the
right, and Second Lieutenant William A. Craven’s 1st swung through the
low ground on the left. A few huts concealing snipers were demolished
by 3.5-inch rockets, but otherwise the Marines met little resistance as
they moved over the crest of the objective early in the evening. With
the first signs of darkness already in the sky, Wray lost no time in
preparing for his third double envelopment of the day.
The remnants of the North Korean company were entrenched on the
crest and forward slopes (facing the Marine attack) of Hill 85,
obviously intent on making a determined stand. Anticipating Charlie
Company’s tactics, the Red leader had bent back both flanks to
prevent encroachments on the sides or rear. Thus, though both Marine
assault platoons swung out to stab at the enemy flanks, the Communist
disposition actually relegated each maneuver to a separate frontal
attack.
Craven’s platoon and Charlie Company machine guns, under First
Lieutenant Francis B. Carlon, covered the attackers from a base of fire
on the northern slopes of Hill 80. Moving aggressively through a hail
of bullets, the 2d Platoon on the left crossed the low ground and
drove up the western incline of the objective. Almost to the top, Guild
was grievously wounded by a machine-gun burst.
[Illustration: ACTION ON 20 SEP
SHOWING DAWN NKPA COUNTERATTACK AGAINST 2/1, & 1st MARINES’ ATTACKS
DURING DAY]
On the right, Lieutenant Commiskey paved the way in the face of
heavy resistance. Nearing the crest of Hill 85, the officer abruptly
bounded ahead of his platoon and went over the top. He jumped into a
machine-gun emplacement and was dispatching the last of five occupants
when his lead skirmishers caught up with him. He ran forward again to
clean out another North Korean position in a single-handed attack. By
this time, the Reds on the eastern side of the hill had had enough.
Those who still had hides to save pelted down the northern slopes in
the direction of the mouth of the Kalchon River, where the stream was
spanned by the now damaged bridge.
Guild’s platoon, inspired by its leader who remained in action despite
a mortal wound, gained the summit shortly after Commiskey’s unit.
Captain Wray, following closely behind, later described his meeting
with Guild on the slope as follows:
“He stayed on his feet and turned toward where I was climbing 20 yards
behind him. He dropped at my feet and made every effort to remain
conscious long enough to tell me how his squads were attacking and
pleading with me to keep them attacking. I called for a corpsman; he
tried to refuse, saying that he had a wounded man who needed one more
than he did.”
Lieutenant Guild died shortly afterwards.
_1st Marines in Position_
During the morning phase of Charlie Company’s attack, Hawkins and
the others on Hill 118 were racked by frustration of a type seldom
experienced by Marines in the history of the Corps. It will be recalled
that the ground between the Kimpo-Yongdungpo Highway and the Han River
was not cleared in the course of 1/5’s attack on Hills 80 and 85 on
19 September. Since the 5th Marines’ unit had withdrawn to cross the
Han at Haengju, and since Charlie Company of 1/1 had chosen a southern
route in recapturing the twin heights, enemy bands in hiding along the
river bank were unmolested. The potential danger in the area was not
realized, however, until too late.
From Kimpo came a “weasel” of the 1st Signal Battalion, the crew calmly
stringing wire into the 1st Marines’ zone as the vehicle rattled along
the highway. Just short of the Kalchon bridge, the little tractor
struck a mine and was ambushed by a party of North Koreans. The
power-packed Marine infantry on Hill 118, less than a thousand yards
away, watched helplessly as the communications men were either killed
or captured. No sooner had the Reds disappeared into the brush with two
prisoners than a Marine truck, belonging to A/Engineers, cruised down
the highway with four unsuspecting passengers. Captain Barrow ordered
his troops to fire over the vehicle, hoping that the driver would hear
the bullets in the air and turn back. But the truck continued on into
the ambuscade, where it was stopped by an enemy fusilade.[347]
[347] Barrow interv, 17 Aug 54; and SSgt C. O. Edwards
interv, 12 May 54.
The engineers piled out and plunged into a rice paddy in an attempt
to escape. Three of them made it. The fourth, Private First Class
Clayton O. Edwards, was tracked down and captured. Although the Marine
was out of ammunition and already wounded, one heroic warrior of the
NKPA stepped forward and bayoneted him in the shoulder after he had
surrendered. Edwards later escaped from a POW train fleeing before the
UN drive into North Korea.
Not long after these incidents, Captain Richard F. Bland led Baker
Company of 1/1 through the area and secured Hill 55 and the nearby
villages on the bank of the Han. The North Koreans pulled out and
crossed the Kalchon to join the Yongdungpo garrison.
With fighting going on to the right and left, 3/1 sat quietly on
Lookout Hill during 20 September without suffering a casualty. An
occasional break in the orange and black pall over Yongdungpo allowed
the Marines a glimpse of the wrecked railroad and highway spans which
once had bridged the Han to Seoul.
The ROK capital was still a long way off for the 1st Marines; and the
2d Battalion, now on the regimental right and in its sixth straight
day of the assault, was more concerned with the immediate foreground.
After smashing the Red attack in the morning of the 20th, Sutter’s unit
jumped off at 0645 against scattered resistance along the Inchon-Seoul
Highway. The assault elements reached the bridge spanning the western
branch of the Kalchon at 1230, and the battalion commander immediately
ordered engineers to inspect the long concrete structure. It was
reported to be in good enough condition to support M-26 tanks for the
attack on Yongdungpo the next day.[348]
[348] 2/1 _SAR_.
While the battalion dug in on the west side of the stream, the Marines
eyed the 2,000-yard stretch of highway leading ahead to a second span,
bridging the Kalchon’s eastern branch at the very edge of the blazing
town. A high ridge on the right of the road--technically in the 32d
Infantry’s zone of action--was a beehive of North Korean activity.
Anticipating the effect of this commanding position on his attack the
following day, Sutter contacted Lieutenant Colonel Charles M. Mount,
USA, commanding the 2d Battalion of the 32d, for permission to shell
the height. The Army officer approved the request at 1300, but more
than _seven hours_ elapsed before the necessary clearance filtered
through 7th Division, X Corps, and 1st Marine Division to reach the
11th Marines. When the howitzers finally opened up, darkness prevented
effective observed fire from being delivered on the enemy strong
point.[349]
[349] _Ibid._; and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55.
Out of sight and earshot of 2/1 during 20 September, Colonel Charles
E. Beauchamp’s 32d Regiment, in its first day of actual combat, paid
with seven killed and 36 wounded in taking Tongdok Mountain and part
of “Copper Mine Hill.” Using the Inchon-Anyang road as an MSR, the
Army unit lost three tanks in a field of over 150 wooden box mines.
Beauchamp himself narrowly escaped death or serious injury when his
jeep struck one of the explosives, killing the driver and wounding a
radio operator. By nightfall, the 32d was deployed far out on the right
of the Marines on the Inchon-Seoul Highway; and the 31st Infantry,
having landed at Inchon earlier in the day, went into position even
farther southward.[350]
[350] 32d InfRegt _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50.
_Assault of Yongdungpo_
There was no infantry action during the night of 20–21 September.
Both sides were steeling themselves for the ordeal each knew would
commence at dawn. The Red commander in Yongdungpo threw up formidable
earthworks to block the approach over the Kalchon from Hills 80 and 85
in the northwest; and he concentrated a strong force between the two
tributaries in the southwest. That edge of town facing due west, though
most defensible, he left unguarded, with the result that a single
Marine rifle company would hasten his demise.
Marine artillery thundered all night long, and the glare from flaming
Yongdungpo rolled back the darkness in an ever broadening arc. Shortly
after dawn, the Marines of Company B, 1st Battalion, threaded across
the wreckage of the Kalchon bridge under cover of machine-gun, mortar,
and tank fire from Hill 85. Reaching the eastern bank, the attackers
swept over a knoll overlooking the Han on the left, which the North
Koreans had left undefended. The assault inched forward toward the
town, first through sporadic small arms resistance, then into a deadly
cross-fire from several automatic weapons.[351]
[351] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; and Bates interv,
27 Aug 51.
Baker Company was now confronted by two dikes which the Reds had
converted into a main line of resistance. One of the barriers
paralleled the Han River north of Yongdungpo; the other ran the entire
length of the western edge of town. Where they met to form a point
facing the Kalchon bridge and the Marine advance, a reinforced company
of North Koreans was deployed across each levee in strong, mutually
supporting positions.
Captain Bland chose wisely in directing his attack against the northern
dike alone. By this decision he not only kept his left flank and rear
protected by the Han, but also maintained local superiority in numbers
over the Reds immediately confronting him. Grinding slowly forward with
heavy casualties, Company B rolled up the length of enemy entrenchments
on the levee and pushed eastward 2,000 yards by afternoon. The Marines
then formed a line with their backs to the Han and shot it out with the
Communists on the second dike at a range of 500 yards. At this point
the attack stalled, and the fight settled down to one of attrition.
Casualties on both sides mounted rapidly under the ceaseless exchange
of machine-gun, mortar, and tank fire.[352]
[352] _Ibid._
Part of Bland’s difficulty owed to the random deployment of all
opposing forces at this time, as indicated on the charts of the 11th
Marines. Noting that Company B’s positions were along the Han north
of Yongdungpo, the artillerymen expressed reluctance to fire on the
enemy-held dike to the “rear” in answer to Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins’
repeated requests from his OP on Hill 85. It was a matter of the
howitzers pointing generally north toward Seoul, while Bland’s outfit,
at the moment, was trying to head south. The misunderstanding was
finally cleared up late in the afternoon, and Marine air joined the
artillery in pounding the southern barrier. The Reds held stubbornly
under the battering, and at darkness Hawkins sent Charlie and Weapons
Companies across the bridge to form a perimeter with Baker for the
night.[353]
[353] _Ibid._
The narrative will now switch to the action in the 2d Battalion zone,
leaving the separate attack of Company A to be taken up in detail later.
Sutter’s unit jumped off at 0630 on the 21st with Companies D and
E in the assault. The infantry crossed the first bridge without
incident, then fanned out to move on the second. It was no surprise
when the North Koreans on the intermediate ridge to the right of the
highway suddenly threw heavy fire across the Marine front, but it was
disconcerting to Sutter that his calls for artillery fire met with the
same delay as on the previous day. He therefore shelled the high ground
with attached 4.2-inch mortars on his own initiative, before ordering
Companies E and F to attack the enemy bastion.[354]
[354] 2/1 _SAR_; and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55.
Meanwhile, Captain Welby Cronk led Company D forward on the left of the
highway against a strongly defended dike fronting the Kalchon’s western
branch. Progress was slow and casualties severe, but the Marines closed
to within 100 yards of the barrier by noon. There they dug in and
slugged it out, while the 2d and 3d Platoons of Charlie Company tanks
alternated in ripping the Communist trenches with 90mm, delayed-action
shells.
Heavy fighting continued on the right side of the road until evening.
Companies E and F fought part way up the slopes of the ridge and
suffered heavily during the close exchange with the Reds on the crest.
Since the enemy was still in control of most of the high ground at
dusk, Sutter ordered the assault units to withdraw into 2/1’s zone and
dig in with Dog Company. VMF-214 covered the hot disengagement--one of
the most difficult of all tactics--under a masterful job of forward
air controlling by First Lieutenant Norman Vining, Sutter’s FAC. After
bombing and rocketing from 75 to 100 yards beyond the Marine front,
the Corsairs closed to within 30 yards for strafing runs to shield the
retracting line of infantry.[355]
[355] _Ibid._; and E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air
Over Inchon-Seoul,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36, no. 6
(Jun 52).
[Illustration: ASSAULT OF YONGDUNG-PO
1st MARINES----21 SEP]
The seventh straight day in the assault had cost the 2d Battalion 11
killed and 74 wounded, bringing its total casualties since D-Day to
28 KIA and 226 WIA. Partially because of these crippling statistics,
Colonel Puller, at 1530 on the 21st, had committed 3/1 to the relief
of the battle-weary outfit. The reserve battalion swung northeast from
Lookout Hill to flank the enemy dike positions facing Company D from
the eastern tributary. Crossing the Kalchon against light resistance,
the attackers ran into trouble at the fortified levees fronting
southwestern Yongdongpo.
After heavy machine guns of 3/1 bested a battery of Communist automatic
weapons, Companies G and I, the latter on the right, attacked astride
the stream branch. Progress was slow, but at a cost of 11 killed and 18
wounded, the Marines rolled up the heavily defended dike and reached
the bridge entering the city. Darkness fell with the 3d Battalion
entrenching to the north of the 2d, both units along the left side of
the Inchon-Seoul Highway.[356]
[356] 2/1 _SAR_; 3/1 _SAR_; LtCol T. L. Ridge ltr to CMC, 20
May 55; and LtCol E. H. Simmons ltr to CMC, 19 May 55.
To the south of the 1st Marines, the 32d Infantry met with considerable
success during its attack over a mountainous nine-mile front. The 1st
Battalion on the right mopped up Copper Mine Hill, then seized the high
ground around Anyang against “light sniper fire.” In the left of the
Army zone and adjacent to the Marines, 2/32 took its objective south
of Yongdungpo against light-to-moderate resistance. Thus, at a cost
of two KIA, 28 WIA, and one MIA, the regiment succeeded in cutting
the railroad and highway leading from Suwon to Seoul via Anyang and
Yongdungpo. Difficulties in Marine-Army liaison and coordination
throughout 21 September stemmed from the fact that neither realized
the size of the gap between them. The map will show that the 32d’s
route of advance was planned to miss Yongdungpo by two miles, not even
coming close to the NKPA strong point which gave the 2d Battalion, 1st
Marines, so much trouble.[357]
[357] 32d InfRegt _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50.
_Able Company on a Limb_
With the coming of night on 21 September, there was grave apprehension
in the 1st Marines over the fate of one rifle company. In the course
of the day, the Reds had staved off major penetrations by two Marine
battalions in the southwest and the better part of another in the
northwest. Incredibly enough, one Marine unit of some 200 men had swept
through the space in between and cleared the very heart of Yongdungpo;
so that when darkness fell, the isolated force was anchored in the rear
of the enemy, a good mile and a half beyond the closest friendly units.
Company A of the 1st Battalion had jumped off from below Hill 80 on
the morning of the 21st, after Baker Company was slowed by the dike
positions east of the Kalchon bridge. In committing the unit to an
attack through a mile of open rice paddies, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins
was gambling with high stakes for surprise.[358]
[358] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Bates interv, 27 Aug 51;
Maj R. H. Barrow intervs, 8 Oct 51 and 17 Aug 54; and
Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54.
Captain Barrow employed the classic approach-march formation. Forward
on the left was Second Lieutenant John J. Swords’ 3d Platoon; on the
right front was the 2d, under Second Lieutenant Donald R. Jones.
To the left rear was First Lieutenant William A. McClelland’s 1st
Platoon, with the dual mission of company reserve and flank guard. In
the right rear were the 60mm mortars, a section of heavy machine guns
of Weapons Company, and the assault squad. Light machine gun sections
were attached to each rifle platoon, so that they could be employed to
the front or flanks on a moment’s notice. Barrow’s six-foot, four-inch
frame loomed between the two assault platoons.
To say that these Marines were tense and expectant as they plodded
across the broad, flat expanse would be an understatement. Far off
on the left and right, small arms crackled continuously at the
bridge entrances to Yongdungpo. Marine planes were swooping down in
the distance, the hollow eruptions of their ordnance adding to the
incessant rumbling of artillery and mortars.
Almost hidden from view by the high grain stalks, Company A swept
through the rice paddies against no opposition whatever. Its advance
was rapid until the 3d Platoon was slowed by muck which marked the
beginning of the Kalchon’s bed. Heads craned eagerly to the front and
flanks as progress dropped to a snail’s pace for several minutes.
The crucial moment seemed certainly at hand when the assault line
stepped forward from the concealment of the rice and waded into the
stream, completely exposed to the wide bank and parallel dike beyond.
Still, not an enemy shot was fired. Dripping mud and water, the
green-clad figures in the van surged ashore and over the dike. The rest
of the men followed, unbelieving, close behind.
Retaining the same tactical formation, ready to engage in any or all
directions, Company A marched into Yongdungpo. The first buildings were
100 yards ahead of the levee. Barrow channeled his advance astride the
main east-west street. Although buildings and dwellings were many, the
layout was not dense; and the Marines were able to keep their ranks
open and enjoy good all-around observation.
The place seemed empty and dead. By noon Able Company was several
hundred yards within the town, its careful search of buildings and
side streets having failed to uncover a flicker of enemy resistance.
Barrow could tell from the din far out on either flank that he was well
ahead (eastward) of Baker Company and the 2d Battalion. He radioed for
instructions, and Hawkins told him to keep going.
Halfway through town, Barrow noted on his map that the Inchon-Seoul
Highway was now converging on his right, so that it would meet the
company’s attack route just east of Yongdungpo. Because of the furious
clatter along the stretch of highway out of sight on the southwest
(2/1’s fight), he ordered the reserve platoon to shift from the left
side to the right. No sooner had McClelland completed the move than his
men spotted an enemy column advancing down the highway in the direction
of 2/1’s front. The Reds were chanting a spirited military air when the
3d Platoon opened up and cut the formation to ribbons.
Simultaneously, the two lead platoons began firing on individuals and
small groups in the streets of eastern Yongdungpo. Astonished at the
sight of a large Marine force in the very heart of their bastion, most
of the North Koreans took to their heels. But there were other Reds “in
the rear with the gear” who obviously did not recognize the attackers.
After glancing curiously from distant streets, they went calmly about
their business.
Swords’ 3d Platoon barreled through town on the left of the street and
broke into the open. A dike topped by a road lay across the Marine
front, and the platoon leader led his men into a hasty defense on
top. From this position they could cover the vast sand spit with its
airfield and approaches to Seoul. Looking north, they observed a large
body of enemy soldiers withdrawing from Baker Company’s zone onto the
spit. Light machine guns took the North Koreans under fire immediately,
and the section of heavies sent forward by Barrow joined in shortly
afterwards. Caught by surprise in the open, the Red outfit suffered
heavy casualties before the survivors could fan out and disappear.
The rest of Company A moved up on the right of the 3d Platoon,
occupying more of the dike and the junction with the Inchon-Seoul
Highway. It was at this point that Company A--if it could hold the
ground--had an opportunity to deal the Yongdungpo garrison a mortal
blow. For the road junction turned out to be the enemy’s supply center.
Across the intersection lay what appeared at first glance to be a huge
coal pile. Actually it was a camouflaged mountain of ammunition. During
a fire fight with a small group of North Koreans taking cover behind
the explosives, one Marine set off the dump with a grenade. The whole
countryside shook with the detonation, and the great cloud of smoke
that shot into the air marked Able Company’s isolated position for the
rest of the 1st Marines on the outskirts of town.
While part of the unit dug in on the dike, the remainder inspected and
cleared the area around the intersection. A five-story building on the
near corner was jammed with captured U. S. Army medical supplies, field
equipment, ammunition, and enemy ordnance. The Marines could not use
the heavy caliber ammo but they did help themselves to blood plasma for
their wounded.
Throughout the afternoon, the Reds made repeated attempts to regain
the vital area by throwing small assault parties against Able Company
from the south. Each attack was smashed, and darkness found the Marines
firmly entrenched on the dike, hoping only that their limited supply
of ammunition would last throughout the night. A weak SCR-300 battery
prevented further communications with the battalion CP.
_Yongdungpo Secured_
If the Marine Corps Schools ever enlarges its varied curriculum to
include “The Defense of a Dike,” Captain Barrow’s tactical disposition
on the night of 21–22 September 1950 can be taken as a unique
precedent. Able Company’s commander chose to defend a 100-yard stretch
of the levee just north of the intersection. Here the macadam road ran
about 25 feet above ground level, and the incline on either side sloped
gently. The Marines staggered their foxholes alongside, some high on
the slope, others low. Machine guns and BARs were emplaced along the
shoulders at the top, so that automatic fire could be directed in
volume in any direction. Since all of their ammunition had been fired
during the afternoon counterattacks, the 60mm mortar crews laid aside
their tubes and went into the line as infantry.[359]
[359] _Ibid._
Company A’s perimeter for the night thus had the shape of a long
sausage, with the 3d Platoon in an arc at the northern end, the 1st
defending the west side, and the 2d in position on the east. From their
foxholes on the top and sides of the levee, the Marines commanded the
sand spit, the road on the dike, Yongdungpo’s eastern exits, and the
vital intersection with the Inchon-Seoul Highway.
Fortunately, they had dug their holes deep. At dusk came the telltale
rattling, revving, and clanking from the direction of 2/1’s front; and
five unescorted T-34s loomed on the Inchon-Seoul Highway, headed toward
the intersection. They turned left just short of the crossroads and
proceeded in column along a street that paralleled Company A’s dike.
The Marines on the levee crouched low in their holes. Cruising
majestically like a file of battleships, the tank column cut loose with
a hail of machine-gun fire and salvoes of 85mm shells at a range of 30
yards. Able Company’s rocket gunners, whose total experience with the
3.5-inch launcher was limited to the firing of a few practice rounds,
popped up from their holes and let fly. One of the tanks exploded in a
convulsion of flame and smoke, its turret twisted askew as though some
giant hand had torn the steel cap from the body.
The other four tanks continued to the end of the perimeter, then
reversed course past the Marine line a second time, pumping a steady
stream of steel into the western slope of the dike. Reaching their
starting point at the Inchon-Seoul Highway, they turned back and made
another round trip, with Marine rocket fire damaging two more vehicles
and sending them limping off the field. The remaining pair, upon
completing the second circuit, again reversed course and made a final
pass--the fifth--on the Marine lines. Clearing the perimeter, they
rumbled into town and disappeared.
[Illustration: DIKE DEFENSE--COMPANY A, 1st MARINES
YONGDUNG-PO--NIGHT OF 21–22 SEP]
Fantastic as it may seem, Company A sustained a single casualty, a
concussion case, during the half hour of sustained heavy caliber
pounding at pistol ranges. Tremendous muzzle velocity had embedded
the 85mm, armor-piercing shells deep in the slope of the dike in the
split second before each explosion; and Marine foxholes proved to be
sufficient protection against the raking machine-gun fire.
Between 1900 and 2100 it was relatively quiet. McClelland’s platoon,
facing town, killed a few Reds attempting to remove stores from the
five-story building. Then the long expected report reached Barrow by
sound-power telephone: Swords’ platoon, manning the northern arc of the
perimeter, could hear a large enemy force approaching its front.
The counterattack hit shortly after 2100. Transmitting a running
account of the sharp fire fight by phone, Swords assured his company
commander that he was “having no trouble.” After 15 minutes of failure,
the Reds withdrew for a breather. They struck in the same place half an
hour later and were thrown back again, despite any inspiration derived
from a display of multi-colored flares and wild cries of “banzai.”
By midnight, the 3d Platoon had withstood five such onslaughts, each
appearing to be in about company strength. Before the last attack, a
captive Red officer escaped from Company A’s POW “compound” east of
the dike and ran northward into the blackness, shouting repeatedly,
according to Barrow’s ROK interpreter, “Don’t attack any more! They’re
too strong for you!”
Apparently his advice was heeded, much to the relief of the Marines,
whose ammunition supply was becoming dangerously low. At midnight,
following the enemy’s fifth unsuccessful attempt against Swords’
position, the fight for Yongdungpo came to an end for the 1st Marines.
There was scattered firing throughout the night, but the North Koreans,
denied access to their vital supplies, quickly withered on the vine.
At dawn, Company A counted 275 dead and 50 automatic weapons around its
perimeter, principally in front of the 3d Platoon. The four T-34 tanks
which had withdrawn into town were found abandoned.
The 1st and 3d Battalions attacked at 0800 against negligible
resistance and converged on the isolated unit, making the historic
linkup in short order. The enemy was gone, except for the hundreds
of dead that littered the borders of the city. He had left behind
practically all of his heavy armament, equipment, and supplies.
Continuing the advance on the 22d, the 1st Marines surged eastward
beyond Yongdungpo, then spent the remainder of the day reorganizing and
patrolling. On the 23d, the regiment moved almost unopposed to the bank
of the Han, 3/1 seizing Hill 108 which dominated the battered bridges.
Late that night Puller received orders to effect the river-crossing
early next morning.