Crossing the Han
_Swimming Team Leads the Way--Marine LVTs Grounded in Mud--Daylight
Assault Crossing by 3/5--Departure of General MacArthur--Supporting
Arms of Bridgehead--Command Ashore Assumed by X Corps_
The CP of the 5th Marines had a holiday atmosphere during the afternoon
of 19 September. An already large group of newspaper and magazine
correspondents had been reinforced by new arrivals flown in from Tokyo
to report the crossing of the Han. The gathering might have been
mistaken for a journalistic convention, and Lieutenant Colonel Murray
and his regimental planners could scarcely make themselves heard.
Finally it became necessary to request the gentlemen of the press to
leave, so that the battalion and company commanders could be summoned
for briefing and orders.
The CP was located in a basement room of the Kimpo Airfield
administration building. Coleman lanterns lighted the scene as Murray
gave a brief talk to his officers, seated about him on boxes and
bedrolls. There had been little time for planning, said the regimental
commander, but he was confident of success. General Craig, who made a
helicopter reconnaissance of the river and roads leading to Seoul, had
recommended the old ferry crossing to Haengju. The river was about 400
yards wide at this site, which was about a mile from the Kaesong-Seoul
railroad and main highway to Seoul. Hill 125, as the principal terrain
feature, was an isolated knob rising nearly 500 feet and located on the
right of the landing point. To the left was the village of Haengju,
bordered by dikes and rice paddies.
Regimental planning, said Murray, had been conducted in compliance
with 1st MarDiv OpnO 7-50, issued at 1430 that afternoon. The 5th
Marines was directed to cross the Han in the vicinity of Haengju seize
Hill 125 and advance southeast along the railroad to the high ground
dominating the Seoul highway. The units attached for the operation
were the 2d Battalion, KMC Regiment, the Division Reconnaissance
Company, Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion, and Company A of the 56th
Amphibian Tractor Battalion, USA. In addition, the 11th Marines had
been directed to give priority in artillery fires to the 5th Marines,
while the 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Shore Party Battalion and 1st
Amphibian Tractor Battalion were in direct support.
_Swimming Team Leads the Way_
Major William C. Esterline, the S-2 of the 5th Marines admitted that
intelligence as to conditions on the north bank left much to be
desired. He mentioned the reports of an enemy build-up on the other
side of the river, and he added that a POW had told of enemy mining
activities along the road to Haengju. But in spite of these warning
notes, his listeners got the impression that 5th Marines’ planning was
based on assumptions of light resistance.
Major Charles H. Brush, Jr., the S-3, announced the hastily formulated
regimental plan. Houghton’s Recon Company was to lead the advance
by sending a swimming team across shortly after nightfall. If the
swimmers found the other bank clear of the enemy, they were to signal
for the rest of the men to follow in LVTs. Recon Company then had the
mission of seizing a bridgehead consisting roughly of the triangle
formed by Hills 95, 125, and 51. After securing these objectives, about
1,500 yards apart, Recon was to defend until Taplett’s 3d Battalion
crossed at 0400, with Bohn’s and McMullen’s companies in assault and
Wildman’s in reserve. While they passed through Recon and attacked
toward Seoul, Roise’s 2d Battalion would follow in column two hours
later, with Newton’s 1st Battalion remaining in reserve and crossing
on order as the KMC battalion protected the regiment’s left flank.
Tanks and vehicles would be ferried across on 50-ton floating bridge
sections.[286]
[286] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen, 19 Sep 50; Capt
R. B. Crossman ltr to authors, 23 Nov 54.
No alternate plan was provided. After the briefing ended at 1700,
Houghton and Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence C. Hays, Jr., executive
officer of RCT-5, climbed a hill on the south bank and inspected the
old ferry crossing and the opposite shore. They saw no enemy activity.
Houghton was so optimistic that he asked permission to swim across at
dusk but Murray denied the request.[287]
[287] Maj K. J. Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54.
[Illustration: HAN RIVER CROSSING & SEIZURE OF HILL 125
5th MARINES--20 SEP]
The swimming team consisted of Houghton, Second Lieutenant Dana
M. Cashion, and ten enlisted men, accompanied by two Navy reserve
officers, Lieutenant Horace Underwood and Ensign John Seigle. The first
went along as interpreter, and the other as public information officer
with a tape recorder. General Lowe had asked permission to cross in the
LVTs; and when the Division commander refused, the 66-year old observer
showed a card signed by President Truman, requesting that he be allowed
to go anywhere. Even this passport did not swerve General Smith, who
decided that Lowe must wait to accompany the reserve battalion.[288]
[288] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 227.
It was a dark and moonless night when the swimmers trudged through the
muddy grain fields to the river bank, carrying two small rubber boats
in which to tow the arms and equipment. After checking the current
and making allowances for drift, they stripped to their skivvies and
slipped into the tepid water shortly after 2000. Only two or three
sets of rubber fins were available, but speed was not expected of
men using a slow breast stroke to avoid making noise or ripples.
These precautions became all the more necessary after a Marine shell
or aerial bomb set fire to a native house on the far bank and the
flames cast a lurid glow over the water. Apparently the swimmers had
not been observed when they scrambled ashore, dripping, about 2040.
They encountered two Koreans at the water’s edge and overpowered them
without much difficulty. Lieutenant Underwood questioned the captives
in their native tongue and reported that they were escaping from
Seoul.[289]
[289] 1stLt E. L. DeFazio ltr to authors, 11 Dec 54.
Houghton ordered Lieutenant Cashion and four enlisted men out on patrol
duty with a mission of reconnoitering Hill 125 and the Haengju area.
The Recon commander remained at the beach, where Gunnery Sergeant
Ernest L. DeFazio and the other members of the swimming team guarded
the prisoners and prowled the immediate area without encountering
enemy. There were so few signs of NKPA activity that Houghton decided
even before the return of Cashion’s patrol to give the signal for the
rest of the company to cross. And it was when the LVTs revved up on
the south bank, shattering the night’s stillness, that hell broke
loose.[290]
[290] _Ibid._; Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54.
_Marine LVTs Grounded in Mud_
The men in the amtracs had the problem of advancing five miles by road
from Kimpo to an embarkation site they had never seen, crossing a
river in the darkness, and seizing three objectives on a basis of map
reconnaissance. First Lieutenant Ralph B. Crossman, executive officer
of Recon Company, had received oral orders without an overlay or an
opportunity to take notes during the briefing at the Fifth Marines CP.
His first message by SCR-300 from Houghton came about 2000, warning
that the swimming team was taking to the water. This was the signal
for the amtracs to start their road trip. They were on the way when
Houghton prematurely radioed the familiar words:
“The Marines have landed and the situation is well in hand.”[291]
[291] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54.
An hour later the Recon commander came in again with a message that
no enemy had been encountered. He directed his executive officer to
cross in LVTs with the three platoons of Recon Company and the attached
platoon of Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, which had a mission of
mining road blocks after the objectives were secured.
Crossman acknowledged this message but replied that he could not reach
the river bank for nearly an hour. He had assigned the three objectives
to his platoon commanders, directing that they take their orders from
Houghton upon reaching the other bank. SCR-300 communications were
frequently blurred, however, or blasted off the air altogether by
the more powerful radios of the tractors. Thus the possibilities for
confusion were multiplied as the nine amtracs proceeded in column
to the embarkation point, clanking and revving up thunderously in
preparation for the crossing.[292]
[292] Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54.
The din was deafening enough to arouse even an enemy who had not shown
much fight so far in the zone of RCT-5. Hill 125 suddenly came to life
as NKPA bullets whipped the water and mortar shells exploded among
the LVTs or along the beach occupied by Houghton’s swimmers. Although
Cashion’s patrol reported no enemy encountered on Hill 125, his men
came under fire from that quarter on their return to the beach. One
of them, Private First Class Alphonse O. Ledet, Jr., was reported as
missing in action, and it was assumed that Communists bullets had cut
him down.[293]
[293] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54.
The embarkation area was so cramped that Crossman had found it
necessary to send the LVTs across the river in column, with First
Lieutenant Francis R. Kraince’s 1st Platoon in the lead, followed by
Second Lieutenant Philip D. Shutler’s 2d Platoon and the 3d commanded
by Second Lieutenant Charles Puckett. Kraince was to seize Hill 125
while Shutler attacked Hill 51 and Puckett went up against Hill 95.
The three platoons were accompanied by a 4.2-inch mortar forward
observer team, two 105mm FO teams from the 11th Marines, and a squad
of engineers. Communications on the SCR-300 net were so badly jammed,
however, that Houghton and Crossman were figuratively as well as
literally in the dark on opposite sides of the river. Crossman’s final
messages from Kraince and Shutler reported that four of their amtracs
had drifted from the course and grounded in the mud. He ordered both
officers to extricate themselves while Puckett, who had not yet left
the south bank, covered them with fire. Just then DeFazio radioed that
Houghton and his team were planning to swim to the LVTs. This was the
last word from the north bank received by Crossman, who lost all radio
contact afterwards with anyone except the 5th Marines.[294]
[294] Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54.
At the height of the pandemonium on the north bank, the two Korean
prisoners attempted to escape. Both were killed by Marines of the
swimming team.[295]
[295] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54.
Houghton’s first thought had been to swim out and guide the LVTs to
the north bank. But the enemy had shown such unexpected resistance as
to justify the withdrawal of the swimming team. The rubber boats and
excess equipment were hidden along the shore and some of the weapons
thrown in the river to prevent capture.[296] Then the swimmers
started their return trip through water churned by mortar shells,
chiefly Marine 4.2-inch bursts falling short. One of these projectiles
exploded so near to Houghton as to knock him out momentarily, and
he was assisted to a grounded LVT by Corporal James Morgan. The
Recon commander suffered a sprained back and double vision from the
concussion, and two men of the team were slightly wounded. DeFazio led
the remaining swimmers to the south bank.
[296] Ensign Seigle found it hard to part with his tape
recorder containing an account of the venture. He hid
it near the water, but the record had been erased by
subsequent sounds when he retrieved it the next day.
There he learned that all the amtracs had returned except the four
reported grounded. Most of the Recon troops on these stranded vehicles
had chosen to swim or wade back to the south bank. These stragglers
were collected on the northern tip of Hill 131 by Captain John F. Paul
and Corporal James P. Harney of the amtracs and shuttled to Kimpo as
fast as they returned.[297]
[297] 1stLt J. P. Harney interv, 17 Nov 54.
DeFazio took care of his casualties, then set out with eight men in
search of Houghton. It was low tide by this time, but wading through
the mud proved to be more tiring than swimming. After finding Houghton
in a dazed condition on one of the grounded LVTs, the sergeant agreed
with Kraince and Shutler that the approach of dawn made it necessary
to abandon the two amtracs which were still stuck. They returned
on the two that the officers had succeeded in extricating. Thus at
daybreak the swimming expedition ended in the CP of the 5th Marines,
with DeFazio reporting to Murray and Brush after seeing his commanding
officer on the way to a field hospital.[298]
[298] DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54.
The crews and troops on the LVTs retained a confused impression of the
night’s events. Master Sergeant Edwin L. Knox, who crossed with the
engineers in the second amtrac, could not understand why the column
withdrew. The vehicles were dispersed in every direction after some
became stuck, and it was on his LVT that Captain Houghton received
first aid.[299]
[299] MSgt E. L. Knox, ltr to authors, 13 May 55.
It was not officially established who gave the order for the return
of the LVTs when they neared the north bank, if indeed such an order
was ever given. But all participants agreed that it was for the best.
Events had proved that too much dependence was placed in assumptions
of little or no resistance, despite G-2 warnings of an enemy build-up
in the Haengju area. And even if Recon Company had landed, the task of
taking three hills in a night attack without previous reconnaissance
would probably have been too much for a unit of 126 men against an
enemy estimated by Houghton at a battalion.
_Daylight Assault Crossing by 3/5_
At dawn on the 20th the command and staff of the 5th Marines rebounded
from this preliminary reverse with vigor and firmness. General Craig,
the ADC, summed up the viewpoint of Murray and his officers when he
commented:
“The eyes of the world were upon us. It would have looked bad for the
Marines, of all people, to reach a river and not be able to cross.”[300]
[300] LtGen (Ret) E. A. Craig ltr to authors, 25 Aug 54.
It was decided at 0430 that the 3d Battalion would make a daylight
assault crossing just two hours later. The revised plan called for LVTs
to cross at the Haengju site in waves of two to six vehicles. Troop
units would be organized into boat teams, and the plan provided for a
15-minute artillery preparation by the 1st and 4th Battalions of the
11th Marines.[301]
[301] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 27, 28.
Many of the Marine shells fell short, so that little benefit was
derived from the barrage by the assault troops. On the other hand,
enemy fire from Hill 125 was only too well placed. About 200 hits were
taken by the first wave of amtracs from 14.5mm antitank projectiles and
small caliber high explosive shells as well as machine-gun bullets. The
armor plate prevented any infantry losses, and only four casualties
were suffered by the crews.
Battalion objectives, according to the revised plan, were designated
ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE--Hills 125, 51, and 95. Captain McMullen’s
Item Company landed at 0650 in the first wave, followed by How
and George. While discharging troops, the LVTs were exposed to
more machine-gun and antitank fire, resulting in several infantry
casualties.[302]
[302] This section is based upon: McMullen interv, 27 Jul 54;
Maj J. N. Irick interv, 16 Nov 54; 1st MarDiv _SAR_,
Annexes Peter Peter and Queen Queen.
Item Company, it may be recalled, consisted of newcomers who had
arrived at Pusan to make up third infantry companies just before the
Brigade embarked for Inchon. Barring a few World War II men, these
troops had known no combat experience before they hit GREEN Beach at
Wolmi-do. They acquitted themselves like veterans in the Han crossing,
however, as platoon leaders organized them under fire after they piled
out of the amtracs.
The only covering fires at first were provided by the 50-caliber
machine guns of First Lieutenant Stanley H. Carpenter’s platoon of
amtracs, which had taken the first wave across. Then four Corsairs of
VMF-214 struck the enemy on Hill 125 while Captain Joseph N. Irick of
the amtracs led four of his vehicles eastward to a position where they
could direct 50 caliber fire on the NKPA positions.
Item Company’s plan of attack called for a two-pronged assault on Hill
125 (Objective ABLE) from the northwest by First Lieutenant William F.
Sparks’ 3d Platoon on the right, attacking up the main spur paralleling
the river, while First Lieutenant Elmer G. Peterson’s 2d Platoon
attacked on the left after riding a few hundred yards inland on LVTs.
Second Lieutenant Roy E. Krieger’s 1st Platoon was to remain on call in
reserve.
Item Company had it hot and heavy from the beginning. The two
assault platoons overcame such difficulties as bogged-down amtracs,
intermingled units, and bullet-swept open areas before getting in
position to return the Communist fire. The first phase ended on a
plateau about halfway up the hill when enemy machine guns cut down most
of the mortar section before the Marines could gain a foothold.
At this point it became necessary for the 3d Platoon to fall back and
redeploy. Contact had been lost momentarily with Peterson’s men; but
after he appeared on the left, McMullen called up his reserve unit
to pass through the 3d Platoon. Sparks having been wounded, First
Lieutenant Wallace Williamson took command of his men, now reinforced
by an engineer squad and troops from company headquarters. The revamped
3d Platoon was sent out to envelop the enemy left while Krieger hit the
center and Peterson worked his way around the NKPA right.
This time the plateau was carried in a single rush. But casualties
had reduced the company to the point where another reorganization
was necessary before attacking the military crest. Although Captain
McMullen had been wounded, he remained in action to lead the final
assault.
The 1st and 3d Platoons were clawing their way upward when Peterson
radioed from the left that he could see enemy soldiers in flight from
the peak to the low ground north of the hill mass. One of the VMF-214
Corsairs also reported Communists streaming down the eastern slopes
with Marine planes in hot pursuit. Thanks to their efforts, not many
Korean Reds were left on the crest when the panting Marines arrived
to finish the job. More lucrative targets were presented by the foes
racing down the eastern slopes. Marine rifles and BARs cut down many of
these fugitives when they attempted to change into civilian clothes to
avoid capture.
It was estimated that the enemy had 200 killed on Objective ABLE. The
other two battalion objectives offered little or no resistance to
troops who rode in column from the beaches on LVTs--How Company to
seize Hill 95, and George Company attacking Hill 51. Thus at a total
cost of 43 casualties--most of them in Item Company--the 3d Battalion
had secured its three objectives by 0940.
Among the other results of the successful assault crossing was the
salvaging of the two grounded LVTs, both of which had been in the
enemy’s field of fire. The equipment left on the north bank by the
swimming team was also recovered, and PFC Ledet showed up unharmed.
After being assigned to an observation post, he had inadvertently been
left behind as missing in action when the Reds opened fire. But he kept
his head throughout his lonely night’s vigil and was able to give a
good report of enemy numbers and activities.
At 1000 on the 20th the first wave of amtracs crossed the river
with troops of 2/5. This battalion had orders to remain in the LVTs
while passing through 3/5 and continuing the attack. The scheme of
maneuver called for a sharp turn to the right at Hill 51, and the next
objectives, DOG and EASY, consisted of the high ground on either side
of the Kaesong-Seoul Railroad about three miles east of Haengju.
Company A of the 56th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, USA, was to follow
with the 2d Battalion of the KMC regiment in DUKWs. These troops had a
mission of providing security for the rear of the 5th Marines.
The 1st Battalion of that regiment was alerted to be ready to cross the
Han at 1330 and move into an assembly area near Hill 95, prepared to
continue the attack toward Seoul.
Once the plan has been told, it would be repetitive to describe a
performance which put it into effect without incident. At 1400 the
regimental CP displaced across the river to the vicinity of Sojong,
about two miles northeast of the Haengju crossing site. Fifteen minutes
later the 2d Battalion reported that it had secured Objectives Dog and
EASY. Troops of that unit had ridden the LVTs as far as Sojong, where
they encountered a swamp and a bridge too small for anything larger
than a jeep. The infantry proceeded on foot while a few LVTs and a
platoon of tanks crossed over a railroad bridge. About 30 prisoners,
believed to be the remnants of enemy forces on Hill 125, were taken
on Objective EASY. They were hiding in a cave and surrendered after a
couple of warning rounds fired by a platoon of the Army amtrac troops
supporting the battalion. Company D dug in on Objective EASY and
Company E on Objective DOG while Company F covered the gap between.[303]
[303] Roise memo to authors, 13 May 55.
The 3d Battalion went into an assembly area a mile north of Hill 95.
And after 1/5 moved a company to Hill 125 to secure the landing area
for the night, the 1st Marine Division had a firm bridgehead on the
north bank of the Han.
_Departure of General MacArthur_
General Shepherd and Admiral Struble witnessed the crossing from a
vantage point on the south bank, where they had a good view of the
fight for Hill 125.[304] Both accompanied General MacArthur that
afternoon, when he made a final tour of the front before his departure
for Tokyo.
[304] Col V. H. Krulak interv, 27 Jun 55.
The caravan of jeep-borne officers and reporters stopped first at the
crossing area, then proceeded to the zone of the 1st Marines, where the
battle for Yongdungpo was going on full blast. General MacArthur got
out of his jeep and continued on foot along rice paddies where Marines
were still flushing out snipers. This meant a period of anxiety for
General Smith which lasted until the responsibility for the safety of
the commander-in-chief passed to General Barr in the zone of the 7th
Infantry Division.
On the afternoon of the 21st the Marine general saw MacArthur off at
Kimpo on his plane for Tokyo. Never had the old warrior worn his famous
“scrambled egg” cap with more verve. Barely a week had gone by since
the Marines scrambled ashore on RED and BLUE Beaches, yet most of the
major objectives had already been taken--Inchon, Kimpo, Yongdungpo,
the north bank of the Han, and the approaches to Seoul. In the Pusan
Perimeter meanwhile, the Eighth Army had been hitting the enemy hard in
its joint offensive.
This was the score on D-plus 7. But perhaps the famous septuagenarian
recalled with pardonable complacency that as late as D-minus 7, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff had reiterated doubts of the Inchon landing which
they had expressed on several previous occasions. MacArthur was warned
that if the operation failed, the entire United Nations cause in Korea
might be plunged into serious difficulties. The commander in chief
replied with superb assurance, “I and all of my commanders and staff
officers, without exception, are enthusiastic and confident of the
success of the enveloping operation.”[305]
[305] CinCFE radio to JCS, 8 Sep 50, quoted in OCMH
(Schnabel), _Korean Conflict_ (MS), v. I, ch. I.
Such confidence could not be withstood. But it was not until 8
September 1950 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally acquiesced in an
operation they had never entirely approved--an operation scheduled to
take place in just one week.
It may be that Douglas MacArthur was recalling this exchange of views
as he stood in the sunlight of Kimpo Airfield, his eyes flashing and
his chin outthrust. There is no tonic like victory, and he looked 20
years younger than his actual years as he decorated General Smith with
a Silver Star just before the plane took off.
“To the gallant commander of a gallant division!” said the commander in
chief by way of citation.
_Supporting Arms of Bridgehead_
Even success did not alter the conviction of Navy and Marine amphibious
specialists that risks had been assumed in the Inchon landing which
might have resulted in disaster. It was taking no credit away from
General MacArthur for his unshakeable faith in victory to conclude
that fortune had smiled in some instances when a frown would have been
costly.
The teamwork of Marine supporting arms was never shown to better effect
than in the establishment of a bridgehead over the Han. Lieutenant
Colonel Partridge’s engineers, of course, were on the job from the
beginning. It was up to them to get the tanks across the river as
soon as possible, in case the infantry needed the support of armor.
Approaches and ferry landings had to be constructed for this purpose;
and just six hours after the initial infantry crossing, the engineers
had their first six-float M4A2 raft in operation. It had taken them
four hours to build.[306]
[306] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Nan Nan; Partridge interv, 23
Nov 54.
The 2d Platoon of Able Company, 1st Tank Battalion, crossed the river
at 1410 on 20 September and moved up in support of 3/5. The 1st Platoon
followed at 1600 and the 3d Platoon late that afternoon, after the
engineers completed a second raft.
When the KMCs attempted to cross in DUKWs, the clumsy vehicles bogged
down several yards from the river on the south bank. Partridge
suggested to the KMC commander that his troops build a makeshift
corduroy approach off the main route which Marine engineers were
constructing to the embarkation point. The Korean officer agreed with
Partridge that this was a sensible solution and soon had his men
gathering logs.
Neither of them dreamed that they had stirred up an international
incident which called for a decision on the division level. American
policy makers had felt it necessary to lean backwards to avoid giving
Communist propagandists any excuse to charge us with recruiting Koreans
for “slave labor.” It was an extremely sensitive subject, and Partridge
was astonished at the repercussions. At last General Craig visited
the ferry site and ruled that it was a closed incident after finding
all explanations satisfactory. It was further decided--for mechanical
rather than political reasons--to take the KMCs across in amtracs
rather than waste any more time on DUKWs.[307]
[307] Partridge interv, 23 Nov 54.
On the night of the 20th, Partridge and Colonel McAlister, the Division
G-4, interviewed a captured NKPA engineer major at Kimpo Airfield.
The prisoner informed them that the bombed highway bridge between
Yongdungpo and Seoul had been damaged beyond repair with the means at
hand. This agreed with the conclusions of the Marine officers on the
basis of aerial observation. Prospects for a span over the Han seemed
dim as Partridge was leaving McAlister’s quarters. That very evening,
however, Lieutenant Colonel Rowny, chief of the X Corps engineers,
telephoned to announce that materials for a floating bridge unit had
been accumulated by the Army in Japan and would be flown to Korea
shortly. Up to this time, with rafts the only solution, the Marine
engineers had supplied all the materials. But Rowny announced that
Corps would assume the responsibility after the arrival of enough
materials for a floating bridge unit.[308]
[308] _Ibid._
Military operations could not wait a week or ten days for the new span,
and the Marine ferry plus amtracs and DUKWs[309] had to nourish the
assault on Seoul. With this end in view, the 1st Shore Party Battalion
reverted to Division control on the 19th and displaced from Inchon to
Oeoso-ri. By nightfall the entire battalion was bivouacked in this area.
[309] MajGen E. W. Snedeker ltr to authors, 29 Apr 55.
On the 20th, after establishing a forward CP at Kimpo Airfield, the
shore party troops of Baker Company moved up to the Han in support of
the 5th Marines, followed by two teams from Able Company. Evacuation
stations and supply dumps were set up on both banks. Other shore party
missions were maintaining LVT and DUKW traffic control, providing
guides for the amtracs, posting security at the crossing sites on both
banks, and effecting unit distribution of supplies upon request by the
DUKWs and LVTs.
Control of the ferry site, known as BAKER Ferry, became the
responsibility of Baker Company of the 1st Shore Party Battalion. Teams
1 and 2 were employed on the south bank, and Team 3 plus headquarters
troops on the other shore. Traffic control was of the utmost
importance, since ferry operation had to be limited to periods of low
tide, and during idle intervals a long line of vehicles accumulated.
Most of them were trucks containing cargo to be reloaded in LVTs and
taken across the river. The shore party men had the duty of keeping the
traffic flowing as smoothly as possible, both on land and water, and
special regulations were enforced to prevent the LVTs from colliding
with the ferries. With the establishment of a third ferry, the problem
of supplying the troops across the river was pretty well solved.[310]
[310] 1st Mar Div _SAR_, Annex Mike Mike.
_Command Ashore Assumed by X Corps_
A military ceremony was held on 21 September when the commanding
general of X Corps established his CP in Inchon and assumed command at
1700 of all forces ashore. It was stated in some reports that command
had been transferred from the commander of JTF-7 to the commander of X
Corps. But officers familiar with amphibious doctrine pointed out that
at no time prior to landing did CG X Corps relinquish command; and only
through him did the commander of JTF-7 exercise command.[311]
[311] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 32.
The date was also significant for the 1st Marine Division in that its
third rifle regiment, the 7th Marines, landed at Inchon with Major
Francis F. Parry’s 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines attached. Before
the ships reached the inner harbor, Colonel Litzenberg went ashore and
reported at the Division CP. Informing General Smith that troop units
in the convoy had been vertically loaded for maximum flexibility, he
asked what troops the Division commander desired to have unloaded first.
“An infantry battalion,” said General Smith.
“And what next?”
“Another infantry battalion,” said the commanding general.
Colonel Litzenberg began unloading at once, and by 2200 his CP had
opened at Wonjong-ni, two miles south of Kimpo Airfield, while H&S
Company and the 3d Battalion (Major Maurice E. Roach) occupied near-by
assembly areas. The 2d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Thornton M.
Hinkle) had reached an assembly area at Hill 131, a mile north of
Kimpo, by 0100 on 22 September with a mission of providing security for
the airfield and a river crossing site. The 1st Battalion (Lieutenant
Colonel Raymond G. Davis) was given the duty of unloading the ships of
the convoy.[312]
[312] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg memo to authors, 11 May 55.
It appeared for a few hours on 21 September that the enemy might be
planning to retake Kimpo Airfield. At 0730 a report came to the 3d
Battalion, KMC Regiment, warning of an attempted NKPA crossing of the
Han in the area about seven miles northwest of the field. Air strikes
were called immediately with the result of dispersing the enemy. At
1310, however, an estimated two NKPA battalions were reported in front
of KMC positions by the air liaison officer attached to the battalion.
All units in the Kimpo area were alerted to the possibility of attack.
The CO of the 1st Shore Party Battalion was designated as coordinator
of defensive forces consisting of his unit, and elements of the 1st
Engineer Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Ordnance Battalion, and 1st
Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Army troops of the 56th Amphibian Tractor
Battalion were also ordered to Kimpo.
With an NKPA attack threatening, some concern was felt about an enemy
Yak type aircraft--fueled, armed, and ready for flight--which had
been discovered in a revetment on the edge of the airfield by First
Lieutenant Edward E. Collins of the Ordnance Battalion and later of
the 5th Marines. The plane was hastily disarmed and painted with U. S.
markings, so that it could be flown to Japan in case the enemy overran
Kimpo.[313]
[313] Capt E. E. Collins ltr to authors, 6 May 55.
Although the NKPA threat did not materialize, there could be no
doubt of an enemy build-up within striking distance. And it was on
this sensitive left flank that the support of naval gunfire was most
effective.
As early as 19 September the 1st and 5th Marines had advanced beyond
the range of the light cruisers and destroyers. The battleship
_Missouri_ was made available the next day, but targets in Seoul
proved to be too distant for her maximum range, and no further efforts
were made to call upon the battleship’s 16-inch rifles. In the Kimpo
area, however, naval gunfire was at its best, and a total of 535
8-inch shells were fired from 21 to 24 September by the _Toledo_ and
_Rochester_. These fires were requested by Lieutenant Wayerski in
support of patrol actions by the 3d KMC Battalion. One of the KMC
attacks wiped out a company-size pocket of Red Korean resistance in the
vicinity of Chongdong--about three miles northwest of the airfield on
the south bank of the Han--with a loss to the enemy of 40 counted dead
and some 150 prisoners.[314]
[314] Capt J. R. Wayerski, interv, of 28 Sep 54.
After the Han crossing, the 1st Marine Division found itself in
the position of advancing astride an unbridged tidal river with
the northern flank wide open. Generals Smith and Craig depended on
VMO-6 helicopters for their visits to the 5th Marines front. Those
rotary-winged aircraft were in increasing demand for evacuating serious
casualties; and the commanding general directed that such missions be
given priority over command and liaison flights. This meant that Smith
and Craig were occasionally “bumped.” In such instances they crossed
the river by LVT or waited until their helicopter could return.
At the time of the Han crossing, the general plan of the 1st Marine
Division had been for RCT-5 to clear the north bank and open up
crossing sites for RCT-1 in the Yongdungpo area. That regiment would
then cross to seize South Mountain, just north of the crossing site,
thus forming an enclave in Seoul proper. Further objectives were to be
seized by RCT-1 to the north and east while the KMC Regiment passed
through RCT-5 to attack the center of the city. Here a political
motive entered the picture, since it was desired to have Koreans take
a prominent part in the liberation of the former ROK capital. To the
north, on the left flank of the Division, it was planned for RCT-7 to
seize objectives to protect the flank and cut off the escape of the
enemy. Meanwhile, RCT-5 would revert to Division reserve as soon as the
tactical situation made it possible.
So much for the plan. Before it could be put into execution, stiffening
NKPA resistance made it necessary to consider revisions.[315] Not only
was the hilly terrain northwest of Seoul well suited to defensive
operations, but it had been a training area as far back as the Japanese
overlordship, with fields of fire accurately charted. Moreover, it
had become evident by the 21st that the enemy was about to exchange
a strategy of delaying operations for one of defending to the last
ditch. The 1st Marines had already experienced the new NKPA spirit
at Yongdungpo, and on the 21st the 5th Marines contented itself with
limited advances for the purpose of seizing high ground from which to
launch the assault on Seoul.
[315] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 253–255.
The attack on the 21st was launched astride the railroad by the 3d
Battalion to the north and the 1st Battalion between the railroad and
the river. After passing through the 2d Battalion, Taplett’s men seized
three hills and by dusk were digging in on Hill 216, about six miles
east of Hill 125 and the ferry landing site.
The 1st Battalion had meanwhile advanced to Hill 96, about 3,000
yards southeast of yesterday’s Objective DOG, now occupied by the
2d Battalion in reserve. Further gains of some 2,500 yards to the
southeast took the battalion to Hill 68, between the railroad and
river, which was seized and held for the night.
Enemy resistance ranged from light to moderate in both battalion zones.
Between them, the 1st Battalion of the KMCs moved up to Hill 104, just
north of the railroad and south of Sachon Creek.[316]
[316] 1st MarDiv, _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; O. P. Smith,
_Notes_, 255–256.
This was the situation across the river at nightfall on the 21st. The
5th Marines was in position to grapple with the enemy for possession of
Seoul. Hill 104, in the center of the 5th Marines front, was only 5,000
yards west of the Government Palace in the northwest section of the
city. Less than three miles, yet officers and men alike realized that
they would have to fight for every inch of the way. If anyone had any
doubts, he had only to watch the flashes of gunfire stabbing the night
sky to the southeast, and he had only to listen to the unremitting roar
of gunfire. For at Yongdungpo the 1st Marines had been slugging it out
with the enemy for the last three days in a battle for the rambling
industrial suburb.