Marine Air Support
_Helicopters and OYs in Support--Marine Air Units at Kimpo--Progress of
Eighth Army Offensive--Division CP Displaces to Oeoso-Ri--Advance of
RCT-1 to Sosa--Reports of Enemy Build-up--Preparations for Crossing the
Han_
At 1000 on the morning of 18 September an HO3S-1 helicopter became
the first American aircraft to land on Kimpo Airfield since June.
Mopping up operations had scarcely been completed, following the
enemy counterattack, when Captain Victor A. Armstrong of VMO-6 made
a vertical approach with General Shepherd and Colonel Krulak as
passengers. They were greeted by General Craig, the ADC, who had just
arrived in a jeep.
The field was in surprisingly good shape, considering the fighting it
had seen within the last few hours. As evidence that the enemy had
been surprised, one Russian-built fighter of the Yak III type and two
Stormovik type aircraft were found “relatively undamaged” and turned
over to Air Force Intelligence.[246] Several other Yaks and Stormoviks
had been destroyed by the enemy.
[246] 1st MAW, Annex Able.
On the return trip, Armstrong was requested by his passengers to fly
them across the Han for a preview of the outskirts of Seoul. Except
for scattered small-arms fire, the helicopter was allowed to proceed
without being molested by the enemy. There were few signs of extensive
NKPA preparations to be seen at this time.[247]
[247] Maj V. A. Armstrong interv, 16 Mar 55.
_Helicopters and OYs in Support_
VMO-6, the composite observation squadron commanded by Major Vincent J.
Gottschalk, had already made a name for itself in the Pusan Perimeter
actions. Consisting of eight HO3S-1 helicopters and an equal number of
OY planes, this former Brigade unit came under the operational control
of the 1st Marine Division and the administrative and logistical
control of MAG-33. During the Inchon assault, VMO-6 was based on SCAJAP
LST QO79 in the harbor except for an Oy attached to each of the two
CVEs.
The first of a long sequence of helicopter rescue missions during the
Inchon-Seoul operation took place on D-plus 1 when First Lieutenant
Max N. Nebergall picked up a Navy pilot who had ditched in Inchon
harbor. Flights carried out by other aircraft were reported as three
reconnaissance, two artillery spot, three beach reconnaissance, and one
utility.[248]
[248] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe.
VMO-6 displaced ashore the next day to an airstrip improvised near
the Division CP by the Marine engineers. This was the beginning of
liaison, utility, reconnaissance, evacuation, and rescue flights on a
dawn-to-dark basis.
Division air and naval gunfire representatives of the Fire Support
Coordination Center followed VMO-6 ashore on the 16th. During the
planning phase they had worked with their opposite numbers of PhibGru
One and with the 11th Marines after the Division landed at Kobe.
Although some of the officers and men embarked for Inchon in the _Mount
McKinley_, the materiel and 90 percent of the personnel arrived in the
_President Jackson_. At 1400 on D-plus 2 the FSCC became operational
after all elements and their equipment reported to the Division CP.
Responsibility for the coordination of supporting arms ashore was
assumed at 0630 on 16 September for air, at 1500 on the 17th for
artillery, and at 1800 on the 18th for naval gunfire.[249]
[249] _Ibid._, Annexes Baker Baker, Charlie Charlie, and Dog
Dog.
The rapid advance of Marine ground forces during the first three days
meant that Major Robert L. Schreier’s 1st Signal Battalion had a job
on its hands. The main body reached the objective area on board the
_President Jackson_, and the first units ashore were the battalion and
regimental ANGLICO teams, most of which had embarked in LSTs. When
the ADC group displaced from Wolmi-do to Inchon, radio facilities were
maintained without a hitch.
Radio and message center facilities met all requirements during
the night of 16–17 September. Teletype (through radio carrier) was
initiated between the Division CP and Corps, afloat on the _Mount
McKinley_. And by the morning of D-plus 2, such progress had been made
that wire communication was established not only with both advancing
infantry regiments but also with most of the battalions.[250]
[250] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex George George.
Enemy resistance was so ineffectual from 16 to 18 September that
the Marine infantry regiments were able to advance without much
flank protection. The three battalions of the 11th Marines did more
displacing than firing in their efforts to keep pace, and men and
vehicles of the Signal Battalion were kept busy at laying wire.
Security was provided for the left, or northern, Division flank by
the attack of the KMC Regiment (less the 2d Battalion, left behind
for police duties in Inchon) under the control of the 5th Marines.
Attached to the regiment for possible use in calling down naval gunfire
were two Shore Fire Control Parties. Objectives on Corps Phase Line CC
were reached without much difficulty after the initial KMC setbacks
described in the previous chapter.[251]
[251] _Ibid._, basic rpt, and Annex Queen Queen.
_Marine Air Units at Kimpo_
There had been little or no urgent need for close air support until 18
September, when RCT-1 met stubborn opposition in the Sosa area. Thus
the capture of Kimpo in comparatively good condition was a timely boon,
since it meant that land-based Marine tactical air support could be
initiated as soon as Captain George W. King’s Able Company Engineers
made the field operative with temporary repairs.
This was the conclusion of Generals Harris and Cushman, commanding the
1st MAW and TAC X Corps, when they visited Kimpo by helicopter on the
afternoon of the 18th. They advised CG X Corps accordingly, and that
evening he ordered the deployment of MAG-33 to the captured airfield
with its headquarters and service squadrons.
The tactical squadrons figured in an administrative switch that has
sometimes puzzled chroniclers of Marine air operations. By order of
General Harris, the following reassignments were directed to take
effect on 21 September 1950:
From MAG-33 to MAG-12--VMF-214, VMF-323, and VMF(N)-513;
From MAG-12 to MAG-33--VMF-212, VMF-312, and VMF(N)-542.[252]
[252] CG 1st MAW speedltr, 20 Sep 50.
Both MGCIS-1 and MTACS-2 were already ashore at Inchon under the
operational control of the 1st Marine Division. Aircraft and flight
echelons of the tactical squadrons were to be flown to Kimpo on the
19th from Itazuke and Itami airfields in Japan, with the remaining
elements following by surface shipping. Thus MAG-33 would consist of
these units:
------------+--------+--------+----------
Organization|Officers|Enlisted| Total
------------+--------+--------+----------
HqSq-33 | 74 | 177 | 251
SMS-33 | 29 | 538 | 567
VMF-212 | 32 | 154 | 186
VMF-312 | 53 | 221 | 274
VMF(N)-542 | 54 | 291 | 345
MTACS-2 | 34 | 190 | 224
MGCIS-1 | 19 | 185 | 204
+--------+--------+----------
Total | 295 | 1,756 |[253]2,051
------------+--------+--------+----------
[253] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item.
VMFs-214 and 323 would continue to operate from the carriers _Sicily_
and _Badoeng Strait_, with the night-fighters, VMF(N)-513 being based
as usual at Itazuke AFB in Japan. The only difference was that a
scratch of the pen had transferred these units from MAG-33 to MAG-12.
It was their responsibility to support the advancing ground forces
during the critical period while the other three tactical squadrons
were making the move from Japan to Kimpo.
Control of tactical air support had passed from the TADC on the _Mount
McKinley_ to the Air Support Section of MTACS-2 on D-plus 2, after the
Landing Force Commander signified his readiness to assume it. Calls for
close air support were increasing as the enemy recovered from the first
shock of invasion. On the 18th and 19th, the three fighter squadrons of
MAG-12 flew a total of nearly 50 close support sorties controlled by
the Air Support Section of MTACS-2. Napalm, 20mm ammunition, rockets,
and 500-pound bombs were used to blast NKPA troop concentrations in the
zone of the 1st Marines.[254]
[254] MarCorps Board _Study_, IV-B, 16, 17; 1st MAW _SAR_,
basic rpt, and Annex Jig.
Logistical as well as tactical and administrative problems had to
be solved. During the planning phase, it may be recalled, Colonel
Kenneth H. Weir (C/S TAC X corps) had learned that X corps would not
have enough trucks to support air operations at Kimpo by transporting
aviation gasoline and aircraft munitions from Inchon. As a solution,
arrangements were made to accept the offer of FEAF Combat Cargo Command
to provide logistical support; and these totals in tonnage were flown
in from Japan during the first week:
------+----+-----+-------
Date |Ammo|Avgas| Oil
------+----+-----+-------
18 Sep| 16| 8| 0
19 Sep| 73| 28| 5
20 Sep| 151| 86| 0
21 Sep| 219| 88| 11
22 Sep| 268| 153| 5
23 Sep| 139| 80| 0
24 Sep| 118| 81|[255]16
------+----+-----+-------
[255] 1st MAW _SAR_, basic rpt.
This proved to be the largest total for a single week during the
Inchon-Seoul operation. In addition, about 1,025 tons of POL and 425
tons of ammunition were trucked from Inchon to Kimpo during the entire
period, and the forward echelon of VMR-152 flew in spare parts and
items of urgently needed equipment.
Headquarters of the 1st MAW remained at Itami AFB in Japan, though
General Harris made frequent trips to Kimpo. The chief task of the
Wing during the Kimpo air operations was furnishing administrative and
logistical support to TAC X Corps and MAG-33.
TAC X Corps set up its headquarters at Kimpo Airfield on 19 September,
followed by MTACS-2, MGCIS-1, and VMO-6. The first fighter squadron of
MAG-33 to arrive at the new base was VMF(N)-542. Lieutenant Colonel Max
J. Volcansek, Jr., the commanding officer, and five pilots landed their
F7F-3Ns at 1830 on the 19th after a flight from Itami AFB. This was the
baptism of fire for a majority of the squadron’s pilots. Numbering
54 officers and 274 enlisted men when it left El Toro, VMF(N)-542 had
only 20 trained night fighter pilots. The remainder were volunteer
reservists qualified by “a good experience level and a desire to become
night fighters.”[256]
[256] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item, VMF(N)-542 rpt.
The squadron claimed the distinction of flying the first Marine combat
mission from Kimpo at 0735 on the 20th when four of the F7F-3N aircraft
destroyed two enemy locomotives after expending some 3,000 rounds
of 20mm ammunition. The Corsairs of Lieutenant Colonel Richard W.
Wyczawski’s VMF-212 and two aircraft of Lieutenant Colonel J. Frank
Cole’s VMF-312 also landed at Kimpo on the 19th and got into action the
following day. Conditions were primitive at the outset. In the lack
of refueling facilities, the first strikes had to be flown on fuel
remaining in the aircraft, and bombs were loaded by hand.[257]
[257] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item VMF-212 rpt.
It had been an achievement to have two tactical squadrons of MAG-33 in
action less than 48 hours after the reconnaissance landing by Generals
Harris and Cushman. This accomplishment owed a great deal to the care
shown by the 5th Marines to keep damage at a minimum. Lieutenant
General George E. Stratemeyer, CG FEAF, expressed his appreciation of
this factor in a letter to General Smith:
“I want to take this opportunity of expressing my admiration and
gratification for the manner in which elements of your Division
recently captured Kimpo Airfield and so secured it as to make it
available for use by Far East Air Forces and Marine Corps aircraft in
the shortest possible time.”[258]
[258] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 212–213.
_Progress of Eighth Army Offensive_
General MacArthur had intended the Eighth Army to be the hammer and X
Corps the anvil of a great joint operation. During the first few days,
however, it sometimes appeared as if these roles were reversed. On 18
September, after a penetration of 16 miles on the X Corps front, the
attacking forces in the Pusan Perimeter had just begun to inch ahead
against desperate NKPA resistance. In some sectors, indeed, the enemy
not only put up a stubborn defense but counterattacked vigorously. (See
map in end papers.)
The Eighth Army now consisted of the U. S. I Corps (IX Corps did not
become operational until 23 September) and the ROK I and II Corps.
General Walker’s command was already on the way to becoming the most
cosmopolitan army in which Americans have ever served. Contingents of
British ground forces had reached the front; and before the end of the
year, 40 countries of the United Nations would have offered assistance,
either military or economic, to the fight against Communism.
Most of this aid had not yet materialized on 16 September, but the
Eighth Army had overcome its disadvantage in numbers of trained
troops, thanks to NKPA losses, when it jumped off all along the line
in southeast Korea. In the north the 1st Cavalry Division, 24th
Infantry Division, ROK 1st Division, and British 27th Brigade launched
a determined attack along the Taegu-Waegwon axis to win a bridgehead
across the Naktong. It was nip-and-tuck for the first three days, and
not until the 19th did the UN forces fight their way across the river
against the last-ditch opposition of the 1st, 3d, 10th, and 13th NKPA
Divisions.[259]
[259] Almond, _UN Mil Ops_, 13.
Still farther north, the enemy relinquished little ground until the
18th. On that date the ROK 3d Division recaptured the east coast port
of Pohang-dong, which the invaders had taken in their drive during the
first week of September.
In the south, the U. S. 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions and attached ROK
units were held up for three days by the NKPA 6th and 7th Divisions.
The deadlock lasted until 19 September, when the enemy fell back in the
Masan area along the southern coast.[260]
[260] _Ibid._
Major Joseph H. Reinburg’s VMF(N)-513, operating out of its Itazuke
base, played a conspicuous role in the first days of Walker’s
offensive. Although specialists in night-fighting, the Marine pilots
flew 15 daylight close support missions for Army units from 17 to 19
September. Enemy troops, tanks, vehicles, and artillery were scored
during every strike, as the planes ranged the entire extent of the
Pusan Perimeter.[261]
[261] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item, VMF(N)-513 rpt.
_Division CP Displaces to Oeoso-ri_
So much progress had been made by this date on the X Corps front that
General Smith displaced the 1st Marine Division CP from the eastern
outskirts of Inchon to Oeoso-ri, about a mile and a half southeast of
Kimpo Airfield. This forward location was selected by General Craig
with a view to preliminary Division planning for the crossing of the
Han, which would entail a reshuffling of units.
Oeoso-ri having been an American housing area during the post-World War
II occupation, duplex houses and Quonset huts were available. General
Smith arrived by helicopter on the afternoon of the 19th, and the
new CP opened at 1645. During the next few days the area was treated
to intermittent artillery fire, apparently from a single well-hidden
gun somewhere in the Seoul area. It was an embarrassment to Marine
artillery officers, who were never able to locate the offending weapon,
but no great harm was done.
By this time General Smith could look forward to the arrival of more
units at the front. On D-day the strength of X Corps on paper had been
69,450 ground force troops. In addition to the 1st Marine Division and
7th Infantry Division, there were such major units as the 93d and 96th
Field Artillery Battalions, the 73d Tank Battalion, 56th Amphibian Tank
and Tractor Battalion, the 2d Engineer Combat Group. In GHQ UNC Reserve
were the 3d Infantry Division and the 187th Airborne RCT.[262]
[262] GHQ UNC _OpnO No. 1_, 30 Aug 50.
The 3d Division had not sailed for the Far East in time to take part
in the Inchon-Seoul operation. The 187th Airborne RCT, due to land at
Inchon on 23 September, had been the answer to General MacArthur’s
requests in July for paratroops to land behind the enemy’s lines
in conjunction with the amphibious assault planned as Operation
BLUEHEARTS. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided against flying
an airborne RCT to Japan at the time, the 11th Airborne Division was
later directed to organize and train such a unit for service in the
Far East. On account of the large proportion of new troops filling out
a skeleton unit, General Collins stipulated that the 187th was not
to be committed for an airdrop before 29 September. It was decided,
therefore, that the RCT would be given an initial mission of protecting
the left flank of the 1st Marine Division.
_Advance of RCT-1 to Sosa_
Preliminary planning for the crossing of the river Han began as soon
as the Division staff settled down in the new CP. The reshuffling of
various units had to wait, however, until both Marine regiments took
their assigned objectives of 18 and 19 September. Throughout the 17th,
while Murray’s regiment drove northeastward toward Kimpo, the 1st
Marines had continued the attack from Ascom City along the Inchon-Seoul
Highway. As mentioned previously, Monegan’s rocket launcher and the
75mm recoilless rifles, emplaced in 2/1’s positions on Hill 186, helped
smash the North Korean tank-infantry column at dawn. It appeared that
a second enemy force was supposed to have closed on Marine lines by
taking a parallel course through the hills south of the highway. The
Red infantry, in about company strength, was spotted moving along the
high ground toward Company D’s front on Hill 186. Fox Company dispersed
the column with mortar fire and then notified Dog to be on the
alert.[263]
[263] 2/1 _SAR_, 5; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
Though the North Koreans were stopped cold, they did not flee with the
usual rapidity. Their base of operations seemed to be Hill 208, a land
mass that began near Mahang-ri on the highway and spread southward
across most of the 2d Battalion front. Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s
attack plan committed Easy Company on the left of the road, Fox on
the right, and Dog in the high ground to the south. No sooner had the
companies jumped off than they became involved in scattered, stubborn
fighting with Red soldiers on and around Hill 208.[264]
[264] _Ibid._
Howitzers of the 11th Marines raked the high ground ahead of the
attackers, and Sutter’s troops measured off slow but steady progress.
In the low ground bordering the highway, enemy troops had taken
cover in the fields on both sides of a road block about 500 yards
from Mahang-ri. Second Lieutenant Robert C. Hanlon’s 2d Platoon
of Easy Company was pinned down by fire from three sides. Second
Lieutenants Johnny L. Carter and George E. McAlee started forward
with reinforcements, but McAlee was wounded by several bullets. After
summoning a corpsman, Carter got through to Hanlon, and they called
for 3.5-inch rockets and 75mm recoilless fire on huts sheltering enemy
soldiers. The two officers then led an advance which took the platoon
to a small hill on the right of the road block, where the other two
platoons moved up abreast. About 20 NKPA troops were estimated to have
been killed.[265]
[265] Capt J. L. Carter ltr to authors, 9 May 55.
[Illustration: ADVANCE BY 1st MARINES--17 SEP]
At noon, Companies F and D had secured Hill 208 overlooking the FBHL,
but it remained for E to break into Mahang-ri on the highway. By this
time 3/1 had entered the fight with an armored column. Company G, led
by First Lieutenant Robert L. Gover’s 1st Platoon of Baker Company
Tanks, punched down the road in an attempt to pierce the screen of
Red resistance with the rest of 3/1 in column close behind. The M-26
crews spotted an 85mm gun protruding from a thatched hut and destroyed
the camouflaged T-34 before it could fire a shot. An infantry platoon
riding the Marine tanks was forced to dismount at Mahang-ri and deploy,
while the armor fired from the road at numerous targets of opportunity.
The village was finally secured shortly before 1600, and small bands
of enemy were seen darting eastward to take up new positions along the
highway.[266]
[266] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; 2/1 _SAR_; 3/1
_SAR_; and Capt B. J. Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54. Col
T. L. Ridge, memo to authors, 13 May 55.
The advance to Mahang-ri and the FBHL had carried the 1st Marines 3,000
yards from its starting point at Ascom City. As the attack continued
late in the afternoon, the next objective was Corps Phase Line CC,
whose boundaries were defined in the previous chapter. Midway between
Mahang-ri and the phase line was the town of Sosa, and it was from this
locale that North Korean soldiers were pouring westward to delay the
Marine advance on the highway.
Since the 5th Marines had veered to the northeast to attack Kimpo,
its boundary with the 1st had moved well to the left of the highway.
Henceforth, Puller’s regiment would have to go it alone on the main
road. This was the case as the 2d and 3d Battalions butted against
enemy delaying forces between Ascom City and Mahang-ri, and the
isolation became more pronounced as they attacked toward Sosa late on
the 17th.
Sutter’s unit advanced on the left of the highway with Companies E
and F in assault. George Company of 3/1, transported in LVTs and
followed by the rest of the battalion, moved along the road behind the
2d Platoon, Baker Company Tanks. There is a defile halfway between
Mahang-ri and Sosa, and at this spot the North Koreans chose to make a
determined stand. Second Lieutenant Bryan J. Cummings nosed his lead
M-26 into the pass, while infantry moved to the shoulders on either
side against light opposition. Suddenly the troops and lone tank were
hit from the front by a heavy volume of small-arms, antitank, and
mortar fire.[267]
[267] 2/1 _SAR_; 3/1 _SAR_; and Cummings interv, 24 Aug 54.
The Marine infantry was thrown back by the intensity of the outburst,
the most severe they had yet encountered. As luck would have it, the
engine of Cummings’ tank went dead at this inopportune moment, and the
big vehicle stalled. Remembering that infantry had been riding on top
of his M-26, the platoon leader opened the hatch to make a quick check.
He yanked a lone rifleman inside and buttoned up just as Red soldiers
scrambled down the embankment.
Fumes from the 90mm gun choked the Marines in the vehicle as they
listened to the clamor of North Koreans on the hull. The infantryman
who had been pulled to safety by Cummings suddenly went berserk and
had to be knocked out. Then the officer was forced to choose between
two evils: either his crew must succumb to the acrid fumes or take its
chances on opening the pistol port for ventilation. He opened the port.
A grenade bounced inside, and the ear-shattering explosion within the
steel enclosure wounded Cummings, the rifleman, and one of the tank
gunners. At this moment the semi-conscious Marines resigned themselves
to the worst.[268]
[268] Cummings interv, 24 Aug 54.
Help was on the way, however, and it was timed to the split second.
Just as the grenade exploded, Sergeant Marion C. Altaire’s M-26 moved
to the mouth of the defile and “scratched the back” of the beleaguered
vehicle with bow machine-gun fire. Riddled Red soldiers were swept from
the top of Cummings’ tank and piled up alongside. Within a few minutes,
a VMF-214 flight appeared over the pass, and the planes peeled off to
bomb, rocket, and strafe the high ground.[269]
[269] _Ibid._; and 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig, VMF-214 rpt, 5.
As the tide of battle swept past, Cummings and his men opened the
hatch, coughing and choking, and drank in long breaths of fresh air.
It took them a moment to realize that they were back again in the land
of the living after one of the closest calls that Marines have ever
experienced.
Company G of 3/1 fought back on the right of the MSR and gained the
high ground above the pass. Simultaneously, Staff Sergeant Arthur J.
MacDonald led the second section of Cummings’ tank platoon into the
defile, and the M-26s laid down heavy 90mm and machine-gun fire on the
crescent of North Korean emplacements ahead. A total of six enemy AT
guns was destroyed, but not before the weapons had knocked a track off
Cummings’ vehicle and damaged two others to a lesser extent.[270]
[270] _Ibid._; 3/1 _SAR_; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
The 2d Battalion drove to the top of the high ground on the left of the
road, and the Marines enjoyed a small-scale “turkey shoot” as the North
Koreans pulled out and pelted toward Sosa. While the assault units
consolidated their holdings, the remainder of the 2d and 3d Battalions
moved into the area around the defile and dug in for the night.
The 1st Marines’ attack along the highway had netted 4,800 yards.
Despite repeated clashes in the course of the day, 2/1 lost only one
killed and 28 wounded, and Company G of the 3d Battalion suffered six
WIA. Enemy losses included 250 killed and wounded, 70 prisoners, one
T-34 tank, several AT guns, and large quantities of small arms and
ammunition.[271]
[271] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; 2/1 _SAR_; and 3/1
_SAR_. In its account of NKPA losses for 17 September,
2/1 lists four other enemy tanks destroyed. These
vehicles were among the six knocked out jointly by the
1st and 5th Marines and Able Company Tanks at the dawn
ambuscade near Ascom City. 1st MarDiv G-2 reports of
14 NKPA tanks destroyed this date cannot be supported
by the records of subordinate units. In addition to
the six T-34s destroyed in the morning and the single
vehicle knocked out by our tanks near Mahang-ri, one
other kill was recorded by Marine air.
Action on the Division’s southern flank involved little more than hill
climbing and foot races for the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and the
Division Reconnaissance Company. After jumping off in the morning of
D-plus 2, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins’ infantry fanned out through a
maze of twisting valleys and ridges. The battalion encountered only
light resistance, which invariably evaporated under pressure, and
by dark the assault elements had gained 4,000 yards. Hawkins then
deployed his troops for night defense on the high ground south of 3/1’s
positions overlooking the highway defile.[272]
[272] McGee-Carlon interv, 9 Feb 55.
On the right of the 1st Battalion, Captain Houghton’s Reconnaissance
Company reached the tip of the Namdong Peninsula. The Recon troops
spent two days, the 17th and 18th, patrolling this spacious tactical
vacuum. A number of dispirited prisoners were collected and caches of
arms and munitions uncovered. One of the more significant discoveries
was a small arsenal in which Russian-type wooden box mines were being
manufactured and stored in quantity. First encountered by Able Company
engineers in the Pusan Perimeter, these crude but effective explosives
would become serious obstacles to the Marine advance in the days
ahead.[273]
[273] HqBn, 1st MarDiv _Unit Rpts_, 9 Sep-11 Nov 50; and
Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54. See also this series, I:225.
The night of 17–18 September passed quietly for the 1st Marines. During
the hours of darkness, Ridge requested intermittent naval gunfire to
interdict Sosa and Hill 123, where he believed enemy defenses to be
located. Jump-off fires were also planned for the morning in addition
to air strikes. Captain P. W. Brock’s HMS _Kenya_ poured in more than
300 6-inch rounds with good results. “Our Royal Navy ally not only
supported the battalion to the maximum of its naval gunfire desires,”
said Ridge, “but volunteered to render more than was requested.”[274]
[274] Ridge memo, 13 May 55.
Shortly after first light on D-plus 3, the 2d Battalion attacked along
the highway with Easy Company on the left of the road and Dog on the
right. Premature air bursts from an artillery preparation resulted in
two KIA and three WIA among the troops of Company E.[275]
[275] 2/1 _SAR_, 6; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54; Carter ltr, 9
May 55.
Ridge’s 3d Battalion boarded a column of LVTs, DUKWs, and jeeps, then
rumbled down the highway through 2/1’s assault companies. In striking
contrast to the previous day’s advance, there was a conspicuous absence
of NKPA infantry along the way. The Marines brushed aside light
opposition, including an antitank roadblock at Sosa’s outskirts, and
captured the town at noon. Covered by Baker Company Tanks, 2/1 moved
into defensive positions on the right side of the railroad about a mile
beyond the built-up area, and the 3d Battalion deployed on Hill 123
just across the tracks.[276]
[276] _Ibid._; and 3/1 _SAR_, 7.
On the Division’s right, 1/1 gained another 4,000 yards in the course
of 18 September. In its third consecutive day of attack, the battalion
had yet to encounter anything more formidable than steep hills and
vapid enemy bands. Hawkins built his night defenses along a mountainous
two-mile front south of 2/1’s position overlooking the highway.
[Illustration: CAPTURE OF SOSA
1st MARINES--18 SEP]
_Reports of Enemy Build-up_
There was little activity in the 5th Marines’ zone of action during
the 1st Regiment’s drive on Sosa. After helping 2/5 smash the dawn
counterattack at Kimpo, Company C, 1st Battalion, attacked Objective
Fox under cover of an artillery preparation. Lieutenant Pedersen’s unit
seized the high ground against light opposition at 0930, while the
remainder of 1/5 remained entrenched at Objective Easy, captured the
previous day.[277]
[277] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
Murray’s CP displaced to Kimpo at 1245 on the 18th, and the regiment
spent the rest of the day patrolling from its positions which ringed
the airfield. On the 5th Marines’ left, the 3d Battalion of the KMC was
joined by 1/KMC in searching out the base of the Kumpo Peninsula. A
new security force was added to the Division sector when the 17th ROK
Regiment landed at Inchon and fanned out to comb the troublesome area
between Ascom City and the sea.[278]
[278] _Ibid._; and 1st MarDiv _Chief of Staff_ (C/S)
_Journal_, 15–20 Sep 50.
The General Situation Map gives the disposition of friendly and
suspected enemy elements as of late afternoon on 18 September. This
date is particularly important in that the Marine division, regimental,
and battalion headquarters were swamped by a torrent of intelligence
which indicated for the first time the future patterns of organized
NKPA resistance.
Beginning on the left of the broad arc of the 1st Marine Division’s
front, repeated reports told of enemy concentrations north and south of
the Han River in the area of the Kumpo Peninsula.[279] Upwards of 1,000
troops were sighted by natives and air observers, and it was believed
that the North Koreans were organizing for an attempt against Kimpo.
A strike by four Navy Skyraiders caught part of the Red force exposed
on both banks of the Han northeast of the airfield. After killing an
estimated 50 of the enemy and dispersing the remainder, the Navy pilots
reported the area “still active.”
[279] The following narrative, unless otherwise noted, is
derived from: 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal_, 15–20 Sep 50;
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and 1st Marines
_PIR No. 3_.
[Illustration: _Hail to the Chief--General Smith welcomes General
MacArthur ashore, on D-plus 2, for his first trip of inspection (U. S.
Army Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Drive to Kimpo----Above, Marines pass burning enemy
tank with bodies of NKPA soldiers on top; and, below, enemy transport
knocked out by Marine planes (Marine Corps Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Advance to Yongdungpo----Above, an enemy ammunition
dump goes up in smoke (U. S. Army Photo); and, below, RCT-1 Marines
march prisoners back through a rice paddy (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Kimpo Airfield Secured----Above, correspondents examine
captured Yak fighter (U. S. Army Photo); and, below, First Lieutenant
J. V. Hanes of VMF-214 shows Lieutenant Colonel Walter Lischeid the
flak scars on his Corsair (U. S. Navy Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Marine Aircraft----Above, Corsair fighter-bombers on
Kimpo Airfield; and, below, the F7F Tigercat used as a night fighter
and intruder._]
[Illustration: _Crossing the Han----Above, Marine amtracs take Marines
and KMCs across river, with Hill 125 on far shore; and, below, troops
of 32d Infantry, USA, cross in Marine amtracs (U. S. Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Approach to Seoul----Above, the rugged terrain
northwest of Seoul as seen by Marine from ridge on south bank of Han;
and, below, Marine fire team fighting in this terrain (U. S. Navy
Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Regimental Commanders----Above, Lieutenant Colonel
Raymond L. Murray, commanding officer of RCT-5, in his CP; and, below,
General Smith being greeted by Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, commanding
officer of RCT-7 (Marine Corps Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Command Conferences----Above (left to right) Colonel
Lewis B. Puller, commanding officer of RCT-1, General MacArthur
and General Smith; and, below (left to right), Colonel Charles E.
Beauchamp, commanding officer of 32d Infantry, General Barr, General
Almond and General Craig (U. S. Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Battle Casualties----Above, Navy Hospitalmen R. E.
Rosegoom and Frank J. Yasso give first aid to wounded NKPA prisoner;
and, below, Marines carry wounded comrade back from firing line (U. S.
Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Northwest of Seoul----Above, the KMCs move up in
amtracs; and, below, Korean refugees return to ruined homes on
outskirts of Seoul (U. S. Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _The Fight for Seoul----Above, Marine tank and infantry
close in on northwest approaches; and, below, Marines pass refugees in
battered streets (U. S. Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Return of Refugees----Displaced residents of Seoul come
back to find railway station (above) and Hotel Banta (below) scarred by
artillery fire (U. S. Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Ceremonies----Above, former Marine cemetery at Inchon
is dedicated as United Nations Cemetery; and, below, President Syngman
Rhee and General MacArthur at liberation ceremony in Seoul (U. S. Army
Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Marine Artillery----Two views of 105mm howitzers of
11th Marines in Korea (Marine Corps Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Marine Air Commanders--Above, Major General Field
Harris, commanding the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, holding a captured
Russian burp gun; and, below, facing camera from left to right, General
Harris and Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, commanding TAC X
Corps._]
Marine Air in turn warned of a build-up of Communist troops and
equipment in the vicinity of Haengju and Hill 125, directly across
the Han from 2/5’s position north of Kimpo. East of the airfield, the
enemy was withdrawing from the 5th Marines’ zone toward Yongdungpo,
using the Hill 118 area as an intermediate rallying point. Moreover,
interrogation of two NKPA officers captured near Kimpo disclosed that a
Communist regiment was already committed to the defense of Yongdungpo.
Since this large industrial suburb of Seoul rambled across the 1st
Marines’ path to the Han, Colonel Puller knew well in advance that
trouble lay ahead of his regiment.
Further evidence that storm clouds were gathering over the highway came
from a number of sources in Sosa. Informants were almost unanimous
in their predictions that the approaches to Yongdungpo would be sown
liberally with land mines.
VMF-214, which provided effective close air support for the 1st
Marines’ attack through Sosa, reported destroying huge enemy stockpiles
hidden in and around buildings on the sand spit between Yongdungpo and
Seoul. The squadron also sighted six enemy tanks far beyond Marine
lines and killed two of them with direct napalm hits. Its sister unit,
VMF-323, likewise scoured the Division front and radioed similar
findings to Tactical Air Control.
Other reports from scattered sources placed approximately 3,000 North
Koreans in Seoul--with more on the way. Air spotters noted heavy
traffic south from the 38th Parallel and north from the Suwon area.
Tanks, troops, and vehicles from the latter not only were heading
for the capital but also were veering off toward Yongdungpo and the
Division right flank.
Thus, the Marines faced the possibility of major interference from:
(1) the Kumpo Peninsula; (2) the Haengju locale on the north bank
of the Han; (3) the area around Hill 118 between Kimpo Airfield and
Yongdungpo; (4) Yongdungpo itself; (5) Seoul; and (6) the direction
of the Division’s right (southeastern) flank. Strangely enough for an
enemy who was at his best with the artful dodge, only the two flank
threats failed to measure up to expectations.
The North Koreans gave a preview of the changing picture on the
afternoon of 18 September when, at 1415, the first shells of a
sustained mortar barrage crashed into 3/1’s positions on Hill 123.
During the next hour, 120mm eruptions traced accurate paths back and
forth along the ridge, and 30 Marines were cut down by the whirring
fragments. Moving through the explosions with near-miraculous immunity,
the 3d Battalion’s senior medical officer, Lieutenant Robert J.
Fleischaker, (MC) USN, remained fully exposed to the barrage while
administering to the wounded. “He never thought of his own safety
when men needed his services,” commented Lieutenant Colonel Ridge.[280]
[280] Myers interv, 1 Feb 55; Ridge memo, 13 May 55.
[Illustration: GENERAL SITUATION
18 SEPTEMBER]
South of the highway, enemy gunners ranged in on 2/1’s lines at 1800,
adding 14 more Marines to the casualty rolls. Lieutenant Colonel Sutter
and his S-3, Captain Gildo S. Codispoti, narrowly escaped injury when
two mortar rounds hit the battalion CP. The explosions wounded Captain
Albert L. Williams, commander of Company E, and Warrant Officer Bartley
D. Kent, the battalion supply officer.[281]
[281] Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
_Orders for Crossing the Han_
Late in the afternoon of the 18th, both Corps and Division issued
orders within a period of two hours for crossing the Han. In OpnO 6-50,
the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division directed RCT-5 to
seize crossing sites along the south bank the next day and be prepared
to cross on order while RCT-1 continued its attack along the highway
toward Yongdungpo.
Much more territory was taken in by X Corps Operational Instructions
No. 1, which ordered the 1st Marine Division to reconnoiter the river
on the 19th and cross the next day. Then, after enveloping enemy
positions on the north bank in the vicinity of Seoul, the Marines were
to seize and secure both the city and the high ground to the north.
Since the Corps did not concern itself much with ways and means,
General Smith asked for a conference at 0930 the next morning with
General Almond. He informed the X Corps commander that he and his staff
had already given considerable thought to the question of a crossing
site. A preliminary Marine study had disclosed that three abandoned
ferry crossings met military requirements: one downstream from Kimpo
Airfield; one at Yongdungpo in the zone of the 1st Marines; and one
opposite Kimpo near the village of Haengju. The first was too far from
Seoul, and the second too near; but the Haengju site seemed to satisfy
all conditions, subject to General Craig’s verification by helicopter
reconnaissance.[282]
[282] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 218–219.
Next to be discussed was the problem of bridging material. The X Corps
engineer officer, Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny, reported that
Corps had no material other than that brought by the 1st Engineer
Battalion of the Marines. Fortunately, that unit’s commanding officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Partridge, was prepared to meet the emergency.
Although he did not have enough floating bridge material to span such a
wide stream, he reported to General Smith that he could have one 50-ton
raft in operation to support the assault of troops crossing in LVTs,
and another shortly afterwards. These rafts would take the tanks and
vehicles across, and Partridge added that later his engineers might be
able to put together an actual bridge by combining floating and Bailey
components.[283]
[283] LtCol J. H. Partridge interv, 23 Nov 54.
The two Marine regiments had been in effect the infantry of X Corps
up to this time. But Almond promised the Marine general that the
32d Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division would be moved up on the
right flank of RCT-1. This Army unit, it may be recalled, had made an
administrative landing at Inchon on the 18th and gone into an assembly
area under 1st Marine Division control. The other two regiments of the
7th Division were the 31st Infantry, due to arrive on the 20th, and the
17th Infantry, still attached to the Eighth Army.
The X Corps commander lost no time at ordering the 32d to move up on
the right, after reverting to the control of the 7th Division, to
relieve the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. This was the first of a series
of maneuvers carried out on the 19th in preparation for the river
crossing. On the left, the 2d Battalion of the KMCs advanced against
negligible opposition to occupy the high ground south of the Han and
provide flank protection for the crossing.
A more intricate maneuver was carried out when 1st Battalion of
the 5th Marines was relieved west of Yongdungpo by its opposite of
RCT-1, which had sideslipped to the left after the 32d Infantry moved
up in protection of the regiment’s right flank. This shift was not
accomplished without some fighting, the account of which belongs in a
forthcoming chapter dealing with the battle for Yongdungpo.
Another preliminary step was taken on the 19th when the 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion was relieved of its mission of supporting the 1st
Marines. All LVTs were withdrawn as the unit displaced by motor march
to the vicinity of Kimpo Airfield, a distance of about 18 miles.[284]
[284] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Tare Tare.
The 1st Shore Party Battalion was also concerned in planning for the
river crossing. On the 19th this unit reverted to Division control and
displaced to the vicinity of Oeoso-ri. Meanwhile, a reconnaissance
detail reported to the CP of the 5th Marines with a mission of
selecting DUKW, LVT, and ferry sites. The shore party battalion was
also to have the responsibility of establishing evacuation stations and
supply dumps on both banks after the crossing while exerting LVT and
DUKW traffic control.[285]
[285] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Mike Mike.
Except for the 1st Battalion, the 5th Marines had no trouble on the
19th while advancing to its assigned positions on the south bank of
the Han. All objectives were occupied against little or no opposition,
placing the regiment in position for the crossing.