On to Kimpo
_Operations on Other Korean Fronts--Landing of RCT-7 in
Japan--Destruction of NKPA Tank Column--General MacArthur Visits the
Front--The Drive to Kimpo Airfield--Action at 5th Marines CP--Enemy
Counterattack at Kimpo_
On Sunday morning, D-plus 2, General Smith was directed as Landing
Force Commander to re-establish civil government in Inchon. Although
parts of the Korean seaport had been burned or battered into rubble,
thousands of refugees were returning to the ruins of their homes after
having fled during the bombardments. The KMC Regiment, operating
under the control of RCT-5, had been given the task of screening the
remaining inhabitants for their loyalty. No fault could have been found
with the thoroughness of these Korean allies who were perhaps inclined
to be too zealous when they suspected subversion.
General Smith concluded that the best procedure was to find loyal
Korean officials and uphold their authority. He consulted Rear Admiral
Sohn Won Yil, the ROK Chief of Naval Operations, and learned that the
former mayor of Inchon had fled during the original NKPA invasion and
never returned. Admiral Sohn vouched for the loyalty of one of the
political prisoners, Pyo Yang Moon, who had been the losing candidate
for the mayoralty in the last election. The Marine general decided to
install him as Inchon’s chief executive and issued a proclamation to
that effect in Korean as well as English.
Induction ceremonies were held on the morning of 18 September on the
portico of the city hall, a once imposing edifice which bore the scars
of war. About 700 prominent citizens attended as the Marine interpreter
led in singing the Korean national anthem. After the proclamation had
been read in both languages, General Smith made a few remarks and
the new mayor responded. A ROK Marine guard of honor officiated, and
Admiral Sohn brought the occasion to a close with a brief address.
Steps were taken immediately to bury the civilian dead, to care for
the orphans, to distribute food and clothing to the distressed, and to
establish a civilian hospital and police force.[211]
[211] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 197–199.
_Operations on Other Korean Fronts_
Dispatches received from the Pusan Perimeter revealed that the Eighth
Army had jumped off according to schedule on the 16th in its joint
offensive. Although gains were negligible the first day, this effort
was pinning down NKPA troops who might otherwise have reinforced the
defenders of Kimpo and Seoul.
Several other operations had been mounted on both coasts as diversions
to keep the enemy guessing as to where the lightning would strike.
Kunsan, it may be recalled, had been briefly considered by X Corps
planners as an alternate amphibious objective. Early in September this
west coast seaport was selected as the chief target of feints during
the preparations for the Inchon landing. General Stratemeyer’s Fifth
Air Force bombers initiated strikes on rail and highway communications
within a 30-mile radius. That same day a hit-and-run amphibious raid on
Kunsan was planned at Admiral Joy’s headquarters in Tokyo. As a result,
Colonel Ely sailed with his company on the British frigate _Whitesand
Bay_ and raided the Kunsan waterfront on the night of 12 September.
Three casualties were incurred from enemy machine-gun fire.
The Seventh Fleet added to the deception by singling out Kunsan
for carrier air strikes and naval gunfire bombardments to give the
impression of softening up an objective for amphibious assault.
Chinnampo, the seaport of Pyongyang, also appeared to be threatened
when it was bombarded by a British task force.
On the east coast the USS _Missouri_, just arrived from the United
States, poured 16-inch shells into Samchok on 14 September while a
Navy helicopter did the spotting. The cruiser _Helena_ and three U. S.
destroyers added their metal to the bombardment.[212]
[212] Material for this section has been derived from Karig,
_Korea_, 112, 243–255.
D-day at Inchon was the date of a landing of ROK guerrillas behind the
NKPA lines at Changsa-dong, a coastal town about midway between Yongdok
and Pohang-dong. After the ROK merchant marine LST struck submerged
rocks and grounded, it was used as an improvised fortress by the
guerrillas, who retreated from the NKPA forces when their ammunition
ran short. The only two Americans, an Army lieutenant and sergeant,
radioed for help; and the cruiser _Helena_ provided naval gunfire for
the Navy relief expedition which took off the survivors.
How much these diversions on both Korean coasts may have contributed
to a surprise at Inchon is a moot question. It might even be argued
that the enemy was not surprised, since an intercepted NKPA radio
message warned Pyongyang on 13 September that United Nations vessels
were approaching Inchon and planes bombing Wolmi-do. The senders
deduced that an amphibious landing was forthcoming and assured NKPA
Headquarters that defensive units were being stationed where they would
repulse the UN forces.[213]
[213] Quoted in Karig, _Korea_, 202.
This would make it appear doubtful that a surprise had been achieved.
But it is the opinion of Admiral Struble that “the actual results in
the Inchon-Seoul area clearly indicate surprise.... While the message
was apparently sent, and was a good report, there is no evidence that
the enemy headquarters accepted the report. It is possible that a later
report that the enemy bombarding ships were retreating from Inchon may
have confused the issue. In any event, only a short time was available
to take advantage of strong defensive positions and certainly not
enough time to mine the harbor.”[214]
[214] VAdm A. D. Struble ltr to authors, 18 May 55.
An excellent analysis of the outcome is to be found in Admiral Doyle’s
official report. After paying tribute to the pre-D-day bombardments by
the cruisers and destroyers, plus the air strikes by planes of TF-77
and TG-90.5, he concluded that “the assault itself was successful only
through the perfect teamwork that existed between the participating
Naval and Marine elements. The successful accomplishment of the
assault on Inchon demanded that an incredible number of individual and
coordinated tasks be performed precisely as planned. Only the United
States Marines, through their many years of specialized training in
amphibious warfare, in conjunction with the Navy, had the requisite
know-how to formulate the plans within the limited time available
and execute those plans flawlessly without additional training or
rehearsal.”[215]
[215] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Annex Able Able, 8.
_Landing of RCT-7 in Japan_
Dispatches were received on D-plus 2 at the new Division CP to the
effect that the 7th Marines was preparing to embark that day from Kobe
and land at Inchon on 21 September.
The 3d Battalion of this regiment, it may be recalled, had originally
been a unit of the 6th Marines on FMFLant duty with the Sixth Fleet
in the Mediterranean. Upon being ordered to the Far East, the unit
sailed from Crete to Japan by way of the Suez Canal and Indian Ocean.
Lieutenant Colonel Dowsett, the battalion commander, did not know
throughout the voyage what specific mission awaited his men.
They later met at Kobe their new regimental commander, Colonel
Litzenberg, who had flown to Japan ahead of the other two battalions
sailing from San Diego. He informed Dowsett that his battalion was
now a part of the 7th Marines and named him executive officer of the
regiment. Major Maurice E. Roach succeeded to the command of the newly
designated 3/7.
A formidable task awaited the 7th Marines in Japan. The officers of the
staff, not having served with the Division before, were unfamiliar with
references and terms in directives dealing with the Inchon landing.
Problems of integrating the regiment into the operations of the
division were solved only by intensive application.
A reshuffling of the regiment had to be accomplished meanwhile before
embarking for Inchon. The purpose was to spread the hundreds of
reservists throughout the three battalions instead of having them
concentrated in several companies.[216]
[216] Dowsett interv, 2 Nov 54.
It took some remarkable adjustments to get the regiment ready for
embarkation from Kobe only 17 days after sailing from San Diego. But
it meant that the 7th Marines would get into the fight at least a week
sooner than Division planners had anticipated.
_Destruction of NKPA Tank Column._
The amphibious assault phase was left behind on D-plus 2 when the 1st
and 5th Marines jumped off from the western outskirts of Ascom City to
initiate their drive inland. With the exploitation phase coming next,
command relationships would be as follows:
+-------------+
| CinCFE |
+------+------+
|
+------+------+
| CG X Corps |
+------+------+
|
+------+------+
|CG 1st MarDiv|
+------+------+
|
+---------+---------+
| |
+------+------+ +------+------+
|CG 1st MarDiv| |CG 7th InfDiv|
+-------------+ +-------------+
The night of 16–17 September had been quiet all along the Division
front. It was so quiet, in fact, that the troops of 2/5 paid no
particular heed to a truck which drove through their lines on the
Inchon-Seoul Highway about midnight. Not until the vehicle penetrated a
few hundred yards into Marine territory was it stopped by curious tank
crews of Able/Tanks’ 1st Platoon, whose M-26s were deployed across the
road in deep anti-mechanized defense. The startled occupants of the
stray truck turned out to be an NKPA officer and four enlisted men, but
they were no more surprised than the Marines who stepped out of the
darkness and took them prisoner.[217]
[217] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; and Capt J. E.
Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55.
Apparently, neither the tank crews nor anybody else in the area
attached any special importance to the strange truck incident. In a few
hours, however, an epic of smoke, flame, and twisted steel would attest
to the significance of this scrap of evidence. The fact of the matter
was that the Red leaders in Seoul did not know the exact location of
the 1st Marine Division.
It will be recalled that Dog Company of 2/5 occupied a hill on the west
side of the highway as the attack on D-plus 1 ground to a halt. About
200 yards beyond the company front was a large knoll that nosed into
the center of Ascom City. Observing that the highway turned sharply to
the east and passed through a cut at the base of the knoll, Lieutenant
H. J. Smith decided to outpost the natural roadblock in strength. At
dusk, therefore, he dispatched the 2d Platoon, under Second Lieutenant
Lee R. Howard, to man the advance position along with machine-gun and
rocket-launcher attachments.[218]
[218] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; McNaughton interv,
7 Jan 55; and Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55.
As the first rays of dawn creased the sky on 17 September, Howard and
his troops were entrenched in a compact perimeter atop the knoll.
Several hundred yards to the rear, the 1st Platoon of A/Tanks was
augmented in its blocking position by 3.5-inch rocket launchers of 2/5
and the 75mm recoilless rifles of the 5th Marines. Just across the road
from this formidable array were more 75s and 3.5s of the 1st Marines,
emplaced with Fox Company of 2/1 on Hill 186.[219]
[219] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes Oboe Oboe, Peter Peter, and
Queen Queen; and 2/1 _SAR_, 5.
Records of the 5th Marines describe this bristling gauntlet as “... a
temporary defensive position in depth....” It was more like a giant
torpedo.
Sometime before daybreak, a North Korean column formed on the
Inchon-Seoul Highway a few miles east of Ascom City.[220] In the van
were six sleek T-34s of the 42d NKPA Mechanized Regiment. Perched
atop the tanks and strung out for about a hundred yards were 200
Red infantrymen, comprising a mixed representation of the 18th NKPA
Division in Seoul. The enemy force was on its way to block the advance
of the 1st Marine Division along the highway.
[220] The following narrative, unless otherwise noted, is
taken from: 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes Baker, Oboe Oboe,
Peter Peter, Queen Queen; 2/1 _SAR_; Harrell interv, 4
Jan 55; Roise interv, 21 Dec 54; and McNaughton interv,
7 Jan 55; and Statement of Capt W. D. Pomeroy enclosed
in Maj G. M. English ltr to CMC, 19 Apr 55.
It was obvious that the Communist soldiers had little or no knowledge
of the situation ahead. For as they neared Ascom City at the crack
of dawn, some were still sitting comfortably on the tanks and eating
breakfast. Others laughed and jabbered as they trailed along the road.
Lieutenant Howard saw them approaching his Dog Company outpost on the
knoll. He reported to Smith, who passed the word to Roise at 2/5’s CP,
first one tank, then three, and finally six. Roise took the information
with the proverbial grain of salt, supposing it to be a delusion of
youth and inexperience. Just as quickly as that impression formed in
his mind, it was shattered by the first reverberations of the battle.
[Illustration: NK COUNTERATTACK
ASCOM CITY-17 SEPT]
The attitude of the enemy soldiers as they neared his outpost convinced
Howard that they were unaware of the proximity of Marine lines. He let
the head of the column slip by on the road below, therefore, until the
tanks began to round the bend leading to Dog Company’s MLR. Then the
platoon leader shouted the order, and his men opened up with machine
guns, rifles, and BARs.[221]
[221] _Ibid._
The Red infantry went down under the hail of lead like wheat under the
sickle. Soldiers on the tanks were knocked to the road, where many were
ground under as the big vehicles lurched and roared crazily in reaction
to the surprise.
Corporal Okey J. Douglas moved part way down the knoll and closed on
the lead T-34 with his 2.36-inch rocket launcher. A few well-placed
rounds, fired calmly at a range of 75 yards, killed the armored vehicle
on the spot. Continuing the single-handed assault, Douglas damaged tank
number 2 just as the main Marine position exploded into action.
Under attack by the outpost, the cripple and the four unharmed T-34s
had continued around the road bend, some of them spilling off the curve
in an attempt to deploy in the adjacent rice paddy. All five were taken
under fire by First Lieutenant William D. Pomeroy’s M-26s, about 600
yards away. Within five minutes, the Marine 90mm guns threw 45 rounds
of AP at the enemy armor.
Recoilless rifles of Second Lieutenant Charles M. Jones’ platoon (5th
Marines AT Co) added their hot metal at a range of 500 yards, and the
75s with the 1st Marines across the road also erupted. Simultaneously,
Second Lieutenant James E. Harrell ordered the 3.5-inch rocket
launchers of 2/5’s assault platoon into action.
The T-34’s didn’t have a chance. All of them exploded under the heavy
fusilade; and when the smoke cleared, they were heaps of burning
wreckage. Scattered around the dead tanks and along the road were the
bodies of 200 Red infantrymen. So rapid and complete was the enemy’s
destruction that only one Marine casualty--slightly wounded--resulted
from the fight.
It was only natural that conflicting claims would arise among the
participants in the short, violent clash. To Pomeroy’s tank crews, it
appeared that the M-26s accounted for the five T-34s with little or
no assistance from infantry arms. This was a reasonable conclusion on
their part, owing to the limited visibility from the buttoned vehicles
and the fact that their 90mm guns unquestionably wrought the greatest
destruction on the NKPA machines. Since so many weapons were firing
simultaneously from various other positions, however, and since the
T-34s were wrecked so completely, kills and partial kills were also
claimed by the recoilless rifles of both regiments. Moreover, the
3.5-inch rocket gunners of 2/5 and 2/1 believed that some of their
rounds found the mark in the midst of the furor. It is known, for
instance, that Private First Class Walter C. Monegan, Jr., rocket
man in the assault squad of Fox Company, 1st Marines, closed on the
enemy vehicles after they had rounded the bend and fired his weapon at
point-blank ranges.
_General MacArthur Visits the Front_
The acrid odor of high explosives still lingered in the fresh morning
air as a column of jeeps came slowly around the bend from the rear.
General MacArthur was making his first visit to the front. With him and
Admiral Struble were Generals Almond, Shepherd, Smith, Ruffner, Hodes,
Wright, and a group of X Corps staff officers. Several jeeps filled
with newspaper correspondents and photographers followed close behind
the military cortege.[222]
[222] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 17 Sep 50.
Grimy Marines of RCT-5, their eyes dazzled by the glitter of starry
insignia, gazed in wonder at this sudden revelation of the pomp and
circumstance of war. The generals and admirals in their turn were
equally impressed by the destruction these Marines had wrought--the
warm corpses beside the road, the blazing heaps of twisted metal that
had been T-34 tanks only a few minutes before.
The Marine driver parked the leading jeep on a culvert and General
MacArthur leaped down to survey the spectacle. Instantly he was
surrounded by cameramen snapping pictures which would soon appear on
stateside front pages. All America was rejoicing at the turning tide in
Korea after the humiliating weeks of delaying operations.
Early that morning CinCFE had been met by General Smith at YELLOW Beach
and welcomed to the 1st Marine Division CP, a Quonset hut with a dirt
floor. There the commander in chief was briefed by the Division G-2 and
G-3 on the military situation.
The second stop was at the 1st Marines CP. CinCFE informed Colonel
Puller and Admiral Sohn that he was awarding each of them a Silver
Star. Reaching into the pocket of his leather jacket, he discovered
that he had no medals with him.
“Make a note of that,” he enjoined an aide as the correspondents busily
scribbled on their pads.
Next, the route of the procession led to the zone of RCT-5 and the
scene of the Marine tank ambush. It was not exactly a happy occasion
for General Smith, who felt a heavy responsibility for the lives and
welfare of the 1st Marine Division’s distinguished guests. Not only was
the commander in chief indifferent to danger, but the Marine general
had similar cause to worry about others making the tour of inspection.
For instance, there was Frank Lowe, a 66-year-old retired National
Guard major general visiting Korea as President Truman’s personal
observer. Astonishingly hardy for his age, this admirer of the Marines
took personal risks which gave concern to Smith. Another source of
anxiety was the attractive correspondent of a New York newspaper,
Marguerite Higgins, who had hit RED Beach on the heels of the Landing
Force.
Both she and Lowe were on hand when the column of jeeps stopped to
survey the results of the tank ambush. Smith scanned the landscape with
apprehension, devoutly hoping that some hidden foeman would not choose
this moment to obliterate several visiting generals with a well-aimed
mortar round. It was with relief that he departed with MacArthur for
a visit to the CP of the 5th Marines. And it was just as well that he
did not learn until later what happened shortly after his departure.
First Lieutenant George C. McNaughton’s platoon, hearing a suspicious
noise, had flushed seven armed NKPA soldiers out of a culvert--the
culvert on which General MacArthur’s jeep had been parked! A few rifle
shots persuaded them to surrender as the only survivors of the enemy
expedition.[223]
[223] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55.
The caravan of distinguished visitors proceeded meanwhile to the CP of
the 5th Marines, raising a cloud of dust that could be seen for miles.
Lieutenant Colonel Murray and General Craig were next to be awarded
Silver Stars by General MacArthur. His tour of inspection ended with a
look at the Marine stockade in Inchon, where 671 NKPA prisoners were
held, and a survey of the defenses of Wolmi-do.
When the Marine general returned to his CP, he found Major General
James M. Gavin, USA, waiting to make a detailed study of Marine close
air support and the weapons employed. The day ended with Ruffner
and Hodes conferring with Smith on plans for the employment of the
32d Infantry, due to land the next day as the first unit of the 7th
Infantry Division to go ashore. Plans were made for the Army unit to
assume responsibility at 1200 on 19 September for the zone of action on
RCT-1’s right flank.[224]
[224] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 29; O. P. Smith,
_Chronicle_, 18 Sep 50.
_The Drive to Kimpo Airfield_
On the evening of D-plus 1, General Smith had issued OpnO 5-50,
directing the 1st and 5th Marines to attack toward Corps Phase Line CC
the next morning.[225] The actual jump-off on 17 September was delayed
about an hour by the intrusion of the ill-fated Red tank column.
[225] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Charlie, 7.
Both in scope and in shape, Phase Line CC was an enlargement of the
FBHL. Beginning on the coast above Inchon and running parallel to the
Inchon-Seoul Highway, the line extended inland about eight miles to
bend around Kimpo Airfield. It then ran southward, intersecting the
highway two miles east of Sosa and finally terminating at an inlet not
far from the Namdong Peninsula.
The 5th Marines’ tactical plan was of necessity an ambitious one, since
approximately two-thirds of the Division’s projected 19-mile frontage
lay in Murray’s zone. On the left, an attached KMC battalion would
attack northward to the phase line, taking high ground Objectives
One, Two, and Three en route. Roise’s 2d Battalion was to advance
in the center on a northeasterly course, which included Objectives
ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE, the latter being Kimpo itself. Newton’s 1st
Battalion would follow the 2d initially, then take over the regimental
right and seize Objectives EASY and FOX, two sprawling hills just
beyond the phase line.[226]
[226] _Ibid._, Annex Queen Queen.
The 3d KMC Battalion passed through 2/5’s lines at 0700 for the purpose
of clearing the western outskirts of Ascom City before driving toward
its numbered objectives to the north. That the initial mission was
accomplished only with considerable difficulty and assistance will be
shown later. Afterwards the Korean Marines made rapid progress, as they
advanced over flatlands almost devoid of enemy resistance.
[Illustration: THE DRIVE TO KIMPO
5TH MARINES
17 SEPTEMBER]
Lieutenant Colonel Roise launched 2/5’s attack at 0900. Company E led
the long route column eastward on the Inchon-Seoul Highway through the
carnage left by the defeat of the Red tank thrust. Having marched about
a mile, the vanguard of the battalion turned left on a secondary road
that traced the eastern edge of Ascom City.[227]
[227] _Ibid._ The word “Ascom” was formed from “Army Service
Command.”
This expansive urban area would prove to be a thorn in the side of the
5th Marines for the next 24 hours. Originally a large Korean village
called Taejong-ni, Ascom City became the site of a huge service command
of the United States Army during the occupation of South Korea after
World War II. The few acres of small buildings and thatched huts had
grown into almost two square miles of residential, industrial, and
storage area. Caves, large warehouses, hundreds of other buildings,
and a complex network of streets made it an ideal hiding place for
fragments of a broken enemy, as the Marines were shortly to learn.
Marching northward through the outskirts, Easy Company of 2/5 was
repeatedly held up by small pockets of resistance among the dwellings
on both sides of the road. Captain Jaskilka’s veteran infantry reduced
the enemy positions methodically, but the whole morning was used up in
the process. Simultaneously with the main advance, the 2d Platoon of
Fox Company marched through the heart of Ascom City and screened 2/5’s
left flank. Second Lieutenant Tilton A. Anderson, the platoon leader,
reported everything quiet in his zone, although his men did not have
time to check all of the side streets and blocks of buildings.[228]
[228] _Ibid._; Capt T. A. Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
Having cleared the eastern fringe of the city by noon, Roise looked in
vain for the branch road shown on his map as leading to Objective Able
and Baker, some four miles distant. The chart was inaccurate, and only
a time-consuming reconnaissance could locate the correct route. It was
already 1400 by the time Company E led off on the hike.
While 2/5 was having its troubles in the eastern outskirts, Lieutenant
Colonel Taplett’s 3d Battalion stepped in to help the Korean Marines on
the other side of Ascom City. In regimental reserve, 3/5 was scheduled
to occupy a series of assembly areas throughout the day, moving forward
by bounds behind the assault elements. The morning displacement, into
the western edge of Ascom City, took place before the KMC attack had
cleared the suburb as planned. Using his initiative, Taplett committed
his battalion against moderate resistance that was holding up the South
Koreans.[229]
[229] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and Maj R. A.
McMullen interv, 27 Jul 54.
Company G went into action and knocked out a Communist machine-gun
emplacement in the city. Next, a George Company patrol attacked a
strong enemy force deployed among the buildings. The North Koreans fled
after a hot fight, leaving behind 18 dead at a cost of three wounded to
the Marines. Item and How Companies also spread out through the maze of
streets, and there were several more skirmishes before the “assembly
area” was secured. The Korean Marines then passed through and attacked
to the north, as mentioned earlier.[230]
[230] _Ibid._
The 1st Platoon of A/Tanks, having silenced other enemy positions in
the city, made contact with 3/5 at 1500. Leaving the built-up area,
Lieutenant Pomeroy led his M-26s in search of 2/5, in order to support
that unit’s drive on Kimpo. His armor was escorted by Lieutenant
Anderson’s rifle platoon, which had just completed its independent
mission in Ascom City without incident. Finding a road to the
northeast proved as much of a headache to Pomeroy as it had to Roise,
particularly since his big vehicles could not use the same route over
which 2/5’s infantry column had advanced an hour earlier.[231]
[231] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; and Anderson interv,
20 Aug 54.
Extending his quest northward, the tank platoon leader found a road
that not only paralleled the infantry’s path but also led to within a
few hundred yards of Kimpo, now about five miles distant. The M-26s
proceeded approximately a mile on the new route and were stopped by a
damaged bridge. First Lieutenant Wayne E. Richards rounded up a party
of Korean natives to help his 2d Platoon of A/Engineers repair the
span. During the layover, Pomeroy’s force was beefed up by another
platoon of M-26s, brought forward by Captain Gearl M. English, the
company commander, and by a long column of rolling stock from 2/5’s
headquarters.[232]
[232] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes Oboe Oboe and Queen Queen.
Meanwhile, the leading elements of Roise’s infantry reached the foot
of Objectives Able and Baker, two large hills about 4,000 yards due
south of Kimpo. There being no evidence of the enemy in the area,
the battalion commander did not waste time by committing whole rifle
companies to the high ground. At 1600, Lieutenant Deptula’s 1st
Platoon of Easy Company ascended Objective Baker, while the rest of
the battalion waited on the road below. The hill was laced with vacant
entrenchments, and once on the summit, Deptula further observed that
objective Able was unoccupied. Moreover, he reported by radio that
it appeared to be clear sailing over the low ground leading to the
airfield.[233]
[233] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and Deptula
interv, 18 Jan 55.
Acting on this information, Roise promptly launched his attack on
Kimpo, one of the major tactical objectives of the Inchon-Seoul
operation. A left face by the roadbound column put the troops of 2/5 on
line for the assault. Easy and Dog Companies, the latter on the left,
advanced rapidly against only desultory sniper fire.
Captain English’s tanks arrived propitiously, entering far out to the
left front of the attacking infantry. At a point 1,000 yards south of
the airfield, the M-26s came under moderate small-arms fire. Lieutenant
Anderson’s rifle platoon dismounted and engaged the small force of
North Koreans, knocking out one automatic weapon with grenades. The
Marine armor put down the remaining resistance with seven rounds
of 90mm High Explosive (HE) followed by a thorough hosing with bow
machine-gun fire.[234]
[234] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; and Anderson interv,
20 Aug 54.
Just as this action subsided, Company D of 2/5 swept through the area,
picked up a platoon of tanks, and continued toward the airfield. The
other platoon of armor swung to the right to support Easy Company’s
attack. By 1800, the Marines were on the southern tip of Kimpo’s main
runway. Aside from sporadic long range fire from the east, there was no
opposition worthy of note.[235]
[235] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; Roise interv, 21
Dec 54; and Deptula interv, 18 Jan 55.
_Action at 5th Marines CP_
Over a mile long and three-quarters of a mile wide, Korea’s principal
airdrome was no mean target to secure. Scattered around the field were
more than half a dozen villages, and the runways themselves were lined
by scores of plane revetments and emplacements. It was already dusk
when Roise ordered his two assault companies to take the objective
“with all speed,” but by nightfall the infantry and tanks had cleared
only the southern portion of the runway.[236]
[236] Maj S. Jaskilka memo to authors, 13 May 55; Roise
interv, 21 Dec 54. In the gathering darkness, Roise
underestimated the size of the airfield and thought
he controlled more than actually was the case. Thus
he reported the objective “secured” at 2020, as 2/5
commenced digging in for the night.
Rather than stretch a single defensive line to the point of diminishing
returns, the battalion commander deployed his three rifle companies in
separate perimeters, each one a tightly knit strong point. Easy Company
dug in on the east of the main runway and Dog on the west. Company F
deployed to the south of the airfield, paying particular attention
to the main road and a pair of intersections that tied in secondary
routes. In a central perimeter was 2/5’s CP, and Able Company Tanks
took up positions in Company D’s area. Just before dark, Lieutenant
Deptula’s platoon had raced northward to outpost the village of
Soryu-li, several hundred yards beyond Company E’s lines.[237]
[237] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and Deptula
interv, 18 Jan 55.
While 2/5 was investing the southern reaches of Kimpo, Lieutenant
Colonel Newton’s 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, pressed the attack on the
regimental right. Encountering no resistance, Company A occupied the
southern portion of Objective Easy at 1900. Company B ascended the
northern half of the high ground without incident later in the evening.
With Charlie Company on another hill to the west, 1/5 settled down for
the night some 1,500 yards southeast of the 2d Battalion’s lines. Two
miles to the rear, 3/5 deployed in regimental reserve around a critical
road junction midway between Kimpo and Ascom City.[238]
[238] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
During the afternoon of 17 September, as the assault elements of the
5th Marines rolled forward over a relatively quiet front, regimental
headquarters suddenly found itself in the center of an angry hornets’
nest. Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s CP had just displaced to the north of
the railroad station in Ascom City, when Commissioned Warrant Officer
Bill E. Parrish walked across the tracks to reconnoiter a site for his
ordnance dump. Gaining the summit of a small knoll, the officer and his
NCO assistants were met by a heavy fusilade from the orchard and rice
paddy beyond. Parrish was killed instantly and two of his men seriously
wounded.[239]
[239] Capt G. H. Stewart interv, 17 Nov 54.
Cries of help brought First Lieutenant Nicholas A. Canzona’s 1st
Platoon of A/Engineers, which had just arrived at Murray’s CP. In
a brief clash around the orchard, the engineers killed ten enemy
die-hards. South Korean police swept through the adjoining rice paddy
and came up with seven prisoners.
About the same time, Major James D. Jordan’s party arrived in the area
to select a position for Battery A of 1/11. Again small-arms fire
crackled. Two of Jordan’s NCOs, Technical Sergeants Kenneth C. Boston
and Donald Comiskey, plowed through the hail of lead and killed four
more North Koreans.[240]
[240] Maj J. D. Jordan interv, 27 Sep 54.
North of the railroad, still another Marine was killed and one more
wounded not far from Murray’s headquarters. For obvious reasons a tight
perimeter of engineers and H&S Company troops was drawn around the CP
during the night. Nevertheless, a Red officer stumbled through the
line in the darkness and seriously wounded Second Lieutenant Lawrence
Hetrick of A/Engineers.
At dawn on 18 September the regimental commander and his staff were
awakened by the chatter of an enemy submachine gun a few yards from the
CP. Holed up in a grain field with one Communist rifleman, the officer
who had shot Hetrick fought fanatically against a whole platoon of
engineers. Another Marine was wounded before the suicidal stand was
crushed by grenades and rifle fire.
There were no regrets when Murray’s headquarters took leave of Ascom
City and displaced to Kimpo.
_Enemy Counterattack at Kimpo_
The air at Kimpo was charged with tension during the night of 17–18
September. Troops of 2/5, manning perimeters which had been laid out on
unfamiliar ground during darkness, had every reason to believe that the
North Koreans would not give up the airfield without a fight.
But there were troubles enough in the North Korean camp, where
confusion and panic seemed to be the order of the day. Intelligence
on the enemy garrison in the Kimpo area presents a scrambled picture
so characteristic of the Communist organization throughout the
Inchon-Seoul operation.[241] It appears that elements of the NKPA 1st
Air Force Division were charged with the operation of the airfield.
Under the command of 40-year-old Chinese-trained Brigadier General Wan
Yong, the division was comprised of the following units or, more often
than not, mere fragments thereof:
[241] The intelligence summary is derived from: 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annexes Baker and Queen Queen.
Division Headquarters
1st Co, Engineer Bn, Fighters Regt
3d Co, Engineer Bn, Fighters Regt
3d Plat, Gunners Co
2d Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt
2d Bn, 1st Regt
Finance Co, 3d Technical Bn
Supply Co
The Kimpo force was augmented by a motley mixture of poorly trained
troops from the 226th and 107th NKPA Regiments and the separate 877th
Air Force Unit. In the face of the Marine advance, Colonel Han Choi
Han, commander of the 107th had fled across the Han River, leaving the
remnants of his regiment to an obvious fate. Major Kung Chan So, leader
of the 877th AF Unit, was killed in action on 17 September. Of the 400
men originally assigned to this organization, only five remained in
combat by 18 September.
Crowded into undesirable terrain between the airfield and the Han
River, the Red troops were demoralized and bewildered by the rapid
advance of the 5th Marines. Only the fanaticism of a few officers and
NCOs prevented the complete collapse that would have resulted from the
lack of tangible assistance from the North Korean leaders in Seoul. And
it was no boost to sagging morale that white clothing had been issued
by the Supply Company, so that the Red soldiers could quickly change to
the traditional Korean garb when defeat was imminent, and dissolve in
the local populace.
In the counterattack against the airfield, which was designed to uproot
a full-strength Marine battalion backed by tanks and other heavy
fire support, the celebrated night tactics of the Communists fizzled
completely. With only a few hundred men at most, the rest having
slipped away to safer parts, the North Koreans further reduced their
strength by trying to develop three widely separated attacks. That they
launched these assaults with only rifles and submachine guns serves to
make the story more incredible.
The first move was in company strength against Lieutenant Deptula’s
isolated platoon outpost in Soryu-li, far to the north of Easy Company
lines.[242] Deployed on both sides of a road junction in the village,
the Marines heard the enemy column approaching about 0300. Deptula held
fire until the Red vanguard marched into the center of his position.
Sergeant Richard L. Martson then jumped to his feet, bellowed “United
States Marines!” and opened up with his carbine on full automatic. A
sheet of rifle and BAR fire poured into the column from the roadsides,
and a dozen North Koreans went down in a heap. The remainder fled.
[242] The account of the Kimpo counterattacks is taken from:
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; Deptula interv, 18
Jan 55; and Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55.
The Communist commander rallied his soldiers for three more thrusts
against the Marine platoon. In between the attacks, his gravel-voiced
exhortations ground the air. The will to fight was lacking, however,
and each time, the attackers barely brushed the Marine position before
darting back into the night.
A T-34 tank was finally brought up to buttress another North Korean
assault. Without AT weapons to stop the armored vehicle rumbling
down the road toward his platoon, Deptula retracted southward in the
direction of 2/5’s main positions. The outpost had suffered only one
KIA and one WIA in blunting the four attacks. It was not pursued during
the withdrawal.
Deptula’s platoon gained Company E’s lines at 0500, just before the
perimeter received enemy small-arms fire from the west. Captain
Jaskilka, supposing it to be coming inadvertently from Dog Company,
forbade his men to reply. He stood up and yelled, “Hey! Cease fire, you
guys, this is Easy Company!” Fortunately, the enemy’s aim must have
been disturbed by the spectacle of a Marine officer giving orders, for
Jaskilka escaped without a scratch after discovering his mistake. This
enemy force proved to number about two squads, and just at that moment
the main NKPA force hit from the east. Easy Company was thus engaged
on two fronts, with Jones’ recoilless gun platoon taking on the attack
from the west while the 2d Platoon bore the brunt of the assault from
the east.[243]
[243] Jaskilka memo, 13 May 55.
The 2d Battalion’s southernmost position, manned by Company F, had
been active throughout the night. Lieutenant Harrell’s assault platoon
together with Richards’ engineer outfit was entrenched around an
overpass within the southeastern arc of the company perimeter. In
the first hours of 18 September, a North Korean lieutenant and his
five-man demolition team tried to reach the bridge in an apparent
attempt to destroy it. Sergeant Ray D. Kearl opposed the intruders
single-handedly, killing the Red officer and three of his men, and
driving the remaining pair back into the night. Before daybreak,
another enemy patrol approached on the road and was annihilated.
[Illustration: NK COUNTERATTACK
KIMPO AIRFIELD--18 SEPTEMBER]
It proved that these and other scattered incidents were the prelude
to the third and final attack against the airfield, which was
launched from the south at dawn. This last maneuver by the Reds,
however, was checked even before it began, for the 1st Battalion,
5th Marines, spotted the attackers moving across its front toward
Kimpo. Baker Company took the North Koreans under fire immediately,
and the battalion commander called down heavy mortar and artillery
concentrations.
Most of the Communist column was disorganized and dispersed before
it could reach 2/5’s southern defenses. The lone platoon that did
connect with Company F’s perimeter engaged the Marines at the overpass.
Harrell’s troops and the engineers poured small-arms fire and white
phosphorus rockets into the attackers. Staff Sergeant Robert J. Kikta,
defying enemy bullets as he moved among his men shouting encouragement,
fell mortally wounded. Sergeant David R. DeArmond, normally a bulldozer
operator for A/Engineers, was killed behind his machine gun.
After the short, bitter clash, the surviving North Koreans retreated
through the rice paddies and hills leading to the Han River. Companies
E and F, supported by A/Tanks, fanned out from their perimeters and
mopped up. In 1/5’s zone, Lieutenant Colonel Newton committed Charlie
Company against the withdrawing enemy and inflicted more casualties.
Kimpo and the surrounding villages were secured by 1000, 18 September.
Half an hour later, Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered Company D,
supported by tanks, recoilless rifles, and heavy machine guns, to
seize Regimental Objective Dog--Hill 131, which dominated the banks of
the Han River north of the airfield. Advancing under cover of naval
gunfire, the Marines occupied the high ground unopposed at 1145.[244]
[244] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
In the 24 hours since leaving Ascom City, the 2d Battalion, 5th
Marines, had suffered four KIA and 19 WIA in driving over nine miles of
hills and rice paddies.[245] The rapid advance cost the North Koreans
100 dead in 2/5’s zone, ten prisoners, and one of the finest airdromes
in the Far East.
[245] _Ibid._