Securing the Beachhead
_Supplies on RED and BLUE Beaches--Surgical Teams on the
Beaches--Artillery and Tank Operations--The Attack on D-plus 1--Advance
to the Force Beachhead Line--Displacement Ashore of Division CP_
Of all the calculated risks taken at Inchon, perhaps the most daring
was the decision to ground eight LSTs abreast on RED Beach immediately
after the assault troops landed. The Navy workhorses were vulnerable
enough at best, and on this narrow strip of waterfront they were lined
up so close to one another that shots fired by a blindfolded enemy
could scarcely have missed.
Not all the NKPA shells and bullets did miss, for that matter. But
fortune as usual blessed the bold, and such enemy rounds as found their
targets did not touch off tons of napalm, gasoline, and ammunition.
Only with reluctance had the planners accepted the risk of landing
thin-skinned supply vessels before the immediate battle area was
secured. But Inchon was not a typical amphibious operation. The
tremendous tidal range created an unprecedented situation; and if vital
supplies were not landed on the evening high tide, the assault troops
must pass a precarious first night without adequate quantities of
ammunition, water, and gasoline.
Dusk had fallen, with visibility further reduced by smoke and rain
squalls, when the vessels wallowed into RED Beach. The reconnaissance
element of Shore Party Group Able had gone ahead with the assault
troops to erect landing guides during the last moments of daylight.
While the men were working under fire, one of the beach markers was
riddled by enemy machine guns as it was being erected.
The H&S Company of Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Crowe’s 1st Shore Party
Battalion came in with the first of the LSTs, and other elements of
Groups Able and Baker followed in short order. Each of the eight
vessels brought a cargo consisting of 50 tons of ammunition, 30 tons
of rations, 15 tons of water, and five tons of fuel. These special
loads were in addition to the normal cargo of engineer and shore party
equipment and combat vehicles. Every LST was limited to 500 short
tons, however, in order to insure that it could be beached without
trouble.[171]
[171] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Dog.
The last of the LCMs had not yet unloaded and retracted on RED Beach
when the first of the LSTs appeared slightly ahead of schedule. Naval
officers managed to hold the LSTs back until the beach had cleared, and
the eight vessels made a successful landing in spite of treacherous
currents combined with low visibility. Two of them grounded momentarily
on the mud flats but butted their way through to the beach. And though
the sea wall temporarily prevented several vessels from lowering bow
ramps effectively, the LSTs at each end of the line were able to
discharge cargo over their ramps.[172]
[172] LCdr R. Schneelock, Jr., USN, memo to authors, 20 Apr
55.
Bulldozers were first on the beach. They moved along the sea wall under
enemy fire, pushing down sections of masonry which interfered with
unloading operations.
LST 973 had no more than grated ashore when a Red Korean mortar shell
exploded among the drums of motor fuel. Gasoline flooded the main
deck and leaked down to the crew quarters through holes made by shell
fragments. Orders were given to cut off electric motors and enforce
all possible precautions, and the vessel miraculously escaped a
conflagration even though it took further hits from enemy machine-gun
fire.[173]
[173] Karig, _Korea_, 236–241.
LST 857 ran into a ROK PC boat while heading in toward the beach,
but no harm was done to either vessel. Hits from NKPA mortar and
machine-gun fire punctured eight drums of gasoline without any of them
bursting into flame. This was one of the LSTs which fired back at
enemy gun flashes. During the exchange a sailor was killed and another
knocked unconscious when an enemy projectile damaged one of the LST’s
gun mounts.
LST 859, which had a sailor wounded by enemy mortar fragments, hit
RED Beach with all guns blazing away. When the vessel beached, it was
immediately boarded by Marines who helped themselves to ammunition
while shouting to sailors in the well deck to stop firing. The same
message was slammed home more authoritatively when First Lieutenant
William J. Peter, Jr., appeared on deck, as directed by Lieutenant
Colonel Newton, and demanded that the LST’s guns cease at once.[174]
[174] MSgt B. W. Gifford interv, 17 Nov 54; Col G. R. Newton
memo to authors, 16 Apr 55; LCdr D. Weidemeyer memo to
authors, 12 Apr 55.
This put an end to the bombardment of shore positions. “No LSTs fired
after my ship beached,” commented Lieutenant Trumond E. Houston, USN,
commander of LST 799 at the extreme left of the line. “Earlier LSTs
beaching had opened fire on targets unknown to me, but my command had
received very firm orders not to open fire due to the danger of firing
into our own forces.”[175]
[175] LCdr T. E. Houston ltr to authors, 8 Mar 55.
As dusk shaded into darkness, the Marines on and around Cemetery Hill
extended their lines into the city. Even at the climax of the military
drama there was an unexpected note of comedy--assault troops were to
discover shortly that among the ammunition brought by the LSTs, some
useless .22 caliber cartridges testified to the haste of departure from
Camp Pendleton.[176] There was enough M-1 ammunition, however, so that
the enemy had no cause to complain of being neglected by the Marines.
[176] SSgt H. M. Grenell interv, 15 Nov 54.
_Supplies on RED and BLUE Beaches_
It was absolutely essential that the LSTs unload in time to retract
on the morning high tide and allow other cargo vessels to take their
places. This meant an all-night job for the 1st Shore Party Battalion,
which was to initiate unloading on both beaches for the organization
composed also of the 1st Combat Service Group, the 7th Motor Transport
Battalion, and the U. S. Army 2d Engineer Special Brigade, with the
latter in control.
The vehicles came off the LSTs first--about 450 of them, all told--and
darkness had fallen when the unloading of cargo got into full swing.
Congestion on the 650-foot strip of beach did not permit normal
location and employment of dumps. It was catch-as-catch-can for the
shore party troops and engineers, with the cargo being off-loaded
and stockpiled wherever space could be found. Later, as the tactical
situation improved, designated dumps were established.
The men went about their work under the floodlights, heedless of
scattered enemy small-arms fire which continued throughout the
night. At a glance the unloading presented a scene of noisy chaos,
yet everything was so well under control by midnight that the
accomplishment of the mission within prescribed time limits was assured.
In the morning the eight LSTs were retracted according to schedule as
a like number approached the beach to discharge cargo. Two of them
grounded in the mud flats too far out for unloading, but the supply
problem was already so well solved that this setback was not serious.
On BLUE Beach it was not the intention to develop the area beyond the
needs of the initial assault, so that a comparatively small shore party
element was required. Only such equipment as could be carried by hand
was taken ashore in the LCVPs and LVTs.
The reconnaissance element of Shore Party Group B (--) had landed
with the assault troops, followed by the rest of the group at 1930.
Provisions for the use of pre-loaded LVTs having been made in the
assault phase supply plan, the shore party troops set out flanking
lights to mark the entire BLUE area as a single beach. This was in
preparation for the arrival of the 24 LVTs bringing pre-loaded supplies
to sustain the attack in the morning. Ten of these vehicles were so
delayed by adverse currents that a receding tide left them high and
dry. Officers of the 1st Marines decided that the supplies were not
critical enough to warrant unloading by hand over the mud flats, and
the job was postponed until the LVTs could be floated in on the morning
high tide. While they were discharging on BLUE-3, the LCVPs came in
with other gear which was unloaded and stored in the regimental dump.
Prison stockades were set up on both beaches the first night. The LSTs
continued to unload most of the Division supplies on RED Beach in
spite of treacherous currents, the tidal range and the mistakes made
by Japanese crews. BLUE Beach was closed on D-plus 1, having served
its purpose, and the shore party personnel transferred to GREEN Beach,
where facilities for unloading LSTs had been improved. Supplies landed
there could be trucked across the causeway, and on D-plus 2 the shore
party troops on RED Beach were also relieved and sent to Wolmi-do.
The 2d Engineer Special Brigade retained control of all logistical
operations in the Inchon port area on 17 September as vessels began
to discharge at Pier No. 2, designated as YELLOW Beach. There were
assurances by this time that the engineers would soon have the tidal
basin partially operative, thus adding materially to the capacity of
the harbor.[177]
[177] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Mike Mike; Costigan interv,
17 Nov 54; K. W. Condit, “Marine Supply in Korea” in
_Marine Corps Gazette_, 37, no. 1:48–55 (Jan 53).
The 1st Combat Service Group remained in control of consolidated dumps.
This organization was the storage agency for all X Corps supplies with
the exception of ammunition and engineering materials, both of which
were handled by Army personnel. Owing to the shortage of trucks, the
7th Motor Transport Battalion was held in the port area under control
of the engineer brigade.
The lack of enough motor trucks for port operations was alleviated
by the restoration of rail transportation much sooner than had been
expected. Although the planners did not count on this factor before
D-plus 30, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade rounded up Korean crews and
speeded up the tremendous task of putting the Inchon-Seoul line back
in working order. As early as D-plus 1 a switch engine and six cars
were operating in the Inchon yards. Three days later the first train,
carrying 1,200 Marines, was dispatched over the 5-mile run from Inchon
to Ascom City. As the ground forces advanced, the engineers followed
close behind the front with rail transportation which handled a total
of 350,000 rations, 315,000 gallons of fuel, 1,260 tons of ammunition,
and 10,000 troops before the Division was relieved.
_Surgical Teams on the Beaches_
Casualties of the Landing Force on D-day amounted to 20 KIA, 1 DOW,
1 MIA, and 174 WIA in addition to 14 of non-battle classification.
Medical officers regarded the operation as a landmark because of the
four Navy surgical teams, each composed of three doctors and ten
corpsmen, which went in behind the assault troops on the LSTs. Similar
teams had been employed in the later operations of World War II,
but Inchon had the distinction of being the first amphibious assault
in which carefully planned medical techniques were integrated with
military operations.
The surgical teams had been drilled and rehearsed in Japan for their
tasks. Patients requiring immediate surgery on the night of D-day
were evacuated to LST(H) 898, where an improvised operating room had
been installed. During the assault phase, 42 military and 32 civilian
casualties were treated instead of the 300 which had been expected.
Such an unqualified success was achieved that the teams were recalled
to Japan afterwards to act as instructors. Within a year the numbers of
Navy surgical teams had grown to a total of 22 on standby duty in the
Far East.[178]
[178] Capt E. R. Hering, (MC) USN, memo to authors, 4 Apr 55;
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex How How; Lynn Montross, “They
Make Men Whole Again,” in _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36,
no. 12:42–49 (Dec 52).
Captain Eugene R. Hering, (MC) USN, had served in the Pusan Perimeter
as the Brigade Surgeon. From a study of maps and intelligence reports,
he tentatively selected a site for the Division hospital on the eastern
outskirts of Inchon.
The 1st Medical Battalion, commanded by Commander Howard B. Johnson,
(MC) USN, consisted of an H&S Company and five letter companies.
Able and Baker were hospital companies, while Charlie, Dog, and Easy
functioned as collecting and clearing companies. The last was organized
for attachment to the 7th Marines when that regiment landed at Inchon.
Medical planning necessarily had to be hurried. In view of the unusual
landing conditions at Inchon, it was decided to revert the clearing
platoons, normally attached to infantry regiments, to Division control
when they reached the transport area.
Three casualty teams, each consisting of a medical officer and
six hospital corpsmen--one team from Able Company, and two from
Baker--landed from separate LSTs on D-day with a mission of caring for
initial casualties. Supporting collection sections of Charlie and Dog
Companies landed with the assault troops of the two rifle regiments.
The reconnaissance group and the two hospital companies arrived on
D-plus 1, followed by the H&S Company with equipment for the hospital
set up in a schoolhouse. It was opened at 1500 on D-plus 2, with 47
casualties being received the first day.
These were the forerunners of a total of 5,516 patients to be treated
by the 1st Medical Battalion for all causes during the entire
Inchon-Seoul operation. Most of them were WIA cases, but such ailments
as acute appendicitis, hernia, piles, and sprains are also recorded.
Of the 2,484 surgical patients, only nine died after reaching the first
aid station, and among them were six deaths following major surgery.
The proportion of patients surviving after evacuation, therefore,
reached the figure of 99.43 per cent. This meant that the chances were
about 199 to 1 that a wounded Marine would live.
_Artillery and Tank Operations_
The planners, anticipating the need of artillery support for the
assault on the mainland, had hoped that DUKWs could land two battalions
of Colonel James H. Brower’s 11th Marines on GREEN Beach for this
mission. There was some reason to believe that these vehicles could
cross the mud flats at low tide, thus enabling the 105s to get in
position on Wolmi-do and registered before the Inchon landing. In the
end, however, it was decided that this plan was not feasible, and the
1st and 2d Battalions of the artillery regiment landed on the evening
tide while the rifle regiments were hitting the beaches at Inchon.
A delay of an hour and a half occurred as a result of the confused
maneuvering of ships in the inner harbor. It was not until 2150,
therefore, that the 1st and 2d Battalions were prepared to deliver
massed fires in support of the 5th and 1st Marines respectively.[179]
Fortunately, the lack of this support at H-hour had not been a grave
handicap in view of the light resistance encountered on the beaches.
[179] The 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, was attached to RCT-7
and had not yet landed at Inchon.
Low visibility and lack of targets limited the fires to a few rounds
the first night. Next day the artillery landing was completed when
4/11 went ashore on RED Beach, followed on D-plus 2 by the 96th Field
Artillery Battalion, USA. Plans for the drive inland called for 1/11
and 2/11 to fire in direct support of RCT-5 and RCT-1 respectively.
Support was to be provided by 4/11 for RCT-5 and by the Army battalion
for RCT-1.[180]
[180] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Sugar Sugar.
The problems of tank support for the Inchon operation had given the
planners many a headache. BLUE Beach was dismissed from consideration
because of the mud flats, and the possibilities at RED Beach were not
encouraging. GREEN Beach offered the best prospects for landing tanks,
though it was recognized that they would be stranded if the enemy
destroyed the causeway connecting Wolmi-do with the mainland.
The consequences of the hasty embarkation from Camp Pendleton had borne
down heavily upon the 1st Tank Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Harry T. Milne. Crews trained with the M-4A3 (Sherman) and
105mm howitzer were suddenly equipped with the M-26 (Pershing) and its
90mm gun. With the exception of Company A, which saw action with the
Brigade, few of the men had had any experience either at driving or
firing the new tanks. The flame tank platoon of Headquarters Company
had received some training at Barstow, but most of the personnel of
Baker, Charlie, and Dog Companies were limited to shipboard instruction.
The men of the Company A platoon which landed on GREEN Beach in support
of 3/5 were veterans of several fights with NKPA tanks and infantry in
the Pusan Perimeter. In the evening of D-day they supported the landing
on RED Beach and moved across the causeway to the mainland at dusk.
There they joined the other two platoons of Able Company and the flame
tank platoon, which landed with the LSTs in support of the 5th Marines.
At 1700 on D-day a reconnaissance team went ashore on Wolmi-do to
prepare for the landing of B Company, which took place late the
following afternoon. YELLOW Beach, in the inner harbor, was operative
for the landing of Company C on 18 September, and Company D was to
arrive later with the 7th Marines.[181]
[181] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe.
_The Attack on D-plus 1_
The night of 15–16 September passed quietly for both of the infantry
regiments. At 2000 on D-day the 3d Battalion crossed over the causeway
from Wolmi-do to rejoin RCT-5. The most dramatic action on either
regimental front was an episode in the Cemetery Hill area. Two Marines
mistakenly wandered out in front of the high ground and were cut down
by enemy fire from a cave at the base of the hill, just below the lines
of Company A, 5th Marines. Repeated attempts to reach the fallen men
were thwarted by submachine gun fire from the recess, until a ROK
interpreter, threatening the use of tanks, persuaded the occupants to
surrender. As a squad of North Koreans filed out in submission, troops
from Able Company rushed forward to get their two comrades. One of the
Marines was already dead; the other lay mortally wounded.[182]
[182] Muetzel interv, 6 Jan 55.
In the middle of the night, the 1st and 5th Marines received General
Smith’s OpnO 3-50, directing them to attack after dawn. Murray’s
regiment, by previous plan, would march through the southern part of
Inchon, leaving the heart of the seaport to be cleared by the KMC.
About three miles inland, the 5th Marines would reach the O-2 Line
coming abreast of Puller’s front of the night before. (Thus, the O-1
and O-2 Lines were one and the same in the 1st Marines zone). Tied in
along the Inchon-Seoul Highway at Hill 117, the two regiments would
drive eastward to the O-3 Line, approximately five miles inland. This
last arc was the goal specified in Smith’s attack order.[183]
[183] 1st MarDiv _OpOrders 2-50_ and _3-50_; O. P. Smith
_Notes_, 346.
Murray’s tactical plan was dictated by the simple necessity of getting
out of Inchon as quickly as possible. The 5th Marines would therefore
attack in a column of battalions, with Roise’s 2d in the lead,
followed by the 1st and 3d in that order. Two hills, located north of
the highway on the outskirts of the city, were designated Regimental
Objectives D and E. In taking this high ground, 2/5 would automatically
control the 5th Marines’ segment of the O-2 Line and seal off the
Inchon Peninsula in conjunction with the 1st Marines. This would leave
a secure pocket for the great ship-to-shore build-up commencing on the
morning tide.
Following a brief orientation at dawn, Captain Jaskilka led Company E
forward from the British Consulate. Unopposed, the column passed the
inner tidal basin, where Fox Company fell in behind. In the meantime,
Company D left its positions atop Observatory Hill and brought up the
rear of the battalion formation. Inchon’s streets were strangely quiet
during 2/5’s advance. Frightened civilians peeped from windows and
alleyways, but the enemy was nowhere to be found. The sprawling seaport
seemed dead.
Inconsistencies of the Oriental enemy were exposed in a striking
contrast of scenes at 0700. Nearing the edge of the city, Easy Company
was preparing to veer off the road and attack Objective D. The troops
were encountering no resistance whatsoever, and it was obvious that the
North Koreans had abandoned Inchon in haste during the night. Only five
miles away, however, six T-34 tanks were rumbling along the highway in
broad daylight, headed toward the seaport without infantry escort.
An eight-plane strike of VMF-214 intercepted the enemy armor at the
village of Kansong-ni. As the Corsairs swept down on the first pass,
one of the tanks was enveloped in flaming napalm. Another was disabled
when a rocket hit blew off its tracks. A third was left seemingly
helpless on the road, squatting in a pool of motor fuel which poured
out of its wounds.[184]
[184] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig, VMF-214 rpt, 4.
Marines of 2/1 watched the show with enthusiasm from the top of Hill
117, less than two miles away. The joy of victory went flat, however,
when one of the planes failed to pull out of its dive. Captain William
F. Simpson, the pilot, was killed as the F4U crashed beside the
highway.[185]
[185] _Ibid._; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
A second flight of VMF-214 descended on Kansong-ni with a vengeance.
Rocket fire destroyed one T-34, and a direct bomb hit knocked another
off the road. It will be shown shortly that these two tanks must have
been the same pair that were severely damaged by napalm and rockets
during the first strike. When panicky NKPA crewmen fled to nearby
thatched huts for concealment, the dwellings were promptly razed by
napalm. Marine pilots, assuming incorrectly that all six tanks lay dead
beneath the pall of smoke and flame, turned their attention to other
targets in the area. They bombed an enemy jeep and weapons carrier
standing in the open, then strafed two other motor vehicles which had
been cleverly camouflaged.[186]
[186] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig, VMF-214 rpt, 4.
It would soon become more apparent why Red leaders in Seoul had
sacrificed precious armor in a clearly hopeless thrust against the
swelling beachhead. Communications were destroyed, so that NKPA defense
forces fought or fled as isolated units. Adequate reserves were not
at hand initially, with the result that stop-gap detachments were fed
piecemeal into battle, only to be flattened by the Marine steamroller.
In short, the North Koreans lost control. And when they attempted to
regain it, time had run out.
While Marine air hammered the enemy’s armored column, the 2d Battalion,
5th Marines, deployed outside Inchon. Having made sight contact with
Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s troops on Hill 117 at 0730, Captain
Jaskilka led Easy Company off the road and toward Objective D the left.
Fox Company continued along the pavement several hundred more yards,
then also veered northward in the direction of Objective E. Neither
company met opposition, and both were atop their respective hills at
0930.[187]
[187] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen.
Meanwhile, Company D had advanced eastward on the highway with a
platoon of Able Company tanks. There was the occasional whine of a
sniper’s bullet overhead as the column moved rapidly to its junction
with the 1st Marines. At 0900, while Easy and Fox Companies were
climbing their objectives, Dog made contact with 2/1 at Hill 117.[188]
[188] _Ibid._
It was its opposite of the 1st Marines that Dog Company of 2/5 met at
Hill 117. Fox Company of 2/1 had been clearing the eastern reaches
of the big ridge since 0615, and Easy was to spend all morning and
afternoon securing high ground and a village about a mile off on the
right flank. When the attack along the highway resumed shortly after
0900, Company D of the 5th Marines and a platoon of A/Tanks took the
lead. Fox and Dog Companies of 2/1 followed in trace and on the right
as the formation advanced rapidly against nothing heavier than sniper
fire. By 1100, elements of both battalions were deployed at Sogam-ni,
just a few hundred yards short of smoking Kansong-ni. Since the former
hamlet bordered the O-3 Line, the Marines held up to await further
orders.[189]
[189] _Ibid._; 2/1 _SAR_, 4; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54;
LtGen E. A. Craig ltr to CMC, 21 Apr 55; and Capt J. L.
Carter ltr to CMC, 19 Apr 55.
To the south of the highway, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines,
reorganized in the center of Puller’s zone and moved forward as
regimental reserve. Simultaneously, the 3d Battalion began its sweep of
the Munhang Peninsula, Companies G and I attacking generally southward
from Hill 233. Since the broad front was studded with high ground and
villages, Lieutenant Colonel Ridge relied on LVT transport whenever
possible to regain momentum lost to hill-climbing and searching.
Resistance on the peninsula proved negligible, although once again the
capture of prisoners and materiel revealed enemy potential unused.
Among the weapons abandoned by the North Koreans were quantities of
rifles and machine guns, a battery of Russian-made 120mm mortars, and
four coastal guns, the latter pointing menacingly toward the ships of
the Attack Force anchored in the channel.[190]
[190] 3/1 _SAR_; Crowley-Adams interv, 9 Feb 55; Col T. L.
Ridge ltr to CMC, 12 May 55; LtCol J. Hawkins ltr to
CMC, 27 Apr 55; and LtCol E. H. Simmons ltr to CMC, 15
Apr 55.
Although 1/1 and 3/1 did not reach their portion of the objective until
later in the day, Division Headquarters realized by midmorning that
enemy resistance as far out as the O-3 Line could be discounted. Now
that the tremendous obstacles of the actual landing had been overcome,
the tactical advantage of the moment swung from the Red commander at
Seoul to General Smith. Owing to the conformation of the Inchon and
Munhang Peninsulas, which were linked together inland like Siamese
twins, the O-3 Line formed a front three miles long with both flanks
bounded by water. A glance at the map will show the beachhead thus
set off as an ideal foothold. To North Koreans thinking in terms of
counterattack, the vacuum rapidly being filled by the Landing Force was
a defensible bottleneck. To the Marines, on the other hand, it was the
gateway to freedom of maneuver for an overland offensive.
_Advance to the Force Beachhead Line_
Opening the gate was the subject of General Smith’s OpnO 4-50, issued
by dispatch at 1045, D-plus 1. He directed Puller and Murray to
continue the attack from the O-3 Line, seized the Force Beachhead
Line (FBHL), and thereby conclude the assault phase of the amphibious
operation. The order also marked off a new Tactical Bomb Line,[191]
behind which Marine Air was forbidden to strike without ground
coordination.
[191] The first bomb line corresponded to the FBHL, and Corps
Phase Line AA was the equivalent of the O-2 Line.
Roughly the shape of a right angle, the FBHL corresponded to X Corps
Phase Line BB. Like the O-3 arc, it was anchored on the sea at both
ends. The east-west leg of the angle, five miles long, lay above and
almost parallel to the Inchon-Seoul Highway. The north-south leg, about
seven miles inland, added a third projection, the Namdong Peninsula,
to the beachhead. Encompassing the built-up centers of Ascom City and
Mahang-ri on the main road, the apex of the FBHL pointed northeast
toward Kimpo Airfield like an arrowhead.
[Illustration: MARINE ATTACKS
D-PLUS 1]
The Inchon-Seoul Highway remained the boundary between the 1st and
5th Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s order went out to the latter
before noon, directing a two-pronged assault. The 2d Battalion would
jump off from the O-3 Line and trace the course of the highway,
clearing the hills and villages on the left. Simultaneously, the 3d
was to swing sharply northward from behind 2/5 and attack high ground
overlooking the east-west leg of the FBHL. The 1st Battalion would
remain in regimental reserve.[192]
[192] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
There were a number of reasons why Colonel Puller’s scheme of maneuver
was more complex. Not only was the 1st Marines’ front much wider and
the terrain more difficult, but the rapid advance had left troops units
scattered throughout a zone of action some 15 square miles in area.
There was considerable shuffling to be done before the regiment could
deploy along the highway for the drive to the east.
The 2d Battalion would continue along the MSR, clearing the high ground
on the right and coordinating with 2/5 on the left. To the south, the
1st Battalion would move up on the right of the 2d as quickly as the
rugged terrain allowed. The 3d, after clearing the Munhang Peninsula,
was to pass into regimental reserve subsequent to being relieved on the
right flank by the Reconnaissance Company. Swinging around a sharp cove
of salt pans and mud flats, the latter unit would patrol the Namdong
Peninsula to secure the Division right.[193]
[193] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, sec. 1; 2/1 _SAR_; 3/1 _SAR_; Ridge
ltr, 12 May 55; and Hawkins ltr, 27 Apr 55.
At 1335, the 5th Marines attacked against minor resistance on the north
of the highway. Moving into Kansong-ni, the vanguard of 2/5 and its
tank escort approached a sharp bend where the road veered northward for
about a mile to avoid two large hills. Around the curve were the enemy
tanks believed to have been knocked out by VMF-214 earlier in the day.
A section of Marine armor turned left off the pavement just short of
the bend. The two M-26s crawled to the top of a knoll from which they
could cover the infantry, as the latter advanced around the corner.
Looking down from their vantage point, the tank crews saw three intact
T-34s parked in column on the highway, about 300 yards beyond the turn.
Hatches on the Communist vehicles were buttoned, with the 85mm guns
leveled at the road bend.[194]
[194] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; 2dLt J. Sleger, Jr.,
to Dr A. D. Coox, ORO, Dept of Army, n. d. (Sleger rpt).
The M-26s opened up immediately. Twenty rounds of 90mm armor-piercing
(AP) ammunition crashed into the enemy armor. There was no return fire,
probably because the Red crews had not time to elevate and traverse
their manually-operated guns. In the space of a few minutes, each of
the T-34s exploded and burst into flame. The crews did not escape.[195]
[195] _Ibid._
The Marine attack rolled past the blazing hulks. Nearby were two other
wrecked T-34s, obviously the victims of the air attack. If the pilots
of VMF-214 had attacked a total of six enemy tanks, one of the vehicles
must have escaped before the ground troops reached the scene.[196]
[196] _Ibid._; CG 1st MarDiv disp to CTF 90, 16 Sep 50.
Tracing the north-south stretch of highway that led to Ascom City, Dog
Company of RCT-5 marched a thousand yards beyond the bend and ascended
a high hill on the west side of the road. Company F swung out to the
left, crossed the railroad tracks running parallel to the highway, and
seized the high ground adjacent to that held by Company D. Both assault
units encountered only sniping, but it was early evening before the two
hills and surrounding low ground had been searched thoroughly.[197]
[197] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; LtCol H. S. Roise
interv, 24 Nov 54.
Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered 2/5 to dig in for the night. He
was about 3,000 yards short of the highway’s intersection with the
FBHL, but his battalion held the commanding ground. Companies D and
F defended the approach to Ascom City, which sprawled out on the low
ground just forward of their positions. Company E, in reserve, set up a
perimeter in the battalion rear.[198]
[198] Roise interv, 24 Nov 54.
Lieutenant Sweet’s five M-26s, which had supported the day-long
advance from RED Beach, were relieved at dusk by the 1st Platoon of
Able Company tanks. In addition to their score of three T-34s, Sweet’s
veterans of the Pusan Perimeter had captured an impressive tally of
enemy materiel: three NKPA trucks, two 76mm AT guns, two 122mm mortars,
and a pair of Russian-manufactured jeeps.[199]
[199] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe.
During 2/5’s attack along the MSR, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was
occupied with the hills overlooking that portion of the FBHL to the
northwest. Lieutenant Colonel Taplett had launched his drive at 1330
with Companies G and I in the assault and H in reserve. On the left,
George Company seized its high-ground objective at 1440, while Item
took an extra hour to clear adjacent Hill 137. There were no Marine
casualties during a rapid advance that netted 12 enemy prisoners.[200]
[200] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
Patrols from 3/5 ranged westward to the sea, and eastward to the edge
of Ascom City, where Item Company troops discovered an enemy ammunition
dump and vehicle park. Location of these undefended prizes was promptly
reported to the 5th Marines CP.[201]
[201] _Ibid._
South of the Inchon-Seoul Highway, the 1st Marines attacked from the
O-3 Line at 1600. Sutter’s 2d Battalion drove forward on the right
of the MSR and passed below Kansong-ni without incident. Continuing
a thousand yards farther, Company D scaled the rugged slopes of Hill
186, cleared the summit, and dug in. Fox Company climbed the same high
ground shortly afterwards and went into position on the left of Dog and
overlooking the highway. Thus 2/1’s front for the night was across the
road and slightly to the rear of the high ground positions occupied by
Company D of 2/5. Easy Company returned from its independent mission
on the right flank and set up a reserve position in the vicinity of
Kansong-ni, just rearward of Sutter’s CP at the base of Hill 186.[202]
[202] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Sutter-Codispoti
interv, 25 Jan 55; 2/1 _SAR_, 4; and Carter ltr, 19 Apr
55.
The enemy attitude in the 2d Battalion’s zone gradually had developed
from occasional sniping early in the day to a pattern of definite light
resistance as the Marines surged over Hill 186. Though most of the
North Koreans fled after firing a few rounds, their token efforts cost
the battalion four killed and 10 wounded. These figures are noteworthy
in view of the fact that total losses for the whole Division on D-plus
1 were four KIA and 21 WIA.[203]
[203] _Ibid._
Sutter’s troops exacted a comparatively stiff price from the Reds in
return, for it was estimated that 120 of the enemy were killed or
wounded. Moreover, the Marines captured more than 30 prisoners, 70
rifles, 10 machine guns, and an ordnance dump loaded with small-arms
ammunition.[204]
[204] 2/1 _SAR_, 4; and Carter ltr, 19 Apr 55.
Elsewhere on the 1st Marines front there was considerably more hiking
than combat. The 3d Battalion completed its sweep of the Munhang
Peninsula about 1600 and assembled at the southern tip of the O-3 Line
to await relief by the Reconnaissance Company.[205] In the course of
rounding up NKPA prisoners and abandoned weapons, 3/1 had encountered
a group of Korean villagers, headed by their schoolmaster, who called
themselves the Young People’s Anti-Communist Resistance League. They
had armed themselves with Russian rifles and light machine guns left
behind by enemy troops fleeing inland.[206]
[205] 3/1 _SAR_, 6; Ridge ltr, 12 May 55; Simmons ltr 15 Apr
55.
[206] _Ibid._; Maj G. C. Westover ltr to authors, 1 Apr 55;
and Capt J. R. Fisher ltr to authors, 18 Apr 55.
In the center of Puller’s zone, the 1st Battalion had moved rapidly to
fill the gap between the 2d and 3d. Attacking into the vacuum left by
the retreating enemy, Hawkins’ unit drove two mountainous miles beyond
the O-3 Line, finally stopping for the night on high ground about
2,500 yards south of 2/1’s positions on Hill 186. The break in the
regimental front was protected when 3/1 shifted northward and formed a
reserve perimeter to the rear of the lines, after being relieved on the
right at 1700 by Captain Kenneth J. Houghton’s Reconnaissance Company.
Assuming responsibility for the Division’s southern flank, the Recon
troops set up a night defense at the base of the Namdong Peninsula with
their front linked to that of 1/1 on the left.[207]
[207] Recon Co, HqBn, 1st MarDiv _Unit Rpts_, 9 Sep-11 Nov
50; and Ridge ltr, 12 May 55.
_Displacement Ashore of Division CP_
The establishment of a Division CP on shore was delayed by the
necessity of utilizing every minute of the limited periods of high tide
for the movement of troops, supplies, and equipment. General Smith
decided on D-day that it would not be advisable to displace his CP
ashore until General Craig and the ADC group (former headquarters of
1st ProvMarBrig) were able to set up adequate communications. With this
object in mind, the ADC group landed on the evening high tide of D-day
to locate an advance echelon on Wolmi-do.
Not much could be done that evening. And in the morning Craig informed
CG 1st MarDiv that the island was too crowded. He reported that he
and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart had discovered a likely spot on the
southeast outskirts of Inchon and recommended that the CP be moved
without delay.[208] General Smith approved and the move started at once.
[208] BGen E. W. Snedeker ltr to authors, 5 Apr 55.
Meanwhile, a good deal of military housekeeping had been accomplished
in the Inchon port area. Lieutenant Colonel John H. Partridge’s 1st
Engineer Battalion was given the task of making a survey of beach exit
roads with a view to opening up an MSR between RED and BLUE Beaches.
After elements of Company A hit GREEN Beach, the remaining troops of
the battalion had landed on the two beaches and assisted shore party
units at unloading water, ammunition, and rations. This work was so
well along by the morning of D-plus 1 that the engineers opened up the
MSR between the two beaches and assigned personnel for improvement
and maintenance. A Water point was established at the north end of
RED Beach with 31 distillation units, and 125,000 gallons were issued
during the next six days.[209]
[209] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Nan Nan.
The new Division CP on the outskirts of Inchon was ready by the
afternoon of D-plus 1, and General Smith said goodbye to General
MacArthur on the bridge of the _Mount McKinley_. The commander in chief
wished him well and enjoined him to take Kimpo Airfield at the first
opportunity.[210]
[210] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 188–189.
The Marine general landed at YELLOW Beach at 1730. Upon arrival at the
CP, he sent a dispatch to Admiral Doyle, informing him that he was
assuming responsibility for the conduct of operations ashore at 1800 on
16 September. Thus ended the amphibious assault phase, almost exactly
24 hours after the first wave of Marines set foot on RED Beach.