Hitting the Beaches
_The Assault Plan--Beginning the Ship-to-Shore Movement--Seizure of
Cemetery Hill--RED Beach Secured--LSTs under Enemy Fire--Fighting on
Observatory Hill--1st Marines on BLUE Beach--Ending the Ship-to-Shore
Movement--Seizure of the O-1 Line_
The concept of the amphibious envelopment of the North Korean Peoples
Army, together with the actual assault on Inchon by United States
Marines, constituted heresy to that school of wishful thinkers which
sprang to life as World War II faded in the first brilliant flashes of
the Atomic Age. Widely accepted and noisily proclaimed was the belief,
perhaps sincere, perhaps convenient, that the nuclear and aeronautical
sciences had relegated armies, navies, and man himself to insignificant
positions in the waging of war. The massing of ships and field forces,
it was argued, was a thing of the past; for the next war, if humanity
dared risk another, would be decided in weeks or even days with the
power unleashed by electronic and mechanical devices--many of which in
1950 were still in rudimentary stages on drawing boards.
This was the controversial “push-button” theory of war which left
the peace-loving nations of the world unprepared in 1950 for violent
aggression by the tough little peasant army of North Korea, supported
by some 100 tanks and a few hundred artillery pieces. And to the
premature acceptance of this theory by a large section of the American
public may be attributed many of the major shortcomings of the Inchon
assault, as it unfolded in the evening of 15 September. That the
operation succeeded despite these shortcomings and the myriad natural
handicaps amounts almost to a tactical miracle.
In the words of General Smith, “... half of the problem was in getting
to Inchon at all.”[128] The tremendous obstacles overcome in solving
that “half of the problem” have already been treated at length; and it
remains now, in the short space of a chapter, to show how the other
half became history.
[128] LtGen O. P. Smith memo to authors, 28 Feb 55.
_The Assault Plan_
Aboard the _Henrico_ and _Cavalier_ in the Inchon narrows on 15
September were the 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Marines, yanked out
of the Pusan Perimeter ten days earlier. Having had no time for a
rehearsal and only a few days for planning on the basis of admittedly
sketchy intelligence, these two units would scale the sea wall of
RED Beach and plunge into the dense waterfront area of the sprawling
seaport.
The mission of the 5th Marines (less 3/5 on Wolmi-do) was to seize
the O-A Line, a 3,000-yard arc encompassing Cemetery Hill on the left
(north), Observatory Hill in the center, and thence extending the
last 1,000 yards through a maze of buildings and streets to terminate
at the inner tidal basin. Each battalion would land in a column of
companies, Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton’s 1st, on the left,
seizing Cemetery Hill and the northern half of Observatory Hill;
while Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise’s 2d secured the remainder
of the latter, the hill of the British Consulate, and the inner tidal
basin.[129]
[129] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
Landing nearly three miles southeast of the 5th Marines, the 1st
Regiment would seize BLUE Beach, a north-south strip fronting a
suburban industrial area. BLUE Beach One, on the left, was 500 yards
wide, flanked on the north by the rock revetment of a salt evaporator
that jutted into the water at a sharp angle to the shoreline. A wide
drainage ditch, about which little was known besides the fact that it
existed, formed the south boundary. Just inland a dirt road--the sole
exit from the beach--skirted the north end of a steep knoll that ran
the whole width of the landing site. There being no revetment at the
waterline, Marine planners hoped that amphibian tractors could crawl
ashore with the assault troops.[130]
[130] _Ibid._, Annex Peter Peter.
[Illustration: PLAN FOR INCHON ASSAULT]
BLUE Beach Two, connected to One by the drainage ditch, also extended
500 yards. Like RED Beach it was fronted by a rock sea wall. On the
right half, the wall retained one side of a narrow ramp that jutted
southward like a long index finger. Behind the ramp lay a cove, its
shoreline at a right angle to the sea wall. During the assault, Marines
would scale the waterfront of BLUE Two from LVTs, while the cove around
the corner on the right, unofficially dubbed “BLUE Beach Three,” was
investigated as a possible supplementary landing site.[131]
[131] _Ibid._; and Col T. L. Ridge ltr to authors, 11 May 55.
Preceded by a wave of LVT(A)s of Company A (Reinf), 56th Amphibian
Tractor Battalion, USA, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, would
land abreast on BLUE One and Two respectively. With two companies
initially in the assault, each of the infantry battalions was to drive
forward and secure its portion of the O-1 Line. This four-mile arc bent
inland as far as 3,000 yards to include four main objectives, assigned
as follows:
2d Battalion (BLUE One)
ABLE A critical road junction about 1,000 yards northeast of
the beach.
DOG Hill 117, 3,000 yards northeast of the beach, commanding
Inchon’s back door and the highway leading to Seoul,
22 miles away.
3d Battalion (BLUE Two)
CHARLIE The seaward tip of Hill 233, a long east-west ridge
beginning 1,500 yards southeast of the beach and blocking
off the stubby Munhang Peninsula, which projected
southward.
BAKER A small cape, topped by Hill 94, to the right of Objective
Charlie and flanking BLUE Beach.[132]
[132] 1st MarDiv _OpnO 2-50_; and 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex
Peter Peter.
While a question may arise as to the choice of landing the 5th
Marines in the very heart of Inchon, it must be remembered that
immediate seizure of the port facilities was vital to the success
of the operation. Hitting the beaches at only two-thirds infantry
strength, the 1st Marine Division could not swell to the overwhelming
proportions of an invasion force. A modern harbor for rapid build-up
and exploitation by X Corps figured inherently in MacArthur’s strategy.
If RED Beach thus constituted the critical objective, then the
selection of BLUE Beach for a supporting landing followed in logical
sequence. Once on the O-1 Line, the 1st Marines would flank the single
overland approach to the peninsular seaport, thereby presenting the
NKPA garrison with the grim alternatives of early flight, capitulation,
or strangulation. Without this leverage on Inchon’s flank and rear, the
5th Regiment could easily be swallowed up by two square miles of dense
urban area.
Four assault battalions would have two hours of daylight in which to
bridge the gap between planning and reality. From overhead and behind
they could expect a preponderance of heavy fire support, but ahead lay
enemy and hydrographic situations still clouded by question marks.
_Beginning the Ship-to-Shore Movement_
As the early afternoon of 15 September wore on, the continued silence
of Inchon beckoned temptingly to Lieutenant Colonel Taplett on
Wolmi-do. Having studied the city over a prolonged period without
detecting any significant evidence of Communist defensive capability,
he radioed Division headquarters for permission to move a strong
tank-infantry force across the causeway. The battalion commander
believed that 3/5 could launch either an effective reconnaissance in
force or an actual assault on RED Beach. Although his estimate of the
enemy potential was shortly borne out, the degree of risk in Taplett’s
bold plan drew a firm “negative” from the _Mount McKinley_.[133]
[133] Taplett interv, 25 Aug 54.
Busy with last-minute details aboard the command ship, General Smith
at noon had radioed General Craig instructions to land on Wolmi-do on
the evening tide and set up an advance echelon of the division command
post with the ADC group. Smith did not desire to land the remainder
of his headquarters until D-plus 1, when there would be more room for
dispersion within the expanding beachhead.[134]
[134] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 152.
The Landing Force Commander could look down from the flag bridge at
1400 and note the first signs of activity on the water. A few special
landing craft were beating the forthcoming traffic rush as they sped
toward the various ships to which they were assigned as command boats.
At the same time, the central control vessel, _Diachenko_ (APD 123),
edged forward to its key station 3,000 yards southwest of the BLUE
Beach line of departure. Lieutenant Commander Allmon checked the set
and drift of the current and radioed his observations to Admiral Doyle.
Estimated at three and a half knots, the run of current was heavier
than expected. After receiving the Senior Control Officer’s report, the
Attack Force Commander confirmed 1730 as H-Hour.[135]
[135] _Ibid._; ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_; and LCdr R. W.
Berry ltr to authors, 17 Mar 55.
The confirmation went out to the entire Joint Task Force at 1430, and
Admiral Higgins’ fire support ships immediately commenced the final
bombardment of Inchon. His four cruisers and six destroyers poured
shells into the seaport for the next three hours, smashing every
landmark of tactical importance and starting fires that blazed across
the whole waterfront.
Under the calculating eyes of tactical air observers and coordinators
in F4Us droning high above the objective area, VMFs-323 and -214
and three squadrons of Navy Skyraiders alternately blasted Inchon,
integrating their strikes with naval gunfire from H-minus 180 minutes
onward. Simultaneously, Fast Carrier Task Force 77 kept another 12
planes in the air continuously for deep support missions designed to
freeze all enemy activity within a radius of 25 miles.
As if enough obstacles did not confront the landing force already, rain
squalls began drifting past Inchon during the bombardment. Gradually
the storm clouds merged with the thick smoke boiling up from the city,
and heavy overcasts settled over large areas, particularly in the
vicinity of BLUE Beach.[136]
[136] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
Assault troops of the 5th Marines scrambled down cargo nets on the
_Henrico_ and _Cavalier_ to fill landing craft splashing into the water
from booms and davits. Nearly 200 LCVPs and 70 LCMs soon were joined
by 12 LSUs and 18 LVT(A)s, 164 LVTs, and 85 DUKWs disgorged from the
yawning wells of the LSTs, wherein the Marines of the 1st Regiment had
made ready for battle.[137]
[137] ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_, Annex Item; I.
Guided by Lieutenant Commander Ralph H. Schneeloch, USNR, the _Horace
A. Bass_, RED Beach control vessel, slowly steamed toward the line of
departure, a long file of assault craft trailing behind like a brood
of ducklings. Lieutenant Theodore B. Clark, USN, ordered the _Wantuck_
to the head of the boat lane to BLUE Beach, and _PCEC 896_, under
Lieutenant Reuben W. Berry, USN, took station off Wolmi-do to regulate
the waves scheduled for the administrative landing on GREEN Beach.[138]
[138] _Ibid._, VII; Cdr C. E. Allmon, USN, ltr to authors, 9
Mar 55; LCdr T. B. Clark, USN, ltr to authors, 11 Mar
55; and LCdr R. H. Schneeloch, USN, ltr to authors, 20
Mar 55.
At 1645, the 18 Army LVT(A)s comprising the first wave of the 1st
Marines crossed the line of departure and headed for BLUE Beach.
Crawling at four knots, the armored vehicles had three quarters of an
hour to cover the 5,500 yards to the target. The LCVPs, capable of
twice the speed of the amphibian tractors, left the inner transport
area near the _Diachenko’s_ station for the five-mile trip northward to
the RED and GREEN boat lanes.[139]
[139] ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_, Annex Item:VI.
The roar of the fire support ships increased in volume during the
approach of the landing craft until, at 1705 (H-minus 25), Admiral
Higgins signaled the LSMRs into action. At once the cruisers and
destroyers fell silent. Again missiles soared from the squat rocket
ships in high arcs that sent them plunging into the RED and BLUE
landing areas. Upwards of 6,000 rockets detonated in the seaport during
the next twenty minutes, further numbing the defenders but at the same
time increasing the density and volume of the overcast.[140]
[140] _Ibid._, Annex George: II; and Schneeloch ltr, 20 Mar
55.
_Seizure of Cemetery Hill_
The critical moment of every amphibious assault was now at hand--the
moment when intelligence and planning would be put to the test of
actuality. On the bridge of the _Mount McKinley_ high-ranking Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps officers gathered again about General MacArthur,
seated in a swivel chair. They listened for the second time that day as
the loud speaker gave a blow-by-blow account of developments reported
by aerial observers.
Everything that air attacks and naval gunfire could do to soften up
the target had been done, yet no one could be sure just what sort of
opposition the troops would encounter on RED and BLUE Beaches. It might
be as fainthearted as that brushed aside by 3/5 on Wolmi-do; or it
might be that another Tarawa awaited on those cramped strips of urban
waterfront lying between the mud flats of the harbor and the dark,
crooked streets of the Asiatic town and environs. The enemy had been
given ample time in which to prepare for a defense of the mainland.
Even the possibility of undetected mines or surprise NKPA air attacks
at the last minute had not been overlooked. Although the Attack Force
continued to exercise control from the TADC on the _Mount McKinley_
of all aircraft operating in its assigned area, an alternate control
agency had been installed on the USS _George Clymer_, utilizing an
emergency hookup and a control unit attached to TAC, X Corps. All
nets were manned and communications set up to permit a rapid shift of
control to General Cushman in case of disaster.[141]
[141] 1st MAW _SAR_, basic rpt; and LtGen (Ret) T. J. Cushman
interv, 26 Jul 54.
With H-hour only minutes away, the sky above the objective was murky
and the wind whipped rain as well as stinging spray into the faces
of the Marines in the assault waves. Only the Marine and Navy flyers
upstairs could see the panorama of the waterborne attack--the cruisers
and destroyers standing silent in the background, LSMR rocket flashes
stabbing the false twilight ashore, the landing craft trailing pale
wakes behind them like the tails of comets. The pilots observed the
LCVPs to the left of Wolmi-do fan out at the line of departure and
touch the sea wall of RED Beach minutes later. To the right of the
little island, however, they saw the leading waves of the 1st Marines
disappear in a blanket of gloom. For while the smoke and moisture-laden
air had obscured parts of the 5th Marines’ zone of action ashore, it
had completely blotted out BLUE Beach and half the length of the 1st
Regiment’s boat lanes. Because of this development and other factors
which posed special problems for the 1st Marines, the narrative will
treat each landing separately, beginning with that of the 5th Regiment
on the left.
Eight LCVPs had crossed the line of departure at H-minus 8 and sped
toward RED Beach with the first wave of the 5th Marines. Starting from
the left, boats numbered one through four carried parts of two assault
platoons of Company A, 1st Battalion, whose mission was to seize
Cemetery Hill and anchor the regimental left. In boats five through
eight were troops of Company E, 2d Battalion, whose task included
clearing the right flank of the beach and taking the hill of the
British Consulate.[142]
[142] The RED Beach narrative, unless otherwise noted, is
derived from: 1st Mar Div _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen;
LtCol M. R. Olson interv, 29 Dec 54; LtCol H. S. Roise
interv, 21 Dec 54; Maj J. R. Stevens interv, 1 Aug
54; Capt E. A. Deptula interv, 18 Jan 55; Capt G. C.
McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; and 1stLt F. W. Muetzel
interv, 6 Jan 54.
From Wolmi-do 3/5’s machine guns, mortars, and supporting M-26s cut
loose with a hail of bullets and high explosive to cover the landing.
Technical Sergeant Knox lead an engineer team forward to clear the
causeway, in order that the detachment of Able Company Tanks could
advance to the mainland after the initial assault waves hit the beach.
As the landing craft passed the midway point of the 2,200-yard boat
lane, the heaving LSMRs ceased firing, so that Lieutenant Colonel
Walter E. Lischeid and Major Arnold A. Lund could lead in VMFs-214 and
-323 for final strikes on both RED and BLUE Beaches. Navy Skyraiders
joined in at the request of Captain John R. Stevens, commander of
Company A; and the FAC of 1/5, First Lieutenant James W. Smith,
controlled their strafing passes as the first wave came within 30 yards
of the sea wall.[143]
[143] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item:Baker; and 1stLt (Ret) F. W.
Muetzel ltr to CMC, 11 Apr 54.
Although the tide was racing in fast, the wall still projected about
four feet above the ramps of the landing craft. The Marines readied
their scaling ladders. On the right the boats of Company E touched the
revetment at 1731. Up went the ladders as the assault troops hurled
grenades over the wall. Following the explosions, the Marines from the
four boats scrambled to the top of the barrier one by one. The ladders
slipped and swayed as the LCVPs bobbed next to the wall. But they
served their purpose, and in short order every man of Second Lieutenant
Edwin A. Deptula’s 1st Platoon was on the beach.
There were no casualties from the few stray bullets cracking through
the air. Filtering through smoke and wreckage, the platoon moved inland
to cover the landing of the second and third waves, carrying the
remainder of Easy Company.
On the north of RED Beach, three of the four LCVPs with the leading
elements of Company A bumped the sea wall at 1733. Boat number one,
carrying Technical Sergeant Orval F. McMullen and half of his 1st
Platoon, was delayed offshore by an engine failure. The remainder of
the 1st, under the platoon guide, Sergeant Charles D. Allen, scaled
the wall from boat number two in the face of heavy fire from the north
flank and from submachine guns in a bunker directly ahead. Several
Marines were cut down immediately, the others being unable to advance
more than a few yards inland.
Boat number three, with Second Lieutenant Francis W. Muetzel and a
squad of his 2d Platoon, touched a breach in the sea wall under the
muzzle of an enemy machine gun protruding from a pillbox. The weapon
did not fire as the Marines scrambled through the gap and onto the
beach. A second squad and a 3.5-inch rocket section joined from boat
number four. Gunfire crackled far off on the left, barely audible amid
the road of fighter planes strafing fifty yards ahead. Muetzel and his
men jumped into a long trench which paralleled the sea wall a few feet
away. It was empty. Two Marines threw grenades into the silent pillbox,
and the six bloody North Koreans who emerged in the wake of the hollow
explosions were left under guard of a Marine rifleman.
Just beyond the beach loomed Cemetery Hill, its seaward side an almost
vertical bluff. To avoid getting trapped if the enemy opened up from
the high ground, Muetzel attacked toward his objective, the Asahi
Brewery, without waiting for the remainder of his men in the tardy
second wave. The skirmish line raced across the narrow beach, ignoring
padlocked buildings and flaming wreckage. Passing to the south of
Cemetery Hill, the 2d Platoon entered the built-up area of the city and
marched unopposed up a street to the brewery.
On the left of Company A’s zone, the beached half of the 1st Platoon
made no progress against the flanking fire and the Communist bunker
to the front. The 3d Platoon, under First Lieutenant Baldomero Lopez,
landed in the second wave, and McMullen finally got ashore with the
other half of the 1st. Both units crowded into the restricted foothold
and casualties mounted rapidly. Enemy guns had felled Lopez as he
climbed ashore and moved against the bunker with a grenade. Unable to
throw the armed missile because of his wound, the young officer was
killed when he smothered the explosion with his body to protect his
men. Two Marines attacked the emplacement with flame throwers. They
were shot down and their valuable assault weapons put out of action.
The situation on the left was at its worst when Captain Stevens landed
in Muetzel’s zone at H-plus 5. Learning of Lopez’ death and unable to
contact McMullen, he ordered his executive officer, First Lieutenant
Fred F. Eubanks, Jr., to “take over on the left and get them organized
and moving.”[144] Time was of the essence, since Cemetery Hill,
objective of the 1st Platoon, yet remained in enemy hands. Succeeding
waves would be landing hundreds of Marines in the shadow of the cliff
within the next half hour. Stevens also radioed Muetzel, whose small
force had just reached the brewery without suffering a casualty, and
ordered the 2d Platoon back to the beach to help out.
[144] Capt F. F. Eubanks, Jr., ltr to CMC, 2 Jun 55.
Muetzel immediately formed his unit in column and struck out on the
return trip to the waterfront. Nearing Cemetery Hill again, he noted
that the southern slope of the vital objective was an excellent
route of approach to the top. In planning Company A’s part of the
operation, Stevens had once told him that the 2d Platoon could expect
to help seize the high ground if the job proved too rough for the 1st
alone.[145] With a creditable display of judgment and initiative,
Muetzel launched an assault on the key to RED Beach.
[145] Maj J. R. Stevens ltr to authors, 29 Mar 55.
The Marines moved rapidly up the incline, flushing out about a
dozen Red soldiers who surrendered meekly. Gaining the summit,
they drove forward and saw the entire crest suddenly come alive
with infantry-crewmen of the 226th NKPA Regiment’s mortar company.
Spiritless and dazed from the pounding by air and naval gunfire, the
North Koreans to a man threw down their weapons, filed quietly from
trenches and bunkers, and marched to the base of the hill where a
small detachment kept them under guard. Hardly a shot had been fired
by the 2d Platoon, still without a single casualty, and the capture of
Cemetery Hill had required about ten minutes.
During the attack on the high ground, Eubanks had taken the situation
in hand on the left of the beach. He first bested the bunker’s
occupants in a grenade duel, then ordered the emplacement fired by a
flame thrower. Just as Muetzel prepared to dispatch assistance from the
top of Cemetery Hill, the 1st and 3d Platoons broke out of the pocket,
drove inland to the edge of the city, and made physical contact with
the 2d.
At 1755, Stevens fired an amber star cluster signifying that Cemetery
Hill was secured for the 5th Marines. The half-hour fight in the north
corner of RED Beach had cost Company A eight killed and 28 wounded.
_RED Beach Secured_
After landing in 2/5’s first wave, the 1st Platoon of Company E
pushed inland 100 yards to the railroad tracks against no resistance
whatsoever. Captain Samuel Jaskilka was ashore with the rest of the
Company by H-plus 10, and reorganization took place quickly near the
Nippon Flour Company buildings, just south of the beach. Deptula’s
platoon then moved unopposed down the railroad tracks and seized the
British Consulate, Regimental Objective C, at 1845. Simultaneously,
another platoon cleared the built-up area across the tracks on the
lower slopes of Observatory Hill. These rapid accomplishments secured
the 5th Marines’ right flank, giving an added measure of protection to
22 more waves of landing craft and LSTs scheduled for RED Beach.
Still in enemy hands, however, was Observatory Hill, reaching well over
200 feet above the center of the regimental zone to buttress the arc of
the O-A Line. Company C of the 1st Battalion, landing in the fourth and
fifth waves shortly before 1800, was to take Objective A, northern half
of the critical terrain feature. To Dog Company of 2/5 was charged the
southern half, designated Objective B.
That the attack did not go off as planned stemmed from a series of
mishaps which began as far out as the line of departure. Despite
the fact that Lieutenant Commander Schneeloch was using standard
control procedures from the _Bass_, including radio contact with the
beach, there was a mixing of waves starting with number four.[146]
This development reflected the lack of a rehearsal in the hurried
preparations for the operation, and the end result was that parts of
Companies C and D, both in the second assault echelon, landed over
the wrong beaches.[147] After landing, Charlie Company had the added
disadvantage of being without its company commander for a crucial 12
minutes. Captain Poul F. Pedersen was delayed when the fifth-wave
commander, who shared his boat, decided to tow a stalled LCVP left
behind by the preceding formation.[148] When he finally reached his
company, the job of reorganization was much more difficult than it
would have been had he arrived at the beach on schedule. With troops
pouring over the sea wall from succeeding waves, what had begun as
intermingling at the point of overlap in the center of the landing area
had grown to temporary congestion and confusion.
[146] Schneeloch ltr, 20 Mar 55.
[147] Col G. R. Newton ltr to CMC, 8 Apr 55.
[148] Capt P. F. Pedersen memo to CMC, 1 May 55.
[Illustration: SEIZURE OF RED BEACH
5TH MARINES]
_LSTs Under Enemy Fire_
Out in the channel, the first of eight LSTs[149] heralded the climax of
the ship-to-shore movement at 1830 by crossing the line of departure
and heading for the sea wall. Prior to the approach, ships’ officers
had spotted the close fighting on the north flank of RED Beach as
they peered through binoculars from their respective bridges. Later,
noting the growing knot of Marines in the center of the waterfront
area, they concluded that the assault troops could not advance inland.
This impression was strengthened by an abrupt procession of gun
flashes on Observatory Hill where, owing to the delay in the attack by
Companies C and D, a handful of enemy soldiers had recovered from shock
sufficiently to set up machine guns. A few North Korean mortar crews in
the city also came to life and manned their weapons.
[149] Under the over all command of LCdr James C. Wilson,
who flew his broad pennant in LST 859, the eight ships
were: 859 (Lt L. Tinsley); 883 (Lt C. M. Miller);
914 (Lt R. L. Holzhaus); 973 (Lt R. I. Trapp); 898
(Lt R. M. Beckley); 975 (Lt A. W. Harer); 857 (Lt D.
Weidemeyer); and 799 (Lt T. E. Houston).
LST 859, leading the pack, came under mortar and machine-gun fire as it
waddled toward its berth about 1835. Gun crews on the ship reacted by
opening up with 40mm and 20mm cannon, spraying Cemetery and Observatory
Hills and the right flank of the beach. Next in the column of ships,
LSTs 975 and 857 likewise commenced firing after taking hits from
mortars and machine guns. Enemy automatic weapons touched off a fire
near ammunition trucks on LST 914, trailing fourth, but sailors and
Marines quickly brought the blaze under control. Guns on the latter
ship remained silent as a result of dispatch orders received by the
captain after leaving the line of departure.[150]
[150] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; LtGen (Ret) E. A.
Craig ltr to CMC, 21 Apr 55; LCdr R. I. Trapp, USN, ltr
to CMC, 18 Mar 55; and Lt (Ret) R. L. Holzhaus, USN,
ltr to CMC, 14 Mar 55.
Lieutenant Muetzel and his platoon were chased by LST fire from the
crest of Cemetery Hill to the slope facing Inchon--where they came
under fire from a Red machine gun in a building on Observatory Hill.
Fortunately, a 40mm shell from one of the LSTs crashed into the
building and obliterated the enemy position. There were no casualties
in Muetzel’s outfit, but Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s 2d Battalion did
not fare as luckily from the misdirected shooting by the American
ships. Weapons and H&S Companies of 2/5 had landed about 1830 and were
just proceeding inland when LST fire seared their ranks, killing one
Marine and wounding 23 others. “If it hadn’t been for the thick walls
of the Nippon Flour Company,” remarked Roise later, “the casualties
might have been worse.”[151]
[151] LtCol H. S. Roise ltr to authors, 23 Mar 55.
All eight of the supply vessels were intact in their berths by 1900.
Guns fell silent as soon as the LSTs touched the sea wall and contact
was established with the infantry.
On the beach, meanwhile, Second Lieutenant Byron L. Magness had
reorganized his 2d Platoon of Company C and, on his own initiative,
attacked Observatory Hill. Second Lieutenant Max A. Merritt’s 60mm
mortar section followed closely behind, but the rest of the company
remained fragmented in the landing area. Sparked by Technical Sergeant
Max Stein, who was wounded while personally accounting for a North
Korean machine gun, the provisional force advanced rapidly in the
gathering darkness and at 1845 seized the saddle between Objectives A
and B on Observatory Hill. This was just about the time when the LSTs
stopped firing.[152]
[152] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and Maj F. I.
Fenton, Jr., ltr to authors, 21 Mar 55.
Since their single flare misfired and they were not able to raise
Lieutenant Pedersen by radio, Magness and Merritt were unable to inform
the beach of their success. In the meantime, Company B, 1/5’s reserve,
had landed in the 2d Battalion zone, the waves having swerved to
that area to avoid small-arms fire peppering their assigned approach
on the left. Captain Francis I. Fenton, Jr., led the unit through a
mixed group on the waterfront to an assembly area near the base of
Cemetery Hill. When he discussed the beach situation by radio with the
battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Newton ordered him to take over
Charlie Company’s mission and assault the northern half of Observatory
Hill.[153]
[153] _Ibid._; Newton ltr, 8 Apr 55; and Capt B. L. Magness
ltr to CMC, 29 Mar 55.
_Fighting on Observatory Hill_
Darkness had fallen when Company B drove up the slopes of Objective A
in a two-pronged attack. Six Marines were wounded in brief skirmishes
with North Korean die-hards along the way. Gaining the summit at 2000,
Fenton deployed three platoons on line, making contact with the
Magness-Merritt force dug in on the saddle to the right. With Objective
A seized and Able Company deployed on top and to the flanks of Cemetery
Hill, Newton radioed the 5th Marines at 2240 that 1/5’s segment of the
O-A Line was secured.[154]
[154] _Ibid._
In the right of the 5th Marines’ zone, the 2d Battalion had also been
making gains, despite the handicaps of mixed boat waves, LST fire, poor
visibility, and, finally, enemy action.[155] It will be recalled that
Company E suffered no casualties in landing and clearing the waterfront
as far south as Objective C, the British Consulate. Next to hit the
beach was First Lieutenant H. J. Smith’s Company D, part of which went
ashore in 1/5’s zone. Assembling later near the base of Observatory
Hill, the unit prepared to carry out its mission of seizing Objective
B, the southern half of the big ridge.
[155] The following narrative is derived from: 1st Mar Div
_SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; Roise interv, 21 Dec 54;
Roise ltr, 23 Mar 55; McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; and
Magness ltr, 29 Mar 55.
Although 2d Battalion overlays show that Easy Company bore no
responsibility for the crest of Observatory Hill, Smith’s men somehow
got the impression that part of Jaskilka’s force was already on the
summit. Its tactics based on this misunderstanding, Company D formed
a simple route column, with Second Lieutenant Ray Heck’s 1st Platoon
leading the way, and marched up a street to the top of the hill. The
vanguard troops cleared the first peak in the company zone without
opposition and continued along the road to the second, expecting to
meet men of Company E. They were greeted, however, by machine-gun fire
from an enemy squad entrenched to the right of the street.
The Marines tumbled into positions on the left. Grenades and small-arms
fire flew back and forth across the road during a brisk exchange that
lasted about 15 minutes. One of Heck’s men was killed and three others
wounded. The company corpsmen was hit but refused evacuation until
he had first administered to the other casualties and seen them off
to safety. Company D’s executive officer, First Lieutenant Michael
J. Dunbar, went forward with Lieutenant Colonel Roise, the battalion
commander, and was wounded by a ricochet.
The enemy troops were driven off just as darkness closed in, leaving
the Marines to grope for night defensive positions on unfamiliar
ground. Eventually Lieutenant Smith formed a line with all three
rifle platoons deployed on the forward slopes of Objective B. Out of
battalion reserve came Second Lieutenant Harry J. Nolan’s platoon of
Company F to bridge the gap between Company D and the Magness-Merritt
positions in 1/5’s zone on the left.
With Cemetery and Observatory Hills secured, the only portion of
the O-A Line not yet under control was the extreme right, anchored
on the inner tidal basin. Since the night was pitch black, Roise
felt apprehensive about sending troops any farther into the city.
In answer to a query, Lieutenant Colonel Murray, whose regimental
headquarters had landed at 1830 and set up near the terminus of the
Wolmi-do causeway, emphasized to Roise that where the O-A Line could
not actually be defended from a suitable tactical standpoint, it must
at least be outposted. The battalion commander forthwith dispatched a
two-squad patrol from Fox Company to the tidal basin, and the small
force returned from the 1,000-yard prowl into the city at 2300, having
seen no sign of the enemy. Roise reacted by committing Company F, less
its platoon on Observatory Hill, to a defensive perimeter on the right
flank. Shortly after midnight, Captain Uel D. Peters deployed the
company next to the tidal basin as ordered; and the 5th Marines’ O-A
Line, though not manned in entirety, came as close to tactical reality
as the tangled black depths of the seaport would allow.
_1st Marines on BLUE Beach_
As mentioned earlier, the overcast resulting from rain squalls and
smoke had completely blotted out BLUE Beach by H-hour, 1730. This fact
in itself would have sufficed to upset a precise landing procedure;
but at this point in the narrative, it is timely to review some of the
other problems which had beset the 1st Marines since the inception of
the plan for the Inchon assault.[156]
[156] The preliminary to the landing account is derived from:
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Col R. W. Rickert
memo to authors, 15 Apr 55; ltr, 11 May 55; Col A.
Sutter and Maj G. S. Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; Col
A. Sutter memo to authors, 5 May 55; and Maj E. H.
Simmons ltr to CMC, 28 Mar 55.
In the short space of weeks, the regiment had been brought up to war
strength by the rapid convergence on Camp Pendleton of Marines--in
units or as individuals, both regular and reserve--from all over the
United States; it had embarked at San Diego and crossed the Pacific;
and it had reloaded and embarked from Japan for a combat operation
designed to quench a major conflagration. There had been time for only
the sketchiest training above the company level. The new 1st Marines
had never operated tactically as a regiment, nor had it ever been
concentrated in one place as an organizational entity up until the time
it hit BLUE Beach.
During the planning phase in Kobe, battalions had to combat-load their
LSTs according to an X factor, while awaiting the prescribed tactical
plans that would be handed down from higher echelon at the last
minute. Intelligence on the enemy and beach conditions was practically
non-existent; and the speculative studies and inadequate photos
available could be kept only a few hours before being passed on to the
next unit in line.
Whenever Marines are given a difficult assignment, the United States
Navy invariably draws its own full measure of handicaps. A typical
example of the problems confronting naval planners was this case, cited
by Major Edwin H. Simmons, of 3/1:
“I was aboard LST 802, which was carrying H&S Company and
elements of Weapons Company. The ship had just been recovered
from the island trade. Her captain had been flown out to
Sasebo from the States, given a pick-up crew and two weeks to
condition the ship and crew for an amphibious landing. Despite
his best efforts, the 802 had three major breakdowns and had to
drop out of convoy several times. At one point it appeared as
though the battalion command group would have to be taken off
the 802 if they were to get to Inchon in time.”
In connection with BLUE Beach itself, officers of the 1st Marines had
only a vague impression of offshore conditions and the accessibility
of the landing site. As already noted, the current in the channel was
underestimated, and so little was known about the consistency of the
mud flats that each landing craft contained planking for emergency use
by the assault troops.
The sole exit from BLUE One was the dirt road already mentioned. On
aerial photos the drainage ditch separating BLUE One and Two appeared
to be some kind of a road over which tractors could crawl ashore. No
one was certain, and “BLUE Beach Three,” the cove on the right, was
ruled out as a possible landing area early in the planning. At the last
minute, however, recent aerial photos and studies led to the conclusion
that both the inlet and the ramp at the southern tip of BLUE Two might
be good approaches after all. Acting on this information while en route
to the target area, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge, commanding
officer of 3/1, decided to explore personally the right flank with
his executive officer at the outset of the assault. If the ramp, BLUE
Three, or both were accessible to LVTs, Ridge would divert later
assault echelons on a “follow me” basis.
Thus vital questions were to remain unanswered until the officers
and men of the 1st Marines got their first look at BLUE Beach. It
was keenly disappointing, therefore, when they stared from the line
of departure on the afternoon of 15 September and saw, instead of
the distant shoreline, a murky wall rolling seaward from the blazing
waterfront.
As noted previously, the line of departure was 5,500 yards--3.2
miles--from the beach, a distance requiring 45-minute trips for the
slow-moving LVT waves. The ship-to-shore movement got off to a bad
start owing to the current, which scattered some of the landing
formations during the rendezvous phase. Other obstacles entered the
picture in rapid succession, one of them best described by Lieutenant
Clark, BLUE Beach Control Officer:
“At about H-50, while press boats and the initial waves of
LVT(A) and LVT were milling around the BLUE Beach control
vessel [_Wantuck_], mortar fire was received in the immediate
vicinity. This created some confusion until a destroyer spun
around on her anchor and silenced the battery. This was the
beginning of the end of the well-planned ship-to-shore movement
for BLUE Beach.”[157]
[157] Clark ltr, 11 Mar 55.
Other shortcomings that took on special significance because of the
overcast were the lack of compasses and radios in the amphibian
tractors and the inexperience of many of the crews. The first wave,
consisting of the Army LVT(A)s, was escorted shoreward from the line of
departure by Navy guide boats, manned by UDT crews who possessed both
the compasses and seamanship necessary to pierce the smoke screen and
find the distant beach on time.[158] Wave number two, only a minute
behind and close enough to benefit by the expert guidance, did not fare
too badly. The ragged formation of number three, however, indicated
mounting difficulties at the line of departure. From a study of
numerous accounts, the experience of Major Simmons appears to have been
typical:
[158] Unless otherwise cited, the remainder of this section
is derived from: ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_, Item, V-VI;
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; 2/1 _SAR_ and
_OpPlan 1-50_; Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and
Capt B. F. Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
“Wave 5 cleared the 802 about 1630. We had been told that
a wave guide would pick us up and lead us to the line of
departure.... Time was passing and we were feeling desperate
when we came alongside what was apparently the central control
vessel. I asked the bridge for instructions. A naval officer
with a bull horn pointed out the direction of BLUE Two, but
nothing could be seen in that direction except mustard-colored
haze and black smoke. We were on our way, and our path crossed
that of another wave. I asked if they were headed for BLUE Two.
Their wave commander answered, ‘Hell no, we’re the 2d Battalion
headed for BLUE One.’ We then veered off to the right. I broke
out my map, but the LVT driver had no compass.... With no
confidence in its accuracy within a steel hull, I got out my
lensatic compass and made a best guess as to the azimuth of our
approach line.”[159]
[159] Simmons ltr, 28 Mar 55.
The nine LVT(A)s leading off for Lieutenant Colonel Alan Sutter’s 2d
Battalion thrashed through the gloom and crawled ashore on BLUE One at
1730, on schedule. Meeting no opposition at the beach, they rumbled
northward to the road skirting the knoll in order to penetrate the
interior. The exit was blocked by an earth slide resulting from the
naval bombardment of the high ground, and the column of amphibious
vehicles ground to a halt.
At H-plus 1, most of the eleven LVTs of the second wave crunched ashore
with elements of two assault companies. The remainder, with troops of
Fox Company embarked, had grounded in mud about 300 yards offshore.
The Marines had to wade to the beach, and they lost several pieces
of communications gear in potholes en route. Company D, on the left,
was to have remained aboard the tractors for the drive inland, while
the troops of Company F debarked at the beach, cleared the knoll, and
continued overland on foot. The latter scheme of maneuver unfolded as
planned, and the Marines encountered no resistance when they swept to
the top of the high ground. Dog Company, meanwhile, had also dismounted
because of the blocked road.
The third wave groped ashore through the smoke at H-plus 4, bringing
the remainder of both assault companies and raising the total strength
on BLUE One to 30 tractors and over 600 men. Noting that the beach was
getting crowded, Lieutenant Colonel Sutter ordered his free tractor
to pull alongside the revetment of the evaporator on the left. When
his battalion headquarters had debarked on the wall, he turned his
attention seaward that he might signal the succeeding three waves,
carrying the rest of 2/1, to do likewise. He looked and waited in vain,
however, for the LVT formations did not materialize out of the offshore
haze.
Meanwhile, Companies D and F reorganized quickly to continue the
attack. Looking inland from the knoll, officers and NCOs could catch
glimpses of the unfamiliar terrain only between billows of smoke.
Several landmarks loomed ahead that were not marked on the inaccurate
tactical maps. Many others that had been recorded were ablaze, and the
numerous fires would make direct compass marches difficult. Moreover,
since the enemy situation inland was open to conjecture, dispersed
tactical formations would add to the problem of controlling the Marine
advance.
Despite these disadvantages, Sutter pressed the attack. Easy Company
in battalion reserve, together with part of Weapons and H&S, had not
landed, nor had all of the vital signal equipment for supporting arms.
But further waiting and delay was out of the question, since only about
an hour of daylight remained.
Company D struck out for Regimental Objective ABLE, the junction on
the left flank 1,000 yards away, and Company F drove northeast in the
direction of Objective DOG, Hill 117. It was almost dark when the last
of the 600 troops plunged forward into the unknown, leaving LVT crews
behind to open the road with picks and shovels.
_Ending the Ship-to-Shore Movement_
The nine LVT(A)s comprising 3/1’s first wave had closed on the sea wall
of BLUE Beach Two shortly after H-hour.[160] Nosing their vehicles
toward the drainage ditch on the left, the drivers apparently eyed
the muck and conformation of the restricted passageway with some
skepticism, for they backed off and exchanged fire with scattered enemy
soldiers shooting from just beyond the waterfront.
[160] Unless otherwise cited, this section is derived from:
ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_, Item, V-VI; 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annexes Peter Peter and Tare Tare; LtCol R. R.
Myers interv, 1 Feb 55; LtCol J. D. Trompeter interv,
31 Jan 55; Maj D. W. Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; Maj
W. L. Bates interv with MarCorps HistDiv, 27 Aug 51;
Capt J. G. Costigan interv, 17 Nov 54; Capts R. W.
Crowley and N. L. Adams II interv, 9 Feb 55.
Wave number two passed through the Army tractors and bumped the sea
wall ten minutes late with the leading elements of Companies G and I,
the former on the left. Since the landing echelons had intermingled
in the cloudy boat lane, some LVTs of the third wave arrived with
those of the second. This accounted for Lieutenant Colonel Ridge’s
tractor reaching the beach one increment ahead of schedule. The
battalion commander and his executive officer, Major Reginald R. Myers,
immediately swung their separate vehicles around to the right flank,
Ridge heading toward the ramp while the other officer continued around
the corner in the direction of BLUE Three.
On the left of BLUE Two, meanwhile, the amphibians carrying Captain
George C. Westover’s Company G formed a column and crawled into the
drainage ditch.[161] Troops of First Lieutenant Joseph R. Fisher’s Item
Company simultaneously scrambled up their aluminum ladders and deployed
just beyond the sea wall in the face of moderate small arms fire.
As had been anticipated, some of the metal scaling devices bent and
buckled under the strain, delaying troop debarkation from the landing
craft crowding the revetment. Assault elements of Captain Lester G.
Harmon’s Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion, reached the beach and
anchored cargo nets over the wall to speed up the landing.[162]
[161] Maj G. C. Westover memo to CMC, 21 Apr 55.
[162] Rickert memo, 15 Apr 55. “Study of aerial photos of
BLUE Beach prior to departing Kobe, Japan, convinced
CO, 1st Marines, that aluminum scaling ladders might
not suffice for the sea wall. Consequently, the assault
companies were provided with debarkation nets, 3´
steel picket pins, and sledges with which to anchor
the nets on the reverse slope of the sea wall. The
nets proved very valuable, not only with regard to
getting personnel ashore but particularly in landing
crew-served weapons, ammo, and equipment.”
The lead tractor in George Company’s column bellied down in the mud of
the drainage ditch, blocking five other LVTs behind. Westover ordered
his troops to dismount and move forward along a road near the beach.
After a brief period of reorganization, Company G fanned out for
the drive inland, its mission being to block a lowland corridor and
secondary access road leading to BLUE Beach out of the east.[163]
[163] Westover memo, 21 Apr 55.
Just about the time Westover’s LVTs bogged down in the ditch on the
left, the tractors transporting Ridge and Myers crawled ashore over
the ramp and BLUE Beach Three respectively, setting a precept for the
mounting number of landing craft lying off BLUE Two. A heavy volume of
traffic was thus diverted to the cove, and the appreciable gain in time
far outweighed the intermingling which developed by landing troops at a
right angle to those scaling the sea wall.
[Illustration: SEIZURE OF BLUE BEACH
1ST MARINES]
In recalling the situation ashore as of 1800 (H-plus30), Colonel Lewis
B. Puller, the regimental commander, later observed:
“I personally landed on BLUE Beach with the 3d wave. My reason
for doing so was, exactly, that there was a strong possibility
of confusion and disorganization under the circumstances:
namely, the unavoidable necessity of landing the regiment
without a rehearsal, without even a CPX.... The reorganization
of the assault battalions was accomplished with remarkable
speed and effectiveness. I recall being, at the time, extremely
gratified that my prior concern in this connection was not
warranted.”[164]
[164] MajGen L. B. Puller ltr to authors, 11 May 55.
Despite the initial delays at the ditch and sea wall, Companies G and I
cleared the beach rapidly. Of the few casualties taken during the first
30 minutes ashore, most were caused by an enemy machine gun in a tower
about 500 yards inland. LVT fire silenced the weapon, and the Marine
infantry plunged forward through a labyrinth of blazing buildings
and smoke-filled streets. On the left, George Company groped almost
straight ahead toward the lowland corridor as Item veered sharply
southward to attack Objective CHARLIE, the seaward tip of Hill 233.
While the assault units fought inland, the gathering darkness created
one more formidable handicap for the last wave serials leaving the
line of departure far out in the channel. The four Navy guide boats,
mentioned earlier as having escorted the first wave, were exactly 28
short of the number prescribed by amphibious doctrine for a landing
of the Inchon assault’s magnitude.[165] For this reason the guide
boats took station on either side of the boat lanes after the initial
run, since it was manifestly impossible for them to help out in any
other way. The limited visibility, however, just about negated their
worth as stationary markers, owing to the fact that some landing craft
formations were losing their direction even before they entered the
boat lanes.
[165] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Tare Tare, 4.
In describing the situation as it developed at the line of departure
Lieutenant Clark later commented:
“The BLUE Beach Control Officer was unable to contact LVT
wave commanders or wave guide officers by radio at any time
during the initial assault. The control officer was aware that
waves or groups of LVTs and boats were landing at the wrong
places but was helpless to prevent it without communications.
As a last resort, Casualty and Salvage landing craft were
dispatched to assist the initial wave guides (members of UDT
1) in rounding up vehicles and leading or directing them to
BLUE Beach.”[166]
[166] Clark ltr, 11 Mar 55.
Since current and smoke fought relentlessly against tractors seaward of
the line of departure, not all of the vehicles could find the control
ship. If they did, it was next to impossible to come in close enough to
get instructions shouted from the bridge. Thus many wave commanders,
amtrac officers, and infantry leaders gave orders to head shoreward
on their own initiative. They went in with waves and fragments of
waves, displaying the kind of leadership that made the operation an
overwhelming success in spite of the obstacles. This was the case with
the three waves of 2/1 that failed to arrive at BLUE One. They found
their way ashore, some of the LVTs landing on BLUE Two, others diverted
to BLUE Three; but the important thing was that they got there.[167]
[167] Capt J. L. Carter ltr to CMC, 12 Apr 55.
The most serious error of the day, again offset by initiative and
decision, involved Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins’ 1st Battalion,
landing in regimental reserve.[168] About H-hour, Puller radioed
Hawkins and ordered him to cross the line of departure with LCVP waves
21 through 25, carrying the whole of 1/1. Had the approach to the beach
gone smoothly, the battalion would have begun landing at approximately
H-plus 45 (1815).
[168] The following account of 1/1 is derived from: Rickert
memo, 15 Apr 55; LtCol J. Hawkins ltr, 8 Mar 55; Bates
interv, 27 Aug. 51; Bridges interv, 18 Oct. 54, and
memo to CMC, 31 Mar 55; Maj R. H. Barrow memo to CMC,
25 Apr 55; and Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 23 Apr 55.
Because of conditions in the channel and boat lanes, as already
described, a searchlight on the control ship now beamed the supposed
course to the beach. Actually, the whole area had become so clouded
that the light was mistakenly pointed toward the outer tidal basin,
some 45 degrees off course to the northeast.
Moving in the designated direction, the first two of the reserve waves
reached the sea wall of the basin; and the Marines, believing they were
at the revetment of BLUE Two, began debarking. Hawkins, following in
the third wave (wave number 23), caught the error as his boat passed
within sight of two outlying islands between the basin and the salt
evaporator jutting out from the left of BLUE One. About the same time,
Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Rickert, executive officer of the 1st
Marines, noticed some of the errant landing craft from his free boat
between the line of departure and BLUE One. He intercepted a group of
the LCVPs and reoriented them.
In the meantime, Hawkins cruised the length of the basin wall and
shouted instructions to the troops of the first two waves. Most of
Company B had already debarked and a few of the empty boats had left
for the channel. Able Company, having just begun to land, promptly
reembarked in its LCVPs. In short order, the battalion reformed at sea
and headed toward BLUE Two. Owing to the lack of boats, one platoon of
Baker Company remained on the tidal basin all night. Hiking to rejoin
the company on the mainland next morning, this platoon rounded up an
impressive bag of prisoners.
Upon reaching BLUE Two in darkness, Hawkins found Company C, which
had avoided the detour owing to the sixth sense of a boat coxswain,
organizing and setting up local security. The battalion commander led
most of 1/1 forward to a night assembly area along the railroad tracks,
half a mile inland. Major David W. Bridges, battalion S-3, was left
behind to organize late-comers as they arrived from the tidal basin.
_Seizure of the O-1 Line_
The tactical situation ashore had meanwhile begun to crystallize
for the 1st Marines. In the 2d Battalion zone, Dog Company occupied
Objective A, the road intersection, at 2000. Two hours later, Fox
Company reported that it occupied enough of Objective D, Hill 117, so
that it could cover the Inchon-Seoul highway with fire.
The attack from the beach had cost Sutter’s unit one KIA and 19 WIA as
compared to enemy losses of 15 prisoners and an estimated 50 dead.
On the right of the regimental zone, Ridge’s 3d Battalion was also
making good progress against light resistance. Item Company reported at
1900 that it was on Objective C, the western nose of Hill 233. Half an
hour later, George company began deploying in blocking positions across
the corridor and road at the center of the O-1 Line. This movement was
completed about 2030.[169]
[169] Ridge ltr, 11 May 55.
The 1st Platoon of How Company passed seaward of Item at 2030 and
pressed a night attack against a company of North Koreans on Objective
B, the small cape topped by Hill 94. After a token resistance, the
Reds abandoned their well-prepared entrenchments, leaving 30 dead and
wounded to be counted by the Marines.
How Company (less 1st and 2d Platoons) covered the low ground between
George and Item, finally occupying a blocking position about 400 yards
behind the O-1 Line.
With the seizure of Hill 94, the critical portions of the O-1 Line
were secured. There was, however, a good deal of activity within the
perimeter for several more hours. Major Bridges of 1/1 collected about
100 late-comers at BLUE Three and led them forward in search of the
battalion assembly area. Composed of men from H&S, Able and Baker
Companies, the little force not only missed its destination but made
one of the deepest penetrations of the day, finally halting on a hill
to the left of George Company’s front lines.
Shortly after Bridges set up a defensive position for the night, his
position was invaded by an Easy Company contingent in search of the
2d Battalion. Reoriented to some degree, the visitors reached Dog
Company’s intersection much later. The 2d Battalion CP had meanwhile
intercepted a group from Major Whitman S. Bartley’s Weapons Company at
the trail junction selected in the darkness for the initial battalion
CP. At one or the other of these points, the misdirected portions of
Sutter’s battalion were directed to their parent units. All personnel
were present or accounted for before dawn.[170]
[170] Sutter memo, May 55.
Two other troop movements completed the tactical mosaic of the 1st
Marines. The 2d Platoon of How Company was to pass through Item’s lines
on Objective C at 2330 and outpost the summit of Hill 233, some 2,000
yards farther along the ridge and beyond the regimental front. After
setting out on schedule, the small unit covered about half of its
rugged journey upon reaching Hill 180, an intermediate height. With
most of the night gone and his troops wearied by the climb, the platoon
leader radioed for permission to halt and his request was granted.
Another venture into the unknown was made by an even smaller unit.
Second Lieutenant Bruce F. Cunliffe’s 60mm section of Fox Company had
somehow mingled with 3d Battalion troops during the drive inland. When
he led his men through the darkness in search of 2/1, the section
ranged forward of friendly lines and into unexplored territory near
Hill 117.
The surprise was mutual when these Marines stumbled into a small NKPA
patrol. But a brief fire fight in the darkness was enough for the Red
soldiers, who took to their heels and left three dead. Cunliffe’s
force, which had no casualties, spent the rest of the night in
uneventful isolation.