Embarkation and Assault
_Landing of 1st Marine Division--Plan to Seize Kimpo Airfield--Shipping
Assigned to Marines--Movement to the Objective Area--Strikes and
Bombardments--Marine Landings on GREEN Beach--The Two Harbor Islands
Secured_
On 30 August, ComNavFE issued his Operation Plan 108-50, assigning
to JTF-7, of which X Corps was a part, the mission of seizing by
amphibious assault a beachhead at Inchon.
X Corps OpnO No. 1 was dated on the 28th, though not received by
Division until the 30th. By that time, Division planning had made so
much progress that Embarkation Order 1-50 was issued on the last day of
the month, followed on 4 September by the final draft of Division OpnO
2-50. Operations orders of JTF-7 and TF-90 were issued concurrently.
This meant that the assault RCTs, contrary to amphibious doctrine, were
to receive rigid landing plans drawn up completely by the Division.
Lack of time caused this variation from usual procedure, but General
Smith had confidence in the ability of his troops to overcome the
handicap. “Under the circumstances,” he asserted, “adoption of such
methods was justified by the common background and training of all
elements and individuals in amphibious doctrine, procedures, tactics,
and techniques.”[103]
[103] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Charlie.
The most that could be done was to summon Brigade staff officers from
Korea for a conference. Colonel Edward D. Snedeker (Chief of Staff),
Captain Eugene R. Hering, Jr., USN (Brigade Surgeon), Lieutenant
Colonel Arthur A. Chidester (G-4), and Major Donald W. Sherman
(G-1) arrived on board the _Mount McKinley_ for a conference on 28
August and the following day. The Brigade G-3, Lieutenant Colonel
Joseph L. Stewart, reported as liaison officer on the 31st. When he
returned to the front, the 5th Marines was attacking, and he discussed
landing schedules with Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray while the
regimental commander directed the action.
“This,” remarked General Smith, “was hardly in accordance with accepted
procedure for planning amphibious operations.”[104]
[104] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 82. See v. I of this series for a
detailed account of the Brigade in the second battle of
the Naktong and the embarkation from Pusan.
The recommendation of Brigade staff officers that the 3d Battalion,
5th Marines, be designated for the assault on Wolmi-do was accepted
by Division planners. Colonel Snedeker also proposed that the 1st
Korean Marine Corps (KMC) Regiment of nearly 3,000 men be substituted
for the 17th ROK Regiment, which he said was committed in the Pusan
Perimeter and might not be available. The change was approved by GHQ on
3 September, with the Eighth Army being directed to provide weapons for
the newcomers.
This was the beginning of a relationship that would find the KMCs
serving with distinction alongside the men of the 1st Marine Division
and eventually becoming a fourth infantry regiment of the Division.
Activated in 1949 by the Republic of Korea, the unit took part in
anti-guerrilla operations until the NKPA invasion. After the outbreak
of hostilities, the KMCs fought creditably in UN delaying actions in
southwest Korea. The turning point came when they were attached to the
1st Marine Division and sent to Pusan for test-firing of their new
weapons before embarking for Inchon. Immediately the Koreans commenced
to model themselves after U. S. Marines so assiduously as to win
respect for their spirit and rugged fighting qualities.[105] They were
quick to learn, despite the language handicap, and showed aptitude in
mechanical respects.
[105] 1st MarDiv, “1st KMC Regiment and its relationship to
the 1st Marine Division,” (Type “C” Rpt) 1–2.
_Landing of 1st Marine Division_
The main body of the 1st Marine Division troops landed at Kobe from
29 August to 3 September. Marine officers sent in advance to that
seaport had found the authorities there “very cooperative” and brought
back to Tokyo a billeting plan which General Smith approved. Since
the facilities in and about Kobe were limited, two large APs were
designated as barracks ships, thus making available a Marine labor pool
at the docks.
At best, every hour was needed for the tremendous task of transferring
cargo from merchant type shipping into assault shipping.[106] There was
cause for anxiety, therefore, when a telephone message informed the
command of the 1st Marine Division on 3 September that Typhoon JANE
had struck Kobe with winds of 74 miles per hour. First reports had it
that the _Marine Phoenix_ was on the bottom with all of the Division’s
signal gear. Several ships were said to have broken their moorings and
gone adrift; the docks were reported under 4 feet of water, and loose
cargo on the piers had been inundated by breakers.
[106] As a time-saving measure, it was decided to combat-load
only the assault elements, allowing the other elements
to go as organization loads. This was considered
an acceptable risk in view of the enemy’s lack of
effective air and submarine forces.
Later accounts proved to be less alarming. The _Marine Phoenix_, having
merely developed a bad list as a result of shifting cargo, was soon
righted. Nor was the other damage as serious as had at first been
supposed. But 24 hours were lost from the tight reloading schedule
while Typhoon JANE kicked up her heels, and time was one commodity that
could not be replaced. All operations at Kobe had to be speeded up to
pay for this delay.
On 4 September the _Mount McKinley_ set sail for Kobe, arriving at 1445
the next day to be welcomed by an Army band at the pier. The soothing
powers of music were needed by Marine officers who learned that fire
had broken out in the hold of the _Noonday_ as she belatedly approached
Kobe. This “Jonah” had taken so long to load at San Diego that she
lagged behind the others, and now large quantities of much-needed
Marine clothing were apparently ruined by water when the fire was
extinguished. Once again the Army came to the rescue with wholehearted
cooperation by taking the water-soaked boxes to a reclamation depot
where the garments were dried, repackaged and sent back to the docks in
time for loading out on the originally scheduled ships.
Only the most basic troop training could be conducted at Kobe to
supplement the individual and amphibious instruction the men had
received on shipboard. At this time, moreover, an order from the
Secretary of the Navy made it necessary to reduce the size of the
landing force by withdrawing about 500 Marines who had not yet reached
their 18th birthday. They were transferred to the 1st Armored Amphibian
Tractor Battalion, which was to be left behind at Kobe when the
Division embarked for Inchon.
This unit had been organized at Camp Pendleton in accordance with a
directive from the Commandant. It was found necessary, however, to
transfer most of its combat-ready men to the 1st Tank Battalion in
order to bring that outfit up to full strength. The tank battalion
was given priority because its vehicles would be used throughout
the operation while the armored amphibians might be employed only
occasionally. As a consequence, the 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor
Battalion left San Diego with new personnel lacking in the skills to
make it fully combat ready.
Lieutenant Colonel Francis H. Cooper, the commanding officer,
recommended at Kobe that the unit be withheld from action until
drivers, gunners, and maintenance crews could be properly trained.
General Smith and his staff concurred, having learned that a trained
Army unit, Company A of the 56th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, could be
made available. Orders were given for Cooper’s battalion to remain at
Kobe, therefore, with the 17-year-old Marines attached.
Several other U. S. Army units were to take part along with the
Marines--the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, the 2d Engineer Special
Brigade, the 73d Engineer (c) Battalion, the 73d Tank Battalion, the
50th Engineer Port Construction Company, and the 65th Ordnance and
Ammunition Company. These units comprised a total of about 2,750 troops.
Plans called for the commanding officer of the 2d Engineer Special
Brigade to head a logistical task organization which also included
several Marine units--the 1st Shore Party Battalion, the 1st Combat
Service Group, and the 7th Motor Transport Battalion. The Shore Party
troops were to initiate unloading at the objective, whereupon the
over-all control would pass to the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, on
order, to insure continuity of development of unloading facilities.[107]
[107] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, sec. 1, and Annexes Dog and Jig;
O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 101, 104, 107, 110–112.
Division service units, in accordance with current directives, were to
carry the 30-day replenishment of spare parts appropriate to the unit
concerned. Although the Combat Service Group had neither spare parts
nor supplies, it was to have custody of both after the landing. Thus
the units would be freed immediately to move away from the beach in
support of the Division as it drove toward Kimpo and Seoul.[108]
[108] See Appendix D for a list of supplies and equipment to
be embarked in assigned shipping, as prescribed by 1st
MarDiv Embarkation Order 1-50 of 31 Aug 50.
At Kobe the men of the 1st Marine Division were required to leave the
full clothing bags they had brought from San Diego and embark for
Inchon with field transport packs containing only the most essential
items. This meant that some 25,000 sea bags must be stored at the
Japanese port in such a way that future casualties and rotation drafts
could reclaim their personal effects without delay. As a reminder of
the grim task ahead, provisions must be also made to return to proper
custody the effects of deceased personnel.
_Plan to Seize Kimpo Airfield_
Intelligence reports on the eve of embarkation did not depart from
earlier estimates of a maximum of 2,500 NKPA troops in the objective
area. From 400 to 500 were believed to be garrisoning Wolmi-do, 500
defending Kimpo, and the balance stationed in and about Inchon.[109]
Despite the estimates of low to moderate enemy resistance, however,
General Smith differed with the command of X Corps when a commando-type
raid on Kimpo was proposed.
[109] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Baker.
The question came up on 8 September at a conference held at Kobe on the
_Mount McKinley_ and attended by Generals Hickey and Smith, Admiral
Doyle and Colonel Louis B. Ely, USA. Ely commanded the newly formed
X Corps Special Operations Company composed of 124 U. S. Army troops
briefly trained by TTU instructors in demolitions, individual combat
and ship-to-shore movements in rubber boats.[110] General Almond’s plan
called for this company, reinforced by Marines, to embark at Kobe on 10
September in a British frigate and transfer to a South Korean picket
boat. Upon arrival at the objective area on D-day, the raiders were to
paddle three miles in rubber boats to the north of the Attack Force,
land under cover of darkness, and move inland for a surprise attack on
Kimpo at dawn.
[110] Col E. H. Forney, _Special Report_, 5–7.
General Almond felt it necessary to seize the airfield at the earliest
possible moment. Surprise, he felt, would reduce the risks. General
Smith pointed out, however, that Colonel Ely’s men would have to row
their rubber boats against a strong tide and cross a wide expanse of
mud flats on foot. His radios could only reach four miles, and his
presence in the 1st Marine Division’s zone of action would restrict the
use of naval gunfire and air support. Finally, said the Marine general,
it was not certain that the raiders could hold the airfield even if
they took it.[111]
[111] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 92–95.
This conference did not settle the issue. Colonel Williams, the
Division chief of staff, was requested in a telephone call followed
by a dispatch from the G-1 Section of GHQ to turn over 100 specially
qualified Marines to Ely’s company. Smith sent a dispatch requesting
reconsideration. He cited the battle casualties of the Brigade, which
had not been replaced, and the 500 under-age Marines to be left behind
at Kobe. As a final objection, many of his best qualified men had
already embarked on the LSTs.
General Shepherd sent a dispatch supporting the 1st Marine Division
commander, and the order from GHQ was recalled.[112]
[112] _Ibid._ Colonel Ely actually did embark with his
Special Operations Company and make the approach, but
the landing was called off because of his last-minute
decision that too great a distance had to be covered in
rubber boats.
Another proposal by General Almond to speed up the drive inland from
the beachhead was relayed to General Smith aboard the _Mount McKinley_
on 9 September by Brigadier General Henry I. Hodes, ADC of the 7th
Infantry Division. This was a plan to land a battalion of the 32d
Infantry on GREEN Beach, Wolmi-do, with a mission of racing across
the causeway on the late afternoon of D-day and moving rapidly down
the road to seize the high ground south of Seoul, more than 20 miles
inland. The 1st Marine Division was requested to furnish five tanks in
support of the enterprise tentatively scheduled to take place while two
battalions of Marine artillery were landing on Wolmi-do and two Marine
rifle regiments were landing on the Inchon beaches.
This idea struck Smith as being extremely optimistic. Without
going into the tactical objections, he decided that the scheme was
logistically impracticable.[113]
[113] _Ibid._ It later developed that the 32d Infantry, first
regiment of the 7th Infantry Division ashore, did not
land until D-plus 3.
_Shipping Assigned to Marines_
The embarkation at Kobe was not completed without some confusion.
Much of the equipment was in its original containers and had never
been checked or identified. Large quantities of Class I, III, and V
supplies, distributed throughout the incoming shipping, had to be
reassembled and reassigned for the outloading. In the lack of suitable
storage areas near the piers, Classes III and V were off-loaded into
Japanese barges and held in floating storage until they could be
reloaded into assault shipping.[114]
[114] See Appendix D.
Inter-pier transfer of cargo was avoided whenever possible by berthing
incoming shipping so that units could load directly into assault
shipping. Unfortunately, this could not be done in some instances,
since the LST landing was outside but adjacent to the pier area.
Facilities for the embarkation of the Brigade at Pusan were
satisfactory, with pier space for three APAs and one AKA at one
pier and an LSD at another. All of the assigned LSTs could beach
simultaneously along the sea wall.
Only Marine amphibious experience enabled the Division to complete
its tremendous task at Kobe in spite of the time lost as a result of
Typhoon JANE. The shipping tentatively assigned by X Corps consisted
of one AGC, six APAs, eight AKAs, three LSDs, one LSM, three APDs, 12
LSUs, and 47 LSTs. This last figure included 17 Navy-manned and 30
SCAJAP (Japanese-manned) LSTs. The troop list of approximately 29,000
men was broken down by the Division into the following six embarkation
groups with their assigned shipping:
-----------------+-------------------+-------------------------
Embarkation group| Principal units | Shipping
-----------------+-------------------+-------------------------
ABLE |Divisional Troops |1 AGC
|1st CSG |2 APAs
| |5 AKAs
| |9 LSTs
| |1 LSM
| |3 LSUs (towed to
| | objective area by tugs)
| |
BAKER |1st Marine (Reinf) |1 APA
|1st Amtrac Bn |12 LSTs
| |
CHARLIE |5th Marines (Reinf)|3 APAs
|73d Tank Bn, USA |12 LSTs
| |3 APDs
| |1 LSD w/3 LSUs
| |
DOG |11th Marines |1 AKA
| |6 LSTs
| |
EASY |1st Tank Bn |2 LSDs w/3 LSUs each
| |4 LSTs (later
| | increased to 6)
| |
FOX |2d Engr Spec Brig, |1 AKA
| USA |
|96th FA Bn, USA |4 LSTs
-----------------+-------------------+-------------------------
Four of these groups were to embark from Kobe while CHARLIE mounted
out from Pusan and FOX from Yokohama, Yokosuka, and Camp McGill in
Japan.[115] The main body of the Division’s third rifle regiment, the
7th Marines, was scheduled to land in Japan on 17 September. Colonel
Litzenberg, the commanding officer, arrived at Itami Airfield on the
6th, having flown from Camp Pendleton ahead of his troops to make
arrangements.
[115] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, sec. 1, and Annex Jig; O. P. Smith,
_Notes_, 102, 117–119.
_Movement to the Objective Area_
Command relationships during the assault and embarkation phase were as
follows:
+---------+
| CinCFE |
+----+----+
|
+----+----+
|ComNavFE |
+----+----+
|
+----+----+
| CJTF-7 |
+----+----+
|
+---------+--------+
| |
+-----+----+ +-----+-----+
| CTF-90 | |CG X Corps |
+-----+----+ +-----+-----+
| |
+---------+---------+--------+--------+
| | |
+------+-------+ +-------+------+ +------+-------+
| ComPhibGru-1 | |CG 7th Inf Div| |CG 1st Mar Div|
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
The movement of JTF-7 to the objective area was planned in the most
exacting detail, owing to the dispersion of the ships to begin with,
the need for secrecy, and the limited time. Another complication
entered the picture at the last minute, when a second typhoon loomed on
the Pacific horizon with considerably more menace than its exotic name
would imply.
Navy meteorologists had been plotting the movement of Typhoon KEZIA
since the first signs of turbulence near the Marianas Islands on 6
September. Generating winds of 100 miles per hour three days later,
the typhoon was churning a steady course toward the East China Sea and
Tsushima Strait, where it was expected to hit on 12 or 13 September.
The timing could not have been worse as far as Admiral Doyle and
General Smith were concerned. KEZIA threatened to strike the ships
of the task force during the last stages of embarkation and the
first phase of the approach to Inchon. And any serious disruption of
the Navy’s delicate timetable would place the 15 September deadline
hopelessly beyond reach.
With the carriers, cruisers, and destroyers scheduled to be in the
Yellow Sea, beyond the path of the storm, Admiral Doyle’s amphibious
vessels were the most imperiled elements. The Attack Force Commander
planned to move his ships to the objective area in six increments,
three of them loading in Japan, one in Pusan, and two at both places
simultaneously. Because of the last two, certain rendezvous areas
were designated so that fragments of a group could converge at sea to
form the whole. Obviously, then, the mathematics of navigation was a
dominant factor. Success hinged on coordination in terms of hours, not
weeks or days.
Each of the six increments had its own time schedule for an independent
voyage. The route to Inchon was marked off on maps by a chain of check
points, the most significant of which bore the code names ARKANSAS,
IOWA, and CALIFORNIA. The first two, lying in the East China Sea off
the southwestern tip of Korea, formed the junction of the sea lanes
from Japan and Pusan. Consequently, there was no alternative to their
remaining fixed in the direct path of the oncoming typhoon. Point
CALIFORNIA was important in that it marked the end of the open sea
phase and the beginning of the treacherous offshore approach to Inchon
via Flying Fish and East channels.[116]
[116] ComPhibGru-1, _OpOrder 14-50_, Annex Dog.
[Illustration: MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA]
The departure schedule for the Attack Force was set out in Doyle’s
Operation Order 14-50 as follows:
------------------------------------------------------+--------+------
Unit | Port | Date
------------------------------------------------------+--------+------
Pontoon Movement Group (2 ATFs, 3 LSUs, 1 YTB, 1 YW) |Yokohama| 5 Sep
LSMR Movement Element (3 LSMRs) | do | 9 Sep
Tractor Movement Element A (LSM, 1 AMS, 1 AM, 1 ARS, 2| |
LSDs, 36 LSTs) |Kobe |10 Sep
Tractor Movement Element B (1 ARL, 1 PF, 1 PCEC, | |
12 LSTs) | do |10 Sep
Transport Movement Group (5 APAs, 8 AKAs, 1 AP, 2 PFs)| do |12 Sep
Advance Attack Group (Wolmi-do) (1 LSD, 3 APDs) |Pusan |13 Sep
------------------------------------------------------+--------+------
The chart shows the basic pattern, which would evolve only after
considerable shuffling and secondary routing. For instance, two vessels
of the cumbersome Pontoon Movement Group, carrying vital equipment
for the expansion of Inchon’s port facilities, would not leave Sasebo
until 11 September. They were to join the slow Yokohama convoy near
Point IOWA the same day. Tractor Elements A and B, the latter trailing
at a distance of six miles, would pick up the Pusan LSTs at IOWA on
13 September. The Kobe contingent of the Transport Movement Group was
to pass through Point ARKANSAS on the 14th, joining the _Cavalier_,
_Pickaway_, _Henrico_, and _Seminole_ from Pusan.
All ship movements took place on schedule until the morning of 11
September, when angry ocean swells off the coast of Japan marked the
approach of KEZIA. Winds at the center of the typhoon were estimated
at 125 miles per hour, but Admiral Doyle based his decisions on the
assumption that the storm would curve off to the north instead of
colliding with the invasion armada in full force. He was taking a
calculated risk, therefore, when he ordered the Transport Movement
Group at Kobe to weigh anchor on the 11th, a day ahead of schedule, and
proceed to the objective area. The LSTs, already on their way, were now
out of danger; and Doyle believed that advancing the sailing date would
enable the AKAs and APAs to escape the worst of the typhoon.
The _Mount McKinley_, with Doyle, Smith, and their staffs aboard,
departed Kobe at 1030 on the 11th. As the ship rolled and pitched in
heavy seas, the Attack Force Commander remarked that KEZIA was one of
the worst storms he had ever encountered.[117]
[117] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 127–129.
This was also the opinion of Captain Cameron Briggs, USN, then fighting
it out with KEZIA in an effort to reach Sasebo with the carrier _Boxer_
and its 96 planes plus 14 extra aircraft taken aboard at Pearl Harbor.
It was necessary to launch these spares and land them on Okinawa before
he could finally make port on the 12th and prepare to mount out two
days later for Inchon.[118]
[118] Karig, _Korea_, 197.
On 12 September the _Mount McKinley_ overtook the AKAs and APAs. They
had reversed course, apparently on the assumption that they could not
get around the typhoon. If Doyle had not ordered the heaving vessels to
circle about and follow the flagship through the storm, their chances
for meeting the 15 September deadline at Inchon would have vanished
like the wind-whipped spray.[119]
[119] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 127–129.
There was no joy in the troop compartments as the transports plowed
through mountains of water. But Doyle was winning his gamble that the
typhoon would slowly veer off to the north, and starting the Transport
Group a day early proved to be a sound decision. Thanks to the
admiral’s judgment and resolution, every ship weathered the storm and
approached Point ARKANSAS on schedule.
After rounding Kyushu on 12 September, the _Mount McKinley_ docked at
Sasebo that evening to pick up General MacArthur with his party of GHQ
and X Corps officers. The proper ship for this purpose was Admiral
Struble’s flagship, the USS _Rochester_. But CinCFE preferred the
_Mount McKinley_ despite the fact that an AGC was designed for the
staffs of an Attack Force and Landing Force and had no accommodations
suited to a party including seven general officers. The ship was warped
in by two tugs and CinCFE came aboard. General Shepherd had previously
been assigned by General MacArthur to his staff for temporary duty
as amphibious adviser and personal liaison officer to the 1st Marine
Division. The Marine general was accompanied by Colonel V. H. Krulak,
G-3 of FMFPac, and his personal aide, Major J. B. Ord.
In less than an hour the _Mount McKinley_ was back on the high seas,
straining through the darkness toward Korea.[120]
[120] _Ibid._
All elements of the Attack Force completed the last leg of the voyage
without incident on 14 September. Headquarters of the 2d Battalion, 1st
Marines, rode the only cripple, an LST partially incapacitated by an
engine breakdown. Fortunately, an ocean-going tug was on hand to tow
the ailing vessel at eight knots--sufficient speed to get her to the
objective area on time.
The Yellow Sea was quiet as the columns of ships closed on Point
CALIFORNIA and Korea’s coastline. Nothing was taken for granted,
and the approach was carefully screened to the very end by Admiral
Andrewes’ fast Blockade and Covering Force.
_Air and Naval Bombardments_
The softening up of Wolmi-do had begun on 10 September, when the Marine
fliers of TG-95.5 made napalm attacks designed to burn off the trees
screening NKPA artillery. Six planes of VMF-323 and eight planes of
VMF-214 took off from the CVEs at 0600 and scorched the eastern side of
the island. The next flight of 14 planes found it necessary to orbit
for a few minutes until the smoke cleared sufficiently for them to
continue the work of destruction.
Lieutenant Clark’s reports had led G-2 officers to believe that enemy
defensive installations on Wolmi-do were more formidable than had
at first been supposed. As if in support of this conclusion, the
Marine fliers of the second strike were greeted with small-caliber
anti-aircraft fire both from the island and mainland. A third attack,
launched from the decks of the _Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_ shortly
before noon, left the hump-backed island in flames from one shore to
another.
After the CVEs returned to Sasebo for replenishment the next day,
the carrier-based Navy planes of TF-77 worked over both Wolmi-do and
Inchon on 12 and 13 September. It was now the turn of the destroyers,
and Admiral Higgins had planned a bold venture. Instead of risking
collision or grounding in a night approach, he decided to forego the
advantages of surprise and attack in broad daylight. And instead of
avoiding NKPA fire, he intended to goad the enemy into retaliations
which would reveal the positions of NKPA guns on Wolmi-do.
The hazards of the operation were increased by the fact that a ROK PC
boat had discovered an NKPA craft laying mines on the morning of the
10th. This confirmed Admiral Struble’s opinion that the Inchon area
offered the enemy excellent opportunities for this form of warfare.
Not only would the muddy waters make detection difficult, but crippled
ships would block the narrow channel.
It was not a pleasant prospect. And the outlook became darker on the
morning of 13 September when four mines were spotted in Flying Fish
Channel. The U. S. cruisers _Toledo_ and _Rochester_ and the British
cruisers _Kenya_ and _Jamaica_ had dropped off in support as the six
destroyers carried out their mission. Pausing only to detonate the
mines with 40mm rounds, the cans moved up within 800 yards of Wolmi-do
to fire down the enemy’s throat while the four cruisers poured in 6-
and 8-inch salvoes and the planes of TF-77 made bombing runs.[121]
[121] Lynn Montross, “Fleet Marine Force Korea,” _United
States Naval Institute Proceedings_, 37, no. 9 (Aug
53): 836–838.
It had been long since the Navy issued the historic order “Prepare to
repel boarders!” But Admiral Higgins did not overlook the possibility
of NKPA infantry swarming out over the mud flats to attack a disabled
and grounded destroyer. And though he did not issue pikes and
cutlasses, the crews of the _Gurke_, _Henderson_, _Swanson_, _Collett_,
_De Haven_, and _Mansfield_ were armed with grenades and Tommy guns for
action at close quarters.
The enemy endured half an hour of punishment before obliging Higgins
by opening up with the shore guns of Wolmi-do. The _Gurke_ and _De
Haven_ took hits, and five NKPA shells found the _Collett_. The total
damage was insignificant, however, and the casualties amounted to one
man killed and eight wounded. These results cost the enemy dearly when
the cruisers and destroyers silenced the NKPA guns shortly after they
revealed their positions.
On the return trip the destroyers found eight more mines and exploded
them. This proved to be all, for the enemy had neglected an opportunity
to make the waters around Inchon dangerous for the attack force. The
next morning, when the destroyers paid another visit to Wolmi-do, the
shore guns appeared to have been effectually silenced. The DDs fired
more than 1,700 5-inch shells and drew only a few scattered shots
in reply. Meanwhile, the Marine planes of VMFs-214 and -323, having
returned from Sasebo, cooperated by spotting for the cruisers and
launching napalm strikes before and after the bombardment.
On the evening of 14 September, after five days of continual pounding,
Wolmi-do was a blasted piece of real estate as the Marines of 3/5
prepared to hit GREEN Beach in the morning.
_Marine Landings on GREEN Beach_
The pre-dawn stillness of the Yellow Sea was shattered as the Corsairs
of VMFs-214 and -323 flashed up from the decks of the _Sicily_ and
_Badoeng Strait_. To the west the planes of Task Force 77 were
assembling in attack formations above the _Valley Forge_, _Philippine
Sea_, and _Boxer_. Squadron after squadron droned eastward through the
blackness, and the first aircraft began orbiting over the objective
area at 0454.[122]
[122] ComAirSupGrp and ComCarDiv 15 _Report of Operations
6–21 Sep 50_; 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item: Baker, 4.
Two hours earlier, Advance Attack Group 90.1, under Captain Norman W.
Sears, USN, had glided into the entrance of Flying Fish channel. Led by
the _Mansfield_, the column of 19 ships snaked through the treacherous
passage while captains and navigators sweated over radar scopes.
Lieutenant Clark’s handiwork provided a welcome relief midway along
the route, when the glimmering beacon on Palmi-do guided the vessels
past one of the more dangerous points in the channel. Minutes after
air cover began to form over Inchon, the ships eased into the narrows
west of Wolmi-do and sought assigned battle stations. Training their
big guns on the port city were the cruisers _Toledo_, _Rochester_,
_Kenya_, and _Jamaica_, comprising one of the three Fire Support Units
under Admiral Higgins. Other support vessels scattered throughout the
waters of the objective area were the destroyers _Collet_, _Gurke_,
_Henderson_, _Mansfield_, _De Haven_, _Swenson_, and _Southerland_;
and this array of fire power was further supplemented by the three
bristling rocket ships, LSMR’s 401, 403, and 404.[123]
[123] 1st MarDiv _OpOrder_ 2-50; Karig, _Korea_, 213.
The control ship, _Mount McKinley_, its flag bridge crowded with
star-studded commanders, steamed into the narrows just before dawn.
No sooner had the gray shoreline become outlined in the morning haze
than the 6- and 8-inch guns of the cruisers belched sheets of orange
flame in the direction of Inchon; and at 0545, the initial explosions
rocked the city and reverberated throughout the channel. There was
a deafening crescendo as the destroyers hammered Wolmi-do with their
5-inch guns. Radio Hill, its seaward side already burnt and blackened
from previous bombardments, was almost hidden by smoke when Marine
planes streaked down at 0600 to smother the island with tons of rockets
and bombs.[124]
[124] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, sec. I; 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal,
15–20 Sep 50_; O. P. Smith, _Notes_.
Captain Sears, reporting to the _Mount McKinley_, confirmed L-hour at
0630. To this end, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett’s landing force
was boated by 0600, and the LCVPs and LSUs rendezvoused while Marine
air continued to soften up the target.[125]
[125] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen; and O. P. Smith, _Notes_.
Air attacks ceased at 0615, but Wolmi-do enjoyed only a momentary
respite before the most unnerving blow of all. In strange contrast to
the sleek men-o’-war and nimble aircraft, three squat LSMRs closed on
the island from the north, a few hundred yards offshore. Phalanxes
of rockets arose from the decks of the clumsy ships, arched steeply,
and crashed down. One of the rocket ships, taking a southerly course,
passed GREEN Beach and dumped salvo after salvo along the slopes and
crest of Radio Hill.
When the LSMR cleared North Point of Wolmi-do, seven LCVPs darted
across the line of departure and sped shoreward with 3/5’s first
wave.[126] Rockets and 40mm shells were still ripping the southern
half of the island when one platoon of Company G and three platoons of
Company H stormed GREEN Beach at 0633. Two minutes later, the second
wave of landing craft ground to a halt on the sand, bringing the
remainder of both assault companies.
[126] The following narrative is derived from 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annexes Queen Queen and Oboe Oboe; 1st MAW
_SAR_; 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal, 15–20 Sep 50_; Taplett
interv, 25 Aug 54; Maj R. A. McMullen interv, 27 Jul
54; Capt J. D. Counselman memo to authors, 10 Mar 55;
and MSgt E. L. Knox memo to authors, 10 Jan 55.
The Marines were confronted by a scene of devastation almost devoid
of enemy resistance. Only a few scattered shots greeted the assault
force as it punched inland. The failure of UDT men to clear away all
of the wrecked small craft cluttering the beach had left 3/5 a landing
strip less than fifty yards wide. Consequently, each wave had to
contract like an accordion, and there was considerable crowding during
the first crucial minutes of the landing. But even at this stage, the
potent Marine air arm offered a final measure of protection to the
infantrymen splashing ashore. Pilots swung their F4Us fifty yards ahead
of the assault troops and hosed the routes of advance with machine-gun
bullets.
[Illustration: SEIZURE OF WOLMI-DO
3RD BN, 5TH MARINES
15 SEPT 1950]
After a brief pause for reorganization at the beach, First Lieutenant
Robert D. Bohn’s Company G wheeled to the right and drove up the
northern slopes of Radio Hill, Objective 1-A. Only half-hearted
resistance was met along the way, most of the scattered and numb North
Koreans preferring to surrender rather than face the inevitable. At
0655, Sergeant Alvin E. Smith, guide of the 3d Platoon, secured the
American flag to a shell-torn tree on the crest.
At this point General MacArthur rose from the swivel chair in which
he had been viewing the operation on the flag bridge of the _Mount
McKinley_. “That’s it,” he said. “Let’s get a cup of coffee.”
Meanwhile, the Wolmi-do assault continued as Captain Patrick E.
Wildman, after detaching a small force from Company H to clear
rubble-strewn North Point, attacked across Wolmi-do toward the Inchon
causeway with the rest of his unit. How Company’s mission was to seize
Objective 2-B, which included the eastern nose of Radio Hill and the
shoreline industrial area facing Inchon.
At 0646, the three LSUs comprising the third wave squeezed into the
narrow beach and disgorged the armored detachment of Company A, 1st
Tank Battalion, under Second Lieutenant Granville G. Sweet. Ten tanks
were landed in all--six M-26s, one flame-thrower, two dozers, and one
retriever. The big vehicles crunched inland a short distance to await
calls from the infantry.
Lieutenant Colonel Taplett ordered his free boat to the beach at 0650.
Fifteen minutes later, he radioed the _Mount McKinley_ and _Fort
Marion_ that his assault companies were advancing on schedule.
It was ironic that 3/5’s reserve company should encounter the angriest
hornets’ nest on Wolmi-do. Landing in the fourth wave at 0659, Captain
Robert A. McMullen’s Company I moved through North Point in trace of
the How Company detachment which supposedly had cleared the area.
Suddenly a flurry of hand grenades clattered on the rubble, and the
surprised Marines scattered for cover. Regaining their composure after
the explosions, the infantrymen determined the source of trouble to be
a by-passed string of enemy emplacements dug into a low cliff at the
shoreline facing Inchon. There appeared to be about a platoon of North
Koreans, who would rise from their holes intermittently, fling grenades
inland, then disappear from sight.
Item Company’s interpreter crawled toward the cliff during a lull,
bellowing to the Reds that their predicament was hopeless and
exhorting them to surrender. When the Communists responded to this
advice by throwing more grenades, McMullen signalled Sweet’s tanks
into action. The M-26s and Marine riflemen took covering positions,
while the dozer tank, directed by McMullen himself, rumbled into the
troublesome pocket and systematically sealed the die-hard Reds in their
holes.
Another bit of drama unfolded before the reserve troops when they
closed on the causeway terminus in the wake of How Company’s advance.
From one of many caves drifted noises indicating the presence of
several occupants, hitherto unnoticed. While riflemen covered the
entrance, a Marine tank drove forward and fired two rounds into the
interior.
Muffled explosions shook the area, and billows of black smoke streaked
with flame rolled out of the cave. Wide-eyed, as though watching ghosts
emerge, the Marines of Company I saw thirty enemy soldiers stagger out
of the blazing recess and throw up their hands.
Less than an hour after landing, 3/5 controlled half of Wolmi-do.
Company H, having cleared the causeway terminus, was pivoting southward
to clean out the ruins of the industrial area. Engineers, close on the
heels of the infantry, advanced 25 yards out on the pavement leading
to Inchon and laid an antitank mine field. George Company had advanced
about 400 yards and was clearing the northern crest of Radio Hill.
Action up to this point is best summed up in Taplett’s message to the
_Mount McKinley_ at 0745:
“Captured 45 prisoners. Meeting light resistance.”
Nor did the situation change as Company G occupied the dominating peak
of Radio Hill, some 105 meters high. The enemy lacked the will to
fight, despite the fact that he had sufficient weapons and a formidable
defensive complex from which to fire them. Frightened, dejected Red
soldiers continued to surrender singly or in small groups, and Taplett
exulted over the amazingly light casualties sustained by his battalion.
Since Company H found the going slow in the shambles of the industrial
area, the battalion commander ordered Lieutenant Bohn to seize the
whole of Radio Hill. Accordingly, George Company troops rushed across
the ridgeline to the eastern spur. This done, Bohn dispatched a force
to clear the western reaches of the high ground. By 0800, Radio Hill
became the property of the 1st Marine Division, and with the prize went
control of the island and Inchon Harbor.
When the news of 3/5’s success blared from the loudspeaker on the
flag bridge of the _Mount McKinley_, the commander in chief, wearing
his famous leather jacket and braided campaign cap, withdrew to his
cabin and penned a spirited message to Vice Admiral Struble aboard the
_Rochester_:
“The Navy and Marines have never shone more brightly than this
morning.
MACARTHUR”
Consolidation of Wolmi-do required the reduction of an enemy outpost on
Sowolmi-do, the small lighthouse station connected to the southwestern
tip of the island by a causeway 750 yards long and 12 yards wide. An
islet of about 500 square yards, Sowolmi-do was topped by a low hill
with the navigational beacon on the summit. Before bothering with this
tiny, isolated target, Taplett put his larger house in order.
By previous plan, the three rifle companies of 3/5 took up defensive
positions generally facing Inchon. Item Company occupied North Point,
Wildman’s unit the slopes above the industrial area, and Company G the
crest of Radio Hill. While the battalion dug in, mopping-up operations
throughout the island continued to net more prisoners and reveal
the extent of North Korean fortifications. Radio Hill was ringed by
mutually supporting trenches and emplacements, all of which had brought
only a negligible return on the Reds’ investment in time and labor.
Parked on the western nose of the ridge were two intact 76mm antitank
guns that could have wrought havoc on landing waves approaching GREEN
Beach. Fortunately, these weapons had been exposed to the 40mm fire of
the LSMR covering the beach assault, and their crews had lacked the
stomach to man them.
More antitank guns were scattered around the terminus of the causeway
leading to Inchon, leaving some question as to whether they had been
rushed to the defense of the island or were marked for displacement to
the city.
North Point, once a luxurious resort, was honeycombed with caves used
both for storage and for bomb shelters. The swimming pool, one of the
few structures still recognizable after the bombardment, was converted
by the Marines into a prisoner-of-war stockade.
More than 300 cast-iron antipersonnel mines were found attached to the
barbed wire entanglement stretched along the west coast at the base
of Radio Hill. The explosives were removed and disarmed by Technical
Sergeant Edwin L. Knox and his detachment from Company A, 1st Engineer
Battalion. Though the North Koreans had been helpful in placing these
mines in so obvious a location, they had, oddly enough, failed to
employ similar obstacles on the beaches, roads, and paths around the
island.
Prior to the midmorning advance on Sowolmi-do, total casualties for
the 3d Battalion were 14 wounded--an incredibly small price for a
critical terrain feature commanding the approaches to Korea’s major
west coast port. Evacuation plans so carefully laid out by the 1st
Medical Battalion worked smoothly. In the early phase of the operation,
LCVPs returning from GREEN Beach delivered Marine casualties to the
_Fort Marion_, whose normal medical complement had been augmented
by a special surgical team. Men with particularly bad wounds were
transferred to the _Mount McKinley_ after being administered first aid.
As the battle developed, navy medical corpsmen of 3/5 established a
collecting point on a small pier which could be reached by ambulance
boats even during low water.
Shortly before 1000, Taplett ordered Company G to seize Sowolmi-do.
Bohn in turn assigned the mission to one infantry squad reinforced
with machine guns and a section of tanks, all under the control of
Second Lieutenant John D. Counselman, leader of George Company’s 3d
Platoon. Although the islet was by no means an objective of formidable
proportions, the attackers eyed their route of approach over the long
strip with misgivings. Their skepticism was not unfounded, for they
neared the entrance to the causeway only to be stopped cold by heavy
rifle and machine-gun fire from the other end. A platoon of North
Koreans, almost literally at the end of a rope, preferred to fight it
out.
Taplett ordered the tank-infantry team to hold up while he radioed a
mission to Marine air. A few minutes later, Corsairs of VMF-214 nosed
down and scorched the objective with napalm.
Sweet’s tanks, preceded by an engineer mine-clearance team and followed
by the column of infantrymen, rumbled onto the rock bed tracing the
seaward edge of the causeway. As the task force filed across the
exposed route, 81mm shells from 3/5’s mortar platoon rattled overhead
and tore into the Communist emplacements. Enemy fire was reduced to a
light patter, and the observers on Radio Hill breathed a sigh of relief
when the attackers gained the far end of the causeway at 1048.
Covered by tank fire, the Marine infantry quickly fanned out and closed
with the defenders. There was a sharp outburst of small-arms racket,
interspersed with the clatter of machine guns; then a few scattered
volleys and the main fight was over at 1115. Mopping up with grenades
and a flame thrower continued for almost another hour, owing to the
number of caves and the determination of a few Red soldiers.
Nineteen North Koreans surrendered and 17 were killed, including some
hapless warriors who tried to swim to the mainland. Despite the size
of the islet, eight Reds succeeded in hiding out from the attackers;
and General Craig, after landing on Wolmi-do with the ADC group in the
evening, observed the fugitives escape to the mainland.[127]
[127] LtGen E. A. Craig memo to authors, 12 Jan 55.
_The Two Harbor Islands Secured_
Three Marines were wounded on Sowolmi-do, bringing 3/5’s total
casualties for the day to 17 WIA. In return, Taplett’s battalion could
count 136 prisoners and 108 enemy dead. Since interrogation of captives
established the original number of Red defenders at 400, it could be
concluded that some 150 more Communist fatalities lay entombed in
sealed emplacements and caves throughout the island.
The Wolmi-do garrison was part of a 2,000-man force committed to the
defense of Inchon by NKPA headquarters in Seoul. Represented were
elements of the 226th Marine Regiment, to which two companies of the
2d Battalion, 918th Coast Artillery Regiment were attached with their
Soviet-manufactured 76mm guns. The spiritless resistance encountered
by 3/5 was the natural reaction of green troops to the awesome power
of modern combined arms; for the North Korean marines and their
artillerymen were largely recent conscripts with sketchy training and
no experience. It remained to be seen how the other 1,600 Red troops
would respond to the later assaults on RED and BLUE Beaches.
Mopping-up operations on the island were completed by noon, and with
the support ships standing silent in the narrows, an oppressive quiet
settled on the objective area. Gradually the phenomenal tide rolled
back from its morning high of more than 30 feet. By 1300 the waters
had receded, leaving 3/5 perched on an island in a sea of mud. For the
next several hours Taplett and his men were on their own, speculating
whether an enemy force might suddenly rush out of Inchon’s dead streets
in an attempt to cross the mud flats, or whether a Red tank column
would abruptly streak from the city and make for the causeway.
Nothing happened. The air of unreality caused by the stillness of the
Oriental seaport weighed down on the nerves of the entire attack force.
As the afternoon wore on, the Marines detected movement here and there,
but the distant figures were identified as civilians more often than
not. Captain McMullen, studying the RED Beach area from his OP on North
Point, reported possible enemy “field pieces” on Cemetery Hill. What he
actually sighted were the tubes of the mortar company of the 226th NK
Marine Regiment, as will be shown later.
At Taplett’s OP on Radio Hill, the Shore Fire Control Party Officer,
Second Lieutenant Joseph R. Wayerski, searched Inchon intently through
his binoculars. On one occasion he called down naval gunfire on
small groups of people stirring in the inner tidal basin area to his
right front, but when further observation revealed the figures to be
civilians raiding a pile of rice, the Marine officer promptly cancelled
the mission. Wayerski’s lone tactical target of importance was a
section of trench on Observatory Hill in which he once spotted about 20
enemy soldiers on the move. He smothered the earthworks with 30 5-inch
shells from the _Mansfield_, and what North Koreans remained chose
other avenues from that point on.
Taplett and others of his headquarters picked out enemy gun
emplacements right at the waterfront near the Inchon dry dock. After
the report went out to the _Mount McKinley_, red pencils throughout the
task force circled the locale on maps for special attention during the
pre-H-Hour bombardment.
Thus, the 3d Battalion enjoyed an almost uneventful interlude during
its isolation. An occasional mortar round or long-range machine gun
burst was the feeble reminder that Inchon still remained in enemy hands.
While the infantry lolled in relative ease and safety, service and
support elements, attached to 3/5 for the landing, set the stage at
GREEN Beach for the logistical follow-up so vital to amphibious
operations. First Lieutenant Melvin K. Green’s team from Shore Party
Group A, having unloaded its LSUs in record time, established dumps
for ammunition, rations, and other field necessities. Personnel of
the Ordnance Battalion, Combat Service Group, and Service Battalion
engaged in backbreaking toil to alleviate the headaches of a harried
beachmaster. Signalmen scurried about, setting up their equipment and
creating the familiar maze of wire. The reconnaissance detachment of
the 11th Marines probed around the island’s desolation in search of
battery positions for the howitzers scheduled to roll ashore on the
evening tide.
The narrow strip of sand on North Point would have appeared crowded
and hopelessly confused to the inexperienced eye, but old hands knew
that order would gradually emerge, as if by magic, from the “early rush
hour”--that necessary evil inherent in all assault landings.