The Minute Men of 1950
_Expansion to Full Peace Strength--Mobilization of Marine Corps
Reserve--The Influx at Camp Pendleton--Embarkation of 1st Marine
Division--Build-up of 7th Marine Regiment--Staff Groups Flown to Japan_
On 18 July 1950, it was D-minus 59 for the Marine reservists who would
hit the beaches at Inchon. These young civilians were doubtless more
interested in major league baseball standings at the moment than in
hydrographic conditions at the Korean seaport they would assault within
two months. Yet the proposed amphibious operation moved a long step
closer to reality on the 18th when Major General Oliver P. Smith left
Washington under orders to assume command of the 1st Marine Division at
Camp Pendleton, California.
A graduate of the University of California in 1916, General Smith had
been commissioned a Marine second lieutenant at the age of 24 in the
first World War. After serving in Guam during that conflict, he saw
duty at sea and in Haiti during the early 1920’s, followed by studies
at the Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, and duty as an
instructor in the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico.
In Paris, while attached administratively to the office of the U. S.
Naval Attaché, he took the full two-year course at the École Supérieure
de Guerre, and afterwards he was an instructor for three more years at
the Marine Corps Schools. He had an extensive experience of hard-fought
amphibious operations during World War II as a regimental commander in
the Talasea, New Britain, landing, as ADC of the 1st Marine Division
at Peleliu, and as deputy chief of staff of the U. S. Tenth Army on
Okinawa. Returning with the rank of brigadier, he became Commandant of
the Marine Corps Schools; and after putting up a second star, the tall,
slender, white-haired general served as Assistant Commandant at Marine
Corps Headquarters in Washington.
At the outbreak of the Korean conflict, Major General Graves B. Erskine
had commanded the 1st Marine Division. Following his assignment to a
secret State Department mission in southeast Asia, General Smith was
named as his relief.
The division had meanwhile been reduced to 3,386 officers and men as
compared to a strength of 7,789 on 30 June 1950. It had been stripped
of its principal operating elements to build up the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade, which numbered about 5,000 officers and men when it
sailed from San Diego to the Far East on 14 July under the command of
Brigadier General Edward A. Craig.[30]
[30] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra. Estimate of
Brigade numbers will be found to vary according to
different stages of the build-up.
At El Toro, the near-by Marine Corps Air Station, it was the same
story. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with a total strength of 4,004
officers and men on 30 June, provided most of the 1,548 officers and
men of Marine Aircraft Group 33, the air component of the Brigade,
commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, who was also deputy
Brigade commander.[31]
[31] _Ibid._; see also XV: Charlie Charlie.
_Expansion to Full Peace Strength_
General Smith had known before his arrival at Pendleton that his first
task would be the building up of the 1st Marine Division to full
peace strength. As early as 12 July, a dispatch from CNO had warned
CinCPacFlt that this expansion would take place, including the elements
of the Brigade.[32] And on 15 July General Shepherd directed Brigadier
General Harry B. Liversedge, temporary CG 1st Marine Division, to
extend the work day and work week while intensifying training and
making preparations to expand.[33]
[32] CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 12 Jul 50.
[33] CG FMFPac disp to CG 1st MarDiv, 14 July 50.
The 15th was also the date of General MacArthur’s second request for
a war-strength Marine division with its own air for employment in
his proposed Inchon amphibious assault. General Shepherd advised CMC
that same day as to the composition of cadres to facilitate the rapid
expansion of the 1st Marine Division.[34]
[34] CG FMFPac disp to CMC, 15 Jul 50; CG FMFPac ltr to CMC,
16 Jul 50.
Already it was becoming apparent that this build-up would allow little
time for training. Fortunate it was, therefore, that the Division and
the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had participated in an intensive training
program during recent months. Following are the principal exercises:
Oct 1949 Air lift field exercise involving movement of a
reinforced battalion and air command to San Nicholas
Island, Calif. One Marine aircraft group carrier-embarked
for participation in Operation MIKI with Sixth Army in
Hawaii.
Nov 1949 Field exercise involving a reinforced regiment and
supporting aircraft.
Dec 1949 Combined field exercise--a simulated amphibious
assault extending over a period of seven days--involving
all principal elements of the Division and Wing.
Jan 1950 Participation by elements of Division in Operation
MICOWEX 50, stressing the use of the transport submarine
and helicopter in amphibious operations.
Feb 1950 Field exercise involving a reinforced regiment with
supporting air.
Mar 1950 Land plane and seaplane air-lift exercise involving
seizure of San Nicholas Island by a reinforced battalion
and a Marine air command.
May 1950 Participation by a majority of Division and Wing
elements in DEMON III, an amphibious demonstration for
students of Command and General Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth. Participation by Wing in two-week major
advanced base field exercise, with intensive training in
close support.
Jun 1950 Continuation of training in lesser air-ground
problems, field exercises and command post exercises.[35]
[35] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV:Zebra, 3–5.
Counterparts of nearly all of these exercises might have been found in
the training program for the 2d Marine Division and 2d Marine Aircraft
Wing on the North Carolina coast. Operation CAMID at Little Creek, Va.,
was similar to DEMON III. All principal FMFLant elements participated
in Operation CROSSOVER at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in the spring
of 1950, and a Marine aircraft group was embarked aboard a carrier in
the Mediterranean. Other elements of the Wing took part in PORTREX,
an Army-Navy amphibious exercise in the Caribbean, and in SWARMER, an
Army-Air Force airborne exercise in North Carolina. Units of both the
Division and the Wing were represented in the annual Amphibious Command
Post Exercise at Lejeune; and throughout the winter and spring a
succession of smaller ground, air, and air-ground exercises emphasized
close support and amphibious landings.
Posts and stations were meanwhile conducting annual weapons
qualification firing tests and individual training as required by USMC
General Order No. 10. This program was designed to maintain the basic
military proficiency of men not serving with the Fleet Marine Force. It
is significant, however, that a large proportion of them had reported
to such duty directly from FMF units, in accordance with the rotation
policy.
The program for the Organized Reserve included both armory and active
duty summer training. Air and ground units of reservists were “adopted”
during their summer training by similar units of the Fleet Marine
Force, which supervised the exercises and provided instructors. By the
summer of 1950, a large proportion of the reservists had progressed
beyond basic training into advanced individual and unit training, so
that they could be classed as “nearly combat ready” at the time of the
1st Marine Division expansion.[36]
[36] _Ibid._
_Mobilization of Marine Corps Reserve_
Shortcomings in quantity rather than quality of Marine personnel made
expansion a problem on 19 July 1950, when General MacArthur sent his
third request to the Pentagon for a Marine division with appropriate
air. Again the Joint Chiefs referred the matter to General Cates, who
was prepared with two plans worked out in detail by his staff--Plan
ABLE, providing third rifle companies and replacements for the Brigade;
and Plan BAKER, designed to bring the 1st Marine Division up to full
war strength by calling reservists to active duty.
These plans were based on the personnel statistics of 30 June 1950. The
grand total of 74,279 Marines on active duty at that time (97 per cent
of authorized strength) was distributed as follows:
_Operating Forces_--engaged directly in carrying out assigned
missions and tasks 40,364
_Supporting Establishment_--comprising trained administrative
and supply personnel 24,552
_Special Assignment_--including all personnel serving with
organizations outside the regular establishment 3,871
_Non-Available_--made up of personnel hospitalized, confined,
or en route 5,492
-------
Total 74,279
A breakdown of the Operating Forces reveals that the Fleet Marine Force
numbered 27,703 men, the security detachments included 11,087, and
1,574 Marines were afloat. Of the 11,853 in FMFPac, 7,779 were in the
1st Marine Division, and 3,733 in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The
15,803 Marines in FMFLant included 8,973 in the 2d Marine Division and
5,297 in the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.[37]
[37] Giusti, I-2.
These figures make it evident that the 1st Marine Division could not be
brought up to war strength of about 25,000 troops without drawing upon
the 33,527 (77 per cent of authorized strength) in the ground forces
of the Organized Reserve, and the 6,341 (94 per cent of authorized
strength) in the aviation forces. The ground personnel were distributed
among these units:
Twenty-one infantry battalions; 16 rifle companies; seven 105mm
howitzer battalions; five 155mm howitzer battalions; one 155mm gun
battalion; two 40mm gun batteries; two tank battalions; three amphibian
tractor battalions; one amphibian truck company; one signal company
(supplementary); six signal companies; one engineer battalion; 15
women’s reserve platoons.
Aviation units consisted of 30 Marine fighter squadrons (VMF) and 12
Marine ground control intercept squadrons (MGCI).
The Organized Reserve was exceeded as a reservoir of potential man
power by the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve, which had a total of
90,044 men and women on 30 June 1950. This total included 2,267
volunteer reservists on continuous active duty with the regular
establishment, about 5,000 training in some 200 volunteer training
units, and 1316 in the Fleet Reserve.
Altogether, the strength of all Marine reserve components (less
volunteer reservists on active duty) amounted to a total of 128,959, or
nearly double the number of Marines in the regular establishment.[38]
[38] _Ibid._, 1–5, 6.
Behind every Marine regular, figuratively speaking, stood two
reservists who were ready to step forward and fill the gaps in the
ranks. Thus it was scarcely far-fetched when some inspired public
information officer coined the phrase “Minute Men of 1950” for these
recent civilians who made it possible for the 1st Marine Division to
hit the beaches at Inchon.
Events moved swiftly on 19 July. Only a few hours after the receipt of
CinCFE’s third request, the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve
was authorized by President Truman with the sanction of Congress.
Headquarters Marine Corps, on the hill overlooking the Pentagon, was
ablaze with lights that summer night; and decisions were made which
enabled four important steps to be taken next day:
(1) a warning to Reserve District directors that the Organized
Reserve would soon be ordered to active duty;
(2) notification to commanding generals to expect some 21,000
Organized Reservists shortly at Marine Barracks, Camp
Pendleton, and about 5,800 at Marine Barracks, Camp Lejeune;
(3) orders issued by CMC, with the approval of CNO, to
discontinue the practice of discharging reservists at their
own request;
(4) the first reservists--22 units with a total strength of 4,830
men--ordered to active duty with a delay of ten days.[39]
[39] _Ibid._, II-2.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still not convinced that a Marine force
could be embarked to meet General MacArthur’s deadline of 10 September
without stripping FMFLant units to a dangerous extent. On the advice of
Admiral Sherman, they informed CinCFE on 20 July that a Marine division
could not be sent before November or even December.
General Shepherd had a great deal to do with shaping the ultimate
decision. On the 20th, when CNO conferred with Admiral Radford on the
question of a Marine division, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet in
his turn asked the opinion of the Marine general. General Shepherd
replied that a Marine amphibious striking force could be raised for the
proposed Inchon landing without seriously weakening the Fleet Marine
Force as a whole. This striking force, he predicted, would prove to be
“the key of achievement of a timely and economical decision for our
arms.”[40]
[40] CG FMFPac memo to CinCPacFlt, 20 Jul 50.
The Marine general’s statement was one of the main factors in causing
the Joint Chiefs to advise MacArthur on the 22d that they were
reconsidering their stand. During the next 48 hours, as dispatches sped
back and forth across the Pacific, a compromise was reached. CinCFE was
promised his Marine division in time for his target date--but it was to
be a division minus one RCT. In other words, the infantry regiment of
the Brigade would be supplemented by another RCT and supporting troops
with appropriate Marine air. But the Joint Chiefs were adamant in their
decision that MacArthur must wait until autumn or even winter for his
third RCT.
These preliminaries cleared the way so that General MacArthur’s request
was finally approved by JCS on 25 July, the day when General Smith took
over command of the 1st Marine Division. The Marine Corps was directed
to build the division (less one RCT) up to full war strength, and a
date of departure of 10–15 August for the Far East was set.
A 50 percent reduction in Marine security forces within the continental
limits of the United States was authorized by CNO on that same date.
This meant that an additional 3,630 regulars would be enabled to report
for service with the 1st Marine Division.
On the morning of the 26th a courier from Washington arrived at Camp
Pendleton with a communication for General Smith indicating that
the expanded 1st Marine Division would be composed of four types of
personnel: (1) Brigade units, to be combined with the Division upon
arrival in the Far East; (2) units of the 2d Marine Division, to be
ordered to Camp Pendleton to augment elements of the 1st; (3) regular
personnel to be called in from posts and stations; and (4) final
deficiencies to be filled by men from the Marine Corps Reserve who met
minimum combat experience requirements.[41]
[41] MajGen Oliver P. Smith, _Notes on the Operations of the
1st Marine Division during the First Nine Months of the
Korean War, 1950–1951_ (MS), 3–4. (Hereafter, O. P.
Smith, _Notes_.) Among the most valuable sources of the
present book are the _Chronicle of the Operations of the
1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the
Korean War, 1950–1951_ (MS), (hereafter, O. P. Smith,
_Chronicle_), and _Notes_ prepared in typescript by the
commanding general of the division. The _Chronicle_ is
a day-by-day account of planning, command decisions,
and resulting events, while the _Notes_ are an
analytical review of the relative facts, statistics,
and directives. Combining accuracy with a keen sense of
historical values, the Marine general by his knowledge
of shorthand was able to keep a fairly complete record
in the field which he later checked with official
reports.
Congress passed legislation on 27 July authorizing the President to
extend for one year all enlistments in the armed forces, both regular
and reserve, which were due to expire before 9 July 1951. This gave the
assurance of a stable body of troops.
On the 31st, with the first reservists arriving at Camp Pendleton and
the first contingents leaving Camp Lejeune for the West Coast, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CNO to expand the 2d Marine Division
to war strength while increasing the number of Marine tactical air
squadrons from 16 to 18.[42] Obviously, the 1st and 2d Divisions could
not be built up simultaneously without serious delays, and priority
must be given to the 1st. It was equally obvious, moreover, that this
expansion must be largely accomplished during the first week of August
if the troops were to be made ready for embarkation between the 10th
and 15th.
[42] Giusti, II-2.
_The Influx at Camp Pendleton_
The first build-up troops to reach Camp Pendleton were three Organized
Reserve units which arrived on 31 July--the 13th Infantry Company, of
Los Angeles; the 12th Amphibian Tractor Company, of San Francisco; and
the 3d Engineer Company, of Phoenix, Arizona. This was the beginning of
an inundation which kept the camp keyed to a 24-hour day and a 7-day
week. A torrent of troops poured into the vast military reservation
by bus, train, and plane at all hours of the day and night. Confusion
seemed to reign from the tawny California hills to the blue Pacific;
and yet this seeming chaos was under the control of veteran officers
and NCOs who had mounted out before. Accommodations for the newcomers
were not de luxe, but men were being processed, assigned, fed, and
equipped as rapidly as they arrived. The tramp of feet could be heard
all night long as details of troops drew clothing and equipment or
reported for medical examinations.
A total of 13,703 Marines reached Camp Pendleton during this busy week.
Counting the personnel already on hand, troops of four categories were
represented:
Officers and men remaining in 1st Marine Division at Camp
Pendleton after dispatch of the Brigade 3,459
Officers and men reporting from posts and stations up to
4 August 3,630
Officers and men reporting from the 2d Marine Division from
3 to 6 August 7,182
Officers and men selected as combat-ready out of the total of
about 10,000 reservists reporting by 7 August 2,891
------
Total 17,162
The expansion took place in two phases. First, of course, came the
bringing of the 1st Marine Division (less one RCT) up to war strength,
including augmentation personnel and supplies for the units of the
Brigade. Next, the organization of a third reinforced infantry
regiment, the 7th Marines, was directed by a letter from CMC to CG 1st
Marine Division on 4 August.[43]
[43] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 5–6.
Headquarters Marine Corps naturally foresaw the necessity for
replacement and rotation troops. The importance of the Reserve in this
long-range expansion program may be seen by glancing ahead at the
statistics of the next few months. Units of these recent civilians
continued to report at such a rate that by 11 September 1950 the
Organized Reserve (Ground) had in effect ceased to exist! In other
words, all acceptable personnel had already reported for active duty,
and the total of 33,528 officers and men represented a 90.02 percentage
of availability.
The record of the Volunteer Reserve proved to be equally good after it
was ordered to active duty on 15 August 1950. During the next seven and
a half months, down to 31 March 1951, the Volunteer Reserve furnished
51,942 of the 84,821 reservists on active duty. As to the quality of
these troops, about 99 per cent of the officers and 77.5 per cent of
the enlisted were veterans of World War II.[44]
[44] Giusti, III-2, 7.
Many of the first reservists to report at Camp Pendleton made unusual
sacrifices. Although they had the privilege of being discharged at
their own request as late as 18 July 1950, the unexpectedness of the
Korean conflict worked hardships in some instances. Reservists with
several dependents or just establishing themselves in a business or
profession had to settle their affairs hurriedly. There was little
applause when the Minute Men of 1950 departed from home communities
which were on a basis of business and pleasure as usual. The Korean
conflict was still regarded as a “police action” which would be ended
shortly. Nobody dreamed that within its first year it would become the
fourth largest military effort of our nation’s history.
The Marine Corps was as lenient as could reasonably be expected when it
came to granting delays and deferments. On 1 August a board of eight
officers at Marine Corps Headquarters initiated daily meetings to
consider such requests emanating from the various Reserve districts.
Two weeks later the Commandant gave Reserve District directors the
authority to grant delays for periods up to six months after judging
each case on its individual merits. But even after every concession had
been made that could be reconciled with the national interest, it was a
wrench for hundreds of reservists to make the sudden plunge from civil
into military life.
There were instances of men seeking deferment by using political
influence or pleading physical disability. But such cases were rare
as compared to the great majority who reported promptly and declared
themselves combat-ready.
In the selection of reservists for the division, two categories were
recognized--combat-ready and noncombat-ready. The first applied to
men whose records proved that they had been members of the Organized
Reserve for two years and had attended one summer camp and 72 drills
or two summer camps and 32 drills. Veterans of more than 90 days’
service in the Marine Corps also qualified. All other reservists were
classified as noncombat-ready.
When lost or incomplete records complicated the equation, a reservist’s
own opinion could not be accepted as proof of his fitness for combat.
This ruling had to be made because so many men were found to have more
spunk than training. Officers of a reservist’s unit were questioned
before a decision was reached, and any man feeling the need of
further training could be removed without prejudice from immediate
consideration for combat.
Standards were so strictly observed that only about half of the
reservists qualified as being combat-ready. This group broke down into
the 15 per cent accepted for the 1st Marine Division and the 35 per
cent assigned to posts and stations to relieve regulars who joined the
division. The remaining 50 per cent consisted of men placed in the
noncombat-ready or recruit class.[45]
[45] Andrew Geer, _The New Breed_ (New York, 1952), 103–105.
The emergency found the Organized Aviation Reserve with 30 VMF and
12 GCI squadrons generally up to peacetime strength. Of the 1,588
officers, about 95 per cent were combat-experienced, and only about 10
per cent of the enlisted men stood in need of basic training. It was a
comparatively simple task, therefore, to comply with the order of 23
July calling for six VMF and three GCI squadrons to report to El Toro.
Their mission was to build up to war strength the units of the 1st MAW
which had been stripped to mount out MAG-33.
On 3 August the remaining nine GCI squadrons of the Organized Aviation
Reserve were ordered to El Toro.[46] By this time the build-up was so
well in hand that Major General Field Harris, commanding the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing, conferred with General Smith about aviation shipping for
the embarkation.
[46] Giusti, III-2.
This veteran Marine pilot, a native of Kentucky, had been commissioned
a second lieutenant in 1917 after graduating from the U. S. Naval
Academy. Three years of service with Marine ground forces in Cuba and
the Philippines were followed by Headquarters duty at Washington and
flight training at Pensacola. Designated a naval aviator in 1929, he
held various Marine air commands before participating as colonel and
brigadier general in the Guadalcanal, Northern Solomons, and Green
Island air operations of World War II. On his return, he was appointed
Assistant Commandant (Air) and Director of Aviation.
In the autumn of 1946, after Operation CROSSROADS had given a glimpse
into the tactical future, Generals Shepherd, Harris, and Smith were
named as a Special Board “to orient the effort of the Marine Corps away
from the last war and toward the next.” The result was recommendations
leading to experiments with rotary wing aircraft as a means of tactical
dispersion in amphibious operations against an enemy employing atomic
weapons. Thus the Marine Corps worked out new helicopter combat
techniques which were soon to create tactical history with the Brigade
and Division in Korea.[47]
[47] Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the Sky_ (New York, 1954),
51–53.
_Embarkation of 1st Marine Division_
It is a curious circumstance that not until 8 August did General Smith
himself have his first information as to the Inchon landing. The
basic directive of 25 July had merely specified that the main body
of the Division would embark from San Diego, prepared for combat.
The commanding general did not learn even unofficially about the
time and the place of the proposed operation until he was told by
General Fellers. While reporting at Camp Pendleton on his return from
Japan, the TTU commander gave General Smith an informal account of
the conference which took place on 4 July at FECOM Headquarters in
Tokyo.[48]
[48] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 18, 41.
On the following day, 9 August, the Division issued Operation Order No.
1-50, which provided for the movement of the Division (less the Brigade
and one RCT) to the Far East to report upon arrival to CinCFE for
operational control. Embarkation was to be carried out in accordance
with Embarkation Plan No. 1-50 of 6 August.
By this date, 17,162 Marines in Camp Pendleton were eligible for
reassignment to the 1st Marine Division. There was no time, of course,
for much training. On 2 August the Division issued Training Bulletin
No. 36–50 as a general guide providing for some rudiments of individual
and small-unit instruction. But about all that could be accomplished
was conditioning training and test firing of weapons. As a result, many
of the weapons issued directly to units were found to be defective,
having been in storage since 1945.[49]
[49] _Ibid._, 16–17.
The war news from Korea at this time lent an atmosphere of grim realism
to preparations at Camp Pendleton. On 2 August the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade had landed at Pusan, the day following the debarkation
of two U. S. Army units, the skeletonized 2d Infantry Division and the
5th RCT. The original destination of the Marines had been Japan, but
during the voyage the military situation deteriorated so rapidly that
on 25 July a landing in Korea was ordered by CinCFE.
Following the capture of Taejon on 20 July, the Red Korean columns
of invasion speeded up their “end run” around the Eighth Army’s open
left flank. Driving eastward as well as southward, the enemy made such
progress during the next ten days that on 31 July the UN forces were
pushed back into a chain of defensive positions in southeast Korea.
This was the Pusan Perimeter, which must be held if the vital line of
communications from the supply port to Taegu was to be maintained.
The Marines jumped off east of Masan on 7 August with the Army 5th
RCT and elements of the 25th Infantry Division in the first sustained
counterattack mounted by UN forces. General Craig had control of Army
as well as Marine units during the most critical period of the initial
two days, and carrier-based MAG-33 squadrons provided tactical air
support. Enemy resistance was so shattered by the 9th that the Red
Korean machine of invasion went into reverse for the first time.
[Illustration: NKPA GAINS
30 JUNE-1 AUGUST
1950]
From the 9th to the 13th, when they were relieved, parallel columns of
Army and Marine assault troops drove from Chindong-ni nearly to Chinju,
a distance of about 40 miles by the seacoast route. It was only a local
setback for the enemy, to be sure, but it had a heartening effect for
tired UN forces which had known only delaying actions so far.
It also added to the problems of staff officers at Camp Pendleton and
Pearl Harbor, since replacements must be sent to the Brigade. With
this in mind, the Commandant had begun the organization of the 1st
Replacement Draft of approximately 800 men on the date of Brigade
activation. These troops, however, were absorbed into the 1st Marine
Division when it expanded to war strength, as was a second draft (also
designated the 1st Replacement Draft) of 3,000 men.[50]
[50] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV:Zebra, 8–9.
On 3 August the 1st Marine Division was directed by FMFPac to send 10
officers and 290 enlisted men to the Brigade by airlift. This draft was
to be ready to move from Camp Pendleton by MATS planes on 9 August, but
not until five days later did it finally proceed to San Francisco by
rail and fly to Japan.
On the 23d another draft of 10 officers and 300 enlisted men from
Marine posts in Hawaii and Guam was sent by air to Japan, these
troops being replaced by the same number of noncombat-ready Marines
airlifted from Camp Pendleton. This process was twice repeated early
in September, when two more drafts totaling 20 officers and 590 men
flew to Japan to provide replacements and third companies for the 5th
Marines of the Brigade.[51]
[51] _Ibid._; Col A. L. Bowser ltr to CMC, 11 Feb 55.
Logistics offered as many problems as personnel at Camp Pendleton,
since both the Brigade and Division units had been on peace tables
of organization and equipment. The 30-day replenishment stock, held
in readiness for such an emergency, was also based on peace strength
tables. Thus it was found that the specification of “requirements” was
best determined in most instances by making out requisitions based on
the difference between T/E for peace and war.
Narrow time limits did not permit the assembly of supplies and
equipment delivered at Camp Pendleton under the relentless pressure
of urgent deadlines. FMFLant air and ground units arriving from Camp
Lejeune brought their own organization equipment, which was staged
through the Recruit Depot at San Diego. Much of the heavy equipment
from the Barstow, California, Annex, Depot of Supplies, was delivered
dockside and loaded without further inspection. Not until arrival at
Kobe, Japan, were such items as the LVTs finally given a mechanical
checkup.[52]
[52] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra, 18–22.
Ammunition was delivered from the depots to the Naval Station, San
Diego, for loading. The following units of fire were specified by
Division Embarkation Plan 1-50:
(1) 3 UF in hands of 1st Marines, LVT, tank, and artillery units;
1 UF in hands of all other units;
(2) 2 UF in hands of 1st Ordnance Bn for the 1st Marines, LVT,
tank, and artillery units;
(3) 4 UF in the hands of the 1st Ordnance Bn for other units.[53]
[53] 1st MarDiv _Embarkation Plan 1-50_, 6 Aug 50, Annex
Charlie.
Even after all items of initial supply had been assembled, the problem
was by no means solved. Since the Division and Wing would be operating
under Army and Air Force control, it became necessary to establish
a long-range policy for resupply. The best answer seemed to be the
procedure adopted by the Brigade, providing that the Army and Air Force
furnish all supplies not peculiar to the Marine Corps. The latter
would be provided by Marine or Navy agencies automatically in 30-day
increments, with 120 days of resupply allotted to ground units and
90 days to air units. Thereafter, supply was to be requisitioned as
needed. And in the lack of a service command as such, the G-4 section
of FMFPac was committed to the task of preparing and submitting
resupply requisitions for items in this category.[54]
[54] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra, 12.
Five hundred civilians were employed to help with the reconditioning of
motor transport and other heavy equipment which had been “in mothballs”
at Barstow since the end of World War II. Such items had to be put
through the shops in many instances and restored to operating condition
before delivery. The enormous supply depot in the California desert
erupted with activity as trains of flatcars and long columns of motor
trucks were routed to San Diego.
The actual loading and embarkation were conducted almost according to
schedule in spite of such handicaps as inadequate dock facilities,
the reception of supplies and equipment from a variety of sources, a
shortage of stevedores, and piecemeal assignments of shipping. Only 54
stevedore crews were available out of the 90 requested, and commercial
ships were necessary to supplement naval shipping. Nevertheless, the
loading began on 8 August and was completed by the 22d. The following
19 ships were employed to mount out the main body of the 1st Marine
Division:
LST 845; LSM 419; two APAs, the USS _Noble_ and USS _President
Jackson_; five APs, the USNS _General Buckner_, USNS _General
Weigel_, USS _Marine Phoenix_, USNS _General Meigs_ and USS _General
Butner_; and ten AKs, the SS _Dolly Thurman_, SS _Green Bay Victory_,
SS _Noonday_, SS _African Patriot_, SS _Twin Falls Victory_, SS
_Southwind_, SS _American Press_, SS _American Victory_, SS _Alma
Victory_, and SS _Belgian Victory_.[55]
[55] 1st Marine Division _Special Action Report for the
Inchon-Seoul Operation_, 20 Apr 51, sec. 1. (Hereafter,
1st MarDiv _SAR_.)
Generals Shepherd and Cates arrived for the main embarkation on the
13th and 14th respectively, accompanied by Major General Franklin
A. Hart and Brigadier General Edwin A. Pollock. While these general
officers were being acquainted with the progress made so far, the AKA
_Titania_ blew out two boilers after being about 20 percent loaded.
Since the repairs would require about ten days, a commercial freighter
was provided as a last-minute replacement.
_Build-up of 7th Marine Regiment_
One of the purposes of General Shepherd’s visit was to discuss with
General Cates the problems of organizing and embarking the 7th
Marines (Reinf.). The activation of this unit had been directed on 10
August 1950, when an officer of the G-1 Section, Headquarters FMFPac,
delivered orders to Camp Pendleton.[56]
[56] FMFPac _Operation Order (Opn O) 3-50_, 11 Aug 50.
This was the result of a change of mind on the part of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. After reconsideration, they decided that it would be
feasible to raise a third RCT much sooner than had at first seemed
possible, though not in time for MacArthur’s assault landing. Arrival
in Japan about 20 September seemed to be the earliest date that could
be managed.
Of the 17,162 eligible Marines at Camp Pendleton at that time, the
regulars in excess of those required to mount out between the 10th and
15th were placed in the rear echelon of the division as a cadre for the
third infantry regiment.[57] The following troops were made available
to draw upon for the formation of the 7th Marines:
[57] See Appendix B for the build-up of the 1st Marine
Division and Appendix C for the Task Organization.
Officers and men from 2d Marine Division 1,822
Officers and men of 3d Bn, 6th Marines in the Mediterranean 735
Officers and men of Marine Corps Reserve selected as
combat-ready 1,972
Officers and men of rear echelon of Division, and from posts
and stations 1,109
---------
Total [58]5,638
[58] This account of the build-up of the 7th Marines is based
on the summary in PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra,
pt. V.
Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg was designated as commanding officer on
the date of activation, 17 August 1950. The Chief of Naval Operations
directed the regiment to embark for the Far East not later than 3
September. These components were included in the build-up:
3d Battalion, 11th Marines; Company D, 1st Tank Battalion; Company D,
1st Engineer Battalion; Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion (including
two Shore Party communication teams from Signal Company, Signal
Battalion); Company D, 1st Motor Transport Battalion; Company E, 1st
Medical Battalion.
Forming the nucleus of the regiment, the 6th Marines, at peace strength
and less two battalions, arrived from Camp Lejeune on 16 August. The
3d Battalion of this FMFLant regiment, then stationed afloat in the
Mediterranean, was ordered to proceed through the Suez Canal to become
part of the 7th Marines upon arrival in Japan.
While the other elements were being absorbed at Camp Pendleton, a
conference attended by General Smith, Major General Alfred H. Noble,
and Colonel Litzenberg was held to discuss rear echelon personnel
and the formation of RCT-7. The following troops were found to be
available to take care of casuals and retain custody of such division
supplies and equipment as had not yet been embarked:
MARINE CORPS NAVY
----------------- -----------------
_Off._ _Enl._ _Off._ _Enl._
224 1,029 11 35
Not included in these figures were 197 noneffective enlisted personnel,
a rocket battery, a motor transport company, and the organizational
rear echelon of eight officers and 28 men. It was decided that General
Noble, as FMFPac representative, would examine MOSs, to determine
how many men would be transferred to the 7th Marines or retained for
FMF units to be activated later. The need was also foreseen for rear
echelon working parties to relieve personnel of units mounting out.[59]
[59] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 36–37.
_Staff Groups Flown to Japan_
Although the 1st Marine Division had enough problems at Camp Pendleton
to keep a full war-strength staff busy, several of the key members
were in Korea with the Brigade. The complete Division staff was never
integrated until after the landing at Inchon. On 7 August, however, a
dispatch from CinCFE requested that the “Commanding General, 1st Marine
Division, and planning group capable of developing Division embarkation
and landing plans be airlifted” to the Far East.[60]
[60] CinCFE disp to CinCPacFlt, 7 Aug 50, info CNO, CMC, CG
1st MarDiv, CG FMFPac, and ComNavFE.
General Smith decided that this flight could best be made in two
echelons. The first, which took off for Japan at 1400 on 16 August
1950, included a group of 12 officers and six enlisted men selected to
initiate planning:
_Officers_ _Enlisted_
G-2 Col B. T. Holcomb, Jr. TSgt W. O’Grady
Ass’t G-2 Maj J. G. Babashanian Cpl J. N. Lareau
G-3 Col A. L. Bowser, Jr. Sgt G. O. Davis, Jr.
Ass’t G-3 LtCol F. R. Moore
Ass’t G-4 LtCol C. T. Hodges
Ass’t Emb Off Capt R. E. Moody PFC H. J. McAvinue
Shore Pty Off Maj J. G. Dibble
Signal Off LtCol A. Creal Cpl L Shefchik
Ass’t G-1 LtCol B. D. Godbold
Fire Sup Coord LtCol D. E. Reeve SSgt P. Richardson
Naval Gunfire Off LtCol L. S. Fraser
Air Off Capt W. F. Jacobs
General Smith stayed at Camp Pendleton for two more days until he
was assured that the main body of the Division had sailed. Then he
accompanied the second echelon of planners which departed by air at
1410 on 18 August:
_Officers_ _Enlisted_
CG MajGen O. P. Smith
C/S Col G. A. Williams Cpl C. V. Irwin
Aide to CG Capt M. J. Sexton PFC W. D. Grove
G-1 Col H. S. Walseth Cpl W. P. Minette
Ass’t Signal Off Capt A. J. Gunther MSgt F. J. Stumpges
G-4 Col F. M. McAlister
Engineer Off Maj E. P. Moses, Jr.
Embark Off Maj J. M. Rouse
Amtrac Off Maj A. J. Barrett
Motor Trans Off Maj H. W. Seeley, Jr.
Ordnance Off Maj L. O. Williams[61]
[61] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 37–38.
The departure of the commanding general coincided with the closing of
the Division CP at Camp Pendleton. There were still several thousand
Marines of the rear echelon left under the control of General Noble in
the sprawling installation, but the brown California hills looked down
upon a scene of strange and brooding quiet as compared to the activity
of the past three weeks.
It was D-minus 28 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.