[Illustration]
U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA
1950–1953
VOLUME II
_The Inchon-Seoul Operation_
by
LYNN MONTROSS
and
CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. CANZONA, USMC
[Illustration]
Historical Branch, G-3
Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps,
Washington, D. C., 1955
Foreword
The Inchon Landing was a major amphibious operation, planned in
record time and executed with skill and precision. Even more, it was
an exemplification of the fruits of a bold strategy executed by a
competent force. The decision to attack at Inchon involved weakening
the line against enemy strength in the Pusan Perimeter in order to
strike him in the rear. It involved the conduct of an amphibious attack
under most difficult conditions of weather and geography.
The stakes were high and the risk was fully justified. Had it not been
for the intervention of the Chinese Communist Army, the offensive
generated by the Inchon attack would have resulted in a complete
victory for our arms in Korea. A study of the record of this operation
will disclose, with arresting clarity, the decisive power that is to
be found in highly trained amphibious forces when their strength is
applied at the critical place and time.
[Illustration: Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr (signature)]
LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.,
_General, U. S. Marine Corps_,
_Commandant of the Marine Corps_.
Preface
This is the second volume of a series dealing with United States Marine
Operations in Korea during the period 2 August 1950 to 27 July 1953.
Volume II presents in detail the operations of the 1st Marine Division
and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as a part of X Corps, USA, during and
immediately following the Inchon Landing on 15 September 1950.
In order to tell a complete story of this historic amphibious
operation, the authors have described the mobilization of the Marine
Corps reserves to form the components of the Division and Aircraft
Wing; the movement to the staging area and the hurried planning for an
amphibious landing; the withdrawal of the 1st Provisional Brigade and
Marine Air Group 33 from the embattled Pusan Perimeter to amalgamate
with the larger force for D-day at Inchon; the seizure of Seoul and its
environs, and finally the withdrawal on 7 October to prepare for the
Wonsan operation.
Again, this is primarily a Marine Corps story. Activities of other
services are presented in sufficient detail only to set this operation
in its proper perspective.
Grateful acknowledgment is made for the valuable information furnished
by the scores of officers and men consulted by interview or letter and
for the assistance provided by the Current History Branch of the Office
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.
Maps included herein were prepared by the Reproduction Section, Marine
Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia.
[Illustration: T.A. Wornham (signature)]
T. A. WORNHAM,
_Major General, U. S. Marine Corps_,
_Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3_.
Contents
_Page_
I The Communist Challenge 1
Authorization of Marine Brigade--First Conference on
Inchon Landing--General Shepherd in Tokyo--Request
for a Marine Division--America’s Force-in-Readiness--
Planning for the Pohang Landing
II The Minute Men of 1950 17
Expansion to Full Peace Strength--Mobilization of
Marine Corps Reserve--The Influx at Camp Pendleton--
Embarkation of 1st Marine Division--Build-up of 7th
Marine Regiment--Staff Groups Flown to Japan
III Operation Plan CHROMITE 37
Interview with General MacArthur--Conferences in
Tokyo--Inception of X Corps--Final Conference on
Inchon--Brigade Victory in Korea--The Marine Amphibious
Mission
IV The Planning Phase 53
Working Around the Clock--X Corps Scheme of Maneuver--
Intelligence Planning for Inchon--The Landing
Force Plan--Naval Gunfire and Rockets--Plans for Air
Support
V Embarkation and Assault 73
Landing of 1st Marine Division--Plan to Seize Kimpo
Airfield--Shipping Assigned to Marines--Movement to
the Objective Area--Strikes and Bombardments--Marine
Landings on GREEN Beach--The Two Harbor Islands
Secured
VI Hitting the Beaches 97
The Assault Plan--Beginning the Ship-to-Shore Movement--
Seizure of Cemetery Hill--RED Beach Secured--LSTs
under Enemy Fire--Fighting on Observatory Hill--1st
Marines on BLUE Beach--Ending the Ship-to-Shore
Movement--Seizure of the 0-1 Line
VII Securing the Beachhead 125
Supplies on RED and BLUE Beaches--Surgical Teams on
the Beaches--Artillery and Tank Operations--The Attack
on D-plus 1--Advance to the Force Beachhead Line--
Displacement Ashore of Division CP
VIII On to Kimpo 143
Operations on Other Korean Fronts--Landing of RCT-7
in Japan--Destruction of NKPA Tank Column--General
MacArthur Visits the Front--The Drive to Kimpo
Airfield--Action at 5th Marines CP--Enemy Counterattack
at Kimpo
IX Marine Air Support 165
Helicopters and OYs in Support--Marine Air Units at
Kimpo--Progress of Eighth Army Offensive--Division
CP Displaces to Oeoso-Ri--Advance of RCT-1 to Sosa--
Reports of Enemy Build-up--Preparations for Crossing
the Han
X Crossing the Han 187
Swimming Team Leads the Way--Marine LVTs Grounded
in Mud--Daylight Assault Crossing by 3/5--Departure of
General MacArthur--Supporting Arms of Bridgehead--
Command Ashore Assumed by X Corps
XI The Fight For Yongdungpo 205
Three Hills Taken by 1/5-Enemy Minefields Encountered--
NKPA Counterattacks of 20 September--Recapture
of Hills 80 and 85--1st Marines in Position--Assault
of Yongdungpo--Able Company on a Limb--Yongdungpo
Secured
XII Main Line of Resistance 233
Three Hills Designated 105--RCT-7 North of the Han--
Attack Continued by RCT-5--Modified Plan of Corps
Attack--Climax of the Marine Assault--The Epic of Dog
Company--River Crossing of RCT-1
XIII Seoul as a Battlefield 253
Two More River Crossings--Division Attack of 25
September--Night Pursuit Ordered by Corps--Renewal of
Drive Through Seoul--Entrapment of Dog Company,
RCT-7--Last Fight on Hill 296--1st Marines in the
Heart of Seoul--Objective Secured
XIV The Drive to Uijongbu 281
Operations of 28 September--Liberation Ceremony at
Seoul--Crumbling of NKPA Resistance--RCT-7 and the
Battle for Uijongbu--Last Days of Inchon-Seoul
Operation--Summaries and Conclusions--MacArthur’s Report
to United Nations
_Appendixes_
A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 299
B Build-up of 1st Marine Division (Reinf) 303
C Task Organization of Marine Division for Inchon Landing 305
D Supplies and Equipment for Inchon 311
E Task Organization, Joint Task Force Seven 313
F Final Troop List of Division for the Inchon Landing 321
G Summary of Operation Orders Issued by 1st Marine Division for
the Inchon-Seoul Campaign 323
H Enemy Units During the Inchon-Seoul Campaign 325
I Congratulatory Messages 329
J Casualties During the Inchon-Seoul Campaign 333
K Comments on Close Air Support Provided By 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing 335
L Presidential Unit Citation 339
Bibliography 341
Index 347
Illustrations
_Photographs_
Sixteen-page sections of photographs follow pages 68 and 180.
_Maps and Sketches_
_Page_
NKPA Gains, 30 June-1 August 1950 29
Plan for Inchon Assault 68
Movements to the Objective Area 82
Seizure of Wolmi-do 89
Plan for Inchon Assault 99
Seizure of Red Beach 109
Seizure of Blue Beach 119
Marine Attacks D + 1 137
NK Counterattack Ascom City, 17 September 149
The Drive to Kimpo 154
NK Counterattack Kimpo Air Field, 18 September 162
Advance by 1st Marines, 17 September 174
Capture of Sosa by 1st Marines, 18 September 179
General Situation, 18 September 182
Han River Crossing and Seizure of Hill 125 189
Action on 19 September 207
Action on 20 September 218
Assault on Yongdungpo 224
Dike Defense--Company A, 1st Marines 230
Approaching the Enemy MLR, 5th Marines, 21 September 237
Smashing the MLR, 5th Marines, 22–24 September 242
Seoul Assault Plan 265
The Battle of Seoul 266
Action North of Seoul, 7th Marines 269
Pursuit of the NKPA and Capture of Uijongbu 288
CHAPTER I
The Communist Challenge
_Authorization of Marine Brigade--First Conference on Inchon
Landing--General Shepherd in Tokyo--Request for a Marine
Division--America’s Force-in-Readiness--Planning for the Pohang Landing_
No spot on earth could have seemed farther removed from war’s alarms
than Yellowstone Park on the tranquil Sunday afternoon of 25 June
1950. Yet it was here that Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,
Commanding General of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), had his
first news of Communist armed aggression in Korea and the resulting
threat to world peace.
Appointed to his new command only nine days before, he was motoring
from the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico to the West Coast. From
Yellowstone Park he advised Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, of his readiness to proceed to Hawaii and
the Far East. His offer was accepted, and a Marine plane from El Toro
transported him from Salt Lake City to San Francisco. There he boarded
the first available plane to Pearl Harbor, arriving in the early
morning hours of 2 July.[1]
[1] FMFPac _Historical Diary, 1–31 Aug 50_.
On this date, with the Korean conflict only a week old, the armed
forces of the United States were already committed. From the outset
the United Nations had viewed the Red Korean invasion of the Republic
of Korea as a challenge issued to free nations by World Communism. The
so-called North Korean People’s Republic had been set up after World
War II as a Communist puppet state, and the army of invasion was both
trained and armed by Soviet Russia.
More than half of the troops in the original North Korean People’s Army
(NKPA) were veterans of the victorious Chinese Communist forces in the
Chinese Civil War. Weapons and equipment, all the way from T-34 tanks
to Tokarev pistols, had been made available by the Soviet Union; and
Soviet instructors prepared the invading army for its surprise attack
of 25 June on the Republic of Korea.[2]
[2] For a more detailed account of the organization of the
NKPA and ROK forces, see v. I of this series, _The Pusan
Perimeter_, ch. II.
There could have been little doubt as to the outcome. Although the ROK
army included eight divisions and a regiment, estimated at some 98,000
men in all, it could not compare with the NKPA establishment of about
equal numbers. The difference lay in the purposes for which the two
forces had been organized during the joint Soviet-American occupation
of Korea after World War II. While Red Army officers created the NKPA
as an instrument of aggression, American instructors trained the ROK
troops for frontier defense and internal security. They had neither
tanks nor combat aircraft, and their heaviest artillery consisted of a
few battalions of 105mm howitzers. It was scarcely more than a lightly
armed constabulary which crumpled at the first shock of NKPA columns
led by Soviet-made tanks and supported by Soviet-made bombing planes.
The four ROK divisions deployed along the frontier were routed, and
Seoul fell to the invaders on the third day.
The reaction of the United Nations was prompt and decisive. On 27 June
the UN Security Council denounced the NKPA attack as a breach of world
peace and called upon member nations to aid the Republic of Korea. The
United States and 52 other nations approved this resolution, which was
opposed only by the Soviet Union and two of its satellites.[3]
[3] US Dept of State, _Guide to the U. N. in Korea_
(Washington, 1951).
As the NKPA tanks entered Seoul, just evacuated by American nationals,
President Truman ordered American air and sea forces in the Far East to
support the shattered ROK army. With the U. S. Seventh Fleet protecting
Formosa, Task Force 77 bombed and bombarded points on the Korean coast.
Far East Air Forces (FEAF), consisting of eight and a half combat
groups commanded by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, USAF,
flew interdictory strikes meanwhile from bases in Japan against NKPA
supply lines.
Within a few days the NKPA air force, consisting of about 100 Yak-type
planes, was driven from the skies except for occasional night raids.
It would appear that a mountainous peninsula of few good roads would
be a favorable area for strategic bombing, since our naval forces were
denying the sea lanes to the enemy. Yet the FEAF bombers could not
prevent the aggressors from bringing up supplies at night by means
of truck, animal, and human transport. The columns of invasion were
doubtless hampered, but they continued to roll on southward in spite of
interdictory strikes.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East
(CinCFE), concluded on 29 June, during his first flying visit to the
front, “that air and naval action alone could not be decisive, and that
nothing short of the intervention of U. S. ground forces could give any
assurance of stopping the Communists and of later regaining the lost
ground.”[4] Unfortunately, he had only the four understrength divisions
of the Eighth U. S. Army at his disposal in the Far East. During the
two World Wars the United States had been able to raise and train
armies while allies held the line. But no such respite was forthcoming
in Korea, and the first U. S. ground forces at the front consisted of a
small task force flown from Japan--an incomplete battalion reinforced
by a battery of artillery.
[4] Quoted from report of Chief of Staff, FECOM: LtGen Edward
M. Almond (USA). _United Nations Military Operations in
Korea, 29 June 1950–31 December 1951_ (Carlisle Barracks,
1952), 10–11. (Hereafter, Almond, _UN Mil Ops_.)
The date was 2 July 1950. And on this same Sunday, CinCFE sent a
request to Washington for the immediate dispatch of a Marine regimental
combat team (RCT) with appropriate air to the Far East.
_Authorization of Marine Brigade_
It is not quite a coincidence that 2 July happened also to be the date
of General Shepherd’s arrival at Pearl Harbor. Previous decisions in
Washington had made it virtually certain that General MacArthur’s
request would be granted, and CG FMFPac was on his way to the Far East
to prepare for the reception of the Marine reinforcements.
The first step had been taken on 28 June. General Clifton B. Cates,
Commandant of the Marine Corps, conferred at the Pentagon with Admiral
Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. He urged that troops
of the Fleet Marine Force be employed, and CNO promptly informed Vice
Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander of Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE),
that a Marine RCT could be made available if General MacArthur desired
it.[5]
[5] Gen C. B. Cates ltr to authors, 7 Apr 54.
CinCFE had hoped that an entire Marine division could be sent to the
Far East. But after being briefed by Admiral Joy as to the limitations
of Marine Corps numbers, he had to content himself with the request for
an RCT.
Admiral Sherman acted at once. With the approval of JCS and the
President, he ordered Admiral Radford to transport the Marine units
across the Pacific. This was the inception of the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade (Reinf.), which was activated on 7 July with three
squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group 33 as its air component.[6]
[6] For the full story of the 1st ProvMarBrig, see _The Pusan
Perimeter_, _op. cit._
_First Conference on Inchon Landing_
While General Shepherd stopped for a few days at Pearl Harbor, the
possibility of an Inchon amphibious operation was mentioned officially
for the first time at a conference in Tokyo attended by two Marine
officers.
On 4 July a party given by the American colony was interrupted by a
message for Brigadier General William S. Fellers, commanding general
of Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet,
and Colonel Edward S. Forney, commanding Mobile Training Team Able
of that organization. As specialists in amphibious techniques, they
were summoned along with Army and Air Force officers to a meeting at
Headquarters, FECOM, presided over by General MacArthur’s chief of
staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, USA.[7]
[7] Col Edward S. Forney _Transcript of Special Report_, n.
d., Part II.
The Marine officers were in Japan as a result of General MacArthur’s
belief in the efficacy of amphibious tactics. Early in 1950, several
months before the outbreak of the Korean conflict, he had foreseen the
necessity of recovering lost ground by means of a ship-to-shore assault
if an enemy ever won a foothold in the Japanese Islands. His request
for amphibious instructors to train U. S. Army troops in Japan had
found the Navy and Marine Corps ready with units set up for just such a
purpose.[8]
[8] In the autumn of 1946 a TTU team of 35 Marine officers
and 40 enlisted men had been sent to Yokosuka, Japan, at
MacArthur’s request, to train Army troops in amphibious
techniques.
The oldest was the TTU organization of the Phib Tra Pac established
originally on 15 August 1943 to prepare Army as well as Navy and Marine
forces for amphibious operations. After making a distinguished record
in World War II, TTU created a permanent place for itself during the
following five years.[9]
[9] Joint Landing Force Board, Project No. 13-52, Annex
Able, 28–30; see also FMFPac, _Historical Outline of the
Development of FMFPac 1941–1950_ (Preliminary), 15–16
(hereafter, FMFPac _History_); and Maj Gen W. S. Fellers
memo to authors, 16 Feb. 55.
A group of TTU officers and enlisted men under the command of Colonel
Forney made up Mobile Training Team Able in the spring of 1950. Sailing
from San Diego in April, these Marines were accompanied by a second
group of amphibious specialists, the ANGLICO (Air and Naval Gunfire
Liaison Company) instruction team commanded by Lieutenant Edward B.
Williams, USN.[10]
[10] Capt E. P. Stamford interv with HistDiv HQMC, 16 Mar 51.
The ANGLICOs, composed of both Navy and Marine Corps personnel, evolved
in 1949 to assist Army units lacking the forward air control and naval
gunfire control units which are integral in Marine divisions. Growing
out of the responsibility of the Marine Corps for the development
of those phases of landing force operations pertaining to tactics,
techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces, the first company
was formed in answer to the request of Lieutenant General Mark W.
Clark, USA, for a unit capable of giving an Army division this sort of
amphibious fire support. After taking part in the MIKI exercises with
the Sixth Army in Hawaii during the autumn of 1949, this ANGLICO split
up into instruction teams assigned to various Army units.[11]
[11] _Ibid._ The amphibious functions of the Marine Corps, as
outlined by National Security Act of 1947 and the Key
West Conference of 1948, are discussed in the following
chapter.
Training Team Able and Lieutenant Williams’ ANGLICO team reached Japan
just in time to cooperate with a third organization of amphibious
specialists, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle’s Amphibious Group (PhibGru)
One of the Pacific Fleet. The three teams were given a mission of
training one regiment from each of the four Eighth Army divisions in
Japan. But the instruction program had only been launched when it was
interrupted by the Korean conflict.
PhibGru One and the ANGLICO team were immediately assigned to new
duties in connection with the sea lift of Eighth Army troops to Korea.
They had just begun this task when orders came for Admiral Doyle and
his staff, in the USS _Mount McKinley_ at Sasebo, to proceed by air on
4 July to the conference at Tokyo.[12] There at FECOM Headquarters,
they met General Fellers, Colonel Forney, and the Army officers who had
been summoned from the Independence Day celebration of the American
colony.
[12] ComPhibGru-1 (CTF 90), “Rpt of Ops for 25 Jun 50 to 1
Jan 51,” in CinCPacFlt. _Interim Evaluation Report No.
1_, v. XV, Annex Able Able. (Hereafter, PacFlt _Interim
Rpt No. 1_, XV: Able Able. For detailed description and
location of major reports, see the bibliography.)
At the conference it was made plain that the concept of an Inchon
landing had originated with General MacArthur. Even at this early
date, he envisioned not only a ship-to-shore assault on some east or
west coast seaport, preferably Inchon, but also a drive inland to cut
enemy communications and envelop Seoul. The Joint Strategic Plans and
Operations Group (JSPOG) headed by Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright,
U. S. A. (FECOM G-3) was then drawing up the outline of such an
amphibious attack plan. Code-named Operation BLUEHEARTS, it called for
a landing in the Inchon area by a Marine RCT and an Army assault force
in coordination with a frontal attack from the south by the 24th and
25th Divisions. Inchon had been designated the objective area for the
amphibious assault, and the date would depend upon the availability of
troops for the combined operation.[13]
[13] LtGen Edward M. Almond (USA, Ret.) ltr to authors, 10
Feb 55; Col Edward S. Forney interv, 7 Dec 54. (Unless
otherwise noted, all interviews were conducted by the
authors of this work.)
It would be an understatement to say that the naval and Marine officers
were impressed by the boldness of MacArthur’s thinking. At a time when
he could send only a battalion-size force to the aid of the shattered
ROK army, his mind had soared over obstacles and deficiencies to the
concept of an amphibious operation designed to end the war at a stroke.
It was an idea that fired the imagination. But the amphibious
specialists of TTU and PhibGru One had been trained to view the risks
with a realistic appraisal. Their admiration was tempered by caution,
therefore, when they took into account the difficulties.[14]
[14] Forney interv, 7 Dec 54.
The end of World War II had found the United States at a peak of
military strength never before attained in the Nation’s history.
Then, within a year, the popular clamor for the immediate discharge
of citizen-soldiers had left the Army with scarcely enough troops for
the occupation of strategic areas in the Far East. It took vigorous
recruiting to fill the ranks in time of peace, and on 25 June 1950 the
U. S. Eighth Army in Japan included the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry
Divisions and the 1st Cavalry (dismounted) Division. Infantry regiments
were limited to two battalions.
In the lack of trained amphibious assault troops, a definite decision
could not be reached at the conference of 4 July. But it was proposed
by FECOM officers that Major General Hobart H. Gay’s 1st Cavalry
Division be employed as the Army assault force of the proposed Inchon
operation. PhibGru One and Training Team Able were to give the troops
all possible amphibious training, and Colonel Forney was assigned on 5
July as the G-5 (Plans) of the division.[15]
[15] _Ibid._
_General Shepherd in Tokyo_
The activation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade on 7 July freed
General Shepherd to continue his trip to the Far East. That evening,
accompanied by his G-3, Colonel Victor H. Krulak, he took off from the
Pearl Harbor area on the flight to Tokyo.
Upon his arrival, CG FMFPac was acquainted by General Almond with the
deteriorating military situation. As a first step toward sending U. S.
ground forces to Korea, CinCFE had set up the GHQ Advanced Command
Group under the command of Brigadier General John H. Church, USA.
After beginning the reorganization of the ROK forces, it was absorbed
on 3 July by Headquarters, U. S. Armed Forces in Korea. And with the
establishment next day of the Pusan Logistical Command (Brigadier
General Crump Garvin, USA), a start was made toward handling the
mountains of supplies which would be required.[16]
[16] USMA, Dept of Mil Art and Engr, _Operations in Korea_
(West Point, 1953).
On 4 July the initial contact of U. S. ground forces with the enemy
took place near Osan. The little task force from Major General William
F. Dean’s 24th Infantry Division could not attempt anything more
ambitious than delaying actions. But preparations were afoot to send
the rest of the division to Korea as soon as possible, to be followed
by Major General William B. Kean’s 25th Infantry Division.
The first fire fights occurred on 5 and 6 July in the vicinity of Osan.
It was evident at once that the enemy held a great superiority in arms
and equipment. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, USA, who had been
one of Patton’s favorite subordinates, commented after his first visit
to the Korean front that the NKPA units appeared equal to the Germans
who were his adversaries in World War II.[17]
[17] CG FMFPac _Report of Liaison Visit to the Far East_,
10–11 Jul 50.
Accounts of the early actions in Korea were depressing to FECOM
officers.[18] Many plausible excuses may be found for men snatched
from occupation duties and rushed piecemeal into action against great
material odds. The nation as a whole must share the blame when willing
troops are sent to the firing line without adequate preparation,
as were the first U. S. units. Eighth Army officers had done their
best under the circumstances, but a scarcity of maneuver areas in
Japan had restricted training exercises to the battalion and company
levels. Divisions with barely 70 percent of their full complement of
troops were armed with worn World War II weapons, some of which proved
unserviceable for lack of spare parts and maintenance personnel.
Division tank units, equipped with light M-24 tanks because of poor
roads and bridges in Japan, operated at a handicap against the enemy’s
new Soviet T-34 tanks; and American 2.36-inch rocket launchers knocked
out NKPA armor only at fairly close ranges.[19]
[18] Several of these encounters are realistically described
from first-hand interviews in a study sponsored by the
Chief of Military History, USA: Capt R. A. Gugeler,
_Combat Actions in Korea_ (Washington, 1954), 3–19.
[19] USMA, _op. cit._, 7–8.
At this stage the ground forces were particularly dependent upon air
support because of shortages of artillery. But since the mission of the
Air Force in Japan had been primarily of a defensive nature, neither
the organization nor equipment was available for effective air-ground
cooperation on the tactical level. As a consequence, FEAF units had to
confine their tactical efforts largely to targets of opportunity, and
24th Infantry units had to do without such support when it was most
needed.[20]
[20] _Ibid._
Altogether, the so-called “police action” in Korea proved to be one of
the toughest assignments ever given to American soldiers.
_Request for a Marine Division_
General Shepherd’s few days in Tokyo were filled with conferences, and
history was made on 10 July during the course of a conversation with
General MacArthur at FECOM Headquarters.
The commander in chief was not optimistic about the situation at the
front. Not only had the NKPA invasion developed into a formidable
threat at the end of the first two weeks, but the possibility of Red
Chinese or Soviet armed intervention could not be dismissed.
President Truman had named General MacArthur as supreme commander of UN
forces after the Security Council passed a resolution on 7 July calling
for a unified effort in Korea. General Walker was soon to be appointed
to the command of the Eighth Army in Korea (EUSAK), assuming control of
all ROK ground forces.
The personnel situation had grown critical. After being completely
routed, the ROK troops were now in process of reorganization into five
divisions. Meanwhile, the U. S. 25th Infantry Division was being sent
to Korea as rapidly as possible; and it had been decided to withdraw
the 1st Cavalry Division from consideration as the landing force of
the proposed Inchon operation. Not only were these troops lacking in
amphibious training, but they were needed as infantry reinforcements.
Thus it was planned for the combat-loaded 1st Cavalry Division to make
a landing at the East Coast port of Pohang-dong, under the direction of
ComPhibGru One and Mobile Training Team Able, before proceeding to the
front. This would leave only the 7th Infantry Division in Japan, and it
was being stripped of troops to fill out units of the other three.
The outweighed UN forces were still limited to delaying actions. But
General MacArthur hoped that space could be traded for time until
the arrival of stateside units enabled him to take the offensive. At
his urgent request, the 2d Infantry Division and 2d Engineer Special
Brigade had been alerted in the United States for immediate movement to
the Far East. Port dates commencing on 20 July had been assigned, and
General Wright expressed his opinion that these units might be employed
along with the recently activated 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to
initiate the first UN counterstroke.[21]
[21] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50.
The only hope of an early UN decision, General MacArthur told CG FMFPac
at their conference of 10 July, lay in the launching of an amphibious
assault to cut supply lines in the enemy’s rear. This situation,
he added, reminded him of the critical days of World War II in the
Pacific, when troops trained in amphibious techniques were urgently
needed to make ship-to-shore landings on Japanese-held islands.
In a reminiscent mood, MacArthur recalled the competence shown by the
1st Marine Division while under his control during the New Britain
operation of 1943–1944. If only he had this unit in Japan, he said, he
would employ it at his first opportunity as his landing force for the
Inchon assault.
Shepherd, who had been assistant division commander of the 1st Marine
Division during the New Britain landings, immediately suggested that
the UN supreme commander make a request that the 1st Marine Division
with appropriate Marine air be assigned to him. This possibility had
apparently been put aside by MacArthur after being limited to an RCT in
his request of 2 July. He asked eagerly if the Marine general believed
that the division could be made available for an Inchon landing as
early as 15 September. And Shepherd replied that since the unit was
under his command, he would take the responsibility for stating that it
could be sent to Korea by that date, minus the infantry regiment and
other troops of the Brigade.[22]
[22] USMC, MarCorps Board, _An Evaluation of the Influence
of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War_
(4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50), v. I, I-B-1. (Hereafter, MarCorps
Board _Study_.)
Thus was history made without pomp or ceremony during the conference at
FECOM Headquarters.
The date was 10 July, but it was already D-minus 67 for thousands of
American young men. On farms and in offices, in cities and villages
from coast to coast, these civilians had no inkling that just 67 days
later they would be fighting their way ashore in a major amphibious
operation. For they were Marine reservists, and the 1st Marine Division
could not be brought up to full strength without calling them back into
uniform.
Shepherd realized, even while assuring MacArthur that the division
could be made combat-ready by 15 September, that the activation of
the Brigade had left the division with less than the strength of a
single RCT. Nearly as many men would be required to bring it up to
full strength as were contained at present in the entire Fleet Marine
Force.[23] But so great was his confidence in the Marine Corps Reserve
that he did not hesitate to take the responsibility.
[23] For statistics on Reserve mobilization, see Ernest H.
Giusti, _The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve
in the Korean Conflict_. (HistBr, G-3 HQMC, 1952).
(Hereafter, Giusti.)
Nor did MacArthur lose any time at making up his mind. That very day,
10 July, he sent his first request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a
Marine division.
As the conference ended, Shepherd found the UN supreme commander
“enthusiastic” about the prospect of employing again the Marine outfit
that had been his reliance seven years before in the New Britain
operation. He planned to stabilize the front in Korea as soon as
possible, he said, as a prelude to the landing in the NKPA rear which
he believed would be decisive.[24]
[24] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50.
_America’s Force-in-Readiness_
Long before the New Britain landing, Cates and Shepherd had learned
from first-hand experience as junior officers how decisive a
force-in-readiness can be. The lieutenant from Tennessee and the
lieutenant from Virginia took part in June 1918 with the Marines who
stopped the Germans by counterattacking at Belleau Wood. In terms of
human tonnage, two Marine regiments did not cut much of a figure in the
American Expeditionary Force. What counted was the _readiness_ of the
Marines and a few outfits of U. S. Army regulars at a time when most of
the American divisions had not yet finished training.
More than three decades later, as CMC and CG FMFPac, both Marine
generals were firm advocates of the force-in-readiness concept as
a basic mission of the Marine Corps. It was a mission that had
evolved from practice rather than theory. During the half century
since the Spanish-American War, there had been only two years when
U. S. Marines were not on combat duty somewhere. It had long been a
tradition that the Marines, as transitory naval forces, might land on
foreign soil without the implication of hostilities usually associated
with invasion. This principle was invoked, along with a liberal
interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, by the State Department from
1906 to 1932 in the Caribbean and Central America. As a means of
supervising unstable governments in sensitive strategic areas, Marines
were sent to Cuba, Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua,
and China for long periods of occupation.[25]
[25] For a detailed discussion of this subject, see US Dept
of State, Office of the Solicitor, _Right to Protect
Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces_, 3d
rev. ed. with sup. app. to 1933 (Washington, 1934).
(State Dept Pub. No. 538.)
U. S. Marines were not only web-footed infantry during these overseas
operations; they also distinguished themselves as scouts, cannoneers,
constabulary, engineers, and horse marines. As modern warfare grew more
complex, however, the time came when the Leathernecks could no longer
sail on a few hours’ notice as a “gangplank expeditionary force” made
up of men detailed from the nearest posts and stations. No longer could
such light weapons as machine guns, mortars, and mountain howitzers
serve as the only armament necessary for seizing a beachhead.
The Fleet Marine Force evolved in 1933, therefore, to fill the need for
a corps of highly-trained amphibious specialists capable of carrying
out a major ship-to-shore assault against modern defensive weapons.
New landing craft as well as new landing tactics and techniques were
developed during the next ten years, and the reputation of the Marine
Corps as a force-in-readiness was upheld in the amphibious operations
of World War II.
During these three eventful decades of Marine development, General
Cates and General Shepherd had participated in all the stages while
ascending the ladder of command. Thus in the summer of 1950, they were
eminently qualified for leadership in the task of building the 1st
Marine Division up to war strength for the amphibious operation which
General MacArthur hoped to launch on 15 September.
As a prerequisite, the sanction of Congress and authorization of the
President had to be obtained before the Marine Corps Reserve could be
mobilized. General MacArthur’s request of 10 July for a Marine division
went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who referred it to General Cates.
The Commandant could only reply that it would be necessary to call out
the Reserve, and no action was taken on this first request. It was
enough that a beginning had been made, and CMC put his staff to work on
the necessary studies and plans.
General Shepherd was meanwhile winding up his visit to Tokyo by
conferring with Admirals Joy and Doyle and Generals Almond and
Stratemeyer. The Air Force general tentatively confirmed (subject to
discussion with his staff) the assignment of Itami Airfield in Japan
to Marine air units. He also informed CG FMFPac that he accepted as
valid the principle of employing Marine air in support of Marine ground
forces.[26]
[26] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50.
The air situation in Korea had struck General Shepherd as abounding
in paradoxes. He noted that “B-29’s are employed against tactical
targets to the dissatisfaction of all concerned--the Air Force because
of misemployment of its planes, and the ground forces because of the
results achieved. Carrier aircraft, despite the wealth of close support
targets available, were committed against deep and semi-strategic
targets. Jet fighters, with little enemy air to engage, have been
assigned to close support work despite a fuel restriction which holds
them to no more than 15 minutes in the combat zone. Only a very limited
number of aircraft adaptable to tactical support missions are available
(F-51 and B-26) and there appears to be urgent need for suitable close
support aircraft along with competent air-ground liaison units.”[27]
[27] _Ibid._
These conclusions had much to do with a Marine policy, dating back
to World War II, of insisting whenever possible on Marine close air
support for Marine ground forces. Without disparaging other techniques,
Marines believed that their own fliers, trained in Marine infantry
methods, could provide the most effective tactical air for Marine
infantry.
_Planning for the Pohang Landing_
While General Shepherd was flying back to Pearl Harbor, a succession
of sleepless nights awaited the officers of PhibGru One, the ANGLICO
group, and Training Team Able. Upon the shoulders of these amphibious
specialists fell the task of drawing up the orders, planning the
loading, and mounting out the troops of the 1st Cavalry Division for
its landing of 18 July at Pohang-dong.
It was not even certain, when the division commenced loading at
Yokohama on 14 July, that Pohang-dong could be held by the ROKs long
enough for a landing to be effected. Three reinforced NKPA divisions
were making the enemy’s main thrust down the Seoul-Taejon axis. They
were opposed only by weary 24th Infantry Division units fighting
delaying actions while falling back on Taejon and the line of the river
Kum. Along the east coast and the mountains of the central sector,
five regrouped and reorganized ROK divisions held as best they could.
Two of these units in the center were being relieved by the U. S. 25th
Infantry Division, which completed its movement to Korea on the 14th.
As a preliminary step in the Pohang landing, a reconnaissance party of
Army, Navy, and Marine officers flew from Tokyo on 11 July into the
objective area. They returned two days later with valuable information
about the beaches, depths of water, and unloading facilities.
“Because of the extraordinary speed with which the landing at
Pohang-dong was conceived, planned, and executed,” said the report of
ComPhibGru One, “there was no opportunity for conventional and orderly
planning.... Since all echelons of the planning force were installed
in offices at GHQ in Tokyo, it was possible to employ the quickest
and most informal ways of doing business. Telephone conversations and
oral directives were used in place of dispatches, letters, and formal
orders.”[28]
[28] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Able Able.
Lack of amphibious shipping in the area made it a Herculean labor to
provide boat servicing gear, general securing gear, debarkation nets,
towing bridles, and boat and vehicle slings in less than a week. By 14
July, however, enough shipping to move the four embarkation groups of
the division had been assembled at Yokohama--two MSTS transports, two
AKAs, six LSUs, and 16 LSTs in addition to LCVPs and LCMs.
The transport group and screen got under way on the 15th for a
rendezvous near the objective area on D-day with the tractor group.
Naval aircraft of Rear Admiral John M. Hoskins’ carrier group of the
Seventh Fleet were on call to provide support; but at 0558 on the
18th, the armada was unopposed as it steamed into Yongil Bay. CTF 90
signaled orders for the carrying out of Plan Baker, calling for a
landing against little or no enemy resistance. By midnight the _Mount
McKinley_, _Union_, _Oglethorpe_, and _Titania_ had been completely
unloaded, and the LSTs had accounted for 60 per cent of their cargoes.
Altogether, 10,027 troops, 2,022 vehicles, and 2,729 tons of bulk cargo
were put ashore on D-day.
The Second Echelon consisted of six LSTs, three APs, and four Japanese
freighters, while six LSTs made up the Third Echelon. These ships
discharged their cargo from 23 to 29 July, having been delayed by
Typhoon GRACE. And on the 30th, ComPhibGru One, as CTF 90, reported
that the operation had been completed and no naval units were now at
the objective.[29]
[29] _Ibid._
Viewed superficially, the uncontested Pohang landing may have seemed
a tame affair to stateside newspaper readers. Nevertheless, it was
a timely demonstration of Navy and Marine Corps amphibious know-how
and Army energy, and it came at a critical moment. The important
communications center of Taejon had to be abandoned by 24th Infantry
Division units on 20 July, and it was growing apparent that the
Eighth Army would be hard-pressed to retain a foothold in Korea until
reinforcements from the States could give the United Nations a material
equality. It was a time when every platoon counted, and the fresh
regiments of General Gay’s division were rushed to the Yongdong area
two days after their landing to relieve weary and battered elements of
the 24th Infantry Division.