Operation Plan CHROMITE
_Interview with General MacArthur--Conferences in Tokyo--Inception of X
Corps--Final Conference on Inchon--Brigade Victory in Korea--The Marine
Amphibious Mission_
The scars of war heal rapidly. From the air General Smith could see
jungle covering the battlefields of Guam. Iwo Jima looked as untouched
as if it had never been the scene of Marine casualties exceeding the
losses of the Union army at Gettysburg. Even fire-blasted Tokyo had
recovered to a surprising extent from the terrible bombings of 1945.
Now, five years later, the United States had entered upon a new
military effort. As the Marine general landed at Haneda Airfield on the
afternoon of 22 August 1950, he was met by Admiral Doyle and driven to
the _Mount McKinley_, tied up at the dock in Tokyo harbor. And though
assigned to the cabin reserved for the landing force commander, CG 1st
MarDiv found it an ironical circumstance that he did not yet know the
prospective D-day and H-hour of the landing.[62]
[62] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 22 Aug 50.
He had not long to wait for such data. The advance section of the
Marine planning group being already aboard the _Mount McKinley_, he was
quickly informed by Colonel Bowser, the G-3 of the incomplete Division
staff. D-day at Inchon had been tentatively set for 15 September, and
the landing must be made during the high tide of late afternoon. It
meant assaulting a port of 250,000 prewar population over the mud flats
and seawalls, with little opportunity to consolidate positions before
nightfall. Nor would there be time for training and rehearsals, since
the troops would reach Japan barely in time to unload and reload in
amphibious shipping before proceeding to the objective area.
General Smith learned further that a new command structure, to be known
as X Corps, was being hastily erected by FECOM especially for the
operation. No announcement had been made of a project still classified
as Top Secret, but it was known to the planning group that General
Almond would command a corps not yet activated. The 1st Marine Division
would be under his control as the landing force.
Admiral Doyle, an old hand at amphibious warfare, was not happy about
Inchon when he considered the naval aspects. Initiated at Guadalcanal
and Tulagi in 1942, he had taken part in some rugged ship-to-shore
assaults of World War II. Afterwards, as Commander of Amphibious
Shipping for the Pacific Fleet, he had made a career of it. And Admiral
Doyle considered Inchon a hard nut to crack. He refused to admit that
any amphibious operation was impossible as long as the United States
Navy remained afloat, but he did maintain that Inchon bristled with
risks.
In twenty minutes that Tuesday afternoon General Smith heard enough
to convince him that the forthcoming assault would take a great deal
of doing. But there was no time for discussion. For at 1730, just two
hours after stepping from his plane, he had an appointment with the
commander in chief.
_Interview with General MacArthur_
Arriving on the minute at the Dai Ichi building, General Smith
reported to FECOM Headquarters. He was met by an aide, who escorted
him to General Almond’s office. On the way down echoing corridors,
he responded at frequent intervals to the salutes of sentries who
presented arms with fixed bayonets.[63]
[63] This section is based upon: O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 45–51,
_Chronicle_, 22 Aug 50, and interv. 13 Jan 55.
The offices of CinCFE and his chief of staff were connected by an
imposing conference room with paneled walls and pillars along one side.
General Smith had an opportunity to survey his surroundings at leisure
before General Almond appeared. The new X Corps commander explained
that his chief had a habit of taking a long afternoon break and would
arrive later.
Of medium height and stocky build, Almond gave the impression at the
age of 58 of a buoyant temperament and restless energy. A native
Virginian and graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, he had been
an ETO division commander in World War II. After joining MacArthur’s
staff, he became one of the most loyal officers of a group noted for
devotion to their famous chief.
Almond greeted the reserved, white-haired Marine general cordially. He
launched at once into the topic of the Inchon operation, expressing the
utmost confidence in the ability of the UN forces to prevail.
It was the initial contact of the two men. Mutual respect was not
lacking, but differences in temperament made it inevitable that these
generals would not always see eye to eye. History teaches that this is
by no means a deplorable situation when kept within reasonable bounds.
Character can be as decisive a factor as logistics, and some of the
greatest victories of the ages have been won by colleagues who did not
agree at times. Friction, in fact, is more likely to sharpen than to
blunt military intellects; and Smith’s precision had potentialities of
being a good counterpoise for Almond’s energy.
While they were discussing the tactical problems, the commander in
chief returned to his office. He summoned his chief of staff for a
brief conference, then requested that Smith be presented.
MacArthur shook hands warmly, grasping the Marine general’s elbow with
his left hand. Without the celebrated “scrambled eggs” cap, he looked
his 70 years in moments of fatigue, but the old fire and dash were
not lacking. The very simplicity of his attire--shirtsleeves and open
collar--made a dramatic contrast to the military pomp and ceremony
surrounding him in this former Japanese commercial building, one of the
few earthquake-proof and air-conditioned structures in Tokyo.
In a cigarette-smoking age, both MacArthur and Smith preferred the
calm comfort of a pipe. The commander in chief lit up and puffed
reflectively a moment. Then he leaned back in his chair and gave his
concept of the Inchon operation. But it was more than a concept in the
usual military sense; it was a vision of a victory potent enough to end
the Korean conflict at a stroke. And it was more than confidence which
upheld him; it was a supreme and almost mystical faith that he could
not fail.
He granted, of course, that there were difficulties and risks.
Evidently Almond had mentioned Smith’s reservations, for he proceeded
to reassure the Marine general. His voice full of feeling, he expressed
his deep conviction that the war could be won in a month at Inchon,
and that the 1st Marine Division could win it. The enemy, he explained,
had committed nearly all of his troops in the Pusan Perimeter. Thus the
Marines would not be heavily opposed when they stormed ashore at Inchon
and drove inland to cut the main NKPA line of communications at Seoul.
MacArthur said he knew that the Marines had high standards, having
commanded them in the New Britain operations of the last war. He
realized that the Marines strove for perfection, and the Inchon landing
was bound to be somewhat helter-skelter by the very nature of things.
But there was no doubt, he affirmed, that the victory soon to be gained
by the 1st Marine Division would make 15 September 1950 a glorious date
in American history.
His voice was charged with fervor as it rose and fell eloquently. Once
General Smith made a move as if to depart, but the commander in chief
motioned him back to his chair. At last he brought the conversation to
a close by standing suddenly, grasping the Marine general’s hand, and
bidding him a cordial good-bye.
_Conferences in Tokyo_
It was sometimes an awkward situation for Navy and Marine officers in
general, and Admiral Doyle and General Smith in particular. In many
respects they appeared doubters and pessimists in contrast to FECOM
staff officers who reflected General MacArthur’s shining confidence.
But as amphibious specialists, carrying a heavy load of responsibility
for the landing, they had to give serious thought to the risks at
Inchon.
This was brought home forcibly to the Marine general on the morning of
the 23d, when he attended a meeting conducted by Major General Clark L.
Ruffner, Chief of Staff of the future X Corps. Although the conference
proceeded according to the usual form, General Smith felt that it
departed at times from the realism which he considered an essential of
sound amphibious planning. It was announced, for instance, that after
taking Inchon, the 1st Marine Division was to cross the Han and attack
Seoul, although X Corps had neither equipment nor materiel for bridging
the sizeable river.[64]
[64] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 23 Aug 50.
A review of the background disclosed that after CinCFE decided on 10
July not to use the 1st Cavalry Division as his landing force, he
briefly considered two other Army outfits. The 2d Infantry Division,
commanded by Major General Lawrence B. Keiser, was then under orders
to embark from the West Coast. Some of the personnel had been given
amphibious training by an ANGLICO instruction team and had taken part
in Operation MIKI, but the division as a whole was much understrength.
The same difficulty led to the elimination of Major General David G.
Barr’s 7th Infantry Division in Japan, which had supplied troops to
units at the front until only a cadre remained.
The assurance on 25 July of a war-strength Marine division took care
of the _who_ question. Next came the problems of _when_ and _where_
an amphibious assault could be best mounted. JANIS (Joint Army and
Navy Intelligence Studies) reports indicated that the east coast of
Korea, though of lesser importance in military respects, offered such
hydrographic advantages as unusually moderate tides and a general
absence of shoals. In forbidding contrast, the shallow west coast
waters could be navigated at most points only by means of narrow
channels winding through the mud flats.[65]
[65] JANIS No. 75, ch. IV, _Theater Study, Korean Coast and
Beaches_.
Of all the west coast seaports, Inchon was probably the least desirable
objective when considered strictly from the viewpoint of hydrographic
conditions. From first to last, however, Inchon was Douglas MacArthur’s
choice. FECOM staff officers ventured to suggest two alternatives,
Wonsan on the east coast and Kunsan on the west coast, but the
commander in chief replied that neither was close enough to the enemy’s
main line of communications to suit his purposes. He would settle for
nothing less than Inchon.
So much for the place. As to the time, the choice was even more
limited. The tidal range varied from an average spring tide[66] height
of 23 feet to an occasional maximum of 33 feet. Landing craft required
a tide of 25 feet to navigate the mud flats of the harbor, and the LSTs
must have 29 feet. Only during a few days in the middle of September
and October were those depths provided by spring tides of the next 12
weeks. MacArthur rejected an October date as being too late in the
season, so that 15 September became D-day by virtue of elimination.
[66] A spring tide is a higher than normal tide caused by the
sun and moon being in conjunction or opposition, as at
new moon and full moon. Conversely, when the moon is at
first or third quarter the tide (neap tide) is smaller
than usual.
A late afternoon H-hour was also a choice of necessity. Islands, reefs,
and shoals restricted the approach to the outer harbor, and currents
ranging from three to six knots multiplied the chances of confusion.
This meant that daylight landings were necessary for all but small
groups.
Much of the inner harbor was a vast swamp at low water, penetrated by a
single dredged channel 12 to 13 feet deep.[67] The duration of spring
tides above the prescribed minimum depth averaged about three hours,
and during this interval the maximum in troops and supplies must be put
ashore. Every minute counted, since initial landing forces could not be
reinforced or supplied until the next high water period.
[67] JANIS No. 75, ch. V.
Time and tide seemed to have combined forces to protect Inchon from
seaborne foes. As if such natural obstacles were not enough, the
target area provided others. Two islands, Wolmi-do and Sowolmi-do,
located in a commanding position between the inner and outer harbors,
were linked to each other and to Inchon by a causeway. In advance of
intelligence reports, it must be assumed that rocky, wooded Wolmi-do
would be honeycombed with hidden emplacements for enough guns to create
a serious menace for the landing craft.
This critical terrain feature must somehow be reduced as a preliminary
to the main landing during the high tide of late afternoon. Inchon
being situated on a hilly promontory, the “beaches” were mere narrow
strips of urban waterfront, protected by seawalls too high for ramps
to be dropped at any stage of the tide. Once past these barriers, the
troops would have about two hours of daylight in which to secure an
Oriental city with a population comparable to that of Omaha.
But the amphibious assault was only the first phase of the operation as
conceived by CinCFE. After taking Inchon the landing force had the task
of driving some 16 miles inland, without loss of momentum, to assault
Korea’s largest airfield before crossing a tidal river to assault
Korea’s largest city.
And even this ambitious undertaking was not the whole show. For a
joint operation was to be carried out meanwhile by Eighth Army forces
thrusting northward from the Pusan Perimeter to form a junction with
the units of the Inchon-Seoul drive. This double-barreled assault, it
was believed, would shatter North Korean resistance and put an end to
the war.
_Inception of X Corps_
The time, the place, the landing force, the main objectives--these
essentials of the proposed Inchon-Seoul operation had been pretty well
settled, at least to General MacArthur’s satisfaction, by the first
week of August. But even though he had his assault troops, there was as
yet no headquarters organization.
Admiral Sherman urged early in August that the commander in chief call
upon General Shepherd and the facilities of the FMFPac organization at
Pearl Harbor. Since there was so little time left before D-day--only a
fraction of the time usually allotted to the planning phase of a major
ship to shore assault--he felt that amphibious know-how and experience
were required. He proposed, therefore, that steps be taken to obtain
the approval of Admiral Radford, who had jurisdiction over FMFPac.
The need for a headquarters organization was discussed on 7 August
by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) of FECOM.
Brigadier General Wright, G-3 of FECOM, received a memorandum from the
other members of the staff recommending that the gap be filled in one
of two ways--either by putting into effect Admiral Sherman’s plan, or
by sponsoring the organization of a provisional corps headquarters.
General Wright favored the first course of action, as did Brigadier
General Doyle G. Hickey, FECOM deputy chief of staff. Ultimately,
however, the FECOM chief of staff decided in favor of the latter
command arrangement.[68]
[68] OCMH, Dept of Army (Maj J. F. Schnabel), _The Korean
Conflict_ (MS), v. I, ch. I.
_Final Conference on Inchon_
The questions of _when_ and _where_ and _who_ had been answered to some
extent. But as late as 23 August, a good many variations of opinion
existed as to _how_ the amphibious assault was to be accomplished.
The natural obstacles of the Inchon harbor area were so disturbing
that Doyle suggested an alternative to MacArthur and Almond. Since
the purpose of the landing was to drive inland and cut the enemy’s
communications, urged ComPhibGru One, why not select a west coast
objective with fewer hydrographic difficulties? He proposed the
Posung-Myon area, about 30 miles south of Inchon on the west coast,
where better approach channels and beaches were believed to be
available in a more lightly populated locality. A landing at this
point, Doyle contended, would not be attended by the risks and
restrictions of Inchon, yet after securing a beachhead the troops would
be in position to strike inland at the enemy’s main line of rail and
highway communications in the vicinity of Osan.[69]
[69] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 23 Aug 50, _Notes_, 51–52.
A _myon_ is comparable to our county, being a Korean
political subdivision containing several towns or
villages.
Smith was favorably impressed. He brought up the subject on 23 August,
when he and Barr had a meeting with Almond. The X Corps commander did
not concur, though conceding that Posung-Myon had possibilities as an
area for a subsidiary landing in connection with the Inchon assault.
Nor was Doyle able to obtain MacArthur’s consent to the alternate
objective.
It was the Marine general’s third conference of the day. From the X
Corps meeting he had gone directly to the regular conference at GHQ,
and thence to the talk with Almond and Barr. He came away from all
three meetings with the conviction that CinCFE and his staff were
not to be swerved by his objections. It was definitely to be Inchon
on 15 September, and Smith instructed his planning group to proceed
accordingly.
Doyle made a last attempt at 1730 that afternoon to present a
comprehensive picture of the risks and difficulties inherent at Inchon.
This final conference on the subject of a west coast landing was
attended by some of the nation’s highest ranking officers--General J.
Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief
of Naval Operations; General Shepherd, CG FMFPac; Lieutenant General
Idwal H. Edwards, U. S. Air Force; as well as other high-ranking
staff officers who had flown out from Washington. It was no secret in
Tokyo military circles that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were present
for the purpose of studying General MacArthur’s plans for the Inchon
landing. It was also generally known that doubts and misgivings had
been expressed at various times when the project was discussed at the
Pentagon. General Collins stated candidly at a later date that the
purpose of his Tokyo visit was “... to find out exactly what the plans
were. Frankly, we were somewhat in the dark, and as it was a matter of
great concern, we went out to discuss it with General MacArthur. We
suggested certain alternate possibilities and places....”[70]
[70] MacArthur Hearings, 1295, quoted by Major Schnabel in
_The Korean Conflict_ (MS), v. I, ch. I.
Admirals Joy and Doyle also attended the meeting, and FECOM was
represented by Generals Almond, Ruffner, and Wright. The conference
room on the sixth floor of the Dai Ichi building proved too small
for the audience, and members of the PhibGru One team had to wait
their turn in Almond’s adjoining office. One by one, at eight-minute
intervals, Doyle’s officers took turns at being presented to MacArthur,
who listened gravely while puffing at his pipe. The following
amphibious specialists were heard:
Cdr Edmund S. L. Marshall, USN Navigation
Lt Charles R. Barron, USN Aerology
LtCol William E. Benedict, USMC Military Aspects
LCdr Jack L. Lowentrout, USN Beach Study
LCdr M. Ted Jacobs, Jr., USN Seabees Pontoon Causeway Plans
LCdr Clyde E. Allmon, USN Ship to Shore Plans
LCdr Arlie G. Capps, USN Gunfire Support
Cdr Theophilus H. Moore, USN Air Support[71]
[71] The description of the conference has been derived from:
LCdr Frank A. Manson (USN) interv, 22 Apr 52; Capt
Walter Karig (USNR), _et al._, _Battle Report: The War
in Korea_ (New York, 1952), 165–168 (hereafter, Karig,
_Korea_); VAdm Arthur D. Struble ltr to authors, 25 Apr
55.
The officers spoke of the natural obstacles. They asserted that it
would be the peak of optimism to hope for a strategic surprise at
Inchon, for the enemy also knew that only a few days each autumn month
offered a tidal range sufficient to float the landing craft and supply
ships over the mud flats of the harbor.
They contended that even a tactical surprise was out of the question,
since Wolmi-do must be neutralized before landings could be made on the
mainland. Otherwise, the vulnerable column of landing craft would be
exposed to a slaughter from the flanking fire of the island’s guns.
The Navy group pointed out further that it must also be assumed that
the enemy would not neglect a good opportunity to sow both moored and
magnetic mines in the channels the shipping must take. And to cap all
the other natural and man-made risks, there was danger at the height
of the typhoon season that Nature would intervene and scatter the
amphibious armada during its approach to the objective area.
The presentation lasted for nearly an hour and a half. At the
conclusion, Admiral Doyle summed up by giving his opinion. “The best
I can say,” he told the commander in chief, “is that Inchon is not
impossible.”
General MacArthur heard the amphibious specialists to a finish without
his imperturbability being shaken. Even the onlookers who could not
partake of his perfect faith were impressed. There was something
magnificent about this old warrior in shirtsleeves and open collar,
calmly smoking his pipe while hearing his plan dissected. Daring and
optimism are supposed to be the exclusive prerogatives of youth, yet
this smiling septuagenarian was not only the oldest officer at the
conference, he was also the most confident and assured! After the
PhibGru One presentation ended, he took 45 minutes for his comments.
Speaking with eloquence, he declared that the natural obstacles and
practical difficulties of the proposed Inchon operation were more than
balanced in the strategic scale by the psychological advantages of a
bold stroke. About 90 percent of the NKPA forces were fighting in the
Pusan Perimeter. A combined offensive by X Corps and the Eighth Army
would have the effect of placing the enemy between the hammer and anvil.
Referring to the Kunsan landing favored by General Collins and Admiral
Sherman, CinCFE asserted that this objective was too far south for a
fatal blow to be dealt the invaders. He cited a historical precept in
Wolfe’s victory at Quebec, made possible by audacity in overcoming
natural obstacles that the enemy regarded as insurmountable. He
recalled the amphibious victories he himself had won in the Southwest
Pacific, with the Navy and sometimes the Marine Corps sharing in
the glory. And he ended on a dramatic note with a single, prophetic
sentence spoken in a tense voice:
“We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them!”[72]
[72] Karig, _Korea_, 165–168.
As the officers filed out into the noisy, teeming Tokyo street, most
of them felt certain that the last word had been said. It was still
possible, of course, for the Joint Chiefs to overrule CinCFE; and
it was not likely that all of their doubts had been laid to rest.
Nevertheless, the Navy and Marine planners proceeded on the basis that
a final decision had been reached that August afternoon.
_Brigade Victory in Korea_
Before his arrival at Tokyo, General Shepherd had paid a flying visit
to the headquarters of the Brigade in Korea immediately after the
Marines stormed and seized Obong-ni Ridge. Just as General Craig’s
men had taken part from 7 to 13 August in the first sustained UN
counterattack, so this Army and Marine effort a week later became the
first rout of a major NKPA unit. After putting up a fierce struggle
to hold their bridgehead on the east bank of the river Naktong, the
veteran troops of the NKPA 4th Division were shattered by repeated
Marine attacks. Carrier-borne Corsairs of MAG-33 had a turkey shoot at
the expense of panic stricken enemy soldiers who abandoned their arms
in a wild flight. Some of the fugitives were shot down while trying to
swim the river.
Despite this encouraging little victory, it was still nip and tuck on
the central front of the Pusan Perimeter. With the U. S. 2d Infantry
Division and 5th RCT now in line, the Eighth Army strategy of trading
space for time had resulted in whittling down the enemy’s material
superiority. But the invaders still held the material advantage, and
there were signs that they would soon launch an all-out effort to smash
through to Pusan.
_The Marine Amphibious Mission_
General Shepherd, after being informed as to the Tokyo conferences,
accompanied General Smith on the morning of 24 August to a meeting with
Admirals Sherman, Radford, Joy, and Doyle. It was generally agreed that
not enough weight had been given to amphibious considerations in the
final decision to attack at Inchon. Navy opinion held that one more
attempt should be made to propose another landing point with fewer
hydrographic objections. The area south of Inchon had been investigated
by Navy UDT and Marine amphibious scouts of the Reconnaissance Company,
1st Marine Division, who had sailed to the Far East with the Brigade.
As a preliminary, this group had embarked on the USS _Horace A. Bass_
(APD-124) and gone ashore undetected to stage several raids during the
period 12–16 August on the enemy’s main line of communications along
the west coast. Three tunnels and two railway bridges were destroyed
without the loss of a man.[73]
[73] CTF 90 _Opn O 13-50_, in PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_,
XV:Able, 6.
Next the raiders successfully carried out a survey and reconnaissance
of available landing beaches during the period 22–25 August in the
Posung-Myon area. Their findings impressed General Shepherd so much
that before his departure from Tokyo he called on CinCFE to make a
last plea for reconsideration of the landing area. General MacArthur,
however, remained firm in his preference for Inchon.[74]
[74] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 24 Aug 50.
The meeting of the admirals and Marine generals on the 24th broke up
with a general agreement that the decision as to Inchon on 15 September
must be accepted as the basis for final planning. That same afternoon
General Smith instructed his planning group to begin work on a scheme
of maneuver.
Modern amphibious tactics were in their infancy during World War I
when an appalling object lesson seemed to have been left by the Allied
disaster at Gallipoli in 1915–16. Brilliant in strategic conception,
this major amphibious operation might have knocked Turkey out of
the war and opened the unlocked back door of Austria and Germany.
Unfortunately, the execution fell short; and the failure was too often
charged to amphibious warfare itself rather than a wholesale violation
of its basic principles.
In 1920 the new Marine Corps Schools at Quantico became the center
of Marine amphibious study and research. Marine units participated
in fleet problems at Panama and Culebra during the post-war years;
and in 1927 the Joint Board of the Army and Navy (forerunner of JCS)
stated in a directive that the Marine Corps had the mission of “special
preparation in the conduct of landing operations.”[75]
[75] BrigGen Eli K. Cole, “Joint Overseas Operation,” _US
Naval Institute Proceedings_, 55, No. 11 (Nov 29):927.
During the early 1920s the writings of a brilliant Marine officer,
Major Earl H. Ellis, had a tremendous influence on current amphibious
thought. Predicting that Japan would strike first in the Pacific and
win initial successes, he drew up a strategic plan for assaults on
Japanese-mandated islands which was approved by Major General John
A. Lejeune, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Later known as Operation
Plan No. 712, this Top Secret document helped to shape the ORANGE
plans adopted by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy for offensive
operations against Japan if it came to war.
After making good progress in the early 1920s, with landing exercises
being held annually, the Marine amphibious program bogged down from
1927 to 1932 because of the necessity of sending expeditionary forces
to China and Nicaragua. The turning point came in 1933, a memorable
date in the evolution of modern amphibious warfare. It was then that
Major General John H. Russell, Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Corps, urged that a staff be set up at Quantico to plan for the
organization of a mobile Marine striking force. This force, under the
Commandant, and fully prepared for service with the fleet, was to be
in readiness for tactical employment subject to the orders of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Navy. General Russell further proposed that
the old name “Expeditionary Force” be discontinued and “Fleet Marine
Force” adopted as a name better expressing this mission.[76]
[76] J. A. Isely and P. A. Crowl, _The U. S. Marines and
Amphibious War_ (Princeton, 1951), 21–24, 33–34.
After the acceptance of these recommendations, the Commandant ordered
classes discontinued at the Marine Corps Schools and a concerted
effort applied to the preparation of a new amphibious manual. Both the
Army and Navy had treated some of the procedures in existing manuals,
but it remained for the Marine Corps in 1934 to put out the first
complete work of the sort. Known as the _Tentative Manual on Landing
Operations_, it became either directly or indirectly the guide for
exercises and maneuvers of the Navy and Marine Corps down to World War
II.
Most of its suggested procedures were endorsed with revisions in the
Navy’s _Fleet Training Publication 167_, published in 1938. This work
in its turn became the model three years later for the Army’s first
basic field manual for landing operations.[77]
[77] FMFPac, _History_, 6–9.
Training exercises were held every year, usually at Culebra or Vieques
in the Caribbean and San Clemente Island off San Diego. At the
suggestion of the Fleet Marine Force, the Navy purchased Bloodsworth
Island in Chesapeake Bay as the first amphibious gunfire range used for
that purpose alone.
Schools were set up to train Army and Navy as well as Marine officers
as specialists in fire control parties. Air support was closely
integrated with naval gunfire, shore artillery, and troop movements.
Technology came to the aid of tactics when the Fleet Marine Force
encouraged and supervised the designing of strange new amphibious craft
and vehicles. Concepts were actually based in several instances on
landing craft not yet developed and the confidence of the Marine Corps
in American inventiveness proved to be justified.
Thus the Nation entered World War II with a system of offensive tactics
which opened Europe, Africa, and the islands of the Pacific to American
invasion without incurring a single major defeat. Not only was the
United States ahead of the enemy in the development of amphibious
operations but the Axis Powers never found the key to an adequate
defense. In an often quoted summary, the British military critic and
historian, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, has asserted that these
techniques were “in all probability ... the most far-reaching tactical
innovation of the war.”[78]
[78] MajGen J. F. C. Fuller, _The Second World War_ (London,
1948), 207.
During the next few years the Marine Corps was twice officially given
the major responsibility for American amphibious tactics. The National
Security Act of 1947 made it the function of the Corps “to provide
fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air
components, for service with the fleet in the seizure and defense of
advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may
be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”[79]
[79] 61 _U. S. Stat. at L._ (1947), 495.
At the so-called Key West Conference the following spring (March 11–14,
1948), the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff restated the
Marine Corps’ mission to include that of developing “in coordination
with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the tactics, technique,
and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. The
Marine Corps shall have primary interest in the development of those
landing force tactics, techniques, and equipment which are of common
interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.”[80]
[80] OAFIE, OSD, _The United States Marine Corps_
(Washington, 1950). (Armed Forces Talk No. 317.)
During these post-war years, the Marine Corps was grappling with the
new amphibious problems posed by atomic weapons. It was fitting,
therefore, that the three men who formed the Special Board for this
research--Generals Shepherd, Harris, and Smith--should have been at the
forefront in 1950 when the Marine Corps faced its next amphibious test.
As veterans of World War II operations, they could recall the scramble
for the beaches of Bougainville, the fight for Bloody Nose on Peleliu,
the off-the-cuff landing on Oroku Peninsula in Okinawa. There had been
some tense moments in those battles, but never had Marine generals
contemplated an objective which held more potentialities for trouble
than the harbor area at Inchon.