"I. General Bonham will send, as early as practicable in the

morning, a command of two of his regiments of infantry, a strong

force of cavalry, and one field-battery, to scour the country

and roads to his front, toward Centreville. He will carry with

him abundant means of transportation for the collection of our

wounded, all the arms, ammunition, and abandoned hospital

stores, subsistence, and baggage, which will be sent immediately

to these headquarters.

"General Bonham will advance with caution, throwing out an

advanced guard and skirmishers on his right and left, and the

utmost caution must be taken to prevent firing into our own men.

"Should it appear, while this command is occupied as directed,

that it is insufficient for the purposes indicated, General

Bonham will call on the nearest brigade commander for support.

"II. Colonel P. St. George Cocke, commanding, will dispatch at

the same time, for similar purposes, a command of the same size

and proportions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry on the road

_via_ Stone Bridge; and another command of two companies of

infantry and one of cavalry on the road by which the enemy

retreated toward and _via_ Sudley's Mills.

"By command of Brigadier-General Beauregard:

(Signed) "Thomas Jordan, _A. A. Adjutant-General._

"To Brigadier-General Bonham."

Impressed with the belief that the enemy was very superior to us, both

in numbers and appointments, I had felt apprehensive that, unless

pressed, he would recover from the panic under which he fled from the

field, rally on his reserves, and renew the contest. Therefore it was

that I immediately felt the necessity for a pursuit of the fugitives,

and insisted that the troops on the extreme left should retain their

position during the night of the 21st, as has been heretofore stated. In

conference with the generals that night, this subject was considered,

and I dictated an order for a movement on the rear of the enemy at early

dawn, which, on account of the late hour at which it was given, differed

very little from one for an immediate movement. A rainfall,

extraordinary for its violence and duration, occurred on the morning of

the succeeding day, so that, over places where during the battle one

could scarcely get a drink of water, rolled torrents which, in the

afternoon of the 22d, it was difficult to cross.

From these and other causes, the troops were scattered to such an extent

that but few commands could have been assembled for immediate service.

It was well for us that the enemy, instead of retiring in order, so as

to be rallied and again brought to the attack, left hope behind, and

fled in dismay to seek for safety beyond the Potomac.

Each hour of the day following the battle added to the evidence of a

thorough rout of the enemy. Abandoned wagons, stores, guns, caissons,

small-arms, and ammunition, proved his complete demoralization. As far

as our cavalry went, no hostile force was met, and all the indications

favored the conclusion that the purpose of invasion had for the time

been abandoned.

The victory, though decisive and important, both in its moral and

physical effect, had been dearly bought by the sacrifice of the lives of

many of our bravest and best, who at the first call of their country had

rushed to its defense.

When riding to the front, I met an ambulance bearing General Barnard Bee

from the field, where he had been mortally wounded, after his patriotism

had been illustrated by conspicuous exhibitions of skill, daring, and

fortitude. Soon after, I learned that my friend Colonel Bartow had

heroically sealed with his life-blood his faith in the sanctity of our

cause. He had been the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs in

the Provisional Congress, and, after the laws were enacted to provide

for the public defense, he went to the field to maintain them. It is to

such virtuous and devoted citizens that a country is indebted for its

prosperity and honor, as well in peace as in war.

Reference has been made to the dispersion of our troops after the

battle, and in this connection the following facts are mentioned: In the

afternoon of the 22d, with a guide, supposed to be cognizant of the

positions at which the different commands would be found, I went to

visit the wounded, and among them a youth of my family, who, it was

reported to me, was rapidly sinking. After driving many miles, and

witnessing very painful scenes, but seldom finding the troops in the

position where my guide supposed them to be, and always disappointed in

not discovering him I particularly sought, I was, at the approach of

night, about to abandon the search, when, accidentally meeting an

officer of the command to which the youth belonged, I was directed to

the temporary hospital to which the wounded of that command had been

removed. It was too late; the soul of the young soldier had just left

his body; the corpse lay before me. Around him were many gentle boys,

suffering in different degrees from the wounds they had received. One

bright, refined-looking youth from South Carolina, severely if not

fatally wounded, responded to my expression of sympathy by the heroic

declaration that it was "sweet to die for such a cause."

Many kindred spirits ascended to the Father from that field of their

glory. The roll need not be recorded here; it has a more enduring

depository than the pen can make--the traditions of a grateful people.

The victory at Manassas was certainly extraordinary, not only on account

of the disparity of numbers and the inferiority of our arms, but also

because of many other disadvantages under which we labored. We had no

disciplined troops, and, though our citizens were generally skilled in

the use of small-arms, which, with their high pride and courage, might

compensate for the want of training while in position, these

inadequately substituted military instruction when manoeuvres had to be

performed under fire, and could not make the old-fashioned musket equal

to the long-range, new-model muskets with which the enemy was supplied.

The disparity in artillery was still greater, both in the number and

kind of guns; but, thanks to the skill and cool courage of the Rev.

Captain W. N. Pendleton, his battery of light, smooth-bore guns, manned

principally by the youths whose rector he had been, proved more

effective in battle than the long-range rifle-guns of the enemy. The

character of the ground brought the forces into close contact, and the

ricochet of the round balls carried havoc into the columns of the enemy,

while the bolts of their rifle-guns, if they missed their object,

penetrated harmlessly into the ground.

The field was very extensive, broken, and wooded. The senior general had

so recently arrived that he had no opportunity minutely to learn the

ground, and the troops he brought were both unacquainted with the field

and with those with whom they had to coöperate. To all this must be

added the disturbing fact that the plan of battle, as originally

designed, was entirely changed by the movement of the enemy on our

extreme left, instead of right and center, as anticipated. The

operations, therefore, had to be conducted against the plan of the

enemy, instead of on that which our generals had prepared and explained

to their subordinate commanders. The promptitude with which the troops

moved, and the readiness with which our generals modified their

preconceived plans to meet the necessities as they were developed,

entitled them to the commendation so liberally bestowed at the time by

their countrymen at large.

General Johnston had been previously promoted to the highest grade in

our army, and I deemed it but a fitting reward for the services rendered

by General Beauregard that he should be promoted to the same grade;

therefore, I addressed to him the following letter:

"Manassas, Virginia, _July 21, 1861._

"Sir: Appreciating your services in the battle of Manassas, and

on several other occasions during the existing war, as affording

the highest evidence of your skill as a commander, your

gallantry as a soldier, and your zeal as a patriot, you are

promoted to be a general in the army of the Confederate States

of America, and, with the consent of the Congress, will be duly

commissioned accordingly.

"Yours, etc.,

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis.

"General P. G. T. Beauregard, etc."

The 22d, the day after the battle, was spent in following up the line of

the retreating foe, and collecting the large supplies of arms, of

ammunition, and other military stores. The supplies of the army were on

a scale of such luxurious extravagance as to excite the surprise of

those accustomed only to our rigid economy. The anticipation of an easy

victory had caused many to come to the battle as to a joyous feast, and

the signs left behind them of the extent to which they had been

disappointed in the entertainment, constituted the staple of many

laughable stories, which were not without their value because of the

lesson they contained as to the uncertainties of war, and the

mortification that usually follows vain boasting. Among the articles

abandoned by the enemy in his flight were some which excited a just

indignation, and which indicated the shameless disregard of all the

usages of honorable warfare. They were handcuffs, the fit appendage of a

policeman, but not of a soldier who came to meet his foeman hilt to

hilt. These were reported to have been found in large numbers; some of

them were sent to Richmond.

On the night of the 22d I held a second conference with Generals

Johnston and Beauregard. All the revelations of the day were of the most

satisfactory character as to the completeness of our victory. The large

amount gained of fine artillery, small-arms, and ammunition, all of

which were much needed by us, was not the least gratifying consequence

of our success. The generals, like myself, were well content with what

had been done.

I propounded to them the inquiry as to what more it was practicable to

do. They concurred as to their inability to cross the Potomac, and to

the further inquiry as to an advance to the south side of the Potomac,

General Beauregard promptly stated that there were strong fortifications

there, occupied by garrisons, which had not been in the battle, and were

therefore not affected by the panic which had seized the defeated army.

He described those fortifications as having wide, deep ditches, with

palisades, which would prevent the escalade of the works. Turning to

General Johnston, he said, "They have spared no expense." It was further

stated in explanation that we had no sappers and miners, nor even the

tools requisite to make regular approaches. If we had possessed both,

the time required for such operations would have more than sufficed for

General Patterson's army and other forces to have been brought to that

locality in such numbers as must have rendered the attempt, with our

present means, futile.

This view of the matter rests on the supposition that the fortifications

and garrisons described did actually exist, of which there seemed then

to be no doubt. If the reports which have since reached us be true, that

there were at that time neither fortifications nor troops stationed on

the south bank of the Potomac; that all the enemy's forces fled to the

north side of the river, and even beyond; that the panic of the routed

army infected the whole population of Washington City; and that no

preparation was made, or even contemplated, for the destruction of the

bridge across the Potomac--then it may have been, as many have asserted,

that our army, following close upon the flying enemy, could have entered

and taken possession of the United States capital. These reports,

however, present a condition of affairs altogether at variance with the

information on which we had to act. Thus it was, and, so far as I knew,

for the reasons above stated, that an advance to the south bank of the

Potomac was not contemplated as the immediate sequence of the victory at

Manassas. What discoveries would have been made and what results would

have ensued from the establishment of our guns upon the south bank of

the river, to open fire upon the capital, are speculative questions upon

which it would be useless to enter.

After the conference of the 22d, and because of it, I decided to return

to Richmond and employ all the power of my office to increase the

strength of the army, so as the better to enable it to meet the public

need, whether in offensive-defensive or purely defensive operations, as

opportunity should offer for the one, or the renewal of invasion require

the other.

A short time subsequent to my return, a message was brought to me from

the prison, to the effect that a non-commissioned officer, captured at

Manassas, claimed to have a promise of protection from me. The name was

given Hulburt, of Connecticut. I had forgotten the name he gave when I

saw him; but, believing that I would recognize the person who had

attended to Colonel Gardner, and to whom only such a promise had been

given, the officer in charge was directed to send him to me. When he

came, I had no doubt of his identity, and explained to him that I had

directed that he should not be treated as a prisoner, but that, in the

multitude of those wearing the same uniform as his, some neglect or

mistake had arisen, for which I was very sorry, and that he should be

immediately released and sent down the river to the neighborhood of

Fortress Monroe, where he would be among his own people. He then told me

that he had a sister residing a few miles in the country, whom he would

be very glad to visit. Permission was given him to do so, and a time

fixed at which he was to report for transportation; and so he left, with

manifestations of thankfulness for the kindness with which he had been

treated. In due time a newspaper was received, containing an account of

his escape, and how he had lingered about the suburbs of Richmond and

made drawings of the surrounding fortifications. The treachery was as

great as if his drawings had been valuable, which they could not have

been, as we had only then commenced the detached works which were

designed as a system of defenses for Richmond.

When the smoke of battle had lifted from the field of Manassas, and the

rejoicing over the victory had spread over the land and spent its

exuberance, some, who, like Job's war-horse, "snuffed the battle from

afar," but in whom the likeness there ceased, censoriously asked why the

fruits of the victory had not been gathered by the capture of Washington

City. Then some indiscreet friends of the generals commanding in that

battle, instead of the easier task of justification, chose the harder

one of exculpation for the imputed failure. Their ill-advised zeal,

combined perhaps with malice against me, induced the allegation that the

President had prevented the generals from making an immediate and

vigorous pursuit of the routed enemy.

This, as other stories had been, was left to the correction which time

it was hoped would bring, the sooner because it was expected to be

refuted by the reports of the commanding generals with whom I had

conferred on that subject immediately after the battle.

After considerable time had elapsed, it was reported to me that a member

of Congress, who had served on that occasion as a volunteer aide to

General Beauregard, had stated in the House of Representatives that I

had prevented the pursuit of the enemy after his defeat at Manassas.

This gave to the rumor such official character and dignity as seemed to

me to entitle it to notice not theretofore given, wherefore I addressed

to General Johnston the following inquiry, which, though restricted in

its terms to the allegation, was of such tenor as left it to his option

to state all the facts connected with the slander, if he should choose

to do me that justice, or should see the public interest involved in the

correction, which, as stated in my letter to him, was that which gave it

in my estimation its claim to consideration, and had caused me to

address him on the subject:

"Richmond, Virginia, _November 3, 1861._

"General J. E. Johnston, _commanding Department of the Potomac._

"Sir: Reports have been, and are being, widely circulated to the

effect that I prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the

enemy after the battle of Manassas, and had subsequently

restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. Though such

statements may have been made merely for my injury, and in that

view might be postponed to a more convenient season, they have

acquired importance from the fact that they have served to

create distrust, to excite disappointment, and must embarrass

the Administration in its further efforts to reënforce the

armies of the Potomac, and generally to provide for the public

defense. For these public considerations, I call upon you, as

the commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences

held by me on the 21st and 22d of July, to say whether I

obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at

Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other active

operation which it was feasible for the army to undertake.

"Very respectfully, yours, etc.,

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

"Headquarters, Centreville, _November 10, 1861_.

"To his Excellency the President.

"Sir: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 3d

inst., in which you call upon me, 'as the commanding general,

and as a party to all the conferences held by you on the 21st

and 22d of July, to say whether you obstructed the pursuit after

the victory of Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or

other active operation which it was feasible for the army to

undertake?'

"To the first question I reply, No. The pursuit was 'obstructed'

by the enemy's troops at Centreville, as I have stated in my

official report. In that report I have also said why no advance

was made upon the enemy's capital (for reasons) as follows:

"The apparent freshness of the United States troops at

Centreville, which checked our pursuit; the strong forces

occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington, and Alexandria;

the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if needed, would

reach Washington with his army of more than thirty thousand

sooner than we could; and the condition and inadequate means of

the army in ammunition, provisions, and transportation,

prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the capital.

"To the second question I reply that it has never been feasible

for the army to advance farther than it has done--to the line of

Fairfax Court-House, with its advanced posts at Upton's,

Munson's, and Mason's Hills. After a conference at Fairfax

Court-House with the three senior general officers, you

announced it to be impracticable to give this army the strength

which those officers considered necessary to enable it to assume

the offensive. Upon which I drew it back to its present

position.

"Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed) "J. E. Johnston."

This answer to my inquiry was conclusive as to the charge which had been

industriously circulated that I had prevented the immediate pursuit of

the enemy, and had obstructed active operations after the battle of

Manassas, and thus had caused the failure to reap the proper fruits of

the victory.

No specific inquiry was made by me as to the part I took in the

conferences of the 21st and 22d of July, but a general reference was

made to them. The entire silence of General Johnston in regard to those

conferences is noticeable from the fact that, while his answer was

strictly measured by the terms of my inquiry as to pursuit, he added a

statement about a conference at Fairfax Court-House, which occurred in

the autumn, say October, and could have had no relation to the question

of pursuit of the enemy after the victory of Manassas, or other active

operations therewith connected. The reasons stated in my letter for

making an inquiry, naturally pointed to the conferences of the 21st and

22d of July, but surely not to a conference held months subsequent to

the battle, and on a question quite different from that of hot pursuit.

In regard to the matter of this subsequent conference I shall have more

to say hereafter.

I left the field of Manassas, proud of the heroism of our troops in

battle, and of the conduct of the officers who led them. Anxious to

recognize the claim of the army on the gratitude of the country, it was

my pleasing duty to bear testimony to their merit in every available

form. Those who left the field and did not return to share its glory, it

was wished, should only be remembered as exceptions proving a rule.

With all the information possessed at the time by the commanding

generals, the propriety of maintaining our position, while seeking

objects more easily attained than the capture of the United States

capital, seemed to me so demonstrable as to require no other

justification than the statements to which I have referred in connection

with the conference of the 22d of July. It would have seemed to me then,

as it does now, to be less than was due to the energy and fortitude of

our troops, to plead a want of transportation and supplies for a march

of about twenty miles through a country which had not then been denuded

by the ravages of war.

Under these impressions, and with such feelings, I wrote to General

Beauregard as follows:

"Richmond, Virginia, _August 4, 1861._

"General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia._

"My Dear Sir: ... I think you are unjust to yourself in putting

your failure to pursue the enemy to Washington to the account of

short supplies of subsistence and transportation. Under the

circumstances of our army, and in the absence of the knowledge

since acquired, if indeed the statements be true, it would have

been extremely hazardous to have done more than was performed.

You will not fail to remember that, so far from knowing that the

enemy was routed, a large part of our forces was moved by you,

in the night of the 21st, to repel a supposed attack upon our

right, and that the next day's operations did not fully reveal

what has since been reported of the enemy's panic. Enough was

done for glory, and the measure of duty was full; let us rather

show the untaught that their desires are unreasonable, than, by

dwelling on possibilities recently developed, give form and

substance to the criticisms always easy to those who judge after

the event.

"With sincere esteem, I am your friend,

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

I had declared myself content and gratified with the conduct of the

troops and the officers, and supposed the generals, in recognition of my

efforts to aid them by increasing their force and munitions, as well as

by my abstinence from all interference with them upon the field, would

have neither cause nor motive to reflect upon me in their reports, and

it was with equal surprise and regret that in this I found myself

mistaken. General Johnston, in his report, represented the order to him

to make a junction with General Beauregard as a movement left to his

discretion, with the condition that, if made, he should first send his

sick and baggage to Culpepper Court-House. I felt constrained to put

upon his report when it was received the following endorsement:

"The telegram referred to by General Johnston in this report as

received by him about one o'clock on the morning of the 18th of

July is inaccurately reported. The following is a copy:

"'Richmond, _July 17, 1861_.

"'General J. E. Johnston, _Winchester, Virginia_.

"'General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive

blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If

practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to

Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In

all the arrangements, exercise your discretion.

"'S. Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General_.'

"The word 'after' is not found in the dispatch before the words

'sending your sick,' as is stated in the report; so that the

argument based on it requires no comment. The order to move 'if

practicable' had reference to General Johnston's letters of the

12th and 15th of July, representing the relative strength and

positions of the enemy under Patterson and of his own forces to

be such as to make it doubtful whether General Johnston had the

power to effect the movement."

Upon the receipt of General Beauregard's report of the battle of

Manassas, I found that it contained matter which seemed to me out of

place, and therefore addressed to him the following letter:

"Richmond, Virginia, _October 30, 1861_.

"General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia_.

"Sir: Yesterday my attention was called to various newspaper

publications purporting to have been sent from Manassas, and to

be a synopsis of your report of the battle of the 21st of July

last, and in which it is represented that you have been

overruled by me in your plan for a battle with the enemy south

of the Potomac, for the capture of Baltimore and Washington, and

the liberation of Maryland.

"I inquired for your long-expected report, and it has been

to-day submitted to my inspection. It appears, by official

endorsement, to have been received by the Adjutant-General on

the 18th of October, though it is dated August 26, 1861.

"With much surprise I found that the newspaper statements were

sustained by the text of your report. I was surprised, because,

if we did differ in opinion as to the measure and purposes of

contemplated campaigns, such fact could have no appropriate

place in the report of a battle; further, because it seemed to

be an attempt to exalt yourself at my expense; and, especially,

because no such plan as that described was submitted to me. It

is true that, some time before it was ordered, you expressed a

desire for the junction of General Johnston's army with your

own. The movement was postponed until the operations of the

enemy rendered it necessary, and until it became thereby

practicable to make it with safety to the Valley of Virginia.

Hence, I believe, was secured the success by which it was

attended.

"If you have retained a copy of the plan of campaign which you

say was submitted to me through Colonel Chesnut, allow me to

request that you will furnish me with a duplicate of it."

"Very respectfully yours, etc.,"

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

As General Beauregard did not think proper to omit that portion of his

report to which objection was made, it necessitated, when the entire

report was transmitted to Congress, the placing of an endorsement upon

it, reviewing that part of the report which I considered objectionable.

The Congress, in its discretion, ordered the publication of the report,

except that part to which the endorsement referred, thereby judiciously

suppressing both the endorsement and the portion of the report to which

it related. In this case, and _every other_ official report ever

submitted to me, I made neither alteration nor erasure.

That portion of the report which was suppressed by the Congress has,

since the war, found its way into the press, but the endorsement which

belonged to it has not been published. As part of the history of the

time, I will here present both in their proper connection:

"General S. Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond

Virginia._

"Before entering upon a narration of the general military

operations in the presence of the enemy on July 21st, I

propose--I hope not unreasonably--first to recite certain events

which belong to the strategy of the campaign, and consequently

form an essential part of the history of the battle.

"Having become satisfied that the advance of the enemy with a

decidedly superior force, both as to numbers and war equipage,

to attack or turn my position in this quarter was immediately

impending, I dispatched, on July 13th, one of my staff, Colonel

James Chesnut, of South Carolina, to submit for the

consideration of the President a plan of operations

substantially as follows:

"I proposed that General Johnston should unite, as soon as

possible, the bulk of the Army of the Shenandoah with that of

the Potomac, then under my command, leaving only sufficient

force to garrison his strong works at Winchester, and to guard

the five defensive passes of the Blue Ridge, and thus hold

Patterson in check. At the same time Brigadier-General Holmes

was to march hither with all of his command not essential for

the defense of the position of Acquia Creek. These junctions

having been effected at Manassas, an immediate, impetuous attack

of our combined armies upon General McDowell was to follow, as

soon as he approached my advanced position, at and around

Fairfax Court-House, with the inevitable result, as I submitted,

of his complete defeat, and the destruction or capture of his

army. This accomplished, the Army of the Shenandoah, under

General Johnston, increased with a part of my forces and

rejoined as he returned by the detachment left to hold the

mountain-passes, was to march back rapidly into the Valley, fall

upon and crush Patterson with a superior force, wheresoever he

might be found. This, I confidently estimated, could be achieved

within fifteen days after General Johnston should march from

Winchester for Manassas.

"Meanwhile, I was to occupy the enemy's works on this side of

the Potomac, if, as I anticipated, he had been so routed as to

enable me to enter them with him or, if not, to retire again for

a time within the lines of Bull Run with my main force.

Patterson having been virtually destroyed, then General Johnston

would reënforce General Garnett sufficiently to make him

superior to his opponent (General McClellan) and able to defeat

that officer. This done, General Garnett was to form an

immediate junction with General Johnston, who was forthwith to

cross the Potomac into Maryland with his whole force, arouse the

people as he advanced to the recovery of their political rights,

and the defense of their homes and families from an offensive

invader, and then march to the investment of Washington, in the

rear, while I resumed the offensive in front. This plan of

operations, you are aware, was not acceptable at the time, from

considerations which appeared so weighty as to more than

counterbalance its proposed advantages. Informed of these views,

and of the decision of the War Department, I then made my

preparations for the stoutest practicable defense of the line of

Bull Run, the enemy having developed his purpose, by the advance

on and occupation of Fairfax Court-House, from which my advance

brigade had been withdrawn.

"The War Department having been informed by me, by telegraph on

July 17th, of the movement of General McDowell, General Johnston

was immediately ordered to form a junction of his army corps

with mine, should the movement in his judgment be deemed

advisable. General Holmes was also directed to push forward with

two regiments, a battery, and one company of cavalry."[179]

"ENDORSEMENT.

"The order issued by the War Department to General Johnston was

not, as herein reported, to form a junction, 'should the

movement in his judgment be deemed advisable.' The following is

an accurate copy of the order:

"'General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive

blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If

practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to

Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In

all the arrangements, exercise your discretion.'

"The words 'if practicable' had reference to letters of General

Johnston of the 12th and 15th of July, which made it extremely

doubtful if he had the power to make the movement, in view of

the relative strength and position of Patterson's forces as

compared with his own.

"The plan of campaign reported to have been submitted, but not

accepted, and to have led to a decision of the War Department,

can not be found among its files, nor any reference to any

decision made upon it; and it was not known that the army had

advanced beyond the line of Bull Run, the position previously

selected by General Lee, and which was supposed to have

continued to be the defensive line occupied by the main body of

our forces. Inquiry has developed the fact that a message, to be

verbally delivered, was sent by Hon. Mr. Chesnut. If the

conjectures recited in the report were entertained, they rested

on the accomplishment of one great condition, namely, that a

junction of the forces of Generals Johnston and Holmes should be

made with the army of General Beauregard and should gain a

victory. The junction was made, the victory was won; but the

consequences that were predicted did not result. The reasons why

no such consequences could result are given in the closing

passages of the reports of both the commanding generals, and the

responsibility can not be transferred to the Government at

Richmond, which certainly would have united in any feasible plan

to accomplish such desirable results.

"If the plan of campaign mentioned in the report had been

presented in a written communication, and in sufficient detail

to permit proper investigation, it must have been pronounced to

be impossible at that time, and its proposal could only have

been accounted for by the want of information of the forces and

positions of the armies in the field. The facts that rendered it

impossible are the following:

"1. It was based, as related from memory by Colonel Chesnut, on

the supposition of drawing a force of about twenty-five thousand

men from the command of General Johnston. The letters of General

Johnston show his effective force to have been only eleven

thousand, with an enemy thirty thousand strong in his front,

ready to take possession of the Valley of Virginia on his

withdrawal.

"2. It proposed to continue operations by effecting a junction

of a part of the victorious forces with the army of General

Garnett in Western Virginia. General Garnett's forces amounted

only to three or four thousand men, then known to be in rapid

retreat before vastly superior forces under McClellan, and the

news that he was himself killed and his army scattered arrived

within forty-eight hours of Colonel Chesnut's arrival in

Richmond.

"3. The plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible

supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and

motionless, until our forces could effect junctions to attack

them in detail.

"4. It could not be expected that any success obtainable on the

battle-field would enable our forces to carry the fortifications

on the Potomac, garrisoned, and within supporting distance of

fresh troops; nor after the actual battle and victory did the

generals on the field propose an advance on the capital, nor

does it appear that they have since believed themselves in a

condition to attempt such a movement.

"It is proper also to observe that there is no communication on

file in the War Department, as recited at the close of the

report, showing what were the causes which prevented the advance

of our forces and prolonged, vigorous pursuit of the enemy to

and beyond the Potomac.

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

It has not been my purpose to describe the battles of the war. To the

reports of the officers serving on the field, in the armies of both

Governments, the student of history must turn for knowledge of the

details, and it will be the task of the future historian, from

comparison of the whole, to deduce the truth.

It is fortunate for the cause of justice that error and

misrepresentation have, in their inconsistencies and improbabilities,

the elements of self-destruction, while truth is in its nature

consistent and therefore self-sustaining. To such general remarks in

regard to campaigns, sieges, and battles as may seem to me appropriate

to the scope and object of my work, I shall append or insert, from time

to time, the evidence of reliable actors in those affairs, as well to

elucidate obscurity as to correct error.

From the official reports it appears that the strength of the two armies

was: Confederate, 30,167 men of all arms, with 29 guns;[180] Federal,

35,732 men,[181] with a body of cavalry, of which only one company is

reported, and a large artillery force not shown in the tabular

statement. Of these troops, some on both sides were not engaged in the

battle. This, it is believed, was the case to a much larger extent on

our side than on that of the enemy. He selected the point of attack, and

could concentrate his troops for that purpose, but we were guarding a

line of some seven miles front, and therefore widely dispersed.

For the purpose above stated, extracts are herein inserted from a

narrative in the "Operations on the Line of Bull Run in June and July,

1861, including the First Battle of Manassas." The name of the author,

J. A. Early, will, to all who know him, be a sufficient guarantee for

the accuracy of the statements, and for the justice of the conclusions

announced. To those who do not know him, it may be proper to state that

he was educated as a soldier; after leaving the army became a lawyer,

but, when his country was involved in war with Mexico, he volunteered

and served in a regiment of his native State, Virginia. After that war

terminated, he returned to the practice of his profession, which he was

actively pursuing when the controversy between the sections caused the

call of a convention to decide whether Virginia should secede from the

Union. He was sent, by the people of the county in which he resided, to

represent them in that convention. There he opposed to the last the

adoption of the ordinance for secession; but, when it was decided,

against his opinion, to resort to the remedy of withdrawal from the

Union, he, true to his allegiance to the State of which he was a

citizen, paused not to cavil or protest, but at once stepped forth to

defend her against a threatened invasion. The sword that had rusted in

peace gleamed brightly in war. He rose to the high grade of

lieutenant-general. None have a more stainless record as a soldier, none

have shown a higher patriotism or purer fidelity through all the bitter

trials to which we have been subjected since open war was ended and

nominal peace began.

Extracts from the narrative of General J. A. Early, of events occurring

when he was colonel of the Twenty-fourth Regiment of Virginia Infantry

and commanding a brigade:

"On June 19, 1861, I arrived at Manassas Junction and reported

to General P. G. T. Beauregard, the Twenty-fourth Virginia

Regiment having been previously sent to him, under the command

of Lieutenant-Colonel Hairsten, from Lynchburg, where I had been

stationed under the orders of General Robert E. Lee, for the

purpose of organizing the Virginia troops which were being

mustered into service at that place....

"On the morning of July 18th, my brigade was moved, by order of

General Beauregard, to the left of Camp Walker, on the railroad,

and remained there some time....

"On falling back, General Ewell, in pursuance of his

instructions, had burned the bridges on the railroad over Pope's

Run, from Fairfax Station to Union Mills, and while I was at

Camp Walker I saw the smoke ascending from the railroad-bridge

over Bull Run, which was burned that morning.

"The burning of this bridge had not been included in the

previous instructions to Ewell, and I have always been at a loss

to know why it was now fired. That bridge certainly was not

necessary to the enemy for crossing Bull Run, either with his

troops or wagons, as that stream was easily fordable at numerous

places, both above and below. The bridge was, moreover,

susceptible of easy defense, as there were deep cuts leading to

it on both sides. The only possible purpose to be subserved by

the burning of that bridge would have been the prevention for a

short time of the running of trains over it by the enemy, in the

event of our defeat, or evacuation of Manassas without a fight.

As it was, we were afterward greatly inconvenienced by its

destruction." ...

The attack made on the 18th is described as directed against our right

center, and as having been met and repulsed in a manner quite creditable

to our raw troops, of whom he writes:

"On the 19th they were occupied in the effort to strengthen

their position by throwing up the best defenses they could with

the implements at hand, which consisted of a very few picks and

spades, some rough bowie-knives, and the bayonets of the

muskets.... The position was a very weak one, as the banks on

the opposite side of Bull Run overlooked and commanded those on

the south side, which were but a few feet above the water's

edge, and there was an open field in rear of the strip of woods

on our side of the stream, for a considerable distance up and

down it, which exposed all of our movements on that side to

observation from the opposite one, as the strip of woods

afforded but a thin veil which could be seen through....

"About dusk on the 19th, brigade commanders were summoned to a

conference at McLean's house by General Beauregard, and he then

informed us of the fact that General Johnston had been ordered,

at his instance, from the Valley, and was marching to coöperate

with us. He stated that Johnston would march directly across the

Blue Ridge toward the enemy's right flank, and would probably

attack on that flank at dawn the next morning. Before he had

finished his statement of the plans he proposed pursuing in the

event of Johnston's attack on the enemy's right flank, a party

of horsemen rode up in front of the house, and, dismounting, one

of them walked in and reported himself as Brigadier-General T.

J. Jackson, who had arrived with the advanced brigade of

Johnston's troops by the way of Manassas Gap Railroad, and he

stated that his brigade was about twenty-five hundred strong.

This information took General Beauregard very much by surprise,

and, after ascertaining that General Jackson had taken the cars

at Piedmont Station, General Beauregard asked him if General

Johnston would not march the rest of his command on the direct

road, so as to get on the enemy's right flank. General Jackson

replied with some little hesitation, and, as I thought at the

time, in rather a stolid manner, that he thought not; that he

thought the purpose was to transport the whole force by railroad

from Piedmont Station. This was the first time I ever saw

General Jackson, and my first impressions of him were not very

favorable from the manner in which he gave his information. I

subsequently ascertained very well how it was that he seemed to

know so little, in the presence of the strangers among whom he

found himself, of General Johnston's intended movements, and I

presume nothing but the fact of General Beauregard being his

superior in rank, and his being ordered to report to him, could

have elicited as much information from him, under the

circumstances, as was obtained. After General Jackson had given

the information above stated, and received instructions where to

put his brigade, he retired, and General Beauregard proceeded to

develop fully his plans for the next day. The information

received from General Jackson was wholly unexpected, but General

Beauregard said he thought Jackson was not correctly informed,

and was mistaken; that he was satisfied General Johnston was

marching with the rest of his troops and would attack the

enemy's right flank early next day as he had before stated. Upon

this hypothesis, he directed that when General Johnston's attack

began and he had become fully engaged, of which we were to judge

from the character of the musketry-fire, we should cross Bull

Run from our several positions, and move upon the enemy so as to

attack him on his left flank and rear. He said that he had no

doubt General Johnston's attack would be a complete surprise to

the enemy; that the latter would not know what to think of it;

that when he turned to meet that attack, and soon found himself

assailed on the other side, he would be still more surprised and

would not know what to do; that the effect would become a

complete rout--a perfect Waterloo; and that, when the enemy took

to flight, we would pursue, cross the Potomac, and arouse

Maryland....

"During the 20th General Johnston arrived at Manassas Junction

by the railroad, and that day we received the order from him

assuming command of the combined armies of General Beauregard

and himself.

"Early on the morning of the 21st (Sunday), we heard the enemy's

guns open from the heights north of Bull Run, from which they

had opened on the 18th, and I soon received orders for the

movement of my brigade....

"Upon arriving there (McLean's Ford), I found General Jones had

returned to the intrenchments with his brigade, and I was

informed by him that General Beauregard had directed that I

should join him (General Beauregard) with my brigade.... He then

asked me if I had received an order from General Beauregard to

go to him, and, on my replying in the negative, he informed me

that he had such an order for me in a note to him. He sent to

one of his staff-officers for the note, and showed it to me. The

note was one directing him to fall back behind Bull Run, and was

in pencil. At the foot of it were these words: 'Send Early to

me.' This was all the order that I received to move to the left,

and it was shown to me a very little after twelve o'clock....

Chisholm, who carried the note to Jones, in which was contained

the order I received, passed me at McLean's Ford going on to

Jones about, or a little after, eleven o'clock. If I had not

received the order until 2 P. M., it would have been impossible

for me to get on the field at the time I reached it, about 3.30

P. M. Colonel Chisholm informed me that the order was for all

the troops to fall back across Bull Run.... I was met by Colonel

John S. Preston, one of the General's aides, who informed me

that General Beauregard had gone where the fighting was ... but

that General Johnston was just in front, and his directions were

that we should proceed to the left, where there was a heavy fire

of musketry.... When we reached General Johnston, he expressed

great gratification at our arrival, but it was very perceptible

that his anticipations were not sanguine. He gave me special

instructions as to my movements, directing me to clear our lines

completely before going to the front.... In some fields on the

left of our line we found Colonel Stuart with a body of cavalry

and some pieces of artillery, belonging, as I understood, to a

battery commanded by Lieutenant Beckham.... I found Stuart

already in position beyond our extreme left, and, as I

understood it, supporting and controlling Beckham's guns, which

were firing on the enemy's extreme right flank, thus rendering

very efficient service. I feel well assured that Stuart had but

_two_ companies of cavalry with him, as these were all I saw

when he afterward went in pursuit of the enemy. As I approached

the left, a young man named Saunders came galloping to me from

Stuart with the information that the enemy was about retreating,

and a request to hurry on. This was the first word of

encouragement we had received since we reached the vicinity of

the battle. I told the messenger to inform Stuart that I was

then moving as rapidly as my men could move; but he soon

returned with another message informing me that the other was a

mistake, that the enemy had merely retired behind the ridge in

front to form a new flanking column, and cautioning me to be on

my guard. This last information proved to be correct. It was the

last effort of the enemy to extend his right beyond our left,

and was met by the formation of my regiments in his front....

The hill on which the enemy's troops were was Chinn's Hill, so

often referred to in the accounts of this battle, and the one

next year, on the same field.... An officer came to me in a

gallop, and entreated me not to fire on the troops in front, and

I was so much impressed by his earnest manner and confident

tone, that I halted my brigade on the side of the hill, and rode

to the top of it, when I discovered, about a hundred and fifty

yards to my right, a regiment bearing a flag which was drooping

around the staff in such a manner as not to be distinguishable

from the Confederate flag of that day. I thought that, if the

one that had been in front of me was a Virginia regiment, this

must also be a Confederate one; but one or two shots from

Beckham's guns on the left caused the regiment to face about,

when its flag unfurled, and I discovered it to be the United

States flag. I forthwith ordered my brigade forward, but it did

not reach the top of the hill soon enough to do any damage to

the retiring regiment, which retreated precipitately down the

hill and across the Warrenton Pike. At that time there was very

little distinction between the dress of some of the Federal

regiments and some of ours. As soon as the misrepresentation in

regard to the character of the troops was corrected, my brigade

advanced to the top of the hill that had been occupied by the

enemy, and we ascertained that his troops had retired

precipitately, and a large body of them was discovered in the

fields in rear of Dogan's house, and north of the turnpike.

Colonel Cocke, with one of his regiments, now joined us, and our

pieces of artillery were advanced and fired upon the enemy's

columns with considerable effect, causing them to disperse, and

we soon discovered that they were in full retreat.... When my

column was seen by General Beauregard, he at first thought it

was a column of the enemy, having received erroneous information

that such a column was on the Manassas Gap Railroad. The enemy

took my troops, as they approached his right, for a large body

of our troops from the Valley; and as my men, moving by flank,

were stretched out at considerable length, from weariness, they

were greatly over-estimated. We scared the enemy worse than we

hurt him....

"We saw the evidences of the flight all along our march, and

unmistakable indications of the overwhelming character of the

enemy's defeat in abandoned muskets and equipments. It was

impossible for me to pursue the enemy farther, as well because I

was utterly unacquainted with the crossings of the Run and the

woods in front, as because most of the men belonging to my

brigade had been marching the greater part of the day and were

very much exhausted. But pursuit with infantry would have been

unavailing, as the enemy's troops retreated with such rapidity

that they could not have been overtaken by any other than

mounted troops. On the next day we found a great many articles

that the routed troops had abandoned in their flight, showing

that no expense or trouble had been spared by the enemy in

equipping his army.... In my movement after the retreat of the

enemy commenced, I passed the Carter house and beyond our line

of battle. The enemy had by this time entirely disappeared, and,

having no knowledge of the country whatever, being on the ground

for the first time, besides not observing any movement of troops

from our line, I halted, with the expectation of receiving

further orders. Observing some men near the Carter house, I rode

to it, and found some five or six Federal soldiers, who had

collected some wounded there of both sides, and among them

Colonel Gardner, of the Eighth Georgia Regiment, who was

suffering from a very painful wound in the leg, which was

fractured just above the ankle.... Just after my return from the

house where I saw Colonel Gardner, President Davis, in company

with several gentlemen, rode to where my command was, and

addressed a few stirring remarks to my regiments, in succession,

which received him with great enthusiasm.

"I briefly informed Mr. Davis of the orders I had received, and

the movements of my brigade, and asked him what I should do

under the circumstances. He told me that I had better get my men

into line, and wait for further orders. I then requested him to

inform Generals Johnston and Beauregard of my position, and my

desire to receive orders. I also informed him of the condition

in which I had found Colonel Gardner, and also of Colonel Jones

being in the neighborhood badly wounded, requesting him to have

a surgeon sent to their relief, as all of mine were in the rear

attending to the wounded of their regiments. While we were

talking, we saw a body of troops moving on the opposite side of

Bull Run, some distance below us.

"Mr. Davis then left me, going to the house where Colonel

Gardner was, and I moved my brigade some half a mile farther,

and formed it in line across the peninsula formed by a very

considerable bend in Bull Run above the stone bridge. I put out

a line of pickets in front, and my brigade bivouacked in this

position for the night. By the time all these dispositions were

made it was night, and I then rode back with Captain Gardner

over the route I had moved on, as I knew no other, in order to

find General Johnston or General Beauregard, so that I might

receive orders, supposing that there would be a forward movement

early in the morning. I first went to the Lewis house, which I

found to be a hospital filled with wounded men; but was unable

to get any information about either of the generals. I then rode

toward Manassas, and, after going some distance in that

direction, I met an officer who inquired for General Johnston,

stating that he was on his staff. I informed him that I was

looking for General Johnston also, as well as for General

Beauregard, and supposed they were at Manassas; but he said that

he was just from Manassas, and neither of the generals was

there.... At about twelve o'clock at night I lay down in the

field in rear of my command, on a couple of bundles of wheat in

the straw. My men had no rations with them. I had picked up a

haversack on the field, which was filled with hard biscuits, and

had been dropped by some Yankee in his flight, and out of its

contents I made my own supper, distributing the rest among a

number of officers who had nothing.

"Very early next morning, I sent Captain Gardner to look out for

the generals, and get orders for my command. He went to

Manassas, and found General Beauregard, who sent orders to me to

remain where I was until further orders, and to send for the

camp-equipage, rations, etc., of my command. A number of the men

spread over the country in the vicinity of the battlefield, and

picked up a great many knapsacks, India-rubber cloths, blankets,

overcoats, etc., as well as a good deal of sugar, coffee, and

other provisions that had been abandoned by the enemy....

"After I had received orders showing that there was no purpose

to make a forward movement, I rode over a good deal of the

field, north of the Warrenton pike, and to some hospitals in the

vicinity, in order to see what care was being taken of the

wounded. I found a hospital on the Sudley road, back of the

field of battle, at which Colonel Jones, of the Fourth Alabama,

had been, which was in charge of a surgeon of a Rhode Island

regiment, whose name was Harris, I think. I asked him if he had

what he wanted for the men under his care, and he told me he

would like to have some morphine, of which his supply was short.

I directed a young surgeon of our cavalry, who rode up at the

time, to furnish the morphine, which he did, from a pair of

medical saddle-pockets which he had. Dr. Harris told me that he

knew that their troops had had a great deal of coffee and sugar

mixed, ready for boiling, of which a good deal had been left at

different points near the field, and asked if there would be any

objection to his sending out and gathering some of it for the

use of the wounded under his charge, as it would be of much

service to them. I gave him the permission to get not only that,

but anything else that would tend to the comfort of his

patients. There did not come within my observation any instance

of harsh or unkind treatment of the enemy's wounded; nor did I

see any indication of a spirit to extend such treatment to them.

The stories which were afterward told before the Committee on

the Conduct of the War (appointed by the Federal Congress), in

regard to 'rebel atrocities,' were very grossly exaggerated, or

manufactured from the whole cloth....

"On the night following the battle, when I was looking for

Generals Beauregard and Johnston, in riding over and to the rear

of the battle-field, I discovered that the greater part of the

troops that had been engaged in the battle were in a great state

of confusion. I saw companies looking for their regiments, and

squads looking for their companies, and they were scattered as

far as I went toward Manassas. It was very apparent that no

considerable body of those troops that had been engaged on the

left could have been brought into a condition next day for an

advance toward Washington....

"The dispute as to who planned the battle, or commanded on the

field, General Johnston or General Beauregard, is a most

unprofitable one. The battle which General Beauregard planned

was never fought, because the enemy did not move as he expected

him to move. The battle which was fought was planned by

McDowell, at least so far as the ground on which it was fought

was concerned. He made a movement on our left which was wholly

unexpected and unprovided for, and we were compelled to fight a

defensive battle on that flank, by bringing up reënforcements

from other points as rapidly as possible. When Generals Johnston

and Beauregard arrived on the field where the battle was

actually fought, it had been progressing for some time, with the

odds greatly against us. What was required then was to rally the

troops already engaged, which had been considerably shattered,

and hold the position to which they had been compelled to retire

until reënforcements could be brought up. According to the

statements of both generals, the command of the troops then on

the field was given to General Beauregard, and he continued to

exercise it until the close, but in subordination, of course, to

General Johnston, as commander-in-chief, while the movements of

all the reënforcements as they arrived were unquestionably

directed by the latter. According to the statement of both, the

movement of Elzey's brigade to the left averted a great danger,

and both concur in attributing the turning of the tide of battle

to the movement of my brigade against the enemy's extreme right

flank (General Beauregard in a letter on the origin of the

battle-flag, and General Johnston in his 'Narrative' recently

published).

"General Beauregard unquestionably performed the duty assigned

him with great ability, and General Johnston gives him full

credit therefor. Where, then, is there any room for a

controversy in regard to the actual command, and what profit can

there be in it?

"General Johnston assumes the responsibility for the failure to

advance on Washington, and why, then, should an effort be made

to shift it on any one else? He certainly was

commander-in-chief, and had the privilege of advancing if he

thought proper. The attempt to show that the failure to advance

was due to the want of transportation and rations for the army

is idle. If the Bull Run bridge had not been burned on the 18th,

our supplies could have been run to Alexandria, if we could have

advanced, as easily as to Manassas, for the enemy had repaired

the railroad to Fairfax Station as he moved up, and failed to

destroy it when he went back. Moreover, we had abundant

transportation at that time for all the purposes of an advance

as far as Washington. In my brigade, the two Virginia regiments

had about fourteen six-horse wagons each, and that would have

furnished enough for the brigade, if the Seventh Louisiana had

none. In 1862 we carried into Maryland only enough wagons to

convey ammunition, medical supplies, and cooking-utensils, and

we started from the battle-field of second Manassas with no

rations on hand, being, before we crossed the Potomac, entirely

dependent on the country, which, in July, 1861, was teeming with

supplies, but in August and September, 1862, was nearly

depleted. The pretense, therefore, that the advance in July,

1861, was prevented by the want of transportation and of

supplies is wholly untenable."

I will now make the promised extracts from reminiscences of Colonel

(then Captain) Lay, which were sent to a friend, and handed to me for my

use. The paper bears date February 13, 1878. After some preliminary

matter, and stating that his force consisted of three cavalry companies,

the narrative proceeds:

"I was under orders to be in the saddle at 6.30 A. M., July 21,

1861, and to report immediately to General Beauregard at his

headquarters. About 7.30 A. M. I accompanied him and General

Johnston to a position near to Mitchell's Ford, where for some

hours we remained under an active fire of the long-range guns of

the enemy upon the opposite hills. When the unexpected flank

movement of the enemy was developed, with the generals named, we

rode at rapid speed to the left, when General Beauregard

immediately rode to the front, General Johnston taking position

near and to the left of the Lewis house.... About 3.15 P. M.,

Captain R. Lindsey Walker, with his battery, took position to

the left and in front of the Lewis house and commenced firing. I

was near him when the shot from his battery was fired, and

watched its effect as it swept through the columns of the enemy,

producing perfect confusion and demoralization.... I rode to

join my brother, Colonel Lay, whom I saw going toward my command

from General Johnston. He reported to me that General Johnston

said: 'Now is your time; push the pursuit.' I started at once on

a trot, was passing General Johnston, who gave some orders, and

I understood him to say, 'Salute the President in passing.' ...

I saluted, and passed on at a gallop.

"I halted at Bull Run to water my horses--then suffering--and to

confer a moment or two with my gallant old commander, General

Philip St. George Cocke.

"I passed on, ... when to my astonishment I saw the President

near me in the orchard. I immediately rode up to him, and said

that he was much farther forward than he should be; that the

forces of the enemy were not entirely broken, and very few of

our troops in front of the Run, and advised him to retire; that

I was then about to charge....

"We made the charge; a small body of the enemy broke before we

reached them, and scattered, and the larger body of troops

beyond proved to be of our own troops rapidly advancing upon our

left.... After parting from the President, I pushed on to Sudley

Church, and far beyond. Sent my surgeon, Dr. Randolph Barksdale,

to Captains Tillinghast, Ricketts, and other badly wounded

United States officers, and was going on until a superior force

should stop me, but was recalled by an order and returned over

the field to my quarters at Manassas a little before daylight--I

and my little gallant squadron--having been actively in the

saddle, I think, more than twenty hours....

(Signed) "John F. Lay,

_"Late Colonel of Cavalry, C. S. A._

"N.B.: It may be well to add that General R. Lindsey Walker

(then Captain Walker, of the battery referred to) is now in my

office, and confirms my recollection.... J. F. L."

The quartermaster-general of General Beauregard's command, W. L. Cabell,

states in a letter written at Dallas, Texas, on the 16th of August,

1880, in regard to the field transportation of General Beauregard's

forces before the battle of Manassas, that as nearly as he could

remember it was as follows, viz.:

One four-horse wagon to each company.

One " " " for field and staff (regimental).

One " " " " ammunition.

One " " " " hospital purposes.

Two " " wagons " each battery of artillery.

Twenty-five wagons in a train for depot purposes.

One ambulance for each regiment.

Transportation belonging to General Johnston's army did not arrive until

the day (or probably two days) after the battle.

If General Johnston, as stated, had nine thousand infantry, the field

transportation reported above could surely have been distributed so as

to supply this additional force, and have rendered, as General Early

states, the pretense wholly untenable that the advance in July, 1861,

was prevented by want of transportation.

The deep anxiety which had existed, and was justified by the

circumstances, had corresponding gratification among all classes and in

all sections of our country. On the day after the victory, the Congress,

then sitting in Richmond, upon receiving the dispatch of the President

from the field of Manassas, adopted resolutions expressive of their

thanks to the most high God, and inviting the people of the Confederate

States to offer up their united thanksgiving and praise for the mighty

deliverance. The resolutions also deplored the necessity which had

caused the soil of our country to be stained with the blood of its sons,

and to their families and friends offered the most cordial sympathy;

assuring them that in the hearts of our people would be enshrined "the

names of the gallant dead as the champions of free and constitutional

liberty."

If universal gratulation at our success inspired an overweening

confidence, it also begat increased desire to enter the military

service; and, but for our want of arms and munitions, we could have

enrolled an army little short of the number of able-bodied men in the

Confederate States.

I have given so much space to the battle of Manassas because it was the

first great action of the war, exciting intense feeling, and producing

important moral results among the people of the Confederacy; and

further, because it was made the basis of misrepresentation, and unjust

reflection upon the chief Executive, which certainly had no plausible

pretext in the facts, and can not be referred to a reasonable desire to

promote the successful defense of our country.

Impressed with the conviction that time would naturally work to our

disadvantage, as training was more necessary to make soldiers of the

Northern people than of our own; and further, because of their larger

population, as well as their greater facility in obtaining recruits from

foreign countries, the Administration continued assiduously to exert

every faculty to increase the efficiency of the army by addition to its

numbers, by improving its organization, and by supplying the needful

munitions and equipments. Inactivity is the prolific source of evil to

an army, especially if composed of new levies, who, like ours, had

hurried from their homes at their country's call. For these, and other

reasons more readily appreciated, it was thought desirable that all our

available forces should be employed as actively as might be practicable.

On the 1st of August, 1861, I wrote to General J. E. Johnston, at

Manassas, as follows:

"We are anxiously looking for the official reports of the battle

of Manassas, and have present need to know what supplies and

wagons were captured. I wish you would have prepared a statement

of your wants in transportation and supplies of all kinds, to

put your army on a proper footing for active operations....

"I am, as ever, your friend,

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

[Footnote 179: The foregoing was copied from "The Land we Love," for

February, 1867 (vol. ii, No. 4).]

[Footnote 180: General Beauregard's report.]

[Footnote 181: General McDowell's return, July 16, 17, 1861.]

CHAPTER VIII.

The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-'99.--Their Influence on

Political Affairs.--Kentucky declares for

Neutrality.--Correspondence of Governor Magoffin with the

President of the United States and the President of the

Confederate States.--Occupation of Columbus, Kentucky, by

Major-General Polk.--His Correspondence with the Kentucky

Commissioners.--President Lincoln's View of Neutrality.--Acts of

the United States Government.--Refugees.--Their Motives of

Expatriation.--Address of ex-Vice-President Breckinridge to the

People of the State.--The Occupation of Columbus secured.--The

Purpose of the United States Government.--Battle of

Belmont.--Albert Sidney Johnston commands the Department.--State

of Affairs.--Line of Defense.-Efforts to obtain Arms; also

Troops.

Kentucky, the eldest daughter of Virginia, had moved contemporaneously

with her mother in the assertion of the cardinal principles announced in

the resolutions of 1798-'99. She then by the properly constituted

authority did with due solemnity declare that the Government of the

United States was the result of a compact between the States to which

each acceded as a State; that it possessed only delegated powers, of

which it was not the exclusive or final judge; and that, as in all cases

of compact among parties having no common judge, "each party has an

equal right to judge for itself as well of infractions as of the mode

and measure of redress." Thus spoke Kentucky in the first years of her

existence as a sovereign. The great truth announced in her series of

resolutions was the sign under which the Democracy conquered in 1800,

and which constituted the corner-stone of the political edifice of which

Jefferson was the architect, and which stood unshaken for sixty years

from the time its foundation was laid. During this period, the growth,

prosperity, and happiness of the country seemed unmistakably to confirm

the wisdom of the voluntary union of free sovereign States under a

written compact confining the action of the General Government to the

expressly enumerated powers which had been delegated therein. When

infractions of the compact had been deliberately and persistently made,

when the intent was clearly manifested to pervert the powers of the

General Government from the purposes for which they had been conferred,

and to use them for the injury of a portion of the States, which were

the integral parties to the compact, some of them resolved to judge for

themselves of the "mode and measure of redress," and to exercise the

right, enunciated in the Declaration of Independence to be the

unalienable endowment of every people, to alter or abolish any form of

government, and to institute a new one, "laying its foundation on such

principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall

seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." By no rational

mode of construction, in view of the history of the Declaration of

Independence, or of the resolutions of Kentucky, can it be claimed that

the word "people" had any other meaning than that of a distinct

community, such as the people of each colony who by their delegates in

the Congress declared themselves to be henceforth a State; and that none

other than the people of each State could, by the resolutions of

1798-'99, have been referred to as the final judge of infractions of

their compact, and of the remedy which should be applied.

Kentucky made no decision adverse to this right of a State, but she

declared, in the impending conflict between the States seceding from and

those adhering to the Federal Government, that she would hold the

position of neutrality. If the question was to be settled by a war of

words, that was feasible; but, if the conflict was to be one of arms, it

was utterly impracticable. To maintain neutrality under such

circumstances would have required a power greater than that of both the

contestants, or a moral influence commanding such respect for her wishes

as could hardly have been anticipated from that party which had, in

violation of right, inflicted the wrongs which produced the withdrawal

of some of the States, and had uttered multiplied threats of coercion if

any State attempted to exercise the rights defined in the resolutions of

1798-'99. If, however, any such hope may have been entertained, but few

moons had filled and waned before the defiant occupation of her

territory and the enrollment of her citizens as soldiers in the army of

invasion must have dispelled the illusion.

The following correspondence took place in August, between Governor

Magoffin, of Kentucky, and President Lincoln--also between the Governor

and myself, as President of the Confederate States--relative to the

neutrality of the State:

"Commonwealth of Kentucky, Executive Department,

"Frankfort, _August 19,1861_.

To his Excellency Abraham Lincoln, _President of the United

States_.

"Sir: From the commencement of the unhappy hostilities now

pending in this country, the people of Kentucky have indicated

an earnest desire and purpose, as far as lay in their power,

while maintaining their original political status, to do nothing

by which to involve themselves in the war. Up to this time they

have succeeded in securing to themselves and to the State peace

and tranquillity as the fruits of the policy they adopted. My

single object now is to promote the continuance of these

blessings to this State.

"Until within a brief period the people of Kentucky were quiet

and tranquil, free from domestic strife, and undisturbed by

internal commotion. They have resisted no law, rebelled against

no authority, engaged in no revolution, but constantly

proclaimed their firm determination to pursue their peaceful

avocations, earnestly hoping that their own soil would be spared

the presence of armed troops, and that the scene of conflict

would be kept removed beyond the border of their State. By thus

avoiding all occasions for the introduction of bodies of armed

soldiers, and offering no provocation for the presence of

military force, the people of Kentucky have sincerely striven to

preserve in their State domestic peace and avert the calamities

of sanguinary engagements.

"Recently a large body of soldiers have been enlisted in the

United States army and collected in military camps in the

central portion of Kentucky. This movement was preceded by the

active organization of companies, regiments, etc., consisting of

men sworn into the United States service, under officers holding

commissions from yourself. Ordnance, arms, munitions, and

supplies of war are being transported into the State, and placed

in large quantities in these camps. In a word, an army is now

being organized and quartered within the State, supplied with

all the appliances of war, without the consent or advice of the

authorities of the State, and without consultation with those

most prominently known and recognized as loyal citizens. This

movement now imperils that peace and tranquillity which from the

beginning of our pending difficulties have been the paramount

desire of this people, and which, up to this time, they have so

secured to the State.

"Within Kentucky there has been, and is likely to be, no

occasion for the presence of military force. The people are

quiet and tranquil, feeling no apprehension of any occasion

arising to invoke protection from the Federal arm. They have

asked that their territory be left free from military

occupation, and the present tranquillity of their communication

left uninvaded by soldiers. They do not desire that Kentucky

shall be required to supply the battle-field for the contending

armies, or become the theatre of the war.

"Now, therefore, as Governor of the State of Kentucky, and in

the name of the people I have the honor to represent, and with

the single and earnest desire to avert from their peaceful homes

the horrors of war, I urge the removal from the limits of

Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within

the State. If such action as is here urged be promptly taken, I

firmly believe the peace of the people of Kentucky will be

preserved, and the horrors of a bloody war will be averted from

a people now peaceful and tranquil.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"B. Magoffin."

"Washington, _August 24, 1861_.

"To his Excellency B. Magoffin, _Governor of the State of

Kentucky._

"Sir: Your letter of the 19th instant, in which you 'urge the

removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now

organized and in camp within that State,' is received.

"I may not possess full and precisely accurate knowledge upon

this subject; but I believe it is true that there is a military

force in camp within Kentucky, acting by authority of the United

States, which force is not very large, and is not now being

augmented.

"I also believe that some arms have been furnished to this force

by the United States.

"I also believe this force consists exclusively of Kentuckians,

having their camp in the immediate vicinity of their own homes,

and not assailing or menacing any of the good people of

Kentucky.

"In all I have done in the premises, I have acted upon the

urgent solicitation of many Kentuckians, and in accordance with

what I believed, and still believe, to be the wish of a majority

of all the Union-loving people of Kentucky.

"While I have conversed on this subject with many of the eminent

men of Kentucky, including a large majority of her members of

Congress, I do not remember that any one of them, or any other

person except your Excellency and the bearers of your

Excellency's letter, has urged me to remove the military force

from Kentucky, or to disband it. One very worthy citizen of

Kentucky did solicit me to have the augmenting of the force

suspended for a time.

"Taking all the means within my reach to form a judgment, I do

not believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky that this force

shall be removed beyond her limits; and, with this impression, I

must respectfully decline to so remove it.

"I most cordially sympathize with your Excellency in the wish to

preserve the peace of my own native State, Kentucky. It is with

regret I search for, and can not find, in your not very short

letter, any declaration or intimation that you entertain any

desire for the preservation of the Federal Union.

"Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln."

"Commonwealth of Kentucky, Executive Department,

"Frankfort, _August 24, 1861_.

"Hon. Jefferson Davis, _Richmond, Virginia._

"Sir: Since the commencement of the unhappy difficulties pending

in the country, the people of Kentucky have indicated a

steadfast desire and purpose to maintain a position of strict

neutrality between the belligerent parties. They have earnestly

striven by their policy to avert from themselves the calamity of

war, and protect their own soil from the presence of contending

armies. Up to this period they have enjoyed comparative

tranquillity and entire domestic peace.

"Recently a military force has been enlisted and quartered by

the United States authorities within this State. I have on this

day addressed a communication and dispatched commissioners to

the President of the United States, urging the removal of these

troops from the soil of Kentucky, and thus exerting myself to

carry out the will of the people in the maintenance of a neutral

position. The people of this State desire to be free from the

presence of the soldiers of either belligerent, and to that end

my efforts are now directed.

"Although I have no reason to presume that the Government of the

Confederate States contemplate or have ever proposed any

violation of the neutral attitude thus assumed by Kentucky,

there seems to be some uneasiness felt among the people of some

portion of the State, occasioned by the collection of bodies of

troops along their southern frontier. In order to quiet this

apprehension, and to secure to the people their cherished object

of peace, this communication is to present these facts and

elicit an authoritative assurance that the Government of the

Confederate States will continue to respect and observe the

position indicated as assumed by Kentucky.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"B. Magoffin."

"Richmond, _August 28, 1861._

"To Hon. B. Magoffin, _Governor of Kentucky, etc._

"Sir: I have received your letter informing me that 'since the

commencement of the unhappy difficulties pending in the country,

the people of Kentucky have indicated a steadfast desire to

maintain a position of strict neutrality between the belligerent

parties.' In the same communication you express your desire to

elicit 'an authoritative assurance that the Government of the

Confederate States will continue to respect and observe the

neutral position of Kentucky.'

"In reply to this request, I lose no time in assuring you that

the Government of the Confederate States neither desires nor

intends to disturb the neutrality of Kentucky. The assemblage of

troops in Tennessee, to which you refer, had no other object

than to repel the lawless invasion of that State by the forces

of the United States, should their Government seek to approach

it through Kentucky, without respect for its position of

neutrality. That such apprehensions were not groundless has been

proved by the course of that Government in the States of

Maryland and Missouri, and more recently in Kentucky itself, in

which, as you inform me, 'a military force has been enlisted and

quartered by the United States authorities.'

"The Government of the Confederate States has not only respected

most scrupulously the neutrality of Kentucky, but has continued

to maintain the friendly relations of trade and intercourse

which it has suspended with the United States generally.

"In view of the history of the past, it can scarcely be

necessary to assure your Excellency that the Government of the

Confederate States will continue to respect the neutrality of

Kentucky so long as her people will maintain it themselves.

"But neutrality, to be entitled to respect, must be strictly

maintained between both parties; or, if the door be opened on

the one side for the aggressions of one of the belligerent

parties upon the other, it ought not to be shut to the assailed

when they seek to enter it for purposes of self-defense.

"I do not, however, for a moment believe that your gallant State

will suffer its soil to be used for the purpose of giving an

advantage to those who violate its neutrality and disregard its

rights, over others who respect both.

"In conclusion, I tender to your Excellency the assurance of my

high consideration and regard, and am, sir, very respectfully,

"Yours, etc., Jefferson Davis."

Movements by the Federal forces in southwestern Kentucky revealed such

designs as made it absolutely necessary that General Polk, commanding

the Confederate forces in that section, should immediately occupy the

town of Columbus, Kentucky; a position of much strategic importance on

the shore of the Mississippi River.

That position was doubly important, because it commanded the opposite

shore in Missouri, and was the gateway on the border of Tennessee.

Two States of the Confederacy were therefore threatened by the

anticipated movement of the enemy to get possession of Columbus.

Major-General Polk, therefore, crossed the State line, took possession

of Hickman on September 3d, and on the 4th secured Columbus. General

Grant, who took command at Cairo on September 2d, being thus

anticipated, seized Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee River, and

occupied it in force on the 5th and 6th.

After the occupation, under date of September 4th, I received the

following dispatch from Major-General Polk: "The enemy having descended

the Mississippi River some three or four days since, and seated himself

with cannon and entrenched lines opposite the town of Columbus,

Kentucky, making such demonstrations as left no doubt upon the minds of

any of their intention to seize and forcibly possess said town, I

thought proper, under the plenary power delegated to me, to direct a

sufficient portion of my command both by the river way and land to

concentrate at Columbus, as well to offer to its citizens that

protection they unite to a man in accepting, as also to prevent, in

time, the occupation by the enemy of a point so necessary to the

security of western Tennessee. The demonstration on my part has had the

desired effect. The enemy has withdrawn his forces even before I had

fortified my position. It is my intention to continue to occupy and hold

this place." On the same day I sent the following reply to Major-General

Polk: "Your telegram received; the necessity must justify the action."

The Legislature of Kentucky passed resolutions and appointed a committee

to inquire into the action of General Polk, from which the annexed

correspondence resulted:

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MAJOR-GENERAL POLK AND THE AUTHORITIES OF

KENTUCKY.

_Resolutions of the Kentucky Senate relative to the Violation of

the Neutrality of Kentucky._

"_Resolved by the Senate_, That the special committee of the

Senate, raised for the purpose of considering the reported

occupation of Hickman and other points in Kentucky by

Confederate troops, take into consideration the occupation of

Paducah and other places in Kentucky by the Federal authorities,

and report thereon when the true state of the case shall have

been ascertained. That the Speaker appoint three members of the

Senate to visit southern Kentucky, who are directed to obtain

all the facts they can in reference to the recent occupation of

Kentucky soil by Confederate and Federal forces, and report in

writing at as early a day as practicable.

"In Senate of Kentucky, Saturday, September 7, A. D. 1861.

"Twice read and adopted.

"Attest: (Signed) J. H. Johnson, S. S.

"In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the Speaker

appointed as said committee Messrs. John M. Johnson, William B.

Read, and Thornton F. Marshall.

"Attest: (Signed) J. H. Johnson, S. S."

_Letter of Hon. J. M. Johnson, Chairman of the Committee of the

Kentucky Senate, to General Polk_.

"Columbus, Kentucky, _September 9, 1861._

"To Major-General Polk, _commanding forces, etc._

"Sir: I have the honor to inclose herewith a resolution of the

Senate of Kentucky, adopted by that body upon the reception of

the intelligence of the military occupation of Hickman, Chalk

Bank, and Columbus, by the Confederate troops under your

command. I need not say that the people of Kentucky are

profoundly astonished that such an act should have been

committed by the Confederates, and especially that they should

have been the first to do so with an equipped and regularly

organized army.

"The people of Kentucky, having with great unanimity determined

upon a position of neutrality in the unhappy war now being

waged, and which they had tried in vain to prevent, had hoped

that one place at least in this great nation might remain

uninvaded by passion, and through whose good office something

might be done to end the war, or at least to mitigate its

horrors, or, if this were not possible, that she might be left

to choose her destiny without disturbance from any quarter.

"In obedience to the thrice-repeated will of the people, as

expressed at the polls, and in their name, I ask you to withdraw

your forces from the soil of Kentucky.

"I will say, in conclusion, that all the people of the State

await, in deep suspense, your action in the premises.

"I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, etc.,

(Signed) "John M. Johnson,

"_Chairman of Committee_."

_Letter from General Polk to the Kentucky Commissioners._

Columbus, Kentucky, _September 9, 1861._

To J. M. Johnson, _Chairman of Committee, Senate of Kentucky._

"Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter

of this date, conveying to me a copy of a resolution of the

Senate of Kentucky, under which a committee (of which you are

chairman) was raised 'for the purpose of considering the

reported occupation of Hickman and other points in Kentucky by

the Confederate troops, and that they take into consideration

the reported occupation of Paducah and other points in Kentucky

by the Federal authorities, and report thereon'; also, that they

be 'directed to obtain all the facts they can in reference to

the recent occupation of Kentucky soil by the Confederate and

Federal forces, and report, in writing, at as early a day as

practicable.'

"From the terms of the resolution, it appears your office, as

committee-men, was restricted merely to collecting the facts in

reference to the recent occupation of Kentucky soil by the

Confederate and Federal forces, and to report thereon in

writing, at as early a day as possible. In answer to these

resolutions, I have respectfully to say that, so far as the

Confederate forces are concerned, the facts are plain, and

shortly stated. The Government which they represent, recognizing

as a fundamental principle the right of sovereign States to take

such a position as they choose in regard to their relations with

other States, was compelled by that principle to concede to

Kentucky the right to assume the position of neutrality, which

she has chosen in the passing struggle. This it has done on all

occasions, and without an exception. The cases alluded to by his

Excellency, Governor Magoffin, in his recent message, as

'raids,' I presume, are the cases of the steamers Cheney and

Orr. The former was the unauthorized and unrecognized act of

certain citizens of Alabama, and the latter the act of citizens

of Tennessee and others, and was an act of reprisal. They can

not, therefore, be charged, in any sense, as acts of the

Confederate Government.

"The first and only instance in which the neutrality of Kentucky

has been disregarded is that in which the troops under my

command, and by my direction, took possession of the place I now

hold, and so much of the territory between it and the Tennessee

line as was necessary for me to pass over in order to reach it.

This act finds abundant justification in the history of the

concessions granted to the Federal Government by Kentucky ever

since the war began, notwithstanding the position of neutrality

which she had assumed, and the firmness with which she

proclaimed her intention to maintain it. That history shows the

following among other facts: In January, the House of

Representatives of Kentucky passed anti-coercion

resolutions--only four dissenting. The Governor, in May, issued

his neutrality proclamation. The address of the Union Central

Committee, including Mr. James Speed, Mr. Prentice, and other

prominent Union men, in April, proclaimed neutrality as the

policy of Kentucky, and claimed that an attempt to coerce the

South should induce Kentucky to make common cause with her, and

take part in the contest on her side, 'without counting the

cost.' The Union speakers and papers, with few exceptions,

claimed, up to the last election, that the Union vote was strict

neutrality and peace. These facts and events gave assurance of

the integrity of the avowed purpose of your State, and we were

content with the position she assumed.

"Since the election, however, she has allowed the seizure in her

port (Paducah) of property of citizens of the Confederate

States; she has, by her members in the Congress of the United

States, voted supplies of men and money to carry on the war

against the Confederate States; she has allowed the Federal

Government to cut timber from her forests for the purpose of

building armed boats for the invasion of the Southern States;

she is permitting to be enlisted in her territory, troops, not

only of her own citizens, but of the citizens of other States,

for the purpose of being armed and used in offensive warfare

against the Confederate States. At Camp Robinson, in the county

of Garrard, there are now ten thousand troops, if the newspapers

can be relied upon, in which men from Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana,

and Illinois are mustered with Kentuckians into the service of

the United States, and armed by that Government for the avowed

purpose of giving aid to the disaffected in one of the

Confederate States, and of carrying out the designs of that

Government for their subjugation. Notwithstanding all these and

other acts of a similar character, the Confederate States have

continued to respect the attitude which Kentucky had assumed as

a neutral, and forborne from reprisals, in the hope that

Kentucky would yet enforce respect for her position on the part

of the Government of the United States.

"Our patient expectation has been disappointed, and it was only

when we perceived that this continued indifference to our rights

and our safety was about to culminate in the seizure of an

important part of her territory by the United States forces for

offensive operations against the Confederate States, that a

regard for self-preservation demanded of us to seize it in

advance. We are here, therefore, not by choice, but of

necessity, and as I have had the honor to say, in a

communication addressed to his Excellency Governor Magoffin, a

copy of which is herewith inclosed and submitted as a part of my

reply, so I now repeat in answer to your request, that I am

prepared to agree to withdraw the Confederate troops from

Kentucky, provided she will agree that the troops of the Federal

Government be withdrawn simultaneously, with a guarantee (which

I will give reciprocally for the Confederate Government) that

the Federal troops shall not be allowed to enter nor occupy any

part of Kentucky for the future.

"In view of the facts thus submitted, I can not but think the

world at large will find it difficult to appreciate the

'profound astonishment' with which you say the people of

Kentucky received the intelligence of the occupation of this

place.

"I have the honor to be, respectfully,

"Your obedient servant, etc.,

"Leonidas Polk,

"_Major-General commanding_."

_Letter from General Polk to Governor Magoffin._

"Columbus, Kentucky, _September 3, 1861_.

"Governor Magoffin, _Frankfort, Kentucky_.

"I should have dispatched to you immediately, as the troops

under my command took possession of this position, the very few

words I addressed to the people here; but my duties since that

time have so preoccupied me, that I have but now the first

leisure moment to communicate with you. It will be sufficient

for me to inform you (as my short address herewith will do) that

I had information, on which I could rely, that the Federal

forces intended, and were preparing to seize Columbus. I need

not describe to you the danger resulting to western Tennessee

from such occupation.

"My responsibility could not permit me quietly to lose to the

command intrusted to me so important a position. In evidence of

the accuracy of the information I possessed, I will state that,

as the Confederate force approached this place, the Federal

troops were found in formidable numbers in position upon the

opposite bank, with their cannon turned upon Columbus. The

citizens of the town had fled with terror, and not a word of

assurance of safety or protection had been addressed to them.

Since I have taken possession of this place, I have been

informed by highly respected citizens of your State that certain

representatives of the Federal Government are seeking to take

advantage of its own wrong, are setting up complaints against my

acts of occupation, and are making it a pretest for seizing

other points. Upon this proceeding I have no comments to make.

But I am prepared to say that I will agree to withdraw the

Confederate troops from Kentucky, provided that she will agree

that the troops of the Federal Government be withdrawn

simultaneously, with a guarantee (which I will give reciprocally

for the Confederate Government) that the Federal troops shall

not be allowed to enter or occupy any part of Kentucky in the

future.

"I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

"Leonidas Polk,

"_Major-General commanding_."

However willing the government of Kentucky might have been to accede to

the proposition of General Polk, and which from his knowledge of the

views of his own Government he was fully justified in offering, the

State of Kentucky had no power, moral or physical, to prevent the United

States Government from using her soil as best might suit its purposes in

the war it was waging for the subjugation of the seceded States.

President Lincoln, in his message of the previous July, had distinctly

and reproachfully spoken of the idea of neutrality as existing in some

of the border States. He said: "To prevent the Union forces passing one

way, or the disunion the other, over their soil, would be disunion

completed.... At a stroke it would take all the trouble off the hands of

secession, except only what proceeds from the external blockade."

The acts of the Federal Government corresponded with the views announced

by its President. Briefly, but conclusively, General Polk showed in his

answer that the United States Government paid no respect to the neutral

position which Kentucky wished to maintain; that it was armed, but not

neutral, for the arms and the troops assembled on her soil were for the

invasion of the South; and that he occupied Columbus to prevent the

enemy from taking possession of it. When our troops first entered

Columbus they found the inhabitants had been in alarm from

demonstrations of the United States forces, but that they felt no dread

of the Confederate troops. As far as the truth could be ascertained, a

decided majority of the people of Kentucky, especially its southwestern

portion, if left to a free choice, would have joined the Confederacy in

preference to remaining in the Union. Could they have foreseen what in a

short time was revealed, there can be little doubt that mule contracts,

and other forms of bribery, would have proved unavailing to make her the

passive observer of usurpations destructive of the personal and

political rights of which she had always been a most earnest advocate.

With the slow and sinuous approach of the serpent, the General

Government, little by little, gained power over Kentucky, and then,

throwing off the mask, proceeded to outrages so regardless of law and

the usages of English-speaking people, as could not have been

anticipated, and can only be remembered with shame by those who honor

the constitutional Government created by the States. While artfully

urging the maintenance of the Union as a duty of patriotism, the

Constitution which gave the Union birth was trampled under foot, and the

excesses of the Reign of Terror which followed the French Revolution

were reënacted in our land, once the vaunted home of law and liberty.

Men who had been most honored by the State, and who had reflected back

most honor upon it, were seized without warrant, condemned without

trial, because they had exercised the privilege of free speech, and for

adhering to the principles which were the bed-rock on which our fathers

builded our political temple. Members of the Legislature vacated their

seats and left the State to avoid arrest, the penalty hanging over them

for opinion's sake. The venerable Judge Monroe, who had presided over

the United States District Court for more than a generation, driven from

the land of his birth, the State he had served so long and so well, with

feeble step, but upright conscience and indomitable will, sought a

resting place among those who did not regard it a crime to adhere to the

principles of 1776 and of 1787, and the declaratory affirmation of them

in the resolutions of 1793-'99. About the same time others of great

worth and distinction, impelled by the feeling that "where liberty is

there is my country," left the land desecrated by despotic usurpation,

to join the Confederacy in its struggle to maintain the personal and

political liberties which the men of the Revolution had left as an

inheritance to their posterity. Space would not suffice for a complete

list of the refugees who became conspicuous in the military events of

the Confederacy; let a few answer for the many: J. C. Breckinridge, the

late Vice-President of the United States, and whose general and

well-deserved popularity might have reasonably led him to expect in the

Union the highest honors the States could bestow; William Preston,

George W. Johnston, S. B. Buckner, John H. Morgan, and a host of others,

alike meritorious and alike gratefully remembered. When the passions of

the hour shall have subsided, and the past shall be reviewed with

discrimination and justice, the question must arise in every reflecting

mind, Why did such men as these expatriate themselves, and surrender all

the advantages which they had won by a life of honorable effort in the

land of their nativity? To such inquiry the answer must be, the

usurpations of the General Government foretold to them the wreck of

constitutional liberty. The motives which governed them may best be

learned from the annexed extracts from the statement made in the address

of Mr. Breckinridge to the people of Kentucky, whom he had represented

in both Houses of the United States Congress, with such distinguished

ability and zeal for the general welfare as to place him in the front

rank of the statesmen of his day:

"Bowling Green, Kentucky, _October 8,1861_.

"In obedience, as I supposed, to your wishes, I proceeded to

Washington, and at the special session of Congress, in July,

spoke and voted against the whole war policy of the President

and Congress; demanding, in addition, for Kentucky, the right to

refuse, not men only, but money also, to the war, for I would

have blushed to meet you with the confession that I had

purchased for you exemption from the perils of the battle-field,

and the shame of waging war against your Southern brethren, by

hiring others to do the work you shrunk from performing. During

that memorable session a very small body of Senators and

Representatives, even beneath the shadow of a military

despotism, resisted the usurpations of the Executive, and, with

what degree of dignity and firmness, they willingly submit to

the judgment of the world.

"Their efforts were unavailing, yet they may prove valuable

hereafter, as another added to former examples of many protest

against the progress of tyranny.

"On my return to Kentucky, at the close of the late special

session of Congress, it was my purpose immediately to resign the

office of Senator. The verbal and written remonstrances of many

friends in different parts of the State induced me to postpone

the execution of my purpose; but the time has arrived to carry

it into effect, and accordingly I now hereby return the trust

into your hands.... In the House of Representatives it was

declared that the South should be reduced to 'abject

submission,' or their institutions be overthrown. In the Senate

it was said that, if necessary, the South should be depopulated

and repeopled from the North; and an eminent Senator expressed a

desire that the President should be made dictator. This was

superfluous, since they had already clothed him with dictatorial

powers. In the midst of these proceedings, no plea for the

Constitution is listened to in the North; here and there a few

heroic voices are feebly heard protesting against the progress

of despotism, but, for the most part, beyond the military lines,

mobs and anarchy rule the hour.

"The great mass of the Northern people seem anxious to sunder

every safeguard of freedom; they eagerly offer to the Government

what no European monarch would dare to demand. The President and

his generals are unable to pick up the liberties of the people

as rapidly as they are thrown at their feet.... In every form by

which you could give direct expression to your will, you

declared for neutrality. A large majority of the people at the

May and August elections voted for the neutrality and peace of

Kentucky. The press, the public speakers, the candidates--with

exceptions in favor of the Government at Washington so rare as

not to need mention--planted themselves on this position. You

voted for it, and you meant it. You were promised it, and you

expected it.... Look now at the condition of Kentucky, and see

how your expectations have been realized--how these promises

have been redeemed.... General Anderson, the military dictator

of Kentucky, announces in one of his proclamations that he will

arrest no one who does not act, write, or speak in opposition to

Mr. Lincoln's Government. It would have completed the idea if he

had added, or think in opposition to it. Look at the condition

of our State under the rule of our new protectors. They have

suppressed the freedom of speech and of the press. They seize

people by military force upon mere suspicion, and impose on them

oaths unknown to the laws. Other citizens they imprison without

warrant, and carry them out of the State, so that the writ of

_habeas corpus_ can not reach them.

"Every day foreign armed bands are making seizures among the

people. Hundreds of citizens, old and young, venerable

magistrates, whose lives have been distinguished by the love of

the people, have been compelled to fly from their homes and

families to escape imprisonment and exile at the hands of

Northern and German soldiers, under the orders of Mr. Lincoln

and his military subordinates. While yet holding an important

political trust, confided by Kentucky, I was compelled to leave

my home and family, or suffer imprisonment and exile. If it is

asked why I did not meet the arrest and seek a trial, my answer

is, that I would have welcomed an arrest to be followed by a

judge and jury; but you well know that I could not have secured

these constitutional rights. I would have been transported

beyond the State, to languish in some Federal fortress during

the pleasure of the oppressor. Witness the fate of Morehead and

his Kentucky associates in their distant and gloomy prison.

"The case of the gentleman just mentioned is an example of many

others, and it meets every element in a definition of despotism.

If it should occur in England it would be righted, or it would

overturn the British Empire. He is a citizen and native of

Kentucky. As a member of the Legislature, Speaker of the House,

Representative in Congress from the Ashland district, and

Governor of the State, you have known, trusted, and honored him

during a public service of a quarter of a century. He is eminent

for his ability, his amiable character, and his blameless life.

Yet this man, without indictment, without warrant, without

accusation, but by the order of President Lincoln, was seized at

midnight, in his own house, and in the midst of his own family,

and led through the streets of Louisville, as I am informed,

with his hands crossed and pinioned before him--was carried out

of the State and district, and now lies a prisoner in a fortress

in New York Harbor, a thousand miles away....

"The Constitution of the United States, which these invaders

unconstitutionally swear every citizen whom they

unconstitutionally seize to support, has been wholly abolished.

It is as much forgotten as if it lay away back in the twilight

of history. The facts I have enumerated show that the very

rights most carefully reserved by it to the States and to

individuals have been most conspicuously violated.... Your

fellow-citizen,

(Signed) "John C. Breckinridge."

Such was the "neutrality" suffered by the Confederacy from governments

both at home and abroad.

The chivalric people of Kentucky showed their sympathy with the just

cause of the people of the Southern States, by leaving the home where

they could not serve the cause of right against might, and nobly shared

the fortunes of their Southern brethren on many a blood-dyed field. In

like manner did the British people see with disapprobation their

Government, while proclaiming neutrality, make new rules, and give new

constructions to old ones, so as to favor our enemy and embarrass us.

The Englishman's sense of fair-play, and the manly instinct which

predisposes him to side with the weak, gave us hosts of friends, but all

their good intentions were paralyzed or foiled by their wily Minister

for Foreign Affairs, and his coadjutor on this side, the artful,

unscrupulous United States Secretary of State.

I have thus presented the case of Kentucky, not because it was the only

State where false promises lulled the people into delusive security,

until, by gradual approaches, usurpation had bound them hand and foot,

and where despotic power crushed all the muniments of civil liberty

which the Union was formed to secure, but because of the attempt, which

has been noticed, to arraign the Confederacy for invasion of the State

in disregard of her sovereignty.

The occupation of Columbus by the Confederate forces was only just soon

enough to anticipate the predetermined purpose of the Federal

Government, all of which was plainly set forth in the letter of General

Polk to the Governor of Kentucky, and his subsequent letter to the

Kentucky commissioners.

Missouri, like Kentucky, had wished to preserve peaceful relations in

the contest which it was foreseen would soon occur between the Northern

and the Southern States. When the Federal Government denied to her the

privilege of choosing her own position, which betokened no hostility to

the General Government, and she was driven to the necessity of deciding

whether or not her citizens should be used for the subjugation of the

Southern States, her people and their representative, the State

government, repelled the arbitrary assumption of authority by military

force to control her government and her people.

Among other acts of invasion, the Federal troops had occupied Belmont, a

village in Missouri opposite to Columbus, and with artillery threatened

that town, inspiring terror in its peaceful inhabitants. After the

occupation of Columbus, under these circumstances of full justification,

a small Confederate force, Colonel Tappan's Arkansas regiment, and

Beltzhoover's battery, were thrown across the Mississippi to occupy and

hold the village, in the State of Missouri, then an ally, and soon to

become a member, of the Confederacy. On the 6th of November General

Grant left his headquarters at Cairo with a land and naval force, and

encamped on the Kentucky shore. This act and a demonstration made by

detachments from his force at Paducah were probably intended to induce

the belief that he contemplated an attack on Columbus, thus concealing

his real purpose to surprise the small garrison at Belmont. General Polk

on the morning of the 7th discovered the landing of the Federal forces

on the Missouri shore, some seven miles above Columbus, and, divining

the real purpose of the enemy, detached General Pillow with four

regiments of his division, say two thousand men, to reënforce the

garrison at Belmont. Very soon after his arrival, the enemy commenced an

assault which was sternly resisted, and with varying fortune, for

several hours. The enemy's front so far exceeded the length of our line

as to enable him to attack on both flanks, and our troops were finally

driven back to the bank of the river with the loss of their battery,

which had been gallantly and efficiently served until nearly all its

horses had been killed, and its ammunition had been expended. The enemy

advanced to the bank of the river below the point to which our men had

retreated, and opened an artillery-fire upon the town of Columbus, to

which our guns from the commanding height responded with such effect as

to drive him from the river bank. In the mean time General Polk had at

intervals sent three regiments to reënforce General Pillow. Upon the

arrival of the first of these, General Pillow led it to a favorable

position, where it for some time steadily resisted and checked the

advance of the enemy. General Pillow, with great energy and gallantry,

rallied his repulsed troops and brought them again into action. General

Polk now proceeded in person with two other regiments. Whether from this

or some other cause, the enemy commenced a retreat. General Pillow,

whose activity and daring on the occasion were worthy of all praise, led

the first and second detachments, by which he had been reënforced, to

attack the enemy in the rear, and General Polk, landing further up the

river, moved to cut off the enemy's retreat; but some embarrassment and

consequent delay which occurred in landing his troops caused him to be

too late for the purpose for which he crossed, and to become only a part

of the pursuing force.

One would naturally suppose that the question about which there would be

the greatest certainty would be the number of troops engaged in a

battle, yet there is nothing in regard to which we have such conflicting

accounts. It is fairly concluded, from the concurrent reports, that the

enemy attacked us on both flanks, and that in the beginning of the

action we were outnumbered; but the obstinacy with which the conflict

was maintained and the successive advances and retreats which occurred

in the action indicate that the disparity could not have been very

great, and therefore that, after the arrival of our reënforcements, our

troops must have become numerically superior. The dead and wounded left

by the enemy upon the field, the arms, ammunition, and military stores

abandoned in his flight, so incontestably prove his defeat, that his

claim to have achieved a victory is too preposterous for discussion.

Though the forces engaged were comparatively small to those in

subsequent battles of the war, six hours of incessant combat, with

repeated bayonet-charges, must place this in the rank of the most

stubborn engagements, and the victors must accord to the vanquished the

meed of having fought like Americans. One of the results of the battle,

which is at least significant, is the fact that General Grant, who had

superciliously refused to recognize General Polk as one with whom he

could exchange prisoners, did, after the battle, send a flag of truce to

get such privileges as are recognized between armies acknowledging each

other to be "foemen worthy of their steel."

General Polk reported as follows: "We pursued them to their boats, seven

miles, and then drove their boats before us. The road was strewed with

their dead and wounded, guns, ammunition, and equipments. The number of

prisoners taken by the enemy, as shown by their list furnished, was one

hundred and six, all of whom have been returned by exchange. After

making a liberal allowance to the enemy, a hundred of their prisoners

still remain in my hands, one stand of colors, and a fraction over one

thousand stand of arms, with knapsacks, ammunition, and other military

stores. Our loss in killed, wounded, and missing, was six hundred and

forty one; that of the enemy was probably not less than twelve hundred."

Meanwhile, Albert Sidney Johnston, a soldier of great distinction in the

United States Army, where he had attained the rank of brigadier-general

by brevet, and was in command of the Department of California, resigned

his commission, and came overland from San Francisco to Richmond, to

tender his services to the Confederate States. Though he had been bred a

soldier, and most of his life had been spent in the army, he had not

neglected such study of political affairs as properly belongs to the

citizen of a republic, and appreciated the issue made between States

claiming the right to resume the powers they had delegated to a general

agent and the claims set up by that agent to coerce States, his

creators, and for whom he held a trust.

He was a native of Kentucky, but his first military appointment was from

Louisiana, and he was a volunteer in the war for independence by Texas,

and for a time resided in that State. Much of his military service had

been in the West, and he felt most identified with it. On the 10th of

September, 1861, he was assigned to command our Department of the West,

which included the States of Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, the Indian

country, and the western part of Mississippi.

General Johnston, on his arrival at Nashville, found that he lacked not

only men, but the munitions of war and the means of obtaining them. Men

were ready to be enlisted, but the arms and equipments had nearly all

been required to fit out the first levies. Immediately on his survey of

the situation, he determined to occupy Bowling Green in Kentucky, and

ordered Brigadier-General S. B. Buckner, with five thousand men, to take

possession of the position. This invasion of Kentucky was an act of

self-defense rendered necessary by the action of the government of

Kentucky, and by the evidences of intended movements of the forces of

the United States. It was not possible to withdraw the troops from

Columbus in the west, nor from Cumberland Ford in the east, to which

General Felix K. Zollicoffer had advanced with four thousand men. A

compliance with the demands of Kentucky would have opened the frontiers

of Tennessee and the Mississippi River to the enemy; besides, it was

essential to the defense of Tennessee.

East of Columbus, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Hopkinsville were

garrisoned with small bodies of troops; and the territory between

Columbus and Bowling Green was occupied by moving detachments which

caused the supposition that a large military force was present and

contemplated an advance. A fortified camp was established at Cumberland

Gap as the right of General Johnston's line, and an important point for

the protection of East Tennessee against invasion. Thus General Johnston

located his line of defense, from Columbus on the west to the Cumberland

Mountains on the east, with his center at Bowling Green, which was

occupied and intrenched. It was a good base for military operations, was

a proper depot for supplies, and, if fortified, could be held against

largely superior numbers.