On October 28th General Johnston took command at Bowling Green. He

states his force to have been twelve thousand men, and that the enemy's

force at that time was estimated to be double his own, or twenty-four

thousand. He says: "The enemy's force increased more rapidly than our

own, so that by the last of November it numbered fifty thousand, and

continued to increase until it ran up to between seventy-five and one

hundred thousand. My force was kept down by disease, so that it numbered

about twenty-two thousand."

The chief anxiety of the commander of the department was to procure arms

and men. On the next day after his arrival at Nashville, he wrote to the

Governor of Alabama, "I shall beg to rely on your Excellency to furnish

us as rapidly as possible, at this point, with every arm it may be in

your power to provide--I mean small-arms for infantry and cavalry." The

Governor replied, "It is out of the power of Alabama to afford you any

assistance in the way of arms." The Governor of Georgia replied to the

same request on September 18th, "It is utterly impossible for me to

comply with your request." General Bragg, in command at Pensacola,

writes in reply on September 27th: "The mission of Colonel Buckner will

not be successful, I fear, as our extreme Southern country has been

stripped of both arms and men. We started early in this matter, and have

wellnigh exhausted our resources." On September 19th General Johnston

telegraphed to me: "Thirty thousand stand of arms are a necessity to my

command. I beg you to order them, or as many as can be got, to be

instantly procured and sent with dispatch." The Secretary of War

replied: "The whole number received by us, by that steamer, was eighteen

hundred, and we purchased of the owners seventeen hundred and eighty,

making in all thirty-five hundred Enfield rifles, of which we have been

compelled to allow the Governor of Georgia to have one thousand for

arming troops to repel an attack now hourly threatened at Brunswick. Of

the remaining twenty-five hundred, I have ordered one thousand sent to

you, leaving us but fifteen hundred for arming several regiments now

encamped here, and who have been awaiting their arms for several

months.... We have not an engineer to send you. The whole engineer corps

comprises only six captains together with three majors, of whom one is

on bureau duty. You will be compelled to employ the best material within

your reach, by detailing officers from other corps, and by employing

civil engineers."

These details are given to serve as an illustration of the deficiencies

existing in every department of the military service in the first years

of the war. In this respect much relief came from the well-directed

efforts of Governor Harris and the Legislature of Tennessee. A

cap-factory, ordnance-shops, and workshops were established. The

powder-mills at Nashville turned out about four-hundred pounds a day.

Twelve or fourteen batteries were fitted out at Memphis. Laws were

passed to impress and pay for the private arms scattered throughout the

State, and the utmost efforts were made to collect and adapt them to

military uses. The returns make it evident that, during most of the

autumn of 1861, fully one half of General Johnston's troops were

imperfectly armed, and whole brigades remained without weapons for

months.

No less energetic were the measures taken to concentrate and recruit his

forces. General Hardee's command was moved from northeastern Arkansas,

and sent to Bowling Green, which added four thousand men to the troops

there. The regiment of Texan rangers was brought from Louisiana, and

supplied with horses and sent to the front. Five hundred Kentuckians

joined General Buckner on his advance, and five regiments were gradually

formed and filled up. A cavalry company under John H. Morgan was also

added. At this time (September, 1861), General Johnston, under the

authority granted to him by the Government, made a requisition for

thirty thousand men from Tennessee, ten thousand from Mississippi, and

ten thousand from Arkansas. The Arkansas troops were directed to be sent

to General McCulloch for the defense of their own frontier. The Governor

of Mississippi sent four regiments, when this source of supply was

closed.

Up to the middle of November only three regiments were mustered in under

this call from Tennessee, but, by the close of December, the number of

men who joined was from twelve to fifteen thousand. Two regiments,

fifteen hundred strong, had joined General Polk.

In Arkansas, five companies and a battalion had been organized, and were

ready to join General McCulloch.

A speedy advance of the enemy was now indicated, and an increase of

force was so necessary that further delay was impossible. General

Johnston, therefore, determined upon a levy _en masse_ in his

department. He made a requisition on the Governors of Tennessee,

Alabama, and Mississippi, to call out every able-bodied member of the

militia into whose hands arms could be placed, or to provide a volunteer

force large enough to use all the arms that could be procured. In his

letters to these Governors, he plainly presents his view of the posture

of affairs on December 24th, points out impending dangers, and shows

that to his applications the response had not been such as the emergency

demanded. He says:

"It was apprehended by me that the enemy would attempt to assail

the South, not only by boats and troops moving down the river,

to be assembled during the fall and winter, but by columns

marching inland, threatening Tennessee, by endeavoring to turn

the defenses of Columbus. Further observation confirms me in

this opinion; but I think the means employed for the defense of

the river will probably render it comparatively secure. The

enemy will energetically push toward Nashville the heavy masses

of troops now assembled between Louisville and Bowling Green.

The general position of Bowling Green is good and commanding;

but the peculiar topography of the place and the length of the

line of the Barren River as a line of defense, though strong,

require a large force to defend it. There is no position equally

defensive as Bowling Green, nor line of defense as good as the

Barren River, between the Barren and the Cumberland at

Nashville; so that it can not be abandoned without exposing

Tennessee, and giving vastly the vantage-ground to the enemy. It

is manifest that the Northern generals appreciate this; and, by

withdrawing their forces from western Virginia and east

Kentucky, they have managed to add them to the new levies from

Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and to concentrate a force in front

of me variously estimated at from sixty to one hundred thousand

men, and which I believe will number seventy-five thousand. To

maintain my position, I have only about seventeen thousand men

in this neighborhood. It is impossible for me to obtain

additions to my strength from Columbus; the generals in command

in that quarter consider that it would imperil that point to

diminish their force, and open Tennessee to the enemy. General

Zollicoffer can not join me, as he guards the Cumberland, and

prevents the invasion and possible revolt of East Tennessee."

On June 5th General Johnston was reënforced by the brigades of Floyd and

Maney from western Virginia. He also sent a messenger to Richmond to ask

that a few regiments might be detached from the several armies in the

field, and sent to him to be replaced by new levies. He said: "I do not

ask that my force shall be made equal to that of the enemy; but, if

possible, it should be raised to fifty thousand men." Meantime such an

appearance of menace had been maintained as led the enemy to believe

that our force was large, and that he might be attacked at any time.

Frequent and rapid expeditions through the sparsely settled country gave

rise to rumors which kept alive this apprehension.

CHAPTER IX.

The Coercion of Missouri.--Answers of the Governors of States to

President Lincoln's Requisition for Troops.--Restoration of

Forts Caswell and Johnson to the United States Government.--

Condition of Missouri similar to that of Kentucky.--

Hostilities, how initiated in Missouri.--Agreement between

Generals Price and Harney.--Its Favorable Effects.--General

Harney relieved of Command by the United States Government

because of his Pacific Policy.--Removal of Public Arms from

Missouri.--Searches for and Seizure of Arms.--Missouri on the

Side of Peace.--Address of General Price to the People.--

Proclamation of Governor Jackson.--Humiliating Concessions of

the Governor to the United States Government, for the sake of

Peace.--Demands of the Federal Officers.--Revolutionary

Principles attempted to be enforced by the United States

Government.--The Action at Booneville.--The Patriot Army of

Militia.--Further Rout of the Enemy.--Heroism and Self-sacrifice

of the People.--Complaints and Embarrassments--Zeal: its

effects.--Action of Congress.--Battle of Springfield.--General

Price.--Battle at Lexington.--Bales of Hemp.--Other Combats.

To preserve the Union in the spirit and for the purposes for which it

was established, an equilibrium between the States, as grouped in

sections, was essential. When the Territory of Missouri constitutionally

applied for admission as a State into the Union, the struggle between

State rights and that sectional aggrandizement which was seeking to

destroy the existing equilibrium gave rise to the contest which shook

the Union to its foundation, and sowed the seeds of geographical

divisions, which have borne the most noxious weeds that have choked our

political vineyard. Again, in 1861, Missouri appealed to the

Constitution for the vindication of her rights, and again did usurpation

and the blind rage of a sectional party disregard the appeal, and assume

powers, not only undelegated, but in direct violation of the fourth

section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which every Federal

officer had sworn to maintain, and which secured to every State a

republican government, and protection against invasion.

If it be contended that the invasion referred to must have been by other

than the troops of the United States, and that their troops were

therefore not prohibited from entering a State against its wishes, and

for purposes hostile to its policy, the section of the Constitution

referred to fortifies the fact, heretofore noticed, of the refusal of

the Convention, when forming the Constitution, to delegate to the

Federal Government power to coerce a State. By its last clause it was

provided that not even to suppress domestic violence could the General

Government, on its own motion, send troops of the United States into the

territory of one of the States. That section reads thus:

"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union

a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them

against invasion, and on application of the Legislature, or of

the executive (when the Legislature can not be convened),

against domestic violence."

Surely, if Federal troops could not be sent into a State without its

application, even to protect it against domestic violence, still less

could it be done to overrule the will of its people. That, instead of an

obligation upon the citizens of other States to respond to a call by the

President for troops to invade a particular State, it was in April,

1861, deemed a high crime to so use them: reference is here made to the

published answers of the Governors of States, which had not seceded, to

the requisition made upon them for troops to be employed against the

States which had seceded.

Governor Letcher, of Virginia, replied to the requisition of the United

States Secretary of War as follows:

"I am requested to detach from the militia of the State of

Virginia the quota designated in a table which you append, to

serve as infantry or riflemen, for the period of three months,

unless sooner discharged.

"In reply to this communication, I have only to say that the

militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at

Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view.

Your object is to subjugate the Southern States, and a

requisition made upon me for such an object--an object, in my

judgment, not within the purview of the Constitution, or the Act

of 1795--will not be complied with."

Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, replied:

"Your dispatch is received. In answer, I say emphatically,

Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of

subduing her sister Southern States."

Governor Harris, of Tennessee, replied:

"Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but fifty

thousand, if necessary, for the defense of our rights, or those

of our Southern brothers."

Governor Jackson, of Missouri, answered:

"Requisition is illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary,

inhuman, diabolical, and can not be complied with."

Governor Rector, of Arkansas, replied:

"In answer to your requisition for troops from Arkansas, to

subjugate the Southern States, I have to say that none will be

furnished. The demand is only adding insult to injury."

Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, responded to the requisition for

troops from that State as follows:

"Your dispatch is received, and, if genuine--which its

extraordinary character leads me to doubt--I have to say, in

reply, that I regard the levy of troops made by the

Administration, for the purpose of subjugating the States of the

South, as in violation of the Constitution, and a usurpation of

power. I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of

the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free

people. You can get no troops from North Carolina."

Governor Ellis, who had lived long enough to leave behind him an

enviable reputation, was a fair representative of the conservatism,

gallantry, and tenacity in well-doing, of the State over which he

presided. He died too soon for his country's good, and the Confederacy

seriously felt the loss of his valuable services. The prompt and

spirited answer he gave to the call upon North Carolina to furnish

troops for the subjugation of the Southern States, was the fitting

complement of his earlier action in immediately restoring to the Federal

Government Forts Johnson and Caswell, which had been seized without

proper authority. In communicating his action to President Buchanan, he

wrote:

"My information satisfies me that this popular outbreak was

caused by a report, very generally credited, but which, for the

sake of humanity, I hope is not true, that it was the purpose of

the Administration to coerce the Southern States, and that

troops were on their way to garrison the Southern ports, and to

begin the work of subjugation.... Should I receive assurance

that no troops will be sent to this State prior to the 4th of

March next, then all will be peace and quiet here, and the

property of the United States will be fully protected, as

heretofore. If, however, I am unable to get such assurances, I

will not undertake to answer for the consequences.

"The forts in this State have long been unoccupied, and their

being garrisoned at this time will unquestionably be looked upon

as a hostile demonstration, and will in my opinion certainly be

resisted."

The plea so constantly made by the succeeding Administration, as an

excuse for its warlike acts, that the duty to protect the public

property required such action, is shown by this letter of Governor Ellis

to have been a plea created by their usurpations, but for which there

might have been peace, as well as safety to property, and, what was of

greater worth, the lives, the liberties, and the republican institutions

of the country.

There was great similarity in the condition of Missouri to that of

Kentucky. They were both border States, and, by their institutions and

the origin of a large portion of their citizens, were identified with

the South. Both sought to occupy a neutral position in the impending

war, and offered guarantees of peace and order throughout their

territory if left free to control their own affairs. Both refused to

furnish troops to the United States Government for the unconstitutional

purpose of coercing the Southern States. Both, because of their stronger

affinity to the South than to the North, were the objects of suspicion,

and consequent military occupation by the troops of the United States

Government. At the inception of this unwarrantable proceeding, an effort

was made by the Governor of Missouri to preserve the rights of the State

without disturbing its relations to the United States Government. If it

had been the policy of the Government to allow to Missouri the control

of her domestic affairs, and an exemption from being a party to the

violation of the Constitution in making war against certain of the

States, the above-described effort of the Governor might and probably

would have been successful. The form and purpose of that effort appear

in the compact entered into between Major-General Price, commanding the

militia or "Missouri State Guard," and General Harney, of the United

States Army, commanding the Department of the West, a geographical

division which included the State of Missouri.

During a temporary absence of General Harney, Captain Lyon, commanding

United States forces at St. Louis, initiated hostilities against the

State of Missouri under the following circumstances:

In obedience to the militia law of the State, an annual encampment was

directed by the Governor for instruction in tactics. Camp Jackson, near

St. Louis, was designated for the encampment of the militia of the

county in 1861. Here for some days companies of State militia, amounting

to about eight hundred men, under command of Brigadier-General D. M.

Frost, were being exercised, as is usual upon such occasions. They

presented no appearance of a hostile camp. There were no sentinels to

guard against surprise; visitors were freely admitted; it was the

picnic-ground for the ladies of the city, and everything wore the aspect

of merry-making rather than that of grim-visaged war.

Suddenly, Captain (afterward General) Nathaniel Lyon appeared with an

overwhelming force of Federal troops, surrounded this holiday

encampment, and demanded an unconditional surrender. Resistance was

impracticable, and none was attempted; the militia surrendered, and were

confined as prisoners; but prisoners of what? There was no war, and no

warrant for their arrest as offenders against the law. It is left for

the usurpers to frame a vocabulary suited to their act.

After the return of General Harney, Brigadier-General D. M. Frost, of

the Missouri militia, appealed to him from his prison, the St. Louis

Arsenal, on May 11, 1861, representing that, "in accordance with the

laws of the State of Missouri, which have been existing for some years,

and in obedience to the orders of the Governor, on Monday last I entered

into an encampment with the militia force of St. Louis County for the

purpose of instructing the same in accordance with the laws of the

United States and of this State." He further sets forth that every

officer and soldier of his command had taken an oath to sustain the

Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Missouri,

and that while in the peaceable performance of their duties the

encampment was surrounded by the command of Captain N. Lyon, United

States Army, and a surrender demanded, to which General Frost replied as

follows:

"Camp Jackson, _May 10, 1861_.

"Sir: I, never for a moment having conceived the idea that so

illegal and unconstitutional a demand as I have just received

from you would be made by an officer of the United States Army,

am wholly unprepared to defend my command from this unwarranted

attack, and shall therefore be forced to comply with your

demand.

"I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"D. Frost,

"_Brigadier-General, commanding Camp Jackson, M. M._

"Captain N. Lyon, _commanding United States troops_."

General Frost's letter to General Harney continues: "My command was, in

accordance with the above, deprived of their arms, and surrendered into

the hands of Captain Lyon; after which, while thus disarmed and

surrounded, a fire was opened on a portion of it by his troops, and a

number of my men put to death, together with several innocent

lookers-on, men, women, and children." On the occasion of the attack

upon Camp Jackson, "a large crowd of citizens, men, women, and children,

were gathered around, gazing curiously at these strange proceedings,

when a volley was fired into them, killing ten and wounding twenty

non-combatants, mostly women and children. A reign of terror was at once

established, and the most severe measures were adopted by the Federals

to overawe the excitement and the rage of the people."[182]

The massacre at Camp Jackson produced intense excitement throughout the

State. The Legislature, upon receipt of the news, passed several bills

for the enrollment and organization of the militia, and to confer

special powers upon the Governor of the State. By virtue of these,

general officers were appointed, chief of whom was Sterling Price.

Because of the atrocities at St. Louis, and the violent demonstrations

consequent upon them, not only in St. Louis but elsewhere in the State,

General Price, well known to be what was termed "a Union man," and not

only by his commission as commander-in-chief of the militia of the

State, but also, and even more, because of his influence among the

people, was earnestly solicited by influential citizens of St. Louis to

unite with General Harney in a joint effort to restore order and

preserve peace. With the sanction of Governor Jackson he proceeded to

St. Louis, the headquarters of the Department of the West, and, after

some preliminary conference, entered into the following agreement,

which, being promulgated to the people, was received with general

satisfaction, and for a time allayed excitement. The agreement was as

follows:

"St. Louis, _May 21, 1861_.

"The undersigned, officers of the United States Government and of

the government of the State of Missouri, for the purpose of

removing misapprehension and of allaying public excitement, deem

it proper to declare publicly that they have this day had a

personal interview in this city, in which it has been mutually

understood, without the semblance of dissent on either part,

that each of them has no other than a common object, equally

interesting and important to every citizen of Missouri--that of

restoring peace and good order to the people of the State in

subordination to the laws of the General and State governments.

"It being thus understood, there seems no reason why every

citizen should not confide in the proper officers of the General

and State governments to restore quiet, and, as among the best

means of offering no counter-influences, we mutually commend to

all persons to respect each other's rights throughout the State,

making no attempt to exercise unauthorized powers, as it is the

determination of the proper authorities to suppress all unlawful

proceedings which can only disturb the public peace. General

Price, having by commission full authority over the militia of

the State of Missouri, undertakes with the sanction of the

Governor of the State, already declared, to direct the whole

power of the State officers to maintaining order within the

State among the people thereof. General Harney publicly declares

that, this object being assured, he can have no occasion, as he

has no wish, to make military movements that might otherwise

create excitement and jealousy, which he most earnestly desires

to avoid.

"We, the undersigned, do therefore mutually enjoin upon the

people of the State to attend to their civil business, of

whatever sort it may be, and it is hoped that the unquiet

elements which have threatened so seriously to disturb the

public peace may soon subside, and be remembered only to be

deplored.

"W. S. Harney,

"_Brigadier-General commanding._

"Sterling Price,

"_Major-General Missouri State Guard._"

The distinct position of General Harney, that the military force of the

United States should not be used in Missouri except in case of

necessity, together with the emphatic declaration of General Price that

he had the power and would use it to preserve peace and order in

Missouri, seemed to remove all danger of collision in that State between

the Federal and local forces. In conformity with this understanding,

General Price returned to the capital of the State, and sent to their

homes the militia who had been assembled there by the Governor for the

defense of the capital against an anticipated attack by the troops of

the United States.

Those who desired to preserve peace in Missouri had just cause to be

gratified at the favorable prospect now presented. Those who desired war

had equal ground for dissatisfaction. A few days after the promulgation

of the agreement between General Price and General Harney, the latter

was removed from command, as many believed, because of his successful

efforts to allay excitement and avoid war. Rumors had been in

circulation that the Missourians were driving the "Union men" from their

homes, and many letters purporting to be written in different parts of

the State represented the persecution of Union men. It was suspected

that many of them were written in St. Louis, or inspired by the cabal.

An incident related in confirmation of the justice of this suspicion is,

that General Harney received a letter from St. Joseph, stating that

ex-Governor Stewart and a number of the most respectable men in St.

Joseph had been driven from their homes, and that, unless soldiers were

soon sent, the Union men would all have to leave. He called upon the

Hon. F. P. Blair, an influential citizen of St. Louis, and asked him if

he knew the writer of the letter. The reply was: "Oh, yes, he is

perfectly reliable; you can believe anything he says."[183] General

Harney said he would write immediately to General Price. Dissatisfaction

was then manifested at such delay; but, two or three days later, a

letter from ex-Governor Stewart was published in the "St. Joseph News,"

in which was a marked paragraph of the copy sent to General Harney:

"Neither I nor any other Union man has been driven out of St. Joe."[184]

An attempt has been made to evade the conclusion that General Harney was

relieved from command because of his pacific policy. The argument is,

that the order was dated the 16th of May, and his agreement with General

Price was on the 21st of the same month, an argument more specious than

fair, as it appears from the letter of President Lincoln of May 18,

1861, to Hon. F. P. Blair, that the order sent from the War Department

to him was to be delivered or withheld at his discretion, and that it

was not delivered until the 30th of the month, and until after General

Harney had not only entered into his agreement with General Price, but

had declined to act upon sensational stories of persecution, on which

applications were made to send troops into the interior of Missouri.

During the days this order was held for his removal, with discretionary

power to deliver or withhold it, the above-recited events occurred, and

they may fairly be considered as having decided the question of his

removal from that command.

The principal United States arsenal at the West was that near to St.

Louis. To it had been transferred a large number of the altered muskets

sent from Springfield, Massachusetts, so that in 1861 the arms in that

arsenal were, perhaps, numerically second only to those at Springfield.

These arms, by a conjunction of deceptive and bold measures, were

removed from the arsenal in Missouri and transported to Illinois. To

whom did those arms belong? Certainly to those whose money had made or

purchased them. That is, to the States in common, not to their agent the

General Government, or to a portion of the States which might be in a

condition to appropriate them to their special use, and in disregard of

the rights of their partners.

Not satisfied with removing the public arms from the limits of Missouri,

the next step was that, in total disrespect of the constitutional right

of the citizens to bear arms for their own defense, and to be free from

searches and seizures except by warrants duly issued, the officers of

the General Government proceeded to search the houses of citizens in St.

Louis, and to seize arms wherever they were found.

Missouri had refused to engage in war against her sister States of the

South; therefore she was first to be disarmed, and then to be made the

victim of an invasion characterized by such barbarous atrocities as

shame the civilization of the age. The wrongs she suffered, the brave

efforts of her unarmed people to defend their hearthstones and their

liberties against the desecration and destruction of both, form a

melancholy chapter in the history of the United States, which all who

would cherish their fair fame must wish could be obliterated.

These acts of usurpation and outrage, as well upon the political as

personal rights of the people of Missouri, aroused an intense feeling in

that State. It will be remembered that Governor Jackson had responded to

the call of Mr. Lincoln upon him for troops with the just indignation of

one who understood the rights of the State, and the limited powers of

the General Government. His stern refusal to become a party to the war

upon the South made him the object of special persecution. By his side

in this critical juncture stood the gallant veteran, General Price. To

the latter was confided the conduct of the military affairs of the

State, and, after exhausting every effort to maintain order by peaceful

means, and seeing that the Government would recognize no other method

than that of force, he energetically applied himself to raise troops,

and procure arms so as to enable the State to meet force by force.

During this and all the subsequent period, the Governor and the General

were ably seconded by the accomplished, gallant, and indefatigable

Lieutenant-Governor, Reynolds.

The position of Missouri in 1860-'61 was unquestionably that of

opposition to the secession of the State. The people generously confided

in the disposition of the General Government to observe their rights,

and continued to hope for a peaceful settlement of the questions then

agitating the country. This was evinced by the fact that not a single

secessionist was elected to the State Convention, and that General

Price, an avowed "Union man," was chosen as President of the Convention.

Hence the general satisfaction with the agreement made between Generals

Harney and Price for the preservation of peace and non-intervention by

the army of the United States. General Harney, the day before the order

for his removal was communicated to him, wrote to the War Department,

expressing his confidence in the preservation of peace in Missouri, and

used this significant expression: "Interference by unauthorized parties

as to the course I shall pursue can alone prevent the realization of

these hopes."[185] The "unauthorized parties" here referred to could not

have been the people or the government of Missouri. Others than they

must have been the parties wishing to use force, provocative of

hostilities.

As has been heretofore stated, after his agreement with General Harney

at St. Louis, General Price returned to the capital and dismissed to

their homes the large body of militia that had been there assembled.

After the removal of General Harney, believed to be in consequence of

his determination to avoid the use of military force against the people

of Missouri, reports were rife of a purpose on the part of the

Administration at Washington to disarm the citizens of Missouri who did

not sympathize with the views of the Federal Government, and to put arms

into the hands of those who could be relied on to enforce them. On the

4th of June General Price issued an address to the people of Missouri,

and in reference to that report said: "The purpose of such a movement

could not be misunderstood; and it would not only be a palpable

violation of the agreement referred to, and an equally plain violation

of our constitutional rights, but a gross indignity to the citizens of

this State, which would be resisted to the last extremity."

The call of President Lincoln for seventy-five thousand volunteers

removed any preëxisting doubt as to the intent to coerce the States

which should claim to assert their right of sovereignty. Missouri, while

avowing her purpose to adhere to the Union, had asserted her right to

exercise supreme control over her domestic affairs, and this put her in

the category of a State threatened by the proceedings of the United

States Government. To provide for such contingency as might be

anticipated, Governor Jackson, on the 13th of June, issued a call for

fifty thousand volunteers, and Major-General Price took the field in

command. In this proclamation Governor Jackson said:

"A series of unprovoked and unparalleled outrages has been

inflicted on the peace and dignity of this Commonwealth, and

upon the rights and liberties of its people, by wicked and

unprincipled men professing to act under the authority of the

Government of the United States."

In his endeavor to maintain the peace of the State, and to avert, if

possible, from its borders a civil war, he caused the aforementioned

agreement to be made with the commander of the Northern forces in the

State, by which its peace might be preserved. That officer was promptly

removed by his Government. The Governor then, upon the increase of

hostile actions, proposed, at an interview with the new officer

commanding the forces of the United States Government, to disband the

State Guard, and break up its organization; to disarm all companies that

had been armed by the State; to pledge himself not to organize the

militia under the military bill; that no arms or munitions of war should

be brought into the State; that he would protect the citizens equally in

all their rights, regardless of their political opinions; that he would

repress all insurrectionary movements within the State; would repel all

attempts to invade it, from whatever quarter, and by whomsoever made;

and would maintain a strict neutrality and preserve the peace of the

State. And, further, if necessary, he would invoke the assistance of the

United States troops to carry out the pledges. The only conditions to

this proposition made by the Governor were that the United States

Government should undertake to disarm the "Home Guard" which it had

illegally organized and armed throughout the State, and pledge itself

not to occupy with its troops any localities in the State not occupied

by them at that time.

The words of a Governor of a State who offered such truly generous terms

deserve to be inserted: "Nothing but the most earnest desire to avert

the horrors of civil war from our beloved State could have tempted me to

propose these humiliating terms. They were rejected by the Federal

officers."

These demanded not only the disorganization and disarming of the State

militia and the nullification of the military bill, but they refused to

disarm their own "Home Guard," and insisted that the Government of the

United States should enjoy an unrestricted right to move and station its

troops throughout the State whenever and wherever it might, in the

opinion of its officers, be necessary either for the protection of its

"loyal subjects" or for the repelling of invasion; and they plainly

announced that it was the intention of the Administration to take

military occupation of the whole State, and to reduce it, as avowed by

General Lyon, to the "exact condition of Maryland."

We have already stated that the revolutionary measures which the United

States Government had undertaken to enforce involved the subjection of

every State, either by voluntary submission or subjugation. However much

a State might desire peace and neutrality, its own will could not elect.

The scheme demanded the absolute sovereignty of the Government of the

United States, or, in other words, the extinguishment of the

independence and sovereignty of the State. Human actions are not only

the fruit of the ruling motive, but they are also the evidence of the

existence of that motive. Thus, when we see the Governor of the State of

Missouri offering such generous terms to the government of the United

States in order to preserve peace and neutrality, and the latter,

rejecting them, avow its intention to do its will with the authorities,

the property, and the citizens of the State, and proceed with military

force to do it, its actions are both the evidence and the fruit of its

theory. These measures were revolutionary in the extreme. They involved

the entire subversion of those principles on which the American Union

was founded, and of the compact or Constitution of that Union. The

Government of the United States, in the hands of those who wielded its

authority, was made the bloody instrument to establish these usurpations

on the ruins of the crushed hopes of mankind for permanent freedom under

constitutional government. For the justness and truthfulness of these

allegations I appeal to the impartial and sober judgment of posterity.

The volunteers who were assembled under this proclamation of Governor

Jackson, of June 13th, had few arms except their squirrel-rifles and

shot-guns, and could scarcely be said to have any military equipments.

The brigadier-generals who were appointed were assigned to geographical

divisions, and, with such men as they could collect, reported in

obedience to their orders at Booneville and Lexington. On the 20th of

June, 1861, General Lyon and Colonel F. P. Blair, with an estimated

force of seven thousand well-armed troops, having eight pieces of

artillery, ascended the Missouri River, and debarked about five miles

below Booneville. To oppose them, the Missourians had there about eight

hundred men, poorly armed, without a piece of artillery, and but little

ammunition. With courage which must be commended at the expense of their

discretion, they resolved to engage the enemy, and, after a combat of an

hour and a half or more, retired, having inflicted heavy loss upon the

enemy, and suffering but little themselves. This first skirmish between

the Federal troops and the Missouri militia inspired confidence in their

fellow-citizens, and checked the contemptuous terms in which the militia

had been spoken of by the enemy. Governor Jackson, with some two hundred

and fifty to three hundred of the militia engaged in the action at

Booneville, started toward the southwestern portion of the State. He

marched in the direction of a place called Cole Camp, and, when within

twelve or fifteen miles of it, learned that a force of seven hundred to

one thousand of the enemy had been sent to that point by General Lyon

and Colonel Blair, with the view of intercepting his retreat. The

design, however, was frustrated by an expedition consisting of about

three hundred and fifty men, commanded by Colonel O'Kane, who had

assembled them in a very few hours in the neighborhood south of the

enemy's camp. There were no pickets out except in the neighborhood of

Jackson's forces, and Colonel O'Kane surprised the enemy where they were

asleep in two large barns. The attack was made at daybreak, the enemy

routed after suffering the heavy loss of two hundred and six killed and

more wounded, and more than a hundred prisoners. Three hundred and

sixty-two muskets with bayonets were captured. The Missourians lost four

killed and fifteen or twenty wounded.

General Price, with a view to draw his army from the baseline of the

enemy, the Missouri River, ordered his troops to the southwestern

portion of the State. The column from Lexington marched without

transportation, without tents or blankets, and relied for subsistence on

the country through which it passed, being in the mean time closely

pursued by the enemy. The movement was successfully made, and a junction

effected in Cedar County with the forces present with Governor Jackson.

The total when assembled was about thirty-six hundred men.

"This, then, was the patriot army of Missouri. It was a

heterogeneous mass representing every condition of Western life.

There were the old and young, the rich and poor, the grave and

gay, the planter and laborer, the farmer and clerk, the hunter

and boatman, the merchant and woodsman. At least five hundred of

these men were entirely unarmed. Many had only the common rifle

and shot-gun. None were provided with cartridges or canteens.

They had eight pieces of cannon, but no shells, and very few

solid shot, or rounds of grape and canister.

"Rude and almost incredible devices were made to supply these

wants: trace-chains, iron rods, hard pebbles, and smooth stones

were substituted for shot; and evidence of the effect of such

rough missiles was to be given in the next encounter with the

enemy."[186]

Governor Jackson continued his march toward southwestern Missouri. He

had received reliable intelligence that he was pursued by General Lyon

from the northeast, and by Lane and Sturgis from the northwest, their

supposed object being to form a junction in his rear, and he

subsequently learned that a column numbering three thousand had been

sent out from St. Louis to intercept his retreat, and had arrived at the

town of Carthage, immediately in his front. These undisciplined, poorly

armed Missourians were, therefore, in a position which would have

appalled less heroic men--a large hostile force in their rear, and

another, nearly equal in numbers to their own, disputing their passage

in front. They, however, cheerfully moved forward, attacked the enemy in

position, and, after a severe engagement, routed him, pursued him to a

second position, from which he was again driven, falling back to

Carthage, where he made his last stand, and, upon being driven from

which, as was subsequently ascertained, continued his retreat all night.

The killed and wounded of the enemy, left along the route of his retreat

over a space of ten miles, were estimated at from one hundred and fifty

to two hundred killed, and from three to four hundred wounded. Several

hundred muskets were captured, and the Missourians were better prepared

for future conflicts. Our loss was between forty and fifty killed, and

from one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and fifty wounded.[187]

If any shall ask why I have entered into such details of engagements

where the forces were comparatively so small, and the results so little

affected the final issue of the war, the reply is, that such heroism and

self-sacrifice as these undisciplined, partially armed, unequipped men

displayed against superior numbers, possessed of all the appliances of

war, claim special notice as bearing evidence not only of the virtue of

the men, but the sanctity of the cause which could so inspire them.

Unsupported, save by the consciousness of a just cause, without other

sympathy than that which the Confederate States fully gave, despising

the plea of helplessness, and defying the threats of a powerful

Government to crush her, Missouri, without arms or other military

preparation, took up the gauntlet thrown at her feet, and dared to make

war in defense of the laws and liberties of her people.

My motive for promptly removing the seat of government, after authority

was given by the Provisional Congress, has been heretofore stated, but

proximity to the main army of the enemy, and the flanking attacks by

which the new capital was threatened, did not diminish the anxiety,

which had been felt before removal from Montgomery, in regard to affairs

in Missouri, the "far West" of the Confederacy.

The State, which forty years before had been admitted to the Union,

against sectional resistance to the right guaranteed by the

Constitution, and specifically denominated in the treaty for the

acquisition of Louisiana, now, because her Governor refused to furnish

troops for the unconstitutional purpose of coercing States, became the

subject of special hostility and the object of extraordinary efforts for

her subjugation.

The little which it would have been possible for the Confederacy to do

to promote her military efficiency was diminished by the anomalous

condition in which the State troops remained until some time in the

second year of the war. A strange misapprehension led to unreasonable

complaints, under the supposition that Missouri was generally neglected,

and her favorite officer, General Price, was not accorded a commission

corresponding to his merit and the wishes of the people. It is due to

that gallant soldier and true patriot, that it should here be stated

that he was not a party to any such complaints, knew they were

unfounded, and realized that his wishes for the defense of Missouri were

fully reciprocated by the Executive of the Confederacy; all of which was

manifested in the correspondence between us, before Missouri had

tendered any troops to the Confederate States. It was his statement of

the difficulties and embarrassments which surrounded him that caused me

to write to the Governor of Missouri on the 21st of December, 1861,

stating to him my anxiety to have the troops of Missouri tendered and

organized into brigades and divisions, so that they might be rendered

more effective, and we be better able to provide for them by the

appointment of general officers and otherwise.

For a full understanding of the nature and degree of the complaints and

embarrassments referred to, I here insert my reply to letters sent to me

by the Hon. John B. Clarke, M.C., of Missouri:

Richmond, Virginia, _January 8, 1862_.

"Hon. John B. Clarke, _Richmond_, _Virginia_.

"Sir: I have received the two letters from Governor Jackson sent

by you this day. The Governor speaks of delay by the authorities

of Richmond, and neglect of the interests of Missouri, and

expresses the hope that he has said enough to be well understood

by me.

"When I remember that he wrote in reply to my call upon him to

hasten the tender of Missouri troops, so that they should be put

upon the footing of those of other States, and with a knowledge

that as militia of the State I had no power to organize or

appoint commanders for them, and that it was his duty to attend

to their wants, but that I had sent an agent of the Confederate

Government as far as practicable to furnish the necessary

supplies to the militia of Missouri actually in service, I can

only say, I hope he is not understood by me. It is but a short

time since, in a conversation of hours, I fully explained to you

the ease so far as I am connected with it, and there is nothing

for me to add to what you then seemed to consider conclusive.

"Very respectfully yours,

"Jefferson Davis."

As is usually the case when citizens are called from their ordinary

pursuits for the purposes of war, the people of Missouri did not then

realize the value of preparation in camp, and were reluctant to enroll

themselves for long periods. The State, even less than the Confederate

Government, could not supply them with the arms, munitions, and equipage

necessary for campaigns and battles and sieges. Under all these

disadvantages, it is a matter of well-grounded surprise that they were

able to achieve so much. The Missourians who fought at Vicksburg, and

who, after that long, trying, and disastrous siege, asked, when in the

camp of parolled prisoners, not if they could get a furlough, not if

they might go home when released, but how soon they might hope to be

exchanged and resume their places in the line of battle, show of what

metal the Missouri troops were made, and of what they were capable when

tempered in the fiery furnace of war.

I can recall few scenes during the war which impressed me more deeply

than the spirit of those worn prisoners waiting for the exchange that

would again permit them to take the hazards of battle for the cause of

their country.

This memory leads me to recur with regret to my inability, in the

beginning of the war, to convince the Governor of Missouri of the

necessity for thorough organization and the enrollment of men for long

terms, instead of loose combinations of militia for periods always short

and sometimes uncertain.

General Price possessed an extraordinary power to secure the personal

attachment of his troops, and to inspire them with a confidence which

served in no small degree as a substitute for more thorough training.

His own enthusiasm and entire devotion to the cause he served were

infused throughout his followers, and made them all their country's own.

To Lord Wellington has been attributed the remark that he did not want

zeal in a soldier, and to Napoleon the apothegm that Providence is on

the side of the heavy battalions. Zeal was oftentimes our main

dependence, and on many a hard-fought field served to drive our small

battalions, like a wedge, through the serried ranks of the enemy.

The Confederate States, yet in their infancy, and themselves engaged in

an unequal struggle for existence, by act of their Congress declared

that, if Missouri was engaged in repelling a lawless invasion of her

territory by armed forces, it was their right and duty to aid the people

and government of said State in resisting such invasion, and in securing

the means and the opportunity of expressing their will upon all

questions affecting their rights and liberties. With small means,

compared to their wants, the Confederate Congress, on the 6th of August,

appropriated one million dollars "to aid the people of the State of

Missouri in the effort to maintain, within their own limits, the

constitutional liberty which it is the purpose of the Confederate States

in the existing war to vindicate," etc.

In the next battle after that of Carthage, which has been noticed,

Missourians were no longer to be alone. General McCullough, commanding a

brigade of Confederate troops, marched from Arkansas to make a junction

with General Price, then threatened with an attack by a large force of

the enemy under General Lyon, which was concentrated near Springfield,

Missouri. The battle was fiercely contested, but finally won by our

troops. In this action General Lyon was killed while gallantly

endeavoring to rally his discomfited troops, and lead them to the

charge. While we can not forget the cruel wrongs he had inflicted and

sought still further to impose upon an unoffending people, we must

accord to him the redeeming virtue of courage, and recognize his ability

as a soldier. On this occasion General Price exhibited in two instances

the magnanimity, self-denial, and humanity which ever characterized him.

General McCulloch claimed the right to command as an officer of the

Confederate States Army. General Price, though he ranked him by a grade,

replied that "he was not fighting for distinction, but for the defense

of the liberties of his countrymen, and that it mattered but little what

position he occupied. He said he was ready to surrender not only the

command, but his life, as a sacrifice to the cause."[188] He surrendered

the command and took a subordinate position, though "he felt assured of

victory."

The second instance was an act of humanity to his bitterest enemy.

General Lyon's "surgeon came in for his body, under a flag of truce,

after the close of the battle, and General Price sent it in his own

wagon. But the enemy, in his flight, left the body unshrouded in

Springfield. The next morning, August 11th, Lieutenant-Colonel Gustavus

Elgin and Colonel R. H. Musser, two members of Brigadier General

Clarke's staff, caused the body to be properly prepared for

burial."[189]

After the battle of Springfield, General McCulloch returned with his

brigade to his former position in Arkansas. John C. Fremont had been

appointed a general, and assigned to the command made vacant by the

death of General Lyon. He signalized his entrance upon the duty by a

proclamation, confiscating the estates and slave property of "rebels."

"On the 10th of September, when General Price was about to go into camp,

he learned that a detachment of Federal troops was marching from

Lexington to Warrensburg, to seize the funds of the bank in that place,

and to arrest and plunder the citizens of Johnson County, in accordance

with General Fremont's proclamation and instructions."[190] General

Price resumed his march, and, pressing rapidly forward with his mounted

men, arrived about daybreak at Warrensburg, where he learned that the

enemy had hastily fled about midnight. He then decided to move with his

whole force against Lexington. He found the enemy in strong

intrenchments, and well supplied with artillery.

The place was stubbornly defended. The siege proper commenced on the

18th of September, 1861, and with varying fortunes. Fierce combats

continued through that day and the next. On the morning of the 20th

General Price ordered a number of bales of hemp to be transported to the

point from which the advance of his troops had been repeatedly repulsed.

They were ranged in a line for a breastwork, and, when rolled before the

men as they advanced, formed a moving rampart which was proof against

shot, and only to be overcome by a sortie in force, which the enemy did

not dare to make. On came the hempen breastworks, while Price's

artillery continued an effective fire. In the afternoon of the 20th the

enemy hung out a white flag, upon which General Price ordered a

cessation of firing, and sent to ascertain the object of the signal. The

Federal forces surrendered as prisoners of war, to the number of

thirty-five hundred; also, seven pieces of artillery, over three

thousand stand of muskets, a considerable number of sabres, a valuable

supply of ammunition, a number of horses, a large amount of commissary's

stores, and other property. Here were also recovered the great seal of

the State and the public records, and about nine hundred thousand

dollars of which the Bank of Lexington had been robbed. General Price

caused the money to be at once returned to the bank.

After the first day of the siege of Lexington, General Price learned

that Lane and Montgomery, from Kansas, with about four thousand men, and

General Sturgis, with fifteen hundred cavalry, were on the north side of

the Missouri River, advancing to reënforce the garrison at Lexington. At

the same time, and from the same direction, Colonel Saunders, with about

twenty-five hundred Missourians, was coming to the aid of General Price.

General D. R. Atchison, who had long been a United States Senator from

Missouri, and at the time of his resignation was President _pro tem._ of

the Senate, was sent by General Price to meet the command of Colonel

Saunders and hasten them forward. He joined them on the north bank of

the river, and, after all but about five hundred had been ferried over,

General Atchison still remaining with these, they were unexpectedly

attacked by the force from Kansas. The ground was densely wooded, and

partially covered with water. The Missourians, led and cheered by one

they had so long and deservedly honored, met the assault with such

determination, and fighting with the skill of woodsmen and hunters, that

they put the enemy to rout, pursuing him for a distance of ten miles,

and inflicting heavy loss upon him, while that of the Missourians was

but five killed and twenty wounded.

The expedient of the bales of hemp was a brilliant conception, not

unlike that which made Tarik, the Saracen warrior, immortal, and gave

his name to the northern pillar of Hercules.

The victories in Missouri which have been noticed, and which so far

exceeded what might have been expected from the small forces by which

they were achieved, had caused an augmentation of the enemy's troops to

an estimated number of seventy thousand. Against these the army of

General Price could not hope successfully to contend; he therefore

retired toward the southwestern part of the State.

The want of supplies and transportation compelled him to disband a

portion of his troops; with the rest he continued his retreat to Neosho.

By proclamation of Governor Jackson, the Legislature had assembled at

this place, and had passed the ordinance of secession. If other evidence

were wanting, the fact that, without governmental aid, without a

military chest, without munitions of war, the campaign which has been

described had so far been carried on by the voluntary service of the

citizens, and the free-will offerings of the people, must be conclusive

that the ordinance of secession was the expression of the popular will

of Missouri.

The forces of Missouri again formed a junction with the Confederate

troops under General McCulloch, and together they moved to Pineville, in

McDonald County.

[Footnote 182: See "Confederate First and Second Missouri Brigades,"

Bevier, pp. 24-26.]

[Footnote 183: See "Life of General Wm. S. Harney," by L. U. Reavis, p.

373.]

[Footnote 184: See Ibid., p. 373.]

[Footnote 185: See "Life of General Wm. S. Harney," by L. U. Reavis, p.

72]

[Footnote 186: Bevier, pp. 35, 36.]

[Footnote 187: Bevier, pp. 86-88.]

[Footnote 188: Bevier, p. 41.]

[Footnote 189: Ibid., pp. 49, 50.]

[Footnote 190: Ibid., p. 54.]

CHAPTER X.

Brigadier-General Henry A. Wise takes command in Western

Virginia.--His Movements.--Advance of General John B.

Floyd.--Defeats the Enemy.--Attacked by Rosecrans.--Controversy

between Wise and Floyd.--General R. E. Lee takes the Command in

West Virginia.--Movement on Cheat Mountain.--Its

Failure.--Further Operations.--Winter Quarters.--Lee sent to

South Carolina.

In June, 1861, Brigadier-General Henry A. Wise, who was well and

favorably known to the people of the Kanawha Valley, in his enthusiasm

for their defence and confidence in his ability to rally them to resist

the threatened invasion of that region, offered his services for that

purpose. With a small command, which was to serve as a nucleus to the

force he hoped to raise, he was sent thither. His success was as great

as could have been reasonably expected, and, after the small but

brilliant affair on Scary Creek, he prepared to give battle to the enemy

then advancing up the Kanawha Valley under General Cox; but the defeat

of our forces at Laurel Hill, which has been already noticed, uncovered

his right flank and endangered his rear, which was open to approach by

several roads; he therefore fell back to Lewisburg.

Brigadier-General John B. Floyd had in the mean time raised a brigade in

southwestern Virginia, and advanced to the support of General Wise.

Unfortunately, there was a want of concert between these two officers,

which prevented their entire coöperation. General Floyd engaged the

enemy in several brilliant skirmishes, when he found that his right was

threatened by a force which was approaching on that flank, with the

apparent purpose of crossing the Gauley River at the Carnifex Ferry so

as to strike his line of communication with Lewisburg. He crossed the

river with his brigade and a part of Wise's cavalry, leaving that

general to check any advance which Cox might make. General Floyd's

movement was as successful as it was daring; he met the enemy's forces,

defeated and dispersed them, but the want of coöperation between

Generals Wise and Floyd prevented a movement against General Cox.

Floyd intrenched himself on the Gauley, in a position of great natural

strength, but the small force under his command and the fact that he was

separated from that of General Wise probably induced General Rosecrans,

commanding the enemy's forces in the Cheat Mountain, to advance and

assail the position. Though his numbers were vastly superior, the attack

was a failure; after a heavy loss on the part of the enemy, he fell back

after nightfall. During the night Floyd crossed the river and withdrew

to the camp of General Wise, to form a junction of the two forces, and

together they fell back toward Sewell's Mountain. The unfortunate

controversy between these officers, which had prevented coöperation in

the past, grew more bitter, and each complained of the other in terms

that left little hope of future harmony; and this want of coöperation

led to confusion, and threatened further reverses.

General Loring had succeeded General Garnett, and was in command of the

remnant of the force defeated at Laurel Hill. His headquarters were at

Valley Mountain. General R. E. Lee, on duty at Richmond, aiding the

President in the general direction of military affairs, was now ordered

to proceed to western Virginia. It was hoped that, by his military skill

and deserved influence over men, he would be able to retrieve the

disaster we had suffered at Laurel Hill, and, by combining all our

forces in western Virginia on one plan of operations, give protection to

that portion of our country. Such reënforcement as could be furnished

had been sent to Valley Mountain, the headquarters of General Loring.

Thither General Lee promptly proceeded. The duty to which he was

assigned was certainly not attractive by the glory to be gained or the

ease to be enjoyed, but Lee made no question as to personal preference,

and, whatever were his wishes, they were subordinate to what was

believed to be the public interest.

The season had been one of extraordinary rains, rendering the

mountain-roads, ordinarily difficult, almost impassable. With

unfaltering purpose and energy, he crossed the Alleghany Mountains, and,

learning that the main encampment of the enemy was in the valley of

Tygart River and Elk Run, Randolph County, he directed his march toward

that position. The troops under the immediate command of

Brigadier-General H. R. Jackson, together with those under

Brigadier-General Loring, were about thirty-five hundred men. The force

of the enemy, as far as it could be ascertained, was very much greater.

In the detached work at Cheat Mountain Pass, we learned by a

provision-return, found upon the person of a captured staff-officer,

that there were three thousand men, being but a fraction less than our

whole force. After a careful reconnaissance, and a full conference with

General Loring, Lee decided to attack the main encampment of the enemy

by a movement of his troops converging upon the valley from three

directions. The colonel of one of his regiments, who had reconnoitered

the position of the works at Cheat Mountain Pass, reported that it was

feasible to turn it and carry it by assault, and he was assigned to that

duty. General Lee ordered other portions of his force to take position

on the spurs overlooking the enemy's main encampment, while he led three

regiments to the height below and nearest to the position of the enemy.

The instructions were that the officer sent to turn the position at

Cheat Mountain Pass should approach it at early dawn, and immediately

open fire, which was to be the signal for the concerted attack by the

rest of the force. It rained heavily during the day, and, after a

toilsome night-march, the force led by General Lee, wet, weary, hungry,

and cold, gained their position close to and overlooking the enemy's

encampment. In their march they had surprised and captured the picket,

without a gun being fired, so that no notice had been given of their

approach.

The officer who had been sent to attack the work at Cheat Mountain Pass

found on closer examination that he had been mistaken as to the

practicability of taking it by assault, and that the heavy abatis which

covered it was advanced beyond the range of his rifles. Not having

understood that his firing was to be the signal for the general attack,

and should therefore be opened, whether it would be effective or not, he

withdrew without firing a musket.

The height occupied by General Lee was shrouded in fog, and, as morning

had dawned without the expected signal, he concluded that some mishap

had befallen the force which was to make it. By a tortuous path he went

down the side of the mountain low enough to have a distinct view of the

camp. He saw the men, unconscious of the near presence of an enemy,

engaged in cleaning their arms, cooking, and other morning occupations;

then returning to his command, he explained to his senior officers what

he had seen, and expressed his belief that, though the plan of attack

had failed, the troops there with him could surprise and capture the

camp. The officers withdrew, conferred with their men, and reported to

the General that the troops were not in condition for the enterprise. As

the fog was then lifting, and they would soon be revealed to the enemy

below, whose numbers were vastly superior to his own, he withdrew his

command by the route they had come, and without observation returned to

his camp. Beyond some skirmishes with outposts and reconnoitering

parties, our troops had not been engaged, and in these affairs our

reported loss was comparatively small.

Colonel John A. Washington, aide-de-camp of General Lee, was killed,

while making a reconnaissance, by a party in ambuscade. The loss of this

valuable and accomplished officer was much regretted by his general and

all others who knew him.

The report that Rosecrans and Cox had united their commands and were

advancing upon Wise and Floyd caused General Lee to move at once to

their support. He found General Floyd at Meadow Bluff and General Wise

at Sewell Mountain. The latter position being very favorable for

defense, the troops were concentrated there to await the threatened

attack by Rosecrans, who advanced and took position in sight of General

Lee's intrenched camp, and, having remained there for more than a week,

withdrew in the night without attempting the expected attack.

The weak condition of his artillery-horses and the bad state of the

roads, made worse by the retiring army, prevented General Lee from

attempting to pursue; and the approach of winter, always rigorous in

that mountain-region, closed the campaign with a small but brilliant

action in which General H. R. Jackson repelled an attack of a greatly

superior force, inflicting severe loss on the assailants, and losing but

six of his own command.

With the close of active operations, General Lee returned to Richmond,

and, though subjected to depreciatory criticism by the carpet-knights

who make campaigns on assumed hypotheses, he with characteristic

self-abnegation made no defense of himself, not even presenting an

official report of his night-march in the Cheat Mountain, but orally he

stated to me the facts which have formed the basis of this sketch. My

estimate of General Lee, my confidence in his ability, zeal, and

fidelity, rested on a foundation not to be shaken by such criticism as I

have noticed. I had no more doubt then, than after his fame had been

securely established, that, whenever he had the opportunity to prove his

worth, he would secure public appreciation. Therefore, as affairs on the

coast of South Carolina and Georgia were in an unsatisfactory condition,

he was directed to go there and take such measures for the defense,

particularly of Savannah and Charleston, as he should find needful. Lest

the newspaper attack should have created unjust and unfavorable

impressions in regard to him, I thought it desirable to write to

Governor Pickens and tell him what manner of man he was who had been

sent to South Carolina.

After the withdrawal of the Confederate army from Fairfax Court-House

and the positions which had been occupied in front of that place, a

movement was made by the enemy to cross the Potomac near Leesburg, where

we had, under the command of Brigadier General N. S. Evans, of South

Carolina, four regiments of infantry (i.e., the Thirteenth, Seventeenth,

and Eighteenth Mississippi, and the Eighth Virginia), commanded

respectively by Colonels Barksdale, Featherston, Burt, and Hunton, a

small detachment of cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jenifer, and some

pieces of artillery.

On the 21st of October the enemy commenced crossing the river at

Edwards's Ferry. A brigade was thrown over and met by the Thirteenth

Mississippi, which held them in check at the point of crossing. In the

mean time another brigade was thrown over at Ball's Bluff, and, as

troops continued to cross at that point, where the Eighth Virginia had

engaged them, General Evans ordered up the Seventeenth and Eighteenth

Mississippi, and the three regiments made such an impetuous attack as to

drive back the enemy to the bluff, and their leader, Colonel Baker,

having fallen, a panic seemed to seize the command, so that they rushed

headlong down the bluff, and crowded into the flat-boats, which were

their means of transportation, in such numbers that they were sunk, and

many of the foe were drowned in their attempt to swim the river. The

loss of the enemy, prisoners included, exceeded the number of our troops

in the action. The Confederate loss was reported to be thirty-six

killed, one hundred and seventeen wounded, and two captured; total, one

hundred and fifty-five. Among the killed was the gallant Colonel Burt, a

much-respected citizen of Mississippi, where he had held high civil

station, and where his death was long deplored.

CHAPTER XI.

The Issue.--The American Idea of Government.--Who was

responsible for the War?--Situation of Virginia.--Concentration

of the Enemy against Richmond.--Our Difficulty.--Unjust

Criticisms.--The Facts set forth.--Organization of the

Army.--Conference at Fairfax Court-House.--Inaction of the

Army.--Capture of Romney.--Troops ordered to retire to the

Valley.--Discipline.--General Johnston regards his Position as

unsafe.--The First Policy.--Retreat of General Johnston.--The

Plans of the Enemy.--Our Strength magnified by the

Enemy.--Stores destroyed.--The Trent Affair.

It has been shown that the Southern States, by their representatives in

the two Houses of Congress, consistently endeavored even to the last

day, when they were by their constituents permitted to remain in the

halls of Federal legislation, to maintain the Constitution, and preserve

the Union which the States had by their independent action ordained and

established. On the other hand, proof has been adduced to show that the

Northern States, by a majority of their representatives in the Congress,

had persisted in agitation injurious to the welfare and tranquillity of

the Southern States, and at the last moment had refused to make any

concessions, or to offer any guarantees to check the current toward

secession of the complaining States, whose love for the Union rendered

them willing to accept less than justice should have readily accorded.

The issue was then presented between submission to empire of the North,

or the severance of those ties consecrated by many memories, and

strengthened by those habits which render every people reluctant to

sever long-existing associations.

The authorities heretofore cited have, I must believe, conclusively

shown that the question of changing their government was one that the

States had the power to decide by virtue of the unalienable right

announced in the Declaration of Independence, and which had been proudly

denominated the American idea of government. The hope and the wish of

the people of the South were that the disagreeable necessity of

separation would be peacefully met, and be followed by such commercial

regulations as would least disturb the prosperity and future intercourse

of the separated States. Every step taken by the Confederate Government

was directed toward that end. The separation of the States having been

decided on, it was sought to effect it in such manner as would be just

to the parties concerned, and preserve as far as possible, under

separate governments, the fraternal and mutually beneficial relations

which had existed between the States when united, and which it was the

object of their compact of union to secure. To all the proofs heretofore

offered I confidently refer for the establishment of the fact that

whatever of bloodshed, of devastation, or shock to republican government

has resulted from the war, is to be charged to the Northern States. The

invasions of the Southern States, for purposes of coercion, were in

violation of the written Constitution, and the attempt to subjugate

sovereign States, under the pretext of "preserving the Union," was alike

offensive to law, to good morals, and the proper use of language. The

Union was the voluntary junction of free and independent States; to

subjugate any of them was to destroy constituent parts, and necessarily,

therefore, must be the destruction of the Union itself.

That the Southern States were satisfied with a Federal Government such

as their fathers had formed, was shown by their adoption of a

Constitution so little differing from the instrument of 1787. It was

against the violations of that instrument, and usurpations offensive to

their pride and injurious to their interests, that they remonstrated,

argued, and finally appealed to the inherent, undelegated power of the

States to judge of their wrongs, and of the "mode and measure of

redress."

After many years of fruitless effort to secure from their Northern

associates a faithful observance of the compact of union; after its

conditions had been deliberately and persistently broken, and the signs

of the times indicated further and more ruthless violations of their

rights as equals in the Union, the Southern States, preferring a

peaceful separation to continuance in a hostile Union, decided to

exercise their sovereign right to withdraw from an association which had

failed to answer the ends for which it was formed. It has been shown how

they endeavored to effect the change with strict regard to the

principles controlling a dissolution of partnership, and how earnestly

they desired to remain in friendly relations to the Northern States, and

how all their overtures were rejected. When they pleaded for peace, the

United States Government deceptively delayed to answer, while making

ready for war. To the calm judgment of mankind is submitted the

question, Who was responsible for the war between the States?

Virginia, whose history, from the beginning of the Revolution of 1776,

had been a long course of sacrifices for the benefit of her sister

States, and for the preservation of the Union she had mainly contributed

to establish, clung to it with the devotion of a mother. It has been

shown how her efforts to check dissolution were persisted in when the

aggrieved were hopeless and the aggressors reckless, and how her

mediations were rejected in the "Peace Congress," which on her motion

had been assembled. Sorrowing over the failure of this, her blessed

though unsuccessful attempt to preserve the Union _of the Constitution_,

she was not permitted to mourn as a neutral, but was required by the

United States Government to choose between furnishing troops to

subjugate her Southern sisters or the reclamation of the grants she had

made to the Federal Government when she became a member of the Union.

The first was a violation of the letter and the spirit of the

Constitution; the second was a reserved right. The voice of Henry called

to her from the ground; the spirits of Washington and Jefferson moved

among her people.

There was but one course consistent with her stainless reputation and

often-declared tenets, as to the liberties of her people, which she

could have adopted. As in 1776, reluctantly she bowed to the necessity

of separation from the Crown, so in 1861 the ordinance of secession was

adopted. Having exhausted all other means, she took the last resort,

and, if for this she was selected as the first object of assault,

"methinks the punishment exceedeth the offense."

The large resources and full preparation of the United States Government

enabled it to girt Virginia as with a wall of fire. It has been shown

that she was threatened from the east, from the north, and from the

west. The capital of the State and of the Confederacy, Richmond, was the

objective point, and on this the march of three columns concentrated. On

the east, the advance of the enemy was on several occasions feasible,

when we consider the number of his forces at and about Fortress Monroe,

in comparison with the small means retained for the defense of the

capital. On the north, the most formidable army of the enemy was

assembled; to oppose it we had the comparatively small Army of the

Potomac. This being regarded as the line on which the greatest danger

was apprehended, our efforts were mostly directed toward giving it the

requisite strength. Troops, as rapidly as they could be raised and

armed, were sent forward for that purpose. From the beginning to the

close of the war, we mainly relied for the defense of the capital on its

aged citizens, boys too young for service, and the civil employees of

the executive departments. On several occasions these were called out to

resist an attack. They answered with alacrity, and always bore

themselves gallantly, more than once repelling the enemy in the open

field. Had it been practicable to do so, it would surely have been

proper to keep a large force in reserve for the defense of the capital,

so often and vauntingly proclaimed to be the object of the enemy's

campaign. Perhaps the propriety of such provision gave currency and

credence to rumors that we had a large force at Richmond. This even led

to the application for a detachment from it to reënforce our Army of the

Potomac, which caused me to write to General J. E. Johnston at Manassas,

Virginia, on September 5, 1861, as follows:

"You have again been deceived as to the forces here. We never

have had anything near to twenty thousand men, and have now but

little over one fourth of that number.... Since the date of your

glorious victory the enemy have grown weaker in numbers, and far

weaker in the character of their troops, so that I had felt it

remained with us to decide whether another battle should soon be

fought or not. Your remark indicates a different opinion.... I

wish I could send additional force to occupy Loudon, but my

means are short of the wants of each division I am laboring to

protect. One ship-load of small-arms would enable me to answer

all demands, but vainly have I hoped and waited."

Then, there, and everywhere, our difficulty was the want of arms and

munitions of war. Lamentable cries came to us from the West for the

supplies which would enable patriotic citizens to defend their homes.

The resource upon which the people had so confidently relied, the

private arms in the hands of citizens, proved a sad delusion, and

elsewhere it has been shown how deficient we were in ammunition, or the

means of providing it. The simple fact was, the country had gone to war

without counting the cost.

Undue elation over our victory at Manassas was followed by

dissatisfaction at what was termed the failure to reap the fruits of

victory; and rumors, for which there could be no better excuse than

partisan zeal, were circulated that the heroes of the hour were

prevented from reaping the fruits of the victory by the interference of

the President. Naturally there followed another rumor, that the inaction

of the victorious army, to which reënforcements continued to be sent,

was due to the policy of the President; and he also was held

responsible, and with more apparent justice, for the failure to organize

the troops of the several States, as the law contemplated, into brigades

and divisions composed of the soldiers of each.

Though these unjust criticisms weakened the power of the Government to

meet its present and provide for its future necessities, I bore them in

silence, lest to vindicate myself should injure the public service by

turning the public censure to the generals on whom the hopes of the

country rested. That motive no longer exists; and, to justify the faith

of those who, without a defense continued to uphold my hands, I propose

to set forth the facts by correspondence and otherwise. So far as, in

doing this, blame shall be transferred from me to others, it will be the

incident, not the design, as it would be most gratifying to me only to

notice for praise each and all who wore the gray.

The fiction of my having prevented the pursuit of the enemy after the

victory of Manassas was exploded after it had acquired an authoritative

and semi-official form in the manner and for the reasons heretofore set

forth. It only remains, therefore, to notice the other points indicated

above:

First, the organization of the army.

Disease and discontent are known to be the attendants of armies lying

unemployed in camps, especially, as in our case, when the troops were

composed of citizens called from their homes under the idea of a

pressing necessity, and with the hope of soon returning to them.

Our citizen soldiers were a powerful political element, and their

correspondence, finding its way to the people through the press and to

the halls of Congress by direct communication with the members, was

felt, by its influence both upon public opinion and general legislation.

Members of Congress, and notably the Vice-President, contended that men

should be allowed to go home and attend to their private affairs while

there were no active operations, and that there was no doubt but that

they would return whenever there was to be a battle. The experience of

war soon taught our people the absurdity of such ideas, and before its

close probably none would have uttered them.

There were very many men out of the army who were anxious to enter it,

but for whom we had not arms. This gave rise to the remark, more

humorous than profound, that we "stood around the camps with clubs to

keep one set in and an other set out." Had this been true, it was

certainly justifiable to refuse to exchange a trained man for a recruit.

All who have seen service know that one old soldier is, in campaign,

equal to several who have everything of military life to learn.

A marked characteristic of the Southern people was individuality, and

time was needful to teach them that the terrible machine, a disciplined

army, must be made of men who had surrendered their freedom of will. The

most distinguished of our citizens were not the slowest to learn the

lesson, and perhaps no army ever more thoroughly knew it than did that

which Lee led into Pennsylvania, and none ever had a leader who in his

own conduct better illustrated the lesson.

Our largest army in 1861 was that of the Potomac. It had been formed by

the junction of the forces under General J. E. Johnston with those under

General P. G. T. Beauregard, with such additions as could be hurriedly

sent forward to meet the enemy on the field of Manassas. They were

combined into brigades and divisions as pressing exigencies required.

By the act of February 28, 1861, the President was authorized to receive

companies, battalions, and regiments to form a part of the provisional

army of the Confederate States, and, with the advice and consent of

Congress, to appoint general officers for them; and by the act of March

6th the President was to apportion the staff and general officers among

the respective States from which the volunteers were received. It will

thus be seen that the States generously surrendered their right to

preserve for those volunteers the character of State troops and to

appoint general officers when furnishing a sufficient number of

regiments to require such grade for their command; but, in giving their

volunteers to form the provisional army of the Confederacy, it was

distinctly suggested that the general officers should be so appointed as

to make a just apportionment among the States furnishing the troops.

During the repose which followed the battle of Manassas, it was deemed

proper that the regiments of the different States should be assembled in

brigades together, and, as far as consistent with the public service,

that the spirit of the law should be complied with by the assignment of

brigadier-generals of the same State from which the troops were drawn.

Instructions to that end were therefore given, and again and again

repeated, but were for a long time only partially complied with, until

the delay formed the basis of the argument that those who had by

association become thoroughly acquainted would more advantageously be

left united. In the mean time, frequent complaints came to me from the

army, of unjust discrimination, the law being executed in regard to the

troops of some States but not of others, and of serious discontent

arising therefrom.

The duty to obey the law was imperative, and neither the Executive nor

the officers of the army had any right to question its propriety. I,

however, considered the policy of that law wise, and was not surprised

when it was stated to me that the persistent obstruction to its

execution was repressing the spirit to volunteer in places to which

complaints of such supposed favoritism had been transmitted.

About the 1st of October, at the request of General Johnston, I went to

his headquarters, at Fairfax Court-House, for the purpose of conference.

At the time of this visit to the army, the attention of the general

officers, who then met me in conference, was called to the obligation

created by law to organize the troops, when the numbers tendered by any

State permitted it, into brigades and divisions composed of the

regiments, battalions, or companies of such State, and to assign general

and staff officers in the ratio of the troops thus received. After my

return to the capital, the importance of the subject weighed so heavily

upon me as to lead to correspondence with the generals, which will be

best understood by the following extracts from my letters to them--which

are here appended:

"Major-General G. W. Smith, _Army of Potomac_.

"... How have you progressed in the solution of the problem I

left--the organization of the troops with reference to the

States, and term of service? If the volunteers continue their

complaints that they are commanded by strangers and do not get

justice, and that they are kept in camp to die when reported for

hospital by the surgeon, we shall soon feel a reaction in the

matter of volunteering. Already I have been much pressed on both

subjects, and have answered by promising that the generals would

give due attention, and, I hoped, make satisfactory changes. The

authority to organize regiments into brigades and the latter

into divisions is by law conferred only on the President; and I

must be able to assume responsibility of the action taken by

whomsoever acts for me in that regard. By reference to the law,

you will see that, in surrendering the sole power to appoint

general officers, it was nevertheless designed, as far as should

be found consistent, to keep up the State relation of troops and

generals. Kentucky has a brigadier, but not a brigade; she has,

however, a regiment--that regiment and brigadier might be

associated together. Louisiana had regiments enough to form a

brigade, but no brigadier in either corps; all of the regiments

were sent to that corps commanded by a Louisiana general.

Georgia has regiments now organized into two brigades; she has

on duty with that army two brigadiers, but one of them serves

with other troops. Mississippi troops were scattered as if the

State were unknown. Brigadier-General Clark was sent to remove a

growing dissatisfaction, but, though the State had nine

regiments there, he (Clark) was put in command of a post and

depot of supplies. These nine regiments should form two

brigades. Brigadiers Clark and (as a native of Mississippi)

Whiting should be placed in command of them, and the regiments

for the war put in the army man's brigade. Both brigades should

be put in the division commanded by General Van Dorn, of

Mississippi. Thus would the spirit and intent of the law be

complied with, disagreeable complaint be spared me, and more of

content be assured under the trials to which you look forward.

It is needless to specify further. I have been able in writing

to you to speak freely, and you have no past associations to

disturb the judgment to be passed upon the views presented. I

have made and am making inquiries as to the practicability of

getting a corps of negroes for laborers to aid in the

construction of an intrenched line in rear of your present

position.

"Your remarks on the want of efficient staff-officers are

realized in all their force, and I hope, among the elements

which constitute a staff-officer for volunteers, you have duly

estimated the qualities of forbearance and urbanity. Many of the

privates are men of high social position, of scholarship and

fortune. Their pride furnishes the motive for good conduct, and,

if wounded, is turned from an instrument of good to one of great

power for evil...."

"Richmond, Virginia, _October 16, 1861_.

"General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia_.

"... I have thought often upon the questions of reorganization

which were submitted to you, and it has seemed to me that,

whether in view of disease, or the disappointment and suffering

of a winter cantonment on a line of defense, or of a battle to

be fought in and near your position, it was desirable to combine

the troops, by a new distribution, with as little delay as

practicable. They will be stimulated to extraordinary effort

when so organized, in that the fame of their State will be in

their keeping, and that each will feel that his immediate

commander will desire to exalt rather than diminish his

services. You pointed me to the fact that you had observed that

rule in the case of the Louisiana and Carolina troops, and you

will not fail to perceive that others find in the fact a reason

for the like disposal of them. In the hour of sickness, and the

tedium of waiting for spring, men from the same region will best

console and relieve each other. The maintenance of our cause

rests on the sentiments of the people. Letters from the camp,

complaining of inequality and harshness in the treatment of the

men, have already dulled the enthusiasm which filled our ranks

with men who by birth, fortune, education, and social position

were the equals of any officer in the land. The spirit of our

military law is manifested in the fact that the State

organization was limited to the regiment. The volunteers come in

sufficient numbers to have brigadiers, but have only colonels.

It was not then intended (is the necessary conclusion) that

those troops should be under the immediate command of officers

above the grade of colonel. The spirit of the law, then,

indicates that brigades should be larger than customary, the

general being charged with the care, the direction, the

preservation of the men, rather than the internal police."

"Richmond, Virginia, _October_ 20, 1861.

"General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia_.

"My Dear General:... Two rules have been applied in the

projected reorganization of the Army of the Potomac:

"1. As far as practicable, to keep regiments from the same State

together; 2. To assign generals to command the troops of their

own State. I have not overlooked the objections to each, but the

advantages are believed to outweigh the disadvantages of that

arrangement. In distributing the regiments of the several States

it would, I think, be better to place the regiments for the war

in the same brigade of the State, and assign to those brigades

the brigadiers whose services could least easily be dispensed

with. For this, among other reasons, I will mention but one: the

commission of a brigadier expires upon the breaking up of his

brigade (see the law for their appointment). Of course, I would

not for slight cause change the relations of troops and

commanders, especially where it has been long continued and

endeared by the trials of battle; but it is to be noted that the

regiment was fixed as the unit of organization, and made the

connecting link between the soldier and his home. Above that,

all was subject to the discretion of the Confederate

authorities, save the pregnant intimation in relation to the

distribution of generals among the several States. It was

generous and confiding to surrender entirely to the Confederacy

the appointment of generals, and it is the more incumbent on me

to carry out as well as may be the spirit of the volunteer

system."

"Richmond, _May 10, 1862_.

"General J. E. Johnston.

"... Your attention has been heretofore called to the law in

relation to the organization of brigades and divisions--orders

were long since given to bring the practice and the law into

conformity. Recently reports have been asked for from the

commanders of separate armies as to the composition of their

respective brigades and divisions. I have been much harassed,

and the public interest has certainly suffered, by the delay to

place the regiments of some of the States in brigades together,

it being deemed that unjust discrimination was made against

them, and also by the popular error which has existed as to the

number of brigadiers to which appointments could be specially

urged on the grounds of residence. While some have expressed

surprise at my patience when orders to you were not observed, I

have at least hoped that you would recognize the desire to aid

and sustain you, and that it would produce the corresponding

action on your part. The reasons formerly offered have one after

another disappeared, and I hope you will, as you can, proceed to

organize your troops as heretofore instructed, and that the

returns will relieve us of the uncertainty now felt as to the

number and relations of the troops, and the commands of the

officers having brigades and divisions.... I will not dwell on

the lost opportunity afforded along the line of northern

Virginia, but must call your attention to the present condition

of affairs and probable action of the enemy, if not driven from

his purpose to advance on the Fredericksburg route....

"Very truly yours,

"Jefferson Davis."

On the 26th of May General Johnston's attention was again called to the

organization of the ten Mississippi regiments into two brigades, and was

reminded that the proposition had been made to him in the previous

autumn, with an expression of my confidence that the regiments would be

more effective in battle if thus associated.

I will now proceed to notice the allegation that I was responsible for

inaction by the Army of the Potomac, in the latter part of 1861 and in

the early part of 1862. After the explosion of the fallacy that I had

prevented the pursuit of the enemy from Manassas in July, 1861, my

assailants have sought to cover their exposure by a change of time and

place, locating their story at Fairfax Court-House, and dating it in the

autumn of 1861.

When at that time and place I met General Johnston for conference, he

called in the two generals next in rank to himself, Beauregard and G. W.

Smith. The question for consideration was, What course should be adopted

for the future action of the army? and the preliminary inquiry by me was

as to the number of the troops there assembled. To my surprise and

disappointment, the effective strength was stated to be but little

greater than when it fought the battle of the 21st of the preceding

July. The frequent reënforcements which had been sent to that army in

nowise prepared me for such an announcement. To my inquiry as to what

force would be required for the contemplated advance into Maryland, the

lowest estimate made by any of them was about twice the number there

present for duty. How little I was prepared for such a condition of

things will be realized from the fact that previous suggestions by the

generals in regard to a purpose to advance into Maryland had induced me,

when I went to that conference, to take with me some drawings made by

the veteran soldier and engineer, Colonel Crozêt, of the falls of the

Potomac, to show the feasibility of crossing the river at that point.

Very little knowledge of the condition and military resources of the

country must have sufficed to show that I had no power to make such an

addition to that army without a total disregard of the safety of other

threatened positions. It only remained for me to answer that I had not

power to furnish such a number of troops; and, unless the militia

bearing their private arms should be relied on, we could not possibly

fulfill such a requisition until after the receipt of the small-arms

which we had early and constantly striven to procure from abroad, and

had for some time expected.

After I had written the foregoing, and all the succeeding chapters on

kindred subjects, a friend, in October, 1880, furnished me with a copy

of a paper relating to the conference at Fairfax Court-House, which

seems to require notice at my hands.

Therefore I break the chain of events to insert here some remarks in

regard to it.

The paper appears to have been written by General G. W. Smith, and to

have received the approval of Generals Beauregard and J. E. Johnston,

and to bear date the 31st of January, 1862.

It does not agree in some respects with my memory of what occurred, and

is not consistent with itself. It was not necessary that I should learn

in that interview the evil of inactivity. My correspondence of anterior

date might have shown that I was fully aware of it, and my suggestions

in the interview certainly did not look as if it was necessary to

impress me with the advantage of action.

In one part of the paper it is stated that the reënforcements asked for

were to be "seasoned soldiers," such as were there present, and who were

said to be in the "finest fighting condition." This, if such a

proposition had been made, would have exposed its absurdity, as well as

the loophole it offered for escape, by subsequently asserting that the

troops furnished were not up to the proposed standard.

In another part of the paper it is stated that there were hope and

expectation that, before the end of the winter, arms would be introduced

into the country, and that then we could successfully invade that of the

enemy; but this supply of arms, however abundant, could not furnish

"seasoned soldiers," and the two propositions are therefore

inconsistent. In one place it is written that "it was felt it might be

better to run the risk of almost certain destruction fighting upon the

other side of the Potomac, rather than see the gradual dying out and

deterioration of this army during a winter," etc.; but, when it was

proposed to cross into eastern Maryland on a steamer in our possession

for a partial campaign, difficulties arose like the lion in the path of

the sluggard, so that the proposition was postponed and never executed.

In like manner the other expedition in the Valley of Virginia was

achieved by an officer not of this council, General T. J. Jackson.

In one place it is written that the President stated, "At that time no

reënforcements could be furnished to the army of the character asked

for." In another place he is made to say he could not take any troops

from the points named, and, "without arms from abroad, could not

reënforce that army." Here, again, it is clear from the answer that the

proposition had been for such reënforcement as additional arms would

enable him to give. Those arms he expected to receive, barring the

dangers of the sea, and of the enemy, which obstacles alone prevented

the "positive assurance that they would be received at all."

It was, as stated, with deep regret and bitter disappointment that I

found, notwithstanding our diligent efforts to reënforce this army

before and after the battle of Manassas, that its strength had but

little increased, and that the arms of absentees and discharged men were

represented by only twenty-five hundred on hand. I can not suppose that

General Johnston could have noticed the statement that his request for

conference had set forth the object of it to be to discuss the question

of reënforcement. He would have known that in Richmond, where all the

returns were to be found, any consideration of reënforcement, by the

withdrawal of troops from existing garrisons, could best be decided.

Very little experience or a fair amount of modesty without any

experience would serve to prevent one from announcing his conclusion

that troops could be withdrawn from a place or places without knowing

how many were there, and what was the necessity for their presence.

I was at the conference by request; the confidence felt in those

officers is shown by the fact that I met them alone, and did not require

any minutes to be made of the meeting. About four months afterward a

paper was prepared to make a record of the conversation; the fact was

concealed from me, whereas, both for accuracy and frankness, it should

have been submitted to me, even if there had been nothing due to our

official relations. Twenty years after the event, I learned of this

secret report, by one party, without notice having been given to the

other, of a conversation said to have lasted two hours.

I have noticed the improbabilities and inconsistencies of the paper,

and, without remark, I submit to honorable men the concealment from me

in which it was prepared, whereby they may judge of the chances for such

co-intelligence as needs must exist between the Executive and the

commanders of armies to insure attainable success.

The position at Fairfax Court-House, though it would answer very well as

a point from which to advance, was quite unfavorable for defense; and

when I so remarked, the opinion seemed to be that to which the generals

had previously arrived. It, therefore, only remained to consider what

change of position should be made in the event of the enemy threatening

soon to advance. But in the mean time I hoped that something could be

done by detachments from the army to effect objects less difficult than

an advance against his main force, and particularly indicated the lower

part of Maryland, where a small force was said to be ravaging the

country and oppressing our friends. This, I thought, might be feasible

by the establishment of a battery near to Acquia Creek, where the

channel of the Potomac was said to be so narrow that our guns could

prevent the use of the river by the enemy's boats, and, by employing a

steamboat lying there, troops enough could be sent over some night to

defeat that force, and return before any large body could be

concentrated against them. The effect of the battery and of the

expedition, it was hoped, would be important in relieving our friends

and securing recruits from those who wished to join us. Previously,

General Johnston's attention had been called to possibilities in the

Valley of the Shenandoah, and that these and other like things were not

done, was surely due to other causes than "the policy of the

Administration," as will appear by the letters hereto annexed:

"Richmond, Virginia, _August_ 1, 1861.

"General J. E. Johnston:

"... General Lee has gone to western Virginia, and I hope may be

able to strike a decisive blow in that quarter, or, failing in

that, will be able to organize and post our troops so as to

check the enemy, after which he will return to this place.

"The movement of Banks will require your attention. It may be a

_ruse_, but, if a real movement, when your army has the

requisite strength and mobility, you will probably find an

opportunity, by a rapid movement through the passes, to strike

him in rear or flank, and thus add another to your many claims

to your country's gratitude.... We must be prompt to avail

ourselves of the weakness resulting from the exchange of the new

and less reliable forces of the enemy, for those heretofore in

service, as well as of the moral effect produced by their late

defeat....

"I am, as ever, your friend,

"Jefferson Davis."

From the correspondence which occurred after the conference at Fairfax

Court-House, I select a reply made to General Smith, who had written to

me in advocacy of the views he had then expressed about large

reënforcements to the Army of the Potomac, for an advance into Maryland.

Nothing is more common than that a general, realizing the wants of the

army with which he is serving, and the ends that might be achieved if

those wants were supplied, should overlook the necessities of others,

and accept rumors of large forces which do not exist, and assume the

absence of danger elsewhere than in his own front.

"Richmond, Virginia, _October_ 10, 1861.

"Major-General G. W. Smith, _Army of the Potomac_.

"... Your remarks about the moral effect of repressing the hope

of the volunteers for an advance are in accordance with the

painful impression made on me when, in our council, it was

revealed to me that the Army of the Potomac had been reduced to

about one half the legalized strength, and that the arms to

restore the numbers were not in depot. As I there suggested,

though you may not be able to advance into Maryland and expel

the enemy, it may be possible to keep up the spirits of your

troops by expeditions such as that particularly spoken of

against Sickles's brigade on the lower Potomac, or Banks's

above. By destroying the canal and making other rapid movements

wherever opportunity presents, to beat detachments or to destroy

lines of communication....

"Very truly, your friend,

"Jefferson Davis".

"Richmond, Virginia, _November_ 18, 1861.

"General J. E. Johnston.

"... If a large force should be landed on the Potomac below

General Holmes, with the view to turn or to attack him, the

value of the position between Dumfries and Fredericksburg will

be so great that I wish you to give to that line your personal

inspection. With a sufficient force, the enemy may be prevented

from leaving his boats, should he be able to cross the river. To

make our force available at either of the points which he may

select, it will be necessary to improve the roads connecting the

advance posts with the armies of the Potomac and of the Acquia,

as well as with each other, and to have the requisite teams to

move heavy guns with celerity....

"Very respectfully yours,

"Jefferson Davis."

In November, 1861, reports became current that the enemy were

concentrating troops west of the Valley of the Shenandoah with a view to

a descent upon it. That vigilant, enterprising, and patriotic soldier,

General T. J. Jackson, whose steadiness under fire at the first battle

of Manassas had procured for him the _sobriquet_ of "Stonewall," was

then on duty as district commander of the Shenandoah Valley.

He was a West Virginian; and, though he had not acquired the fame which

subsequently shed such luster upon his name, he possessed a

well-deserved confidence among the people of that region. Ever watchful

and daring in the discharge of any duty, he was intensely anxious to

guard his beloved mountains of Virginia. This, stimulating his devotion

to the general welfare of the Confederacy, induced him to desire to

march against the enemy, who had captured Romney. On the 20th of

November, 1861, he wrote to the War Department, proposing an expedition

to Romney, in western Virginia. It was decided to adopt his proposition,

endorsed by the commander of the department, and, further to insure

success, though not recommended in the endorsement, his old brigade,

then in the Army of the Potomac, was selected as a part of the command

with which he was to make the campaign. General Johnston remonstrated

against this transfer, and the correspondence is subjoined for a fuller

understanding of the matter:

"Headquarters, Valley District, _November_ 20, 1861.

"Hon. J. P. Benjamin, _Secretary of War_.

"Sir: I hope you will pardon me for requesting that, at once,

all the troops under General Loring be ordered to this point.

Deeply impressed with the importance of absolute secrecy

respecting military operations, I have made it a point to say

but little respecting my proposed movements in the event of

sufficient reënforcements arriving, but, since conversing with

Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. T. Preston upon his return from General

Loring, and ascertaining the disposition of the General's

forces, I venture to respectfully urge that, after concentrating

all his troops here, an attempt should be made to capture the

Federal forces at Romney. The attack on Romney would probably

induce McClellan to believe that the Army of the Potomac had

been so weakened as to justify him in making an advance on

Centreville; but, should this not induce him to advance, I do

not believe anything will during the present winter. Should the

Army of the Potomac be attacked, I would be at once prepared to

reënforce it with my present volunteer force, increased by

General Loring's. After repulsing the enemy at Manassas, let the

troops that marched on Romney return to the Valley and move

rapidly westward to the waters of the Monongahela and Little

Kanawha. Should General Kelley be defeated, and especially

should he be captured, I believe that, by a judicious

disposition of the militia, a few cavalry, and a small number of

field-pieces, no additional forces would be required for some

time in this district. I deem it of very great importance that

northwestern Virginia be occupied by Confederate troops this

winter. At present, it is to be presumed that the enemy are not

expecting an attack there, and the resources of that region

necessary for the subsistence of our troops are in greater

abundance than in almost any other season of the year. Postpone

the occupation of that section until spring, and we may expect

to find the enemy prepared for us, and the resources to which I

have referred greatly exhausted. I know that what I have

proposed will be an arduous undertaking, and can not be

accomplished without the sacrifice of much personal comfort, but

I feel that the troops will be prepared to make this sacrifice

when animated by the prospects of important results to our cause

and distinction to themselves. It may be urged, against this

plan, that the enemy will advance on Staunton or Huntersville. I

am well satisfied that such a step would but make their

destruction more certain. Again, it may be said that General

Floyd will be cut off. To avoid this, if necessary, the General

has only to fall back toward the Virginia and Tennessee

Railroad. When northwestern Virginia is occupied in force, the

Kanawha Valley, unless it be the lower part of it, must be

evacuated by the Federal forces, or otherwise their safety will

be endangered by forcing a column across from the Little Kanawha

between them and the Ohio River. Admitting that the season is

too far advanced, or that from other causes all can not be

accomplished that has been named, yet, through the blessing of

God, who has thus far so wonderfully prospered our cause, much

more may be expected from General Loring's troops, according to

this programme, than can be expected from them where they are.

If you decide to order them here, I trust that, for the purpose

of saving time, all the infantry, cavalry, and artillery will be

directed to move immediately upon the reception of the order.

The enemy, about five thousand strong, have been for some time

slightly fortifying at Romney, and have completed their

telegraph from that place to Green Spring Depot. Their forces at

and near Williamsport are estimated as high as five thousand,

but as yet I have no reliable information of their strength

beyond the Potomac. Your most obedient servant,

"T. J. Jackson, _Major-General, P. A. C. S._"

"Headquarters, Centreville, _November_ 21, 1861.

"Respectfully forwarded. I submit that the troops under General

Loring might render valuable services by taking the field with

General Jackson, instead of going into winter-quarters, as now

proposed.

"J. E. Johnston, _General_."

"Headquarters, Centreville, _November_ 22, 1861.

"General Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General_.

"Sir: I have received Major-General Jackson's plan of operations

in his district, for which he asks for reënforcements. It seems

to me that he proposes more than can well be accomplished in

that high, mountainous country at this season. If the means of

driving the enemy from Romney (preventing the reconstruction of

the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and incursions by marauders

into the counties of Jefferson, Berkeley, and Morgan) can be

supplied to General Jackson, and with them those objects,

accomplished, we shall have reason to be satisfied, so far as

the Valley district is concerned. The wants of other portions of

the frontier--Acquia district, for instance--make it

inexpedient, in my opinion, to transfer to the Valley district

so large a force as that asked for by Major-General Jackson. It

seems to me to be now of especial importance to strengthen

Major-General Holmes, near Acquia Creek. The force there is very

small, compared with the importance of the position. Your

obedient servant,

"J. E. Johnston, _General_.

"[Endorsement.]

"Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War:

"S. Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General_.

"_November 25, 1861_."

"Richmond, Virginia, _November_ 10, 1861.

"General J. E. Johnston, _Manassas, Virginia_.

"Sir: The Secretary of War has this morning laid before me yours

of the 8th instant. I fully sympathize with your anxiety for the

Army of the Potomac. If indeed mine be less than yours, it can

only be so because the south, the west, and the east, presenting

like cause for solicitude, have in the same manner demanded my

care. Our correspondence must have assured you that I fully

concur in your view of the necessity for unity in command, and I

hope by a statement of the case to convince you that there has

been no purpose to divide your authority by transferring the

troops specified in order No. 206 from the center to the left of

your department. The active campaign in the Greenbrier region

was considered as closed for the season. There is reason to

believe that the enemy is moving a portion of his forces from

that mountain-region toward the Valley of Virginia, and that he

has sent troops and munitions from the east by the way of the

Potomac Canal toward the same point. The failure to destroy his

communications by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and by the

Potomac Canal has left him in possession of great advantages for

that operation. General Jackson, for reasons known to you, was

selected to command the division of the Valley, but we had only

the militia and one mounted regiment within the district

assigned to him. The recent activity of the enemy, the capture

of Romney, etc., required that he should have for prompt service

a body of Confederate troops to coöperate with the militia of

that district. You suggest that such force should be drawn from

the army at the Greenbrier; this was originally considered, and

abandoned, because they could not reach him in time to

anticipate the enemy's concentration, and also because General

Jackson was a stranger to them, and time was wanting for the

growth of that confidence between the commander and his troops,

the value of which need not be urged upon you. We could have

sent to him from this place an equal number of regiments, being

about double the numerical strength of those specified in the

order referred to, but they were parts of a brigade now in the

Army of the Potomac, or were southern troops, and were ignorant

of the country in which they were to serve, and all of them

unknown to General Jackson. The troops sent were his old

brigade, had served in the Valley, and had acquired a reputation

which would give confidence to the people of that region upon

whom the General had to rely for his future success. Though the

troops sent to you are, as you say, 'raw,' they have many able

officers, and will, I doubt not, be found reliable in the hour

of danger. Their greater numbers will to you, I hope, more than

compensate for the experience of those transferred; while, in

the Valley, the latter, by the moral effect their presence will

produce, will more than compensate for the inferiority of their

numbers. I have labored to increase the Army of the Potomac,

and, so far from proposing a reduction of it, did not intend to

rest content with an exchange of equivalents. In addition to the

troops recently sent to you, I expected soon to send further

reënforcements by withdrawing a part of the army from the

Greenbrier Mountains. I have looked hopefully forward to the

time when our army could assume the offensive, and select the

time and place where battles were to be fought, so that ours

should be alternations of activity and repose, theirs the heavy

task of constant watching. When I last visited your

headquarters, my surprise was expressed at the little increase

of your effective force above that of the 21st of July last,

notwithstanding the heavy reënforcements which, in the mean

time, had been sent to you. Since that visit I have frequently

heard of the improved health of the troops, of the return of

many who had been absent sick; and some increase has been made

by reënforcements. You can, then, imagine my disappointment at

the information you give, that, on the day before the date of

your letter, the army at your position was yet no stronger than

on the 21st of July. I can only repeat what has been said to you

in our conference at Fairfax Court-House, that we are restricted

in our capacity to reënforce by the want of arms. Troops to bear

the few arms you have in store have been ordered forward. Your

view of the magnitude of the calamity of defeat of the Army of

the Potomac is entirely concurred in, and every advantage which

is attainable should be seized to increase the power of your

present force. I will do what I can to augment its numbers, but

you must remember that our wants greatly exceed our resources.

"Banks's brigade, we learn, has left the position occupied when

I last saw you. Sickles is said to be yet in the lower Potomac,

and, when your means will enable you to reach him, I still hope

he may be crushed.

"I will show this reply to the Secretary of War, and hope there

will be no misunderstanding between you in future. The success

of the army requires harmonious coöperation.

"Very respectfully, etc.,

"Jefferson Davis."

After General Jackson commenced his march, the cold became unexpectedly

severe, and, as he ascended into the mountainous region, the slopes were

covered with ice, which impeded his progress, the more because his

horses were smooth-shod; but his tenacity of purpose, fidelity, and

daring, too well known to need commendation, triumphed over every

obstacle, and he attained his object, drove the enemy from Romney and

its surroundings, took possession of the place, and prevented the

threatened concentration. Having accomplished this purpose, and being

assured that the enemy had abandoned that section of country, he

returned with his old brigade to the Valley of the Shenandoah, leaving

the balance of his command at Romney. General Loring, the senior officer

there present, and many others of the command so left, appealed to the

War Department to be withdrawn. Their arguments were, as well as I

remember, these: that the troops, being from the South, were

unaccustomed to, and unprepared for, the rigors of a mountain winter;

that they were strangers to the people of that section; that the

position had no military strength, and, at the approach of spring, would

be accessible to the enemy by roads leading from various quarters.

After some preliminary action, an order was issued from the War Office

directing the troops to retire to the Valley. As that order has been the

subject of no little complaint, both by civil and military

functionaries, my letter to the General commanding the department, in

explanation of the act of the Secretary of War, is hereto annexed:

"Richmond, Virginia, _February_ 14, 1862.

"General J. E. Johnston, _commanding Department of Northern

Virginia, Centreville, Virginia_.

"General: I have received your letter of the 5th instant. While

I admit the propriety in all cases of transmitting orders

through you to those under your command, it is not surprising

that the Secretary of War should, in a case requiring prompt

action, have departed from this, the usual method, in view of

the fact that he had failed more than once in having his

instructions carried out when forwarded to you in the proper

manner. You will remember that you were directed, on account of

the painful reports received at the War Department in relation

to the command at Romney, to repair to that place, and, after

the needful examination, to give the orders proper in the case.

You sent your adjutant- (inspector?) general, and I am informed

that he went no farther than Winchester, to which point the

commander of the expedition had withdrawn; leaving the troops,

for whom anxiety had been excited, at Romney. Had you given your

personal attention to the case, you must be assured that the

confidence reposed in you would have prevented the Secretary

from taking any action before your report had been received. In

the absence of such security, he was further moved by what was

deemed reliable information, that a large force of the enemy was

concentrating to capture the troops at Romney, and by official

report that place had no natural strength and little strategic

importance. To insure concert of action in the defense of our

Potomac frontier, it was thought best to place all the forces

for this object under one command. The reasons which originally

induced the adding of the Valley district to your department

exist in full force at present, and I can not, therefore, agree

to its separation from your command.

"I will visit the Army of the Potomac as soon as other

engagements will permit, although I can not realize your

complimentary assurance that great good to the army will result

from it; nor can I anticipate the precise time when it will be

practicable to leave my duties here.

"Very respectfully and truly yours,

"Jefferson Davis."

To complaints by General Johnston that the discipline of his army was

interfered with by irregular action of the Secretary of War, and its

numerical strength diminished by furloughs granted directly by the War

Department, I replied, after making inquiry at the War Office, by a

letter, a copy of which is hereto annexed:

"Richmond, Virginia, _March_ 4, 1862.

"General J. E. Johnston, _Centreville, Virginia_.