The Convention for that alliance set forth that Virginia, looking to a

speedy union with the Confederate States, and for the purpose of meeting

pressing exigencies, agreed that "the whole military force and military

operations, offensive and defensive, of said Commonwealth, in the

impending conflict with the United States, shall be under the chief

control and direction of the President of the said Confederate States."

The whole was made subject to the approval and ratification of the

proper authorities of both governments respectively.

To those who criticise South Carolina as having acted precipitately in

withdrawing from the Union, it may be answered that intervening

occurrences show that her delay could not have changed the result; and,

further, that her prompt action had enabled her better to prepare for

the contingency which it was found impossible to avert. Thus she was

prepared in the first necessities of Virginia to send to her troops

organized and equipped.

Before the convention for coöperation with the Confederate States had

been adopted by Virginia, that knightly soldier, General Bonham, of

South Carolina, went with his brigade to Richmond; and, throughout the

Southern States, there was a prevailing desire to rush to Virginia,

where it was foreseen that the first great battles of the war were to be

fought; so that, as early as the 22d of April, I telegraphed to Governor

Letcher that, in addition to the forces heretofore ordered, requisitions

had been made for thirteen regiments, eight to rendezvous at Lynchburg,

four at Richmond, and one at Harper's Ferry. Referring to an application

that had been made to him from Baltimore, I wrote: "Sustain Baltimore if

practicable. We will reënforce you." The universal feeling was that of a

common cause and common destiny. There was no selfish desire to linger

around home, no narrow purpose to separate local interests from the

common welfare. The object was to sustain a principle--the broad

principle of constitutional liberty, the right of self-government.

The early demonstrations of the enemy showed that Virginia was liable to

invasion from the north, from the east, and from the west. Though the

larger preparation indicated that the most serious danger to be

apprehended was from the line of the Potomac, the first conflicts

occurred in the east.

The narrow peninsula between the James and York Rivers had topographical

features well adapted to defense. It was held by General John B.

Magruder, who skillfully improved its natural strength by artificial

means, and there, on the ground memorable as the field of the last

battle of the Revolution, in which General Washington compelled Lord

Cornwallis to surrender, Magruder, with a small force, held for a long

time the superior forces of the enemy in check.

CHAPTER II.

The Supply of Arms; of Men.--Love of the Union.--Secessionists

few.--Efforts to prevent the Final Step.--Views of the

People.--Effect on their Agriculture.--Aid from African

Servitude.--Answer to the Clamors on the Horrors of

Slavery.--Appointment of a Commissary-General.--His Character

and Capacity.--Organization, Instruction, and Equipment of the

Army.--Action of Congress.--The Law.--Its Signification.--The

Hope of a Peaceful Solution early entertained; rapidly

diminished.--Further Action of Congress.--Policy of the

Government for Peace.--Position of Officers of United States

Army.--The Army of the States, not of the Government.--The

Confederate Law observed by the Government.--Officers retiring

from United States Army.--Organization of Bureaus.

The question of supplying arms and munitions of war was the first

considered, because it was the want for which it was the most difficult

to provide. Of men willing to engage in the defense of their country,

there were many more than we could arm.

Though the prevailing sentiment of the Southern people was a cordial

attachment to the Union as it was formed by their fathers, their love

was for the spirit of the compact, for the liberties it was designed to

secure, for the self-government and State sovereignty which had been won

by separation from the mother-country, and transmitted to them by their

Revolutionary sires as a legacy for their posterity for ever. The number

of those who desired to dissolve the Union, even though the Constitution

should be faithfully observed--those who, in the language of the day,

were called "secessionists _per se_"--was so small as not to be felt in

any popular decision; but the number of those who held that the States

had surrendered their sovereignty, and had no right to secede from the

Union, was so inappreciably small, if indeed any such existed, that I

can not recall the fact of a single Southern advocate of that opinion.

The assertion of the right is not to be confounded with a readiness to

exercise it. Many who had no doubt as to the right, looked upon its

exercise with reluctance amounting to sorrow, and claimed that it should

be the last resort, only to be adopted as the alternative to a surrender

of the equality in the Union of States, free, sovereign, and

independent. Of that class, forming a large majority of the people of

Mississippi, I may speak with the confidence of one who belonged to it.

Thus, after the Legislature of Mississippi had enacted a law for a

convention which, representing the sovereignty of the State, should

consider the propriety of passing an ordinance to reassume the grants

made to the General Government, and withdraw from the Union, I, as a

United States Senator of Mississippi, retained my position in the

Senate, and sought by every practicable mode to obtain such measures as

would allay the excitement and afford to the South such security as

would prevent the final step, the ordinance of secession from the Union.

When the last hope of preserving the Union of the Constitution was

extinguished, and the ordinance of secession was enacted by the

Convention of Mississippi, which was the highest authority known under

our form of government, the question of the expediency of adopting that

remedy was no longer open to inquiry by one who acknowledged his

allegiance as due to the State of which he was a citizen. To evade the

responsibilities resulting from the decree of his sovereign, the people,

would be craven; to resist it would be treason. The instincts and

affections of the citizens of Mississippi led them with great unanimity

to the duty of maintaining and defending their State, without pausing to

ask what would be the consequences of refusing obedience to its mandate.

A like feeling pervaded all of the seceding States, and it was not only

for the military service, but for every service which would strengthen

and sustain the Confederacy, that an enthusiasm pervading all classes,

sexes, and ages was manifested.

Though our agricultural products had been mainly for export, insomuch

that in the planting States the necessary food-supplies were to a

considerable extent imported from the West, and it would require that

the habits of the planters should be changed from the cultivation of

staples for export to the production of supplies adequate for home

consumption and the support of armies in the field, yet, even under the

embarrassments of war, this was expected, and for a long time the result

justified the expectation, extraordinary as it must appear when viewed

by comparison with other people who have been subjected to a like

ordeal. Much of our success was due to the much-abused institution of

African servitude, for it enabled the white men to go into the army, and

leave the cultivation of their fields and the care of their flocks, as

well as of their wives and children, to those who, in the language of

the Constitution, were "held to service or labor." A passing remark may

here be appropriate as to the answer thus afforded to the clamor about

the "horrors of slavery."

Had these Africans been a cruelly oppressed people, restlessly

struggling to be freed from their bonds, would their masters have dared

to leave them, as was done, and would they have remained as they did,

continuing their usual duties, or could the proclamation of emancipation

have been put on the plea of a military necessity, if the fact had been

that the negroes were forced to serve, and desired only an opportunity

to rise against their masters? It will be remembered that, when the

proclamation was issued, it was confessed by President Lincoln to be a

nullity beyond the limit within which it could be enforced by the

Federal troops.

To direct the production, preservation, collection, and distribution of

food for the army required a man of rare capacity and character at the

head of the subsistence department. It was our good fortune to have such

an one in Colonel L. B. Northrop, who was appointed commissary-general

at the organization of the bureaus of the executive department of the

Confederate Government. He had been an officer of the United States

Army, had served in various parts of the South, had been for some time

on duty in the commissariat, and, to the special and general knowledge

thus acquired, added strong practical sense and incorruptible integrity.

Of him and the operations of the subsistence department I shall have

more to say hereafter, when treating of the bureaus of the Confederacy.

Assured of an army as large as the population of the Confederate States

could furnish, and a sufficient supply of subsistence for such an army,

at least until the chances of war should interfere with production and

transportation, the immediate object of attention was the organization,

instruction, and equipment of the army.

As heretofore stated, there was a prevailing belief that there would be

no war, or, if any, that it would be of very short duration. Therefore

the first bill which passed the provisional Congress provided for

receiving troops for short periods--as my memory serves, for sixty days.

The chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, the heroic Colonel

Bartow, who sealed his devotion to the cause with his life's blood on

the field of Manassas, in deference to my earnest remonstrance against

such a policy, returned with the bill to the House (the Congress then

consisted of but one House), and procured a modification by which the

term of service was extended to twelve months unless sooner discharged.

I had urged upon him, in our conference, the adoption of a much longer

period, but he assured me that one year was as much as the Congress

would agree to. On this, as on other occasions, that Congress showed a

generous desire to yield their preconceived opinions to my objections as

far as they consistently could, and, there being but one House, it was

easier to change the terms of a bill after conference with the Executive

than when, under the permanent organization, objections had to be

formally communicated in a message to that branch of Congress in which

the bill originated, and when the whole proceeding was of record.

This first act to provide for the public defense became a law on the

28th of February, 1861, and its fifth section so clearly indicates the

opinions and expectations prevailing when the Confederation was formed,

that it is inserted here:

"That the President be further authorized to receive into the

service of this Government such forces now in the service of

said States (Confederate States) as may be tendered, or who may

volunteer by consent of their State, in such numbers as he may

require for any time not less than twelve months unless sooner

discharged."

The supremacy of the States is the controlling idea. The President was

authorized to receive from the several States the arms and munitions

which they might desire to transfer to the Government of the Confederate

States, and he was also authorized to receive the forces which the

States might tender, or any which should volunteer by the _consent of

their State_, for any time not less than twelve months unless sooner

discharged; and such forces were to be received with their officers by

companies, battalions, or regiments, and the President, by and with the

advice and consent of Congress, was to appoint such general officer or

officers for said forces as might be necessary for the service.

It will be seen that the arms and munitions within the limits of the

several States were regarded as entirely belonging to them; that the

forces which were to constitute the provisional army could only be drawn

from the several States by their consent, and that these were to be

organized under State authority and to be received with their officers

so appointed; that the lowest organization was to be that of a company

and the highest that of a regiment, and that the appointment of general

officers to command these forces was confided to the Government of the

Confederate States, should the assembling of large bodies of troops

require organization above that of a regiment; and it will also be

observed that provision was made for the discharge of the forces so

provided for, before the term of service fixed by the law. No one will

fail to perceive how little was anticipated a war of the vast

proportions and great duration which ensued, and how tenaciously the

sovereignty and self-government of the States were adhered to. At a

later period (March 16, 1861) the Congress adopted resolutions

recommending to the respective States to "cede the forts, arsenals,

navy-yards, dock-yards, and other public establishments within their

respective limits to the Confederate States," etc.

The hope which was early entertained of a peaceful solution of the

issues pending between the Confederate States and the United States

rapidly diminished, so that we find on the 6th of March that the

Congress, in its preamble to an act to provide for the public defense,

begins with the declaration that, "in order to provide speedily forces

to repel invasion," etc., authorized the President to employ the

militia, and to ask for and accept the services of any number of

volunteers, not exceeding one hundred thousand, and to organize

companies into battalions, battalions into regiments, and regiments into

brigades and divisions. As in the first law, the President was

authorized to appoint the commanding officer of such brigades and

divisions, the commissions only to endure while the brigades were in

service.

On the same day (March 6, 1861) was enacted the law for the

establishment and organization of the Army of the Confederate States of

America, this being in contradistinction to the provisional army, which

was to be composed of troops tendered by the States, as in the first

act, and volunteers received, as in the second act, to constitute a

provisional army. That the wish and policy of the Government was peace

is again manifested in this act, which, in providing for the military

establishment of the Confederacy, fixed the number of enlisted men of

all arms at nine thousand four hundred and twenty. Due care was taken to

prevent the appointment of incompetent or unworthy persons to be

officers of the army, and the right to promotion up to and including the

grade of colonel was carefully guarded, and beyond this the professional

character of the army was recognized as follows: "Appointments to the

rank of brigadier-general, after the army is organized, shall be made by

selection from the army." There being no right of promotion above the

grade of colonel in the Army of the United States, selection for

appointment to the rank of general had no other restriction than the

necessity for confirmation by the Senate. The provision just quoted

imposed the further restriction of requiring the person nominated by

selection to have previously been an officer of the Army of the

Confederate States.

Regarding the Army of the United States as belonging neither to a

section of the Union nor to the General Government, but to the States

conjointly while they remained united, it follows as a corollary of the

proposition that, when disintegration occurred, the undivided

_personnel_ composing the army would be left free to choose their future

place of service. Therefore, provision was made for securing to

officers, who should leave the Army of the United States and join that

of the Confederate States, the same relative rank in the latter which

they held in the former.

"Be it further enacted that all officers who have resigned, or

who may within six months tender their resignations, from the

Army of the United States, and who have been or may be appointed

to original vacancies in the Army of the Confederate States, the

commissions issued shall bear one and the same date, so that the

relative rank of officers of each grade shall be determined by

their former commissions in the United States Army, held

anterior to the secession of these Confederate States from the

United States."

The provisions hereof are in the view entertained that the army was of

the States, not of the Government, and was to secure to officers

adhering to the Confederate States the same relative rank which they had

before those States had withdrawn from the Union. It was clearly the

intent of the law to embrace in this provision only those officers who

had resigned or who should resign from the United States Army to enter

the service of the Confederacy, or who, in other words, should thus be

transferred from one service to the other. It is also to be noted that,

in the eleventh section of the act to which this was amendatory, the

right of promotion up to the grade of colonel, in established regiments

and corps, was absolutely secured, but that appointments to the higher

grade should be by selection, at first without restriction, but after

the army had been organized the selection was confined to the army, thus

recognizing the profession of arms, and relieving officers from the

hazard, beyond the limit of their legal right to promotion, of being

superseded by civilians through favoritism or political influence.

How well the Government of the Confederacy observed both the letter and

the spirit of the law will be seen by reference to its action in the

matter of appointments. It is a noteworthy fact that the three highest

officers in rank, and whose fame stands unchallenged either for

efficiency or zeal, were all so indifferent to any question of personal

interest, that they had received their appointment before they were

aware it was to be conferred. Each brought from the Army of the United

States an enviable reputation, such as would have secured to him, had he

chosen to remain in it, after the war commenced, any position his

ambition could have coveted. Therefore, against considerations of

self-interest, and impelled by devotion to principle, they severed the

ties, professional and personal, which had bound them from their youth

up to the time when the Southern States, asserting the consecrated truth

that all governments rest on the consent of the governed, decided to

withdraw from the Union they had voluntarily entered, and the Northern

States resolved to coerce them to remain in it against their will. These

officers were--first, Samuel Cooper, a native of New York, a graduate of

the United States Military Academy in 1815, and who served continuously

in the army until March 7, 1861, with such distinction as secured to him

the appointment of Adjutant-General of the United States Army. Second,

Albert Sidney Johnston, a native of Kentucky, a graduate of the United

States Military Academy in 1826, served conspicuously in the army until

1834, then served in the army of the Republic of Texas, and then in the

United States Volunteers in the war with Mexico. Subsequently he

reëntered the United States Army, and for meritorious conduct attained

the rank of brevet brigadier-general. After the secession of Texas, his

adopted State, he resigned his commission in the United States Army, May

3, 1861, and traveled by land from California to Richmond to offer his

services to the Confederacy. Third, Robert E. Lee, a native of Virginia,

a graduate of the United States Military Academy in 1829, when he was

appointed in the Engineer Corps of the United States Army, and served

continuously and with such distinction as to secure for him in 1847

brevets of three grades above his corps commission. He resigned from the

Army of the United States, April 25, 1861, upon the secession of

Virginia, in whose army he served until it was transferred to the

Confederate States.

Samuel Cooper was the first of these to offer his services to the

Confederacy at Montgomery. Having known him most favorably and

intimately as Adjutant-General of the United States Army when I was

Secretary of War, the value of his services in the organization of a new

army was considered so great that I invited him to take the position of

Adjutant-General of the Confederate Army, which he accepted without a

question either as to relative rank or anything else. The highest grade

then authorized by law was that of brigadier-general, and that

commission was bestowed upon him.

When General Albert Sidney Johnston reached Richmond he called upon me,

and for several days at various intervals we conversed with the freedom

and confidence belonging to the close friendship which had existed

between us for many years. Consequent upon a remark made by me, he asked

to what duty I would assign him, and, when answered, to serve in the

West, he expressed his pleasure at service in that section, but inquired

how he was to raise his command, and for the first time learned that he

had been nominated and confirmed as a general in the Army of the

Confederacy.

The third, General Robert E. Lee, had been commissioned by the State of

Virginia as major-general and commander of her army. When that army was

transferred, after the accession of Virginia to the Confederate States,

he was nominated to be brigadier-general in the Confederate Army, but

was left for obvious reasons in command of the forces in Virginia. After

the seat of government was removed from Montgomery to Richmond, the

course of events on the Southern Atlantic coast induced me to direct

General Lee to repair thither. Before leaving, he said that, while he

was serving in Virginia, he had never thought it needful to inquire

about his rank; but now, when about to go into other States and to meet

officers with whom he had not been previously connected, he would like

to be informed upon that point. Under recent laws, authorizing

appointments to higher grades than that of his first commission, he had

been appointed a full general; but so wholly had his heart and his mind

been consecrated to the public service, that he had not remembered, if

he ever knew, of his advancement.

In organizing the bureaus, it was deemed advisable to select, for the

chief of each, officers possessing special knowledge of the duties to be

performed. The best assurance of that qualification was believed to be

service creditably rendered in the several departments of the United

States Army before resigning from it. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel A. C.

Myers, who had held many important trusts in the United States

Quartermaster's Department, was appointed Quartermaster-General of the

Confederacy, with the rank of colonel.

Captain L. B. Northrop, a gallant officer of the United States Dragoons,

and who, by reason of a wound disabling him to perform regimental duty,

had been employed in the subsistence department, was, after resigning

from the United States Army, appointed Commissary-General of the

Confederate States Army, with the rank of colonel. I have heretofore

alluded to the difficult task thus imposed on him, and the success with

which he performed it, and would be pleased here to enter into a fuller

recital, but have not the needful information in regard to his

administration of that department.

Surgeon L. P. Moore, an officer of recognized merit in the United States

Medical Department, from which he had resigned to join the Confederacy,

was appointed the Surgeon-General of the Confederate States Army. As in

the case of other departments, there was in this a want of the stores

requisite, as well for the field as the hospital.

To supply medicines which were declared by the enemy to be contraband of

war, our medical department had to seek in the forest for substitutes,

and to add surgical instruments and appliances to the small stock on

hand as best they could.

It would be quite beyond my power to do justice to the skill and

knowledge with which the medical corps performed their arduous task, and

regret that I have no report from the Surgeon-General, Moore, which

would enable me to do justice to the officers of his corps, as well in

regard to their humanity as to their professional skill.

In no branch of our service were our needs so great and our means to

meet them relatively so small as in the matter of ordnance and ordnance

stores. The Chief of Ordnance, General Gorgas, had been an ordnance

officer of the United States Army, and resigned to join the Confederacy.

He has favored me with a succinct though comprehensive statement, which

has enabled me to write somewhat fully of that department; but, for the

better understanding of its operations, the reader is referred to the

ordnance report elsewhere.

CHAPTER III.

Commissioners to purchase Arms and Ammunition.--My Letter to

Captain Semmes.--Resignations of Officers of United States

Navy.--Our Destitution of Accessories for the Supply of Naval

Vessels.--Secretary Mallory.--Food-Supplies.--The Commissariat

Department.--The Quartermaster's Department.--The Disappearance

of Delusions.--The Supply of Powder.--Saltpeter.--Sulphur.--

Artificial Niter-Beds.--Services of General G. W. Rains.--

Destruction at Harper's Ferry of Machinery.--The Master

Armorer.--Machinery secured.--Want of Skillful Employees.--

Difficulties encountered by Every Department of the Executive

Branch of the Government.

On the third day after my inauguration at Montgomery, an officer of

extensive information and high capacity was sent to the North, to make

purchases of arms, ammunition, and machinery; and soon afterward another

officer was sent to Europe, to buy in the market as far as possible,

and, furthermore, to make contracts for arms and munitions to be

manufactured. Captain (afterward Admiral) Semmes, the officer who was

sent to the North, would have been quite successful but for the

intervention of the civil authorities, preventing the delivery of the

various articles contracted for. The officer who was sent to Europe,

Major Huse, found few serviceable arms upon the market; he, however,

succeeded in making contracts for the manufacture of large quantities,

being in advance of the agents sent from the Northern Government for the

same purpose. For further and more detailed information, reference is

made to the monograph of the Chief of Ordnance.

My letter of instructions to Captain Semmes was as follows:

"Montgomery, Alabama, _February 21, 1861_.

"Dear Sir: As agent of the Confederate States, you are

authorized to proceed, as hereinafter set forth, to make

purchases, and contracts for machinery and munitions, or for the

manufacture of arms and munitions of war.

"Of the proprietor of the ---- Powder Company, in ----, you will

probably be able to obtain cannon- and musket-powder--the former

to be of the coarsest grain; and also to engage with him for the

establishment of a powder-mill at some point in the limits of

our territory.

"The quantity of powder to be supplied immediately will exceed

his stock on hand, and the arrangement for further supply

should, if possible, be by manufacture in our own territory; if

this is not practicable, means must be sought for further

shipments from any and all sources which are reliable.

"At the arsenal at Washington you will find an artisan named

----, who has brought the cap-making machine to its present

state of efficiency, and who might furnish a cap-machine, and

accompany it to direct its operations. If not in this, I hope

you may in some other way be able to obtain a cap-machine with

little delay, and have it sent to the Mount Vernon Arsenal,

Alabama.

"We shall require a manufactory for friction-primers, and you

will, if possible, induce some capable person to establish one

in our country. The demand of the Confederate States will be the

inducement in this as in the case of the powder-mill proposed.

"A short time since, the most improved machinery for the

manufacture of rifles, intended for the Harper's Ferry Armory,

was, it was said, for sale by the manufacturer. If it be so at

this time, you will procure it for this Government, and use the

needful precaution in relation to its transportation. Mr. ----

----, of the Harper's Ferry Armory, can give you all the

information in that connection which you may require. Mr. Ball,

the master armorer at Harper's Ferry, is willing to accept

service under our Government, and could probably bring with him

skilled workmen. If we get the machinery, this will be

important.

"Machinery for grooving muskets and heavy guns is, I hope, to be

purchased ready made. If not, you will contract for its

manufacture and delivery. You will endeavor to obtain the most

improved shot for rifled cannon, and persons skilled in the

preparation of that and other fixed ammunition. Captain G. W.

Smith and Captain Lovell, late of the United States Army, and

now of New York City, may aid you in your task; and you will

please say to them that we will be happy to have their services

in our army.

"You will make such inquiries as your varied knowledge will

suggest in relation to the supply of guns of different calibers,

especially the largest. I suggest the advantage, if to be

obtained, of having a few of the fifteen-inch guns, like the one

cast at Pittsburg.

"I have not sought to prescribe so as to limit your inquiries,

either as to object or place, but only to suggest for your

reflection and consideration the points which have chanced to

come under my observation. You will use your discretion in

visiting places where information of persons or things is to be

obtained for the furtherance of the object in view. Any

contracts made will be sent to the Hon. L. P. Walker, Secretary

of War, for his approval; and the contractor need not fear that

delay will be encountered in the action of this Government.

"Very respectfully yours, etc.,

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

Captain Semmes had also been directed to seek for vessels which would

serve for naval purposes, and, after his return, reported that he could

not find any vessels which in his judgment were, or could be made,

available for our uses. The Southern officers of the navy who were in

command of United States vessels abroad, under an idea more creditable

to their sentiment than to their knowledge of the nature of our

constitutional Union, brought the vessels they commanded into the ports

of the North, and, having delivered them to the authorities of the

United States Government, generally tendered their resignations, and

repaired to the States from which they had been commissioned in the

navy, to serve where they held their allegiance to be due. The theory

that they owed allegiance to their respective States was founded on the

fact that the Federal Government was of the States; the sequence was,

that the navy belonged to the States, not to their agent the Federal

Government; and, when the States ceased to be united, the naval vessels

and armament should have been divided among the owners. While we honor

the sentiment which caused them to surrender their heart-bound

associations, and the profession to which they were bred, on which they

relied for subsistence, to go, with nothing save their swords and

faithful hearts, to fight, to bleed, and to die if need be, in defense

of their homes and a righteous cause, we can but remember how much was

lost by their view of what their honor and duty demanded. Far, however,

be it from their countrymen, for that or any other consideration, to

wish that their fidelity to the dictates of a conscientious belief

should have yielded to any temptation of interest. The course they

pursued shows how impossible it was that they should have done so, for

what did they not sacrifice to their sense of right! We were doubly

bereft by losing our share of the navy we had contributed to build, and

by having it all employed to assail us. The application of the

appropriations for the Navy of the United States had been such that the

construction of vessels had been at the North, though much of the timber

used and other material employed was transported from the South to

Northern ship-yards. Therefore, we were without the accessories needful

for the rapid supply of naval vessels.

While attempting whatever was practicable at home, we sent a competent,

well-deserving officer of the navy to England to obtain there and

elsewhere, by purchase or by building, vessels which could be

transformed into ships of war. These efforts and their results will be

noticed more fully hereafter.

It may not be amiss to remark here that, if the anticipations of our

people were not realized, it was not from any lack of the zeal and

ability of the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Mallory. As was heretofore

stated, his fondness for and aptitude in nautical affairs had led him to

know much of vessels, their construction and management, and, as

chairman of the Committee on United States Naval Affairs, he had

superadded to this a very large acquaintance with officers of the United

States Navy, which gave him the requisite information for the most

useful employment of the instructed officers who joined our service.

At the North many had been deceived by the fictions of preparations at

the South for the war of the sections, and among ourselves were few who

realized how totally deficient the Southern States were in all which was

necessary to the active operations of an army, however gallant the men

might be, and however able were the generals who directed and led them.

From these causes, operating jointly, resulted undue caution at the

North and overweening confidence at the South. The habits of our people

in hunting, and protecting their stock in fields from the ravages of

ferocious beasts, caused them to be generally supplied with the arms

used for such purposes. The facility with which individuals traveled

over the country led to very erroneous ideas as to the difficulties of

transporting an army. The small amount of ammunition required in time of

peace gave no measure of the amount requisite for warlike operations,

and the products of a country, which insufficiently supplied food for

its inhabitants when peaceful pursuits were uninterrupted, would serve

but a short time to furnish the commissariat of a large army. It was, of

course, easy to foresee that, if war was waged against the seceding

States by all of those which remained in the Union, the large supply of

provisions which had been annually sent from the Northwest to the South

could not, under the altered circumstances, be relied on. That our

people did not more immediately turn their attention to the production

of food-supplies, may be attributed to the prevailing delusion that

secession would not be followed by war. To the able officer then at the

head of the commissariat department, Colonel L. B. Northrop, much credit

is due for his well-directed efforts to provide both for immediate and

prospective wants. It gives me the greater pleasure to say this, because

those less informed of all he did, and skillfully tried to do, have been

profuse of criticism, and sparing indeed of the meed justly his due.

Adequate facilities for transportation might have relieved the local

want of supplies, especially in Virginia, where the largest bodies of

troops were assembled; but, unfortunately, the quartermaster's

department was scarcely less provided than that of the commissary. Not

only were the railroads insufficient in number, but they were poorly

furnished with rolling stock, and had been mainly dependent upon

Northern foundries and factories for their rails and equipment. Even the

skilled operatives of the railroads were generally Northern men, and

their desertion followed fast upon every disaster which attended the

Confederate arms. In addition to other causes which have been mentioned,

the idea that Cotton was king, and would produce foreign intervention,

as well as a desire of the Northern people for the return of peace and

the restoration of trade, exercised a potent influence in preventing our

agriculturists from directing at an early period their capital and labor

to the production of food-supplies rather than that of our staple for

export. As one after another the illusions vanished, and the material

necessities of a great war were recognized by our people, never did

patriotic devotion exhibit brighter examples of the sacrifice of

self-interest and the abandonment of fixed habits and opinions, or more

effective and untiring effort to meet the herculean task which was set

before them. Being one of the few who regarded secession and war as

inevitably connected, my early attention was given to the organization

of military forces and the procurement and preparation of the munitions

of war. If our people had not gone to war without counting the cost,

they were, nevertheless, involved in it without means of providing for

its necessities. It has been heretofore stated that we had no

powder-mills. It would be needless to say that the new-born Government

had no depots of powder, but it may be well to add that, beyond the

small supply required for sporting purposes, our local traders had no

stock on hand. Having no manufacturing industries which required

saltpeter, very little of that was purchasable in our markets. The same

would have been the case in regard to sulphur, but for the fact that it

had been recently employed in the clarification of sugar-cane juice, and

thus a considerable amount of it was found in New Orleans. Prompt

measures were taken to secure a supply of sulphur, and parties were

employed to obtain saltpeter from the caves, as well as from the earth

of old tobacco-houses and cellars; and artificial niter-beds were made

to provide for prospective wants. Of soft wood for charcoal there was

abundance, and thus materials were procured for the manufacture of

gunpowder to meet the demand which would arise when the limited quantity

purchased by the Confederate Government at the North should be

exhausted.

It was our good fortune to secure the services of an able and scientific

soldier, General G. W. Rains, who, to a military education, added

experience in a large manufacturing establishment, and to him was

confided the construction of a powder-mill, and the manufacture of

powder, both for artillery and small-arms. The appalling contemplation

of the inauguration of a great war, without powder or a navy to secure

its importation from abroad, was soon relieved by the extraordinary

efforts of the ordnance department and the well-directed skill of

General Rains, to whom it is but a just tribute to say that, beginning

without even instructed workmen, he had, before the close of the war,

made what, in the opinion of competent judges, has been pronounced to be

the best powder-mill in the world, and in which powder of every variety

of grain was manufactured of materials which had been purified from

those qualities which cause its deterioration under long exposure to a

moist atmosphere.

The avowed purpose and declared obligation of the Federal Government was

to occupy and possess the property belonging to the United States, yet

one of the first acts was to set fire to the armory at Harper's Ferry,

Virginia, the only establishment of the kind in the Southern States, and

the only Southern depository of the rifles which the General Government

had then on hand.

What conclusion is to be drawn from such action? To avoid attributing a

breach of solemn pledges, it must be supposed that Virginia was

considered as out of the Union, and a public enemy, in whose borders it

was proper to destroy whatever might be useful to her of the common

property of the States lately united.

As soon as the United States troops had evacuated the place, the

citizens and armorers went to work to save the armory as far as possible

from destruction, and to secure valuable material stored in it. The

master armorer, Armistead Ball, so bravely and skillfully directed these

efforts, that a large part of the machinery and materials was saved from

the flames. The subduing of the fire was a dangerous and difficult task,

and great credit is due to those who, under the orders of Master Armorer

Ball, attempted and achieved it. When the fire was extinguished, the

work was continued and persevered in until all the valuable machinery

and material had been collected, boxed, and shipped to Richmond, about

the end of the summer of 1861. The machinery thus secured was divided

between the arsenals at Richmond, Virginia, and Fayetteville, North

Carolina, and, when repaired and put in working condition, supplied to

some extent the want which existed in the South of means for the

alteration and repair of old or injured arms, and finally contributed to

increase the very scanty supply of arms with which our country was

furnished when the war began. The practice of the Federal Government,

which had kept the construction and manufacture of the material of war

at the North, had consequently left the South without the requisite

number of skilled workmen by whose labor machinery could at once be made

fully effective if it were obtained; indeed, the want of such employees

prevented the small amount of machinery on hand from being worked to its

full capacity. The gallant Master Armorer Ball, whose capacity, zeal,

and fidelity deserve more than a passing notice, was sent with that part

of the machinery assigned to the Fayetteville Arsenal. The toil, the

anxiety, and responsibility of his perilous position at Harper's Ferry,

where he remained long after the protecting force of the Confederate

army retired, had probably undermined a constitution so vigorous that,

in the face of a great exigency, no labor seemed too great or too long

for him to grapple with and endure. So, like a ship which, after having

weathered the storm, goes down in the calm, the master armorer, soon

after he took his quiet post at Fayetteville, was "found dead in his

bed."

The difficulties which on every side met the several departments of the

executive branch of the Government one must suppose were but little

appreciated by many, whose opportunities for exact observation were the

best, as one often meets with self-complacent expressions as to modes of

achieving readily what prompt, patient, zealous effort proved to be

insurmountable. In the progress of this work, it is hoped, will be

presented not only the magnitude of the obstacles, but the spirit and

capacity with which they were encountered by the unseen and much

undervalued labors of the officers of the several departments, on whom

devolved provision for the civil service, as well as for the armies in

the field. Already has the report of General St. John, Commissary-

General of Subsistence, of the operations of that department, just

before the close of the war, exposed the hollowness of many sensational

pictures intended to fix gross neglect or utter incapacity on the

Executive.

The hoped-for and expected monograms of other chiefs of bureaus will

silence like criticisms on each, so far as they are made by those who

are not willfully blind, or maliciously intent on the circulation of

falsehood.

CHAPTER IV.

The Proclamation for Seventy-five Thousand Men by President

Lincoln further examined.--The Reasons presented by him to

Mankind for the Justification of his Conduct shown to be Mere

Fictions, having no Relation to the Question.--What is the Value

of Constitutional Liberty, of Bills of Rights, of Limitations of

Powers, if they may be transgressed at Pleasure?--Secession of

South Carolina.--Proclamation of Blockade.--Session of Congress

at Montgomery.--Extracts from the President's Message.--Acts of

Congress.--Spirit of the People.--Secession of Border

States.--Destruction of United States Property by Order of

President Lincoln.

If any further evidence had been required to show that it was the

determination of the Northern people not only to make no concessions to

the grievances of the Southern States, but to increase them to the last

extremity, it was furnished by the proclamation of President Lincoln,

issued on April 15, 1861. This proclamation, which has already been

mentioned, requires a further examination, as it was the official

declaration, on the part of the Government of the United States, of the

war which ensued. In it the President called for seventy-five thousand

men to suppress "combinations" opposed to the laws, and obstructing

their execution in seven sovereign States which had retired from the

Union. Seventy-five thousand men organized and equipped are a powerful

army, and, when raised to operate against these States, nothing else

than war could be intended. The words in which he summoned this force

were these: "Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some

time past, and now are, opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed,

in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi,

Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by

the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in

the marshals by law: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, by virtue of

the power in me vested by the Constitution and laws," etc.

The power granted in the Constitution is thus expressed: "The Congress

shall have power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the

laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions."[169] It

was to the Congress, not the Executive, to whom the power was delegated,

and thus early was commenced a long series of usurpations of powers

inconsistent with the purposes for which the Union was formed, and

destructive of the fraternity it was designed to perpetuate.

On November 6, 1860, the Legislature of South Carolina assembled and

gave the vote of the State for electors of a President of the United

States. On the next day an act was passed calling a State Convention to

assemble on December 17th, to determine the question of the withdrawal

of the State from the United States. Candidates for membership were

immediately nominated. All were in favor of secession. The Convention

assembled on December 17th, and on the 20th passed "an ordinance to

dissolve the union between the State of South Carolina and other States

united with her under the compact entitled 'The Constitution of the

United States of America.'" The ordinance began with these words: "We,

the people of the State of South Carolina, in convention assembled, do

declare and ordain," etc. The State authorities immediately conformed to

this action of the Convention, and the laws and authority of the United

States ceased to be obeyed within the limits of the State. About four

months afterward, when the State, in union with others which had joined

her, had possessed herself of the forts within her limits, which the

United States Government had refused to evacuate, President Lincoln

issued the above-mentioned proclamation.

The State of South Carolina is designated in the proclamation as a

combination too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of

judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law.

This designation does not recognize the State, or manifest any

consciousness of its existence, whereas South Carolina was one of the

colonies that had declared her independence, and, after a long and

bloody war, she had been recognized as a sovereign State by Great

Britain, the only power to which she had ever owed allegiance. The fact

that she had been one of the colonies in the original Congress, had been

a member of the Confederation, and subsequently of the Union,

strengthens, but surely can not impair, her claim to be a State. Though

President Lincoln designated her as a "combination," it did not make her

a combination. Though he refused to recognize her as a State, it did not

make her any less a State. By assertion, he attempted to annihilate

seven States; and the war which followed was to enforce the

revolutionary edict, and to establish the supremacy of the General

Government on the ruins of the blood-bought independence of the States.

By designating the State as a "combination," and considering that under

such a name it might be in a condition of insurrection, he assumed to

have authority to raise a great military force and attack the State.

Yet, even if the fact had been as assumed, if an insurrection had

existed, the President could not lawfully have derived the power he

exercised from such condition of affairs. The provision of the

Constitution is as follows: "The United States shall guarantee to every

State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect

each of them against invasion; and, on application of the Legislature,

or of the Executive (when the Legislature can not be convened), against

domestic violence."[170] So the guarantee availed not at all to justify

the act which it was presented to excuse--the fact being that a State,

and not an "unlawful combination," as asserted, was the object of

assault, and the case one of making war. For a State or union of States

to attack with military force another State, is to make war. By the

Constitution, the power to make war is given solely to Congress.

"Congress shall have power to declare war," says the Constitution.[171]

And, again, "to raise and support armies."[172] Thus, under a perverted

use of language, the Executive at Washington did that which he

undeniably had no power to do, under a faithful observance of the

Constitution.

To justify himself to Congress and the people, or, rather, before the

face of mankind, for this evasion of the Constitution of his country,

President Lincoln, in his message to Congress, of July 4, 1861, resorted

to the artifice of saying, "It [meaning the proceedings of the

Confederate States] presents to the whole family of man the question

whether a constitutional republic or democracy--a government of the

people by the same people--can, or can not, maintain its territorial

integrity against its own domestic foes?"

The answer to this question is very plain. In the nature of things, no

union can be formed except by separate, independent, and distinct

parties. Any other combination is not a union; and, upon the destruction

of any of these elements in the parties, the union _ipso facto_ ceases.

If the Government is the result of a union of States, then these States

must be separate, sovereign, and distinct, to be able to form a union,

which is entirely an act of their own volition. Such a government as

ours had no power to maintain its existence any longer than the

contracting parties pleased to cohere, because it was founded on the

great principle of voluntary federation, and organized "to establish

justice and insure domestic tranquillity."[173] Any departure from this

principle by the General Government not only perverts and destroys its

nature, but furnishes a just cause to the injured State to withdraw from

the union. A new union might subsequently be formed, but the original

one could never by coercion be restored. Any effort on the part of the

others to force the seceding State to consent to come back is an attempt

at subjugation. It is a wrong which no lapse of time or combination of

circumstances can ever make right. A forced union is a political

absurdity. No less absurd is President Lincoln's effort to dissever the

sovereignty of the people from that of the State; as if there could be a

State without a people, or a sovereign people without a State.

But the question which Mr. Lincoln presents "to the whole family of man"

deserves a further notice. The answer which he seems to infer would be

given "by the whole family of man" is that such a government as he

supposes "can maintain its territorial integrity against its own

domestic foes." And, therefore, he concluded that he was right in the

judgment of "the whole family of man" in commencing hostilities against

us. He says, "So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out

the war power of the Government." That is the power to make war against

foreign nations, for the Government has no other war power. Planting

himself on this position, he commenced the devastation and bloodshed

which followed to effect our subjugation.

Nothing could be more erroneous than such views. The supposed case which

he presents is entirely unlike the real case. The Government of the

United States is like no other government. It is neither a

"constitutional republic or democracy," nor has it ever been thus

called. Neither is it a "government of the people by the same people";

but it is known and designated as "the Government of the United States."

It is an anomaly among governments. Its authority consists solely of

certain powers delegated to it, as a common agent, by an association of

sovereign and independent States. These powers are to be exercised only

for certain specified objects; and the purposes, declared in the

beginning of the deed or instrument of delegation, were "to form a more

perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide

for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the

blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."

The beginning and the end of all the powers of the Government of the

United States are to be found in that instrument of delegation. All its

powers are there expressed, defined, and limited. It was only to that

instrument Mr. Lincoln as President should have gone to learn his

duties. That was the chart which he had just solemnly pledged himself to

the country faithfully to follow. He soon deviated widely from it--and

fatally erroneous was his course. The administration of the affairs of a

great people, at a most perilous period, is decided by the answer which

it is assumed "the whole family of man" would give to a supposed

condition of human affairs which did not exist and which could not

exist. This is the ground upon which the rectitude of his cause was

placed. He says, "No choice was left but to call out the war power of

the Government, and so to resist force employed for its destruction by

force for its preservation."

"Here," he says, "no choice was left but to call out the war power of

the Government." For what purpose must he call out this war power? He

answers, by saying, "and so to resist force employed for its destruction

by force for its preservation." But this which he asserts is not a fact.

There was no "force employed for its destruction." Let the reader turn

to the record of the facts in Part III of this work, and peruse the

fruitless efforts for peace which were made by us, and which Mr. Lincoln

did not deign to notice. The assertion is not only incorrect, in stating

that force was employed by us, but also in declaring that it was for the

destruction of the Government of the United States. On the contrary, we

wished to leave it alone. Our separation did not involve its

destruction. To such fiction was Mr. Lincoln compelled to resort to give

even apparent justice to his cause. He now goes to the Constitution for

the exercise of his war power, and here we have another fiction.

On April 19th, four days later, President Lincoln issued another

proclamation, announcing a blockade of the ports of seven confederated

States, which was afterward extended to North Carolina and Virginia. It

further declared that all persons who should under their authority

molest any vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on

board, should be treated as pirates. In their efforts to subjugate us,

the destruction of our commerce was regarded by the authorities at

Washington as a most efficient measure. It was early seen that, although

acts of Congress established ports of entry where commerce existed, they

might be repealed, and the ports nominally closed or declared to be

closed; yet such a declaration would be of no avail unless sustained by

a naval force, as these ports were located in territory not subject to

the United States. An act was subsequently passed authorizing the

President of the United States, in his discretion, to close our ports,

but it was never executed.

The scheme of blockade was resorted to, and a falsehood was asserted on

which to base it. Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Dallas: "You will say (to

Lord John Russell) that, by our own laws and the laws of nature and the

laws of nations, this Government has a clear right to suppress

insurrection. An exclusion of commerce from national ports which have

been seized by insurgents, in the equitable form of blockade, is a

proper means to that end."[174] This is the same doctrine of

"combinations" fabricated by the authorities at Washington to serve as

the basis of a bloody revolution. Under the laws of nations, separate

governments when at war blockade each other's ports. This is decided to

be justifiable. But the Government of the United States could not

consent to justify its blockade of our ports on this ground, as it would

be an admission that the Confederate States were a separate and distinct

sovereignty, and that the war was prosecuted only for subjugation. It,

therefore, assumed that the withdrawal of the Southern States from the

Union was an insurrection.

Was it an insurrection? When certain sovereign and independent States

form a union with limited powers for some general purposes, and any one

or more of them, in the progress of time, suffer unjust and oppressive

grievances for which there is no redress but in a withdrawal from the

association, is such withdrawal an insurrection? If so, then of what

advantage is a compact of union to States? Within the Union are

oppressions and grievances; and the attempt to go out brings war and

subjugation. The ambitious and aggressive States obtain possession of

the central authority which, having grown strong in the lapse of time,

asserts its entire sovereignty over the States. Whichever of them denies

it and seeks to retire, is declared to be guilty of insurrection, its

citizens are stigmatized as "rebels," as if they had revolted against a

master, and a war of subjugation is begun. If this action is once

tolerated, where will it end? Where is the value of constitutional

liberty? What strength is there in bills of rights--in limitations of

power? What new hope for mankind is to be found in written

constitutions, what remedy which did not exist under kings or emperors?

If the doctrines thus announced by the Government of the United States

are conceded, then, look through either end of the political telescope,

and one sees only an empire, and the once famous Declaration of

Independence trodden in the dust as a "glittering generality," and the

compact of union denounced as a "flaunting lie." Those who submit to

such consequences without resistance are not worthy of the liberties and

the rights to which they were born, and deserve to be made slaves. Such

must be the verdict of mankind.

Men do not fight to make a fraternal union, neither do nations. These

military preparations of the Government of the United States signified

nothing less than the subjugation of the Southern States, so that, by

one devastating blow, the North might grasp for ever that supremacy it

had so long coveted.

To be prepared for self-defense, I called Congress together at

Montgomery on April 29th, and, in the message of that date, thus spoke

of the proclamation of the President of the United States: "Apparently

contradictory as are the terms of this singular document, one point is

unmistakably evident. The President of the United States calls for an

army of seventy-five thousand men, whose first service is to be the

capture of our forts. It is a plain declaration of war, which I am not

at liberty to disregard, because of my knowledge that, under the

Constitution of the United States, the President is usurping a power

granted exclusively to Congress."

I then proceeded to say that I did not feel at liberty to disregard the

fact that many of the States seemed quite content to submit to the

exercise of the powers assumed by the President of the United States,

and were actively engaged in levying troops for the purpose indicated in

the proclamation. Meantime, being deprived of the aid of Congress, I had

been under the necessity of confining my action to a call on the States

for volunteers for the common defense, in accordance with authority

previously conferred on me. I stated that there were then in the field,

at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and

Pulaski, nineteen thousand men, and sixteen thousand more were on their

way to Virginia; that it was proposed to organize and hold in readiness

for instant action, in view of the existing exigencies of the country,

an army of one hundred thousand men; and that, if a further force should

be needed, Congress would be appealed to for authority to call it into

the field. Finally, that the intent of the President of the United

States, already developed, to invade our soil, capture our forts,

blockade our ports, and wage war against us, rendered it necessary to

raise means to a much larger amount than had been done, to defray the

expenses of maintaining independence and repelling invasion.

A brief summary of the internal affairs of the Government followed, and,

notwithstanding frequent declarations of the peaceful intentions of the

withdrawing States had been made in the most solemn manner, it was

deemed not to be out of place to repeat them once more; and, therefore,

the message closed with these words: "We protest solemnly, in the face

of mankind, that we desire peace at any sacrifice, save that of honor.

In independence we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of

any kind from the States with which we have lately been confederated.

All we ask is to be let alone--that those who never held power over us

shall not now attempt our subjugation by arms. This we will, we must,

resist to the direst extremity. The moment that this pretension is

abandoned, the sword will drop from our grasp, and we shall be ready to

enter into treaties of amity and commerce that can not but be mutually

beneficial. So long as this pretension is maintained, with a firm

reliance on that Divine Power which covers with its protection the just

cause, we must continue to struggle for our inherent right to freedom,

independence, and self-government."

At this session Congress passed acts authorizing the President to use

the whole land and naval force to meet the necessities of the war thus

commenced; to issue to private armed vessels letters of marque; in

addition to the volunteer force authorized to be raised, to accept the

services of volunteers, to serve during the war; to receive into the

service various companies of the different arms; to make a loan of fifty

millions of dollars in bonds and notes; and to hold an election for

officers of the permanent Government under the new Constitution. An act

was also passed to provide revenue from imports; another, relative to

prisoners of war; and such others as were necessary to complete the

internal organization of the Government, and establish the

administration of public affairs.

In every portion of the country there was exhibited the most patriotic

devotion to the common cause. Transportation companies freely tendered

the use of their lines for troops and supplies. Requisitions for troops

were met with such alacrity that the number offering their services in

every instance greatly exceeded the demand and the ability to arm them.

Men of the highest official and social position served as volunteers in

the ranks. The gravity of age and the zeal of youth rivaled each other

in the desire to be foremost in the public defense.

The appearance of the proclamation of the President of the United

States, calling out seventy-five thousand men, was followed by the

immediate withdrawal of the States of Virginia, North Carolina,

Tennessee, and Arkansas, and their union with the Confederate States.

The former State, thus placed on the frontier and exposed to invasion,

began to prepare for a resolute defense. Volunteers were ordered to be

enrolled and held in readiness in every part of the State. Colonel

Robert E. Lee, having resigned his commission in the United States

cavalry, was on April 22d nominated and confirmed by the State

Convention of Virginia as "Commander-in-Chief of the military and naval

forces of the Commonwealth."

Already the Northern officer in charge had evacuated Harper's Ferry,

after having attempted to destroy the public buildings there. His report

says: "I gave the order to apply the torch. In three minutes or less,

both of the arsenal buildings, containing nearly fifteen thousand stand

of arms, together with the carpenter's shop, which was at the upper end

of a long and connected series of workshops of the armory proper, were

in a blaze. There is every reason for believing the destruction was

complete." Mr. Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War, on April 22d replied

to this report in these words: "I am directed by the President of the

United States to communicate to you, and through you to the officers and

men under your command at Harper's Ferry Armory, the approbation of the

Government of your and their judicious conduct there, and to tender you

and them the thanks of the Government for the same." At the same time

the ship-yard at Norfolk was abandoned after an attempt to destroy it.

About midnight of April 20th, a fire was started in the yard, which

continued to increase, and before daylight the work of destruction

extended to two immense ship-houses, one of which contained the entire

frame of a seventy-four-gun ship, and to the long ranges of stores and

offices on each side of the entrance. The great ship Pennsylvania was

burned, and the frigates Merrimac and Columbus, and the Delaware,

Raritan, Plymouth, and Germantown were sunk. A vast amount of machinery,

valuable engines, small-arms, and chronometers, was broken up and

rendered entirely useless. The value of the property destroyed was

estimated at several millions of dollars.

This property thus destroyed had been accumulated and constructed with

laborious care and skillful ingenuity during a course of years to

fulfill one of the objects of the Constitution, which was expressed in

these words, "To provide for the common defense" (see Preamble of the

Constitution). It had belonged to all the States in common, and to each

one equally with the others. If the Confederate States were still

members of the Union, as the President of the United States asserted,

where can he find a justification of these acts?

In explanation of his policy to the Commissioners sent to him by the

Virginia State Convention, he said, referring to his inaugural address,

"As I then and therein said, I now repeat, the power confided in me will

be used to hold, occupy, and possess property and places belonging to

the Government." Yet he tendered the thanks of the Government to those

who applied the torch to destroy this property belonging, as he regarded

it, to the Government.

How unreasonable, how blind with rage must have been that administration

of affairs which so quickly brought the Government to the necessity of

destroying its own means of defense in order, as it publicly declared,

"to maintain its life"! It would seem as if the passions that rule the

savage had taken possession of the authorities at the United States

capital! In the conflagrations of vast structures, the wanton

destruction of public property, and still more in the issue of _lettres

de cachet_ by the Secretary of State, who boasted of the power of his

little bell over the personal liberties of the citizen, the people saw,

or might have seen, the rapid strides toward despotism made under the

mask of preserving the Union. Yet these and similar measures were

tolerated because the sectional hate dominated in the Northern States

over the higher motives of constitutional and moral obligation.

[Footnote 169: Constitution of the United States, Article I, section 8.]

[Footnote 170: Constitution of the United States, Article IV, section

4.]

[Footnote 171: Article I, section 8.]

[Footnote 172: Ibid.]

[Footnote 173: Constitution of the United States, preamble.]

[Footnote 174: Diplomatic correspondence, May 21, 1861.]

CHAPTER V.

Maryland first approached by Northern Invasion.--Denies to

United States Troops the Right of Way across her

Domain.--Mission of Judge Handy.--Views of Governor Hicks.--His

Proclamation.--Arrival of Massachusetts Troops at

Baltimore.--Passage through the City disputed.--Activity of the

Police.--Burning of Bridges.--Letter of President Lincoln to the

Governor.--Visited by Citizens.--Action of the State

Legislature.--Occupation of the Relay House.--The City Arms

surrendered.--City in Possession of United States

Troops.--Remonstrances of the City to the Passage of Troops

disregarded.--Citizens arrested; also, Members of the

Legislature.--Accumulation of Northern Forces at

Washington.--Invasion of West Virginia by a Force under

McClellan.--Attack at Philippi; at Laurel Hill.--Death of

General Garnett.

The border State of Maryland was the outpost of the South on the

frontier first to be approached by Northern invasion. The first

demonstration against State sovereignty was to be made there, and in her

fate were the other slaveholding States of the border to have warning of

what they were to expect. She had chosen to be, for the time at least,

neutral in the impending war, and had denied to the United States troops

the right of way across her domain in their march to invade the Southern

States. The Governor (Hicks) avowed a desire, not only that the State

should avoid war, but that she should be a means for pacifying those

more disposed to engage in combat.

Judge Handy, a distinguished citizen of Mississippi, who was born in

Maryland, had, in December, 1860, been sent as a commissioner from the

State of his adoption to that of his birth, and presented his views and

the object of his mission to Governor Hicks, who, in his response

(December 19, 1860), declared his purpose to act in full concert with

the other border States, adding, "I do not doubt the people of Maryland

are ready to go with the people of those States for weal or woe."[175]

Subsequently, in answer to appeals for and against a proclamation

assembling the Legislature, in order to have a call for a State

convention, Governor Hicks issued an address, in which, arguing that

there was no necessity to define the position of Maryland, he wrote: "If

the action of the Legislature would be simply to declare that Maryland

was with the South in sympathy and feeling; that she demands from the

North the repeal of offensive, unconstitutional statutes, and appeals to

it for new guarantees; that she will wait a reasonable time for the

North to purge her statute-books, to do justice to her Southern

brethren; and, if her appeals are vain, will make common cause with her

sister border States in resistance to tyranny, if need be, it would only

be saying what the whole country well knows," etc.

On the 18th of April, 1861, Governor Hicks issued a proclamation

invoking them to preserve the peace, and said, "I assure the people that

no troops will be sent from Maryland, unless it may be for the defense

of the national capital." On the same day Mayor Brown, of the city of

Baltimore, issued a proclamation in which, referring to that of the

Governor above cited, he said, "I can not withhold my expression of

satisfaction at his resolution that no troops shall be sent from

Maryland to the soil of any other State." It will be remembered that the

capital was on a site which originally belonged to Maryland, and was

ceded by her for a special use, so that troops to defend the capital

might be considered as not having been sent out of Maryland. It will be

remembered that these proclamations were three days after the

requisition made by the Secretary of War on the States which had not

seceded for their quota of troops to serve in the war about to be

inaugurated against the South, and that rumors existed at the time in

Baltimore that troops from the Northeast were about to be sent through

that city toward the South. On the next day, viz., the 19th of April,

1861, a body of troops arrived at the railroad depot; the citizens

assembled in large numbers, and, though without arms, disputed the

passage through the city. They attacked the troops with the loose stones

found in the street, which was undergoing repair, and with such

determination and violence, that some of the soldiers were wounded, and

they fired upon the multitude, killing a few and wounding many.

The police of Baltimore were very active in their efforts to prevent

conflict and preserve the peace; they rescued the baggage and munitions

of the troops, which had been seized by the multitude; and the rear

portion of the troops was, by direction of Governor Hicks, sent back to

the borders of the State. The troops who had got through the city took

the railroad at the Southern Depot and passed on. The militia of the

city was called out, and by evening quiet was restored. During the

night, on a report that more Northern troops were approaching the city

by the railroads, the bridges nearest to the city were destroyed, as it

was understood, by orders from the authorities of Baltimore.

On the 20th of April President Lincoln wrote in reply to Governor Hicks

and Mayor Brown, saying, "For the future, troops must be brought here,

but I make no point of bringing them through Baltimore." On the next

day, the 21st, Mayor Brown and other influential citizens, by request of

the President, visited him. The interview took place in presence of the

Cabinet and General Scott, and was reported to the public by the Mayor

after his return to Baltimore. From that report I make the following

extracts. Referring to the President, the Mayor uses the following

language:

"The protection of Washington, he asseverated with great

earnestness, was the sole object of concentrating troops there,

and he protested that none of the troops brought through

Maryland were intended for any purposes hostile to the State, or

aggressive as against the Southern States.... He called on

General Scott for his opinion, which the General gave at great

length, to the effect that troops might be brought through

Maryland without going through Baltimore, etc.... The interview

terminated with the distinct assurance, on the part of the

President, that no more troops would be sent through Baltimore,

unless obstructed in their transit in other directions, and with

the understanding that the city authorities should do their best

to restrain their own people.

"The Mayor and his companions availed themselves of the

President's full discussion of the questions of the day to urge

upon him respectfully, but in the most earnest manner, a course

of policy which would give peace to the country, and especially

the withdrawal of all orders contemplating the passage of troops

through any part of Maryland."

The Legislature of the State of Maryland appointed commissioners to the

Confederate Government to suggest to it the cessation of impending

hostilities until the meeting of Congress at Washington in July.

Commissioners with like instructions were also sent to Washington. In my

reply to the Commissioners, dated 25th of May, 1861, I referred to the

uniform expression of desire for peace on the part of the Confederate

Government, and added:

"In deference to the State of Maryland, it again asserts in the

most emphatic terms that its sincere and earnest desire is for

peace; but that, while the Government would readily entertain

any proposition from the Government of the United States tending

to a peaceful solution of the present difficulties, the recent

attempts of this Government to enter into negotiations with that

of the United States were attended with results which forbid any

renewal of proposals from it to that Government.... Its policy

can not but be peace--peace with all nations and people."

On the 5th of May, the Relay House, at the junction of the Washington

and Baltimore and Ohio Railroads, was occupied by United States troops

under General Butler, and, on the 13th of the same month, he moved a

portion of the troops to Baltimore, and took position on Federal

Hill--thus was consummated the military occupation of Baltimore. On the

next day, reënforcements were received; and, on the same day, the

commanding General issued a proclamation to the citizens, in which he

announced to them his purpose and authority to discriminate between

citizens, those who agreed with him being denominated "well disposed,"

and the others described with many offensive epithets. The initiatory

step of the policy subsequently developed was found in one sentence:

"Therefore, all manufacturers of arms and munitions of war are hereby

requested to report to me forthwith, so that the lawfulness of their

occupations may be known and understood, and all misconstruction of

their doings avoided."

There soon followed a demand for the surrender of the arms stored by the

city authorities in a warehouse. The police refused to surrender them

without the orders of the police commissioners. The police

commissioners, upon representation that the demand of General Butler was

by order of the President, decided to surrender the arms under protest,

and they were accordingly removed to Fort McHenry.

Baltimore was now disarmed. The Army of the United States had control of

the city. There was no longer necessity to regard the remonstrance of

Baltimore against sending troops through the city, and that more

convenient route was henceforth to be employed. George P. Kane, Marshal

of the Police of Baltimore, who had rendered most efficient service for

the preservation of peace, as well in the city of Baltimore as at Locust

Point, where troops were disembarked to be dispatched to Washington, was

arrested at home by a military force, and sent to Fort McHenry, and a

provost-marshal was appointed by General Banks, who had succeeded to the

command. The excuse given for the arrest of Marshal Kane was that he was

believed to be cognizant of combinations of men waiting for an

opportunity to unite with those in rebellion against the United States

Government. Whether the suspicion were well or ill founded, it

constituted a poor excuse for depriving a citizen of his liberty without

legal warrant and without proof. But this was only the beginning of

unbridled despotism and a reign of terror. The Mayor and Police

Commissioners, Charles Howard, William H. Gatchell, and John W. Davis,

held a meeting, and, after preparing a protest against the suspension of

their functions in the appointment of a provost-marshall, resolved that,

while they would do nothing to "obstruct the execution of such measures

as Major-General Banks may deem proper to take, on his own

responsibility, for the preservation of the peace of the city and of

public order, they can not, consistently with their views of official

duty and of the obligations of their oaths of office, recognize the

right of any of the officers and men of the police force, as such, to

receive orders or directions from any other authority than from this

Board; and that, in the opinion of the Board, the forcible suspension of

their functions suspends at the same time the active operations of the

police law."[176] The Provost-Marshal, with the plenary powers conferred

upon him, commenced a system of search and seizure, in private houses,

of arms and munitions of every description.

On the 1st of July, General Banks announced that, "in pursuance of

orders issued from the headquarters at Washington for the preservation

of the public peace in this department, I have arrested, and do detain

in custody of the United States, the late members of the Board of

Police--Messrs. Charles Howard, William H. Gatchell, Charles D. Hinks,

and John W. Davis." If the object had been to preserve order by any

proper and legitimate method, the effective means would palpably have

been to rely upon men whose influence was known to be great, and whose

integrity was certainly unquestionable. The first-named of the

commissioners I knew well. He was of an old Maryland family, honored for

their public services, and himself adorned by every social virtue. Old,

unambitious, hospitable, gentle, loving, he was beloved by the people

among whom his long life had been passed. Could such a man be the just

object of suspicion, if, when laws had been silenced, suspicion could

justify arrest and imprisonment? Those who knew him will accept as a

just description:

"In action faithful, and in honor clear,

Who broke no promise, served no private end,

Who gained no title, and who lost no friend."

Thenceforward, arrests of the most illustrious became the rule. In a

land where freedom of speech was held to be an unquestioned right,

freedom of thought ceased to exist, and men were incarcerated for

opinion's sake.

In the Maryland Legislature, the Hon. S. Teacle Wallis, from a committee

to whom was referred the memorial of the police commissioners arrested

in Baltimore, made a report upon the unconstitutionality of the act, and

"appealed in the most earnest manner to the whole people of the country,

of all parties, sections, and opinions, to take warnings by the

usurpations mentioned, and come to the rescue of the free institutions

of the country."[177]

For no better reason, so far as the public was informed, than a vote in

favor of certain resolutions, General Banks sent his provost-marshal to

Frederick, where the Legislature was in session; a cordon of pickets was

placed around the town to prevent any one from leaving it without a

written permission from a member of General Banks's staff; police

detectives from Baltimore then went into the town and arrested some

twelve or thirteen members and several officers of the Legislature,

which, thereby left without a quorum, was prevented from organizing, and

it performed the only act which it was competent to do, i.e., adjourned.

S. Teacle Wallis, the author of the report in defense of the

constitutional rights of citizens, was among those arrested. Henry May,

a member of Congress, who had introduced a resolution which he hoped

would be promotive of peace, was another of those arrested and thrown

into prison. Senator Kennedy, of the same State, presented a report of

the Legislature to the United States Senate, reciting the outrage

inflicted upon Maryland in the persons of her municipal officers and

citizens, and, after some opposition, merely obtained an order to have

it printed. Governor Hicks, whose promises had been so cheering in the

beginning of the year, sent his final message to the Legislature on

December 3, 1861. In that, referring to the action of the Maryland

Legislature at its several sessions before that when the arrest of its

members prevented an organization, he wrote, "This continued until the

General Government had ample reason to believe it was about to go

through the farce of enacting an ordinance of secession, when the

treason was summarily stopped by the dispersion of the traitors...."

After referring to the elections of the 13th of June and the 6th of

November, he says, the people have "declared, in the most emphatic

tones, what I have never doubted, that Maryland has no sympathy with the

rebellion, and desires to do her full share in the duty of suppressing

it." It would be more easy than gracious to point out the inconsistency

between his first statements and this last. The conclusion is inevitable

that he kept himself in equipoise, and fell at last, as men without

convictions usually do, upon the stronger side.

Henceforth the story of Maryland is sad to the last degree, only

relieved by the gallant men who left their homes to fight the battle of

State rights when Maryland no longer furnished them a field on which

they could maintain the rights their fathers left them. This was a fate

doubly sad to the sons of the heroic men who, under the designation of

the "Maryland Line," did so much in our Revolutionary struggle to secure

the independence of the States; of the men who, at a later day, fought

the battle of North Point; of the people of a land which had furnished

so many heroes and statesmen, and gave the great Chief-Justice Taney to

the Supreme Court of the United States.

Though Maryland did not become one of the Confederate States, she was

endeared to the people thereof by many most enduring ties. Last in

order, but first in cordiality, were the tender ministrations of her

noble daughters to the sick and wounded prisoners who were carried

through the streets of Baltimore; and it is with shame we remember that

brutal guards on several occasions inflicted wounds upon gentlewomen who

approached these suffering prisoners to offer them the relief of which

they so evidently stood in need.

The accumulation of Northern forces at and near Washington City, made it

evident that the great effort of the invasion would be from that point,

while assaults of more or less vigor might be expected upon all

important places which the enemy, by his facilities for transportation,

could reach. The concentration of Confederate troops in Virginia was

begun, and they were sent forward as rapidly as practicable to the

points threatened with attack.

It was soon manifest that, besides the army at Washington, which

threatened Virginia, there was a second one at Chambersburg,

Pennsylvania, under Major-General Patterson, designed to move through

Williamsport and Martinsburg, and another forming in Ohio, under the

command of Major-General McClellan, destined to invade the western

counties of Virginia.

This latter force, having landed at Wheeling on May 26th, advanced as

far as Grafton on the 29th. At this time Colonel Porterfield, with the

small force of seven hundred men, sent forward by Governor Letcher, of

Virginia, was at Philippi. On the night of June 2d he was attacked by

General McClellan, with a strong force, and withdrew to Laurel Hill.

Reënforcements under General Garnett were sent forward and occupied the

hill, while Colonel Pegram, the second in command, held Rich Mountain.

On July 11th the latter was attacked by two columns of the enemy, and,

after a vigorous defense, fell back on the 12th, losing many of his men,

who were made prisoners. General Garnett, hearing of this reverse,

attempted to fall back, but was pursued by McClellan, and, while

striving to rally his rear guard, was killed. Five hundred of his men

were taken prisoners. This success left the Northern forces in

possession of that region.

The difficult character of the country in which the battle was fought,

as well from mountain acclivity as dense wood, rendered a minute

knowledge of the roads of vast importance. There is reason to believe

that competent guides led the enemy, by roads unknown to our army, to

the flank and rear of its position, and thus caused the sacrifice of

those who had patriotically come to repel the invasion of the very

people who furnished the guides to the enemy. It was treachery

confounding the counsels of the brave. Thus occurred the disaster of

Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill.

General Robert Garnett was a native of Virginia, and a graduate of the

United States Military Academy. He served in Mexico, on the staff of

General Z. Taylor, and was conspicuous for gallantry and good conduct,

especially in the battles of Monterey and Buena Vista. Recognizing his

allegiance as due to the State of Virginia, from which he was appointed

a cadet, and thence won his various promotions in the army, he resigned

his commission when the State withdrew from the Union, and earnestly and

usefully served as aide-de-camp to General R. E. Lee, the

commander-in-chief of the Army of Virginia, until she acceded to the

Confederacy.

When Western Virginia was invaded, he offered his services to go to her

defense, and, relying confidently on the sentiment, so strong in his own

heart, of devotion to the State by all Virginians, he believed it was

only needful for him to have a nucleus around which the people could

rally to resist the invasion of their country. How sadly he was

disappointed, and how bravely he struggled against adverse fortune, and

how gallantly he died in the discharge of his duty, are memories which,

though sad, bear with them to his friends the consolation that the

manner of his death was worthy of the way in which he lived, and that

even his life was an offering he was not unwilling to make for the

welfare and honor of Virginia.

He fell while commanding the rear guard, to save his retreating army,

thus exemplifying the highest quality of man, self-sacrifice for others,

and such devotion and fortitude as made Ney the grandest figure in

Bonaparte's retreat from Moscow.

[Footnote 175: "Annual Cyclopædia," vol. i, p. 443.]

[Footnote 176: "Baltimore American," June 28, 1861.]

[Footnote 177: New York "World", August 6, 1861.]

CHAPTER VI.

Removal of the Seat of Government to Richmond.--Message to

Congress at Richmond.--Confederate Forces in Virginia.--Forces

of the Enemy.--Letter to General Johnston.--Combat at Bethel

Church.--Affair at Romney.--Movements of McDowell.--Battle of

Manassas.

The Provisional Congress, in session at Montgomery, Alabama, on the 21st

of May, 1861, resolved "that this Congress will adjourn on Tuesday next,

to meet again on the 20th day of July at Richmond, Virginia." The

resolution further authorized the President to have the several

executive departments, with their archives, removed at such intermediate

time as he might determine, and added a proviso that, if any public

emergency should "render it impolitic to meet in Richmond," he should

call the Congress together at some other place to be selected by him.

The hostile demonstrations of the United States Government against

Virginia caused the President, at an early day after the adjournment of

Congress, to proceed to Richmond and to direct the executive

departments, with their archives, to be removed to that place as soon as

could be conveniently done.

In the message delivered to the Congress at its meeting in Richmond,

according to adjournment, I gave the following explanation of my conduct

under the resolution above cited: "Immediately after your adjournment,

the aggressive movement of the enemy required prompt, energetic action.

The accumulation of his forces on the Potomac sufficiently demonstrated

that his efforts were to be directed against Virginia, and from no point

could necessary measures for her defense and protection be so

effectively decided as from her own capital."

On my arrival in Richmond, General R. E. Lee, as commander of the Army

of Virginia, was found there, where he had established his headquarters.

He possessed my unqualified confidence, both as a soldier and a patriot,

and the command he had exercised over the Army of Virginia, before her

accession to the Confederacy, gave him that special knowledge which at

the time was most needful. As has been already briefly stated, troops

had previously been sent from other States of the Confederacy to the aid

of Virginia. The forces there assembled were divided into three armies,

at positions the most important and threatened: one, under General J. E.

Johnston, at Harper's Ferry, covering the valley of the Shenandoah;

another, under General P. G. T. Beauregard, at Manassas, covering the

direct approach from Washington to Richmond; and the third, under

Generals Huger and Magruder, at Norfolk and on the Peninsula between the

James and York Rivers, covering the approach to Richmond from the

seaboard.

The first and second of these armies, though separated by the Blue

Ridge, had such practicable communication with each other as to render

their junction possible when the necessity should be foreseen. They both

were confronted by forces greatly superior in numbers to their own, and

it was doubtful which would first be the object of attack. Harper's

Ferry was an important position, both for military and political

considerations, and, though unfavorably situated for defense against an

enemy which should seek to turn its position by crossing the Potomac

above, it was desirable to hold it as long as was consistent with

safety. The temporary occupation was especially needful for the removal

of the valuable machinery and material in the armory located there, and

which the enemy had failed to destroy, though he had for that purpose

fired the buildings before his evacuation of the post. The

demonstrations of General Patterson, commanding the Federal army in that

region, caused General Johnston earnestly to insist on being allowed to

retire to a position nearer to Winchester. Under these circumstances, an

official letter was addressed to him, from which the following extract

is made:

"Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office,

"Richmond, _June 13, 1861_.

"_To_ General J. E. Johnston, _commanding Harper's Ferry,

Virginia_.

"Sir: ... You had been heretofore instructed to exercise your

discretion as to retiring from your position at Harper's Ferry,

and taking the field to check the advance of the enemy.... The

ineffective portion of your command, together with the baggage

and whatever else would impede your operations in the field, it

would be well to send, without delay, to the Manassas road.

Should you not be sustained by the population of the Valley, so

as to enable you to turn upon the enemy before reaching

Winchester, you will continue slowly to retire to the Manassas

road, upon some of the passes of which it is hoped you will be

able to make an effective stand, even against a very superior

force. To this end, it might be well to send your engineer to

make a reconnaissance and construct such temporary works as may

be useful and proper.... For these reasons it has been with

reluctance that any attempt was made to give you specific

instructions, and you will accept assurances of the readiness

with which the freest exercise of discretion on your part will

be sustained.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed) "S. Cooper,

"_Adjutant and Inspector-General_."

The earliest combat in this quarter, and which, in the inexperience of

the time, was regarded as a great battle, may claim a passing notice, as

exemplifying the extent to which the individuality, self-reliance, and

habitual use of small-arms by the people of the South was a substitute

for military training, and, on the other hand, how the want of such

training made the Northern new levies inferior to the like kind of

Southern troops.

A detached work on the right of General Magruder's line was occupied

June 11, 1861, by the First Regiment of North Carolina Volunteers and

three hundred and sixty Virginians under the command of an educated,

vigilant, and gallant soldier, then Colonel D. H. Hill, First Regiment

North Carolina Volunteers, subsequently a lieutenant-general in the

Confederate service. He reports that this small force was "engaged for

five and a half hours with four and a half regiments of the enemy at

Bethel Church, nine miles from Hampton. The enemy made three distinct

and well-sustained charges, but were repulsed with heavy loss. Our

cavalry pursued them for six miles, when their retreat became a total

rout."

On the other side, Frederick Townsend, colonel of Third Regiment of the

enemy's forces, after stating with much minuteness the orders and line

of march, describes how, "about five or six miles from Hampton, a heavy

and well-sustained fire of canister and small-arms was opened upon the

regiment," and how it was afterward discovered to be a portion of their

own column which had fired upon them. After due care for the wounded and

a recognition of their friends, the column proceeded, and the Colonel

describes his regiment as moving to the attack "in line of battle, as if

on parade, in the face of a severe fire of artillery and small-arms."

Subsequently, the description proceeds, "a company of my regiment had

been separated from the regiment by a thickly-hedged ditch," and marched

in the adjoining field in line with the main body. Not being aware of

the separation of that company, the Colonel states that, therefore,

"upon seeing among the breaks in the hedge the glistening of bayonets in

the adjoining field, I immediately concluded that the enemy were

outflanking, and conceived it to be my duty to immediately retire and

repel that advance."[178]

Without knowing anything of the subsequent career of the Colonel from

whose report these extracts have been made, or of the officers who

opened fire upon him while he was marching to the execution of the

orders under which they were all acting, it is fair to suppose that,

after a few months' experience, such scenes as are described could not

have occurred, and these citations have been made to show the value of

military training.

In further exemplification of the difference between the troops of the

Confederate States and those of the United States, before either had

been trained in war, I will cite an affair which occurred on the upper

Potomac. Colonel A. P. Hill, commanding a brigade at Romney, in Western

Virginia, having learned that the enemy had a command at the

twenty-first bridge on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, decided to

attack it and to destroy the bridge, so as to interrupt the use of that

important line of the enemy's communication. For this purpose he ordered

Colonel John C. Vaughn, of the Third Tennessee Volunteers, to proceed

with a detachment of two companies of his regiment and two companies of

the Thirteenth Virginia Volunteers to the position where the enemy were

reported to be posted.

Colonel Vaughn reports that on June 18, 1861, at 8 P. M., he moved with

his command as ordered, marched eighteen miles, and, at 5 A. M. the next

morning, found the enemy on the north bank of the Potomac in some

strength of infantry and with two pieces of artillery. He had no

picket-guards.

After reconnaissance, the order to charge was given. It was necessary,

in the execution of the order, to ford the river waist-deep, which

Colonel Vaughn reports "was gallantly executed in good order but with

great enthusiasm. As we appeared in sight at a distance of four hundred

yards, the enemy broke and fled in all directions, firing as they ran

only a few random shots.... The enemy did not wait to fire their

artillery, which we captured, both guns loaded; they were, however,

spiked by the enemy before he fled. From the best information, their

number was between two and three hundred."

Colonel Vaughn further states that, in pursuance of orders, he fired the

bridge and then retired, bringing away the two guns and the enemy's

flag, and other articles of little value which had been captured, and

arrived at brigade headquarters in the evening, with his command in high

spirits good condition.

Colonel A. P. Hill, the energetic brigade commander who directed this

expedition, left the United States Army when the State, which had given

him to the military service of the General Government, passed her

ordinance of secession. The vigilance and enterprise he manifested on

this early occasion in the war of the States gave promise of the

brilliant career which gained for him the high rank of a

lieutenant-general, and which there was nothing for his friends to

regret save the honorable death which he met upon the field of battle.

Colonel Vaughn, the commander of the detachment, was new to war. His

paths had been those of peace, and his home in the mountains of East

Tennessee might reasonably have secured him from any expectation that it

would ever be the theatre on which armies were to contend, and that he,

in the mutation of human affairs, would become a soldier. He lived until

the close of the war, and, on larger fields than that on which he first

appeared, proved that, though not educated for a soldier, he had

endowments which compensated for that disadvantage.

The activity and vigilance of Stuart, afterward so distinguished as

commander of cavalry in the Army of Virginia, and the skill and daring

of Jackson, soon by greater deeds to become immortal, checked, punished,

and embarrassed the enemy in his threatened advances, and his movements

became so devoid of a definite purpose that one was at a loss to divine

the object of his campaign, unless it was to detain General Johnston

with his forces in the Valley of the Shenandoah, while General McDowell,

profiting by the feint, should make the real attack upon General

Beauregard's army at Manassas. However that may be, the evidence finally

became conclusive that the enemy under General McDowell was moving to

attack the army under General Beauregard. The contingency had therefore

arisen for that junction which was necessary to enable us to resist the

vastly superior numbers of our assailant; for, though the most strenuous

and not wholly unsuccessful exertions had been made to reënforce both

the Armies of the Shenandoah and of the Potomac, they yet remained far

smaller than those of the enemy confronting them, and made a junction of

our forces indispensable whenever the real point of attack should be

ascertained. For this movement we had the advantage of an interior line,

so that, if the enemy should discover it after it commenced, he could

not counteract it by adopting the same tactics. The success of this

policy, it will readily be perceived, depended upon the time of

execution, for, though from different causes, failure would equally

result if done too soon or too late. The determination as to which army

should be reënforced from the other, and the exact time of the transfer,

must have been a difficult problem, as both the generals appear to have

been unable to solve it (each asking reënforcements from the other).

On the 9th of July General Johnston wrote an official letter, from which

I make the following extracts:

"Headquarters, Winchester, _July 9, 1861_.

"General: ... Similar information from other sources gives me

the impression that the reënforcements arriving at Martinsburg

amount to seven or eight thousand. I have estimated the enemy's

force hitherto, you may remember, at eighteen thousand.

Additional artillery has also been received. They were greatly

superior to us in that arm before.

"The object of reënforcing General Patterson must be an advance

upon this place. Fighting here against great odds seems to me

more prudent than retreat.

"I have not asked for reënforcements, because I supposed that

the War Department, informed of the state of affairs everywhere,

could best judge where the troops at its disposal are most

required....

"Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed) "Joseph E. Johnston,

"_Brigadier-General, etc._"

"If it is proposed to strengthen us against the attack I suggest

as soon to be made, it seems to me that General Beauregard might

with _great expedition_ furnish five or six thousand men for a

few days.

"J. E. J."

As soon as I became satisfied that Manassas was the objective point of

the enemy's movement, I wrote to General Johnston, urging him to make

preparations for a junction with General Beauregard, and to his

objections, and the difficulties he presented, replied at great length,

endeavoring to convince him that the troops he described as embarrassing

a hasty march might be withdrawn in advance of the more effective

portion of his command. Writing with entire confidence, I kept no copy

of my letters, and, when subsequent events caused the wish to refer to

them, I requested General Johnston to send me copies of them. He replied

that his tent had been blown down, and his papers had been scattered.

His letters to me, which would show the general purport of mine to him,

have shared the fate which during or soon after the close of the war

befell most of the correspondence I had preserved, and his retained

copies, if still in his possession, do not appear to have been deemed of

sufficient importance to be inserted in his published "Narrative."

On the 17th of July, 1861, the following telegram was sent by the

Adjutant-General:

"Richmond, _July 17, 1861_.

"_To_ General J. E. Johnston, _Winchester, Virginia_.

"General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive

blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If

practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to

Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In

all the arrangements exercise your discretion.

(Signed) "S. Cooper,

"_Adjutant and Inspector-General_."

The confidence reposed in General Johnston, sufficiently evinced by the

important command intrusted to him, was more than equal to the

expectation that he would do all that was practicable to execute the

order for a junction, as well as to secure his sick and baggage. For the

execution of the one great purpose, that he would allow no minor

question to interfere with that which was of vital importance, and for

which he was informed all his "effective force" would "be needed."

The order referred to was the telegram inserted above, in which the

sending the sick to Culpepper Court-House might have been after or

before the effective force had moved to the execution of the main and

only positive part of the order. All the arrangements were left to the

discretion of the General. It seems strange that any one has construed

this expression as meaning that the movement for a junction was left to

the discretion of that officer, and that the forming of a junction--the

imperious necessity--should have been termed in the order "all the

arrangement," instead of referring that word to its proper connection,

the route and mode of transportation. The General had no margin on which

to institute a comparison as to the importance of his remaining in the

Valley, according to his previous assignment, or going where he was

ordered by competent authority.

It gives me pleasure to state that, from all the accounts received at

the time, the plans of General Johnston, for masking his withdrawal to

form a junction with General Beauregard, were conducted with marked

skill, and, though all of his troops did not arrive as soon as expected

and needed, he has satisfactorily shown that the failure was not due to

any defect in his arrangements for their transportation.

The great question of uniting the two armies had been decided at

Richmond. The time and place depended on the enemy, and, when it was

seen that the real attack was to be against the position at Manassas,

the order was sent to General Johnston to move to that point. His

letters of the 12th and 15th instant expressed his doubts about his

power to retire from before the superior force of General Patterson,

therefore the word "practicable" was in this connection the equivalent

of possible. That it was, at the time, so understood by General

Johnston, is shown by his reply to the telegram.

"Headquarters, Winchester, _July 18, 1861_.

"General: I have had the honor to receive your telegram of

yesterday.

"General Patterson, who had been at Bunker Hill since Monday,

seems to have moved yesterday to Charlestown, twenty-three miles

to the east of Winchester.

"Unless he prevents it, we shall move toward General Beauregard

to-day....

(Signed) "Joseph E. Johnston.

"General S. Cooper."

After General Johnston commenced his march to Manassas, he sent to me a

telegram, the substance of which, as my memory serves and the reply

indicates, was an inquiry as to the relative position he would occupy

toward General Beauregard. I returned the following answer:

"Richmond, _July 20, 1861_.

"General J. E. Johnston, _Manassas Junction, Virginia_.

"You are a general in the Confederate Army, possessed of the

power attaching to that rank. You will know how to make the

exact knowledge of Brigadier-General Beauregard, as well of the

ground as of the troops and preparation, avail for the success

of the object in which you coöperate. The zeal of both assures

me of harmonious action.

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

General Johnston, by his promotion to the grade of general, as well as

his superior rank as a brigadier over Brigadier-General Beauregard, gave

him precedence; so there was no need to ask which of the two would

command the whole, when their troops should join and do duty together.

Therefore his inquiry, as it was revolved in my mind, created an

anxiety, not felt before, lest there should be some unfortunate

complication, or misunderstanding, between these officers, when their

forces should be united. Regarding the combat of the 18th of July as the

precursor of a battle, I decided, at the earliest moment, to go in

person to the army.

As has been heretofore stated, Congress was to assemble on the 20th of

July, to hold its first session at the new capital, Richmond, Virginia.

My presence on that occasion and the delivery of a message were required

by usage and law. After the delivery of the message to Congress on

Saturday, the 20th of July, I intended to leave in the afternoon for

Manassas, but was detained until the next morning, when I left by rail,

accompanied by my aide-de-camp, Colonel J. R. Davis, to confer with the

generals on the field. As we approached Manassas Railroad junction, a

cloud of dust was visible a short distance to the west of the railroad.

It resembled one raised by a body of marching troops, and recalled to my

remembrance the design of General Beauregard to make the Rappahannock

his second line of defense. It was, however, subsequently learned that

the dust was raised by a number of wagons which had been sent to the

rear for greater security against the contingencies of the battle. The

sound of the firing had now become very distinct, so much so as to leave

no doubt that a general engagement had commenced. Though that event had

been anticipated as being near at hand after the action of the 18th, it

was both hoped and desired that it would not occur quite so soon, the

more so as it was not known whether the troops from the Valley had yet

arrived.

On reaching the railroad junction, I found a large number of men,

bearing the usual evidence of those who leave the field of battle under

a panic. They crowded around the train with fearful stories of a defeat

of our army. The railroad conductor announced his decision that the

railroad train should proceed no farther. Looking among those who were

about us for one whose demeanor gave reason to expect from him a

collected answer, I selected one whose gray beard and calm face gave

best assurance. He, however, could furnish no encouragement. Our line,

he said, was broken, all was confusion, the army routed, and the battle

lost. I asked for Generals Johnston and Beauregard; he said they were on

the field when he left it. I returned to the conductor and told him that

I must go on; that the railroad was the only means by which I could

proceed, and that, until I reached the headquarters, I could not get a

horse to ride to the field where the battle was ragging. He finally

consented to detach the locomotive from the train, and, for my

accommodation, to run it as far as the army headquarters. In this manner

Colonel Davis, aide-de-camp, and myself proceeded.

At the headquarters we found the Quartermaster General, W. L. Cabell,

and the Adjutant-General, Jordan, of General Beauregard's staff, who

courteously agreed to furnish us horses, and also to show us the route.

While the horses were being prepared, Colonel Jordan took occasion to

advise my aide-de-camp, Colonel Davis, of the hazard of going to the

field, and the impropriety of such exposure on my part. The horses were

after a time reported ready, and we started to the field. The stragglers

soon became numerous, and warnings as to the fate which awaited us if we

advanced were not only frequent but evidently sincere.

There were, however, many who turned back, and the wounded generally

cheered upon meeting us. I well remember one, a mere stripling, who,

supported on the shoulders of a man, who was bearing him to the rear,

took off his cap and waved it with a cheer, that showed within that

slender form beat the heart of a hero--breathed a spirit that would dare

the labors of Hercules.

As we advanced, the storm of the battle was rolling westward, and its

fury became more faint. When I met General Johnston, who was upon a hill

which commanded a general view of the field of the afternoon's

operations, and inquired of him as to the state of affairs, he replied

that we had won the battle. I left him there and rode still farther to

the west. Several of the volunteers on General Beauregard's staff joined

me, and a command of cavalry, the gallant leader of which, Captain John

F. Lay, insisted that I was too near the enemy to be without an escort.

We, however, only saw one column near to us that created a doubt as to

which side it belonged; and, as we were riding toward it, it was

suggested that we should halt until it could be examined with a

field-glass. Colonel Chesnut dismounted so as the better to use his

glass, and at that moment the column formed into line, by which the wind

struck the flag so as to extend it, and it was plainly revealed to be

that of the United States.

Our cavalry, though there was present but the squadron previously

mentioned, and from a statement of the commander of which I will make

some extracts, dashed boldly forward to charge. The demonstration was

followed by the immediate retreat of what was, I believe, the last,

thereabout, of the enemy's forces maintaining their organization, and

showing a disposition to dispute the possession of the field of battle.

In riding over the ground, it seemed quite possible to mark the line of

a fugitive's flight. Here was a musket, there a cartridge-box, there a

blanket or overcoat, a haversack, etc., as if the runner had stripped

himself, as he went, of all impediments to speed.

As we approached toward the left of our line, the signs of an utter rout

of the enemy were unmistakable, and justified the conclusion that the

watchword of "On to Richmond!" had been changed to "Off for Washington!"

On the extreme left of our field of operations, I found the troops whose

opportune arrival had averted impending disaster, and had so materially

contributed to our victory. Some of them had, after arriving at the

Manassas Railroad junction, hastened to our left; their

brigadier-general, E. K. Smith, was wounded soon after getting into

action, and the command of the brigade devolved upon Elzy, by whom it

was gallantly and skillfully led to the close of the battle; others,

under the command of General (then Colonel) Early, made a rapid march,

under the pressing necessity, from the extreme right of our line to and

beyond our left, so as to attack the enemy in flank, thus inflicting on

him the discomfiture his oblique movement was designed to inflict on us.

All these troops and the others near to them had hastened into action

without supplies or camp-equipage; weary, hungry, and without shelter,

night closed around them where they stood, the blood-stained victors on

a hard-fought field.

It was reported to me that some of the troops had been so long without

food as to be suffering severe hunger, and that no supplies could be got

where they were. I made several addresses to them, all to the effect

that their position was that best adapted to a pursuit of the enemy, and

that they should therefore remain there; adding that I would go to the

headquarters and direct that supplies should be sent to them promptly.

General (then Colonel) Early, commanding a brigade, informed me of some

wounded who required attention; one, Colonel Gardner, was, he said, at a

house not far from where we were. I rode to see him, found him in severe

pain, and from the twitching, visible and frequent, seemed to be

threatened with tetanus. A man sat beside him whose uniform was that of

the enemy; but he was gentle, and appeared to be solicitously attentive.

He said that he had no morphine, and did not know where to get any. I

found in a short time a surgeon who went with me to Colonel Gardner,

having the articles necessary in the case. Before leaving Colonel

Gardner, he told me that the man who was attending to him might, without

hindrance, have retreated with his comrades, but had kindly remained

with him, and he therefore asked my protection for the man. I took the

name and the State of the supposed good Samaritan, and at army

headquarters directed that he should not be treated as a prisoner. The

sequel will be told hereafter.

It was then late, and we rode back in the night, say seven miles, to the

army headquarters. I had not seen General Beauregard on the field, and

did not find him at his quarters when we returned; the promise made to

the troops was therefore communicated to a staff-officer, who said he

would have the supplies sent out. At a later hour when I met General

Beauregard and informed him of what had occurred, he stated that,

because of a false alarm which had reached him, he had ordered the

troops referred to from the left to the right of our line, so as to be

in position to repel the reported movement of the enemy against that

flank. That such an alarm should have been credited, and a night march

ordered on account of it, shows how little the completeness of the

victory was realized.

[Footnote 178: see "Rebellion Record," vol. ii, pp. 164, 165.]

CHAPTER VII.

Conference with the Generals after the Battle.--Order to pursue

the Enemy.--Evidences of a Thorough Rout.--"Sweet to die for

such a Cause."--Movements of the Next Day.--What more it was

practicable to do.--Charge against the President of preventing

the Capture of Washington.--The Failure to pursue.--Reflection

on the President.--General Beauregard's Report.--Endorsement

upon it.--Strength of the Opposing Forces.--Extracts relating to

the Battle, from the Narrative of General Early.--Resolutions of

Congress.--Efforts to increase the Efficiency of the Army.

At a late hour of the night, I had a conference with Generals Johnston

and Beauregard; the Adjutant-General of the latter, Colonel Jordan, was

present, and sat opposite to me at the table.

When, after some preliminary conversation, I asked whether any troops

had been sent in pursuit of the enemy, I was answered in the negative.

Upon further inquiry as to what troops were in the best position for

pursuit, and had been least fatigued during the day, General Bonham's

brigade was named. I then suggested that he should be ordered in

pursuit; a pause ensued, until Colonel Jordan asked me if I would

dictate the order. I at once dictated an order for immediate pursuit.

Some conversation followed, the result of which was a modification of

the order by myself, so that, instead of immediate pursuit, it should be

commenced at early dawn. Colonel Jordan spoke across the table to me,

saying, "If you will send the order as you first dictated it, the enemy

won't stop till he gets into the Potomac." I believe I remember the

words very nearly, and am quite sure that I do remember them

substantially. On the 25th of March, 1878, I wrote to General Beauregard

as follows:

"Dear Sir: Permit me to ask you to recall the conference held

between General Johnston, yourself, and myself, on the night

after the close of the battle of Manassas; and to give me, if

you can, a copy of the order which I dictated, and which your

adjutant-general, T. J. Jordan, wrote at my dictation, directing

Brigadier-General Bonham to follow the retreating enemy. If you

can not furnish a copy of the order, please give me your

recollection of its substance.

"Yours respectfully,

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

To this letter General Beauregard courteously replied that his

order-book was in New York, in the hands of a friend, to whom he would

write for a copy of the order desired if it should be in said book, and

that he would also write to his adjutant, General Jordan, for his

recollection of the order if it had not been inscribed in the

order-book.

On the 24th of April General Beauregard forwarded to me the answer to

his inquiries in my behalf, as follows:

"New York, 63 Broadway, _April 18, 1878_.

"My dear General: In answer to your note, I hasten to say that

properly Mr. Davis is not to be held accountable for our failure

to pursue McDowell from the field of Manassas the night of the

21st of July, 1861.

"As to the order, to which I presume Mr. Davis refers in his

note to you, I recollect the incident very distinctly.

"The night of the battle, as I was about to ascend to your

quarters over my office, Captain E. P. Alexander, of your staff,

informed me that Captain ----, attached to General Johnston's

Army of the Shenandoah, reported that he had been as far forward

as Centreville, where he had seen the Federal army completely

routed and in full flight toward Washington.

"This statement I at once repeated to Mr. Davis, General

Johnston, and yourself, whom I found seated around your

table--Mr. Davis at the moment writing a dispatch to General

Cooper.

"As soon as I had made my report, Mr. Davis with much animation

asserted the necessity for an urgent pursuit that night by

Bonham, who, with his own brigade and that of Longstreet, was in

close proximity to Centreville at the moment. So I took my seat

at the same table with you, and wrote the order for pursuit,

substantially at the dictation of Mr. Davis. But, while writing,

either I happened to remember, or Captain Alexander himself--as

I am inclined to believe--called me aside to remind me that his

informant was known among us of the old army as ---- ----,

because of eccentricities, and in contradistinction with others

of the same name. When I repeated this reminder, Mr. Davis

recalled the _sobriquet_, as he had a precise personal knowledge

of the officers of the old army. He laughed heartily, as did all

present.

"The question of throwing General Bonham forward that night,

upon the unverified report of Captain ----, was now briefly

discussed, with a unanimous decision against it; therefore, the

order was not dispatched.

"It is proper to add in this connection that, so far as I am

aware--and I had the opportunity of knowing what occurred--this

was the only instance during Mr. Davis's stay at Manassas in

which he exercised any voice as to the movement of the troops.

Profoundly pleased with the results achieved by the happy

juncture of the two Confederate armies upon the very field of

battle, his bearing toward the generals who commanded them was

eminently proper, as I have testified on a former occasion; and,

I repeat, he certainly expressed or manifested no opposition to

a forward movement, nor did he display the least disposition to

interfere by opinion or authority touching what the Confederate

forces should or should not do.

"You having at the close of the day surrendered the command,

which had been left in your hands, over both Confederate armies

during the engagement, General Johnston was that night in chief

command. He was decidedly averse to an immediate offensive, and

emphatically discountenanced it as impracticable.

"Very truly, your friend,

(Signed) "Thomas Jordan.

"General P. G. T. Beauregard, _New Orleans, Louisiana_."

General Beauregard, in his letter forwarding the above, wrote, "The

account given herewith by General Jordan of what occurred there

respecting further pursuit that night agrees with my own recollection."

It was a matter of importance, as I regarded it, to follow closely on

the retreating enemy, but it was of no consequence then or now as to who

issued the order for pursuit, and, unless requested, I should not have

dictated one, preferring that the generals to whom the operations were

confided should issue all orders to the troops. I supposed the order, as

modified by myself, had been sent. I have found, however, since the

close of the war, that it was not, but that an order to the same effect

was sent on the night of the 21st of July, for a copy of which I am

indebted to the kindness of that chivalrous gentleman, soldier, and

patriot, General Bonham. It is as follows:

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac,

"Manassas, _July 21, 1861_.

"(Special Orders, No. 140.)