The Peace Conference.--Demand for "a Little Bloodletting."--Plan
proposed by the Conference.--Its Contemptuous Reception and
Treatment in the United States Congress.--Failure of Last
Efforts at Reconciliation and Reunion.--Note.--Speech of General
Lane, of Oregon.
While the events which have just been occupying our attention were
occurring, the last conspicuous effort was made within the Union to stay
the tide of usurpation which was driving the Southern States into
secession. This effort was set on foot by Virginia, the General Assembly
of which State, on the 19th of January, 1861, adopted a preamble and
resolutions, deprecating disunion, and inviting all such States as were
willing to unite in an earnest endeavor to avert it by an adjustment of
the then existing controversies to appoint commissioners to meet in
Washington, on the 4th of February, "to consider, and, if practicable,
agree upon some suitable adjustment." Ex-President John Tyler, and
Messrs. William C. Rives, John W. Brockenbrugh, George W. Summers, and
James A. Seddon--five of the most distinguished citizens of the
State--were appointed to represent Virginia in the proposed conference.
If they could agree with the Commissioners of other States upon any plan
of settlement requiring amendments to the Federal Constitution, they
were instructed to communicate them to Congress, with a view to their
submission to the several States for ratification.
The "border States" in general promptly acceded to this proposition of
Virginia, and others followed, so that in the "Peace Congress," or
conference, which assembled, according to appointment, on the 4th, and
adjourned on the 27th of February, twenty-one States were eventually
represented, of which fourteen were Northern, or "non-slaveholding," and
seven slaveholding States. The six States which had already seceded were
of course not of the number represented; nor were Texas and Arkansas,
the secession of which, although not consummated, was obviously
inevitable. Three of the Northwestern States--Michigan, Wisconsin, and
Minnesota--and the two Pacific States--Oregon and California--also held
aloof from the conference. In the case of these last two, distance and
lack of time perhaps hindered action. With regard to the other three,
their reasons for declining to participate in the movement were not
officially assigned, and are therefore only subjects for conjecture.
Some remarkable revelations were afterward made, however, with regard to
the action of one of them. It appears, from correspondence read in the
Senate on the 27th of February, that the two Senators from Michigan had
at first opposed the participation of that State in the conference, on
the ground that it was, as one of them expressed it, "a step toward
obtaining that concession which the imperious slave power so insolently
demands."[130]--that is to say, in plain terms, they objected to it
because it might lead to a compromise and pacification. Finding,
however, that most of the other Northern States were represented--some
of them by men of moderate and conciliatory temper--that writer had
subsequently changed his mind, and at a late period of the session of
the conference recommended the sending of delegations of "true,
unflinching men," who would be "in favor of the Constitution as it
is"--that is, who would oppose any amendment proposed in the interests
of harmony and pacification.
The other Senator exhibits a similar alarm at the prospect of compromise
and a concurrent change of opinion. He urges the sending of
"stiff-backed" men, to thwart the threatened success of the friends of
peace, and concludes with an expression of the humane and patriotic
sentiment that "without a little bloodletting" the Union would not be
"worth a rush."[131] With such unworthy levity did these leaders of
sectional strife express their exultation in the prospect of the
conflict, which was to drench the land with blood and enshroud thousands
of homes in mourning!
It is needless to follow the course of the deliberations of the Peace
Conference. It included among its members many men of distinction and
eminent ability, and some of unquestionable patriotism, from every part
of the Union. The venerable John Tyler presided, and took an active and
ardent interest in the efforts made to effect a settlement and avert the
impending disasters. A plan was finally agreed upon by a majority of the
States represented, for certain amendments to the Federal Constitution,
which it was hoped might be acceptable to all parties and put an end to
further contention. In its leading features this plan resembled that of
Mr. Crittenden, heretofore spoken of, which was still pending in the
Senate, though with some variations, which were regarded as less
favorable to the South. It was reported immediately to both Houses of
the United States Congress. In the Senate, Mr. Crittenden promptly
expressed his willingness to accept it as a substitute for his own
proposition, and eloquently urged its adoption. But the arrogance of a
sectional majority inflated by recent triumph was too powerful to be
allayed by the appeals of patriotism or the counsels of wisdom. The plan
of the Peace Conference was treated by the majority with the
contemptuous indifference shown to every other movement for
conciliation. Its mere consideration was objected to by the extreme
radicals, and, although they failed in this, it was defeated on a vote,
as were the Crittenden propositions.
With the failure of these efforts, which occurred on the eve of the
inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, and the accession to power of a party
founded on a basis of sectional aggression, and now thoroughly committed
to its prosecution and perpetuation, expired the last hopes of
reconciliation and union.
Note.--In the course of the debate in the Senate on these grave
propositions, a manly and eloquent speech was made on the 2d of March,
1861, by the Hon. Joseph Lane, a Senator from Oregon, who had been the
candidate of the Democratic State-rights party for the Vice-Presidency
of the United States, in the canvass of 1860. Some passages of this
speech seem peculiarly appropriate for insertion here. General Lane was
replying to a speech of Mr. Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, afterward
President of the United States:
"Mr. President, the Senator from Tennessee complains of my
remarks on his speech. He complains of the tone and temper of
what I said. He complains that I replied at all, as I was a
Northern Senator. Mr. President, I am a citizen of this Union
and a Senator of the United States. My residence is in the
North, but I have never seen the day, and I never shall, when I
will refuse justice as readily to the South as to the North. I
know nothing but my country, the whole country, the
Constitution, and the equality of the States--the equal right of
every man in the common territory of the whole country; and by
that I shall stand.
"The Senator complains that I replied at all, as I was a
Northern Senator, and a Democrat whom he had supported at the
last election for a high office. Now, I was, as I stated at the
time, surprised at the Senator's speech, because I understood it
to be for coercion, as I think it was understood by almost
everybody else, except, as we are now told, by the Senator
himself; and I still think it amounted to a coercion speech,
notwithstanding the soft and plausible phrases by which he
describes it--a speech for the execution of the laws and the
protection of the Federal property. Sir, if there is, as I
contend, the right of secession, then, whenever a State
exercises that right, this Government has no laws in that State
to execute, nor has it any property in any such State that can
be protected by the power of this Government. In attempting,
however, to substitute the smooth phrases 'executing the laws'
and 'protecting public property' for coercion, for civil war, we
have an important concession: that is, that this Government dare
not go before the people with a plain avowal of its real
purposes and of their consequences. No, sir; the policy is to
inveigle the people of the North into civil war, by masking the
design in smooth and ambiguous terms."--("Congressional Globe,"
second session, Thirty-sixth Congress, p. 1347.)
[Footnote 130: See letter of Hon. S. K. Bingham to Governor Blair, of
Michigan, in "Congressional Globe," second session, Thirty-sixth
Congress, Part II, p. 1247.]
[Footnote 131: See "Congressional Globe," _ut supra_. As this letter,
last referred to, is brief and characteristic of the temper of the
typical so-called Republicans of the period, it may be inserted entire:
"Washington, _February_ 11, 1861.
"My dear Governor: Governor Bingham and myself telegraphed you
on Saturday, at the request of Massachusetts and New York, to
send delegates to the Peace or Compromise Congress. They admit
that we were right, and that they were wrong; that no Republican
State should have sent delegates; but they are here, and can not
get away; Ohio, Indiana, and Rhode Island are caving in, and
there is danger of Illinois; and now they beg us, for God's
sake, to come to their rescue, and save the Republican party
from rupture. I hope you will send _stiff-backed_ men, or none.
The whole thing was gotten up against my judgment and advice,
and will end in thin smoke. Still, I hope, as a matter of
courtesy to some of our erring brethren, that you will send the
delegates.
"Truly your friend,
"(Signed) Z. Chandler.
"His Excellency Austin Blair."
"P.S.--Some of the manufacturing States think that a fight would
be awful. Without a _little bloodletting_, this Union will not,
in my estimation, be worth a rush."
The reader should not fall into the mistake of imagining that the
"erring brethren," toward whom a concession of courtesy is recommended
by the writer of this letter, were the people of the seceding, or even
of the border, States. It is evident from the context that he means the
people of those so-called "Republican" States which had fallen into the
error of taking part in a plan for peace, which might have averted the
bloodletting recommended.]
CHAPTER IX.
Northern Protests against Coercion.--The "New York Tribune,"
Albany "Argus," and "New York Herald."--Great Public Meeting in
New York.--Speeches of Mr. Thayer, ex-Governor Seymour,
ex-Chancellor Walworth, and Others.--The Press in February,
1861.--Mr. Lincoln's Inaugural.--The Marvelous Change or
Suppression of Conservative Sentiment.--Historic Precedents.
It is a great mistake, or misstatement of fact, to assume that, at the
period under consideration, the Southern States stood alone in the
assertion of the principles which have been laid down in this work, with
regard to the right of secession and the wrong of coercion. Down to the
formation of the Confederate Government, the one was distinctly
admitted, the other still more distinctly disavowed and repudiated, by
many of the leaders of public opinion in the North of both
parties--indeed, any purpose of direct coercion was disclaimed by nearly
all. If presented at all, it was in the delusive and ambiguous guise of
"the execution of the laws" and "protection of the public property."
The "New York Tribune"--the leading organ of the party which triumphed
in the election of 1860--had said, soon after the result of that
election was ascertained, with reference to secession: "We hold, with
Jefferson, to the inalienable right of communities to alter or abolish
forms of government that have become oppressive or injurious; and, if
the cotton States shall decide that they can do better out of the Union
than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace. The right to secede
may be a revolutionary right, _but it exists nevertheless_; and we do
not see how one party can have _a right to do what another party has a
right to prevent_. We must ever resist the asserted right of any State
to remain in the Union and nullify or defy the laws thereof: _to
withdraw from the Union is quite another matter_. And, whenever a
considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out,
_we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep her in. We hope
never to live in a republic whereof one section is pinned to the residue
by bayonets_."[132]
The only liberty taken with this extract has been that of presenting
certain parts of it in italics. Nothing that has ever been said by the
author of this work, in the foregoing chapters, on the floor of the
Senate, or elsewhere, more distinctly asserted the right of secession.
Nothing that has been quoted from Hamilton, or Madison, or Marshall, or
John Quincy Adams, more emphatically repudiates the claim of right to
restrain or coerce a State in the exercise of its free choice. Nothing
that has been said since the war which followed could furnish a more
striking condemnation of its origin, prosecution, purposes, and results.
A comparison of the sentiments above quoted, with the subsequent career
of the party, of which that journal was and long had been the recognized
organ, would exhibit a striking incongruity and inconsistency.
The "Tribune" was far from being singular among its Northern
contemporaries in the entertainment of such views, as Mr. Greeley, its
chief editor, has shown by many citations in his book, "The American
Conflict." The Albany "Argus," about the same time, said, in language
which Mr. Greeley characterizes as "clear and temperate": "We sympathize
with and justify the South as far as this: their rights have been
invaded to the extreme limit possible within the forms of the
Constitution; and, beyond this limit, their feelings have been insulted
and their interests and honor assailed by almost every possible form of
denunciation and invective; and, if we deemed it certain that the real
_animus_ of the Republican party could be carried into the
administration of the Federal Government, and become the permanent
policy of the nation, we should think that all the instincts of
self-preservation and of manhood rightfully impelled them to a resort to
revolution and a separation from the Union, and we would applaud them
and wish them godspeed in the adoption of such a remedy."
Again, the same paper said, a day or two afterward: "If South Carolina
or any other State, through a convention of her people, shall formally
separate herself from the Union, probably both the present and the next
Executive will simply let her alone and _quietly allow all the functions
of the Federal Government within her limits to be suspended. Any other
course would be madness_; as it would at once enlist all the Southern
States in the controversy and plunge the whole country into a civil
war.... As a matter of policy and wisdom, therefore, independent of the
question of right, we should deem resort to force most disastrous."
The "New York Herald"--a journal which claimed to be independent of all
party influences--about the same period said: "Each State is organized
as a complete government, holding the purse and wielding the sword,
possessing the right to break the tie of the confederation as a nation
might break a treaty, and to repel coercion as a nation might repel
invasion.... Coercion, if it were possible, is out of the question."
On the 31st of January, 1861--after six States had already seceded--a
great meeting was held in the city of New York, to consider the perilous
condition of the country. At this meeting Mr. James S. Thayer, "an
old-line Whig," made a speech, which was received with great applause.
The following extracts from the published report of Mr. Thayer's speech
will show the character of the views which then commanded the cordial
approval of that metropolitan audience:
"We can at least, in an authoritative way and a practical
manner, arrive at the basis of a _peaceable separation_.
[Cheers.] We can at least by discussion enlighten, settle, and
concentrate the public sentiment in the State of New York upon
this question, and save it from that fearful current, which
circuitously but certainly sweeps madly on, through the narrow
gorge of 'the enforcement of the laws,' to the shoreless ocean
of civil war! [Cheers.] Against this, under all circumstances,
in every place and form, we must now and at all times oppose a
resolute and unfaltering resistance. The public mind will bear
the avowal, and let us make it--that, if a revolution of force
is to begin, _it shall be inaugurated at home_. And if the
incoming Administration shall attempt to carry out the line of
policy that has been foreshadowed, we announce that, when the
hand of Black Republicanism turns to blood-red, and seeks _from
the fragment of the Constitution to construct a scaffolding for
coercion--another name for execution_--we will reverse the order
of the French Revolution, and save the blood of the people by
making those who would inaugurate a reign of terror the first
victims of a national guillotine!" [Enthusiastic applause.]
And again:
"It is announced that the Republican Administration will enforce
the laws against and in all the seceding States. A nice
discrimination must be exercised in the performance of this
duty. You remember the story of William Tell.... Let an arrow
winged by the Federal bow strike the heart of an American
citizen, and who can number the avenging darts that will cloud
the heavens in the conflict that will ensue? [Prolonged
applause.] What, then, is the duty of the State of New York?
What shall we say to our people when we come to meet this state
of facts? That the Union must be preserved? But, if that can not
be, what then? _Peaceable separation._ [Applause.] Painful and
humiliating as it is, let us temper it with all we can of love
and kindness, so that we may yet be left in a comparatively
prosperous condition, in friendly relations with another
Confederacy." [Cheers.]
At the same meeting ex-Governor Horatio Seymour asked the question--on
which subsequent events have cast their own commentary--whether
"successful coercion by the North is less revolutionary than successful
secession by the South? Shall we prevent revolution [he added] by being
foremost in over-throwing the principles of our Government, and all that
makes it valuable to our people and distinguishes it among the nations
of the earth?"
The venerable ex-Chancellor Walworth thus expressed himself:
"It would be as brutal, in my opinion, to send men to butcher
our own brothers of the Southern States as it would be to
massacre them in the Northern States. We are told, however, that
it is our duty to, and we must, enforce the laws. But why--and
what laws are to be enforced? There were laws that were to be
enforced in the time of the American Revolution.... Did Lord
Chatham go for enforcing those laws? No, he gloried in defense
of the liberties of America. He made that memorable declaration
in the British Parliament, 'If I were an American citizen,
instead of being, as I am, an Englishman, I never would submit
to such laws--never, never, never!'" [Prolonged applause.]
Other distinguished speakers expressed themselves in similar
terms--varying somewhat in their estimate of the propriety of the
secession of the Southern States, but all agreeing in emphatic and
unqualified reprobation of the idea of coercion. A series of
conciliatory resolutions was adopted, one of which declares that "civil
war will not restore the Union, but will defeat for ever its
reconstruction."
At a still later period--some time in the month of February--the "Free
Press," a leading paper in Detroit, had the following:
"If there shall not be a change in the present seeming purpose
to yield to no accommodation of the national difficulties, and
if troops shall be raised in the North to march against the
people of the South, _a fire in the rear will be opened upon
such troops_, which will either stop their march altogether or
wonderfully accelerate it."
The "Union," of Bangor, Maine, spoke no less decidedly to the same
effect:
"The difficulties between the North and the South must be
compromised, or the separation of the States _shall be
peaceable_. If the Republican party refuse to go the full length
of the Crittenden amendment--_which is the very least the South
can or ought to take_--then, here in Maine, not a Democrat will
be found who will raise his arm against his brethren of the
South. From one end of the State to the other let the cry of the
Democracy be, Compromise or Peaceable Separation!"
That these were not expressions of isolated or exceptional sentiment is
evident from the fact that they were copied with approval by other
Northern journals.
Mr. Lincoln, when delivering his inaugural address, on the 4th of March,
1861, had not so far lost all respect for the consecrated traditions of
the founders of the Constitution and for the majesty of the principle of
State sovereignty as openly to enunciate the claim of coercion. While
arguing against the right to secede, and asserting his intention "to
hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the
Government, and collect the duties and imposts," he says that, "beyond
what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no
using of force against or among the people anywhere," and appends to
this declaration the following pledge:
"Where hostility to the United States shall be so great as to
prevent competent resident citizens from holding the Federal
offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers
among the people for that object. While the strict legal right
may exist of the Government to enforce the exercise of these
offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so
nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego for
the time the uses of such offices."
These extracts will serve to show that the people of the South were not
without grounds for cherishing the hope, to which they so fondly clung,
that the separation would, indeed, be as peaceable in fact as it was, on
their part, in purpose; that the conservative and patriotic feeling
still existing in the North would control the elements of sectional
hatred and bloodthirsty fanaticism; and that there would be really "no
war."
And here the ingenuous reader may very naturally ask, What became of all
this feeling? How was it that, in the course of a few weeks, it had
disappeared like a morning mist? Where was the host of men who had
declared that an army marching to invade the Southern States should
first pass over their dead bodies? No _new_ question had arisen--no
change in the attitude occupied by the seceding States--no cause for
controversy not already existing when these utterances were made. And
yet the sentiments which they expressed were so entirely swept away by
the tide of reckless fury which soon afterward impelled an armed
invasion of the South, that (with a few praiseworthy but powerless
exceptions) scarcely a vestige of them was left. Not only were they
obliterated, but seemingly forgotten.
I leave to others to offer, if they can, an explanation of this strange
phenomenon. To the student of human nature, however, it may not seem
altogether without precedent, when he remembers certain other instances
on record of mutations in public sentiment equally sudden and
extraordinary. Ten thousand swords that would have leaped from their
scabbards--as the English statesman thought--to avenge even a look of
insult to a lovely queen, hung idly in their places when she was led to
the scaffold in the midst of the vilest taunts and execrations. The case
that we have been considering was, perhaps, only an illustration of the
general truth that, in times of revolutionary excitement, the higher and
better elements are crushed and silenced by the lower and baser--not so
much on account of their greater extent, as of their greater violence.
[Footnote 132: "New York Tribune" of November 9, 1860, quoted in "The
American Conflict," vol. i, chap. xxiii, p. 359.]
CHAPTER X.
Temper of the Southern People indicated by the Action of the
Confederate Congress.--The Permanent Constitution.--Modeled
after the Federal Constitution.--Variations and Special
Provisions.--Provisions with Regard to Slavery and the
Slave-Trade.--A False Assertion refuted.--Excellence of the
Constitution.--Admissions of Hostile or Impartial Criticism.
The conservative temper of the people of the Confederate States was
conspicuously exhibited in the most important product of the early
labors of their representatives in Congress assembled. The Provisional
Constitution, although prepared only for temporary use, and necessarily
in some haste, was so well adapted for the purposes which it was
intended to serve, that many thought it would have been wise to continue
it in force indefinitely, or at least until the independency of the
Confederacy should be assured. The Congress, however, deeming it best
that the system of Government should emanate from the people,
accordingly, on the 11th of March, prepared the permanent Constitution,
which was submitted to and ratified by the people of the respective
States.
Of this Constitution--which may be found in an appendix,[133] side by
side with the Constitution of the United States--the Hon. Alexander H.
Stephens, who was one of its authors, very properly says:
"The whole document utterly negatives the idea, which so many
have been active in endeavoring to put in the enduring form of
history, that the Convention at Montgomery was nothing but a set
of 'conspirators,' whose object was the overthrow of the
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and the
erection of a great 'slavery oligarchy,' instead of the free
institutions thereby secured and guaranteed. This work of the
Montgomery Convention, with that of the Constitution for a
Provisional Government, will ever remain, not only as a monument
of the wisdom, forecast, and statesmanship of the men who
constituted it, but an everlasting refutation of the charges
which have been brought against them. These works together show
clearly that their only leading object was to sustain, uphold,
and perpetuate the fundamental principles of the Constitution of
the United States."[134]
The Constitution of the United States was the model followed throughout,
with only such changes as experience suggested for better practical
working or for greater perspicuity. The preamble to both instruments is
the same in substance, and very nearly identical in language. The words
"We, the people of the United States," in one, are replaced by "We, the
people of the Confederate States," in the other; and the gross
perversion which has been made of the former expression is precluded in
the latter merely by the addition of the explanatory clause, "each State
acting in its sovereign and independent character"--an explanation
which, at the time of the formation of the Constitution of the United
States, would have been deemed entirely superfluous.
The official term of the President was fixed at six instead of four
years, and it was provided that he should not be eligible for
reëlection. This was in accordance with the original draft of the
Constitution of 1787.[135]
The President was empowered to remove officers of his Cabinet, or those
engaged in the diplomatic service, at his discretion, but in all other
cases removal from office could be made only for cause, and the cause
was to be reported to the Senate.[136]
Congress was authorized to provide by law for the admission of "the
principal officer in each of the executive departments" (or Cabinet
officers) to a seat upon the floor of either House, with the privilege
of taking part in the discussion of subjects pertaining to his
department.[137] This wise and judicious provision, which would have
tended to obviate much delay and misunderstanding, was, however, never
put into execution by the necessary legislation.
Protective duties for the benefit of special branches of industry, which
had been so fruitful a source of trouble under the Government of the
United States, were altogether prohibited.[138] So, also, were bounties
from the Treasury,[139] and extra compensation for services rendered by
officers, contractors, or employees, of any description.[140]
A vote of two thirds of each House was requisite for the appropriation
of money from the Treasury, unless asked for by the chief of a
department and submitted to Congress by the President, or for payment of
the expenses of Congress, or of claims against the Confederacy
judicially established and declared.[141] The President was also
authorized to approve any one appropriation and disapprove any other in
the same bill.[142]
With regard to the impeachment of Federal officers, it was intrusted, as
formerly, to the discretion of the House of Representatives, with the
additional provision, however, that, in the case of any judicial or
other officer exercising his functions solely within the limits of a
particular State, impeachment might be made by the Legislature of such
State--the trial in all cases to be by the Senate of the Confederate
States.[143]
Any two or more States were authorized to enter into compacts with each
other for the improvement of the navigation of rivers flowing between or
through them.[144] A vote of two thirds of each House--the Senate voting
by States--was required for the admission of a new State.[145]
With regard to amendments of the Constitution, it was made obligatory
upon Congress, on the demand of any three States, concurring in the
proposed amendment or amendments, to summon a convention of all the
States to consider and act upon them, voting by States, but restricted
in its action to the particular propositions thus submitted. If approved
by such convention, the amendments were to be subject to final
ratification by two thirds of the States.[146]
Other changes or modifications, worthy of special notice, related to
internal improvements, bankruptcy laws, duties on exports, suits in the
Federal courts, and the government of the Territories.[147]
With regard to slavery and the slave-trade, the provisions of this
Constitution furnish an effectual answer to the assertion, so often
made, that the Confederacy was founded on slavery, that slavery was its
"corner-stone," etc. Property in slaves, _already existing_, was
recognized and guaranteed, just as it was by the Constitution of the
United States; and the rights of such property in the common Territories
were protected against any such hostile discrimination as had been
attempted in the Union. But the "extension of slavery," in the only
practical sense of that phrase, was more distinctly and effectually
precluded by the Confederate than by the Federal Constitution. This will
be manifest on a comparison of the provisions of the two relative to the
slave-trade. These are found at the beginning of the ninth section of
the first article of each instrument. The Constitution of the United
States has the following:
"The migration or importation of such persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight
hundred and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such
importations, not exceeding ten dollars for each person."
The Confederate Constitution, on the other hand, ordained as follows:
"1. The importation of negroes of the African race from any
foreign country, other than the slaveholding States or
Territories of the United States of America, is hereby
forbidden; and Congress is required to pass such laws as shall
effectually prevent the same.
"2. Congress shall also have the power to prohibit the
introduction of slaves from any state not a member of, or
Territory not belonging to, this Confederacy."
In the case of the United States, the only prohibition is against any
interference by Congress with the slave-trade for a term of years, and
it was further legitimized by the authority given to impose a duty upon
it. The term of years, it is true, had long since expired, but there was
still no prohibition of the trade by the Constitution; it was after 1808
entirely within the discretion of Congress either to encourage,
tolerate, or prohibit it.
Under the Confederate Constitution, on the contrary, the African
slave-trade was "_hereby forbidden_," positively and unconditionally,
from the beginning. Neither the Confederate Government nor that of any
of the States could permit it, and the Congress was expressly "required"
to enforce the prohibition. The only discretion in the matter intrusted
to the Congress was, whether or not to permit the introduction of slaves
from any of the United States or their Territories.
Mr. Lincoln, in his inaugural address, had said: "I have no purpose,
directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in
the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so,
and I have no inclination to do so." Now, if there was no purpose on the
part of the Government of the United States to interfere with the
institution of slavery within its already existing limits--a proposition
which permitted its propagation within those limits by natural
increase--and inasmuch as the Confederate Constitution precluded any
other than the same natural increase, we may plainly perceive the
disingenuousness and absurdity of the pretension by which a factitious
sympathy has been obtained in certain quarters for the war upon the
South, on the ground that it was a war in behalf of freedom against
slavery.[148] I had no direct part in the preparation of the Confederate
Constitution. No consideration of delicacy forbids me, therefore, to
say, in closing this brief review of that instrument, that it was a
model of wise, temperate, and liberal statesmanship. Intelligent
criticism, from hostile as well as friendly sources, has been compelled
to admit its excellences, and has sustained the judgment of a popular
Northern journal which said, a few days after it was adopted and
published:
"The new Constitution is the Constitution of the United States
with various modifications and some very important and most
desirable improvements. We are free to say that the invaluable
reforms enumerated should be adopted by the United States, with
or without a reunion of the seceded States, and as soon as
possible. But why not accept them with the propositions of the
Confederate States on slavery as a basis of reunion?"[149]
[Footnote 133: See Appendix K.]
[Footnote 134: "War between the States," vol. ii, col. xix, p. 389.]
[Footnote 135: See Article II, section 1.]
[Footnote 136: Ibid., section 2, ¶ 3.]
[Footnote 137: Article I, section 6, ¶ 2.]
[Footnote 138: Article I, section 8, ¶ 1.]
[Footnote 139: Ibid.]
[Footnote 140: Ibid., section 9, ¶ 10.]
[Footnote 141: Ibid., ¶ 9.]
[Footnote 142: Ibid., section 7, ¶ 2.]
[Footnote 143: Ibid., section 2, ¶ 5.]
[Footnote 144: Ibid., section 10, ¶ 3.]
[Footnote 145: Article IV, section 3, ¶ 1.]
[Footnote 146: Article V.]
[Footnote 147: Article I, section 8, ¶¶ 1 and 4, section 9, ¶ 6; Article
III, section 2, ¶ 1; Article IV, section 3, ¶ 3.]
[Footnote 148: As late as the 22d of April, 1861, Mr. Seward, United
States Secretary of State, in a dispatch to Mr. Dayton, Minister to
France, since made public, expressed the views and purposes of the
United States Government in the premises as follows. It may be proper to
explain that, by what he is pleased to term "the revolution," Mr. Seward
means the withdrawal of the Southern States; and that the words
italicized are, perhaps, not so distinguished in the original. He says:
"The Territories will remain in all respects the same, whether the
revolution shall succeed or shall fail. _The condition of slavery in the
several States will remain just the same, whether it succeed or fail._
There is not even a pretext for the complaint that the disaffected
States are to be conquered by the United States if the revolution fails;
for the rights of the States and _the condition of every being in them_
will remain subject to exactly the same laws and forms of
administration, whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shall
fail. In the one case, the States would be federally connected with the
new Confederacy; in the other, they would, as now, be members of the
United States; _but their Constitutions and laws, customs, habits, and
institutions, in either ease, will remain the same_."]
[Footnote 149: "New York Herald," March 19, 1861.]
CHAPTER XI.
The Commission to Washington City.--Arrival of Mr.
Crawford.--Mr. Buchanan's Alarm.--Note of the Commissioners to
the New Administration.--Mediation of Justices Nelson and
Campbell.--The Difficulty about Forts Sumter and Pickens.--Mr.
Secretary Seward's Assurances.--Duplicity of the Government at
Washington.--Mr. Fox's Visit to Charleston.--Secret Preparations
for Coercive Measures.--Visit of Mr. Lamon.--Renewed Assurances
of Good Faith.--Notification to Governor Pickens.--Developments
of Secret History.--Systematic and Complicated Perfidy exposed.
The appointment of Commissioners to proceed to Washington, for the
purpose of establishing friendly relations with the United States and
effecting an equitable settlement of all questions relating to the
common property of the States and the public debt, has already been
mentioned. No time was lost in carrying this purpose into execution. Mr.
Crawford--first of the Commissioners--left Montgomery on or about the
27th of February, and arrived in Washington two or three days before the
expiration of Mr. Buchanan's term of office as President of the United
States. Besides his official credentials, he bore the following letter
to the President, of a personal or semi-official character, intended to
facilitate, if possible, the speedy accomplishment of the objects of his
mission:
"_To the President of the United States._
"Sir: Being animated by an earnest desire to unite and bind
together our respective countries by friendly ties, I have
appointed Martin J. Crawford, one of our most esteemed and
trustworthy citizens, as special Commissioner of the Confederate
States to the Government of the United States; and I have now
the honor to introduce him to you, and to ask for him a
reception and treatment corresponding to his station, and to the
purposes for which he is sent.
"Those purposes he will more particularly explain to you. Hoping
that through his agency these may be accomplished, I avail
myself of this occasion to offer to you the assurance of my
distinguished consideration."
(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."
"Montgomery, _February 27, 1861_."
It may here be mentioned, in explanation of my desire that the
commission, or at least a part of it, should reach Washington before the
close of Mr. Buchanan's term, that I had received an intimation from
him, through a distinguished Senator of one of the border States,[150]
that he would be happy to receive a Commissioner or Commissioners from
the Confederate States, and would refer to the Senate any communication
that might be made through such a commission.
Mr. Crawford--now a Judge of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the only
surviving member of the commission--in a manuscript account, which he
has kindly furnished, of his recollections of events connected with it,
says that, on arriving in Washington at the early hour of half-past four
o'clock in the morning, he was "surprised to see Pennsylvania Avenue,
from the old National to Willard's Hotel, crowded with men hurrying,
some toward the former, but most of the faces in the direction of the
latter, where the new President [Mr. Lincoln, President-elect], the
great political almoner, for the time being, had taken up his lodgings.
At this point," continues Judge Crawford, "the crowd swelled to
astonishing numbers of expectant and hopeful men, awaiting an
opportunity, either to see Mr. Lincoln himself, or to communicate with
him through some one who might be so fortunate as to have access to his
presence."
Describing his reception in the Federal capital, Judge Crawford says:
"The feverish and emotional condition of affairs soon made the
presence of the special Commissioner at Washington known
throughout the city. Congress was still, of course, in session;
Senators and members of the House of Representatives, excepting
those of the Confederate States, who had withdrawn, were in
their seats, and the manifestations of anxious care and gloomy
forebodings were plainly to be seen on all sides. This was not
confined to sections, but existed among the men of the North and
West as well as those of the South....
"Mr. Buchanan, the President, was in a state of most thorough
alarm, not only for his home at Wheatland, but for his personal
safety.[151] In the very few days which had elapsed between the
time of his promise to receive a Commissioner from the
Confederate States and the actual arrival of the Commissioner,
he had become so fearfully panic-stricken, that he declined
either to receive him or to send any message to the Senate
touching the subject-matter of his mission.
"The Commissioner had been for several years in Congress before
the Administration of Mr. Buchanan, as well as during his
official term, and had always been in close political and social
relations with him; yet he was afraid of a public visit from
him. He said that he had only three days of official life left,
and could incur no further dangers or reproaches than those he
had already borne from the press and public speakers of the
North.
"The intensity of the prevalent feeling increased as the vast
crowds, arriving by every train, added fresh material; and
hatred and hostility toward our new Government were manifested
in almost every conceivable manner."
Another of the Commissioners (Mr. Forsyth) having arrived in Washington
on the 12th of March--eight days after the inauguration of Mr.
Lincoln--the two Commissioners then present, Messrs. Forsyth and
Crawford, addressed to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, a note informing
him of their presence, stating the friendly and peaceful purposes of
their mission, and requesting the appointment of a day, as early as
possible, for the presentation to the President of the United States of
their credentials and the objects which they had in view. This letter
will be found in the Appendix,[152] with other correspondence which
ensued, published soon after the events to which it relates. The
attention of the reader is specially invited to these documents, but, as
additional revelations have been made since they were first published,
it will be proper, in order to a full understanding of the transactions
to which they refer, to give here a brief statement of the facts.
No _written_ answer to the note of the Commissioners was delivered to
them for twenty-seven days after it was written. The paper of Mr.
Seward, in reply, without signature or address, dated March 15th,[153]
was "filed," as he states, on that day, in the Department of State, but
a copy of it was not handed to the Commissioners until the 8th of April.
But an oral answer had been made to the note of the Commissioners at a
much earlier date, for the significance of which it will be necessary to
bear in mind the condition of affairs at Charleston and Pensacola.
Fort Sumter was still occupied by the garrison under command of Major
Anderson, with no material change in the circumstances since the failure
of the attempt made in January to reënforce it by means of the Star of
the West. This standing menace at the gates of the chief harbor of South
Carolina had been tolerated by the government and people of that State,
and afterward by the Confederate authorities, in the abiding hope that
it would be removed without compelling a collision of forces. Fort
Pickens, on one side of the entrance to the harbor of Pensacola, was
also occupied by a garrison of United States troops, while the two forts
(Barrancas and McRee) on the other side were in possession of the
Confederates. Communication by sea was not entirely precluded, however,
in the case of Fort Pickens; the garrison had been strengthened, and a
fleet of Federal men-of-war was lying outside of the harbor. The
condition of affairs at these forts--especially at Fort Sumter--was a
subject of anxiety with the friends of peace, and the hope of settling
by negotiation the questions involved in their occupation had been one
of the most urgent motives for the prompt dispatch of the Commissioners
to Washington.
The letter of the Commissioners to Mr. Seward was written, as we have
seen, on the 12th of March. The oral message, above mentioned, was
obtained and communicated to the Commissioners through the agency of two
Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States--Justices Nelson, of
New York, and Campbell, of Alabama. On the 15th of March, according to
the statement of Judge Campbell,[154] Mr. Justice Nelson visited the
Secretaries of State and of the Treasury and the Attorney-General
(Messrs. Seward, Chase, and Bates), to dissuade them from undertaking to
put in execution any policy of coercion. "During the term of the Supreme
Court he had very carefully examined the laws of the United States to
enable him to attain his conclusions, and from time to time he had
consulted the Chief Justice [Taney] upon the questions which his
examination had suggested. His conclusion was that, without very serious
violations of Constitution and statutes, coercion could not be
successfully effected by the executive department. I had made [continues
Judge Campbell] a similar examination, and I concurred in his
conclusions and opinions. As he was returning from his visit to the
State Department, we casually met, and he informed me of what he had
done. He said he had spoken to these officers at large; that he was
received with respect and listened to with attention by all, with
approbation by the Attorney-General, and with great cordiality by the
Secretary of State; that the Secretary had expressed gratification to
find so many impediments to the disturbance of peace, and only wished
there had been more. He stated that the Secretary told him there was a
present cause of embarrassment: that the Southern Commissioners had
demanded recognition, and a refusal would lead to irritation and
excitement in the Southern States, and would cause a counter-irritation
and excitement in the Northern States, prejudicial to a peaceful
adjustment. Justice Nelson suggested that I might be of service."
The result of the interview between these two distinguished gentlemen,
we are informed, was another visit, by both of them, to the State
Department, for the purpose of urging Mr. Seward to reply to the
Commissioners, and assure them of the desire of the United States
Government for a friendly adjustment. Mr. Seward seems to have objected
to an immediate recognition of the Commissioners, on the ground that the
state of public sentiment in the North would not sustain it, in
connection with the withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, which had
been determined on. "The evacuation of Sumter," he said, "is as much as
the Administration can bear."
Judge Campbell adds: "I concurred in the conclusion that the evacuation
of Sumter involved responsibility, and stated that there could not be
too much caution in the adoption of measures so as not to shock or to
irritate the public sentiment, and that the evacuation of Sumter was
sufficient for the present in that direction. I stated that I would see
the Commissioners, and I would write to Mr. Davis to that effect. I
asked him what I should say as to Sumter and as to Pickens. _He
authorized me to say that, before that letter could reach him_ [Mr.
Davis], _he would learn by telegraph that the order for the evacuation
of Sumter had been made_. He said the condition of Pickens was
satisfactory, and there would be no change made there." The italics in
this extract are my own.
The letter in which this promise was communicated to me has been lost,
but it was given in substantially the terms above stated as authorized
by Mr. Seward--that the order for the evacuation of the fort would be
issued before the letter could reach me. The same assurance was given,
on the same day, to the Commissioners. Judge Campbell tells us that Mr.
Crawford was slow to consent to refrain from pressing the demand for
recognition. "It was only after some discussion and the expression of
some objections that he consented" to do so. This consent was clearly
one part of a stipulation, of which the other part was the pledge that
the fort would be evacuated in the course of a few days. Mr. Crawford
required the pledge of Mr. Seward to be reduced to writing, with Judge
Campbell's personal assurance of its genuineness and accuracy.[155] This
written statement was exhibited to Judge Nelson, before its delivery,
and approved by him. The fact that the pledge had been given in his name
and behalf was communicated to Mr. Seward the same evening by letter. He
was cognizant of, consenting to, and in great part the author of, the
whole transaction.
It will be observed that not only the Commissioners in Washington, but
the Confederate Government at Montgomery also, were thus assured on the
highest authority--that of the Secretary of State of the United States,
the official organ of communication of the views and purposes of his
Government--of the intention of that Government to order the evacuation
of Fort Sumter within a few days from the 15th of March, and not to
disturb the existing _status_ at Fort Pickens. Moreover, this was not
the mere statement of a fact, but a _pledge_, given as the consideration
of an appeal to the Confederate Government and its Commissioners to
refrain from embarrassing the Federal Administration by prosecuting any
further claims at the same time. As such a pledge, it was accepted, and,
while its fulfillment was quietly awaited, the Commissioners forbore to
make any further demand for reply to their note of the 12th of March.
Five days having elapsed in this condition of affairs, the Commissioners
in Washington telegraphed Brigadier-General Beauregard, commander of the
Confederate forces at Charleston, inquiring whether the fort had been
evacuated, or any action taken by Major Anderson indicating the
probability of an evacuation. Answer was made to this dispatch, that the
fort had not been evacuated, that there were no indications of such a
purpose, but that Major Anderson was still working on its defenses. This
dispatch was taken to Mr. Seward by Judge Campbell. Two interviews
occurred in relation to it, at both of which Judge Nelson was also
present. Of the result of these interviews, Judge Campbell states: "The
last was full and satisfactory. The Secretary was buoyant and sanguine;
he spoke of his ability to carry through his policy with confidence. He
accounted for the delay as accidental, and _not involving the integrity
of his assurance that the evacuation would take place_, and that I
should know whenever any change was made in the resolution in reference
to Sumter or to Pickens. I repeated this assurance in writing to Judge
Crawford, _and informed Governor Seward in writing what I had
said_."[156]
It would be incredible, but for the ample proofs which have since been
brought to light, that, during all this period of reiterated assurances
of a purpose to withdraw the garrison from Fort Sumter, and of excuses
for delay on account of the difficulties which embarrassed it, the
Government of the United States was assiduously engaged in devising
means for furnishing supplies and reënforcements to the garrison, with
the view of retaining possession of the fort!
Mr. G. V. Fox, afterward Assistant Secretary of the United States Navy,
had proposed a plan for reënforcing and furnishing supplies to the
garrison of Fort Sumter in February, during the Administration of Mr.
Buchanan. In a letter published in the newspapers since the war, he
gives an account of the manner in which the proposition was renewed to
the new Administration and its reception by them, as follows:
"On the 12th of March I received a telegram from
Postmaster-General Blair to come to Washington. I arrived there
on the 13th. Mr. Blair having been acquainted with the
proposition I presented to General Scott, under Mr. Buchanan's
Administration, sent for me to tender the same to Mr. Lincoln,
informing me that Lieutenant-General Scott had advised the
President that the fort could not be relieved, and must be given
up. Mr. Blair took me at once to the White House, and I
explained the plan to the President. Thence we adjourned to
Lieutenant-General Scott's office, where a renewed discussion of
the subject took place. The General informed the President that
my plan was practicable in February, but that the increased
number of batteries erected at the mouth of the harbor since
that time rendered it impossible in March.
"Finding that there was great opposition to any attempt at
relieving Fort Sumter, and that Mr. Blair alone sustained the
President in his policy of refusing to yield, I judged that my
arguments in favor of the practicability of sending in supplies
would be strengthened by a visit to Charleston and the fort. The
President readily agreed to my visit, if the Secretary of War
and General Scott raised no objection.
"Both these gentlemen consenting, I left Washington on the 19th
of March, and, passing through Richmond and Wilmington, reached
Charleston on the 21st."
Thus we see that, at the very moment when Mr. Secretary Seward was
renewing to the Confederate Government, through Judge Campbell, his
positive assurance that "the evacuation _would_ take place," this
emissary was on his way to Charleston to obtain information and devise
measures by means of which this promise might be broken.
On his arrival in Charleston, Mr. Fox tells us that he sought an
interview with Captain Hartstein, of the Confederate Navy, and through
this officer obtained from Governor Pickens permission to visit Fort
Sumter. He fails, in his narrative, to state what we learn from Governor
Pickens himself,[157] that this permission was obtained "expressly upon
the pledge of 'pacific purposes.'" Notwithstanding this pledge, he
employed the opportunity afforded by his visit to mature the details of
his plan for furnishing supplies and reënforcements to the garrison. He
did not, he says, communicate his plan or purposes to Major Anderson,
the commanding officer of the garrison, having discernment enough,
perhaps, to divine that the instincts of that brave and honest soldier
would have revolted at and rebuked the duplicity and perfidy of the
whole transaction. The result of his visit was, however, reported at
Washington, his plan was approved by President Lincoln, and he was sent
to New York to make arrangements for putting it in execution.
"In a very few days after" (says Governor Pickens, in the
message already quoted above), "another confidential agent,
Colonel Lamon, was sent by the President [Mr. Lincoln], who
informed me that he had come to try and arrange for the removal
of the garrison, and, when he returned from the fort, asked if a
war-vessel could not be allowed to remove them. I replied that
no war-vessel could be allowed to enter the harbor on any terms.
He said he believed Major Anderson preferred an ordinary
steamer, and I agreed that the garrison might be thus removed.
He said he hoped to return in a very few days for that purpose."
This, it will be remembered, occurred while Mr. Fox was making active,
though secret, preparations for his relief expedition.
Colonel, or Major, Lamon, as he is variously styled in the
correspondence, did not return to Charleston, as promised. About the
30th of March (which was Saturday) a telegram from Governor Pickens was
received by the Commissioners in Washington, making inquiry with regard
to Colonel Lamon, and the meaning of the protracted delay to fulfill the
promise of evacuation. This was fifteen days after the original
assurance of Mr. Seward that the garrison would be withdrawn
immediately, and ten days after his explanation that the delay was
"accidental." The dispatch of Governor Pickens was taken by Judge
Campbell to Mr. Seward, who appointed the ensuing Monday (1st of April)
for an interview and answer. At that interview Mr. Seward informed Judge
Campbell that "the President was concerned about the contents of the
telegram--_there was a point of honor involved_; that Lamon had no
agency from him, nor title to speak."[158] (This late suggestion of the
point of _honor_ would seem, under the circumstances, to have been made
in a spirit of sarcastic pleasantry, like Sir John Falstaff's celebrated
discourse on the same subject.) The only substantial result of the
conversation, however, was the written assurance of Mr. Seward, to be
communicated to the Commissioners, that "the Government will not
undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor
Pickens."
This, it will be observed, was a very material variation from the
positive pledge previously given, and reiterated, to the Commissioners,
to Governor Pickens, and to myself directly, that the fort was to be
forthwith evacuated. Judge Campbell, in his account of the interview,
says: "I asked him [Mr. Seward] whether I was to understand that there
had been a change in his former communications. His answer was,
'None.'"[159]
About the close of the same week (the first in April), the patience of
the Commissioners having now been wellnigh exhausted, and the hostile
preparations of the Government of the United States, notwithstanding the
secrecy with which they were conducted, having become matter of general
rumor, a letter was addressed to Mr. Seward, upon the subject, by Judge
Campbell, in behalf of the Commissioners, again asking whether the
assurances so often given were well or ill founded. To this the
Secretary returned answer in writing: "_Faith as to Sumter fully kept.
Wait and see._"
This was on the 7th of April.[160] The very next day (the 8th) the
following official notification (without date or signature) was read to
Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, and General Beauregard, in
Charleston, by Mr. Chew, an official of the _State Department_ (Mr.
Seward's) in Washington, who said--as did a Captain or Lieutenant
Talbot, who accompanied him--that it was from the President of the
United States, and delivered by him to Mr. Chew on the 6th--the day
_before_ Mr. Seward's assurance of "_faith fully kept_."
"I am directed by the President of the United States to notify
you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with
provisions only; and that, if such an attempt be not resisted,
no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, will be made,
without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the
fort."[161]
Thus disappeared the last vestige of the plighted faith and pacific
pledges of the Federal Government.
In order fully to appreciate the significance of this communication, and
of the time and circumstances of its delivery, it must be borne in mind
that the naval expedition which had been secretly in preparation for
some time at New York, under direction of Captain Fox, was now ready to
sail, and might reasonably be expected to be at Charleston almost
immediately after the notification was delivered to Governor Pickens,
and before preparation could be made to receive it. Owing to
cross-purposes or misunderstandings in the Washington Cabinet, however,
and then to the delay caused by a severe storm at sea, this expectation
was disappointed, and the Confederate commander at Charleston had
opportunity to communicate with Montgomery and receive instructions for
his guidance, before the arrival of the fleet, which had been intended
to be a surprise.
In publications made since the war by members of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet,
it has been represented that, during the period of the disgraceful
transactions above detailed, there were dissensions and divisions in the
Cabinet--certain members of it urging measures of prompt and decided
coercion; the Secretary of State favoring a pacific or at least a
dilatory policy; and the President vacillating for a time between the
two, but eventually adopting the views of the coercionists. In these
statements it is represented that the assurances and pledges, given by
Mr. Seward to the Confederate Government and its Commissioners, were
given on his own authority, and without the consent or approval of the
President of the United States. The absurdity of any such attempt to
disassociate the action of the President from that of his Secretary, and
to relieve the former of responsibility for the conduct of the latter,
is too evident to require argument or comment. It is impossible to
believe that, during this whole period of nearly a month, Mr. Lincoln
was ignorant of the communications that were passing between the
Confederate Commissioners and Mr. Seward, through the distinguished
member of the Supreme Court--still holding his seat as such--who was
acting as intermediary. On one occasion, Judge Campbell informs us that
the Secretary, in the midst of an important interview, excused himself
for the purpose of conferring with the President before giving a final
answer, and left his visitor for some time, awaiting his return from
that conference, when the answer was given, avowedly and directly
proceeding from the President.
If, however, it were possible to suppose that Mr. Seward was acting on
his own responsibility, and practicing a deception upon his own chief,
as well as upon the Confederate authorities, in the pledges which he
made to the latter, it is nevertheless certain that the principal facts
were brought to light within a few days after the close of the efforts
at negotiation. Yet the Secretary of State was not impeached and brought
to trial for the grave offense of undertaking to conduct the most
momentous and vital transactions that had been or could be brought
before the Government of the United States, without the knowledge and in
opposition to the will of the President, and for having involved the
Government in dishonor, if not in disaster. He was not even dismissed
from office, but continued to be the chief officer of the Cabinet and
confidential adviser of the President, as he was afterward of the
ensuing Administration, occupying that station during two consecutive
terms. No disavowal of his action, no apology nor explanation, was ever
made. Politically and legally, the President is unquestionably
responsible in all cases for the action of any member of his Cabinet,
and in this case it is as preposterous to attempt to dissever from him
the moral, as it would be impossible to relieve him of the legal,
responsibility that rests upon the Government of the United States for
the systematic series of frauds perpetrated by its authority.
On the other hand, Mr. Seward, throughout the whole negotiation, was
fully informed of the views of his colleagues in the Cabinet and of the
President. Whatever his real hopes or purposes may have been in the
beginning, it is positively certain that long before the end, and while
still reiterating his assurances that the garrison would be withdrawn,
he knew that it had been _determined_, and that active preparations were
in progress, to strengthen it.
Mr. Gideon Welles, who was Secretary of the Navy in Mr. Lincoln's
Cabinet, gives the following account of one of the transactions of the
period:
"One evening in the latter part of the month of March, there was
a small gathering at the Executive Mansion, while the Sumter
question was still pending. The members of the Cabinet were soon
individually and quietly invited to the council-chamber, where,
as soon as assembled, the President informed them he had just
been advised by General Scott that it was expedient to evacuate
Fort Pickens, as well as Fort Sumter, which last was assumed at
military headquarters to be a determined fact, in conformity
with the views of Secretary Seward and the General-in-Chief....
"A brief silence followed the announcement of the amazing
recommendation of General Scott, when Mr. Blair, who had been
much annoyed by the vacillating course of the General-in-Chief
in regard to Sumter, remarked, looking earnestly at Mr. Seward,
that it was evident the old General was playing politician in
regard to both Sumter and Pickens; for it was not possible, if
there was a defense, for the rebels to take Pickens; and the
Administration would not be justified if it listened to his
advice and evacuated either. Very soon thereafter, I think at
the next Cabinet meeting, the President announced his decision
that _supplies should be sent to Sumter_, and issued
confidential orders to that effect. All were gratified with this
decision, except Mr. Seward, who still remonstrated, _but
preparations were immediately commenced to fit out an expedition
to forward supplies_."[162]
This account is confirmed by a letter of Mr. Montgomery Blair.[163] The
date of the announcement of the President's final purpose is fixed by
Mr. Welles, in the neat paragraph to that above quoted, as the 28th of
March. This was four days before Mr. Seward's assurance given Judge
Campbell--after conference with the President--that there would be no
departure from the pledges previously given (which were that the fort
_would be evacuated_), and ten days before his written renewal of the
assurance--"_Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see!_" This
assurance, too, was given at the very moment when a messenger from his
own department was on the way to Charleston to notify the Governor of
South Carolina that faith would _not_ be kept in the matter.
It is scarcely necessary to say that the Commissioners had, with good
reason, ceased to place any confidence in the promises of the United
States Government, before they ceased to be made. On the 8th of April
they sent the following dispatch to General Beauregard:
"Washington, _April 8, 1861_.
"General G. T. Beauregard: Accounts uncertain, because of the
constant vacillation of this Government. We were reassured
yesterday that the status of Sumter would not be changed without
previous notice to Governor Pickens, but we have no faith in
them. The war policy prevails in the Cabinet at this time.
"M. J. Crawford."
On the same day the announcement made to Governor Pickens through Mr.
Chew was made known. The Commissioners immediately applied for a
definitive answer to their note of March 12th, which had been permitted
to remain in abeyance. The paper of the Secretary of State, dated March
15th, was thereupon delivered to them. This paper, with the final
rejoinder of the Commissioners and Judge Campbell's letters to the
Secretary of April 13th and April 20th, respectively, will be found in
the Appendix.
Negotiation was now at an end, and the Commissioners withdrew from
Washington and returned to their homes. Their last dispatch, before
leaving, shows that they were still dependent upon public rumor and the
newspapers for information as to the real purposes and preparations of
the Federal Administration. It was in these words:
"Washington, _April 10, 1861_.
"General G. T. Beauregard: The 'Tribune' of to-day declares the
main object of the expedition to be the relief of Sumter, and
that a force will be landed which will overcome all opposition.
"Roman, Crawford, and Forsyth."
The annexed extracts from my message to the Confederate Congress at the
opening of its special session, on the 29th of April, will serve as a
recapitulation of the events above narrated, with all of comment that it
was then, or is now, considered necessary to add:
[_Extracts from President's Message to the Confederate Congress,
of April 29, 1861._]
"... Scarce had you assembled in February last, when, prior even
to the inauguration of the Chief Magistrate you had elected, you
expressed your desire for the appointment of Commissioners, and
for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the
two Governments upon principles of right, justice, equity, and
good faith.
"It was my pleasure, as well as my duty, to coöperate with you
in this work of peace. Indeed, in my address to you, on taking
the oath of office, and before receiving from you the
communication of this resolution, I had said that, as a
necessity, not as a choice, we have resorted to the remedy of
separating, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the
conduct of our own affairs, and the perpetuity of the
Confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual
interest shall permit us to peaceably pursue our separate
political career, my most earnest desire will then have been
fulfilled.
"It was in furtherance of these accordant views of the Congress
and the Executive, that I made choice of three discreet, able,
and distinguished citizens, who repaired to Washington. Aided by
their cordial coöperation and that of the Secretary of State,
every effort compatible with self-respect and the dignity of the
Confederacy was exhausted, before I allowed myself to yield to
the conviction that the Government of the United States was
determined to attempt the conquest of this people, and that our
cherished hopes of peace were unobtainable.
"On the arrival of our Commissioners in Washington on the 5th of
March,[164] they postponed, at the suggestion of a friendly
intermediator, doing more than giving informal notice of their
arrival. This was done with a view to afford time to the
President of the United States, who had just been inaugurated,
for the discharge of other pressing official duties in the
organization of his Administration, before engaging his
attention to the object of their mission.
"It was not until the 12th of the month that they officially
addressed the Secretary of State, informing him of the purpose
of their arrival, and stating in the language of their
instructions their wish to make to the Government of the United
States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring the
Government of the United States that the President, Congress,
and people of the Confederate States desired a peaceful solution
of these great questions; that it was neither their interest nor
their wish to make any demand which was not founded on the
strictest principles of justice, nor to do any act to injure
their late confederates.
"To this communication, no formal reply was received until the
8th of April. During the interval, the Commissioners had
consented to waive all questions of form, with the firm resolve
to avoid war, if possible. They went so far even as to hold,
during that long period, unofficial intercourse through an
intermediary, whose high position and character inspired the
hope of success, and through whom constant assurances were
received from the Government of the United States of its
peaceful intentions--of its determination to evacuate Fort
Sumter; and, further, that no measure would be introduced
changing the existing status prejudicial to the Confederate
States; that, in the event of any change in regard to Fort
Pickens, notice would be given to the Commissioners.
"The crooked path of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example
so wanting in courtesy, in candor, and directness, as was the
course of the United States Government toward our Commissioners
in Washington. For proof of this, I refer to the annexed
documents marked, (?) taken in connection with further facts,
which I now proceed to relate.
"Early in April the attention of the whole country was attracted
to extraordinary preparations, in New York and other Northern
ports, for an extensive military and naval expedition. These
preparations were commenced in secrecy for an expedition whose
destination was concealed, and only became known when nearly
completed; and on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of April, transports and
vessels of war, with troops, munitions, and military supplies,
sailed from Northern ports, bound southward.
"Alarmed by so extraordinary a demonstration, the Commissioners
requested the delivery of an answer to their official
communication of the 12th of March, and the reply, dated on the
15th of the previous month, was obtained, from which it appears
that, during the whole interval, while the Commissioners were
receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success
of their mission, the Secretary of State and the President of
the United States had already determined to hold no intercourse
with them whatever, to refuse even to listen to any proposals
they had to make; and had profited by the delay created by their
own assurances, in order to prepare secretly the means for
effective hostile operations.
"That these assurances were given, has been virtually confessed
by the Government of the United States, by its act of sending a
messenger to Charleston to give notice of its purpose to use
force, if opposed in its intention of supplying Fort Sumter.
"No more striking proof of the absence of good faith in the
conduct of the Government of the United States toward the
Confederacy can be required, than is contained in the
circumstances which accompanied this notice.
"According to the usual course of navigation, the vessels
composing the expedition, and designed for the relief of Fort
Sumter, might be looked for in Charleston Harbor on the 9th of
April. Yet our Commissioners in Washington were detained under
assurances that notice should be given of any military movement.
The notice was not addressed to them, but a messenger was sent
to Charleston to give notice to the Governor of South Carolina,
and the notice was so given at a late hour on the 8th of April,
the eve of the very day on which the fleet might be expected to
arrive.
"That this manoeuvre failed in its purpose was not the fault of
those who controlled it. A heavy tempest delayed the arrival of
the expedition, and gave time to the commander of our forces at
Charleston to ask and receive instructions of the Government."
...
[Footnote 150: Mr. Hunter, of Virginia.]
[Footnote 151: This statement is in accord with a remark which Mr.
Buchanan made to the author at an earlier period of the same session,
with regard to the violence of Northern sentiment then lately indicated,
that he thought it not impossible that his homeward route would be
lighted by burning effigies of himself, and that on reaching his home he
would find it a heap of ashes.]
[Footnote 152: See Appendix L.]
[Footnote 153: Ibid.]
[Footnote 154: See letter of Judge Campbell to Colonel George W. Munford
in "Papers of the Southern Historical Society," appended to "Southern
Magazine" for February, 1874.]
[Footnote 155: "In the course of this conversation I told Judge Crawford
that it was fair to tell him that the opinion at Washington was, the
secession movements were short-lived; that his Government would wither
under sunshine, and that the effect of these measures might be as
supposed; that they might have a contrary effect, but that I did not
consider the effect. I wanted, above all other things, peace. I was
willing to accept whatever peace might bring, whether union or disunion.
I did not look beyond peace. He said he was willing to take all the
risks of sunshine."--(Letter of Judge Campbell to Colonel Munford, as
above.)]
[Footnote 156: Letter to Colonel Munford, above quoted. The italics are
not in the original.]
[Footnote 157: Message to the Legislature of South Carolina, November,
1861.]
[Footnote 158: Letter to Colonel Munford, above cited.]
[Footnote 159: Letter to Munford.]
[Footnote 160: Judge Campbell, in his letter to Mr. Seward of April 13,
1861 (see Appendix L), written a few days after the transaction, gives
this date. In his letter to Colonel Munford, written more than twelve
years afterward, he says "Sunday, April 8th."]
[Footnote 161: For this and other documents quoted relative to the
transactions of the period, see "The Record of Fort Sumter," compiled by
W. A. Harris, Columbia, South Carolina, 1862.]
[Footnote 162: "Lincoln and Seward," New York, 1874, pp. 57, 58. The
italics are not in the original.]
[Footnote 163: Ibid., pp. 64-69.]
[Footnote 164: Mr. Crawford, as we have seen, had arrived some days
earlier. The statement in the message refers to the arrival of the full
commission, or a majority of it.]
CHAPTER XII.
Protests against the Conduct of the Government of the United
States.--Senator Douglas's Proposition to evacuate the Forts,
and Extracts from his Speech in Support of it.--General Scott's
Advice.--Manly Letter of Major Anderson, protesting against the
Action of the Federal Government.--Misstatements of the Count of
Paris.--Correspondence relative to Proposed Evacuation of the
Fort.--A Crisis.
The course pursued by the Government of the United States with regard to
the forts had not passed without earnest remonstrance from the most
intelligent and patriotic of its own friends during the period of the
events which constitute the subject of the preceding chapter. In the
Senate of the United States, which continued in executive session for
several weeks after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, it was the subject
of discussion. Mr. Douglas, of Illinois--who was certainly not suspected
of sympathy with secession, or lack of devotion to the Union--on the
15th of March offered a resolution recommending the withdrawal of the
garrisons from all forts within the limits of the States which had
seceded, except those at Key West and the Dry Tortugas. In support of
this resolution he said:
"We certainly can not justify the holding of forts there, much
less the recapturing of those which have been taken, unless we
intend to reduce those States themselves into subjection. I take
it for granted, no man will deny the proposition, that whoever
permanently holds Charleston and South Carolina is entitled to
the possession of Fort Sumter. Whoever permanently holds
Pensacola and Florida is entitled to the possession of Fort
Pickens. Whoever holds the States in whose limits those forts
are placed is entitled to the forts themselves, unless there is
something peculiar in the location of some particular fort that
makes it important for us to hold it for the general defense of
the whole country, its commerce and interests, instead of being
useful only for the defense of a particular city or locality. It
is true that Forts Taylor and Jefferson, at Key West and
Tortugas, are so situated as to be essentially national, and
therefore important to us without reference to our relations
with the seceded States. Not so with Moultrie, Johnson, Castle
Pinckney, and Sumter, in Charleston Harbor; not so with Pulaski,
on the Savannah River; not so with Morgan and other forts in
Alabama; not so with those other forts that were intended to
guard the entrance of a particular harbor for local defense....
"We can not deny that there is a Southern Confederacy, _de
facto_, in existence, with its capital at Montgomery. We may
regret it. _I_ regret it most profoundly; but I can not deny the
truth of the fact, painful and mortifying as it is.... I
proclaim boldly the policy of those with whom I act. We are for
peace."
Mr. Douglas, in urging the maintenance of _peace_ as a motive for the
evacuation of the forts, was no doubt aware of the full force of his
words. He knew that their continued occupation was virtually a
declaration of war.
The General-in-Chief of the United States Army, also, it is well known,
urgently advised the evacuation of the forts. But the most striking
protest against the coercive measures finally adopted was that of Major
Anderson himself. The letter in which his views were expressed has been
carefully suppressed in the partisan narratives of that period and
wellnigh lost sight of, although it does the highest honor to his
patriotism and integrity. It was written on the same day on which the
announcement was made to Governor Pickens of the purpose of the United
States Government to send supplies to the fort, and is worthy of
reproduction here:[165]
[_Letter of Major Anderson, United States Army, protesting
against Fox's Plan for relieving Fort Sumter_.]
"Fort Sumter, S. C., _April 8, 1861_.
"_To Colonel L. Thomas, Adjutant-General United States Army_.
"Colonel: I have the honor to report that the resumption of work
yesterday (Sunday) at various points on Morris Island, and the
vigorous prosecution of it this morning, apparently
strengthening all the batteries which are under the fire of our
guns, shows that they either have just received some news from
Washington which has put them on the _qui vive_, or that they
have received orders from Montgomery to commence operations
here. I am preparing, by the side of my barbette guns,
protection for our men from the shells which will be almost
continually bursting over or in our work.
"I had the honor to receive, by yesterday's mail, the letter of
the Honorable Secretary of War, dated April 4th, and confess
that what he there states surprises me very greatly--following,
as it does, and contradicting so positively, the assurance Mr.
Crawford telegraphed he was 'authorized' to make. I trust that
this matter will be at once put in a correct light, as a
movement made now, when the South has been erroneously informed
that none such would be attempted, would produce most disastrous
results throughout our country. It is, of course, now too late
for me to give any advice in reference to the proposed scheme of
Captain Fox. I fear that its result can not fail to be
disastrous to all concerned. Even with his boat at our walls,
the loss of life (as I think I mentioned to Mr. Fox) in
unloading her will more than pay for the good to be accomplished
by the expedition, which keeps us, if I can maintain possession
of this work, out of position, surrounded by strong works which
must be carried to make this fort of the least value to the
United States Government.
"We have not oil enough to keep a light in the lantern for one
night. The boats will have to, therefore, rely at night entirely
upon other marks. I ought to have been informed that this
expedition was to come. Colonel Lamon's remark convinced me that
the idea, merely hinted at to me by Captain Fox, would not be
carried out.[166]
"We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly say that my
heart is not in this war, which I see is to be thus commenced.
That God will still avert it, and cause us to resort to pacific
means to maintain our rights, is my ardent prayer!
"I am, Colonel, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"Robert Anderson,
"_Major 1st Artillery, commanding_."
This frank and manly letter, although written with the reserve
necessarily belonging to a communication from an officer to his military
superiors, expressing dissatisfaction with orders, fully vindicates
Major Anderson from all suspicion of complicity or sympathy with the bad
faith of the Government which he was serving. It accords entirely with
the sentiments expressed in his private letter to me, already mentioned
as lost or stolen, and exhibits him in the attitude of faithful
performance of a duty inconsistent with his domestic ties and repugnant
to his patriotism.
The "relief squadron," as with unconscious irony it was termed, was
already under way for Charleston, consisting, according to their own
statement, of eight vessels, carrying twenty-six guns and about fourteen
hundred men, including the troops sent for reënforcement of the
garrison.
These facts became known to the Confederate Government, and it was
obvious that no time was to be lost in preparing for, and if possible
anticipating the impending assault. The character of the instructions
given General Beauregard in this emergency may be inferred from the
ensuing correspondence, which is here reproduced from contemporary
publications:
"Charleston, _April 8th_.
"L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_.
"An authorized messenger from President Lincoln just informed
Governor Pickens and myself that provisions will be sent to Fort
Sumter peaceably, or otherwise by force.
(Signed) "G. T. Beauregard."
"Montgomery, _10th_.
"General G. T. Beauregard, _Charleston_.
"If you have no doubt of the authorized character of the agent
who communicated to you the intention of the Washington
Government to supply Fort Sumter by force, you will at once
demand its evacuation, and, if this is refused, proceed, in such
a manner as you may determine, to reduce it. Answer.
(Signed) "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_."
"Charleston, _April 10th_.
"L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_.
"The demand will be made to-morrow at twelve o'clock.
(Signed) "G. T. Beauregard."
"Montgomery, _April 10th_.
"General Beauregard, _Charleston_.
"Unless there are especial reasons connected with your own
condition, it is considered proper that you should make the
demand at an early hour.
(Signed) "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_."
"Charleston, _April 10th_.
"L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War, Montgomery_.
"The reasons are special for twelve o'clock.
(Signed) "G. T. Beauregard."
"Headquarters Provisional Army, C. S. A.,
"Charleston, S.C., _April 11, 1861, 2_ P. M.
"Sir: The Government of the Confederate States has hitherto
forborne from any hostile demonstration against Fort Sumter, in
the hope that the Government of the United States, with a view
to the amicable adjustment of all questions between the two
Governments, and to avert the calamities of war, would
voluntarily evacuate it. There was reason at one time to believe
that such would be the course pursued by the Government of the
United States; and, under that impression, my Government has
refrained from making any demand for the surrender of the fort.
"But the Confederate States can no longer delay assuming actual
possession of a fortification commanding the entrance of one of
their harbors, and necessary to its defense and security.
"I am ordered by the Government of the Confederate States to
demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter. My aides, Colonel Chesnut
and Captain Lee, are authorized to make such demand of you. All
proper facilities will be afforded for the removal of yourself
and command, together with company arms and property, and all
private property, to any post in the United States which you may
elect. The flag which you have upheld so long and with so much
fortitude, under the most trying circumstances, may be saluted
by you on taking it down.
"Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee will, for a reasonable time,
await your answer.
"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
(Signed) "G. T. Beauregard,
"_Brigadier-General commanding_.
"Major Robert Anderson,
"_Commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S. C._"
"Headquarters Fort Sumter, S. C., _April 11, 1861_.
"General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication demanding the evacuation of this fort; and to say
in reply thereto that it is a demand with which I regret that my
sense of honor and of my obligations to my Government prevents
my compliance.
"Thanking you for the fair, manly, and courteous terms proposed,
and for the high compliment paid me,
"I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
(Signed) "Robert Anderson,
"_Major U. S. Army, commanding_.
"To Brigadier-General G. T. Beauregard,
"_Commanding Provisional Army, C. S. A._"
"Montgomery, _April 11th_.
"General Beauregard, _Charleston_.
"We do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter, if Major
Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he
will evacuate, and agree that, in the mean time, he will not use
his guns against us, unless ours should be employed against Fort
Sumter. You are thus to avoid the effusion of blood. If this or
its equivalent be refused, reduce the fort as your judgment
decides to be most practicable.
(Signed) "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_."
"Headquarters Provisional Army, C. S. A.,
"Charleston, _April 11, 1861, 11_ P. M.
"Major: In consequence of the verbal observations made by you to
my aides, Messrs. Chesnut and Lee, in relation to the condition
of your supplies, and that you would in a few days be starved
out if our guns did not batter you to pieces--or words to that
effect--and desiring no useless effusion of blood, I
communicated both the verbal observation and your written answer
to my Government.
"If you will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort
Sumter, and agree that in the mean time you will not use your
guns against us, unless ours shall be employed against Fort
Sumter, we will abstain from opening fire upon you. Colonel
Chesnut and Captain Lee are authorized by me to enter into such
an agreement with you. You are therefore requested to
communicate to them an open answer.
"I remain, Major, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
(Signed) "G. T. Beauregard,
"_Brigadier-General commanding_.
"Major Robert Anderson,
"_Commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S. C._"
"Headquarters Fort Sumter, S. C., _2.30_ A. M., _April 12,
1861_.
"General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
second communication of the 11th instant, by Colonel Chesnut,
and to state, in reply, that, cordially uniting with you in the
desire to avoid the useless effusion of blood, I will, if
provided with the proper and necessary means of transportation,
evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th instant, should I not
receive, prior to that time, controlling instructions from my
Government, or additional supplies; and that I will not, in the
mean time, open my fire upon your forces unless compelled to do
so by some hostile act against this fort, or the flag of my
Government, by the forces under your command, or by some portion
of them, or by the perpetration of some act showing a hostile
intention on your part against this fort or the flag it bears.
"I have the honor to be, General,
"Your obedient servant,
(Signed) "Robert Anderson,
"_Major U. S. Army, commanding_.
"To Brigadier-General G. T. Beauregard,
"_Commanding Provisional Army, C. S. A._"
"Fort Sumter, S. C., _April 12, 1861, _3.20_ A. M.
"Sir: By authority of Brigadier-General Beauregard, commanding
the provisional forces of the Confederate States, we have the
honor to notify you that he will open the fire of his batteries
on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time.
"We have the honor to be, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servants,
(Signed) "James Chesnut, Jr,
"_Aide-de-camp_.
(Signed) "Stephen D. Lee,
"_Captain S. C. Army, and Aide-de-camp_.
"Major Robert Anderson,
"_United States Army, commanding Fort Sumter_."
It is essential to a right understanding of the last two letters to give
more than a superficial attention to that of Major Anderson, bearing in
mind certain important facts not referred to in the correspondence.
Major Anderson had been requested to state the time at which he _would
evacuate_ the fort, if unmolested, agreeing in the mean time not to use
his guns against the city and the troops defending it unless _Fort
Sumter_ should be first attacked by them. On these conditions General
Beauregard offered to refrain from opening fire upon him. In his reply
Major Anderson promises to evacuate the fort on the 15th of April,
_provided_ he should not, before that time, receive "controlling
instructions" or "additional supplies" from his Government. He
furthermore offers to pledge himself not to open fire upon the
Confederates, unless in the mean time compelled to do so by some hostile
act against the fort _or the flag of his Government_.
Inasmuch as it was known to the Confederate commander that the
"controlling instructions" were already issued, and that the "additional
supplies" were momentarily expected; inasmuch, also, as any attempt to
introduce the supplies would compel the opening of fire upon the vessels
bearing them under the flag of the United States--thereby releasing
Major Anderson from his pledge--it is evident that his conditions could
not be accepted. It would have been merely, after the avowal of a
hostile determination by the Government of the United States, to await
an inevitable conflict with the guns of Fort Sumter and the naval forces
of the United States in combination; with no possible hope of averting
it, unless in the improbable event of a delay of the expected fleet for
nearly four days longer. (In point of fact, it arrived off the harbor on
the same day, but was hindered by a gale of wind from entering it.)
There was obviously no other course to be pursued than that announced in
the answer given by General Beauregard.
It should not be forgotten that, during the early occupation of Fort
Sumter by a garrison the attitude of which was at least offensive, no
restriction had been put upon their privilege of purchasing in
Charleston fresh provisions, or any delicacies or comforts not directly
tending to the supply of the means needful to hold the fort for an
indefinite time.
[Footnote 165: See "The Record of Fort Sumter," p. 37.]
[Footnote 166: The Count of Paris libels the memory of Major Anderson,
and perverts the truth of history in this, as he has done in other
particulars, by saying, with reference to the visit of Captain Fox to
the fort, that, "having visited Anderson at Fort Sumter, _a plan had
been agreed upon between them for revictualing the garrison_."--("Civil
War in America," authorized translation, vol. i, chap. iv, p. 137.) Fox
himself says, in his published letter, "I made no arrangements with
Major Anderson in for supplying the fort, nor did I inform him of my
plan"; and Major Anderson, in the letter above, says the idea had been
"merely hinted at" by Captain Fox, and that Colonel Lamon had led him to
believe that it had been abandoned.]
CHAPTER XIII.
A Pause and a Review.--Attitude of the Two Parties.--Sophistry
exposed and Shams torn away.--Forbearance of the Confederate
Government.--Who was the Aggressor?--Major Anderson's View, and
that of a Naval Officer.--Mr. Horace Greeley on the Fort Sumter
Case.--The Bombardment and Surrender.--Gallant Action of
ex-Senator Wigfall.--Mr. Lincoln's Statement of the Case.
Here, in the brief hour immediately before the outburst of the
long-gathering storm, although it can hardly be necessary for the reader
who has carefully considered what has already been written, we may pause
for a moment to contemplate the attitude of the parties to the contest
and the grounds on which they respectively stand. I do not now refer to
the original causes of controversy--to the comparative claims of
Statehood and Union, or to the question of the right or the wrong of
secession--but to the proximate and immediate causes of conflict.
The fact that South Carolina _was_ a State--whatever her relations may
have been to the other States--is not and can not be denied. It is
equally undeniable that the ground on which Fort Sumter was built was
ceded by South Carolina to the United States _in trust_ for the defense
of her own soil and her own chief harbor. This has been shown, by ample
evidence, to have been the principle governing all cessions by the
States of sites for military purposes, but it applies with special force
to the case of Charleston. The streams flowing into that harbor, from
source to mouth, lie entirely within the limits of the State of South
Carolina. No other State or combination of States could have any
distinct interest or concern in the maintenance of a fortress at that
point, unless as a means of aggression against South Carolina herself.
The practical view of the case was correctly stated by Mr. Douglas, when
he said: "I take it for granted that whoever permanently holds
Charleston and South Carolina is entitled to the possession of Fort
Sumter. Whoever permanently holds Pensacola and Florida is entitled to
the possession of Fort Pickens. Whoever holds the States in whose limits
those forts are placed is entitled to the forts themselves, unless there
is something peculiar in the location of some particular fort that makes
it important for us to hold it for the general defense of the whole
country, its commerce and interests, instead of being useful only for
the defense of a particular city or locality."
No such necessity could be alleged with regard to Fort Sumter. The claim
to hold it as "public property" of the United States was utterly
untenable and unmeaning, apart from a claim of coercive control over the
State. If South Carolina was a mere province, in a state of open
rebellion, the Government of the United States had a right to retain its
hold of any fortified place within her limits which happened to be in
its possession, and it would have had an equal right to acquire
possession of any other. It would have had the same right to send an
army to Columbia to batter down the walls of the State Capitol. The
subject may at once be stripped of the sophistry which would make a
distinction between the two cases. The one was as really an act of war
as the other would have been. The right or the wrong of either depended
entirely upon the question of the rightful power of the Federal
Government to coerce a State into submission--a power which, as we have
seen, was unanimously rejected in the formation of the Federal
Constitution, and which was still unrecognized by many, perhaps by a
majority, even of those who denied the right of a State to secede.
If there existed any hope or desire for a peaceful settlement of the
questions at issue between the States, either party had a right to
demand that, pending such settlement, there should be no hostile grasp
upon its throat. This grip had been held on the throat of South Carolina
for almost four months from the period of her secession, and no forcible
resistance to it had yet been made. Remonstrances and patient,
persistent, and reiterated attempts at negotiation for its removal had
been made with two successive Administrations of the Government of the
United States--at first by the State of South Carolina, and by the
Government of the Confederate States after its formation. These efforts
had been met, not by an open avowal of coercive purposes, but by
evasion, prevarication, and perfidy. The agreement of one Administration
to maintain the _status quo_ at the time when the question arose, was
violated in December by the removal of the garrison from its original
position to the occupancy of a stronger. Another attempt was made to
violate it, in January, by the introduction of troops concealed below
the deck of the steamer Star of the West,[167] but this was thwarted by
the vigilance of the State service. The protracted course of fraud and
prevarication practiced by Mr. Lincoln's Administration in the months of
March and April has been fully exhibited. It was evident that no
confidence whatever could be reposed in any pledge or promise of the
Federal Government as then administered. Yet, notwithstanding all this,
no resistance, other than that of pacific protest and appeals for an
equitable settlement, was made, until after the avowal of a purpose of
coercion, and when it was known that a hostile fleet was on the way to
support and enforce it. At the very moment when the Confederate
commander gave the final notice to Major Anderson of his purpose to open
fire upon the fort, that fleet was lying off the mouth of the harbor,
and hindered from entering only by a gale of wind.
The forbearance of the Confederate Government, under the circumstances,
is perhaps unexampled in history. It was carried to the extreme verge,
short of a disregard of the safety of the people who had intrusted to
that government the duty of their defense against their enemies. The
attempt to represent us as the _aggressors_ in the conflict which ensued
is as unfounded as the complaint made by the wolf against the lamb in
the familiar fable. He who makes the assault is not necessarily he that
strikes the first blow or fires the first gun. To have awaited further
strengthening of their position by land and naval forces, with hostile
purpose now declared, for the sake of having them "fire the first gun,"
would have been as unwise as it would be to hesitate to strike down the
arm of the assailant, who levels a deadly weapon at one's breast, until
he has actually fired. The disingenuous rant of demagogues about "firing
on the flag" might serve to rouse the passions of insensate mobs in
times of general excitement, but will be impotent in impartial history
to relieve the Federal Government from the responsibility of the assault
made by sending a hostile fleet against the harbor of Charleston, to
coöperate with the menacing garrison of Fort Sumter. After the assault
was made by the hostile descent of the fleet, the reduction of Fort
Sumter was a measure of defense rendered absolutely and immediately
necessary.
Such clearly was the idea of the commander of the Pawnee, when he
declined, as Captain Fox informs us, without orders from a superior, to
make any effort to enter the harbor, "there to inaugurate civil war."
The straightforward simplicity of the sailor had not been perverted by
the shams of political sophistry. Even Mr. Horace Greeley, with all his
extreme partisan feeling, is obliged to admit that, "whether the
bombardment and reduction of Fort Sumter shall or shall not be justified
by posterity, it is clear that the Confederacy had no alternative but
its own dissolution."[168]
According to the notice given by General Beauregard, fire was opened
upon Fort Sumter, from the various batteries which had been erected
around the harbor, at half-past four o'clock on the morning of Friday,
the 12th of April, 1861. The fort soon responded. It is not the purpose
of this work to give minute details of the military operation, as the
events of the bombardment have been often related, and are generally
well known, with no material discrepancy in matters of fact among the
statements of the various participants. It is enough, therefore, to add
that the bombardment continued for about thirty-three or thirty-four
hours. The fort was eventually set on fire by shells, after having been
partly destroyed by shot, and Major Anderson, after a resolute defense,
finally surrendered on the 13th--the same terms being accorded to him
which had been offered two days before. It is a remarkable
fact--probably without precedent in the annals of war--that,
notwithstanding the extent and magnitude of the engagement, the number
and caliber of the guns, and the amount of damage done to inanimate
material on both sides, especially to Fort Sumter, nobody was injured on
either side by the bombardment. The only casualty attendant upon the
affair was the death of one man and the wounding of several others by
the explosion of a gun in the firing of a salute to their flag by the
garrison on evacuating the fort the day after the surrender.
A striking incident marked the close of the bombardment. Ex-Senator
Louis T. Wigfall, of Texas--a man as generous as he was recklessly
brave--when he saw the fort on fire, supposing the garrison to be
hopelessly struggling for the honor of its flag, voluntarily and without
authority, went under fire in an open boat to the fort, and climbing
through one of its embrasures asked for Major Anderson, and insisted
that he should surrender a fort which it was palpably impossible that he
could hold. Major Anderson agreed to surrender on the same terms and
conditions that had been offered him before his works were battered in
breach, and the agreement between them to that effect was promptly
ratified by the Confederate commander. Thus unofficially was inaugurated
the surrender and evacuation of the fort.
The President of the United States, in his message of July 4, 1861, to
the Federal Congress convened in extra session, said:
"It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort
Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of
the assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the fort
could by no possibility commit aggression upon them. They
knew--they were expressly notified--that the giving of bread to
the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all which would
on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting
so much, should provoke more."
Mr. Lincoln well knew that, if the brave men of the garrison were
hungry, they had only him and his trusted advisers to thank for it. They
had been kept for months in a place where they ought not to have been,
contrary to the judgment of the General-in-Chief of his army, contrary
to the counsels of the wisest statesmen in his confidence, and the
protests of the commander of the garrison. A word from him would have
relieved them at any moment in the manner most acceptable to them and
most promotive of peaceful results.
But, suppose the Confederate authorities had been disposed to yield, and
to consent to the introduction of supplies for the maintenance of the
garrison, what assurance would they have had that nothing further would
be attempted? What reliance could be placed in any assurances of the
Government of the United States after the experience of the attempted
_ruse_ of the Star of the West and the deceptions practiced upon the
Confederate Commissioners in Washington? He says we were "expressly
notified" that nothing more "would _on that occasion_ be attempted"--the
words in italics themselves constituting a very significant though
unobtrusive and innocent-looking limitation. But we had been just as
expressly notified, long before, that the garrison would be withdrawn.
It would be as easy to violate the one pledge as it had been to break
the other.
Moreover, the so-called notification was a mere memorandum, without
date, signature, or authentication of any kind, sent to Governor
Pickens, not by an accredited agent, but by a subordinate employee of
the State Department. Like the oral and written pledges of Mr. Seward,
given through Judge Campbell, it seemed to be carefully and purposely
divested of every attribute that could make it binding and valid, in
case its authors should see fit to repudiate it. It was as empty and
worthless as the complaint against the Confederate Government based upon
it, is disingenuous.
[Footnote 167: See the report of her commander, Captain McGowan, who
says he took on board, in the harbor of New York, four officers and two
hundred soldiers. Arriving off Charleston, he says, "_The soldiers were
now all put below_, and no one allowed on deck except our own crew."]
[Footnote 168: "American Conflict," vol. i, chap, xxix, p. 449.]
PART IV.
_THE WAR._
CHAPTER I.
Failure of the Peace Congress.--Treatment of the
Commissioners.--Their Withdrawal.--Notice of an Armed
Expedition.--Action of the Confederate Government.--Bombardment
and Surrender of Fort Sumter.--Its Reduction required by the
Exigency of the Case.--Disguise thrown off.--President Lincoln's
Call for Seventy-five Thousand Men.--His Fiction of
"Combinations."--Palpable Violation of the Constitution.--Action
of Virginia.--Of Citizens of Baltimore.--The Charge of
Precipitation against South Carolina.--Action of the Confederate
Government.--The Universal Feeling.
The Congress, initiated by Virginia for the laudable purpose of
endeavoring, by constitutional means, to adjust all the issues which
threatened the peace of the country, failed to achieve anything that
would cause or justify a reconsideration by the seceded States of their
action to reclaim the grants they had made to the General Government,
and to maintain for themselves a separate and independent existence.
The Commissioners sent by the Confederate Government, after having been
shamefully deceived, as has been heretofore fully set forth, left the
United States capital to report the result of their mission to the
Confederate Government.
The notice received, that an armed expedition had sailed for operations
against the State of South Carolina in the harbor of Charleston, induced
the Confederate Government to meet, as best it might, this assault, in
the discharge of its obligation to defend each State of the Confederacy.
To this end the bombardment of the formidable work, Fort Sumter, was
commenced, in anticipation of the reënforcement which was then moving to
unite with its garrison for hostilities against South Carolina.
The bloodless bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter occurred on April
13, 1861. The garrison was generously permitted to retire with the
honors of war. The evacuation of that fort, commanding the entrance to
the harbor of Charleston, which, if in hostile hands, was destructive of
its commerce, had been claimed as the right of South Carolina. The
voluntary withdrawal of the garrison by the United States Government had
been considered, and those best qualified to judge believed it had been
promised. Yet, when instead of the fulfillment of just expectations,
instead of the withdrawal of the garrison, a hostile expedition was
organized and sent forward, the urgency of the case required its
reduction before it should be reënforced. Had there been delay, the more
serious conflict between larger forces, land and naval, would scarcely
have been bloodless, as the bombardment fortunately was. The event,
however, was seized upon to inflame the mind of the Northern people, and
the disguise which had been worn in the communications with the
Confederate Commissioners was now thrown off, and it was cunningly
attempted to show that the South, which had been pleading for peace and
still stood on the defensive, had by this bombardment inaugurated a war
against the United States. But it should be stated that the threats
implied in the declarations that the Union could not exist part slave
and part free, and that the Union should be preserved, and the denial of
the right of a State peaceably to withdraw, were virtually a declaration
of war, and the sending of an army and navy to attack was the result to
have been anticipated as the consequence of such declaration of war.
On the 15th day of the same month, President Lincoln, introducing his
farce "of combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings," called forth the military of the
several States to the number of seventy-five thousand, and commanded
"the persons composing the combinations" to disperse, etc. It can but
surprise any one in the least degree conversant with the history of the
Union, to find States referred to as "persons composing combinations,"
and that the sovereign creators of the Federal Government, the States of
the Union, should be commanded by their agent to disperse. The levy of
so large an army could only mean war; but the power to declare war did
not reside in the President--it was delegated to the Congress only. If,
however, it had been a riotous combination or an insurrection, it must
have been, according to the Constitution, against the State; and the
power of the President to call forth the militia to suppress it, was
dependent upon an application from the State for that purpose; it could
not precede such application, and still less could it be rightfully
exercised against the will of a State. The authorities on this subject
have been heretofore cited, and need not be referred to again.
Suffice it to say that, by section 4, Article IV, of the Constitution,
the United States are bound to protect each State against invasion and
against domestic violence, whenever application shall have been made by
the Legislature, or by the Executive when the Legislature can not be
convened; and that to fail to give protection against any invasion
whatsoever would be a dereliction of duty. To add that there could be no
justification for the invasion of a State by an army of the United
States, is but to repeat what has been said, on the absence of any
authority in the General Government to coerce a State. In any possible
view of the case, therefore, the conclusion must be, that the calling on
some of the States for seventy-five thousand militia to invade other
States which were asserted to be still in the Union, was a palpable
violation of the Constitution, and the usurpation of undelegated power,
or, in other words, of power reserved to the States or to the people.
It might, therefore, have been anticipated that Virginia--one of whose
sons wrote the Declaration of Independence, another of whose sons led
the armies of the United States in the Revolution which achieved their
independence, and another of whose sons mainly contributed to the
adoption of the Constitution of the Union--would not have been slow, in
the face of such events, to reclaim the grants she had made to the
General Government, and to withdraw from the Union, to the establishment
of which she had so largely contributed.
Two days had elapsed between the surrender of Fort Sumter and the
proclamation of President Lincoln calling for seventy-five thousand
militia as before stated. Two other days elapsed, and Virginia passed
her ordinance of secession, and two days thereafter the citizens of
Baltimore resisted the passage of troops through that city on their way
to make war upon the Southern States. Thus rapidly did the current of
events bear us onward from peace to the desolating war which was soon to
ensue.
The manly effort of the unorganized, unarmed citizens of Baltimore to
resist the progress of armies for the invasion of her Southern sisters,
was worthy of the fair fame of Maryland; becoming the descendants of the
men who so gallantly fought for the freedom, independence, and
sovereignty of the States.
The bold stand, then and thereafter taken, extorted a promise from the
Executive authorities that no more troops should be sent through the
city of Baltimore, which promise, however, was only observed until, by
artifice, power had been gained to disregard it.
Virginia, as has been heretofore stated, passed her ordinance of
secession on the 17th of April. It was, however, subject to ratification
by the people at an election to be held on the fourth Thursday of May.
She was in the mean time, like her Southern sisters, the object of
Northern hostilities, and, having a common cause with them, properly
anticipated the election of May by forming an alliance with the
Confederate States, which was ratified by the Convention on the 25th of
April.