CHAPTER XV.

A Bond of Union necessary after the Declaration of

Independence.--Articles of Confederation.--The Constitution of

the United States.--The Same Principle for obtaining Grants of

Power in both.--The Constitution an Instrument enumerating the

Powers delegated.--The Power of Amendment merely a Power to

amend the Delegated Grants.--A Smaller Power was required for

Amendment than for a Grant.--The Power of Amendment is confined

to Grants of the Constitution.--Limitations on the Power of

Amendment.

In July, 1776, the Congress of the thirteen united colonies declared

that "these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and

independent States." The denial of this asserted right and the attempted

coercion made it manifest that a bond of union was necessary, for the

common defense.

In November of the next year, viz., 1777, articles of confederation and

perpetual union were entered into by the thirteen States under the style

of "The United States of America." The government instituted was to be

administered by a congress of delegates from the several States, and

each State to have an equal voice in legislation. The Government so

formed was to act through and by the States, and, having no power to

enforce its requisitions upon the States, embarrassment was early

realized in its efforts to provide for the exigencies of war. After the

treaty of peace and recognition of the independence of the States, the

difficulty of raising revenue and regulating commerce was so great as to

lead to repeated efforts to obtain from the States additional grants of

power. Under the Articles of Confederation no amendment of them could be

made except by the unanimous consent of the States, and this it had not

been found possible to obtain for the powers requisite to the efficient

discharge of the functions intrusted to the Congress. Hence arose the

proceedings for a convention to amend the articles of confederation. The

result was the formation of a new plan of government, entitled "The

Constitution of the United States of America."

This was submitted to the Congress, in order that, if approved by them,

it might be referred to the States for adoption or rejection by the

several conventions thereof, and, if adopted by nine of the States, it

was to be the compact of union between the States so ratifying the same.

The new form of government differed in many essential particulars from

the old one. The delegates, intent on the purpose to give greater

efficiency to the government of the Union, proposed greatly to enlarge

its powers, so much so that it was not deemed safe to confide them to a

single body, and they were consequently distributed between three

independent departments of government, which might be a check upon one

another. The Constitution did not, like the Articles of Confederation,

declare that the States had agreed to a perpetual union, but distinctly

indicated the hope of its perpetuity by the expression in the preamble

of the purpose to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our

posterity." The circumstances under which the Union of the Constitution

was formed justified the hope of its perpetuity, but the brief existence

of the Confederation may have been a warning against the renewal of the

assertion that the compact should be perpetual.

A remedy for the embarrassment which had been realized, under the

Articles of Confederation, in obtaining amendments to correct any

defects in grants of power, so as to render them effective for the

purpose for which they were given, was provided by its fifth article. It

is here to be specially noted that new grants of power, as asked for by

the Convention, were under the Articles of Confederation only to be

obtained from the unanimous assent of the States. Therefore it followed

that two of the States which did not ratify the Constitution were, so

long as they retained that attitude, free from its obligations. Thus it

is seen that the same principle in regard to obtaining grants of

additional power for the Federal Government formed the rule for the

Union as it had done for the Confederation; that is, that the consent of

each and every State was a prerequisite. The apprehension which justly

existed that several of the States might reject the Constitution, and

under the rule of unanimity defeat it, led to the seventh article of the

Constitution, which, provided that the ratification by the conventions

of nine States should be sufficient for the establishment of the

Constitution between the States ratifying it, which of course

contemplated leaving the others, more or less in number, separate and

distinct from the nine States forming a new government. Thus was the

Union to be a voluntary compact, and all the powers of its government to

be derived from the assent of each of its members.

These powers as proposed by the Constitution were so extensive as to

create alarm and opposition by some of the most influential men in many

of the States. It is known that the objection of the patriot Samuel

Adams was only overcome by an assurance that such an amendment as the

tenth would be adopted. Like opposition was by like assurance elsewhere

overcome. That article is in these words: "The powers not delegated to

the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the

States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people."

Amendment, however, of the delegated powers was made more easy than it

had been under the Confederation. Ratification by three fourths of the

States was sufficient under the Constitution for the adoption of an

amendment to it. As this power of amendment threatens to be the Aaron's

rod which will swallow up the rest, I propose to give it special

examination. What is the Constitution of the United States? The whole

body of the instrument, the history of its formation and adoption, as

well as the tenth amendment, added in an abundance of caution, clearly

show it to be an instrument enumerating the powers delegated by the

States to the Federal Government, their common agent. It is specifically

declared that all which was not so delegated was reserved. On this mass

of reserved powers, those which the States declined to grant, the

Federal Government was expressly forbidden to intrude. Of what value

would this prohibition have been, if three fourths of the States could,

without the assent of a particular State, invade the domain which that

State had reserved for its own exclusive use and control?

It has heretofore, I hope, been satisfactorily demonstrated that the

States were sovereigns before they formed the Union, and that they have

never surrendered their sovereignty, but have only intrusted by their

common agent certain functions of sovereignty to be used for their

common welfare.

Among the powers delegated was one to amend the Constitution, which, it

is submitted, was merely the power to amend the delegated grants, and

these were obtained by the separate and independent action of each State

acceding to the Union. When we consider how carefully each clause was

discussed in the General Convention, and how closely each was

scrutinized in the conventions of the several States, the conclusion can

not be avoided that all was specified which it was intended to bestow,

and not a few of the wisest in that day held that too much power had

been conferred.

Aware of the imperfection of everything devised by man, it was foreseen

that, in the exercise of the functions intrusted to the General

Government, experience might reveal the necessity of modification--i.e.,

amendment--and power was therefore given to amend, in a certain manner,

the delegated trusts so as to make them efficient for the purposes

designed, or to prevent their misconstruction or abuse to the injury or

oppression of any of the people. In support of this view I refer to the

historical fact that the first ten amendments of the Constitution,

nearly coeval with it, all refer either to the powers delegated, or are

directed to the greater security of the rights which were guarded by

express limitations.

The distinction in the mind of the framers of the Constitution between

amendment and delegation of power seems to me clearly drawn by the fact

that the Constitution itself, which was a proposition to the States to

grant enumerated powers, was only to have effect between the ratifying

States; but the fifth article provided that amendments to the

Constitution might be adopted by three fourths of the States, and

thereby be valid as part of the Constitution. It thus appears that a

smaller power was required for an amendment than for a grant, and the

natural if not necessary conclusion is, that it was because an amendment

must belong to, and grow out of, a grant previously made. If a so-called

amendment could have been the means of obtaining a new power, is it to

be supposed that those watchful guardians of community independence, for

which the war of the Revolution had been fought, would have been

reconciled to the adoption of the Constitution, by the declaration that

the powers not delegated are reserved to the States? Unless the power of

amendment be confined to the grants of the Constitution, there can be no

security to the reserved rights of a minority less than a fourth of the

States. I submit that the word "amendment" necessarily implies an

improvement upon something which is possessed, and can have no proper

application to that which did not previously exist.

The apprehension that was felt of this power of amendment by the framers

of the Constitution is shown by the restrictions placed upon the

exercise of several of the delegated powers. For example: power was

given to admit new States, but no new State should be erected within the

jurisdiction of any other State, nor be formed by the junction of two or

more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures

of those States; and the power to regulate commerce was limited by the

prohibition of an amendment affecting, for a certain time, the migration

or importation of persons whom any of the existing States should think

proper to admit; and by the very important provision for the protection

of the smaller States and the preservation of their equality in the

Union, that the compact in regard to the membership of the two Houses of

Congress should not be so amended that any "State, without its consent,

shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." These

limitations and prohibitions on the power of amendment all refer to

clauses of the Constitution, to things which existed as part of the

General Government; they were not needed, and therefore not to be found

in relation to the reserved powers of the States, on which the General

Government was forbidden to intrude by the ninth article of the

amendments.

In view of the small territory of the New England States, comparatively

to that of the Middle and Southern States, and the probability of the

creation of new States in the large Territory of some of these latter,

it might well have been anticipated that in the course of time the New

England States would become less than one fourth of the members of the

Union. Nothing is less likely than that the watchful patriots of that

region would have consented to a form of government which should give to

a majority of three fourths of the States the power to deprive them of

their dearest rights and privileges. Yet to this extremity the new-born

theory of the power of amendment would go. Against this insidious

assault, this wooden horse which it is threatened to introduce into the

citadel of our liberties, I have sought to warn the inheritors of our

free institutions, and earnestly do invoke the resistance of all true

patriots.

PART III.

SECESSION AND CONFEDERATION.

CHAPTER I.

Opening of the New Year.--The People in Advance of their

Representatives.--Conciliatory Conduct of Southern Members of

Congress.--Sensational Fictions.--Misstatements of the Count of

Paris.--Obligations of a Senator.--The Southern Forts and

Arsenals.--Pensacola Bay and Fort Pickens.--The Alleged "Caucus"

and its Resolutions.--Personal Motives and Feelings.--The

Presidency not a Desirable Office.--Letter from the Hon. C. C.

Clay.

With the failure of the Senate Committee of Thirteen to come to any

agreement, the last reasonable hope of a pacific settlement of

difficulties within the Union was extinguished in the minds of those

most reluctant to abandon the effort. The year 1861 opened, as we have

seen, upon the spectacle of a general belief, among the people of the

planting States, in the necessity of an early secession, as the only

possible alternative left them.

It has already been shown that the calmness and deliberation, with which

the measures requisite for withdrawal were adopted and executed, afford

the best refutation of the charge that they were the result of haste,

passion, or precipitation. Still more contrary to truth is the

assertion, so often recklessly made and reiterated, that the people of

the South were led into secession, against their will and their better

judgment, by a few ambitious and discontented politicians.

The truth is, that the Southern people were in advance of their

representatives throughout, and that these latter were not agitators or

leaders in the popular movement. They were in harmony with its great

principles, but their influence, with very few exceptions, was exerted

to restrain rather than to accelerate their application, and to allay

rather than to stimulate excitement. As sentinels on the outer wall, the

people had a right to look to them for warning of approaching danger;

but, as we have seen, in that last session of the last Congress that

preceded the disruption, Southern Senators, of the class generally

considered extremists, served on a committee of pacification, and strove

earnestly to promote its objects. Failing in this, they still exerted

themselves to prevent the commission of any act that might result in

bloodshed.

Invention has busied itself, to the exhaustion of its resources, in the

creation of imaginary "cabals," "conspiracies," and "intrigues," among

the Senators and Representatives of the South on duty in Washington at

that time. The idle gossip of the public hotels, the sensational rumors

of the streets, the _canards_ of newspaper correspondents--whatever was

floating through the atmosphere of that anxious period--however lightly

regarded at the moment by the more intelligent, has since been drawn

upon for materials to be used in the construction of what has been

widely accepted as authentic history. Nothing would seem to be too

absurd for such uses. Thus, it has been gravely stated that a caucus of

Southern Senators, held in the early part of January, "resolved to

assume to themselves the political power of the South"; that they took

entire control of all political and military operations; that they

issued instructions for the passage of ordinances of secession, and for

the seizure of forts, arsenals, and custom-houses; with much more of the

like groundless fiction. A foreign prince, who served for a time in the

Federal Army, and has since undertaken to write a history of "The Civil

War in America"--a history the incomparable blunders of which are

redeemed from suspicion of willful misstatement only by the writer's

ignorance of the subject--speaks of the Southern representatives as

having "kept their seats in Congress in order to be able to paralyze its

action, forming, at the same time, a center whence they issued

directions to their friends in the South to complete the dismemberment

of the republic."[108] And again, with reference to the secession of

several States, he says that "the word of command issued by _the

committee at Washington was_ promptly obeyed."[109]

Statements such as these are a travesty upon history. That the

representatives of the South held conference with one another and took

counsel together, as men having common interests and threatened by

common dangers, is true, and is the full extent of the truth. That they

communicated to friends at home information of what was passing is to be

presumed, and would have been most obligatory if it had not been that

the published proceedings rendered such communication needless. But that

any such man, or committee of men, should have undertaken to direct the

mighty movement then progressing throughout the South, or to control,

through the telegraph and the mails, the will and the judgment of

conventions of the people, assembled under the full consciousness of the

dignity of that sovereignty which they represented, would have been an

extraordinary degree of folly and presumption.

The absurdity of the statement is further evident from a consideration

of the fact that the movements which culminated in the secession of the

several States began before the meeting of Congress. They were not

inaugurated, prosecuted, or controlled by the Senators and

Representatives in Congress, but by the Governors, Legislatures, and

finally by the delegates of the people in conventions of the respective

States. I believe I may fairly claim to have possessed a full share of

the confidence of the people of the State which I in part represented;

and proof has already been furnished to show how little effect my own

influence could have upon their action, even in the negative capacity of

a brake upon the wheels, by means of which it was hurried on to

consummation.

As for the imputation of holding our seats as a vantage-ground in

plotting for the dismemberment of the Union--in connection with which

the Count of Paris does me the honor to single out my name for special

mention--it is a charge so dishonorable, if true, to its object--so

disgraceful, if false, to its author--as to be outside of the proper

limit of discussion. It is a charge which no accuser ever made in my

presence, though I had in public debate more than once challenged its

assertion and denounced its falsehood. It is enough to say that I always

held, and repeatedly avowed, the principle that a Senator in Congress

occupied the position of an ambassador from the State which he

represented to the Government of the United States, as well as in some

sense a member of the Government; and that, in either capacity, it would

be dishonorable to use his powers and privileges for the destruction or

for the detriment of the Government to which he was accredited. Acting

on this principle, as long as I held a seat in the Senate, my best

efforts were directed to the maintenance of the Constitution, the Union

resulting from it, and to make the General Government an effective agent

of the States for its prescribed purpose. As soon as the paramount

allegiance due to Mississippi forbade a continuance of these efforts, I

withdrew from the position. To say that during this period I did nothing

secretly, in conflict with what was done or professed openly, would be

merely to assert my own integrity, which would be worthless to those who

may doubt it, and superfluous to those who believe in it. What has been

said on the subject for myself, I believe to be also true of my Southern

associates in Congress.

With regard to the forts, arsenals, etc., something more remains to be

said. The authorities of the Southern States immediately after, and in

some cases a few days before, their actual secession, took possession

(in every instance without resistance or bloodshed) of forts, arsenals,

custom-houses, and other public property within their respective limits.

I do not propose at this time to consider the question of their right to

do so; that may be more properly done hereafter. But it may not be out

of place briefly to refer to the statement, often made, that the absence

of troops from the military posts in the South, which enabled the States

so quietly to take such possession, was the result of collusion and

prearrangement between the Southern leaders and the Federal Secretary of

War, John B. Floyd, of Virginia. It is a sufficient answer to this

allegation to state the fact that the absence of troops from these

posts, instead of being exceptional, was, and still is, their ordinary

condition in time of peace. At the very moment when these sentences are

being written (in 1880), although the army of the United States is twice

as large as in 1860; although four years of internal war and a yet

longer period of subsequent military occupation of the South have

habituated the public to the presence of troops in their midst, to an

extent that would formerly have been startling if not offensive;

although allegations of continued disaffection on the part of the

Southern people have been persistently reiterated, for party

purposes--yet it is believed that the forts and arsenals in the States

of the Gulf are in as defenseless a condition, and as liable to quiet

seizure (if any such purpose existed), as in the beginning of the year

1861. Certainly, those within the range of my personal information are

occupied, as they were at that time, only by ordnance-sergeants or

fort-keepers.

There were, however, some exceptions to this general rule--especially in

the defensive works of the harbor of Charleston, the forts at Key West

and the Dry Tortugas, and those protecting the entrance of Pensacola

Bay. The events which occurred in Charleston Harbor will be more

conveniently noticed hereafter. The island forts near the extreme

southern point of Florida were too isolated and too remote from

population to be disturbed at that time; but the situation long

maintained at the mouth of Pensacola Bay affords a signal illustration

of the forbearance and conciliatory spirit that animated Southern

counsels. For a long time, Fort Pickens, on the island of Santa Rosa, at

the entrance to the harbor, was occupied only by a small body of Federal

soldiers and marines--less than one hundred, all told. Immediately

opposite, and in possession of the other two forts and the adjacent

navy-yard, was a strong force of volunteer troops of Florida and Alabama

(which might, on short notice, have been largely increased), ready and

anxious to attack and take possession of Fort Pickens. That they could

have done so is unquestionable, and, if mere considerations of military

advantage had been consulted, it would surely have been done. But the

love of peace and the purpose to preserve it, together with a revulsion

from the thought of engaging in fraternal strife, were more potent than

considerations of probable interest. During the anxious period of

uncertainty and apprehension which ensued, the efforts of the Southern

Senators in Washington were employed to dissuade (they could not

_command_) from any aggressive movement, however justifiable, that might

lead to collision. These efforts were exerted through written and

telegraphic communications to the Governors of Alabama and Florida, the

Commander of the Southern troops, and other influential persons near the

scene of operations. The records of the telegraph-office, if preserved,

will no doubt show this to be a very moderate statement of those

efforts. It is believed that by such influence alone a collision was

averted; and it is certain that its exercise gave great dissatisfaction

at the time to some of the ardent advocates of more active measures. It

may be that _they_ were right, and that we, who counseled delay and

forbearance, were wrong. Certainly, if we could have foreseen the

ultimate failure of all efforts for a peaceful settlement, and the

perfidy that was afterward to be practiced in connection with them, our

advice would have been different.

Certain resolutions, said to have been adopted in a meeting of Senators

held on the evening of the 5th of January,[110] have been magnified, by

the representations of artful commentators on the events of the period,

into something vastly momentous.

The significance of these resolutions was the admission that we could

not longer advise delay, and even that was unimportant under the

circumstances, for three of the States concerned had taken final action

on the subject before the resolutions could have been communicated to

them. As an expression of opinion, they merely stated that of which we

had all become convinced by the experience of the previous month--that

our long-cherished hopes had proved illusory--that further efforts in

Congress would be unavailing, and that nothing remained, except that the

States should take the matter into their own hands, as final judges of

their wrongs and of the measure of redress. They recommended the

formation of a confederacy among the seceding States as early as

possible after their secession--advice the expediency of which could

hardly be questioned, either by friend or foe. As to the "instructions"

asked for with regard to the propriety of continuing to hold their

seats, I suppose it must have been caused by some diversity of opinion

which then and long afterward continued to exist; and the practical

value of which must have been confined to Senators of States which did

not actually secede. For myself, I can only say that no advice could

have prevailed on me to hold a seat in the Senate after receiving notice

that Mississippi had withdrawn from the Union. The best evidence that my

associates thought likewise is the fact that, although no instructions

were given them, they promptly withdrew on the receipt of official

information of the withdrawal of the States which they represented.

It will not be amiss here briefly to state what were my position and

feelings at the period now under consideration, as they have been the

subject of gross and widespread misrepresentation. It is not only

untrue, but absurd, to attribute to me motives of personal ambition to

be gratified by a dismemberment of the Union. Much of my life had been

spent in the military and civil service of the United States. Whatever

reputation I had acquired was identified with their history; and, if

future preferment had been the object, it would have led me to cling to

the Union as long as a shred of it should remain. If any, judging after

the event, should assume that I was allured by the high office

subsequently conferred upon me by the people of the Confederate States,

the answer to any such conclusion has been made by others, to whom it

was well known, before the Confederacy was formed, that I had no desire

to be its President. When the suggestion was made to me, I expressed a

decided objection, and gave reasons of a public and permanent character

against being placed in that position.

Furthermore, I then held the office of United States Senator from

Mississippi--one which I preferred to all others. The kindness of the

people had three times conferred it upon me, and I had no reason to fear

that it would not be given again, as often as desired. So far from

wishing to change this position for any other, I had specially requested

my friends (some of whom had thought of putting me in nomination for the

Presidency of the United States in 1860) not to permit "my name to be

used before the Convention for any nomination whatever."

I had been so near the office for four years, while in the Cabinet of

Mr. Pierce, that I saw it from behind the scenes, and it was to me an

office in no wise desirable. The responsibilities were great; the labor,

the vexations, the disappointments, were greater. Those who have

intimately known the official and personal life of our Presidents can

not fail to remember how few have left the office as happy men as when

they entered it, how darkly the shadows gathered around the setting sun,

and how eagerly the multitude would turn to gaze upon another orb just

rising to take its place in the political firmament.

Worn by incessant fatigue, broken in fortune, debarred by public

opinion, prejudice, or tradition, from future employment, the wisest and

best who have filled that office have retired to private life, to

remember rather the failure of their hopes than the success of their

efforts. He must, indeed, be a self-confident man who could hope to fill

the chair of Washington with satisfaction to himself, with the assurance

of receiving on his retirement the meed awarded by the people to that

great man, that he had "lived enough for life and for glory," or even of

feeling that the sacrifice of self had been compensated by the service

rendered to his country.

The following facts were presented in a letter written several years ago

by the Hon. C. C. Clay, of Alabama, who was one of my most intimate

associates in the Senate, with reference to certain misstatements to

which his attention had been called by one of my friends:

"The import is, that Mr. Davis, disappointed and chagrined at

not receiving the nomination of the Democratic party for

President of the United States in 1860, took the lead on the

assembling of Congress in December, 1860, in a 'conspiracy' of

Southern Senators 'which planned the secession of the Southern

States from the Union,' and 'on the night of January 5, 1861,...

framed the scheme of revolution which was implicitly and

promptly followed at the South.' In other words, that Southern

Senators (and, chief among them, Jefferson Davis), then and

there, instigated and induced the Southern States to secede.

"I am quite sure that Mr. Davis neither expected nor desired the

nomination for the Presidency of the United States in 1860. He

never evinced any such aspiration, by word or sign, to me--with

whom he was, I believe, as intimate and confidential as with any

person outside of his own family. On the contrary, he requested

the delegation from Mississippi not to permit the use of his

name before the Convention. And, after the nomination of both

Douglas and Breckinridge, he conferred with them, at the

instance of leading Democrats, to persuade them to withdraw,

that their friends might unite on some second choice--an office

he would never have undertaken, had he sought the nomination or

believed he was regarded as an aspirant.

"Mr. Davis did not take an active part in planning or hastening

secession. I think he only _regretfully_ consented to it, as a

political necessity for the preservation of popular and State

rights, which were seriously threatened by the triumph of a

sectional party who were pledged to make war on them. I know

that some leading men, and even Mississippians, thought him too

moderate and backward, and found fault with him for not taking a

leading part in secession.

"No 'plan of secession' or 'scheme of revolution' was, to my

knowledge, discussed--certainly none matured--at the caucus, 5th

of January, 1861, unless, forsooth, the resolutions appended

hereto be so held. They comprise the sum and substance of what

was said and done. I never heard that the caucus advised the

South 'to accumulate munitions of war,' or 'to organize and

equip an army of one hundred thousand men,' or determined 'to

hold on as long as possible to the Southern seats.' So far from

it, a majority of Southern Senators seemed to think there would

be no war; that the dominant party in the North desired

separation from the South, and would gladly let their 'erring

sisters go in peace.' I could multiply proofs of such a

disposition. As to holding on to their seats, no Southern

Legislature advised it, no Southern Senator who favored

secession did so but one, and none others wished to do so, I

believe.

"The 'plan of secession,' if any, and the purpose of secession,

unquestionably, originated, not in Washington City, or with the

Senators or Representatives of the South, but among the people

of the several States, many months before it was attempted. They

followed no leaders at Washington or elsewhere, but acted for

themselves, with an independence and unanimity unprecedented in

any movement of such magnitude. Before the meeting of the caucus

of January 5, 1861, South Carolina had seceded, and Alabama,

Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas had taken the initial

step of secession, by calling conventions for its

accomplishment. Before the election of Lincoln, all the Southern

States, excepting one or two, had pledged themselves to separate

from the Union upon the triumph of a sectional party in the

Presidential election, by acts or resolutions of their

Legislatures, resolves of both Democratic and Whig State

Conventions, and of primary assemblies of the people--in every

way in which they could commit themselves to any future act.

Their purpose was proclaimed to the world through the press and

telegraph, and criticised in Congress, in the Northern

Legislatures, in press and pulpit, and on the hustings, during

many months before Congress met in December, 1860.

"Over and above all these facts, the reports of the United

States Senate show that, prior to the 5th of January, 1861,

Southern Senators united with Northern Democratic Senators in an

effort to effect pacification and prevent secession, and that

Jefferson Davis was one of a committee appointed by the Senate

to consider and report such a measure; that it failed because

the Northern Republicans opposed everything that looked to

peace; that Senator Douglas arraigned them as trying to

precipitate secession, referred to Jefferson Davis as one who

sought conciliation, and called upon the Republican Senators to

tell what they would do, if anything, to restore harmony and

prevent disunion. They did not even deign a response. Thus, by

their sullen silence, they made confession (without avoidance)

of their stubborn purpose to hold up no hand raised to maintain

the Union...."

[Footnote 108: "History of the Civil war," by the Count of Paris;

American translation, vol. i, p. 122.]

[Footnote 109: Ibid, p. 125.]

[Footnote 110: Subjoined are the resolutions referred to, adopted by the

Senators from Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas,

and Arkansas. Messrs. Toombs, of Georgia, and Sebastian, of Arkansas,

are said to have been absent from the meeting:

"_Resolved_, That, in our opinion, each of the States should, as

soon as may be, secede from the Union.

"_Resolved_, That provision should be made for a convention to

organize a confederacy of the seceding States: the Convention to

meet not later than the 15th of February, at the city of

Montgomery, in the State of Alabama.

"_Resolved_, That, in view of the hostile legislation that is

threatened against the seceding States, and which may be

consummated before the 4th of March, we ask instructions whether

the delegations are to remain in Congress until that date, for

the purpose of defeating such legislation.

"_Resolved_, That a committee be and are hereby appointed,

consisting of Messrs. Davis, Slidell, and Mallory, to carry out

the objects of this meeting."

]

CHAPTER II.

Tenure of Public Property ceded by the States.--Sovereignty and

Eminent Domain.--Principles asserted by Massachusetts, New York,

Virginia, and other States.--The Charleston Forts.--South

Carolina sends Commissioners to Washington.--Sudden Movement of

Major Anderson.--Correspondence of the Commissioners with the

President.--Interviews of the Author with Mr. Buchanan.--Major

Anderson.--The Star of the West.--The President's Special

Message.--Speech of the Author in the Senate.--Further

Proceedings and Correspondence relative to Fort Sumter.--Mr.

Buchanan's Rectitude in Purpose and Vacillation in Action.

The sites of forts, arsenals, navy-yards, and other public property of

the Federal Government were ceded by the States, within whose limits

they were, subject to the condition, either expressed or implied, that

they should be used solely and exclusively for the purposes for which

they were granted. The ultimate ownership of the soil, or eminent

domain, remains with the people of the State in which it lies, by virtue

of their sovereignty. Thus, the State of Massachusetts has declared

that--

"The sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Commonwealth extend to

all places within the boundaries thereof, subject only to such

rights of _concurrent jurisdiction_ as have been or may be

granted over any places ceded by the Commonwealth to the United

States."[111]

In the acts of cession of the respective States, the terms and

conditions on which the grant is made are expressed in various forms and

with differing degrees of precision. The act of New York, granting the

use of a site for the Brooklyn Navy-Yard, may serve as a specimen. It

contains this express condition:

"The United States are to retain such use and jurisdiction, _so

long as said tract shall be applied to the defense and safety of

the city and port of New York, and no longer_.... But the

jurisdiction hereby ceded, and the exemption from taxation

herein granted, shall continue in respect to said property, and

to each portion thereof, _so long as the same shall remain the

property of the United States_, and be used for the purposes

aforesaid, _and no longer_." The cession of the site of the

Watervliet Arsenal is made in the same or equivalent terms,

except that, instead of "defense and safety of the city and port

of New York," etc., the language is, "defense and safety _of the

said State_, and no longer."

South Carolina in 1805, by legislative enactment, ceded to the United

States, in Charleston Harbor and on Beaufort River, various forts and

fortifications, and sites for the erection of forts, on the following

conditions, viz.:

"That, if the United States shall not, within three years from

the passing of this act, and notification thereof by the

Governor of this State to the Executive of the United States,

repair the fortifications now existing thereon or build such

other forts or fortifications as may be deemed most expedient by

the Executive of the United States on the same, and keep a

garrison or garrisons therein; in such case this grant or

cession shall be void and of no effect."--("Statutes at Large of

South Carolina," vol. v, p. 501.)

It will hardly be contended that the conditions of this grant were

fulfilled, and, if it be answered that the State did not demand the

restoration of the forts or sites, the answer certainly fails after

1860, when the controversy arose, and the unfounded assertion was made

that those forts and sites had been purchased with the money, and were

therefore the property, of the United States. The terms of the cession

sufficiently manifest that they were free-will offerings of such forts

and sites as belonged to the State; and public functionaries were bound

to know that, by the United States law of March 20, 1794, it was

provided "that no purchase shall be made where such lands are the

property of a State."--(Act to provide for the defense of certain ports

and harbors of the United States.)

The stipulations made by Virginia, in ceding the ground for Fortress

Monroe and the Rip Raps, on the 1st of March, 1821, are as follows:

"_An Act ceding to the United States the lands on Old Point

Comfort, and the shoal called the Rip Raps._

"_Whereas_, It is shown to the present General Assembly that the

Government of the United States is solicitous that certain lands

at Old Point Comfort, and at the shoal called the Rip Raps,

should be, with the right of property and entire jurisdiction

thereon, vested in the said United States for the purpose of

fortification and other objects of national defense:

"1. _Be it enacted by the General Assembly_, That it shall be

lawful and proper for the Governor of this Commonwealth, by

conveyance or deeds in writing under his hand and the seal of

the State, to transfer, assign, and make over unto the said

United States the right of property and title, as well as all

the jurisdiction which this Commonwealth possesses over the

lands and shoal at Old Point Comfort and the Rip Raps:...

"2. _And be it further enacted_, That, _should the said United

States at any time abandon the said lands and shoal, or

appropriate them to any other purposes than those indicated in

the preamble to this act, that then, and in that case, the same

shall revert to and revest in this Commonwealth_."[112]

By accepting such grants, under such conditions, the Government of the

United States assented to their propriety, and the principle that holds

good in any one case is of course applicable to all others of the same

sort, whether expressly asserted in the act of cession or not. Indeed,

no express declaration would be necessary to establish a conclusion

resulting so directly from the nature of the case, and the settled

principles of sovereignty and eminent domain.

A State withdrawing from the Union would necessarily assume the control

theretofore exercised by the General Government over all public defenses

and other public property within her limits. It would, however, be but

fair and proper that adequate compensation should be made to the other

members of the partnership, or their common agent, for the value of the

works and for any other advantage obtained by the one party, or loss

incurred by the other. Such equitable settlement, the seceding States of

the South, without exception, as I believe, were desirous to make, and

prompt to propose to the Federal authorities.

On the secession of South Carolina, the condition of the defenses of

Charleston Harbor became a subject of anxiety with all parties. Of the

three forts in or at the entrance of the harbor, two were unoccupied,

but the third (Fort Moultrie) was held by a garrison of but little more

than one hundred men--of whom only sixty-three were said to be

effectives--under command of Major Robert Anderson, of the First

Artillery.

About twelve days before the secession of South Carolina, the

representatives in Congress from that State had called on the President

to assure him, in anticipation of the secession of the State, that no

purpose was entertained by South Carolina to attack, or in any way

molest, the forts held by the United States in the harbor of

Charleston--at least until opportunity could be had for an amicable

settlement of all questions that might arise with regard to these forts

and other public property--provided that no reënforcements should be

sent, and the military _status_ should be permitted to remain unchanged.

The South Carolinians understood Mr. Buchanan as approving of this

suggestion, although declining to make any formal pledge.

It appears, nevertheless, from subsequent developments, that both before

and after the secession of South Carolina preparations were secretly

made for reënforcing Major Anderson, in case it should be deemed

necessary by the Government at Washington.[113] On the 11th of December

instructions were communicated to him, from the War Department, of which

the following is the essential part:

"You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly

tend to provoke aggression; and for that reason you are not,

without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position

which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile

attitude, but you are to hold possession of the forts in this

harbor, and, if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last

extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you,

perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an

attack on, or attempt to take possession of either of them, will

be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your

command into either of them which you may deem most proper to

increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to

take similar defensive steps, whenever you have tangible

evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act."[114]

These instructions were afterward modified--as we are informed by Mr.

Buchanan--so as, instead of requiring him to defend himself "to the last

extremity," to direct him to do so as long as any reasonable hope

remained of saving the fort.[115]

Immediately after the secession of the State, the Convention of South

Carolina deputed three distinguished citizens of that State--Messrs.

Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, and James L. Orr--to proceed to

Washington, "to treat with the Government of the United States for the

delivery of the forts, magazines, lighthouses, and other real estate,

with their appurtenances, within the limits of South Carolina, and also

for an apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of all other

property held by the Government of the United States, as agent of the

confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member; and

generally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper

to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for

the continuance of peace and amity between this Commonwealth and the

Government at Washington."

The Commissioners, in the discharge of the duty intrusted to them,

arrived in Washington on the 26th of December. Before they could

communicate with the President, however--indeed, on the morning after

their arrival--they were startled, and the whole country electrified, by

the news that, during the previous night, Major Anderson had "secretly

dismantled Fort Moultrie,"[116] spiked his guns, burned his

gun-carriages, and removed his command to Fort Sumter, which occupied a

more commanding position in the harbor. This movement changed the whole

aspect of affairs. It was considered by the Government and people of

South Carolina as a violation of the implied pledge of a maintenance of

the _status quo_; the remaining forts and other public property were at

once taken possession of by the State; and the condition of public

feeling became greatly exacerbated. An interview between the President

and the Commissioners was followed by a sharp correspondence, which was

terminated on the 1st of January, 1861, by the return to the

Commissioners of their final communication, with an endorsement stating

that it was of such a character that the President declined to receive

it. The negotiations were thus abruptly broken off. This correspondence

may be found in the Appendix.[117]

In the mean time, Mr. Cass, Secretary of State, had resigned his

position early in December, on the ground of the refusal of the

President to send reënforcements to Charleston. On the occupation of

Fort Sumter by Major Anderson, Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War, taking the

ground that it was virtually a violation of a pledge given or implied by

the Government, had asked that the garrison should be entirely withdrawn

from the harbor of Charleston, and, on the refusal of the President to

consent to this, had tendered his resignation, which was promptly

accepted.[118]

This is believed to be a correct outline of the earlier facts with

regard to the Charleston forts, and in giving it I have done so, as far

as possible, without prejudice, or any expression of opinion upon the

motives of the actors.

The kind relations, both personal and political, which had long existed

between Mr. Buchanan and myself, had led him, occasionally, during his

presidency, to send for me to confer with him on subjects that caused

him anxiety, and warranted me in sometimes calling upon him to offer my

opinion on matters of special interest or importance. Thus it was that I

had communicated with him freely in regard to the threatening aspect of

events in the earlier part of the winter of 1860-'61. When he told me of

the work that had been done, or was doing, at Fort Moultrie--that is,

the elevation of its parapet by crowning it with barrels of sand--I

pointed out to him the impolicy as well as inefficiency of the measure.

It seemed to me impolitic to make ostensible preparations for defense,

when no attack was threatened; and the means adopted were inefficient,

because any ordinary field-piece would knock the barrels off the

parapet, and thus to render them only hurtful to the defenders. He

inquired whether the expedient had not been successful at Fort Brown, on

the Rio Grande, in the beginning of the Mexican war, and was answered

that the attack on Fort Brown had been made with small-arms, or at great

distance.

After the removal of the garrison to the stronger and safer position of

Fort Sumter, I called upon him again to represent, from my knowledge of

the people and the circumstances of the case, how productive the

movement would be of discontent, and how likely to lead to collision.

One of the vexed questions of the day was, by what authority the

collector of the port should be appointed, and the rumor was, that

instructions had been given to the commanding officer at Fort Sumter not

to allow vessels to pass, unless under clearance from the United States

collector. It was easy to understand that, if a vessel were fired upon

under such circumstances, it would be accepted as the beginning of

hostilities--a result which both he and I desired to avert, as the

greatest calamity that could be foreseen or imagined. My opinion was,

that the wisest and best course would be to withdraw the garrison

altogether from the harbor of Charleston.

The President's objection to this was, that it was his bounden duty to

preserve and protect the property of the United States. To this I

replied, with all the earnestness the occasion demanded, that I would

pledge my life that, if an inventory were taken of all the stores and

munitions in the fort, and an ordnance-sergeant with a few men left in

charge of them, they would not be disturbed. As a further guarantee, I

offered to obtain from the Governor of South Carolina full assurance

that, in case any marauders or lawless combination of persons should

attempt to seize or disturb the property, he would send from the citadel

of Charleston an adequate guard to protect it and to secure its keepers

against molestation.

The President promised me to reflect upon this proposition, and to

confer with his Cabinet upon the propriety of adopting it. All Cabinet

consultations are secret; which is equivalent to saying that I never

knew what occurred in that meeting to which my proposition was

submitted. The result was not communicated to me, but the events which

followed proved that the suggestion was not accepted.

Major Anderson, who commanded the garrison, had many ties and

associations that bound him to the South. He performed his part like the

true soldier and man of the finest sense of honor that he was; but that

it was most painful to him to be charged with the duty of holding the

fort as a threat to the people of Charleston is a fact known to many

others as well as to myself. We had been cadets together. He was my

first acquaintance in that corps, and the friendship then formed was

never interrupted. We had served together in the summer and autumn of

1860, in a commission of inquiry into the discipline, course of studies,

and general condition of the United States Military Academy. At the

close of our labors the commission had adjourned, to meet again in

Washington about the end of the ensuing November, to examine the report

and revise it for transmission to Congress. Major Anderson's duties in

Charleston Harbor hindered him from attending this adjourned meeting of

the commission, and he wrote to me, its chairman, to explain the cause

of his absence. That letter was lost when my library and private papers

were "captured" from my home in Mississippi. If any one has preserved it

as a trophy of war, its publication would show how bright was the honor,

how broad the patriotism of Major Anderson, and how fully he sympathized

with me as to the evils which then lowered over the country.

In comparing the past and the present among the mighty changes which

passion and sectional hostility have wrought, one is profoundly and

painfully impressed by the extent to which public opinion has drifted

from the landmarks set up by the sages and patriots who formed the

constitutional Union, and observed by those who administered its

government down to the time when war between the States was inaugurated.

Mr. Buchanan, the last President of the old school, would as soon have

thought of aiding in the establishment of a monarchy among us as of

accepting the doctrine of coercing the States into submission to the

will of a majority, in mass, of the people of the United States. When

discussing the question of withdrawing the troops from the port of

Charleston, he yielded a ready assent to the proposition that the

cession of a site for a fort, for purposes of public defense, lapses,

whenever that fort should be employed by the grantee against the State

by which the cession was made, on the familiar principle that any grant

for a specific purpose expires when it ceases to be used for that

purpose. Whether on this or any other ground, if the garrison of Fort

Sumter had been withdrawn in accordance with the spirit of the

Constitution of the United States, from which the power to apply

coercion to a State was deliberately and designedly excluded, and if

this had been distinctly assigned as a reason for its withdrawal, the

honor of the United States Government would have been maintained intact,

and nothing could have operated more powerfully to quiet the

apprehensions and allay the resentment of the people of South Carolina.

The influence which such a measure would have exerted upon the States

which had not yet seceded, but were then contemplating the adoption of

that extreme remedy, would probably have induced further delay; and the

mellowing effect of time, with a realization of the dangers to be

incurred, might have wrought mutual forbearance--if, indeed, anything

could have checked the madness then prevailing among the people of the

Northern States in their thirst for power and forgetfulness of the

duties of federation.

It would have been easy to concede this point. The little garrison of

Fort Sumter served only as a menace; for it was utterly incapable of

holding the fort if attacked, and the poor attempt soon afterward made

to reënforce and provision it, by such a vessel as the Star of the West,

might by the uncharitable be readily construed as a scheme to provoke

hostilities. Yet, from my knowledge of Mr. Buchanan, I do not hesitate

to say that he had no such wish or purpose. His abiding hope was to

avert a collision, or at least to postpone it to a period beyond the

close of his official term. The management of the whole affair was what

Talleyrand describes as something worse than a crime--a blunder.

Whatever treatment the case demanded, should have been prompt; to wait

was fatuity.

The ill-advised attempt secretly to throw reënforcements and provisions

into Fort Sumter, by means of the steamer Star of the West, resulted in

the repulsion of that vessel at the mouth of the harbor, by the

authorities of South Carolina, on the morning of the 9th of January. On

her refusal to heave-to, she was fired upon, and put back to sea, with

her recruits and supplies. A telegraphic account of this event was

handed me, a few hours afterward, when stepping into my carriage to go

to the Senate-chamber. Although I had then, for some time, ceased to

visit the President, yet, under the impulse of this renewed note of

danger to the country, I drove immediately to the Executive mansion, and

for the last time appealed to him to take such prompt measures as were

evidently necessary to avert the impending calamity. The result was even

more unsatisfactory than that of former efforts had been.

On the same day the special message of the President on the state of the

Union, dated the day previous (8th of January), was submitted to

Congress. This message was accompanied by the _first_ letter of the

South Carolina Commissioners to the President, with his answer, but of

course _not_ by their rejoinder, which he had declined to receive. Mr.

Buchanan, in his memoirs, complains that, immediately after the reading

of his message, this rejoinder (which he terms an "insulting letter")

was presented by me to the Senate, and by that body received and entered

upon its journal.[119] The simple truth is, that, regarding it as

essential to a complete understanding of the transaction, and its

publication as a mere act of justice to the Commissioners, I presented

and had it read in the Senate. But its appearance upon the journal as

part of the proceedings, instead of being merely a document introduced

as part of my remarks, was the result of a discourteous objection, made

by a so-called "Republican" Senator, to the reading of the document by

the Clerk of the Senate at my request. This will be made manifest by an

examination of the debate and proceedings which ensued.[120] The

discourtesy recoiled upon its author and supporters, and gave the letter

a vantage-ground in respect of prominence which I could not have

foreseen or expected.

The next day (January 10th) the speech was delivered, the greater part

of which may be found in the Appendix[121]--the last that I ever made in

the Senate of the United States, except in taking leave, and by the

sentiments of which I am content that my career, both before and since,

should be judged.

The history of Fort Sumter during the remaining period, until the

organization of the Confederate Government, may be found in the

correspondence given in the Appendix.[122] From this it will be seen

that the authorities of South Carolina still continued to refrain from

any act of aggression or retaliation, under the provocation of the

secret attempt to reënforce the garrison, as they had previously under

that of its nocturnal transfer from one fort to another.

Another Commissioner (the Hon. I. W. Hayne) was sent to Washington by

the Governor of South Carolina, to effect, if possible, an amicable and

peaceful transfer of the fort, and settlement of all questions relating

to property. This Commissioner remained for nearly a month, endeavoring

to accomplish the objects of his mission, but was met only by evasive

and unsatisfactory answers, and eventually returned without having

effected anything.

There is one passage in the last letter of Colonel Hayne to the

President which presents the case of the occupancy of Fort Sumter by the

United States troops so clearly and forcibly that it may be proper to

quote it. He writes as follows:

"You say that the fort was garrisoned for our protection, and is

held for the same purposes for which it has been ever held since

its construction. Are you not aware, that to hold, in the

territory of a foreign power, a fortress against her will,

avowedly for the purpose of protecting her citizens, is perhaps

the highest insult which one government can offer to another?

But Fort Sumter was never garrisoned at all until South Carolina

had dissolved her connection with your Government. This garrison

entered it in the night, with every circumstance of secrecy,

after spiking the guns and burning the gun-carriages and cutting

down the flag-staff of an adjacent fort, which was then

abandoned. South Carolina had not taken Fort Sumter into her own

possession, only because of her misplaced confidence in a

Government which deceived her."

Thus, during the remainder of Mr. Buchanan's Administration, matters

went rapidly from bad to worse. The old statesman, who, with all his

defects, had long possessed, and was entitled still to retain, the

confidence due to extensive political knowledge and love of his country

in all its parts--who had, in his earlier career, looked steadily to the

Constitution, as the mariner looks to the compass, for guidance--retired

to private life at the expiration of his term of office, having effected

nothing to allay the storm which had been steadily gathering during his

administration.

Timid vacillation was then succeeded by unscrupulous cunning; and, for

futile efforts, without hostile collision, to impose a claim of

authority upon people who repudiated it, were substituted measures which

could be sustained only by force.

[Footnote 111: "Revised Statutes of Massachusetts," 1836, p. 56.]

[Footnote 112: See "Revised Statutes of Virginia."]

[Footnote 113: "Buchanan's Administration," chap. ix, p. 165, and chap.

xi, pp. 212-214.]

[Footnote 114: "Buchanan's Administration," chap. ix, p. 166.]

[Footnote 115: Ibid.]

[Footnote 116: Ibid., chap. x, p. 180.]

[Footnote 117: See Appendix G.]

[Footnote 118: "Buchanan's Administration," chap. x, pp. 187, 188.]

[Footnote 119: "Buchanan's Administration," chap. x, p. 184.]

[Footnote 120: See "Congressional Globe," second session, Thirty-fifth

Congress, Part I, p. 284, _et seq._]

[Footnote 121: See Appendix I.]

[Footnote 122: Ibid.]

CHAPTER III.

Secession of Mississippi and Other States.--Withdrawal of

Senators.--Address of the Author on taking Leave of the

Senate.--Answer to Certain Objections.

Mississippi was the second State to withdraw from the Union, her

ordinance of secession being adopted on the 9th of January, 1861. She

was quickly followed by Florida on the 10th, Alabama on the 11th, and,

in the course of the same month, by Georgia on the 18th, and Louisiana

on the 26th. The Conventions of these States (together with that of

South Carolina) agreed in designating Montgomery, Alabama, as the place,

and the 4th of February as the day, for the assembling of a congress of

the seceding States, to which each State Convention, acting as the

direct representative of the sovereignty of the people thereof,

appointed delegates.

Telegraphic intelligence of the secession of Mississippi had reached

Washington some considerable time before the fact was officially

communicated to me. This official knowledge I considered it proper to

await before taking formal leave of the Senate. My associates from

Alabama and Florida concurred in this view. Accordingly, having received

notification of the secession of these three States about the same time,

on the 21st of January Messrs. Yulee and Mallory, of Florida,

Fitzpatrick and Clay, of Alabama, and myself, announced the withdrawal

of the States from which we were respectively accredited, and took leave

of the Senate at the same time.

In the action which she then took, Mississippi certainly had no purpose

to levy war against the United States, or any of them. As her Senator, I

endeavored plainly to state her position in the annexed remarks

addressed to the Senate in taking leave of the body:

"I rise, Mr. President, for the purpose of announcing to the

Senate that I have satisfactory evidence that the State of

Mississippi, by a solemn ordinance of her people, in convention

assembled, has declared her separation from the United States.

Under these circumstances, of course, my functions are

terminated here. It has seemed to me proper, however, that I

should appear in the Senate to announce that fact to my

associates, and I will say but very little more. The occasion

does not invite me to go into argument; and my physical

condition would not permit me to do so, if it were otherwise;

and yet it seems to become me to say something on the part of

the State I here represent on an occasion so solemn as this.

"It is known to Senators who have served with me here that I

have for many years advocated, as an essential attribute of

State sovereignty, the right of a State to secede from the

Union. Therefore, if I had not believed there was justifiable

cause, if I had thought that Mississippi was acting without

sufficient provocation, or without an existing necessity, I

should still, under my theory of the Government, because of my

allegiance to the State of which I am a citizen, have been bound

by her action. I, however, may be permitted to say that I do

think she has justifiable cause, and I approve of her act. I

conferred with her people before that act was taken, counseled

them then that, if the state of things which they apprehended

should exist when their Convention met, they should take the

action which they have now adopted.

"I hope none who hear me will confound this expression of mine

with the advocacy of the right of a State to remain in the

Union, and to disregard its constitutional obligations by the

nullification of the law. Such is not my theory. Nullification

and secession, so often confounded, are, indeed, antagonistic

principles. Nullification is a remedy which it is sought to

apply within the Union, and against the agent of the States. It

is only to be justified when the agent has violated his

constitutional obligations, and a State, assuming to judge for

itself, denies the right of the agent thus to act, and appeals

to the other States of the Union for a decision; but, when the

States themselves and when the people of the States have so

acted as to convince us that they will not regard our

constitutional rights, then, and then for the first time, arises

the doctrine of secession in its practical application.

"A great man who now reposes with his fathers, and who has often

been arraigned for a want of fealty to the Union, advocated the

doctrine of nullification because it preserved the Union. It was

because of his deep-seated attachment to the Union--his

determination to find some remedy for existing ills short of a

severance of the ties which bound South Carolina to the other

States--that Mr. Calhoun advocated the doctrine of

nullification, which he proclaimed to be peaceful, to be within

the limits of State power, not to disturb the Union, but only to

be a means of bringing the agent before the tribunal of the

States for their judgment.

"Secession belongs to a different class of remedies. It is to be

justified upon the basis that the States are sovereign. There

was a time when none denied it. I hope the time may come again

when a better comprehension of the theory of our Government, and

the inalienable rights of the people of the States, will prevent

any one from denying that each State is a sovereign, and thus

may reclaim the grants which it has made to any agent

whomsoever.

"I, therefore, say I concur in the action of the people of

Mississippi, believing it to be necessary and proper, and should

have been bound by their action if my belief had been otherwise;

and this brings me to the important point which I wish, on this

last occasion, to present to the Senate. It is by this

confounding of nullification and secession that the name of a

great man whose ashes now mingle with his mother earth has been

evoked to justify coercion against a seceded State. The phrase,

'to execute the laws,' was an expression which General Jackson

applied to the case of a State refusing to obey the laws while

yet a member of the Union. That is not the case which is now

presented. The laws are to be executed over the United States,

and upon the people of the United States. They have no relation

to any foreign country. It is a perversion of terms--at least,

it is a great misapprehension of the case--which cites that

expression for application to a State which has withdrawn from

the Union. You may make war on a foreign state. If it be the

purpose of gentlemen, they may make war against a State which

has withdrawn from the Union; but there are no laws of the

United States to be executed within the limits of a seceded

State. A State, finding herself in the condition in which

Mississippi has judged she is--in which her safety requires that

she should provide for the maintenance of her rights out of the

Union--surrenders all the benefits (and they are known to be

many), deprives herself of the advantages (and they are known to

be great), severs all the ties of affection (and they are close

and enduring), which have bound her to the Union; and thus

divesting herself of every benefit--taking upon herself every

burden--she claims to be exempt from any power to execute the

laws of the United States within her limits.

"I well remember an occasion when Massachusetts was arraigned

before the bar of the Senate, and when the doctrine of coercion

was rife, and to be applied against her, because of the rescue

of a fugitive slave in Boston. My opinion then was the same that

it is now. Not in a spirit of egotism, but to show that I am not

influenced in my opinions because the case is my own, I refer to

that time and that occasion as containing the opinion which I

then entertained, and on which my present conduct is based. I

then said that if Massachusetts--following her purpose through a

stated line of conduct--chose to take the last step, which

separates her from the Union, it is her right to go, and I will

neither vote one dollar nor one man to coerce her back; but I

will say to her, Godspeed, in memory of the kind associations

which once existed between her and the other States.

"It has been a conviction of pressing necessity--it has been a

belief that we are to be deprived in the Union of the rights

which our fathers bequeathed to us--which has brought

Mississippi to her present decision. She has heard proclaimed

the theory that all men are created free and equal, and this

made the basis of an attack upon her social institutions; and

the sacred Declaration of Independence has been invoked to

maintain the position of the equality of the races. That

Declaration of Independence is to be construed by the

circumstances and purposes for which it was made. The

communities were declaring their independence; the people of

those communities were asserting that no man was born--to use

the language of Mr. Jefferson--booted and spurred, to ride over

the rest of mankind; that men were created equal--meaning the

men of the political community; that there was no divine right

to rule; that no man inherited the right to govern; that there

were no classes by which power and place descended to families;

but that all stations were equally within the grasp of each

member of the body politic. These were the great principles they

announced; these were the purposes for which they made their

declaration; these were the ends to which their enunciation was

directed. They have no reference to the slave; else, how

happened it that among the items of arraignment against George

III was that he endeavored to do just what the North has been

endeavoring of late to do, to stir up insurrection among our

slaves? Had the Declaration announced that the negroes were free

and equal, how was the prince to be arraigned for raising up

insurrection among them? And how was this to be enumerated among

the high crimes which caused the colonies to sever their

connection with the mother-country? When our Constitution was

formed, the same idea was rendered more palpable; for there we

find provision made for that very class of persons as property;

they were not put upon the footing of equality with white

men--not even upon that of paupers and convicts; but, so far as

representation was concerned, were discriminated against as a

lower caste, only to be represented in the numerical proportion

of three fifths. So stands the compact which binds us together.

"Then, Senators, we recur to the principles upon which our

Government was founded; and when you deny them, and when you

deny to us the right to withdraw from a Government which, thus

perverted, threatens to be destructive of our rights, we but

tread in the path of our fathers when we proclaim our

independence and take the hazard. This is done, not in hostility

to others, not to injure any section of the country, not even

for our own pecuniary benefit, but from the high and solemn

motive of defending and protecting the rights we inherited, and

which it is our duty to transmit unshorn to our children.

"I find in myself perhaps a type of the general feeling of my

constituents toward yours. I am sure I feel no hostility toward

you, Senators from the North. I am sure there is not one of you,

whatever sharp discussion there may have been between us, to

whom I can not now say, in the presence of my God, I wish you

well; and such, I am sure, is the feeling of the people whom I

represent toward those whom you represent. I, therefore, feel

that I but express their desire when I say I hope, and they

hope, for peaceable relations with you, though we must part.

They may be mutually beneficial to us in the future, as they

have been in the past, if you so will it. The reverse may bring

disaster on every portion of the country, and, if you will have

it thus, we will invoke the God of our fathers, who delivered

them from the power of the lion, to protect us from the ravages

of the bear; and thus, putting our trust in God and in our firm

hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate the right as best we

may.

"In the course of my service here, associated at different times

with a great variety of Senators, I see now around me some with

whom I have served long; there have been points of collision,

but, whatever of offense there has been to me, I leave here. I

carry with me no hostile remembrance. Whatever offense I have

given which has not been redressed, or for which satisfaction

has not been demanded, I have, Senators, in this hour of our

parting, to offer you my apology for any pain which, in the heat

of discussion, I have inflicted. I go hence unencumbered by the

remembrance of any injury received, and having discharged the

duty of making the only reparation in my power for any injury

offered.

"Mr. President and Senators, having made the announcement which

the occasion seemed to me to require, it only remains for me to

bid you a final adieu."

There are some who contend that we should have retained

our seats and "fought for our rights in the Union." Could

anything be less rational or less consistent than that a Senator,

an ambassador from his State, should insist upon representing

it in a confederacy from which the State has withdrawn?

What was meant by "fighting in the Union" I have never

quite understood. If it be to retain a seat in Congress for the

purpose of crippling the Government and rendering it unable to

perform its functions, I can certainly not appreciate the idea of

honor that sanctions the suggestion. Among the advantages

claimed for this proposition by its supporters was that of thwarting

the President in the appointment of his Cabinet and other

officers necessary for the administration of public affairs.

Would this have been to maintain the Union formed by the

States? Would such have been the Government which Washington

recommended as a remedy for the defects of the original

Confederation, the greatest of which was the paralysis of the

action of the general agent by the opposition or indifference of

the States? Sad as have been the consequences of the war

which followed secession--disastrous in its moral, material, and

political relations--still we have good cause to feel proud that

the course of the Southern States has left no blot nor stain upon

the honor and chivalry of their people.

"And if our children must obey,

They must, but--thinking on our day--

'Twill less debase them to submit."

CHAPTER IV.

Threats of Arrest.--Departure from Washington.--Indications of

Public Anxiety.--"Will there be war?"--Organization of the "Army

of Mississippi."--Lack of Preparations for Defense in the

South.--Evidences of the Good Faith and Peaceable Purposes of

the Southern People.

During the interval between the announcement by telegraph of the

secession of Mississippi and the receipt of the official notification

which enabled me to withdraw from the Senate, rumors were in circulation

of a purpose, on the part of the United States Government, to arrest

members of Congress preparing to leave Washington on account of the

secession of the States which they represented. This threat received

little attention from those most concerned. Indeed, it was thought that

it might not be an undesirable mode of testing the question of the right

of a State to withdraw from the Union.

No attempt, however, was made to arrest any of the retiring members;

and, after a delay of a few days in necessary preparations, I left

Washington for Mississippi, passing through southwestern Virginia, East

Tennessee, a small part of Georgia, and north Alabama. A deep interest

in the events which had recently occurred was exhibited by the people of

these States, and much anxiety was indicated as to the future. Many

years of agitation had made them familiar with the idea of separation.

Nearly two generations had risen to manhood since it had begun to be

discussed as a possible alternative. Few, very few, of the Southern

people had ever regarded it as a desirable event, or otherwise than as a

last resort for escape from evils more intolerable. It was a calamity,

which, however threatened, they had still hoped might be averted, or

indefinitely postponed, and they had regarded with contempt, rather than

anger, the ravings of a party in the North, which denounced the

Constitution and the Union, and persistently defamed their brethren of

the South.

Now, however, as well in Virginia and Tennessee, neither of which had

yet seceded, as in the more Southern States, which had already taken

that step, the danger so often prophesied was perceived to be at the

door, and eager inquiries were made as to what would happen

next--especially as to the probability of war between the States.

The course which events were likely to take was shrouded in the greatest

uncertainty. In the minds of many there was the not unreasonable hope

(which had been expressed by the Commissioner sent from Mississippi to

Maryland) that the secession of six Southern States--certainly soon to

be followed by that of others--would so arouse the sober thought and

better feeling of the Northern people as to compel their representatives

to agree to a Convention of the States, and that such guarantees would

be given as would secure to the South the domestic tranquillity and

equality in the Union which were rights assured under the Federal

compact. There were others, and they the most numerous class, who

considered that the separation would be final, but peaceful. For my own

part, while believing that secession was a right, and properly a

peaceable remedy, I had never believed that it would be permitted to be

peaceably exercised. Very few in the South at that time agreed with me,

and my answers to queries on the subject were, therefore, as unexpected

as they were unwelcome.

On my arrival at Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, I found that the

Convention of the State had made provision for a State army, and had

appointed me to the command, with the rank of major-general. Four

brigadier-generals, appointed in like manner by the Convention, were

awaiting my arrival for assignment to duty. After the preparation of the

necessary rules and regulations, the division of the State into

districts, the apportionment among them of the troops to be raised, and

the appointment of officers of the general staff, as authorized by the

ordinance of the Convention, such measures as were practicable were

taken to obtain the necessary arms. The State had few serviceable

weapons, and no establishment for their manufacture or repair. This fact

(which is true of other Southern States as of Mississippi) is a clear

proof of the absence of any desire or expectation of war. If the purpose

of the Northern States to make war upon us because of secession had been

foreseen, preparation to meet the consequences would have been

contemporaneous with the adoption of a resort to that remedy--a remedy

the possibility of which had for many years been contemplated. Had the

Southern States possessed arsenals, and collected in them the requisite

supplies of arms and munitions, such preparation would not only have

placed them more nearly on an equality with the North in the beginning

of the war, but might, perhaps, have been the best conservator of peace.

Let us, the survivors, however, not fail to do credit to the generous

credulity which could not understand how, in violation of the compact of

Union, a war could be waged against the States, or why they should be

invaded because their people had deemed it necessary to withdraw from an

association which had failed to fulfill the ends for which they had

entered into it, and which, having been broken to their injury by the

other parties, had ceased to be binding upon them. It is a satisfaction

to know that the calamities which have befallen the Southern States were

the result of their credulous reliance on the power of the Constitution,

that, if it failed to protect their rights, it would at least suffice to

prevent an attempt at coercion, if, in the last resort, they peacefully

withdrew from the Union.

When, in after times, the passions of the day shall have subsided, and

all the evidence shall have been collected and compared, the

philosophical inquirer, who asks why the majority of the stronger

section invaded the peaceful homes of their late associates, will be

answered by History: "The lust of empire impelled them to wage against

their weaker neighbors a war of subjugation."

CHAPTER V.

Meeting of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate

States.--Adoption of a Provisional Constitution.--Election of

President and Vice-President.--Notification to the Author of his

Election.--His Views with Regard to it.--Journey to

Montgomery.--Interview with Judge Sharkey.--False Reports of

Speeches on the Way.--Inaugural Address.--Editor's Note.

The congress of delegates from the seceding States convened at

Montgomery, Alabama, according to appointment, on the 4th of February,

1861. Their first work was to prepare a provisional Constitution for the

new Confederacy, to be formed of the States which had withdrawn from the

Union, for which the style "Confederate States of America" was adopted.

The powers conferred upon them were adequate for the performance of this

duty, the immediate necessity for which was obvious and urgent. This

Constitution was adopted on the 8th of February, to continue in force

for one year, unless superseded at an earlier date by a permanent

organization. It is printed in an appendix, and for convenience of

reference the permanent Constitution, adopted several weeks afterward,

is exhibited in connection with it, and side by side with the

Constitution of the United States, after which it was modeled.[123] The

attention of the reader is invited to these documents and to a

comparison of them, although a more particular notice of the permanent

Constitution will be more appropriate hereafter.

On the next day (9th of February) an election was held for the chief

executive offices, resulting, as I afterward learned, in my election to

the Presidency, with the Hon. Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, as

Vice-President. Mr. Stephens was a delegate from Georgia to the

congress.

While these events were occurring, having completed the most urgent of

my duties at the capital of Mississippi, I had gone to my home,

Brierfield, in Warren County, and had begun, in the homely but

expressive language of Mr. Clay, "to repair my fences." While thus

engaged, notice was received of my election to the Presidency of the

Confederate States, with an urgent request to proceed immediately to

Montgomery for inauguration.

As this had been suggested as a probable event, and what appeared to me

adequate precautions had been taken to prevent it, I was surprised, and,

still more, disappointed. For reasons which it is not now necessary to

state, I had not believed my self as well suited to the office as some

others. I thought myself better adapted to command in the field; and

Mississippi had given me the position which I preferred to any

other--the highest rank in her army. It was, therefore, that I afterward

said, in an address delivered in the Capitol, before the Legislature of

the State, with reference to my election to the Presidency of the

Confederacy, that the duty to which I was thus called was temporary, and

that I expected soon to be with the Army of Mississippi again.

While on my way to Montgomery, and waiting in Jackson, Mississippi, for

the railroad train, I met the Hon. William L. Sharkey, who had filled

with great distinction the office of Chief-Justice of the State. He said

he was looking for me to make an inquiry. He desired to know if it was

true, as he had just learned, that I believed there _would_ be war. My

opinion was freely given, that there would be war, long and bloody, and

that it behooved every one to put his house in order. He expressed much

surprise, and said that he had not believed the report attributing this

opinion to me. He asked how I supposed war could result from the

peaceable withdrawal of a sovereign State. The answer was, that it was

not my opinion that war _should_ be occasioned by the exercise of that

right, but that it _would_ be.

Judge Sharkey and I had not belonged to the same political party, he

being a Whig, but we fully agreed with regard to the question of the

sovereignty of the States. He had been an advocate of nullification--a

doctrine to which I had never assented, and which had at one time been

the main issue in Mississippi politics. He had presided over the

well-remembered Nashville Convention in 1849, and had possessed much

influence in the State, not only as an eminent jurist, but as a citizen

who had grown up with it, and held many offices of honor and trust.

On my way to Montgomery, brief addresses were made at various places, at

which there were temporary stoppages of the trains, in response to calls

from the crowds assembled at such points. Some of these addresses were

grossly misrepresented in sensational reports made by irresponsible

persons, which were published in Northern newspapers, and were not

considered worthy of correction under the pressure of the momentous

duties then devolving upon me. These false reports, which represented me

as invoking war and threatening devastation of the North, have since

been adopted by partisan writers as authentic history. It is a

sufficient answer to these accusations to refer to my farewell address

to the Senate, already given, as reported for the press at the time,

and, in connection therewith, to my inaugural address at Montgomery, on

assuming the office of President of the Confederate States, on the 18th

of February. These two addresses, delivered at an interval of a month,

during which no material change of circumstances had occurred, being one

before and the other after the date of the sensational reports referred

to, are sufficient to stamp them as utterly untrue. The inaugural was

deliberately prepared, and uttered as written, and, in connection with

the farewell speech to the Senate, presents a clear and authentic

statement of the principles and purposes which actuated me on assuming

the duties of the high office to which I had been called.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

"_Gentlemen of the Congress of the Confederate States of

America, Friends, and Fellow-Citizens:_

"Called to the difficult and responsible station of Chief

Magistrate of the Provisional Government which you have

instituted, I approach the discharge of the duties assigned to

me with humble distrust of my abilities, but with a sustaining

confidence in the wisdom of those who are to guide and aid me in

the administration of public affairs, and an abiding faith in

the virtue and patriotism of the people. Looking forward to the

speedy establishment of a permanent government to take the place

of this, which by its greater moral and physical power will be

better able to combat with many difficulties that arise from the

conflicting interests of separate nations, I enter upon the

duties of the office to which I have been chosen with the hope

that the beginning of our career, as a Confederacy, may not be

obstructed by hostile opposition to our enjoyment of the

separate existence and independence we have asserted, and which,

with the blessing of Providence, we intend to maintain.

"Our present political position has been achieved in a manner

unprecedented in the history of nations. It illustrates the

American idea that governments rest on the consent of the

governed, and that it is the right of the people to alter or

abolish them at will whenever they become destructive of the

ends for which they were established. The declared purpose of

the compact of the Union from which we have withdrawn was to

'establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for

the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the

blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity'; and when,

in the judgment of the sovereign States composing this

Confederacy, it has been perverted from the purposes for which

it was ordained, and ceased to answer the ends for which it was

established, a peaceful appeal to the ballot-box declared that,

so far as they are concerned, the Government created by that

compact should cease to exist. In this they merely asserted the

right which the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776,

defined to be 'inalienable.' Of the time and occasion of its

exercise they as sovereigns were the final judges, each for

itself. The impartial and enlightened verdict of mankind will

vindicate the rectitude of our conduct; and He who knows the

hearts of men will judge of the sincerity with which we have

labored to preserve the Government of our fathers in its spirit.

"The right solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the United

States, and which has been solemnly affirmed and reaffirmed in

the Bills of Rights of the States subsequently admitted into the

Union of 1789, undeniably recognizes in the people the power to

resume the authority delegated for the purposes of government.

Thus the sovereign States here represented have proceeded to

form this Confederacy; and it is by abuse of language that their

act has been denominated a revolution. They formed a new

alliance, but within each State its government has remained; so

that the rights of person and property have not been disturbed.

The agent through which they communicated with foreign nations

is changed, but this does not necessarily interrupt their

international relations. Sustained by the consciousness that the

transition from the former Union to the present Confederacy has

not proceeded from a disregard on our part of just obligations,

or any failure to perform every constitutional duty, moved by no

interest or passion to invade the rights of others, anxious to

cultivate peace and commerce with all nations, if we may not

hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that posterity will

acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. Doubly justified

by the absence of wrong on our part, and by wanton aggression on

the part of others, there can be no cause to doubt that the

courage and patriotism of the people of the Confederate States

will be found equal to any measure of defense which their honor

and security may require.

"An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of

commodities required in every manufacturing country, our true

policy is peace, and the freest trade which our necessities will

permit. It is alike our interest and that of all those to whom

we would sell, and from whom we would buy, that there should be

the fewest practicable restrictions upon the interchange of

these commodities. There can, however, be but little rivalry

between ours and any manufacturing or navigating community, such

as the Northeastern States of the American Union. It must

follow, therefore, that mutual interest will invite to good-will

and kind offices on both parts. If, however, passion or lust of

dominion should cloud the judgment or inflame the ambition of

those States, we must prepare to meet the emergency and

maintain, by the final arbitrament of the sword, the position

which we have assumed among the nations of the earth.

"We have entered upon the career of independence, and it must be

inflexibly pursued. Through many years of controversy with our

late associates of the Northern States, we have vainly

endeavored to secure tranquillity and obtain respect for the

rights to which we were entitled. As a necessity, not a choice,

we have resorted to the remedy of separation, and henceforth our

energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and

the perpetuity of the Confederacy which we have formed. If a

just perception of mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to

pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire

will have been fulfilled. But if this be denied to us, and the

integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed, it will

but remain for us with firm resolve to appeal to arms and invoke

the blessing of Providence on a just cause.

"As a consequence of our new condition and relations, and with a

view to meet anticipated wants, it will be necessary to provide

for the speedy and efficient organization of branches of the

Executive department having special charge of foreign

intercourse, finance, military affairs, and the postal service.

For purposes of defense, the Confederate States may, under

ordinary circumstances, rely mainly upon the militia; but it is

deemed advisable, in the present condition of affairs, that

there should be a well-instructed and disciplined army, more

numerous than would usually be required on a peace

establishment. I also suggest that, for the protection of our

harbors and commerce on the high seas, a navy adapted to those

objects will be required. But this, as well as other subjects

appropriate to our necessities, have doubtless engaged the

attention of Congress.

"With a Constitution differing only from that of our fathers in

so far as it is explanatory of their well-known intent, freed

from sectional conflicts, which have interfered with the pursuit

of the general welfare, it is not unreasonable to expect that

States from which we have recently parted may seek to unite

their fortunes to ours under the Government which we have

instituted. For this your Constitution makes adequate provision;

but beyond this, if I mistake not the judgment and will of the

people, a reunion with the States from which we have separated

is neither practicable nor desirable. To increase the power,

develop the resources, and promote the happiness of the

Confederacy, it is requisite that there should be so much of

homogeneity that the welfare of every portion shall be the aim

of the whole. When this does not exist, antagonisms are

engendered which must and should result in separation.

"Actuated solely by the desire to preserve our own rights, and

promote our own welfare, the separation by the Confederate

States has been marked by no aggression upon others, and

followed by no domestic convulsion. Our industrial pursuits have

received no check, the cultivation of our fields has progressed

as heretofore, and, even should we be involved in war, there

would be no considerable diminution in the production of the

staples which have constituted our exports, and in which the

commercial world has an interest scarcely less than our own.

This common interest of the producer and consumer can only be

interrupted by exterior force which would obstruct the

transmission of our staples to foreign markets--a course of

conduct which would be as unjust, as it would be detrimental, to

manufacturing and commercial interests abroad.

"Should reason guide the action of the Government from which we

have separated, a policy so detrimental to the civilized world,

the Northern States included, could not be dictated by even the

strongest desire to inflict injury upon us; but, if the contrary

should prove true, a terrible responsibility will rest upon it,

and the suffering of millions will bear testimony to the folly

and wickedness of our aggressors. In the mean time there will

remain to us, besides the ordinary means before suggested, the

well known resources for retaliation upon the commerce of an

enemy.

"Experience in public stations, of subordinate grade to this

which your kindness has conferred, has taught me that toil and

care and disappointment are the price of official elevation. You

will see many errors to forgive, many deficiencies to tolerate;

but you shall not find in me either want of zeal or fidelity to

the cause that is to me the highest in hope, and of most

enduring affection. Your generosity has bestowed upon me an

undeserved distinction, one which I neither sought nor desired.

Upon the continuance of that sentiment, and upon your wisdom and

patriotism, I rely to direct and support me in the performance

of the duties required at my hands.

"We have changed the constituent parts, but not the system of

government. The Constitution framed by our fathers is that of

these Confederate States. In their exposition of it, and in the

judicial construction it has received, we have a light which

reveals its true meaning.

"Thus instructed as to the true meaning and just interpretation

of that instrument, and ever remembering that all offices are

but trusts held for the people, and that powers delegated are to

be strictly construed, I will hope by due diligence in the

performance of my duties, though I may disappoint your

expectations, yet to retain, when retiring, something of the

good-will and confidence which welcome my entrance into office.

"It is joyous in the midst of perilous times to look around upon

a people united in heart, where one purpose of high resolve

animates and actuates the whole; where the sacrifices to be made

are not weighed in the balance against honor and right and

liberty and equality. Obstacles may retard, but they can not

long prevent, the progress of a movement sanctified by its

justice and sustained by a virtuous people. Reverently let us

invoke the God of our Fathers to guide and protect us in our

efforts to perpetuate the principles which by his blessing they

were able to vindicate, establish, and transmit to their

posterity. With the continuance of his favor ever gratefully

acknowledged, we may hopefully look forward to success, to

peace, and to prosperity."

Note, _relative to the Election of President of the Confederate States

under the Provisional Constitution, and some Other Subjects referred to

in the Foregoing Chapters._

Statements having been made, seeming to imply that I was a candidate

"for the Presidency of the Confederate States; that my election was the

result of a misunderstanding, or of accidental complications"; and also

that I held "extreme views," and entertained at that period an

inadequate conception of the magnitude of the war probably to be waged,

information on the subject has been contributed by several distinguished

members of the Provisional Congress, who still survive. From a number of

their letters which have been published, the annexed extracts are given,

parts being omitted which refer to matters not of historical interest.

From a communication of the Hon. Alexander M. Clayton, of Mississippi,

to the Memphis "Appeal" of June 21, 1870:

"... I was at the time a member of the Provisional Congress from

Mississippi. Believing that Mr. Davis was the choice of the

South for the position of President, before repairing to

Montgomery I addressed him a letter to ascertain if he would

accept it. He replied that it was not the place he desired;

that, if he could have his choice, he would greatly prefer to be

in active service as commander-in-chief of the army, but that he

would give himself to the cause in any capacity whatever. That

was the only letter of which I have any knowledge that he wrote

on the subject, and that was shown to only a very few persons,

and only when I was asked if Mr. Davis would accept the

presidency....

"There was no electioneering, no management, on the part of any

one. Each voter was left to determine for himself in whose hands

the destinies of the infant Confederacy should be placed. By a

law as fixed as gravitation itself, and as little disturbed by

outside influences, the minds of members centered upon Mr.

Davis.

"After a few days of anxious, intense labor, the Provisional

Constitution was framed, and it became necessary to give it

vitality by putting some one at the head of the new

Government....

"Without any effort on the part of the friends of either

[Messrs. Davis or Stephens], the election was made without the

slightest dissent. Of the accidental complications referred to,

I have not the least knowledge, and always thought that the

election of Mr. Davis arose from the spontaneous conviction of

his peculiar fitness. I have consulted no one on the subject,

and have appended my name only to avoid resting an important

fact upon anonymous authority. Very respectfully yours,"

(Signed) "Alexander M. Clayton."

From the Hon. J. A. P. Campbell, of Mississippi, now a Justice of the

Supreme Court of that State:

"... If there was a delegate from Mississippi, or any other

State, who was opposed to the election of Jefferson Davis as

President of the Confederate States, I never heard of the fact.

I had the idea that Mr. Davis did not desire to be President,

and preferred to be in the military service, but no other man

was spoken of for President within my hearing....

"It is within my personal knowledge that the statement of the

interview, that Mr. Davis did not have a just appreciation of

the serious character of the contest between the seceding States

and the Union, is wholly untrue. Mr. Davis, more than any man I

ever heard talk on the subject, had a correct apprehension of

the consequences of secession and of the magnitude of the war to

be waged to coerce the seceding States. While at Montgomery, he

expressed the belief that heavy fighting must occur, and that

Virginia was to be the chief battle-ground. Years prior to

secession, in his address before the Legislature and people of

Mississippi, Mr. Davis had earnestly advised extensive

preparation for the possible contingency of secession.

"After the formation of the Confederate States, he was far in

advance of the Constitutional Convention and the Provisional

Congress, and, as I believe, of any man in it, in his views of

the gravity of the situation and the probable extent and

duration of the war, and of the provision which should be made

for the defense of the seceding States. Before secession, Mr.

Davis thought war would result from it; and, after secession, he

expressed the view that the war commenced would be an extensive

one. What he may have thought at a later day than the early part

of 1862, I do not know; but it is inconceivable that the

'interview' can be correct as to that.

"The idea that Mr. Davis was so 'extreme' in his views is a new

one. He was extremely conservative on the subject of secession.

"The suggestion that Mississippi would have preferred General

Toombs or Mr. Cobb for President has no foundation in fact. My

opinion is, that no man could have obtained a single vote in the

Mississippi delegation against Mr. Davis, who was then, as he is

now, the most eminent and popular of all the citizens of

Mississippi.... Very respectfully,"

(Signed) "J. A. P. Campbell."

From the Hon. Duncan F. Kenner, of Louisiana:

"....My recollections of what transpired at the time are very

vivid and positive....

"Who should be President, was the absorbing question of the day.

It engaged the attention of all present, and elicited many

letters from our respective constituencies. The general

inclination was strongly in favor of Mr. Davis. In fact, no

other name was so prominently or so generally mentioned. The

name of Mr. Rhett, of South Carolina, was probably more

frequently mentioned than that of any other person, next to Mr.

Davis.

"The rule adopted at our election was that each State should

have one vote, to be delivered in open session, _viva voce_, by

one of the delegates as spokesman for his colleagues. The

delegates of the different States met in secret session to

select their candidate and spokesman.

"Of what occurred in these various meetings I can not speak

authoritatively as to other States, as their proceedings were

considered secret. I can speak positively, however, of what took

place at a meeting of the delegates from Louisiana. We, the

Louisiana delegates, without hesitation, and unanimously, after

a very short session, decided in favor of Mr. Davis. No other

name was mentioned; the claims of no one else were considered,

or even alluded to. There was not the slightest opposition to

Mr. Davis on the part of any of our delegation; certainly none

was expressed; all appeared enthusiastic in his favor, and, I

have no reason to doubt, felt so. Nor was the feeling induced by

any solicitation on the part of Mr. Davis or his friends. Mr.

Davis was not in or near Montgomery at the time. He was never

heard from on this subject, so far as I knew. He was never

announced as a candidate. We were seeking the best man to fill

the position, and the conviction at the time, in the minds of a

large majority of the delegates, that Mr. Davis was the best

qualified, from both his civil and military knowledge and

experience, induced many to look upon Mr. Davis as the best

selection that could be made.

"This conviction, coupled with his well-recognized conservative

views--for in no sense did we consider Mr. Davis extreme, either

in his views or purposes--was the deciding consideration which

controlled the votes of the Louisiana delegation. Of this I have

not the least doubt. I remain, respectfully, very truly yours,

etc."

(Signed) "Duncan F. Kenner."

From the Hon. James Chesnut, of South Carolina:

".... Before leaving home I had made up my mind as to who was

the fittest man to be President, and who to be Vice-President;

Mr. Davis for the first, and Mr. Stephens for the second. And

this was known to all my friends as well as to my colleagues.

"Mr. Davis, then conspicuous for ability, had long experience in

civil service, was reputed a most successful organizer and

administrator of the military department of the United States

when he was Secretary of War, and came out of the Mexican war

with much _éclat_ as a soldier. Possessing a combination of

these high and needful qualities, he was regarded by nearly the

whole South as the fittest man for the position. I certainly so

regarded him, and did not change my mind on the way to

Montgomery....

"Georgia was a great State--great in numbers, comparatively

great in wealth, and great in the intellectual gifts and

experiences of many of her sons. Conspicuous among them were

Stephens, Toombs, and Cobb. In view of these facts, it was

thought by all of us expedient--nay, more, positively right and

just--that Georgia should have a corresponding weight in the

counsels and conduct of the new Government.

"Mr. Stephens was also a man of conceded ability, of high

character, conservative, devoted to the rights of the States,

and known to be a power in his own State; hence all eyes turned

to him to fill the second place.

"Howell Cobb became President of the Convention, and General

Toombs Secretary of State. These two gifted Georgians were

called to these respective positions because of their

experience, ability, and ardent patriotism....

"Mr. Rhett was a very bold and frank man. So was Colonel Keitt;

and they, as always, avowed their opinions and acted upon them

with energy. Nevertheless, the vote of the delegation was cast

for Mr. Davis...."

(Signed) "James Chesnut."

From the Hon. W. Porcher Miles, of Virginia, formerly of South Carolina,

and a member of the Provisional Congress of 1861:

"Oak Ridge, _January 27, 1880_.

"....To the best of my recollection there was entire unanimity

in the South Carolina delegation at Montgomery on the subject of

the choice of a President. I think it very likely that Keitt,

from his warm personal friendship for Mr. Toombs, may at first

have preferred him. I have no recollections of Chesnut's

predilections. I think there was no question that Mr. Davis was

the choice of our delegation and of the whole people of South

Carolina.... I do not think Mr. Rhett ever attempted to

influence the course of his colleagues, either in this or in

matters generally before the Congress. Nor do I think his

personal influence in the delegation was as great as that of

some other members of it. If I were to select any one as having

a special influence with us, I would consider Mr. Robert

Barnwell as the one. His singularly pure and elevated character,

entire freedom from all personal ambition or desire for place or

position (he declined Mr. Davis's offer of a seat in the

Cabinet), as well as his long experience in public life and

admirably calm and well-balanced mind, all combined to make his

influence with his colleagues very great. But neither could he

be said 'to lead' the delegation. He had no desire, and never

made any attempt to do so. I think there was no delegation in

the Congress, the individual members of which were more

independent in coming to their own conclusions of what was right

and expedient to be done. There was always the frankest and

freest interchange of opinions among them, but every one

determined his own course for himself."

[Footnote 123: See Appendix K.]

CHAPTER VI.

The Confederate Cabinet.

After being inaugurated, I proceeded to the formation of my Cabinet,

that is, the heads of the executive departments authorized by the laws

of the Provisional Congress. The unanimity existing among our people

made this a much easier and more agreeable task than where the rivalries

in the party of an executive have to be consulted and accommodated,

often at the expense of the highest capacity and fitness. Unencumbered

by any other consideration than the public welfare, having no friends to

reward or enemies to punish, it resulted that not one of those who

formed my first Cabinet had borne to me the relation of close personal

friendship, or had political claims upon me; indeed, with two of them I

had no previous acquaintance.

It was my wish that the Hon. Robert W. Barnwell, of South Carolina,

should be Secretary of State. I had known him intimately during a trying

period of our joint service in the United States Senate, and he had won

alike my esteem and regard. Before making known to him my wish in this

connection, the delegation of South Carolina, of which he was a member,

had resolved to recommend one of their number to be Secretary of the

Treasury, and Mr. Barnwell, with characteristic delicacy, declined to

accept my offer to him.

I had intended to offer the Treasury Department to Mr. Toombs, of

Georgia, whose knowledge on subjects of finance had particularly

attracted my notice when we served together in the United States Senate.

Mr. Barnwell having declined the State Department, and a colleague of

his, said to be peculiarly qualified for the Treasury Department, having

been recommended for it, Mr. Toombs was offered the State Department,

for which others believed him to be well qualified.

Mr. Mallory, of Florida, had been chairman of the Committee on Naval

Affairs in the United States Senate, was extensively acquainted with the

officers of the navy, and for a landsman had much knowledge of nautical

affairs; therefore he was selected for Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Benjamin, of Louisiana, had a very high reputation as a lawyer, and

my acquaintance with him in the Senate had impressed me with the

lucidity of his intellect, his systematic habits and capacity for labor.

He was therefore invited to the post of Attorney-General.

Mr. Reagan, of Texas, I had known for a sturdy, honest Representative in

the United States Congress, and his acquaintance with the territory

included in the Confederate States was both extensive and accurate.

These, together with his industry and ability to labor, indicated him as

peculiarly fit for the office of Postmaster-General.

Mr. Memminger, of South Carolina, had a high reputation for knowledge of

finance. He bore an unimpeachable character for integrity and close

attention to duties, and, on the recommendation of the delegation from

South Carolina, he was appointed Secretary of the Treasury, and proved

himself entirely worthy of the trust.

Mr. Walker, of Alabama, was a distinguished member of the bar of north

Alabama, and was eminent among the politicians of that section. He was

earnestly recommended by gentlemen intimately and favorably known to me,

and was therefore selected for the War Department. His was the only name

presented from Alabama.

The executive departments having been organized, my attention was first

directed to preparation for military defense, for, though I, in common

with others, desired to have a peaceful separation, and sent

commissioners to the United States Government to effect, if possible,

negotiations to that end, I did not hold the common opinion that we

would be allowed to depart in peace, and therefore regarded it as an

imperative duty to make all possible preparation for the contingency of

war.

CHAPTER VII.

Early Acts of the Confederate Congress.--Laws of the United

States continued in Force.--Officers of Customs and Revenue

continued in Office.--Commission to the United

States.--Navigation of the Mississippi.--Restrictions on the

Coasting-Trade removed.--Appointment of Commissioners to

Washington.

The legislation of the Confederate Congress furnishes the best evidence

of the temper and spirit which prevailed in the organization of the

Confederate Government. The very first enactment, made on the 9th of

February, 1861--the day after the adoption of the Provisional

Constitution--was this:

"That all the laws of the United States of America in force and

in use in the Confederate States of America on the first day of

November last, and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the

Confederate States, be and the same are hereby continued in

force until altered or repealed by the Congress."[124]

The next act, adopted on the 14th of February, was one continuing in

office until the 1st of April next ensuing all officers connected with

the collection of customs and the assistant treasurers intrusted with

the keeping of the moneys arising therefrom, who were engaged in the

performance of such duties within any of the Confederate States, with

the same powers and functions which they had been exercising under the

Government of the United States.[125]

The Provisional Constitution itself, in the second section of its sixth

article, had ordained as follows:

"The Government hereby instituted shall take immediate steps for

the settlement of all matters between the States forming it and

their other late confederates of the United States, in relation

to the public property and public debt at the time of their

withdrawal from them; these States hereby declaring it to be

their wish and earnest desire to adjust everything pertaining to

the common property, common liabilities, and common obligations

of that Union, upon the principles of right, justice, equity,

and good faith."[126]

In accordance with this requirement of the Constitution, the Congress,

on the 15th of February--before my arrival at Montgomery--passed a

resolution declaring "that it is the sense of this Congress that a

commission of three persons be appointed by the President-elect, as

early as may be convenient after his inauguration, and sent to the

Government of the United States of America, for the purpose of

negotiating friendly relations between that Government and the

Confederate States of America, and for the settlement of all questions

of disagreement between the two Governments, upon principles of right,

justice, equity, and good faith."[127]

Persistent and to a great extent successful efforts were made to inflame

the minds of the people of the Northwestern States by representing to

them that, in consequence of the separation of the States, they would

lose the free navigation of the Mississippi River. At that early period

in the life of the Confederacy, the intercourse between the North and

South had been so little interrupted, that the agitators, whose vocation

it was to deceive the masses of the people, could not, or should not,

have been ignorant that, as early as the 25th of February, 1861, an act

was passed by the Confederate Congress, and approved by the President,

"to declare and establish the free navigation of the Mississippi River."

That act began with the announcement that "the peaceful navigation of

the Mississippi River is hereby declared free to the citizens of any of

the States upon its borders, or upon the borders of its navigable

tributaries," and its provisions secure that freedom for "all ships,

boats, or vessels," with their cargoes, "without any duty or hindrance,

except light-money, pilotage, and other like charges."[128]

By an act approved on the 26th of February, all laws which forbade the

employment in the coasting-trade of vessels not enrolled or licensed,

and all laws imposing discriminating duties on foreign vessels or goods

imported in them, were repealed.[129] These acts and all other

indications manifest the well-known wish of the people of the

Confederacy to preserve the peace and encourage the most unrestricted

commerce with all nations, surely not least with their late associates,

the Northern States. Thus far, the hope that peace might be maintained

was predominant; perhaps, the wish was father to the thought that there

would be no war between the States lately united. Indeed, all the laws

enacted during the first session of the Provisional Congress show how

consistent were the purposes and actions of its members with their

original avowal of a desire peacefully to separate from those with whom

they could not live in tranquillity, albeit the Government had been

established to promote the common welfare. Under this state of feeling

the Government of the Confederacy was instituted.

My own views and inclinations, as has already been fully shown, were in

entire accord with the disposition manifested by the requirement of the

Provisional Constitution and the resolution of the Congress above

recited, for the appointment of a commission to negotiate friendly

relations with the United States and an equitable and peaceable

settlement of all questions which would necessarily arise under the new

relations of the States toward one another. Next to the organization of

a Cabinet, that of such a commission was accordingly one of the very

first objects of attention. Three discreet, well-informed, and

distinguished citizens were selected as said Commissioners, and

accredited to the President of the Northern States, Mr. Lincoln, to the

end that by negotiation all questions between the two Governments might

be so adjusted as to avoid war, and perpetuate the kind relations which

had been cemented by the common trials, sacrifices, and glories of the

people of all the States. If sectional hostility had been engendered by

dissimilarity of institutions, and by a mistaken idea of moral

responsibilities, and by irreconcilable creeds--if the family could no

longer live and grow harmoniously together--by patriarchal teaching

older than Christianity, it might have been learned that it was better

to part, to part peaceably, and to continue, from one to another, the

good offices of neighbors who by sacred memories were forbidden ever to

be foes. The nomination of the members of the commission was made on the

25th of February--within a week after my inauguration--and confirmed by

Congress on the same day. The Commissioners appointed were Messrs. A. B.

Roman, of Louisiana; Martin J. Crawford, of Georgia; and John Forsyth,

of Alabama. Mr. Roman was an honored citizen, and had been Governor of

his native State. Mr. Crawford had served with distinction in Congress

for several years. Mr. Forsyth was an influential journalist, and had

been Minister to Mexico under appointment of Mr. Pierce near the close

of his term, and continued so under that of Mr. Buchanan. These

gentlemen, moreover, represented the three great parties which had

ineffectually opposed the sectionalism of the so-called "Republicans."

Ex-Governor Roman had been a Whig in former years, and one of the

"Constitutional Union," or Bell-and-Everett, party in the canvass of

1860. Mr. Crawford, as a State-rights Democrat, had supported Mr.

Breckinridge; and Mr. Forsyth had been a zealous advocate of the claims

of Mr. Douglas. The composition of the commission was therefore such as

should have conciliated the sympathy and coöperation of every element of

conservatism with which they might have occasion to deal. Their

commissions authorized and empowered them, "in the name of the

Confederate States, to meet and confer with any person or persons duly

authorized by the Government of the United States, being furnished with

like power and authority, and with him or them to agree, treat, consult,

and negotiate" concerning all matters in which the parties were both

interested. No secret instructions were given them, for there was

nothing to conceal. The objects of their mission were open and avowed,

and its inception and conduct throughout were characterized by frankness

and good faith. How this effort was received, how the Commissioners were

kept waiting, and, while fair promises were held to the ear, how

military preparations were pushed forward for the unconstitutional,

criminal purpose of coercing States, let the shameful record of that

transaction attest.

[Footnote 124: Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, Confederate

States of America, p. 27.]

[Footnote 125: Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, Confederate

States of America, pp. 27, 28.]

[Footnote 126: See Provisional Constitution, Appendix K, _in loco_.]

[Footnote 127: Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, Confederate

States of America, p. 92.]

[Footnote 128: Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, Confederate

States of America, pp. 36-38.]

[Footnote 129: Ibid., p. 38.]