THE UNITY OF COMMAND.
Was it necessary?--Was a French Generalissimo inevitable?--Our share in
the guiding of the last phase of the campaign--Points on which the
British had their way.
The "unity of command" achieved in the Spring of 1918 caused hardly a
ripple of comment at G.H.Q. Some days after it had happened we learned
that Lord Milner (then Secretary of State for War) had been over, and
that, with the approval of Lord Haig, Field Marshal Foch had become
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.
I suppose that in their secret hearts many officers felt a little sad
that the honour of the united command had not fallen to a British
General. But there was no question as to the wisdom of the choice nor as
to the wisdom of the step itself. It was one of the early misfortunes of
the campaign that the British Government in 1914 had insisted very
strongly on keeping our Army as an absolutely independent unit in
France. The reasons, one may presume, were political rather than
strategical; and that there was still some remnant of the old prejudice
against "continental entanglements." I do not suppose that if the issue
had been left to the soldiers themselves there would have been any doubt
but that the small auxiliary British Force would have "reported to" the
main French Army and acted under its direction. That would have been the
natural military course. But the position became more difficult as the
importance of the British Army grew. At the time that the united Command
was achieved the British Army was in fighting force an equal unit to the
French.
Two questions are often raised in connection with this decision of 1918:
Was it necessary? Was it inevitable that the united command should go to
Marshal Foch? Both questions may be answered with "yes;" though in each
case the "yes" needs to be qualified with some explanation.
[Illustration: AT THE CHIEF'S CHATEAU]
It is, for instance, hardly correct to say that the decision to unite
the command "won the war;" though it is probably correct that it
hastened the date of victory. Before it was achieved there was good
co-operation, though not perfect co-operation, between the Allied
Forces. After it was achieved there was maintained a certain
independence of outlook and of policy on the part of the British Command
which was a great factor in the speedy consummation of victory. If
that independence had not been maintained, the operations of 1918 would,
almost certainly, not have been so gloriously decisive. This aspect of
the final campaign has never been discussed to my knowledge, yet a
knowledge of it is important if the events of 1918 are to be viewed in
their proper perspective.
I suppose the average "man in the street" takes the view that early in
1918, the British Army, which had been blundering along up till then,
was put under French Command and straightway the war was won. But it was
not at all like that. The British Army command, whilst giving the most
loyal support to the French Generalissimo and bowing to his decisions
when they were finally made, read it as its duty still to keep a share
in the conduct of the campaign; and in many most important conclusions
it upheld its own view as against the French view. The final result in
some matters showed that the British view was the right view, and that
if it had not been taken the victorious advance would not have been
possible.
In an earlier chapter I have given the facts about the forage ration. It
was not exactly a matter of the first importance, some may say. But if
the French view had been accepted and the British and American horse
ration had come down to the French level our horse transport would not
have been able to carry on as wonderfully as it did from August to
November, 1918. As things were, it had nothing to spare during the last
week, as our pursuing troops can tell. The French with their logical
minds argued that if their horses could do with a certain ration, ours
could. In this case the apparently logical conclusion was not the sound
one; for it left out of consideration some factors--as to whether we did
not use our horses more, and as to whether our men could get, or would
try to get, the same work out of ill-fed horses. In this matter it was
well for the Allied cause that the British had their way.
In another matter logic threatened to lead to a step which might have
proved disastrous. The French saw, as the logical corollary of the
united command, a union, a pooling of all the supply and transport
departments. Not only should the Armies fight under one strategical
direction but they should share and share alike all their resources. A
decision to this effect was actually come to, the Americans agreeing
with the French view. It was logical without a shadow of doubt. But
British common-sense recognised that if this radical reorganisation were
attempted in 1918 it would be 1920 before the Alliance would have been
ready for a great Push. The British Army--let it be confessed with
appropriate candour and shamefacedness--was much more exigent in its
demands than the French. It needed, or thought it needed, more food,
more clothing, more comforts, more ammunition, more transport. It had
evolved for itself during the campaign a system of "housekeeping" which
was over-liberal, perhaps, as compared with the French, but which was
mainly a result of the generosity of the Home people, and was so deeply
rooted in our Army organisation that to have torn it up in 1918 would
have caused all kinds of trouble.
In June, 1918, the "Executive Inter-Allied Committee on Supply" was
formed by an agreement between the French and the American governments,
to which the British government at first (apparently) assented. It
was to take over control of all Supply, Storage, and Transport, and
to have executive functions, _i.e._, its decisions would be binding
on all the Armies. The British Command at once saw that this was
impracticable--that it was impossible in the very midst of the
preparations for the Great Push to throw into a common pool so much
of the actual equipment of the Army. The Allied Command was very
stubborn in supporting its plan. But in time British common-sense
proved stronger than abstract logic, and in July all was made happy
by a decision that the functions of the Board were to _advise_ on
matters of Supply and Storage and methods of utilising material, as far
as practicable, for the common benefit of the Allies. The Board, in
short, was to have its scope in assisting to maintain the excellent
understanding which already existed between the Armies of the Allies in
regard to Supplies and Services.
The position was not at all that the British Army wanted to wallow in
luxury whilst its Allies went short, for it was always willing to help
in every possible way; but that its command knew that the essentially
national system of "housekeeping" which had been set up, could not be
thrown down at an hour's notice without grave danger.
The same sort of problem was always cropping up on a smaller scale in
areas where French troops were fighting with the British. The French had
at first a logical aspiration for an identity of supply systems. Our
view was that when British and French troops were operating together, it
was not possible to serve both from a common stock, nor by a common
railway service. Ammunition and Supplies differed in almost every
respect, and the systems of Supply could not be identical. Except in
regard to a few items, one Army could not supply the other
satisfactorily. Therefore, each Army should have its own depôts,
railheads, and--for the sorting of supplies--its own regulating
stations, which would receive from Base full trains loaded with
particular items of supply and send out to Divisions full trains loaded
with the necessary assortments of different items. Something could be
done in the way of pooling bulk stores, such as forage, coal, and
petrol; but for most things there must be different channels of supply.
British policy was that a British Force in a French area should provide
completely for its own maintenance, and organise its supply lines and
depôts accordingly. Ultimately it was recognised on both sides that this
was the only possible policy, and that the trouble of providing separate
regulating stations, separate railheads, and depôts must be faced. Any
half-way policy was seen to be fraught with too many possibilities of
dangerous failures.
To cite yet one more instance of the British policy proving the sounder:
In July, 1918, there were very strong indications that the German power
of offensive had passed its zenith and that the enemy might be forced
shortly to a great withdrawal. There was set on foot in the British Army
at the earliest opportunity an examination of the measures of Transport
and Supply which would become necessary if the Germans were forced to
withdraw their line. In 1916-1917 the enemy had been able to avoid, to a
great extent, the consequences of his defeats on the Somme and the Ancre
by retiring his line; a promptly effective pursuit was hindered by lack
of the necessary material on our part. A foreseeing preparation would
enable a better harvest of victory to be reaped if the position of
1916-1917 were reproduced in 1918. We wanted to be sure of being able to
follow up with about 2,000 tons of supplies per day per mile of front to
carry our troops over the Hindenburg Line.
There was found to be a divergence of view as to the best means of
following up. The French were inclined to put their faith chiefly in
light railways. The British idea was that light railways could be
overdone; that there was not a full appreciation of the modification in
the rôle of the light railway consequent on the change from trench to
moving warfare; that there was a tendency for light railways to attempt
to duplicate the work of broad-gauge railways; and a hint of a tendency
to look upon light railways as a substitute for, instead of a
reinforcement of, roads in the forward area.
The British "pursuit policy," to put it briefly, was to concentrate all
available labour on pushing forward with the broad-gauge railways and
the roads forward from them, trusting to motor transport and to horse
transport to pick up the burden from broad-gauge railhead. This was
maintained to be a superior policy to concentrating on light railways,
which could not allow so much freedom in lines of advance.
The British view prevailed in our sector, and in the Great Pursuit it
proved to be sound. The Germans were followed up on our sector of the
Front in really fine fashion. In the Somme sector of the Front between
August 8th and September 8th our broad-gauge railheads were pushed
forward an average of 30 miles. To these new railheads, all kinds of
traffic could go direct from the Base to meet there our Motor Transport
(and, of course, light railways; these were not neglected but given
secondary importance).
It was at first the French idea to "sandwich" the various Divisions of
the two Armies, to have a British Division or Corps side by side with a
French wherever possible. This again would have been a beautifully
logical illustration of the complete identity and fraternity of the two
armies, but it was not business. It multiplied difficulties of
administration, and it was finally abandoned, much to the advantage of
the common cause.
These matters I cite not with the idea of deprecating the French General
Staff--there were presumably as many instances in which their view was
right and ours was wrong--but to show that it is not fair to our G.H.Q.
to assume, as many do assume, that the British High Command had little
or nothing to do with the planning of the great victory. Marshal Foch is
prompt to resent that view when it is obtruded. He would, without a
doubt, agree that the British were most loyal in service, and also very
independent and stubborn (and often prevailing) in council. Probably
looking back upon the great victory which was won under his _bâton_ he
is profoundly grateful that the British were so forthright in helping to
keep the Allied operations on the best track.
The other question, asked at the beginning of this chapter, needs to be
explained. Was it inevitable that Marshal Foch should be chosen as
Generalissimo? It is quite certain that no other choice was possible in
view of all the circumstances. There is no need to come to the question
of who was the more renowned soldier, or to argue that if Lord Haig had
been given the same chance he would probably have achieved the same
result. Personally I think that the British Army in 1918 was in respect
of Generalship as in other respects equal to any in the Field. But that
was not the issue. We were fighting on French soil and had to demand
great sacrifices from the French civilian population, which a French
Generalissimo could best get. It was quite certain that the British Army
would fight with exactly the same enthusiasm under a French
Generalissimo; it was not possible to be so certain that the French Army
would under a British Generalissimo.
There was no contested election for the post. Lord Haig as well as
General Pershing supported Marshal Foch's claims. It was the work and
not the glory of the work which was the first consideration.
[Illustration: "SOMEWHERE IN FRANCE"]