THE COMING OF VICTORY.
The June Position--German attempts to pinch out our lines of
supplies--The attacks on hospitals--The glorious last 14 weeks--G.H.Q.'s
share.
By June, 1918, it was fairly evident that the German attack to drive the
British to the sea had exhausted itself. The enemy had attempted to push
through along the Somme line, separating the British and the French
Armies. Foiled in that by the stubborn defence in front of Amiens, he
tried a push towards the Channel ports, which really gave more anxiety
at G.H.Q. than the earlier move, for there we were working on such a
very narrow margin of safety that every yard lost was a grave peril.
The final effort of the enemy was to pinch us out of territory which he
could not push us out of, and this effort, though it led to no great
battles, was a very serious menace. During the month of June there was
not a day's respite from the pertinacious efforts of the enemy to
strangle our arteries of supply. Having arrived, at some places, within
range of our front lateral railway line, the enemy sought by continuous
bombardments to stop or at least hamper traffic, at the same time
constantly attacking with aircraft our rear lateral railway line at its
most sensitive points, the Somme and the Canche crossings. The ports of
entry and the supply depôts were also repeatedly attacked.
Inconvenience--serious at times--and loss followed from these attacks,
but there was never an actual stoppage of essential traffic. Provision
had been made to prevent any blows that the enemy was able to deliver
being really effective Alternative avoiding lines took up promptly the
task of broken channels of traffic, and strenuous work in repair and
good emergency organisation prevented congestion ever reaching the stage
of paralysis. At one time during this month it was necessary to stop for
a few days all but absolutely essential traffic from North to South.
That was the limit of the enemy's success, though he was aided in some
degree by an influenza epidemic (which sadly reduced the supply of
labour for railway and dock work).
One line of German tactics at this time was rather "over the edge" as
Tommy put it. That was to attack the Base hospitals by aircraft. One at
Etaples was set on fire and destroyed. There is, I admit, some room for
a shadow of a doubt as to whether the German deliberately attacked the
hospitals or only accidentally. That shadow of a doubt must be granted,
because it was a fact that several of our hospitals were near to large
railway junctions and camps, though always clearly marked and separated
from other military installations. I am not prepared to question the
good faith of those who give the Germans the benefit of the doubt,
though I cannot agree with them. The attacks on the hospitals came in
June, just when the Germans concentrated their strategy on trying to
cripple our means of supply. They inflicted grave embarrassment on our
resources, for, at a time when material was very short and lines of
transport fearfully congested, we had to construct new hospitals and
move patients and staffs. A note made in July on the point reads:
"Good progress is being made with the transfer to other areas of
hospitals which were rendered necessary by enemy aircraft attacks.
Though there is very little doubt possible that the enemy does not
intend to respect hospitals, wherever they may be sited, in his bombing
raids, the precaution is being taken of choosing new hospital sites well
away from any point of military importance. No hospital will be
established near military camps, important railway junctions, or
bridges."
If it was by a series of accidents that the Germans succeeded in hitting
a number of hospitals in June, 1918, they were singularly fruitful
accidents for him. The difference, from a "results" point of view, in
bombing a camp and a hospital is this: if you bomb a camp you kill a few
men but the camp does not move; if you bomb a hospital you kill a few
patients, nurses, and doctors, and you force the hospital to move, if it
can move, to an apparently safer place.
* * * * *
In June there was cause for anxiety in the whole supply position. Seeing
that the existence of the armies depended on maintaining to the full the
huge rate of supply which modern war demands, and that the enemy was
obviously trying immediately behind our lines the policy (which was
exactly the same as the policy of his submarine campaign) of pinching
out lines of supply, it was judicious to try to extend the margin of
safety. One way of effecting this which was explored was to extend
"Lines of Communication" to England, and to keep in England at places
handy for shipment to France one half the reserve stores of the Army. In
most items the Army worked on a month's reserve margin. The storing of
this month's reserve in the comparatively narrow strip of France which
we held, subject to constant bombing, was becoming a matter of extreme
difficulty. The retreat of the Germans began, however, before any
definite steps in the direction of setting up reserve stores on the
coast of England were taken.
There was no idea that the enemy was going to collapse so suddenly.
G.H.Q. expected to drive him back to the Hindenburg line in 1918 and to
finish him off in 1919. In the middle of July, 1918, the matter was
before the General Staff with the discussion of plans founded on the
postulate that the Germans might withdraw to the Hindenburg line, and
that a prompt following up in full force was intended. An instruction to
the Director General of Transportation asked for facts as to new railway
material that would be needed in such a contingency. The problem of
effective pursuit, it was recognised, would be largely one of Supplies
and Transport. If our Army could be brought up to the new German line
promptly, and maintained there with all the means of vigorous attack,
all kinds of pleasant results might be hoped for. But nobody really was
so optimistic as to think that the enemy would throw in his hand before
the winter. But we prepared for the best as well as for the worst.
The task of getting ready to put Pas de Calais in ruins in case of a
German advance was pleasantly interrupted by the now more urgent task of
getting ready to follow up the enemy with horse, foot, artillery, and
with some scores of thousand of tons of supplies daily. The fruits of
this were reaped in August, when all agreed that the troops had been
well followed up. Cases of real hardships were very rare. Some admirably
prompt work was done in railway construction, road restoration, and
canal clearing. One great main road was opened to traffic two hours
after its capture. Traffic on the Albert line was restored to Corbie and
Heilly the day after capture. The water supply difficulty was great, and
in many cases water for both men and horses had to be sent up by motor
and pack transport. But on the territory won our old water bores were
found in most cases intact, and were promptly restored to usefulness by
the R.E. Baths and laundries followed in close contact with our
advancing troops, and with them in some cases harvesting machinery to
win from waste the crops.
But that, whilst preparing for all possibilities, we were not such
optimists as to believe in an Autumn victory, is shown by the fact that
arrangements were well in hand to secure suitable training areas for the
British troops during the Winter, 1918-1919. For the previous two years,
circumstances had not allowed the British Forces adequate opportunities
for re-training. But, with the character of the war changing radically,
it was thought necessary that they should have opportunities to carry
out extensive training programmes in offensive operations of quick
movement during the Winter. Adequate manoeuvre areas for each Army
close behind its Front were sought. It is a coincidence that just after
this matter was put in hand military experts on the enemy side were
comforting their newspapers with arguments that the new style of Tank
attack evolved by the British required very special training of the
infantry, and that it could not be expected that any large proportion of
the British Army had, or could have, the necessary training.
G.H.Q., when the critical history of the war comes to be written, will
surely win high praise for its 1918 work. It took a hard knock in the
early Spring and was faced simultaneously with the tasks of holding on,
of re-organising a shattered railway system, of training and equipping
reinforcements from America and from our own distant Fronts, of
preparing for the effective destruction of Pas de Calais, and of
organising new lines of supply in case a further retreat was inevitable.
From these tasks it had to switch off suddenly to prepare for a great
pursuit instead of a great retreat, and did so with such skill and care
as the result showed.
How wonderfully, too, the successive blows of the British Army were
timed and driven home! As Marshal Foch recognised, it needed supremely
good staff work on the part of the British to control that deadly
rhythm. Beginning on August 8th, 1918, in four days the British Army
cleared the enemy from the Amiens Front. That restored our old lateral
line Boulogne-Amiens-Paris and added enormously to our transport
strength. We could now hit towards the north, and from the 21st to 31st
August we fought the last and most happy battle of the Somme, driving
the enemy to the east of the river. His position then was attacked
concurrently from the north, and by September 3rd he was back on the
Hindenburg line, and our Army, flushed with victory and its supply lines
working admirably, simply could not be stopped. The bustled enemy did
his best to make a stand on the Hindenburg line, and shortened his front
so as to allow of a stronger holding there, leaving to us without a
battle all of Belgium that he had won in the Spring offensive. But that
gave us a new railway advantage, and on September 18th, 1918, the Battle
of Epéhy carried the advanced posts of the Hindenburg line.
Quickly the home thrust followed. Between September 27th and October
10th the German centre was shattered and the rest of the campaign on our
Front was merely a matter of "mopping up." From August 8th to November
11th the British Army took 188,700 prisoners and 2,840 guns. (The
French, American and Belgian armies combined took 196,800 prisoners and
3,775 guns during the same period). When the Armistice was signed on
November 11th, the British Army was still full of fight and it had still
the means for a further advance, though its horse transport was very
weary and the men were having a really hard time in regard to rations
and water. But it is safe to say that it was in better plight than any
of the other armies.
How different November, 1918, from November, 1914! In 1914 so far as the
British nation at large was concerned it was a time of desperate shifts
and expedients. The lame and the halt and the blind who had fallen out
of the Regular ranks in olden days had come back to train recruits for
the New Armies. A great new industry of munition-making was being
founded. It had to make its machines and its tools before it could make
guns and shell. So far as the Army in the Field was concerned it held on
against heavy odds and with the scantiest supply of shell to answer the
well-supplied German Artillery. Whilst the Germans could send a deluge
of shells over we could reply with a bare sprinkle. And we had our cooks
and batmen fighting in the trenches whilst the Germans were confidently
calculating that the plan of training a new British Army had been
irretrievably compromised by the heavy losses which the British Regular
Army had suffered, and that a descent on the English coast with a very
small force would be sufficient to occupy London and end the war.
There is a legend that the German military plan from the Battle of Mons
to the Battle of the Marne in 1914 was prejudiced by the "political"
consideration of a desire to crush the British Army out of existence;
that to the attack upon the British detachment were devoted forces and
energies out of proportion to its military importance. A part, though
not an essential part, of this legend is the story of the Kaiser's
reference to the "contemptible little army" of Britain. Perhaps the
truth or otherwise of this legend will be established when there is a
full disclosure of events from the German side. It is not unreasonable
in itself, for the presence of the Kaiser with the German Army, and the
presence of his sons, without a doubt interfered often with the military
dispositions of his generals. In an earlier campaign (that of Napoleon
against Russia in 1812) a condition precedent to the ultimate Russian
success was that the Czar Alexander should leave his army to its
commanders, because he could not act as General-in-Chief himself, and
whilst he was with the Army no one else could. The German Kaiser's
emotional hatred of the British might well have led to an unbalanced
effort against the British Force.
In 1918 it was not the vanguard of a "contemptible little Army" that
heard the "cease fire" at Mons. It was an Army 64 Divisions strong, and
in all the fighting from August 8th, 1918, to November 11th, 1918,
those Divisions had been winning great battles from superior numbers of
German Divisions. At the Battle of Amiens we had 16 Divisions to the
German's 20 Divisions; at the Battle of Bapaume our 23 Divisions faced
35 German Divisions; at the decisive Battle of Cambrai-St. Quentin our
38 Divisions, with two American Divisions, drove 45 German Divisions out
of the Hindenburg line.
November 11th, 1918, saw the culmination of a great military
achievement. Of the glory of this achievement the chief share must go to
the British soldier, whose cheerful and imperturbable courage and
individual intelligence made him a perfect instrument of warfare; but a
large share remains for the guiding brain of British generalship in the
Field, with its centre at G.H.Q.
THE END.
Printed by WHITEHEAD BROS., WOLVERHAMPTON.
APPENDIX.
M. Henri Potez, in a farewell article in _Le Journal de Montreuil_ (30th
March, 1919), paid the following eloquent tribute to G.H.Q.:--
"We know indeed that quite a host of painters, coming from beyond
the Channel, have sung the praises of our familiar surroundings, of
our clear and happy countryside, of our changing light. Montreuil,
little by little, was becoming a kind of English Barbizon.
"Then the War broke out. The presence of the General Headquarters
of our Allies made of Montreuil, so to speak, the brain of the
British Army. What with telegraphic and telephonic lines, and
wireless telegraphy installations, a whole collection of nervous
threads radiated from Montreuil, carrying incessantly news and
orders. For some months we have been one of the mysterious centres
of the great epic. And the silhouette of the Supreme Chief has
often been marked on our vast horizons. Our heroes have appreciated
the loyalty and the bravery of our Allies on the fields of battle.
Side by side the two nations have withstood the most terrible
trials in defence of the same ideal. The two great liberal peoples
of the West have been the martyrs of Right and of Civilization. At
the time of the heavy offensives in Artois, we have seen the
splendid troops, who, having set out full of animation and
enthusiasm, returned to their camps reduced to mere handfuls of
men. These are the memories that can never be forgotten.
"Behind the front, the civilian populations have, on many
occasions, praised the affability of our friends, their courtesy
and their liberality. War has its exigencies; but it must be
recognised that they have shown the best of goodwill to mitigate
them. Their kindness on several occasions towards the old people
and the children, who had flocked here before the tempest of war,
has often been manifested.
"Let us not forget, either, in our farewell compliments, and our
wishes for a safe return, those of our Allies who have been
represented here by the Missions--Americans, Italians, and
Belgians. It is more than desirable, it is necessary, that the
great union of the West should outlast the war. It is necessary
that the differences and divergencies which may be brought about by
the settlement of this crisis should not be allowed to embitter or
envenom; but that they should be treated, governed, and regulated
with moderation, kindness, and a reciprocal generosity. In that
lies the future of humanity.
"'You live at Montreuil,' a University man who was employed as an
Officer Interpreter at Lille, recently remarked to me; 'the English
speak of it as if it were a kind of magnificent country, a dream
city ... they like its peace, its originality, its memories.' Many
of those who have lived amongst us propose to pay us a return
visit. We shall receive them cordially. We also hope to see again,
in closed up ranks, the pacific Army of the olden days, that Army
which carried easels as its bucklers, and pencils and brushes as
its lances and halberds."
HENRI POTEZ.
[Illustration: MAP--VICTORY YEAR, THE SUCCESSIVE BRITISH FRONTS]
Philip Allan & Co., Publishers,
_To be Published shortly._
AN INVALUABLE REFERENCE BOOK.
A CONCISE CHRONICLE
OF EVENTS OF THE
GREAT WAR
BY
R. P. P. ROWE,
M.A. (Oxon), Captain, late of the Royal West Kent Regt., and of
the Military Intelligence Directorate.
This is a STANDARD WORK, which will find a place on every desk and every
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contain the VERBATIM TEXTS of the most important documents of the War.
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A FINE NOVEL.
The Barber of Putney
BY
J. B. MORTON.
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"A direct tale, grim, humorous, shrewd by turns, instinct with right
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TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
Apparent printer's errors have been retained, unless stated below.
Punctuation, capitalization and accents have largely been made
consistent.
Page 18, "Montrueil" changed to "Montreuil" for consistency. (In later
years of Anglo-French enmity Montreuil was Montreuil-sur-mer only in
name)
Page 75, "gun" changed to "guns". (The 18-pounder field guns would shoot
100,000 rounds on a normal day, and on a heavy day would use 200,000
rounds.)
Page 83, "cilicifuge" changed to "cimicifuge". (they are on the track of
the perfect cimicifuge which will keep lice off the body)
Page 205 "humourous" changed to "humorous" (annuals of a humorous kind)
Page 218 "suzerainity" changed to "suzerainty" (of admitting a German
suzerainty)
Page 240 "Barrés" changed to "Barès" ( Colonel Barès, Chief of the)