with wounded cavalrymen, we found Sheridan, his headquarters
fixed on a conspicuous elevation, personally superintending from
the commencement the operations of the day. It was to be our
first battle under his command, as well as his first independent
battle; the troops were hitherto destitute of all enthusiasm for
him; fortunately, however, no impression save a favorable one
had as yet been received, it being universally conceded that he
had so far handled his army handsomely. And it was with great
satisfaction that we found him in this early twilight at the
very front, and under the fire of the enemy, carefully attending
to details which we had been accustomed to see more celebrated
commanders entrust to their staff.
"Our Division promptly relieved the cavalry and formed its line
facing west, the Third Brigade which was in advance going to
what was to be the extreme left of the infantry line, resting
on Abraham Creek; the First Brigade following, took up its
position on the right of the Third, and our own Brigade filled
the remaining distance between the First and the road on which
we had reached the battlefield. It had been intended to place us
in two lines, but the unexpected extent of the ground we had to
cover forbade that formation. We were just on the hither edge of
a narrow fringe of wood that concealed us from the enemy; the
Sixth Vermont was thrown forward as a skirmish line perhaps one
hundred yards to the further side of the little forest, and at
once engaged the enemy's skirmishers."
About three regiments, I believe, of the First Brigade, Third
Division, Sixth Corps, were to the left or south of the road, so the
Vermont Brigade didn't reach to the pike.
"Near us in the road at our right was a rebel field work, taken
by Wilson in the night. The hill on which it was situated
commanded the country in both directions, and it was already
occupied by a battery engaged in feeling the enemy, which was
answered vigorously, many of the rebel shell plunging over into
the troops as they successively came up the road.
"Our Division thus formed in a single line was the only
Division on the south or left of the road. The Third Division,
Ricketts', followed us and prolonged the line across and on the
north of the road, placing its two Brigades in two lines. The
First Division, Russell's, came next, and was drawn up behind
the Third as a third line or reserve, also somewhat overlapping
the right of our Brigade."
About three regiments or more of the Third Division, Sixth Corps,
I believe, were south of the road, on the right of the Second
Division. When General Russell's Division charged it was about two
hundred yards to the right of the Tenth Vermont, or about seven
hundred yards or more to the right of Col. Walker's brigade.
"Then to our surprise no more troops appeared, and our Corps was
alone confronting the enemy. There were two or three anxious
hours, but Early was engaged in hurrying up his detachment from
Bunker Hill, which this delay gave him ample time to do, and
made no assault. It was said that the Nineteenth Corps, being
ordered to follow the Sixth, had filed into the road behind our
wagon train, instead of keeping closed up on our column. It is
certain that with this loss of time, from whatever reason it
occurred, we lost the opportunity of attacking the enemy in
detail, and gave him time to prepare for our reception. It was
noon before the Nineteenth Corps had reached its place and was
formed in three or four lines on the right of the Sixth."
The Nineteenth Corps was formed in two lines on the right of the
Sixth.
"Our men during the forenoon had been resting, sitting or lying
on the ground. When at last the disposition was completed and
the signal gun was fired, they sprang to the ranks, and the
line advanced. Particular instructions had been received to the
effect that the road was to give the direction of attack, and
that the guiding regiment was to be the left regiment of the
Third Division, just across the road from our right."
The guiding regiments were the Tenth Vermont and Fourteenth New
Jersey, on the right of the First Brigade, about the center of the
Third Division.
"In passing through the bit of trees in our front, which was
filled with underbrush, our line was necessarily thrown somewhat
into confusion. When we emerged from the wood and the ground
over which we must make our attack was developed, the prospect
was appalling. The hill gradually sloped away before us, for a
quarter of a mile, to a long ravine, irregular in its course,
but its windings extending either way as far as we could see.
The ascent beyond it was in most places sharp, and the enemy
held its crest in force, perfectly commanding with musketry and
artillery the long slope down which we must pass, though the
acclivity on the further side of the hollow was so steep as to
actually present a cover from their fire--if it could once be
reached.
"When this fearful prospect opened the line involuntarily
halted, and the men threw themselves on the ground as was their
wont when under fire. Our own Brigade was properly waiting for
the movement of the guiding regiment which lay across the road
a little to our rear, and which could not be prevailed upon to
stir. To add to the peril of the situation, the road, instead
of continuing straight on, as seems to have been expected,
here made a bend to the left so that our original orders could
not be obeyed without an amount of obliquing that would have
resulted in demoralization; from this cause our own Brigade was
soon afterwards thrown into temporary confusion, and the Third
Division was presently so disorganized as to be unable to
resist a counter-charge made against it by the enemy."
The whole line in front of the enemy's infantry in the ravine in
front of the Third Division halted after through the narrow belt of
timber behind which we had formed, as the trees, brush and terrible
shelling had broken the lines and the advanced men where I was laid
down to avoid the storm of shells which filled the air till the men
got together, which they soon largely did. It was here found the
Second Brigade on my right had excusably gone to pieces, the ground
in its front being untenable, which caused some delay; but soon we
advanced alone without that Brigade, as did the Nineteenth Corps.
This was why the Tenth Vermont or guiding regiment, at this time
where I was, didn't move forward sooner. The bend to the left in the
road is largely a myth. The line of battle wasn't formed at right
angles with it which, as the line advanced led to some confusion, as
our colors had to be kept on the pike. There was no counter charge
in front of where I was in the Tenth Vermont or disorganization,
except in the Second Brigade, but what was soon remedied. The enemy
could do more effective work by remaining in cover with little loss,
which it did.
"At length the commander of the Brigade at our right crossed to
our side of the road and urged us to set his men the example.
Col. Warner took the responsibility, brought the Brigade to its
feet, corrected the alignment, and gave the command to advance,
which was promptly obeyed. The Third Division followed and the
line was again in motion. But our point of direction was lost,
for we were in advance of our guides, and when it was seen
that owing to a curve in the ravine before us the cover on its
further side could be reached much sooner by obliquing sharply
to the left, we took that direction almost by common consent,
and left the road-side."
Why shouldn't Col. Warner with virtually no enemy in his immediate
front be able to set an example of advancing his line when the
Third Division was up against the real thing, it being confronted
with overwhelming numbers of the enemy's infantry in the ravine
and artillery back of it in our immediate front pretty much all
that confronted the army in that midday assault? The situation in
front of our lines is fully explained in this work elsewhere, and
an alleged "bend" in the road or a "curve" in the ravine will not
suffice to excuse the troops on our immediate left for not at once
helping to flank the enemy's infantry from in front of us in the
ravine, at once when on high ground across the ravine instead of
running off on the field on a comparatively useless easy task and
then have to come back. Where was there any infantry of any amount
except in the ravine in front of the Third Division? Why not give
the Third Division its due? The killed and wounded tell the story.
Didn't our Division have about as many killed and wounded as both
the First and Second Divisions together, although smaller than
either? No fair-minded soldier or person can study the illustrations
even, in this work, and fail to see the facts.
"Our whole Brigade, every man at the top of his speed, making
for the coveted protection of the hill beyond us, plunged pell
mell into the hollow. The troops at our right and left were
lost sight of. The ravine was of some considerable width and
its bottom was marshy, being the head waters of a little branch
of Abraham Creek. The steep slope on its further side was
covered with evergreens six or eight feet high. To our intense
consternation, as we reached its swampy bottom, we saw at our
right, at short pistol range, at least a full regiment of the
enemy drawn up in line near the point where the road crosses the
hollow, in anticipation of our taking precisely the course we
did, and firing coolly, as rapidly as they could load, directly
along our line, thus enfilading us completely. Its position
is indicated on the plan. The slaughter was for a few moments
murderous. We could not retreat, for we should again enter the
fire that had been mowing us down in the charge, now cut off by
the hill before us. We therefore floundered on, our coherence
entirely lost, entered the clusters of evergreens through which
the cruel bullets whistled fearfully, and at last, a confused
mass at best, those of us who escaped unhurt reached comparative
safety under the very crest of the hill, and high above the
deadly hollow."
The probabilities are that old soldier-like seeing or suspecting the
true situation, the men intuitively or purposely obliqued away to
an easier place of attack; at any rate they did it. Yes, the rebel
regiment which was seen in the ravine was in front of the left of
our brigade, but crossed to the north side of the pike to my front
early in the fight leaving no rebel force in the ravine south of the
pike in front of the Second Division on the left of ours.
"We now opened fire for the first time during the day, in the
direction of the regiment or brigade that had so frightfully
thinned our ranks, but they were almost out of reach from us,
as well as we from them. At this moment, however, the Third
Division approached them and they filed away."
It is difficult to conceive why if the enemy could fire at the union
forces here they could not return the compliment, at any rate to
one who has so recently studied the ground. It was a good thing the
Third Division was 'round to drive the rebs away, otherwise they
might have more "frightfully thinned" Col. Walker's ranks. It would
be interesting to know exactly how many men Col. Walker lost here.
"When this was discovered, and after gaining breath, our own
advance was resumed, but with little pretense at order. Emerging
upon the plain before us at the summit of the hill we had
climbed, we again turned obliquely towards the road and charged
upon a long breastwork filled with rebels, in our immediate
front. The retreat of their comrades from the ravine apparently
demoralized them; many fled, many more were captured; in fact as
we clambered over the parapet it seemed as if the prisoners who
then surrendered exceeded in number our entire Brigade."
I saw this movement when the men advanced seemingly to me in an
undeployed skirmish line over the open flat ground beyond the ravine
not shown in No. 7 illustration, but further to the right. It was a
weak force and could not have met any determined resistance from any
considerable body; indeed there was but a small force of the enemy's
infantry on that part of the field.
"But we did not stop to count them or to care for them. The
principal position of the enemy in this portion of the field had
now been gained, and we rushed onward toward the distant spires
of Winchester, with shouts and cheers, now thoroughly excited by
our unexpected success. A battery of the enemy was before us,
but it limbered up and retired as we advanced. Several times it
turned, fired a round of canister, and resumed its flight. At
our left the other Brigades of our Division were seen moving
on in our support. At our right an unfortunate ridge now rose,
parallel with our line of advance, along the top of which ran
the road so often referred to, and which hid our friends from
view; we could only hope that they were equally successful, and
push wildly forward. A point was reached probably three-fourths
of a mile beyond the entrenchments where we had captured
the prisoners, when luckily a ditch running across our path
suggested cover and a pause. This ditch was reached only by
the colors of the Fifth, with perhaps two hundred men from the
various regiments. Exhausted with running, they opened fire
as vigorously as they could, but a line of rebels was seen
gradually collecting in their front, as the fugitives were
rallied, and the position held by our troops was presently
dangerously threatened. And now to their dismay, the Brigade
on the higher ground to their left saw reason for retiring and
called for them to follow. What it could mean they did not know,
but it seemed prudent to withdraw, if only for the purpose of
keeping up the connection. An officer sent to investigate soon
reported that at least a Division of the enemy were far behind
their right in an orchard, which they supposed had been carried
by the Third Division. Orders were given therefore to fall back
to the line of the army, following the low ground on the left,
thus keeping under cover of the hill at the right, the enemy
meantime being absorbed in their movement against Ricketts;
and thus the detachment successfully escaped from its dangerous
position and re-formed with the balance of the Brigade near the
works we had carried, being as before on the right of the other
Brigades of our Division, connecting with and at first even in
front of the support which was put in to meet the emergency."
Having watched this whole proceeding, which Sheridan saw, too,
through his field glass just behind me, after I was wounded and the
enemy from the ravine in my front and its artillery were in full
retreat, it reads absurdly. The action of the enemy in Col. Walker's
front largely depended on that of the enemy in ours, which had been
routed and was in full pell mell retreat when Col. Walker's men were
advancing in small irregular groups away from the before-mentioned
ravine (see No. 7 illustration) they were so seemingly anxious to
leave. As a matter of fact if they had swung to the right in and
on the high ground west of the ravine, together with the left of
our brigade, they would have done much more effective service.
The retreating battery mentioned--and others further north not
mentioned--retreated because its infantry in the ravine in my front
was routed. As a matter of fact these Second Division men were
operating comparatively uselessly far on the enemy's rear right
flank and were in a dangerous situation as soon as the bulk of
the enemy's infantry in my front should reach that neighborhood.
I saw this, as did Sheridan, and it was one thing that caused him
to put spurs to his horse and dash away to send a staff officer
to recall these forces. The five succeeding quoted paragraphs
are disingenuously conceived and misleading. They are worse than
worthless for historical purposes because mischievous. The Vermont
Brigade was too grand a body of men to be mortified by exaggerations
and overdrawn situations. The truth is glorious enough, and to write
on such a basis is dignified and fair.
"We afterwards learned that a break had taken place on the right
which for a time seemed likely to result in complete disaster.
The report in our Corps was, that the Nineteenth, advancing
through a long stretch of forest and at first successful, had
afterwards been repulsed, and fled in disorder, many of the
fugitives even going back to the Creek, and that our Third
Division had been checked soon after we lost sight of it,
presently becoming more or less involved in the flight of the
Nineteenth Corps. On the other hand Gen. Emory, commanding the
Nineteenth Corps, in a letter published in the _World_, which
was fortified with affidavits, insisted that the break began at
the right of our Third Division, which led to the turning of
his left and the consequent retiring of his Corps. The official
reports disagree as much as the letters of the correspondents,
who of course reflected the opinions of the several headquarters
to which they were attached, and who created considerable
ill-feeling by the discrepancies in their accounts, and by their
insinuations; the truth is probably between the claims of both,
and the real cause of the enemy's temporary success seems to
have been the unfortunate bend in the road above mentioned,
which interfered with and destroyed the symmetry of our first
advance. Our Third Division obliqued to the left as it moved
against the enemy, following the order to guide on the road,
(there were few or no fences in that vicinity) and so left
an interval between its right and the Nineteenth Corps, which
appears to have gone in impetuously and with little order; the
enemy presently made a counter-charge, and, luckily for them,
struck the gap with a heavy force, crumbling off the troops on
either side of it, and causing the troops on each side of the
interval to think that the others had let the enemy through.
The front line of the Nineteenth Corps was almost entirely
disorganized, and was replaced by the second line, while only
the right of our Third Division was broken up, its left with our
own Division merely retiring a short distance under orders, as
was necessary in order to keep a continuous front."
This is widely erroneous; Emery's left was somewhat broken at first
by the terrific shelling from our front, but it was only in the
edge of the shell storm at first when going through the wood. His
alleged collapse virtually of the right of our Third Division, or
Second Brigade, going through the narrow belt of timber behind which
we formed, is correct as before stated, for it was immediately on
my right, and I know it; it was largely what we halted and laid
down for after getting through the timber. We feared being flanked;
but the delay was short, for I almost immediately moved forward
with my men and others alone over that flat, unsheltered ground,
then being unmercifully swept by artillery and musketry till it was
virtually untenable. The Nineteenth Corps instead of obliquing to
the left towards us to shorten the interval and help us, intuitively
obliqued the other way; but fortunately there was no road or bend
in it to blame it to. In my opinion it was as clear a case of
shirk as to the left of the Third Division, or a desire to find an
easier point to attack. Emery's corps didn't retire that I know
of, and our brigade I _know_ didn't. The marching of his troops in
two long lines was one of the spectacular sights of the day; it
was a beautiful feature. It assaulted to the north of the slight
divide running east and west, where I saw no infantry nor artillery
except a little of the latter far across the breaks. The enfilading
infantry and artillery fire from our front at first was about all
Emery had to fear, but his Corps soon obliqued away from it. There
was _no_ counter charge by the enemy in my front or to either side,
and in this I am _emphatic_, as well as in the fact that general
officers were not where they could see as well as I. There has been
more fiction written about this fight than any I was ever in.
"At the critical moment General Wright, who was for the day
in command of the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, though (as he
says) 'it was too early in the battle to choose to put in the
reserves, still, seeing that the fate of the day depended on
the employment of this force,' promptly ordered in the First
Division with two batteries; it marched gallantly down, with its
full Division front, to the very face of the enemy, relieving
the Third Division, which, reforming, presently took up its
position still further to the right, where the interval had
before been left. Sheridan held back General Upton's Brigade
of the First Division until it could strike the flank of the
charging column of the rebels, when it made the most remarkable
and successful charge of the day, completely breaking up the
rebel assault, and permitting our shattered line again to knit
itself into coherence. General Upton was there wounded and
the brave unostentatious Russell, the idol of the Division he
commanded, was shot dead, while personally employed restoring
the broken line.
"The two hours following were spent in re-arranging the troops,
issuing ammunition, and making dispositions for another
advance." * * *
General Russell's Division started to march on the field _en masse_
and deployed en route; it was one of the grandest sights of the
day or entire war. I never saw such splendid discipline under fire
in a large body of men. It didn't relieve our brigade in the sense
taken above, but did in partially drawing the enemy's musketry and
artillery fire from us, which was appalling and effective. Our
Brigade didn't reform. I was close on the enemy's rail breastworks
in the ravine with my men leading the assault. There was no chance
to reform: it was give and take. Russell's men didn't even get the
opportunity of getting near enough the rebels to get satisfaction,
for they ran when my men and I were within a rod of their works
directly in front. There was no considerable bend in the road
or anything else that obliqued _my_ men either way to any great
extent. The enemy ran before Russell was within effective striking
or flanking distance. The enemy _didn't_ charge. If General Upton
assaulted its flank it _wasn't_ here. I am _emphatic_ in this, for
not twenty seconds after I was twice almost simultaneously wounded
during the enemy's last volley, it was running for dear life and
Sheridan thirty seconds later was on his horse on the high ground
close in my rear looking through his field glass to see where
the enemy was going to make a second stand, and at other things
evidently displeasing to him on his left, where Colonel Walker and
the Second Division were. The whole field of active fighting could
be seen from here. Five of the battlefield views herein were taken
from this point. Colonel Walker is such a graceful, fluent writer
it is a pity he couldn't know the whole facts about the battles the
Vermont troops were in. His works would doubtless then be charmingly
interesting and entertaining.
As several eminent persons, mistakenly as I think, in recent years,
in a moment of weakness and gush have classed General R. E. Lee as
one of the greatest of modern field marshals, and as the battles of
Opequan Creek or Winchester, Va., Sept. 19, 1864, and Gettysburg,
Pa., July 1-3, 1863, both of which I have carefully studied, furnish
an excellent opportunity for a few pertinent questions as to the
ability of Generals Grant, Sheridan and Lee to plan and manage
successfully great battles, I cannot refrain from taking up the
matter at this point, and I defy any honest man of expert judgment
to successfully controvert my stand.
It might as well be said of Sheridan or of Grant, as it has already
been of Lee by partial and incompetent judges, that either of the
former were the equal of Marlborough or Wellington, and far more
truthfully so than of Lee. Had the fortunes of war placed Sheridan
in command of the Army of the Potomac at any period of the Civil
War, there is no doubt but what that war would have developed in
him a field marshal exceeding in dash, ability and brilliancy any
military genius of either ancient or modern times. He was a born
soldier, unspoilt by training, success or anything else, and was
blessed with splendid common sense. _He_ was a _genius_, for, says a
popular poet: