[18] It is alleged by one or more writers that this gap was partly

caused by a turn in the pike to the left, and as the Tenth Vermont

had been ordered to guide on the pike its colors being on it, this

alleged turn in the pike caused the regiment to oblique to the left.

This is incorrect. The turn in the pike when this dangerous gap

was caused partially by the obliquing of the Nineteenth Corps to

its right, which General Russell's Division filled, was about six

hundred yards behind the rebel line of battle, a little beyond the

enemy's battery close to the right of the pike, an exploding shell

from which knocked me down, and this turn in the road at this time

was within the enemy's lines in the rear of this battery, and it was

_then_ shelling us. The pike was _perfectly straight_ from us to

this turn, about a quarter of a mile away, or about a half mile from

where we formed line of battle, the road being virtually straight,

as can be seen from Nos. 2 and 9 illustrations. Our line of battle

wasn't formed at right angles with the pike, hence the obliquing

alleged.

General Sheridan's plan of battle was perfect and I shall never

cease to admire him as the greatest military genius I have ever

seen on a battlefield, for by this and his pluck and dash, I see

the secret of his great successes. The plan of battle was fully

developed by the time I fell twice badly wounded--at first I

supposed mortally--only a few feet in front of the enemy's works,

and as I arose partially recovered from the shock of being twice

hit, quivering and bleeding profusely, one of the first things my

eye caught was Sheridan all alone without a staff officer or even an

orderly near him, about forty yards in my rear, sitting his splendid

thoroughbred horse like a centaur looking--all animation his

very pose suggesting it--intently through his field glass toward

the fleeing routed enemy and later after the third and last assault

of the day all in a jumble with our undaunted dashing cavalry in

perfect order sweeping across the great comparatively level plain

bordering Winchester, like a tornado, with banners, arms, brasses,

etc., brightly gleaming in the blazing autumn sunlight--a battle

scene, as badly as I was wounded, the forepart of which held me

entranced. As I again soon turned after the first assault, Sheridan

put spurs to his horse and off he dashed all animation to another

part of the field to reform his line and so on, going finally

like the wind into the very midst of the great congested jumble,

the enemy trying like a frightened flock of sheep to force itself

through the streets of Winchester all at one time, the men literally

piling themselves at the main street entrances on top of each

other in order to do so. No battle scene will remain photographed

so vividly on my memory as the first part of this for I could see

nearly the whole field from where I long remained.

[Illustration: No. 8.

View from near the head of the ravine occupied by the enemy's

infantry looking southerly towards the pike running along the edge

of the distant forest. This is now (1908) a fine farm: its building

on the left and those dimly seen in the edge of the distant wood

along which the sunken pike runs have been built since the Civil

War. Observe the perfect cover next to the pike for the enemy; it

was here the Tenth Vermont assaulted, and the Second Brigade, this

side as far north as the figure (Maj. Abbott), while the enemy's

infantry behind rail breast-works and its artillery several hundred

yards in rear to the right on higher ground swept the flat open

field over which we charged in their front. It was almost a forlorn

hope. Who would wish to criticise troops unfairly under such

circumstances? The divide running east and west was about a hundred

yards to Maj. Abbott's right. On its opposite or north side the

Nineteenth Corps charged.]

The fatal wounding in my sight near enough to hear his cry of

anguish of my old Captain--Major Dillingham--and the killing of

Major Vredenburg of the Fourteenth New Jersey from his horse by

having his heart torn out, and others; General Russell's brilliant

debouch with his dauntless division marching proudly on the

battlefield en masse with all its enchanting glitter and precision

to take a hand at the sacrifice of his life--unfortunate, gallant,

dashing Russell--Merritt, Averill and Custer's brilliant spirited

final charges on the fleeing enemy, its disorder and worst possible

rout all beggar description, our retreat at the battle of Monocacy,

July 9, 1864, being one of order and dignity comparatively speaking.

I felt revenged for my wound and at having to run so in retreat

at the Monocacy, and for my two wounds that day even if I did

totteringly tarry, maimed and speechless with paralyzed tongue, chin

and blanched face to look at such a brilliant battle scene until

I became so faint from loss of blood, shock and partial reaction,

I could hardly go steadily and finally did accept help, having

declined at first, from two faithful men of my Company who, when I

fell instead of stampeding stayed by me in one of the hottest places

I have ever been in on a battlefield, one of whom was Corporal

Joel Walker of Pownal, Vt. My first wound was from the butt end of

an exploding shell in the breast which maimed and knocked me down

and simultaneously as I fell a minie ball fired but a rod away

in my front just grazed my forehead, torn through my upper lip

crushing both jaws and carrying away eleven teeth, the most painless

dentistry I ever had done; but, Oh! the shock it gave my system and

the misery I suffered that night!

As I entered the long broad avenue running between the great tents

at the field hospital later in the day where there were hundreds of

wounded, dead and dying, Dillingham, Hill and others of my regiment,

among the number, Dr. J. C. Rutherford, one of my regimental

surgeons, seeing me with a man on either side--for here in sight of

others I wouldn't let them support me--close to and keenly watching

my unsteady carriage, came running, hastily examined my wounds,

bade me sit on the ground, ran for his instrument case, placed my

head upturned between his knees, sewed in place a triangular piece

of flesh extending from the right corner of my nose down hanging

at the lower right corner by a slight shred of flesh, which I had

held in place from the battlefield with my fingers, and that job for

the time being was done; but oh! my aching head, jaws and chest,

as well as the extreme feeling of lassitude for the balance of the

day. My face was like a puff ball, so quickly had it swollen, my

chest at the point of the wishbone--so to speak--was mangled black

and blue and resembled a pounded piece of steak ready to be cooked,

and I was so nauseated, lame and sore all over, I dreaded to move.

I guess the rebs came pretty near winging me--but Glory! Early

was licked. To add to my feeling of depression, I was told Major

Dillingham was mortally wounded and that he would soon pass away.

He had been a good friend, a brave man, faultlessly courageous, was

an elegant gentleman and good fellow, and was much beloved. A solid

shot severed a leg going through the woods; his cry of anguish was

distressing, and I shrink from thinking of it whenever it comes into

my mind.

I fell just in front of the enemy's hastily thrown up breastworks

of fence rails in the vanguard after advancing under a murderous

fire about a hundred yards or more, in the open field after passing

through the woods. I saw no other line officer with his men anywhere

in my vicinity so far in front, and there was no other officer there

in the open field except Adjutant Wyllys Lyman who was lauded for

it, but I, being a boy, got nothing but my two wounds as compliments

for my steadfastness, and they will stay with me through life. I

wonder if when across the Great River and in another world I will be

remembered any better for my faithfulness when so many others failed

at such an important moment?[19]

[19] Major Lyman was afterwards honored with a brevet as Major, but

I was only mentioned in routine official papers as wounded. Why he,

being Adjutant, and therefore representing the regimental commander,

and the only officer who saw me, didn't see to it that my services

were duly recognized as well as his, I have never been able to

understand. It always stirs my spirit when I think of it, for if

anyone deserved recognition for that day's work it was the leaders

in such an assault, for on such largely depended its success; and

certainly if Lyman deserved recognition who had no command, then

why shouldn't one who did, whose men largely followed him, as well

as some of the men of five other companies which I had successfully

led in other fights? It is hard to be reconciled to such unfair

discriminations. But brevets in many regiments were quite as apt to

be given for scheming and favoritism as for merit, and some of the

most meritorious line officers who fought gallantly on the front

line of battle through almost the entire war, received no such

recognition from their regimental commanders, although such line

officers' exhibitions of dash and daring, especially in the Tenth

Vermont, which was one thing that gave the regiment an enviable

reputation both in the field and at home, were very frequent. The

company commanders of this regiment did not follow their men into

battle, at any rate to commence with, but led them continually when

fleet enough to do so, and I always did. Being almost invariably

selected when a lieutenant to command a company without an officer,

I was with one exception alone with no company commander to observe

and report my work, and my different regimental commanders didn't

take sufficient interest to do so, even if where they could observe

it; but the fact that I was almost invariably selected to command

different companies in battle when needed and that I overslaughed

several lieutenants when promoted Captain, should have been reason

enough for at least one brevet during the war, if nothing more,

which since, in the regular army, would have saved me from frequent

undeserved embarrassment. A long experience, however, both in the

Civil War and the regular army since in the observance of the

bestowal of brevets and medals of honor has caused me to regard

with very little respect in many instances the recipient's methods

in obtaining such favors, and especially the system of bestowal of

the same, which is a sacred trust. And certainly if in most cases

such consideration was warranted, then many of my acquaintances who

were not recognized even once, especially in the Civil War, could

have been repeatedly decorated with the far greater propriety. But

with me such distinctions were not worth having except earned in

the estimation of others competent to judge, and came unsolicited.

Such, however, is rarely the case, even when repeatedly deservedly

won, and the only reward for such is to tell the truth about

it historically whenever the opportunity offers, regardless of

criticism.

I found the men of Company E good fighters, Corporal Walker and

another big man of my Company whose name I can't recall, being

so short a time with the Company--but believe it was one of the

Brownells, also of Pownal, Vt.--who helped me occasionally going to

the ambulance as I felt faint and weak, were brave fellows. They

followed me closely all through the assault as though they expected

me to be hit, fighting like heroes as they were at the same time,

and when I fell wounded they dropped close by me, Corporal Walker, a

giant, coolly saying: "Don't get up Lieutenant, they'll riddle you

if you do!" but I thought they already had. However, the nervous

shock of both wounds was too great to think of rising at once, and

almost immediately the rebs were running for dear life all branches

of the service mixed together in confusion--a perfect jumble. We

had licked them in a square stand up open field fight of their own

choice--and a very poor one, too, for them in case of defeat, as it

proved--and it was clean cut, the worst stampede and rout I ever saw.

Sheridan was as brave as a lion, and unlike some commanders who hunt

cover when their commands are fighting, went seemingly fearlessly

anywhere he wanted to in order to see what was going on and what

if any part of the line needed reinforcing. As before stated, my

position on the battlefield was sufficiently high to see nearly all

of it. It being a beautiful sunny Fall day with a clear atmosphere,

it was the most spectacular, and before the Infantry broke, the most

beautiful battlefield sight seen, and better yet, the most snappy,

brilliant fighting witnessed during the war. Sheridan hovered near

the centre in the neighborhood of the high ground where I was twice

wounded, and dashed back and forth the line on horseback like a

restless lion, an ideally alert fighter, almost as unmindful of shot

and shell as though both deaf and blind. It was here that I formed

my opinion that he was not only the ideal fighter, but the second,

if not the greatest military genius developed by the Civil War, and

I have never changed my opinion. Honest, alert, aggressive, dashing

and brave with splendid judgment, his equal will be hard to find,

and probably rarely surpassed. He was generally conceded a brilliant

cavalry fighter, but if the world has ever produced a better

planned, executed, dashing, brilliant, spectacular, snappy battle or

commander than he and this Battle of Winchester, where the different

branches of the service were combined, take it from first to last

during the day, it would be interesting to know on what occasion. It

was so unlike any battle ever seen by me that all others sink into

insignificance as dull affairs. Language or words even with the most

gifted talkers or writers can never describe this battle; no pen

picture, or ever so gifted talker can do it justice; it would have

to be seen by an expert to be fully appreciated. Ever afterwards the

Sixth Corps of all others was Sheridan's favorite. Said he later:

"Give me the Sixth Corps and I will charge anywhere."

Among the most admirable pictures of the fight--barring the

orderly, majestic advance to battle of the whole army in unbroken

lines--except after a little our division being unmercifully

shelled from the start on the pike it could not withstand it,

nor could any other have done so--as a whole after through the

wood resembling an immense gracefully waving blue ribbon along

the surface of the ground, caused by that enchantingly swinging,

billowy motion characteristic of regulars when marching in large

bodies, its fluttering banners, glittering arms, equipments and its

blue uniforms looking prettier than ever in the bright September

sunlight under a bright blue sky specked with fleecy white clouds

making a picture beautiful with perfect harmony of color,--was the

beauty, grandeur and majesty of both Russell and Custer's splendid

debouch on the battlefield with their valiant, intrepid commands,

the former's proudly and majestically en masse in perfect order and

cadence, line and bearing, coolly confident as though at parade, and

the latter's also in perfect lines and order, as well as dashing,

intrepid, spirited and assured bearing even the horses as though

vieing with each other in speed to run down the unfortunate enemy,

entering into the spirit of the occasion and sweeping rapidly like

an avalanche down on the demoralized, fleeing and awe-stricken

enemy with the fury and apparently almost certain destruction of

a tornado. These were pictures comprising awe, beauty, power,

grandeur, order and disorder, dash, magnificence, valor, terror,

confusion, inspiration and majesty to such an extent as to defy the

pen picture of any writer however gifted. This battle was different

from any other I ever saw. It was Sheridan's way of doing things--a

revelation in warfare.

So far as this first assault is concerned it can be summed up quite

briefly. The only considerable amount of the enemy's infantry in

the _immediate_ front of the Union infantry line of battle was in

the ravine in front of our division, and it was about two hundred

and fifty yards away from where we formed line behind the woods;

it was a very strong force. If the troops to our right and left

instead of instinctively obliquing away from us veteran like to

an easier place in their right and left fronts respectively, had

guided on our division as it is claimed they were directed to do,

they would have had an enfilading fire on the enemy on our front,

the same as General Russell's division would have had when it filled

the gap to my right which the enemy knew would make their position

untenable and so instantaneously retreated in a rout when it saw him

coming dangerously near, his right flank overlapping their left.

When Russell's movement was executed the Nineteenth Corps' lines

of battle hadn't even broken. There was no considerable number of

the enemy before it within striking distance so far as I could see,

and therefore _nothing_ to break its lines so far as the enemy was

concerned until it reached the breaks in its front.

The Vermont Brigade could have easily advanced at any time of the

assault or any other part of the Second Division, as there was

nothing to speak of--as virtually acknowledged by Colonel Aldace

F. Walker of that brigade in his "History of the Vermont Brigade in

the Shenandoah Valley, 1864"--in its immediate front except about

a regiment of the enemy which crossed the pike from his right and

the left of our Brigade to my front.[20] (See No. 7 illustration).

Had the Vermont Brigade borne to its right instead of its left it

would have done much more effective service, as it would have been

on high ground overlooking the enemy in my front when out of the

ravine. In this instance the credit given this excellent brigade

in at least one Civil War history is erroneous, without the Third

Division was expected to whip _at once_ and alone a considerable

part of the infantry and artillery of Early's army in its immediate

front, no small part of which was in our regimental front and its

immediate right. In proof that there was no considerable rebel force

in front of the Second Division to the _left_ of the pike until

Early's second stand, the reader is invited to examine the official

War Department map of this battle and note the fact; but aside

from this I _know_ there was none. What, therefore, was to prevent

the Second Division or Vermont Brigade from advancing? Unlike our

front, where the strip of timber was narrow, with the enemy strongly

posted just beyond, the scrub or second growth oak, etc., in front

of a part of the Second Division next to us, extended from the top

of the ridge or divide which ran several hundred yards southerly,

down to the bottom of the ravine a hundred yards more or less,

which covered here the Second Division's advance and the cleared

ground beyond, after emerging from the wooded side hill and ravine

towards Winchester, contained no force of the enemy, as there was

no immediate protection for it, sufficient to prevent its or even

the Vermont Brigade's advancing, or the enemy would have done so.

(See Nos. 3, 7 and 8 illustrations.) I mention this here because

I _know_ the facts in the premises, and because this Division is

complimented--unfortunately, but probably unwittingly so--in one

or more histories for advancing, in unpleasant contrast to our

Division, which was up against the _real_ thing, and its advancing

depended largely on the help or enfilading fire along our front, we

had a right to expect from the troops which should have guided on us

from both flanks, but which we never got, as they pulled away from

us. It was useless to try to take such a place as confronted the

right of our regiment and Division by assaulting from its immediate

front (see Nos. 5 and 6 illustrations), as the enemy had to be

flanked out of its position, which is what Russell's men would have

done on the rebel left in case the enemy hadn't seen them in season

to get away and thereby saved many casualties on both sides, and

probably largely there the enemy's capture.

[20] Haynes' "History of the Tenth Vermont Infantry," p. 253.

There were none of the Second Brigade of our Division on my right

after advancing through the woods, nor had there been up to the

time General Russell's command filled the gap occasioned by the

Second Brigade's absence, together with the space caused by the

Nineteenth Corps obliquing to its right. It being level, shell and

bullet swept, it was untenable until a force came large enough to

drive the enemy's infantry from cover, as Russell did. (See No.

5 illustration). I was the only officer except Adjutant Wyllys

Lyman, who is deceased, so far ahead at that time on my part of the

battlefield, and I can make affidavit to this statement. We and a

goodly number of scattering men who generally led in most assaults

were within a rod of the enemy's _strongest_ manned works, _which

no map in existence shows_ that I have seen, where I was twice

almost instantaneously wounded when the enemy ran as it saw General

Russell's Division coming, as though their lives depended upon it,

and I _know_ whereof I am writing.

General Sheridan made no mistake when he selected the First Brigade

for the centre and most important point of his line of battle,

nor was it a mistake to place our regiment and the Fourteenth

New Jersey--with direction for the rest of the army to guide on

our Division in the first assault, for the road was practically

straight--squarely across the pike, with their colors on it, with

such men as Corporals Alexander Scott, F. H. Hoadley, Tenth Vermont,

and other of the color guard like them, to keep them there, for

such men would go wherever told to, if into the very jaws of death.

The leaving off from the official map of this battle of the enemy's

infantry in the ravine in front of the Third Division (see Nos. 6

and 8 illustrations), is a great injustice to our regiment, which

never wholly fell back, but the usual per cent. of men under such

circumstances stubbornly pressed forward under the most trying

circumstances at any rate where I was. The leaving off of the

enemy's infantry in my front, where it was strongest, is misleading

and is doubtless what has caused so many wrong descriptions of this

fight. No one can give a correct description of it where I was

except at that point during the fight. The enemy contested this

point more stubbornly than any other during the day and it was here

the most intrepid of our men assaulted; it was the doorway to the

great battlefield, and if the enemy couldn't hold this point it

couldn't hope to any other, and didn't. Although our division was

smaller than either of the other divisions of our Corps, its loss

was much heavier. General Grant had one hundred shotted guns fired

on his lines in front of Petersburg in honor of this day's victory

by Sheridan. A citizen of Winchester told me that one of the saddest

things he saw during the day was a horse going through the streets

of the city with two badly wounded and one dead Confederate soldiers

on it--probably chums--the latter thrown over the horse's back with

his head and arms hanging on one side and his feet on the other;

but war is a cruel teacher and produces the most shocking sights

imaginable. It is not pleasant to record and much less dwell on them.

[Illustration: No. 9.

Straight view of about a half mile of the pike looking westerly

towards Winchester, Va., from the divide on Sheridan's battle-field,

Sept. 19, 1864. Observe the cut through the divide for the road.]

The following pertaining to Sheridan's battle of Winchester has

been discovered since writing the foregoing. It will be answered in

detail. Says Col. Aldace F. Walker in his "History of the Vermont

Brigade in the Shenandoah Valley, 1864," pp. 91-100:

"Our movement commenced at 3 o'clock Monday morning, September

19th, Getty's Division having the advance, the Vermont Brigade

being the last in the Division. Striking directly across the

country, at first in the darkness, we presently reached the

main road from Berryville to Winchester, and moved down it to

the crossing of the Opequan. This stream is considerably below

the level of the adjoining country, and the road on its further

side keeps the low level of the stream for a mile or more,

winding through a long, tortuous wooded ravine, our unobstructed

passage whereof was for the time a mystery. It seems that

Wilson's Division of cavalry had already cleared the way and

was then holding desperately a position that it had gained with

considerable loss, but which proved a most admirable one in

which to deploy our line of battle.

Personal Recollections and Civil War Diary, 1864 · 第 10 / 17 段