Can silence it or hinder. While there's breath
Or sense of feeling, it will spurn the sod,
And lift itself to glory, and to God.
The acorn sprouted--weeds nor flowers can choke
The certain growth of th' upreaching oak."
One secret of Sheridan's success lay largely in his ability to so
plan a battle as to fight his whole command _effectively_ all at
once, and in such a way that with his dash and unexpected _coup de
main_, the enemy was usually whipped before the fight was fairly
commenced. With Sheridan in command during the Civil War, President
Lincoln would never have had to urge action on the part of the Army
of the Potomac as with McClellan and others, except Grant, when
ready to fight, nor would it have been fought in detail, which was
invariably a fatal fault with both armies, for Sheridan didn't
fight that way; there were no unfought reserves in his army. When
he struck it was with so much method, dash, determination and
judgment it brought brilliant results, such as astonished even his
own army, which always expected victory, as well as the enemy and
every one else; and in consequence he could accomplish more with
fewer men than any other General in the army; not only because he
used his force to the best advantage by fighting it all at once,
but because his personal magnetism, or hypnotism, enthused the
men and gave them confidence, which is a great thing in battle;
besides, they had implicit faith in his ability, splendid judgment
and quick perception on the battlefield, which are indispensable
gifts in a great General; and when combined with an alert, active
temperament such as his, it was _grand_. _He_ was a _great_ field
marshal. This is proven from the fact that anything he undertook
in the Civil War was not only _well_ done if decently supported,
but he proved himself grandly equal to any occasion on the field
of battle, wherever the fortunes of war placed him--not tamely so,
but _brilliantly_; he electrified his men as well as the world by
his splendid dash, pluck and surprisingly overwhelming victories.
A slight reverse not only left him undaunted but, like a raging
lion, it seemed to arouse his wonderful gifts and raise him to such
sublime heights it awed one; so that the moment the eye of his
command caught a vision of him at any distance on the battlefield,
his very pose and action was such it electrified and imbued his men
with the same spirit of conquer or die that dominated him, and no
enemy could or ever did stand for any length of time before his
intrepid command.
Who but Sheridan, as at Cedar Creek, Va., Oct. 19, 1864, just a
month to a day after his splendid victory at Opequan Creek, Sept.
19, 1864, or Winchester, Va., as now more properly known, could
have rallied a defeated and routed army en route to the front and
after and so enthused it in the act, simply by dashing, alert and
crafty through its broken ranks after a twenty mile race with time
from Winchester, with flashing eyes, bared head and waving hat, on
a spirited foaming horse, shouting to his men: "Get back into line,
men! Get into line, _quick_! We can lick 'em! We can lick h----l
out of 'em yet!" and do it almost at once, even as brilliantly so
as at Winchester a month previous? How often are such things done?
Such a man outclasses all others in military history, not excepting
Wellington or Marlborough, for such a man as Sheridan is without a
peer as a field marshal in the annals of warfare; and had he been
found sooner and given greater responsibilities he would not only
have surely proved it, but would have more fully electrified the
world than he did and have been its idol as a military genius and
hero for all time.
He or Grant would never have used such woefully poor judgment as
to have assaulted an army equally as valiant, splendidly posted,
fully as large, if not larger than their own, across an open,
level space without cover quite a mile in extent, as Lee did at
Gettysburg on July 3, 1864. If that act showed ability, good
judgment, or a military genius, then I am lacking in mature sound
judgment, and my lifetime of military training, including my three
years and threescore battles or more in the Civil War and in Indian
wars, has been in vain. This would be equally true even though the
armies had been equal in numbers. General Longstreet's suggestion
to Lee to place his army on General Meade's flank between him and
Washington would have been a splendid substitute for Pickett's
forlorn charge.[21] It was abler and just what Grant did with Lee
hardly a year later, successfully and repeatedly and forced Lee back
to Richmond and Petersburg, as the world now knows, which indicates
superior generalship both on Grant's part as well as Longstreet's.
[21] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 29-30.
Would either Grant or Sheridan have lost their cavalry for several
days, as Lee did, when on such a campaign in an enemy's country
or anywhere else?[22] Would either, with three such splendid
cavalry divisions as Meade, not have used a part of one division if
necessary to have patrolled barely seventy-five miles between York,
Pa., or the Susquehanna, and the Potomac river, in order to detect
any movement by the enemy on Washington? Would this have made the
Union Commander, whoever he might have been, timid about moving to
any point where battle was offered, fearing a fake attack by Lee in
order to cover a movement on Washington or Baltimore? One brigade
would have established a line of patrol posts less than a quarter of
a mile apart of six men each, which would have detected at once any
movement south by Lee, or if preferred, posts one-eighth of a mile
apart of three men each.
[22] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," p. 12.
Would Grant or Sheridan have remained so near a great battle as at
Gettysburg, July 1, 1864, and not have furnished an opportunity
for another soul-stirring poem like "Sheridan's Ride"? When they
were informed that the enemy had attacked their forces barely
three hours' ride away, would they have loitered a whole day away
like dullards, as both army commanders did at Gettysburg?[23] Aye!
either would have made the ride in two hours or even less, and even
though their steeds were as black as night, on their arrival at
Gettysburg they would have been as white as snow or as foam could
have made them; and, still better, they would not only have known,
too, through their cavalry, spies, etc., for we were at home among
friends, where Lee's army corps were, but when each broke camp to
concentrate at Gettysburg, and their own corps close by them would
have been there in season to have met the enemy in at least equal
numbers, instead of being outnumbered all day July 1, two to one, as
was the case.[24] If necessary, too, as at Opequan Creek, Sept. 19,
1864, the different corps would have marched at 2 o'clock instead
of 8 o'clock A. M. or even earlier if thought necessary.
[23] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 16-17.
[24] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 19-33.
Was there any excuse for the Confederates not driving the Union
forces from the field in a rout on July first? They would have
done so, too, except that their forces were fought in detail, its
reserves not even being brought into action when needed.[25] Did
Ewell take the best advantage of his opportunities? The enemy
outnumbered us quite two to one the first day from first to last
after the battle commenced, but still at the first dash of two
brigades of our Infantry--Wadsworth's Division--against two brigades
of the enemy, when Reynolds was killed, we placed _hors de combat_
over half of each of their brigades and captured Archer, a brigade
commander; and still the enemy had two brigades in immediate reserve
as support, but they were not used.[26] This is what I call fighting
an army in detail, a total waste of material. In case Sheridan
hadn't thrown his support or reserve--Russell's division--into
the fight at the right moment at Winchester, Va., Sept. 19, 1864,
his results would have been equally as ignominious as his victory
was brilliant, because he did use his reserve correctly on that
occasion; and so it would have been with the enemy at Gettysburg had
it used its reserve. It would probably have captured many of our
men and driven the balance of them from the field in a rout, as
Sheridan did Early at Winchester, Sept. 19, 1864; there was nothing
to prevent it.
[25] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 19-33.
[26] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 19-33.
Does Lee deserve being classed among the greatest field marshals
of modern times for such field marshalship as was displayed at
the first day's fighting at Gettysburg? But, says the incompetent
critic who forms his conclusions from gush, policy, favoritism,
sentiment, or weakly otherwise, instead of for the sake of truth and
correct history, Lee wasn't there! Aye! but wasn't it an _alert_
Commander's--a _genius's_--business to have been there? What was
he in Pennsylvania for or selected and paid for handling such an
important matter to the Confederacy for? Who gave the order to
concentrate for battle at Gettysburg but he?[27] Does not every
experienced soldier know that under such circumstances no one can
tell exactly at what moment a battle will commence? And would not an
alert, sagacious commander have made a forced night ride in order to
have been with the first of his forces on the field? Lee _knew_ he
was going to fight if the enemy would fight him, but Meade didn't;
hence Lee knew exactly what to do.[28] A _great_ field marshal would
have been more alert--on hand--it seems to me.
[27] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," p. 57.
[28] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 52-3.
Lee commanded in person the second day at Gettysburg, and not only
failed to attack early in the morning, when he should, but, as
usual, when he did, fought his army in detail using Longstreet's
corps largely against two of our corps in turn which, being
overwhelmed by numbers, and Meade failing to reinforce them, as
he should or not have sent them where he did, they were of course
forced back to their proper positions onto the correct line of
battle beyond which they should never have been advanced, and with a
sagacious, alert, competent commander would not have been except the
whole army advanced together in a general assault which it should
have done anyway after Wright's brigade was repulsed.[29]
[29] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 34-45.
From first to last in the battle of Gettysburg, I fail to see
anything to commend on the enemy's part in any of its generals
except in Longstreet; nor on the Union side so far as Meade was
concerned, but do in many others, and especially Buford, Reynolds,
Doubleday and Howard, each of whom in turn successively commanded
our forces in the order mentioned without being routed, against
great odds under exceedingly trying circumstances owing to Meade's
failure apparently, to fully grasp the situation _fourteen miles
away_. It shows what splendid fighters Buford, Reynolds, Doubleday
and Howard's men were to stand off double their number for an entire
day, with what help they got from Schurz's men.
That Lee did not grasp the situation is evident or else he would
have assaulted our lines early on the morning of July second before
Meade's forces arrived on the field. It is said he did give the
order to do so, but if he had been a _great_ military genius
wouldn't he have _seen_ that it was done? Instead of this owing
largely probably, to Meade's lack of alertness and enterprise, Lee
from lack of sagacity became apparently dizzy and unbalanced, as
was most of his command, because of his apparently misunderstood
partial successes, of the first and second days' fights, and was so
criminally lacking in good judgment on the third day as to be led
into the mistake of ordering Pickett's charge which, for obvious
reasons, could only result in calamity to the Southern cause.[30]
This even an amateur soldier of ordinary judgment should have been
able to have foreseen.
[30] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 34-45.
My sympathy in a military and every other sense so far as the enemy
is concerned, goes out to Longstreet sitting on the fence with bowed
head, a picture of despair and blasted hopes probably not only on
account of a useless slaughter of his brave men which he foresaw,
but because of a loss of faith in the ability of his chief and in
consequence the loss eventually of the cause of the Confederacy; and
what thoughtful military man of experience can't see what else for
scapegoats are always found for such occasions on which to try and
lay the blame. But it won't do with ripe scientific military men nor
would it with Lee were he living, for when too late he doubtless saw
his mistake, as he acknowledged like the _man_ he _always_ was to
his veterans, when returning from the slaughter after the assault
that the calamity of defeat was all his fault.[31] How pathetic!
[31] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 19-33.
Longstreet's heart was doubtless breaking when Pickett seemingly
too thoughtless to comprehend the situation rode up to Longstreet
and then "gaily" to his command in the midst of the artillery
fire preceding the assault, and asked if he should commence the
charge.[32] Longstreet's heart and tongue were doubtless as good as
paralyzed or at any rate refused to perform their function, and he
answered with a sad and silent nod.
[32] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 19-65.
How any military student of age and extended experience in
warfare--for few others are expert judges--who ever studied the
country north of the Potomac river, field and battle of Gettysburg
or Antietam, can class Lee with Marlborough and Wellington, it is
difficult to understand; and Lee's mistakes here were by no means
his only. He never found his superior, though, on the battlefield
until he met Grant when, for the first time, he found a _genius_
who didn't know what it was to retreat before the Army of Northern
Virginia, nor did Lee ever advance again but to be checkmated.
Prior to that the Army of the Potomac had taken care of itself
single-handed--so to speak--as it would have done anywhere after
1862, if placed in line and told to fight, if let alone: it would
have carried any man at its head through to victory, as it did Meade
at Gettysburg, and especially in such a place as that when so much
depended upon it.
It was the intrepid men with the guns, many of whom were more
competent in battle than some of their officers, who largely won the
battles, and not unfrequently because of greater physical endurance
and undaunted courage led in the hottest places by scores in all
assaults, for otherwise but few battles would have been won. To be
in such company was an inspiration for such men knew no fear and
they were not reckless either, but coolly alert in taking every
advantage of surroundings and conditions, as well as of the enemy.
Such needed no officer to lead them, but they would be devoted to
one who had the pluck to go with them, and fortunate was he who was
strong enough to put fear behind him and do it. It is more elevating
morally to be born with such a gift than rich.
Anyone who has read Lincoln's telegrams and letters to Meade
imploring him not to let Lee escape across the Potomac after
Pickett's suicidal charge which is only exceeded in American War
history in lack of ability by Abercrombie's maladministration of his
Ticonderoga campaign in the Colonial war in 1758. cannot possibly
think Grant or Sheridan would have showed so little military genius;
and it is a disappointment to one in mature years who fought
continually under Meade in youth about two years to find that
he was so lacking in sagacity and military enterprise as to not
take advantage of his great opportunities. He was all right when a
subordinate, but out of place as chief.
It was largely lack of ability on the part of commanders of the
Army of the Potomac as military men until Lee met Grant, which
in contrast makes Lee appear to some unread in civil war history
so much more brilliant than he really was as a military man. It
was very generally supposed during the war it was interference
from Washington that caused a lack of success on the part of the
Army of the Potomac, but official correspondence between Lincoln
and others at Washington with the different commanders of the
Army of the Potomac published since the Civil War shows that it
was largely due to their downright ignorance of how to conduct a
campaign until Grant took command, which rendered it absolutely
necessary to interfere. To a man of long expert military training
some of the questions asked by commanders of Lincoln and others, are
astonishing. They not only show a lack of judgment, self reliance
and ability, but in some cases utter incompetency; and when such
didn't asked to be relieved from force of circumstances, they _had_
to be. In most cases it was disingenuously claimed by the incumbent
that they were handicapped by the Washington authorities, which is
probably what largely created the false impression that they were
much imposed upon. The government doubtless considerately thought it
could not afford to let the truth be known for obvious reasons, and
besides it was doubtless thought such men might be efficient in a
less responsible position in cases of emergency and their usefulness
would be impaired if the real facts were made known; hence the
position of Lincoln and others near to him in Washington in such a
respect was not only a noble self sacrifice, but must have been even
more trying than at any time or even now generally known. Under such
circumstances any ordinary commander of the Confederate Army would
appear to good advantage as Lee did, which, to any but one who is
expert, is misleading. He had military talent but it even was never
fully developed. His was _not_ Genius:
"Genius spreads its wings
And soars beyond itself, or selfish things.
Talent has need of stepping-stones; some cross,
Some cheated purpose, some great pain or loss,
Must lay the groundwork, and arouse ambition,
Before it labors onward to fruition."
But Lee never in war arose to such sublime heights if indeed ever in
a military sense.
Even Longstreet's Chief of Artillery, General Alexander, a man
of splendid sense and judgment, in his "Military Memoirs of a
Confederate," holds that the real crisis of the War did not occur
until Grant's movement against Petersburg, which is correct,
and that his strategy in that campaign was well planned and
successfully executed. He acknowledges that Grant completely
outmanoeuvered Lee for the last three days during the Petersburg
movement, thus saving his army from attack by the combined forces
of Lee and Beauregard, which is also correct. Imagine Lee's
disappointment when he found out what had been going on after
Grant had crossed the James river! It completely checkmated him,
even his last kick--Early's Shenandoah Valley campaign--proving
worse than a failure it so weakened Lee's army. Think you Lee then
thought himself a greater field marshal than Grant? Or after being
continually flanked by him from the Rapidan to Petersburg and later
to Appomattox where his surrender occurred?
In bringing up this matter at this opportune time when contrasts
can be sharply and tellingly drawn as at Winchester and Gettysburg,
my purpose has not been to disparage anyone unfairly, but to get
at the truth as I see it for the sake of true history. So long a
time has elapsed since the war that I look upon it and its actors
dispassionately, and I can award praise or censure on either side
whenever deserved with calmness and impartiality. Therefore if, as
a veteran, I have advanced any new ideas on a subject necessarily
somewhat perplexing to the general public, at any period, my object
in treating it will have been accomplished.
Possibly there may be some excuse for such as did not fight in
the Army of the Potomac three years and have not read the latest
history on the Civil War and made it a study, erring in their
estimates of the leaders in that conflict. I always, even during
the war, thought the South had abler men to command its army of
Northern Virginia even in that army than Lee, but none more lovely
in disposition and character. He was a good man and good but _not_ a
_great_ general; and, much less, in the same class with Marlborough,
Wellington, and others of modern wars, or Grant, Sheridan, and
others of the Civil War, which facts prove. Any man who is a
military expert familiar with the subject both from participation,
history and study, if of good judgment and honest, will readily
concede this. Lee's distinguished lineage has nothing to do with his
military history. He should be judged on his own merits in such a
way, but his antecedents and charming personal character seemingly
makes it difficult for most writers to place him in a military sense
where he belongs. In my opinion, all things being equal, he was no
match for Grant.
TUESDAY, Sept. 20, 1864.
My wounds were very painful during the night, my lips and face are
terribly swollen and my jaws are in shocking condition, but I'm
thankful it is no worse. My side and chest are very lame, but I
hope it is nothing more serious than a bruise or contusion. Lieut.
Hill has had his leg amputated, but I don't think he can live, the
stump is so short--poor, brave, gallant, natty Hill with the most
of life before him. Sheridan's loss was 5018 of which 4300 were
killed and wounded. Early's loss was about the same. About 850 of
his wounded fell into our hands. Our division lost 600 in killed and
wounded and seventeen are missing, more than both of the other two
divisions of our corps together. Our regiment lost twelve killed
and forty-six wounded. Sheridan captured two thousand prisoners,
five pieces of artillery and nine battle flags. Generals Rhodes and
Godwin of Kershaw's Division were killed, and General York lost an
arm. I saw Major Dillingham at a distance as he lay stricken, when
I entered the hospital grounds yesterday. He was no shirk in battle
but valiant. We feel like sparing him least of any, and had not
looked for it, therefore it is a great shock. Only a moment before
the order to advance he was talking with several officers near me
and was in the best of spirits which, it occurred to me at the time,
greatly contrasted with my feeling for I never dreaded more to go
into battle. I was greatly but silently depressed.
WEDNESDAY, Sept. 21, 1864.
I was moved up to Winchester yesterday with the rest of the wounded.
The city is one vast hospital--in fact nearly every house is used
to accommodate the wounded, and it was a smart place of about four
thousand before the war, but now is one of about ten thousand, owing
to this battle. Most of the wounded officers were left at Taylor's
Hotel. The surgeons are very busy amputating limbs. It is said
that there are over 1300 wounded in this hotel. My wounds are doing
well considering but are very painful. Oh, what a horrible sight! I
have seen piles of arms and legs today at the hospital thrown from
the windows of operating rooms as big as haycocks. It's a shocking
sight! So many lying about dead, too! It is rumored that we have
again given Early battle and completely routed his forces capturing
a large number of prisoners, but this needs confirmation.
[Illustration: No. 10.
Taylor Hotel, Winchester, Va., used during the Civil War by the
Union and Confederate armies as Headquarters and Hospital, 1861-65.
Said to have sheltered 1,300 wounded of both armies after Sheridan's
battle of Winchester, Sept. 19, 1864; it was here Lieut. D. G. Hill,
Tenth Vermont Volunteer Infantry, died. It is now (1908) vacant.]
THURSDAY, Sept. 22, 1864.