_Zeal of Britain with regard to the Spanish struggle--It is
resolved to send an Expedition to Portugal--Retrospect of what had
passed in that Country--Portuguese Assembly of Notables summoned to
Bayonne--Their Singular Audience of Buonaparte--Effects of the
Spanish Success on Portugal--Sir Arthur Wellesley--His Character as
a General--Despatched at the head of the Expedition to
Portugal--Attacks and defeats the French at Roriça--Battle and
victory of Vimeiro--Sir Harry Burrard Neale assumes the command,
and frustrates the results proposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley from
the Battle--Sir Harry Burrard is superseded by Sir Hew
Dalrymple--Convention of Cintra--Its Unpopularity in England--A
Court of Inquiry is held._
There is nothing more praiseworthy in the British, or rather in the
English character--for it is they who in this respect give tone to the
general feelings of the other two British nations--than the noble
candour with which, laying aside all petty and factious considerations,
they have at all times united in the same spring-tide of sentiment, when
the object in question was in itself heart-stirring and generous. At no
time was this unison of sentiment more universally felt and expressed,
than when the news became general through Britain that the Spanish
nation, the victim of an unparalleled process of treachery, had resolved
to break through the toils by which they were enclosed, and vindicate
their national independence at the hazard of their lives. "The war,"
says the elegant historian,[423] to whose labours we are so much
indebted in this part of our subject, "assumed a higher and holier
character, and men looked to the issue with faith as well as hope." Both
these were the brighter that they seemed to have arisen out of the
midnight of scepticism, concerning the existence of public spirit in
Spain.
It became the universal wish of Britain, to afford the Spaniards every
possible assistance in their honourable struggle. Sheridan declared,
that the period had arrived for striking a decisive blow for the
liberation of Europe; and another distinguished member of
Opposition,[424] having expressed himself with more reserve on the
subject, found it necessary to explain, that in doing so he disclaimed
the thoughts of abandoning the heroic Spaniards to their fate. But it
was with particular interest, that all lovers of their country listened
to the manly declaration of Mr. Canning,[425] in which, disclaiming the
false and petty policy which made an especial object of what were called
peculiarly British interests, he pledged himself, and the Administration
to which he belonged, for pursuing such measures as might ensure Spanish
success, because it was that which, considering the cause in which she
was embarked, comprehended the essential interest not of England only,
but of the world. The resolution to support Spain through the struggle,
founded as it was on this broad and generous basis, met the universal
approbation of the country.
It remained only to inquire in what shape the succours of Britain should
be invested, in order to render them most advantageous to the cause of
Spanish independence. Most Spaniards seemed to concur with the deputies,
who had been hastily despatched to England by the Junta of the Asturias,
in declining the assistance of an auxiliary army; "of men," they said,
"Spain had more than enough." Arms, ammunition, and clothing, were sent,
therefore, with a liberal and unsparing profusion, and military officers
of skill and experience were despatched, to assist where their services
could be useful to the insurgents. The war with Spain was declared at an
end, and the Spanish prisoners, freed from confinement, clothed, and
regaled at the expense of the English, were returned to their country in
a sort of triumph.[426]
[Sidenote: BRITISH EXPEDITION TO PORTUGAL.]
The conduct of the Spaniards in declining the aid of British troops,
partly perhaps arose out of that overweening confidence which has been
elsewhere noted as their great national foible, and might be partly
justified by the difficulty of combining the operations of a body of
native insurgents with regular forces, consisting of foreigners,
professing a different religion, and speaking another language. These
objections, however, did not apply with the same force to Portugal,
where the subjected state of the country did not permit their national
pride, though not inferior to that of the Spaniards, to assume so high a
tone; and where, from long alliance, the English, in despite of their
being foreigners and heretics, were ever regarded with favour. It was,
therefore, resolved to send an expedition, consisting of a considerable
body of troops, to assist in the emancipation of Portugal, an operation
for which the progress of the Spanish insurrection rendered the time
favourable.
[Sidenote: PORTUGAL.]
We left Portugal under the provisional command of General Junot,
described by Napoleon himself as one whose vanity was only equalled by
his rapacity, and who conducted himself like a tyrant over the
unresisting natives, from whom he levied the most intolerable exactions.
There is no access to know in what manner Napoleon intended to dispose
of this ancient kingdom. The partition treaty executed at Fontainbleau,
which had been made the pretext of occupying Portugal, had never been in
reality designed to regulate its destinies, and was neglected on all
sides, as much as if it never had existed. Buonaparte subsequently seems
to have entertained some ideas of new-modelling the kingdom, which
caused him to summon together at Bayonne a Diet, or Assembly of
Portuguese Notables, in order to give an ostensible authority to the
change which he was about to introduce.
They met him there, according to the summons; and, although their
proceedings had no material consequences, yet, as narrated by the Abbé
de Pradt, who was present on the occasion, they form too curious an
illustration of Buonaparte's mind and manner to be omitted in this
place. Having heard with indifference an address pronounced by the Count
de Lima, an ancient Portuguese noble, who was President of the
deputation, Napoleon opened the business in this light and desultory
way:--"I hardly know what to make of you, gentlemen--it must depend on
the events in Spain. And then, are you of consequence sufficient to
constitute a separate people?--have you enough of size to do so? Your
Prince has let himself be carried off to the Brazils by the English--he
has committed a great piece of folly, and he will not be long in
repenting of it. A prince," he added, turning gaily to the Abbé de
Pradt, "is like a bishop--he ought to reside within his charge."--Then
again speaking to the Count de Lima, he asked what was the population of
Portugal, answering, at the game time, his own question, "Two millions,
is it?"--"More than three, Sire," replied the Count.--"Ah--I did not
know that--And Lisbon--are there one hundred and fifty thousand
inhabitants?"--"More than double that number, Sire."--"Ah--I was not
aware of that."
Proceeding through several questions regarding matters in which his
information did not seem more accurate, he at length approached the
prime subject of the conference. "What do you wish to be, you
Portuguese?" he said. "Do you desire to become Spaniards?" This
question, even from Napoleon, roused the whole pride of the Portuguese;
for it is well known with what ill-will and jealousy they regard the
sister-country of the Peninsula, against whom they have so long
preserved their independence. The Count de Lima drew up his person to
its full height, laid his hand on his sword, and answered the insulting
demand by a loud No, which resounded through the whole apartment.
Buonaparte was not offended, but rather amused by this trait of national
character. He broke up the meeting without entering farther on the
business for which it was summoned together, and afterwards told those
about his person, that the Count of Lima had treated him with a superb
No. He even showed some personal favour to that high-spirited nobleman,
but proceeded no farther in his correspondence with the Portuguese
deputies. The whole scene is curious, as serving to show how familiar
the transference of allegiance, and alienation of sovereignty, was
become to his mind, since in the case of a kingdom like Portugal, of
some importance were even its ancient renown alone regarded, he could
advance to the consideration of its future state with such imperfect
knowledge of its circumstances, and so much levity both of manner and of
purpose. Kingdoms had become the cards, which he shuffled and dealt at
his pleasure, with all the indifference of a practised gamester. The
occasion he had for the services of the Portuguese assembly of Notables
passed away, and the deputies of whom it had consisted were sent to
Bourdeaux, where they resided in neglect and poverty until the general
peace permitted them to return to Portugal.
Some hints in Buonaparte's letter to Murat, formerly quoted, might
induce one to believe that the crown of the house of Braganza was meant
to be transferred to his brows;[427] but he obtained that of Naples, and
the fate of Portugal continued undetermined, when the consequences of
the Spanish Revolution seemed about to put it beyond the influence of
Napoleon.
A movement so general as the Revolution effected in Spain through all
her provinces, could not fail to have a sympathetic effect on the sister
kingdom of Portugal, on whom the French yoke pressed so much more
severely; not merely wounding the pride, and destroying the independence
of the country, but leading to the plunder of its resources, and the
maltreatment of the inhabitants. The spirit which animated the Spaniards
soon showed itself among the Portuguese. Oporto, the second city in the
kingdom, after a first attempt at insurrection, which the French, by aid
of the timid local authorities, found themselves able to suppress, made
a second effort with better success, expelled the French from the city
and the adjacent country, and placed themselves under the command of a
provisional junta, at the head of whom was the Bishop of Oporto. The
kindling fire flew right and left in every direction; and at length,
wherever the French did not possess a strong and predominating armed
force, the country was in insurrection against them. This did not pass
without much bloodshed. The French, under command of Loison, marched
from the frontier fortress of Almeida, to suppress the insurrection at
Oporto; but General Silviera, a Portuguese nobleman, who had put himself
at the head of the armed population, managed so to harass the enemy's
march, that he was compelled to abandon his intention, and return to
Almeida, though his force amounted to four thousand men. At Beja,
Leiria, Evora,[428] and other places, the discipline of the French
overcame the opposition of the citizens and peasantry; and, in order to
strike terror, the bloody hand of military execution was extended
against the unfortunate towns and districts. But the inhumanity of the
victors only served to increase the numbers and ferocity of their
enemies. Men who had seen their houses burned, their vineyards torn up,
their females violated, had no further use of life save for revenge; and
when either numbers, position, or other advantages, gave the Portuguese
an opportunity, it was exercised with premeditated and relentless
cruelty.[429]
[Sidenote: SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.]
Had Junot been able to employ his full force against the insurgents, it
is likely that in so narrow a country this miserable war might have been
ended by the despotic efforts of irresistible military force. But the
French general had apprehensions from another quarter, which obliged him
to concentrate a considerable part of his army, that might otherwise
have been disposable for the total subjugation of Portugal. Britain,
long excluded from the continent, had assumed, with regard to it, the
attitude of the Grecian hero, who, with his lance pointed towards his
enemy, surveys his armour of proof from head to foot, in hopes of
discovering some rent or flaw, through which to deal a wound. Junot
justly argued, that the condition of the peninsula, more especially of
Portugal, was such as to invite a descent on the part of the English. In
fact, an expedition of ten thousand men had already sailed from Cork,
and, what was of more importance than if the force had been trebled, it
was placed under the command of SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, a younger son of
the Earl of Mornington, one of those gifted individuals upon whom the
fate of the world seems to turn like a gate upon its hinges, or as a
vessel is managed by its rudder.
In India, Sir Arthur Wellesley had seen and conducted war upon a large
and extended scale, of which no general officer in the European army of
England had much comprehension, at least much experience. He was well
acquainted with the best mode of supplying armies while in the field.
His thoughts had been familiarly exercised in the task of combining
grand general movements over extended regions, and his natural genius,
deducing the principles of war from the service which he had seen in the
East, qualified him to apply them to other countries, and to an enemy
of a different description. Formidable in his preparations for battle,
and successful in the action itself, he was even more distinguished by
the alertness and sagacity which never rested satisfied with a useless
victory, but improved to the uttermost the advantages which he had
attained, by his own masterly dispositions, and the valour of his
troops. His mind was never entirely engrossed by the passing event, how
absorbing soever its importance; the past and the future were alike
before him; and the deductions derived from a consideration of the
whole, were combined, in all their bearings, with a truth and
simplicity, which seemed the work of intuition, rather than the exercise
of judgment. In fact, the mind of this singular and distinguished man
seemed inaccessible to those false and delusive views which mislead
ordinary thinkers; his strength of judgment rejected them, as some soils
will not produce noxious weeds; and it might be said of him, that on
subjects to which he gave his attention, the opinions which he formed,
approached, perhaps, as near the perfection of human reason as the
fallibility of our nature will permit.
To this prescience of intellect, in itself so rare a quality, was added
a decision, which, when his resolution was once formed, enabled Sir
Arthur Wellesley to look to the event with a firmness, inaccessible to
all the doubts and vacillations to which minds of the highest resolution
have been found accessible in arduous circumstances, but which are sure
to impair the energy, and exhaust the spirits of others. A frame fitted
to endure every species of fatigue and privation, and capable of
supplying the want of regular repose by hasty and brief slumbers,
snatched as occasion permitted, together with a power of vision
uncommonly acute, may be mentioned as tending to complete the qualities
of Sir Arthur Wellesley for the extraordinary part to which Providence
had destined him. It may be added, that in precision of thought,
sagacity of judgment, promptness of decision, and firmness of
resolution, there was a considerable resemblance betwixt Napoleon and
the English General, destined to be his great rival; and that the
characters of both serve to show that the greatest actions are
performed, and the greatest objects attained, not by men who are gifted
with any rare and singular peculiarities of talent, but by those in whom
the properties of judgment, firmness, power of calculation, and rapidity
in execution, which ordinary men possess in an ordinary degree, are
carried to the highest and most uncommon degree of perfection.
Sir Arthur Wellesley's qualities were well known in India, where, in the
brilliant campaign of Assaye, he defeated the whole force of the
Mahrattas, and ended triumphantly a long and doubtful war. The following
expressions, on his leaving India, occur in the familiar letter of an
excellent judge of human character, and who, it is to be hoped, lives to
take a natural and just pride in the event of his own prophecy:--"You
seem," he wrote to his European correspondent, "to be at a loss for
generals in England. There is one now returning from India, who, if you
can overcome the objections of precedence and length of service, and
place him at once at the head of the British army, is capable of saving
England at least, if not Europe, from the dangers which seem thickening
around you."--Most fortunately for England, and for Europe, the
objections which might have obstructed the rise of another officer in
like circumstances, did not operate against Sir Arthur Wellesley in the
same degree. His brother, the Marquis Wellesley, distinguished by the
talents which had governed and extended our empire in India, had already
much interest in our domestic councils, in which, some months
afterwards, he held an eminent place.
He was selected at this important crisis to go as ambassador
plenipotentiary to Spain, as one on whose wisdom and experience the
utmost reliance could be reposed. The Marquis was of course well
acquainted with Sir Arthur's talents; and, conscious that in urging his
brother's pretensions to high employment in his profession, he was
preparing for the arms of Great Britain every chance of the most
distinguished success, he requested his assistance as the hand to
execute the counsels, which were, in a great measure, to emanate from
himself as the head.
The army and the public had become acquainted with Sir Arthur's merits
during the brief campaign of Copenhagen--his name already inspired hope
and confidence into the country--and when the brother of the Marquis
Wellesley received the command of the expedition destined for the
peninsula, none hinted that the selection had been made from undue
partiality; and subsequent events soon taught the nation, not only that
the confidence, so far as reposed in Sir Arthur Wellesley, was perfectly
just, but that it ought, in wisdom, to have been much more absolute.
Under these auspices the expedition set sail for the peninsula, and,
touching at Corunna, received such news as determined Sir Arthur
Wellesley to select Portugal as the scene of his operations, being the
point upon which success seemed most likely to influence the general
cause. He opened a communication with Oporto, and soon learned the
important news of the defeat of Dupont, and the flight of the intrusive
King from Madrid. These tidings were of particular importance, because
the consequences were likely to find full occupation in Spain for the
victorious army of Bessières, which, if left disengaged, might have
entered Portugal, and co-operated with Junot. At the same time, a body
of British troops, which had been destined to support Castanos, was left
disposable by the surrender of Baylen, and, having embarked for
Portugal, now joined Sir Arthur Wellesley. Lastly, came the important
intelligence, that Sir Arthur's army was to be reinforced immediately
with fifteen thousand men, and that Sir Hew Dalrymple was to command in
chief. This officer was governor of Gibraltar, and, during the Spanish
insurrection, had acted both with wisdom and energy in assisting,
advising, and encouraging the patriots; but it is doing him no injury to
say, that he does not appear to have had the uncommon combination of
talents, both military and political, which, in the present crisis, the
situation of commander-in-chief in Portugal peremptorily demanded.
[Sidenote: ACTION OF RORIÇA.]
Assured of these succours, Sir Arthur Wellesley disembarked his army in
Mondego bay, and advanced towards Leiria by the sea-coast for the sake
of communicating with the fleet, from which they received their
provisions. The French generals Laborde and Thomieres were detached from
Lisbon to check the progress of the invaders, and Loison, moving from
the Alantejo, was in readiness to form a junction with his countrymen.
In the meantime, a tumultuary Portuguese army of insurgents commanded by
General Freire, an unreasonable and capricious man, (who afterwards lost
his life under strong suspicions of treachery to the patriot cause,)
first incommoded the British general by extravagant pretensions, and
finally altogether declined to co-operate with him. A general of an
ordinary character might not unreasonably have been so far disgusted
with the conduct of those whom he had come to assist, as to feel
diminished zeal in a cause which seemed to be indifferent to its natural
defenders. But Sir Arthur Wellesley, distinguished as much by his
knowledge of mankind as his military talents, knew how to make allowance
for the caprice of an individual called suddenly to a command, for which
perhaps his former life had not fitted him, and for the ebb and flow of
national spirit in the ranks of an insurgent population. He knew that
victory over the French was necessary to obtain the confidence of the
Portuguese; and, with an alertness and activity which had prevented the
junction of Loison with Laborde, he pushed on to attack (17th August)
the latter French general, where he waited the approach of his colleague
in a strong position near the town of Roriça. Attacking at once in front
and upon the flank, he drove them from their ground, and his victory
formed the first permanent and available success obtained by the British
army in the eventful Peninsular struggle. Laborde retreated upon Torres
Vedras, on which Loison had also directed his course.[430]
The Portuguese insurrection became wide and general on flank and rear,
and Junot saw little chance of extinguishing the conflagration, unless
he should be able to defeat the English general in a pitched battle. For
this purpose he withdrew all the French garrisons except from Lisbon
itself, Elvas, Almeida, and Peniche; and, collecting his whole forces,
at Vimeiro, near Torres Vedras, determined there to abide the shock of
war.
In the meanwhile, Sir Arthur Wellesley had been joined by a part of the
promised succours; who, disembarking with difficulty on the dangerous
coast, formed a junction with the main body as they marched towards the
enemy. It was not an equally fortunate circumstance, that Sir Harry
Burrard Neale, an officer of superior rank, also appeared on the coast,
and communicated with Sir Arthur Wellesley. The latter explained his
plan of engaging the French army, and throwing it back on Lisbon, where
an insurrection would instantly have taken place in their rear, and thus
Portugal might have been delivered by a single blow. But Sir Harry
Burrard, though a brave officer, does not appear to have had that
confidence in the British soldiery, which they so well deserve at the
hands of their leaders. He recommended a defensive system until the
arrival of the rest of the succours from England; neither seeing how
much, in war, depends upon a sudden and powerful effort, nor considering
that the French of all men can best employ to their own advantage,
whatever leisure may be allowed them by the timidity or indecision of
their enemy.
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF VIMEIRO.]
At this time, however, the difficulties of Junot's situation had
determined him on the hazard of a general action; and the armies being
already very near each other, the only change occasioned in the course
of events by the interposition of the lately arrived British general,
was, that Sir Arthur Wellesley, instead of being the assailant, as he
had proposed, was, on the memorable 21st August, himself attacked by
Junot near the town of Vimeiro. The British amounted to about 16,000
men, but of these not above one half were engaged; the French consisted
of about 14,000, all of whom were brought into action.[431] The French
attacked in two divisions; that on the left, commanded by Laborde, about
five thousand men, and that on the right, under Loison, considerably
stronger. The centre, or reserve, was commanded by Kellerman, occupied
the space between the attacking divisions, and served to connect them
with each other. The battle was interesting to military men, as forming
a remarkable example of that peculiar mode of tactics by which the
French troops had so often broken through and disconcerted the finest
troops of the continent, and also of the manner in which their impetuous
valour might be foiled and rendered unavailing, by a steady, active, and
resolute enemy.
The favourite mode of attack by the French was, we have often noticed,
by formation into massive columns, the centre and rear of which give the
head no opportunity to pause, but thrust the leading files headlong
forward on the thin line of enemies opposed to them, which are
necessarily broken through, as unequal to sustain the weight of the
charging body. In this manner, and in full confidence of success,
General Laborde in person, heading a column of better than two thousand
men, rushed on the British advanced guard, consisting of the 50th
regiment, with some field-pieces, and a single company of
sharp-shooters. The regiment, about four hundred men in number, drawn up
in line on the brow of a hill, presented an obstacle so little
formidable to the heavy column which came against them, that it seemed
the very noise of their approach should have driven them from the
ground. But Colonel Walker suddenly altering the formation of his
regiment, so as to place its line obliquely on the flank of the
advancing column, instead of remaining parallel to it, opened a
terrible, well-sustained, and irresistible fire, where every ball
passing through the dense array of the enemy, made more than one victim,
and where the close discharge of grape-shot was still more fatal. This
heavy and destructive fire was immediately seconded by a charge with the
bayonet, by which the column, unable to form or to deploy, received on
their defenceless flank, and among their shattered ranks, the attack of
the handful of men whom they had expected at once to sweep from their
course. The effect was instantaneous and irresistible; and the French,
who had hitherto behaved with the utmost steadiness, broke their ranks
and ran, leaving near three-fourths of their number in killed, wounded,
and prisoners.[432] The same sort of close combat was general over the
field. The brigade of General Fergusson, on the right, was attacked by
General Loison with an impetuosity and vigour not inferior to that of
Laborde. A mutual charge of bayonets took place; and here, as at Maida,
the French advanced, indeed, bravely to the shock, but lost heart at the
moment of the fatal encounter. To what else can we ascribe the
undeniable fact, that their whole front rank, amounting to three hundred
grenadiers, lay stretched on the ground almost in a single instant?[433]
The French were now in full retreat on all sides. They had abandoned
their artillery--they were flying in confusion--the battle was won--the
victor had only to stretch forth his hand to grasp the full fruits of
conquest. Sir Arthur Wellesley had determined to move one part of his
army on Torres Vedras, so as to get between the French and the nearest
road to Lisbon, while with another division he followed the chase of the
beaten army, to whom thus no retreat on Lisbon would remain, but by a
circuitous route through a country in a state of insurrection.
Unhappily, Sir Arthur Wellesley's period of command was for the present
ended. Sir Harry Burrard had landed during the action, and had with due
liberality declined taking any command until the battle seemed to be
over; when it unhappily occurred to him, in opposition to the
remonstrances of Sir Arthur Wellesley, General Fergusson, and other
general officers, to interpose his authority for the purpose of
prohibiting farther pursuit.[434] He accounted such a measure incautious
where the enemy was superior in cavalry, and perhaps entertained too
sensitive a feeling of the superiority of French tactics. Thus Vimeiro,
in its direct consequences, seemed to be only another example of a
victory gained by the English without any corresponding results; one of
those numerous instances, in which the soldiers gain the battle from
confidence in their own hearts and arms, and the general fails to
improve it, perhaps from an equally just diffidence of his own skill and
talents.
Meanwhile, Sir Hew Dalrymple, arriving from Gibraltar in a frigate,
superseded Sir Harry Burrard, as Sir Harry had superseded Sir Arthur;
and thus, within twenty-four hours, the English army had successively
three commanders-in-chief.[435] The time of prosecuting the victory was
passed away before Sir Hew Dalrymple came ashore--for the French had
been able to gain the position of Torres Vedras, from which it had been
Sir Arthur Wellesley's chief object to exclude them. That general then
knew well, as he afterwards showed to the world, what advantage might be
taken of that position for the defence of Lisbon.
But Junot had suffered too severely in the battle of Vimeiro, and had
too many difficulties to contend with, to admit of his meditating an
obstinate defence. The victorious British army was in his front--the
insurgents, encouraged by the event of the battle, were on his
flanks--the English fleet might operate in his rear--and the populous
town of Lisbon itself was not to be kept down without a great military
force. Then if the successes in Andalusia were to be followed by similar
events, the Spanish armies might invade Portugal, and co-operate with
the English. Moved by these circumstances, the French general was
induced to propose that evacuation of Portugal, its cities, and
fortresses, which was afterwards concluded by the treaty of Cintra.[436]
The French, by the articles of that convention, were to be transported
to their own country, with their arms, artillery, and property--under
which last article they carried off much of the plunder of which they
had stripped the Portuguese. A Russian fleet in the Tagus; commanded by
Admiral Siniavin, was delivered up to the English, in deposit, as it was
termed; so unwilling were we to use towards Russia the language or
practice of war, although the countries were in a state of avowed
hostilities. In a military point of view, all the British generals
concurred in approving of the convention. Sir Arthur Wellesley, who saw
better, it may be supposed, than the others, how long the war might be
protracted, after the favourable moment of victory had been permitted to
pass without being improved, considered the liberation of Portugal, with
its sea-coast, its ports, and its fortresses, besides the eastern line
of frontier, which offered an easy communication with Spain, as an
advantage of the highest importance, and cheaply purchased by the
articles granted to Junot.
[Sidenote: CONVENTION OF CINTRA.]
But the light in which the people of England saw the Convention of
Cintra,[437] was extremely different. It is their nature to nurse
extravagant hopes, and they are proportionally incensed when such are
disappointed. The public were never more generally united in the
reprobation of any measure; and although much of their resentment was
founded in ignorance and prejudice, yet there were circumstances in the
transaction which justified in some measure the general indignation. The
succession of the three generals was compared to the playing of
trump-cards at a game of whist; and, whether it was designed or
fortuitous, had an air of indecision that was almost ludicrous. Then it
was obvious, that the younger and inferior officer of the three had been
prevented from following up the victory he had gained, and that this
interference had rendered necessary the convention which England seemed
determined to consider as injurious to Portugal, and dishonourable to
herself. A Court of Inquiry[438] put the proceedings in a more just
point of view for the two superior officers, whose error appeared in no
degree to have exceeded a mistake in judgment, the fruit of too much
caution. But the fierce and loudly expressed resentment on the part of
the public[439] produced very important consequences; and though there
occurred exceptions, it became comparatively difficult or dangerous,
from that period, to propose any one as commander of an expedition whose
talents had not pretensions to merit the confidence of the people.
FOOTNOTES:
[423] Southey's History of the Peninsular War, vol. i., p. 444.
[424] Mr. Whitbread. See Parliamentary Debates, vol. xi., pp. 886, 891.
As a farther avowal of these sentiments, Mr. Whitbread addressed a
letter, on the situation of Spain, to Lord Holland; "the subject," he
said, "being peculiarly interesting to that distinguished nobleman, from
the attachment he had formed to a people, the grandeur of whose
character he had had the opportunity to estimate."
[425] At that time Secretary of State for foreign affairs.
[426] Southey, vol. i., p. 451.
[427] "I will look after your private interests; give yourself no
concern about them. Portugal will remain at my disposal. Let no personal
project occupy you, or influence your conduct; that would be injurious
to my interests, and would injure you still more than me."
[428] Loison's conduct at Evora was marked by deliberate and sportive
cruelty, of the most flagitious kind. The convents and churches afforded
no asylum. He promised the archbishop that his property should not be
touched, but, after this promise, he, with some of his officers, entered
the Episcopal library, took down the books in the hope of discovering
valuables behind them, broke off the gold and silver clasps, and, in
their wrath at finding so little plunder, tore in pieces a whole pile of
manuscripts. They took every gold and silver coin from his cabinet of
medals, and every jewel and bit of the precious metals with which the
relics were adorned. Loison was even seen in noon-day, to take the
archbishop's ring from the table and pocket it. These circumstances are
stated by Mr. Southey, on the authority of the archbishop himself.
[429] "In such detestation was Loison held by the Portuguese, that he
was scarcely safe from their vengeance when surrounded by his troops.
The execrations poured forth at the mere mention of 'the bloody Maneta,'
as, from the loss of his hand, he was called, proves that he must have
committed many heinous acts."--NAPIER, vol. i., p. 167.
[430] Southey, vol. ii., p. 188; Napier, vol. i., p. 204. The loss of
the French was 600 killed and wounded; among the latter was Laborde
himself. The British also suffered considerably; two lieutenants and
nearly 500 men being killed, taken, or wounded.
[431] A French order of battle found upon the field gave a total of
14,000 men present under arms.
[432] After the capitulation of Cintra, General Loison desired to be
introduced to Colonel Walker, and congratulated that officer on the
steadiness and talent with which he had rendered the defence in line so
decidedly superior to Napoleon's favourite measure--the attack in
column.--S.
[433] Thiebault, Relation de l'Expédition du Portugal, p. 194; Napier,
vol. i., p. 212; Southey, vol. ii., p. 205.
[434] Proceedings of the Board of Inquiry; and Napier, vol. i., p. 217.
[435] "Thus, in the short space of twenty-four hours, during which a
battle was fought, the army fell successively into the hands of three
men, who, coming from different quarters, with different views, habits,
and information, had not any previous opportunity of communing even by
letter, so as to arrange a common plan of operations."--NAPIER, vol. i.,
p. 219.
[436] For a copy of the Convention of Cintra, see Annual Register, vol.
l., p. 265.
[437] "The armistice, the negotiations, the convention itself, and the
execution of its provisions, were all commenced, conducted, and
concluded, at the distance of thirty miles from Cintra, with which place
they had not the slightest connexion, political, military, or local; yet
Lord Byron has gravely asserted, in prose and verse, that the convention
was signed at the Marquis of Marialva's house at Cintra; and the author
of 'The Diary of an Invalid,' improving upon the poet's discovery,
detected the stains of the ink spilt by Junot upon the occasion."--NAPIER.
[438] See Report of the Board of Inquiry, Annual Register, vol. l., p.
272.
[439] See especially Parliamentary Debates, (Feb. 21, 1809,) vol. xii.,
p. 397.