_Duplicity of Buonaparte on his return to Paris--Official
Statements in the Moniteur--Reports issued by Champagny, Minister
of the Foreign Department--French Relations with the different
Powers of Europe--Spirit of Resistance throughout
Germany--Russia--Napoleon and Alexander meet at Erfurt on 27th
September, and separate in apparent Friendship on 17th
October--Actual feelings of the Autocrats--Their joint Letter to
the King of Great Britain proposing a general peace on the
principle of _uti possidetis_--Why rejected--Procedure in
Spain--Catalonia--Return of Romana to Spain--Armies of Blake,
Castanos, and Palafox--Expedition of General Moore--His desponding
Views of the Spanish Cause--His Plans--Defeat of Blake--and
Castanos--Treachery of Morla--Sir John Moore retreats to
Corunna--Disasters on the March--Battle of Corunna, and Death of
Sir John Moore._
During no part of his history did Buonaparte appear before the public in
a meaner and more contemptible light, than immediately after the
commencement of the Spanish revolution. In the deeper disasters of his
life, the courage with which he struggled against misfortune, gave to
his failing efforts the dignity of sinking greatness; but, on the
present occasion, he appeared before France and before Europe in the
humiliating condition of one, who had been tempted by selfish greed to
commit a great crime, from which he had derived the full harvest of
ignominy, without an iota of the expected profit. On the contrary,
blinded by the unconscientious desire of acquisition, he had shown
himself as shortsighted concerning results, as he was indifferent
respecting means.[440] In this, as in other memorable instances,
iniquity had brought with it all the consequences of folly.
For some time after his triumphal return to Paris, Buonaparte preserved
a total silence on the affairs of the Peninsula, excepting general
assurances that all was well;[441] and that the few partial commotions
which had been excited by the agents of England, had been every where
suppressed by the wisdom of the Grand Council, and the ready concurrence
of the good citizens, who saw no safety for Spain save in the renewal of
the family compact of the Bourbons, in the more fortunate dynasty of
Napoleon. To accredit this state of things, many pieces of news were
circulated in the provinces which lay nearest to Spain, tending to
depress the spirit and hopes of the insurgents. Thus, M. de Champagny
was made to write to the prefect of the department of La Gironde, [8th
June,] that George III. of England was dead; that George IV., on
succeeding, had made an instant and total change of ministry; and that a
general pacification might be instantly expected. The same article, with
similar legends, was inserted officially in the Madrid Gazette.[442]
But a system of fiction and imposition resembles an untempered
sword-blade, which is not only subject to break at the utmost need of
him who wields it, but apt to wound him with the fragments as they
spring asunder. The truth began to become too glaring to be concealed.
It could not be disguised that the kingdom of Portugal had been restored
to independence--that Junot and his army had been driven from
Lisbon--that Dupont had surrendered in the south of France--that King
Joseph had been expelled from Madrid--and that in almost all the
harbours of the Peninsula, which, in the month of March, had been as it
were hermetically sealed against the British shipping and commerce, the
English were now received as friends and allies. Nor was it possible to
conceal, that these blots on the French arms had all taken place in
consequence of the unprincipled ambition, which, not satisfied with
disposing of the produce and power of Spain, by using the name of her
native princes, had prompted Napoleon to exasperate the feelings of the
people by openly usurping the supreme power, and had thus converted a
submissive and complaisant ally into a furious and inexorable enemy. It
was no easy matter, even for the talents and audacity of Napoleon, to
venture before the French nation with an official account of these
errors and their consequences, however palliated and modified.
Accordingly, we must needs say, that not the confession of a felon,
when, compelled to avow his general guilt, he seeks to disguise some of
its more atrocious circumstances, and apologise for others, sounds to us
more poor and humiliating, than the uncandid, inconsistent, and unmanly
exposition which Napoleon was at length compelled to mumble forth in his
official document, when the truth could no longer be concealed, and was
likely indeed to be circulated even with exaggerations.
[Sidenote: STATEMENTS IN THE MONITEUR.]
Suddenly, on the 4th of September, there appeared in the _Moniteur_,
which previously had been chiefly occupied by scientific details,
lyrical poetry, or theatrical criticism, a minute and garbled account of
the insurrection in Spain. The sanguinary conduct of the insurgents was
dwelt upon; the successes obtained by the French armies were magnified;
the losses which they had sustained were extenuated or glossed over.
Dupont was represented as having behaved like a fool or a traitor. The
sufferings of Zaragossa, during the siege, were dwelt upon with
emphasis; but on its result the official account remained silent. The
most was made of the victory of Medina del Rio Seco, and the retreat of
King Joseph from Madrid was ascribed to his health's disagreeing with
the air of that capital. There were two reports on the subject of
Spanish affairs, both from Champagny, minister of the foreign
department, and both addressed to the Emperor. The first was designed to
justify the attempt of Napoleon on Spain. It was dated at Bayonne, as
far back as the 24th of April, a period when Buonaparte was very little
inclined to enter into any reasoning on his right, since, believing he
had the power to accomplish his purpose, he did not doubt that the
advantage and honour which France would derive from the subjugation of
Spain, would sufficiently plead his cause with the Great Nation. But
when his first efforts had failed, and further exertions were found
inevitably necessary, it became of consequence to render the enterprise
popular, by showing that the measures which led to it were founded on
policy at least, if not upon moral justice.
[Sidenote: CHAMPAGNY'S REPORTS--CONSCRIPTION.]
To say the truth, the document is contented with arguing the first
point. Something is hinted of the Spanish administration having been
supposed to nourish hostile purposes towards France, and Godoy's
manifesto at the time of the Prussian war is alluded to; but the
principle mainly rested upon, and avowed by M. Champagny, is, in plain
language, a gross and indecent sophism. "That which policy renders
necessary," says the statesman, "justice must of course authorise;" thus
openly placing interest in diametrical opposition to that which is
honourable or honest; or, in other words, making the excess of the
temptation a justification for the immorality of the action. This is the
same principle[443] which sends the robber on the high-road, and upon
which almost every species of villany is committed, excepting those rare
enormities which are practised without any visible motive on the part of
the perpetrators. To apply his reasoning to the case, Champagny sets
forth the various advantages which France must derive from the more
intimate union with Spain--the facilities which such a union afforded
for enforcing the continental system against Great Britain--the
necessity that Spain should be governed by a prince, on whose faithful
attachment France could repose unlimited confidence--and the propriety
of recommencing the work which had been the leading object of the policy
of Louis the Fourteenth. Having thus shown that the seizing upon the
crown and liberties of Spain would be highly advantageous to France, the
reporter holds his task accomplished, and resumes his proposition in
these remarkable words:--"Policy demands a grand measure from your
Majesty--Justice authorises it--the troubles of Spain render it
indispensably necessary."
The second report of M. de Champagny held a different and more ominous
tone. It was dated Paris, 1st September, and darkly indicated that the
gold and machinations of the English had fomented popular intrigues in
Spain, which had frustrated the attempt of his Imperial Majesty to
render that country happy. The reporter then, in the tone with which a
priest addresses the object of his worship, reverentially expostulates
with Napoleon, for permitting anarchy to spread over great part of
Spain, and for leaving Britain at liberty to say, that her flag, driven
from the coasts of the Baltic and of the Levant, floats triumphantly,
nevertheless, on the coasts of the kingdom which is the nearest
neighbour to France. Having thus indirectly communicated the general
fact, that Spain was in insurrection, and that the English fleet rode
triumphant on her coasts, the reporter resumes a noble confidence in the
power and authority which he was invoking. "No, never, Sire, shall it be
thus. Two millions of brave men are ready, if necessary, to cross the
Pyrenees, and chase the English from the Peninsula; if the French would
combat for the liberty of the seas, they must begin by rescuing Spain
from the influence of England."
Much more there is to the same purpose, serving to inform the French
people by implication, if not in direct terms, that the Emperor's plans
upon Spain had been disconcerted; that he had found unanimous resistance
where he had expected unconditional submission; and that the utmost
sacrifices would be necessary on the part of France, to enable her ruler
to perfect the measures which he had so rashly undertaken. But besides
the pressure of Spanish affairs, those of Austria were also hinted at,
as requiring France to increase her armies, and stand upon her guard, as
that power had been of late sedulously employed in increasing her
military strength. The ultimate conclusion founded on these reasonings,
was the necessity of anticipating another conscription of eighty
thousand men.
The Senate, to whom these reports were sent down, together with a
message from the Emperor, failed not to authorise this new draught on
the French population; or, it may be said, on her very flesh and
life-blood. Like the judge in the drama, but without regret or
expostulation, they enforced the demand of the unrelenting creditor.
"The court allowed it, and the law did give it."--"The will of France,"
said these subservient senators, "is the same with the will of her
Emperor. The war with Spain is politic, just, and necessary."
Thus armed with all the powers which his mighty empire could give,
Napoleon girded himself personally to the task of putting down by force
the Spanish insurrection, and driving from the Peninsula the British
auxiliaries. But while preparations were making on an immense scale for
an enterprise of which experience had now taught him the difficulty, it
was necessary for him, in the first place, to ascertain how his
relations with the few powers in Europe who had some claim to
independence, had been affected by the miscarriage of his Spanish
scheme.
Since the treaty of Presburg, by which she lost such a proportion of her
power, Austria had lain like a prostrated combatant, whom want, not of
will, but of strength, prevents from resuming the contest. In 1806, her
friendship became of consequence to Napoleon, then engaged in his
contest with Prussia and Russia. The cession of Branau, and some
territories about the mouth of the Cattaro, were granted to Austria by
France, as in guerdon of her neutrality. But in 1807 and 1808, the
government of that country, more vexed and humiliated by the territory
and influence which she had lost, than thankful for the importance she
had been permitted to retain, began to show the utmost activity in the
war department. Abuses were reformed; more perfect discipline was
introduced; old soldiers were called to muster; new levies were made on
a large scale; armies of reserve were formed, through the Austrian
dominions, of the _landwehr_ and national guards, and they were
subjected to service by conscription, like the militia of England. The
Austrian armies of the line were increased to great magnitude. The
Hungarian Diet had voted twelve thousand recruits for 1807, and eighty
thousand for 1808; while eighty thousand organised soldiers, of whom
thirty thousand were cavalry, constituted the formidable reserve of this
warlike nation. Every thing seemed to announce war, although the answers
of the Court to the remonstrances of France were of the most pacific
tendency.
[Sidenote: GERMANY.]
Yet it was not alone the hostile preparations of Austria which seemed to
trouble the aspect of Germany. Napoleon had defeated her efforts and
defied her armies, when her force was still more imposing. But there was
gradually awakening and extending through Germany, and especially its
northern provinces, a strain of opinion incompatible with the domination
of France, or of any other foreign power, within the ancient empire.
The disappearance of various petty states, which had been abolished in
the convulsion of the French usurpation, together with the general
system of oppression under which the whole country suffered, though in
different degrees, had broken down the divisions which separated the
nations of Germany from each other, and, like relations who renew an
interrupted intimacy under the pressure of a common calamity, the mass
of the people forgot that they were Hanoverians, Hessians, Saxons, or
Prussians, to remember that they were all Germans, and had one common
cause in which to struggle, one general injury to revenge. Less fiery
than the Spaniards, but not less accessible to deep and impassioned
feeling, the youth of Germany, especially such as were engaged in the
liberal studies, cherished in secret, and with caution, a deep hatred
to the French invaders, and a stern resolution to avail themselves of
the first opportunity to achieve the national liberty.
The thousand presses of Germany could not be altogether silenced, though
the police of Napoleon was unceasingly active in suppressing political
publications, wherever they could exercise influence. But the kind of
feeling which now prevailed among the German youth, did not require the
support of exhortations or reasoning, directly and in express terms
adapted to the subject. While a book existed, from the Holy Scriptures
down to the most idle romance; while a line of poetry could be recited
from the works of Schiller or Goëthe, down to the most ordinary stall
ballad--inuendoes, at once secret and stimulating, might be drawn from
them, to serve as watch-words, or as war-cries. The prevailing opinions,
as they spread wider and wider, began to give rise to mysterious
associations, the object of which was the liberation of Germany. That
most generally known was called the Bund, or Alliance for Virtue and
Justice. The young academicians entered with great zeal into these
fraternities, the rather that they had been previously prepared for them
by the Burschenschafts, or associations of students, and that the idea
of secret councils, tribunals, or machinations, is familiar to the
reader of German history, and deeply interesting to a people whose
temper is easily impressed by the mysterious and the terrible. The
professors of the Universities, in most cases, gave way to or guided
these patriotic impressions, and in teaching their students the sciences
or liberal arts, failed not to impress on them the duty of devoting
themselves to the liberation of Germany, or, as it was now called,
Teutonia.[444]
The French, whose genius is in direct opposition to that of the Germans,
saw all this with contempt and ridicule. They laughed at the mummery of
boys affecting a new sort of national freemasonry, and they gave the
principle of patriotic devotion to the independence of Germany the name
of Ideology; by which nickname the French ruler used to distinguish
every species of theory, which, resting in no respect upon the practical
basis of self-interest, could, he thought, prevail with none save
hot-brained boys and crazed enthusiasts.
Napoleon, however, saw and estimated the increasing influence of these
popular opinions, more justly than might have been inferred from his
language. He knew that a government might be crushed, an army defeated,
an inimical administration changed, by violence; but that the rooted
principle of resistance to oppression diffuses itself the wider the more
martyrs are made on its behalf. The Heir of the Revolution spoke on
such subjects the language of the most legitimate of monarchs, and
exclaimed against the system of the Tugendbund, as containing principles
capable of disorganising the whole system of social society.
The menacing appearance of Austria, and the extension of anti-Gallican
principles and feelings through Germany, made it more especially
necessary for Buonaparte to secure his hold upon the Emperor of Russia.
Trusting little in so important a case to his ministers, Napoleon
desired personally to assure himself by a direct communication with the
Emperor Alexander, which was willingly acceded to. We have elsewhere
assigned some reasons, why such direct conference, or correspondence
betwixt sovereigns, tends to degrade their character, without adding any
additional security to the faith of their treaties. It is unbecoming
their rank to take upon themselves the task of advancing, receding,
renouncing, resuming, insisting, and evading, which must occur more or
less in all political negotiations. At the same time, they are
flattering to princes, as if inferring that they are able to act
personally, and free of ministerial control; and in so far have their
charms.
[Sidenote: CONFERENCES AT ERFURT--SPAIN.]
Buonaparte and Alexander met at Erfurt on 27th September, with the same
appearance of cordiality with which they had parted--their friendship
seemed uninjured by a shadow of suspicion. The most splendid festivities
celebrated their meeting, and the theatres of Paris sent their choicest
performers to enliven the evenings.[445]
Amid all these gaieties politics were not neglected, and Buonaparte
found his great ally as tractable as at Tilsit. Alexander not only
ratified the transactions of Spain, but also the subsequent act, by
which Napoleon appropriated to himself the kingdom of Etruria, which,
according to the first draught of the Spanish scheme exhibited at
Tilsit, was to have been assigned to the disinherited Ferdinand. The
Czar stipulated, however, on his own part, that Buonaparte should not in
any shape interfere to prevent Russia from aggrandizing herself at the
expense of Turkey. He promised, also, to take an ally's share with
Buonaparte, if the quarrel with Austria should come to arms. To this
indeed he was bound by treaties; nor was there any way of ridding
himself from their obligation. The conferences of Erfurt ended on the
17th of October, and, as they had begun, amid the most splendid did
festivities. Among these was an entertainment given to the Emperor on
the battle-ground of Jena, where Prussia, the hapless ally of Alexander,
received such a dreadful blow.
It is probable, however, notwithstanding all the show of cordiality
betwixt the Emperors, that Alexander did not require the recollections
which this battle-field was sure to inspire, to infuse into his mind
some tacit jealousy of his powerful ally. He even already saw the
possibility of a quarrel merging between them, and was deeply desirous
that Austria should not waste her national strength, by rushing into a
contest, in which he would be under the reluctant necessity of acting
against her. Neither did Napoleon return from Erfurt with the same
undoubting confidence in his imperial ally. The subject of a match
between the Emperor of France and one of the Russian Archduchesses had
been resumed, and had been evaded, on account, as it was alleged, of the
difference in their religions. The objections of the Empress Mother, as
well as of the reigning Empress, were said to be the real
reasons--objections founded on the character of Napoleon, and the nature
of his right to the greatness which he enjoyed.[446] Such a proposal
could not be brought forward and rejected or evaded, with how much
delicacy soever, without injury to the personal feelings of Napoleon;
and as he must have been conscious, that more than the alleged reason of
religion entered into the cause of declining his proposal, he must have
felt in proportion offended, if not affronted. Still, however, if their
cordiality was in any degree diminished, the ties of mutual interest,
which bound together these two great autocrats, were as yet sufficient
to assure Napoleon of the present assistance of Russia. To confirm this
union still farther, and to make their present friendship manifest to
the world, the two Emperors joined in a letter to the King of Great
Britain, proposing a general peace; and it was intimated that they would
admit the basis of _uti possidetis_, which would leave all the
contracting powers in possession of what they had gained during the war.
The proposal, as must have been foreseen, went off, on Britain demanding
that the Spanish government and the King of Sweden should be admitted as
parties to the treaty.[447]
But the letter of the Emperors had served its turn, when it showed that
the ties between France and Russia were of the most intimate nature;
and, confident in this, Napoleon felt himself at liberty to employ the
gigantic force which he had already put in preparation, to the
subjugation of Spain, and to chasing away the "hideous leopards,"[448]
as he was pleased to term the English banners, from the Peninsula.
[Sidenote: SPAIN.]
In the meantime, the Spaniards had not been unfaithful to the cause they
had undertaken. They had vested the supreme management of the affairs of
their distracted kingdom in a Central or Supreme Junta, which, composed
of delegates from all the principal Juntas, fixed their residence at the
recovered capital of Madrid, and endeavoured, to the best of their
power, to provide for resistance against the invaders. But their
efforts, though neither in themselves unwise nor mistimed, were
seriously impeded by two great causes, arising both from the same
source.
The division of Spain, as already observed, into several disunited and
almost unconnected provinces and kingdoms, though it had contributed
much to the original success of the insurrection, while each province,
regardless of the fate of others, or of the capital itself, provided the
means of individual resistance, rendered them, when the war assumed a
more general character, unapt to obey the dictates which emanated from
the Supreme Junta. General Cuesta, whose devoted and sincere patriotism
was frustrated by the haughtiness, self-importance, and insubordination
of his character, was the first to set an unhappy example of
disobedience to what had been chosen as the residence of the supreme
authority. He imprisoned two members of the Supreme Junta, because he
thought the choice which had been made of them was derogatory to his own
authority, as Captain-General of Castile and Leon, and thus set a
perilous example of disunion among the patriots, for which his real
energy and love of his country were scarce afterwards sufficient to
atone.[449]
But besides this and other instances of personal disregard to the
injunctions of the Junta, there was another deep and widely-operating
error which flowed from the same source. Each province, according to the
high sense which the inhabitants entertained of their individual
importance, deemed itself adequate to the protection of its own peculiar
territory, and did not, or would not, see the necessity of contributing
an adequate proportion of the provincial force to the defence of the
nation in general. Those who had shown themselves manfully eager, and
often successful, in the defence of their own houses and altars, were
more deaf than prudence warranted to the summons which called them to
the frontier, to act in defence of the kingdom as a whole. They had
accustomed themselves, unhappily, too much to undervalue the immense
power by which they were about to be invaded, and did not sufficiently
see, that to secure the more distant districts, it was necessary that
the war should be maintained by the united force of the realm. What
added to this miscalculation, was a point in the national character of
which William III. of England, when commanding an allied army to which
Spain furnished a contingent, had a century before bitterly complained.
"The Spanish generals were so proud of the reputation of their troops
and their country," said that experienced warrior, "that they would
never allow that they were in want of men, ammunition, guns, or the
other necessaries of war, until the moment of emergency came, when they
were too apt to be found unprovided in all with which they had
represented themselves as being well supplied."
The same unhappy spirit of over-confidence and miscalculation now
greatly injured the patriotic cause. Levies and supplies, which it had
been determined to raise, were too often considered as completed, when
the vote which granted them had been passed, and it was deemed unworthy
and unpatriotic to doubt the existence of what the national or
provincial council had represented as indispensable. In this manner the
Spaniards misled both themselves, and their allies, the British, upon
the actual state of their resources; and it followed of course, that
British officers, once deceived by their representations in such
instances, were disposed to doubt of the reality of their zeal, and to
hesitate trusting such representations in future.
Notwithstanding these unhappy errors, the Spanish force, assembled for
the defence of the kingdom, was perhaps not inadequate to the task, had
they been commanded by a general whose superior energies could have
gained him undisputed authority, and who could have conducted the
campaign with due attention to the species of warfare which the time and
the character of the invading army demanded. But unhappily, no Robert
Bruce, no Washington, arose in Spain at this period; and the national
defence was committed to men whose military knowledge was of a bounded
character, though their courage and zeal admitted of no dispute. Yet
favourable incidents occurred to balance these great inconveniences, and
for a time the want of unity amongst themselves, and of military talent
in the generals, seemed to a certain extent compensated by the courage
of the Spanish leaders, and the energy of their followers.
The warlike population of Catalonia are, like the Tyrolese, natural
marksmen, who take the field in irregular bodies, called Somatenes, or
Miquelets.[450] The inhabitants of this country arose in arms almost
universally; and, supported by a small body of four thousand men from
Andalusia, contrived, without magazines, military chest, or any of the
usual materials necessary to military manœuvres, to raise the siege
of Gerona,[451] which had been formed by General Duhesme, and to gain so
many advantages over the enemy, that probably, an auxiliary force of
English, under such a general as the Earl of Peterborough, adventurous
at once and skilful, might, like that gallant leader, have wrested
Barcelona, with Monjouy, from the hands of the French, and left the
invaders no footing in that important district. The troops might have
been supplied from Sicily, where a great British force was stationed,
and there was no want of good and experienced officers, competent to the
ordinary duties of a general. But that genius, which, freeing itself
from the pedantry of professional education, can judge exactly how far
insurrectionary allies are to be trusted; that inventive talent, which
finds resources where the ordinary aids and appliances are scarce, or
altogether wanting, is a gift of very rare occurrence; and
unfortunately, there are no means of distinguishing the officers by whom
it is possessed, unless chance puts them into a situation to display
their qualifications.
Another circumstance favourable for the Spanish cause, was the return of
General Romana to Spain, to co-operate in the defence of his country.
This nobleman, one of the best soldiers whom Spain had at the time, and
a man, besides, of patriotic virtue and excellent talents, commanded
that auxiliary body of ten thousand Spanish troops which Buonaparte had
prevailed on Godoy to unite with the French army in the north of Europe,
in order to secure their absence when he should put his schemes of
invasion into execution against their country. These forces, or a large
proportion of them, were secluded in the isle of Funen, in the Baltic,
with a view to conceal from them all that it did not suit Buonaparte
should be known of the events which were agitating Spain. Nevertheless,
a dexterous and daring agent, a Catholic priest of Scotch extraction,
named Robertson, going ashore in disguise, succeeded in opening a
communication[452] between the Spanish general and the British admiral
Keates, in consequence of which, and by using bold and skilful
combinations, Romana was able to extricate the greater part of his
troops from the precarious situation in which they were placed, and
finally in embarking them for Spain. It was the intention of this
judicious officer to have made this little force of nine or ten thousand
men the foundation of a regular army, by forming every regiment into a
triple battalion. This he was unable to accomplish, but still his body
of veterans inspired the Spaniards with hope and trust.
[Sidenote: SPANISH ARMIES--OVERTURES OF PEACE.]
Three armies had been formed in Spain, designed to co-operate with each
other; the sum of their numbers was calculated at 130,000 men, but they
certainly did not exceed 100,000 at the very utmost. Their commissariat
was in a wretched state, and even before the war commenced, the
hardships of scarcity were felt in their camps. Three generals, each
with independent authority, (an evil of the country and time,) commanded
the Spanish armies. Blake, on the western frontier, extended his line
from Burgos to Bilboa, disputing the possession of, and finally
maintaining himself in, that capital of Biscay. The headquarters of the
central army, under Castanos, were as far back as Soria; while the
eastern army, under Palafox, extended between Zaragossa and Sanguesa. So
that the wings of the army were advanced towards the frontier; and the
centre being drawn back, the whole position had the form of a crescent,
with the concave side opposed to the enemy. Strongly posted within the
position of Northern Spain, which they retained, the French armies,
about sixty thousand men strong, lay protected by the fortresses which
they occupied, and awaited the approach of Napoleon, with such a
predominating force as should enable them to resume the offensive. The
co-operation of a British auxiliary force became now an object of the
first consequence; and the conduct of Britain had given every reason to
expect that she would make in the Spanish cause, exertions to which she
had been yet a stranger.
When the two Emperors of France and Russia met at Erfurt, it had been
resolved, as we have said, to offer peace to Great Britain, either in
some hope that it might have been made upon terms consistent with
Buonaparte's pretensions to universal dominion, and Alexander's views
upon Turkey, or in order to assume to themselves the credit of a
disposition to pacific measures. A letter was accordingly despatched to
the King of England, signed by both Emperors, expressive of their wish
for a general peace. The official note in which the British
administration replied to this overture, declared that the King of
England was willing to treat for peace in conjunction with his allies,
the King of Sweden, and those now possessing the supreme power in Spain,
and exercising it in the name of Ferdinand VII.[453] The admission of
any claim in favour of either of these powers, would have interfered
with the plans both of France and Russia. The latter had for her object
the possession of Finland, and the former judged that peace with England
was chiefly desirable for gaining time to overcome all resistance in
Spain; but must become useless if the independence of that country was
to be stipulated in the treaty. The negotiation, therefore, broke off
on these terms, while Britain, by her share in it, showed a manful
resolution to identify her cause with that of the Spanish patriots.
[Sidenote: SIR JOHN MOORE.]
The actions of England bore a part with her professions. It was
determined, as we have already seen, to reinforce the Portuguese army
with an additional force of ten thousand men, and the whole was placed
under the command of General Moore, a darling name in the British army,
and the only one (excepting the victor of Vimeiro, had his rank in the
service permitted the choice) to whom the public would have looked with
confidence for the discharge of a trust so unusually weighty. But
although the requisite degree of vigour was shown by the English
government, yet they were not yet sufficiently accustomed to the
necessity of acting with rapidity in executing their resolutions.
The arrival of General Moore's army had been expected so early as the
21st August, by those having best access to know the purposes of
Government; yet Sir John Moore and his army were not in motion, to take
part in the Spanish cause, till the beginning of October; and every day
which was thus lost in unreadiness and indecision was of the most
precious import to the cause of Spain. This procrastination could not be
imputed to the general, nor even to the Administration. It was the
consequence of want of alertness in the different departments, which had
been little accustomed to hurry and exertion, and also of the hesitation
apt to influence those who venture for the first time on a great and
decisive measure. Even when the expedition arrived, there was
uncertainty and delay.
Sir John Moore also, in all other respects one of the most eminent
military characters, had embraced an unfavourable idea of the event of
the Spanish struggle. He saw the faults and imperfections of their
system, and they were of a kind which appeared most peculiarly perilous.
Independent generals--an unpaid and ill-fed soldiery--a Supreme Junta
which could not obtain obedience--were features which argued a speedy
and disastrous conclusion to the contest, when opposed to the
disciplined army of France, with which General Moore was so well
acquainted, and to whose merits he could give the testimony of
experience.
His fears, therefore, predominating over his hopes, yet his wishes
alike, and his duty, prompting him to do something for the support of
the Spanish cause, he was anxious so to direct his efforts, that he
might retreat, in case of need, without suffering any considerable loss.
For this purpose, it would have been his desire to have carried round
the British army to Cadiz, to assist in the defence of Andalusia, where
the sea, in case of disaster, would always be open for their retreat.
But the English ministers had formed a bolder and more decisive plan of
the campaign;--a plan which might have been decisive of the fate even
of Buonaparte himself, at least of his Spanish projects of ambition, if
either the Spaniards had acted with the skill which distinguished the
victors of Baylen, or the enthusiasm which animated the defenders of
Zaragossa, or if the British troops had been able to enter into
communication with their armies before they were broken and overwhelmed
by the Emperor of the French. This plan directed, that the British
forces should proceed at once to the north of Spain, where the principal
scene of action was necessarily laid, and thus, co-operate with Blake,
and the other Spanish armies, which were destined to cover the capital,
and withstand the first effort of the invaders. It was left to the
judgment of the commander, either to advance into Spain by land from the
frontiers of Portugal, or to transport his troops by sea to Corunna,
with the purpose of marching through the province of Galicia, and
entering in that manner upon the scene of action.
To accomplish the purpose of government, Sir John Moore deemed it most
convenient to divide his forces. He sent ten thousand men, under Sir
David Baird, by sea to Corunna, and determined to march himself at the
head of the rest of the army, about sixteen thousand, to the north of
Spain, from the frontiers of Portugal. The general science of war, upon
the most extended scale, seems to have been so little understood or
practised by the English generals at this time, that, instead of the
country being carefully reconnoitred by officers of skill, the march of
the army was arranged by such hasty and inaccurate information as could
be collected from the peasants. By their report, General Moore was
induced to divide his army into five divisions,[454] which were directed
to move upon Salamanca, where, or at Valladolid, they were to form a
junction with the forces of Sir David Baird, expected from Corunna. The
advance commenced about the 7th of November; but unhappily ere these
auxiliaries appeared on the field, the armies of the Spaniards, whom
they were destined to support, were defeated, dispersed, and almost
annihilated.
There was no hesitation, no mark of indecision, no loss of precious
time, on the part of Napoleon. He traversed the earth, as a comet does
the sky, working changes wherever he came.[455] The convention at Erfurt
broke up on the 14th October; on the 25th of the same month he opened,
in person, the session of the Legislative Body; and on the second
following day, he set off for the frontiers of Spain.[456] Here he had
prepared, in ample extent, all the means of conquest; for, though
trusting, or affecting to trust, a great deal to the influence of his
fortune and his star, it was his wise and uniform policy to leave
nothing to chance, but always to provide means, adequate to the purpose
which he meditated.
Nearly a hundred thousand men had been gradually pouring into the
position which the French occupied upon the Ebro.[457] The headquarters
at Vittoria, honoured with the residence of the intrusive King, was soon
more illustrious by the arrival of Buonaparte himself, a week before the
British army had commenced its march from Portugal or Corunna.
To destroy the army of Blake, which lay opposed to the right flank of
the French, before the Spanish general could be supported by Sir John
Moore's forces, became for Buonaparte a matter of instant and peremptory
importance. After some previous fighting, a French division, under
Marshal Victor, brought the Spanish general to action at the position of
Espinosa. The battle continued for three hours in the evening, and was
renewed the next day, when the French turned the Spanish position, and
Blake, totally defeated, withdrew from the field with the purpose of
making a stand at Reynosa, where he had his supplies and magazines.[458]
Meantime the activity of Buonaparte had struck another fatal blow on a
different part of the Spanish defensive line. An army, designed to cover
Burgos, and support the right flank of Blake's army, had been formed
under the command of the Count de Belvidere, a young nobleman of
courage, but without experience. He had under his command some remnants
of the old Spanish army of the line, with the Walloons and Spanish
guards, and a battalion of students, volunteers from Salamanca and Leon.
Here also the French were successful. The youths, whom patriotism had
brought to the field, could not be frightened from it by danger. They
fell in their ranks, and their deaths spread mourning through many a
respectable family in Spain.
Burgos was taken, in consequence of Count Belvidere's defeat; and it was
by the same calamity rendered easy for the Duke of Dalmatia [Soult] to
co-operate with the French generals, who were operating against the
unfortunate Blake, with a view to drive him from his place of refuge at
Reynosa. Surrounded on every side, the Spanish general saw no safety for
the remnant of his forces, excepting in a retreat to Saint Andero,
accomplished under such circumstances of haste and confusion, that his
army might be considered as totally disorganised and dispersed. The
disasters of Blake were the more to be lamented, that they involved the
destruction of that fine body of soldiers whom Romana had led from the
Baltic, and who, injudiciously brought into action by single battalions,
perished ingloriously among the cliffs at Espinosa.[459]
The whole left wing of the Spanish army of defence, which so lately
stretched from Bilboa to Burgos, and in support of which the British
forces were advancing, was now totally annihilated, and the central
army, under Castanos, whose left flank was now completely uncovered, was
exposed to imminent danger. The veteran would fain have reserved his
forces for a more fortunate time, by falling back and avoiding a battle.
But he had been joined by Palafox, who had under his independent
authority the army of Arragon; and the Supreme Junta, acting in that
particular according to the custom of the French Convention, had
despatched a commissioner to his camp, to see that that general
performed his duty. This official person, with Palafox and other
generals, joined in overpowering Castanos's reasoning, and, by the
imputations of cowardice and treachery, compelled him to venture an
action.[460]
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF TUDELA.]
The battle took place at Tudela, on the 22d November, with all the
results which Castanos had dreaded. A great number of Spaniards were
killed; guns and baggage were taken; and, for the first time, a
considerable number of prisoners fell into the hands of the French.[461]
Castanos, with the routed troops of his proportion of the army, escaped
to Calatuyud, while Palafox retreated again on the heroic city of
Zaragossa, which was destined to suffer further distresses, and acquire
additional renown. The road of the invader was now open to Madrid,
unless in so far as it might be defended by some forces stationed at the
pass of Samosierra, a mountainous defile about ten miles from the city,
or as his entrance into the capital might be opposed by the desperate
resolution of the citizens themselves. A part of the population placed
their hopes on the defence afforded by this defile, not aware how
easily, in modern warfare, such passes are either stormed or turned. But
most of the citizens assumed the fierce and lowering appearance, which,
in the Spaniard, announces an approaching burst of furious violence.
Many thousands of peasants arrived from the neighbouring country, to
assist, they said, in the defence of the capital; and, animated by the
success of the Zaragossans, menaced war to the knife's point. There were
about eight thousand troops of the line in Madrid; resistance was
undoubtedly possible, and the people seemed determined upon it. A
summons from the Supreme Junta called the inhabitants to arms, and the
commencement of the preparations for defence was begun with unanimous
vigour. For this purpose the pavement of the streets was taken up and
converted into barricadoes; the houses were secured, and loopholed for
musketry; and the whole body of the population toiled at erecting
batteries, not only in the day-time but by torch-light.
Had Palafox commanded in Madrid, the experiment of resistance would, at
all risks, have been attempted. But the governor was Don Thomas Morla,
the same who succeeded Solano at Cadiz. His subsequent conduct seems to
show, that, despairing of the cause of his country, he already meditated
an intended change to the side of the usurper; so that the citizens of
Madrid, at the moment when they had recourse to his skill and authority,
received neither encouragement nor instructions, nor means of defence.
We shall presently see in what manner the generous intentions of the
people were cheated and baffled.
[Sidenote: THE BRITISH ARMY--MADRID.]
Amidst the accumulation of disasters which overwhelmed the Spanish
cause, Sir John Moore arrived at Salamanca, and Sir David Baird at
Astorga, where the latter general halted. The situation of General Moore
was extremely embarrassing, and gave him cause for the deepest anxiety.
He knew the strength and character of the French armies, and was
unwilling to repose too much confidence in the Spaniards, whose wisdom,
he contended, was not a wisdom of action or exertion. On the other hand,
he well knew the enthusiasm of the English for the Spanish cause, and
the high expectations which were founded on his own talents, and on the
gallantry of one of the finest armies which ever left Britain; and he
felt that something was to be attempted worthy of the character of both.
The general voice of the officers and soldiers was also clamorous for
being employed. But the defeat of Castanos at Tudela seems to have
extinguished the last hope in Sir John Moore's mind, and he at one time
determined upon commencing his retreat to Portugal.
Before finally adopting this measure, he thought proper, however, to
consult Mr. Frere, the British Minister, whether he thought any good
would result from the daring measure of marching on Madrid, instead of
retreating to Portugal. The correspondents differed, as might have been
expected, from their difference of temperament and habits. Mr. Frere, a
scholar and a poet, well known in the world of letters, being attached
with enthusiasm to the cause of Spain, was a willing believer in the
miracles that might be wrought by the higher and nobler qualities, which
found a chord in unison in his own bosom.[462] He advised, as a Spartan
would have done, that General Moore should throw all upon the cast, and
advance to the succour of Madrid. The general, upon whom the
responsibility devolved, viewed the measure in a different light, and
his military habits did not permit him to place much confidence in a
defence to be maintained by irregular forces against the disciplined
armies of France. Yet, urged by his own feelings, and the importunity of
the Spanish government, he resolved to try, by an effort against the
north-western part of the French army, to answer the double purpose of
preventing them from pressing on Romana, who, with indefatigable zeal,
was collecting the scattered remains of the Galician army, which had
been destroyed under Cuesta, and also of hindering the French from
advancing southward to complete the subjugation of the Peninsula.
But while General Moore determined to hazard this bold measure, he saw
painfully the danger of drawing upon himself, by adopting it, a
predominant force of the enemy, before whom his retreat might be
difficult and perilous. Yet he finally ordered Sir David Baird, whose
retreat to Corunna was already commenced, again to occupy Astorga, and
expressed his intention of hazarding an advance, at whatever risk. But
he added these ominous words; "I mean to proceed bridle in hand, for if
the bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it."[463]
The fate of Madrid was soon decided; but, as is generally believed, not
without great treachery on the part of those who had been most
apparently zealous for its defence. The passes of Guadarama and
Samosierra had fallen into the possession of the French. The latter, on
which the people of Madrid had fixed their eyes as on a second
Thermopylæ or Roncesvalles, was cleared of its defenders by a charge of
Polish lancers! These melancholy tidings, as they were in correspondence
with General Moore's expectations, did not prevent his intended movement
on the French lines of communication. By this means he might co-operate
with General Romana and his army, and if pressed by superior numbers of
the French, the retreat lay through Galicia to Corunna, where the
transports were attending for the reception of the troops.
[Sidenote: RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY.]
General Moore left Salamanca on the 12th December, and proceeded towards
Mayorga, where, on the 20th, he formed a junction with Sir David Baird.
Advancing upon Sahagun, the troops received encouragement from a gallant
action maintained by the 15th Hussars, five hundred of whom took, cut
down, and dispersed, nearly double their own number of French cavalry.
All now imagined they were to attack Soult, who had concentrated his
forces behind the river Carrion to receive the assault. The British army
was in the highest possible spirits, when news were suddenly received
that Soult had been considerably reinforced; that Buonaparte was
marching from Madrid at the head of ten thousand of his Guards; and that
the French armies, who had been marching to the south of Spain, had
halted and assumed a direction to the north-west, as if to enclose and
destroy the British army.[464] This was exactly the danger which Moore
had never ceased to apprehend, even when executing the movement that led
to it. A retreat into, if not through Galicia, was the only mode of
avoiding the perils by which the British were surrounded. The plan of
defending this strong and mountainous province, or at least of effecting
a retreat through it with order and deliberation, had been in view for
several weeks; Sir David Baird's division of the army passed through it
in their advance to Astorga; yet, so imperfect at that time was the
British general staff, that no accurate knowledge seemed to have been
possessed of the roads through the country, of the many strong military
positions which it presents, or of the particular military advantages
which it affords for defensive war. Another deficiency, incidental to
our service at that period, was the great deficiency of the commissariat
department, which had been pointed out so forcibly by Sir Arthur
Wellesley, but which had not yet been remedied.[465]
Sufficient exertions in this department might have brought forward
supplies from Corunna, and collected those which Galicia itself
afforded; and the troops, retiring gradually from position to position,
and maintained from their own resources, would have escaped the loss and
dishonour of a retreat which resembled a flight in every particular,
excepting the terror which accompanies it.
Besides these great deficiencies, a disadvantage of the most distressing
kind occurred, from the natural and constitutional aversion of the
British army to retrograde movements. Full of hope and confidence when
he advances, the English soldier wants the pliability, lightness, and
elasticity of character, which enables the Frenchman to distinguish
himself during a retreat, by his intelligence, discipline, and
dexterity. Chafed, sullen, and discontented, the soldiers next became
mutinous and insubordinate; and incensed against the Spaniards, by whose
want of zeal they thought they had been betrayed, they committed the
most unjustifiable excesses on the unresisting inhabitants. Despite the
repeated orders of the commander-in-chief, endeavouring to restrain
the passions and soothe the irritation of the soldiers, these
disgraceful outrages were continued. It is matter of some consolation,
that, losing their character for discipline, they retained that for
courage. The French, who had pressed on the British rear, near to
Benevente, and thrown across the river a large body of the Imperial
cavalry, were driven back and defeated on the 29th December; and,
leaving General Lefebvre Desnouettes a prisoner, in future were
contented with observing, without pressing upon, the English
retreat.[466]
At Astorga, 30th December, the commander-in-chief found about 5000
Spaniards under Romana, the relics of the Galician army. These troops
wanted clothing, accoutrements, arms, ammunition, and pay--they wanted,
in short, every thing, excepting that courage and devotion to the cause
of their country, which would have had a better fate, had fortune
favoured desert.
The Spanish general still proposed to make a stand at this rallying
point; but whatever might be Romana's own skill, and the bravery of his
followers, his forces were not of a quality such as to induce Sir John
Moore to halt his retreat, which he now directed avowedly upon Corunna.
The scarcity of provisions required forced marches, and combined, with
want of general knowledge of the country in a military sense, to hurry
forward the soldiers, who too readily took advantage of these irregular
movements to straggle and plunder, inflicting on the friendly natives,
and receiving from them in return, the mutual evils which are given and
received by invaders in an enemy's country. The weather dark and
rainy--the roads blockaded by half-melted snow--the fords become almost
impassable--augmented the difficulties of a retreat, resembling that by
which a defeated army is forced into a country totally unknown to them,
and through which the fugitives must find their way as they can. The
baggage of the army, and its ammunition, were abandoned and destroyed.
The sick, the wounded, were left to the mercy of the pursuers; and the
numbers who in that hour of despair gave way to the national vice of
intoxication, added largely to the ineffective and the helpless. The
very treasure-chests of the army were thrown away and abandoned. There
was never so complete an example of a disastrous retreat.
One saving circumstance, already mentioned, tended to qualify the bad
behaviour of the troops; namely, that when a report arose that a battle
was to be expected, the courage, nay, the discipline of the soldiers,
seemed to revive. This was especially the case on the 6th January, when
the French ventured an attack upon our rear-guard near Lugo. So soon as
a prospect of action was presented, stragglers hastened to join their
ranks--the disobedient became at once subordinate, as if on the parade;
and it was made manifest that the call to battle, far from having the
natural effect of intimidating to utter dispersion troops already so
much disordered, was to the English army the means of restoring
discipline, steadiness, and confidence.
The French having declined the proffered engagement, Sir John Moore
continued his retreat under the same disadvantageous circumstances,
until he arrived at Corunna, the original object of his destination. He
was preparing to embark his forces in the transports, which lay prepared
for their reception, when his pursuer, Soult, now pressing boldly
forward, made it evident that this could not be accomplished unless
either by a convention with him, or by the event of a battle, which
might disqualify him from opposing the embarkation. Sir John Moore, with
the dignity becoming his character, chose the latter alternative, and
occupied a position of no great strength in front of the town, to
protect the embarkation. The attack was made by the French on the 16th
January, in heavy columns, and with their usual vivacity; but it was
sustained and repelled on all hands. The gallant general was mortally
wounded in the action, just as he called on the 42d Highland regiment to
"remember Egypt," and reminded the same brave mountaineers, that though
ammunition was scarce, "they had their bayonets."[467]
Thus died on the field of victory, which atoned for previous
misfortunes, one of the bravest and best officers of the British army.
His body was wrapped in his military cloak, instead of the usual
vestments of the tomb; it was deposited in a grave hastily dug on the
ramparts of the citadel of Corunna; and the army completing its
embarkation upon the subsequent day, their late general was "left alone
with his glory."
Thus ended, in the acquisition of barren laurels, plentifully blended
with cypress, the campaign, which had been undertaken by so beautiful
and efficient an army, under so approved a commander. The delay in
sending it to the scene of action was one great cause of its failure,
and for that the gallant general, or his memory, cannot be held
responsible. Such a force at Salamanca, while the French were unequal in
numbers to the Spanish armies, might have had the most important
consequences. At a later period, when the patriotic armies were every
where defeated, we confess that General Moore, with the ideas which he
entertained of the Spaniards, does not seem to us to have been called
upon to place the fate of the British army--auxiliaries, it must be
observed, not principals in the war--on the same desperate cast by
which the natives were compelled to abide. The disasters of the retreat
appear to rest on want of knowledge of the ground they were to traverse,
and on the deficiency of the commissariat, which, though the army must
be entirely dependent on it, was not at that time sufficiently under the
control of the commander-in-chief. We owe it to his memory to say, that
at the close of his own valuable life, he amply redeemed in his last act
the character of the army which he commanded.[468]
FOOTNOTES:
[440] Gouvion St. Cyr, Journal des Opérations de l'Armée de Catalogne en
1808 et 1809, p. 18.
[441] "The 15th of August was passed in gaiety and amusements, because
the affairs of Andalusia had not been made public; and no suspicion was
entertained that our customary run of prosperity had received a check.
It was only divulged some time afterwards; and it is truly curious to
watch how the courtiers, whose trade is any thing else but to fight,
criticised those military men who had, on that occasion, clouded with
cares that brow, before which the courtiers were all so ready to bend
the knee."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 296.
[442] Of June 14th--the very number which contained Napoleon's
proclamation of Joseph as King of Spain and the Indies.
[443] "A principle which the very thief, on his career to the gallows,
dares not avow to himself."--SOUTHEY, vol. ii., p. 363.
[444] "A Baron de Nostiz, Stein, the Prussian counsellor of state,
Generals Sharnhost and Gneizenau, and Colonel Schill, appear to have
been the principal contrivers and patrons of these societies, so
characteristic of Germans, who, regular and plodding, even to a proverb,
in their actions, possess the most extravagant imaginations of any
people on the face of the earth."--NAPIER, vol. i., p. 316.
[445] "The two Emperors passed some days together in the enjoyment of
the charms of perfect intimacy, and of the most familiar communications
of private life. 'We were,' said Napoleon, 'two young men of quality,
who, in their common pleasures, had no secret from each other.' Napoleon
had sent for the most distinguished performers of the French theatre. A
celebrated actress, Mademoiselle B----, attracted the attention of his
guest, who had a momentary fancy to get acquainted with her. He asked
his companion whether any inconvenience was likely to be the result.
'None,' answered the latter; 'only,' added he, intentionally, 'it is a
certain and rapid mode of making yourself known to all Paris. After
to-morrow, post-day, the most minute details will be despatched, and in
a short time not a statuary at Paris but will be qualified to give a
model of your person from head to foot.' The danger of such a kind of
publicity appeased the monarch's rising passion; 'for,' observed
Napoleon, 'he was very circumspect with regard to that point, and he
recollected, no doubt, the old adage, when the mask falls, the hero
disappears.'"--LAS CASES, tom. ii., p. 219.
[446] Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 220.
[447] For the correspondence with the Russian and French governments,
relative to the overtures from Erfurt, see Parliamentary Debates, vol.
xii., p. 93.
[448] It was one of the minute and childish particulars in which
Buonaparte showed a spleen against the British nation, that he would not
bear the heraldic achievement, which the English flag had displayed for
five hundred years, to be termed Lions, but always called them Leopards.
The spirit which this ebullition of spite manifested, could only be
compared to that exhibited by the poor citizen, when he revenged
himself, as he thought, upon the cognizance of the Earl of Oxford, by
calling the nobleman's Swan a Goose.--S.
[449] Napier, vol. i., p. 303; Southey, vol. ii., p. 300.
[450] Gouvion St. Cyr says of them that they are the best light troops
in Europe.--_Journal_, p. 54.
[451] Southey, vol. ii., p. 323.
[452] "Robertson was qualified for this dangerous service by his skill
as a linguist. One Spanish verse was given him; to have taken any other
credentials might have proved fatal, and there was an anecdote connected
with this which would sufficiently authenticate his mission. During Mr.
Frere's residence as ambassador in Spain, Romana, who was an
accomplished scholar, had recommended to his perusal the Gests of Cid,
as one of the most ancient and curious poems in the language. One day he
happened to call when Mr. Frere was reading it, and had just made a
conjectural emendation in one of the lines: Romana instantly perceived
the propriety of the proposed reading, and this line, therefore, when he
was reminded of it, would prove that Mr. Robertson had communicated with
his friend the British ambassador."--SOUTHEY, vol. ii., p. 337.
[453] Parliamentary Debates, vol. xii., p. 97.
[454] "What 'the general science of war upon an extended scale' may
mean, I cannot pretend to say; but that Sir David Baird was sent by the
Government from England direct to Corunna, and that Sir John Moore was
not induced, by the reports of the peasants, to divide his army, may be
ascertained by a reference to Sir John Moore's correspondence."--NAPIER,
vol. i., p. 333.
[455] "In a few days I go," he said, "to put myself at the head of my
armies, and, with the aid of God, to crown the King of Spain in Madrid,
and to plant my eagles on the towers of Lisbon."
[456] "He reached Bayonne, and afterwards Vittoria, with the rapidity of
an arrow. He performed the latter journey on horseback in two days,
reaching Tolosa on the first, and on the second Vittoria."--SAVARY, tom.
ii., p. 11.
[457] Napier, vol. i., p. 317; Southey, vol. ii., p. 387.
[458] Fifth Bulletin of the French Army in Spain; Napier, vol. i., p.
391; Southey, vol. ii., p. 390.
[459] Seventh Bulletin; Southey, vol. ii., p. 393; Jomini, tom. iii., p.
97.
[460] "These great advantages, the result of Napoleon's admirable
combinations, the fruits of ten days of active exertion, obtained so
easily, and yet so decisive of the fate of the campaign, prove the
weakness of the system upon which the Spanish and British governments
were at this time acting; if that can be called a system, where no one
general knew what another had done--was doing--or intended to
do."--NAPIER, vol. i., p. 394.
[461] Napier, vol. i., p. 401; Seventh Bulletin; Jomini, tom. iii., p.
99.
[462] "They are resolute," said Mr. Frere, "and I believe every man of
them determined to perish with the country; they will not at least set
the example, which the ruling powers and higher orders of other
countries have exhibited, of weakness and timidity." "I have no
hesitation," he added, "in taking upon myself any responsibility which
may attach itself to this advice, as I consider the fate of Spain as
depending absolutely, for the present, upon the decision which you may
adopt. I say, for the present, for such is the spirit and character of
the country, that even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means
despair of their ultimate success."
[463] Southey, vol. ii., p. 481.
[464] "In my life," says one who was present, "I never witnessed such an
instantaneously-withering effect upon any body of living creatures! A
few murmurs only were heard, but every countenance was changed, and they
who, the minute before, were full of that confidence which ensures
victory, were at once deprived of all heart and hope."--SOUTHEY, vol.
ii., p. 493.
[465] Sir Arthur Wellesley, while exculpating from blame the individuals
composing the commissariat of the Portuguese expedition, added these
words:--"The fact is, that I wished to draw the attention of the
government to this important branch of the public service, which is but
little understood in this country. The evils of which I complained, are
probably owing to the nature of our political situation, which prevents
us from undertaking great military operations, in which the subsistence
of armies becomes a subject of serious consideration and difficulty; and
these evils consisted in the inexperience of almost every individual, of
the mode of procuring, conveying, and distributing supplies." He
requested that this explanation might stand in the minutes.--SOUTHEY,
vol. i., p. 340.--S.
[466] "This news was brought to the Emperor at Valderas, and gave him
great pain, owing to the particular value he set upon the chasseurs of
the guard. He did not, however, condemn the courageous determination of
their colonel, but he regretted that he had not shown more
self-command."--SAVARY, tom. ii., part ii., p. 21.
[467] Southey, vol. ii., p. 524. "As the soldiers placed him in a
blanket, his sword got entangled, and the hilt entered the wound.
Captain Hardinge attempted to take it off, but the dying man stopped
him, saying, 'It is as well as it is; I had rather it should go out of
the field with me.' And in that manner, so becoming to a soldier, Moore
was borne from the fight."--NAPIER, vol. i., p. 497.
[468] "Sir John Moore lived to hear that the battle was won. 'Are the
French beaten?' was the question which he repeated to every one who came
into his apartment; and, addressing his old friend, Colonel Anderson, he
said, 'You know that I always wished to die this way.' His strength was
fast failing, and life was almost extinct, when, with an unsubdued
spirit, he exclaimed, 'I hope the people of England will be satisfied! I
hope my country will do me justice!' The battle was scarcely ended, when
his corpse, wrapped in a military cloak, was interred by the officers of
the staff in the citadel of Corunna. The guns of the enemy paid his
funeral honours; and Soult, with a noble feeling of respect for his
valour, raised a monument to his memory."--NAPIER, vol. i., p. 500.