_Plans of Defence of the Spanish Juntas--defeated by the ardour of
the Insurrectionary Armies--Cruelty of the French Troops, and
Inveteracy of the Spaniards--Successes of the Invaders--Defeat of
Rio Secco--Exultation of Napoleon--Joseph enters Madrid--His
reception--Duhesme compelled to retreat to Barcelona, and Moncey
from before Valencia--Defeat of Dupont by Castanos at Baylen--His
Army surrenders Prisoners of War--Effects of this Victory and
Capitulation--Unreasonable Expectations of the British
Public--Joseph leaves Madrid, and retires to Vittoria--Defence of
Zaragossa._
[Sidenote: PLANS OF THE JUNTAS.]
Surrounded by insurrection, as we have stated them to be, the French
generals who had entered Spain entertained no fear but that the
experience of their superiority in military skill and discipline, would
soon teach the Spaniards the folly of their unavailing resistance. The
invading armies were no longer commanded by Murat,[403] who had returned
to France, to proceed from thence to take possession of the throne of
Naples, vacant by the promotion of Joseph, as in earlier life he might
have attained a higher step of military rank, in consequence of
regimental succession. Savary, who had, as we have seen, a principal
share in directing Ferdinand's mind towards the fatal journey to
Bayonne, remained in command at Madrid,[404] and endeavoured, by a
general system of vigorous effort in various directions, to put an end
to the insurrection, which had now become general wherever the French
did not possess such preponderating armed force, as rendered opposition
impossible. We can but hint at the character which the war assumed even
at the outset, and touch generally upon its more important incidents.
[Sidenote: THE INSURRECTIONARY ARMIES.]
The Spanish Juntas had wisely recommended to their countrymen to avoid
general engagements--to avail themselves of the difficulties of various
kinds which their country presents to an army of invaders--to operate
upon the flanks, the rear, and the communications of the French--and to
engage the enemy in a war of posts, in which courage and natural
instinct bring the native sharpshooter more upon a level with the
trained and practised soldier, than the professors of military tactics
are at all times willing to admit. But although this plan was
excellently laid down, and in part adhered to, in which case it seldom
failed to prove successful, yet on many occasions it became impossible
for the Spanish leaders to avoid more general actions, in which defeat
and loss were usually inevitable. The character of the insurrectionary
armies, or rather of the masses of armed citizens so called, led to many
fatal errors of this kind. They were confident in their own numbers and
courage, in proportion to their ignorance of the superiority which
discipline, the possession of cavalry and artillery, and the power of
executing combined and united movements, must always bestow upon regular
forces. They were also impatient of the miseries necessarily brought
upon the country by a protracted and systematic war of mere defence, and
not less unwilling to bear the continued privations to which they
themselves were exposed. On some occasions, opposition on the part of
their officers to their demand of being led against the enemy, to put an
end, as they hoped, to the war, by one brave blow, was construed into
cowardice or treachery; and falling under the suspicion of either, was a
virtual sentence of death to the suspected person. Sometimes, also,
these insurrectionary bodies were forced to a general action, which they
would willingly have avoided, either by want of provisions, with which
they were indifferently supplied at all times, or by the superior
manœuvres of a skilful enemy. In most of the actions which took place
from these various causes, the French discipline effectually prevailed
over the undisciplined courage of the insurgents, and the patriots were
defeated with severe loss.
On these occasions, the cruelty of the conquerors too frequently sullied
their victory, and materially injured the cause in which it was gained.
Affecting to consider the Spaniards, who appeared in arms to oppose a
foreign yoke and an intrusive king, as rebels taken in the fact, the
prisoners who fell into the hands of the French were subjected to
military execution; and the villages where they had met with opposition
were delivered up to the licentious fury of the soldier, who spared
neither sex nor age. The French perhaps remembered, that some such
instances of sanguinary severity, in the commencement of the Italian
campaigns, had compelled the insurgents of Lombardy to lay down their
arms, and secured the advantages which Napoleon had gained by the defeat
of the Austrian forces. But in Spain the result was extremely different.
Every atrocity of this kind was a new injury to be avenged, and was
resented as such by a nation at no time remarkable for forgiveness of
wrongs. The sick, the wounded, the numerous stragglers of the French
army, were, when they fell into the hands of the Spaniards, which
frequently happened, treated with the utmost barbarity; and this
retaliation hardening the heart, and inflaming the passions of either
party as they suffered by it in turn, the war assumed a savage, bloody,
and atrocious character, which seemed to have for its object not the
subjection, but the extermination of the vanquished.
The character of the country, very unfavourable to the French mode of
supporting their troops at the expense of the districts through which
they marched, added to the inveteracy of the struggle. Some parts of
Spain are no doubt extremely fertile, but there are also immense tracts
of barren plains, or unproductive mountains, which afford but a scanty
support to the inhabitants themselves, and are totally inadequate to
supply the additional wants of an invading army. In such districts the
_Marauders_, to be successful in their task of collecting provisions,
had to sweep a large tract of country on each side of the line of
march--an operation the more difficult and dangerous, that though the
principal high-roads through Spain are remarkably good, yet the lateral
communications connecting them with the countries which they traverse
are of the worst possible description, and equally susceptible of being
defended by posts, protected by ambuscades, or altogether broken up, and
rendered impervious to an invader. Hence it was long since said by Henry
IV., that if a general invaded Spain with a small army, he must be
defeated--if with a large one, he must be starved; and the gigantic
undertaking of Buonaparte appeared by no means unlikely to fail, either
from the one or the other reason.
At the first movement of the French columns into the provinces which
were in insurrection, victory seemed every where to follow the invaders.
Lefebvre Desnouettes defeated the Spaniards in Arragon on the 9th of
June; General Bessières beat the insurgents in many partial actions in
the same month, kept Navarre and Biscay in subjection, and overawed the
insurgents in Old Castile. These, however, were but petty advantages,
compared to that which he obtained, in a pitched battle, over two united
armies of the Spaniards, consisting of the forces of Castile and Leon,
joined to those of Galicia.
The first of these armies was commanded by Cuesta, described, by
Southey,[405] as a brave old man, energetic, hasty, and headstrong, in
whose resolute, untractable, and decided temper, the elements of the
Spanish character were strongly marked. His army was full of zeal, but
in other respects in such a state of insubordination, that they had
recently murdered one of the general officers against whom they
harboured some rashly adopted suspicions of treachery. The Galician army
was in the same disorderly condition; and they also had publicly torn to
pieces their general, Filangieri,[406] upon no further apparent cause of
suspicion than that he had turned his thoughts rather to defensive than
offensive operations. Blake, a good soldier, who enjoyed the confidence
of the army, but whose military talents were not of the first order,
succeeded Filangieri in his dangerous command, and having led his
Galician levies to form a junction with Cuesta, they now proceeded
together towards Burgos. The two generals differed materially in
opinion. Cuesta, though he had previously suffered a defeat from the
French near Cabezon, was for hazarding the event of a battle, moved
probably by the difficulty of keeping together and maintaining their
disorderly forces; while Blake, dreading the superiority of the French
discipline, deprecated the risk of a general action. Bessières left them
no choice on the subject. He came upon them, when posted near Medina del
Rio Seco, where, on the 14th July, the combined armies of Galicia and
Castile received the most calamitous defeat which the Spaniards had yet
sustained. The patriots fought most bravely, and it was said more than
twenty thousand slain were buried on the field of battle.
[Sidenote: July 20.]
Napoleon received the news of this victory with exultation. "It is," he
said, "the battle of Villa Viciosa. Bessières has put the crown on
Joseph's head. The Spaniards," he added, "have now perhaps fifteen
thousand men left, with some old blockhead at their head;--the
resistance of the Peninsula is ended."[407] In fact, the victory of
Medina del Rio Seco made the way open for Joseph to advance from
Vittoria to Madrid, where he arrived without molestation. He entered the
capital in state, but without receiving any popular greetings, save what
the municipal authorities found themselves compelled to offer. The money
which was scattered amongst the populace was picked up by the French
alone, and by the French alone were the theatres filled, which had been
thrown open to the public in honour of their new prince.[408]
[Sidenote: VALENCIA.]
In the meantime, however, the advantages obtained by Bessières in
Castile seemed fast in the course of being outbalanced by the losses
which the French sustained in the other provinces. Duhesme, with those
troops which had so treacherously possessed themselves of Barcelona and
Figueras, seems, at the outset, to have entertained little doubt of
being able not only to maintain himself in Catalonia, but even to send
troops to assist in the subjugation of Valencia and Arragon. But the
Catalonians are, and have always been, a warlike people, addicted to the
use of the gun, and naturally disposed, like the Tyrolese, to act as
sharp-shooters. Undismayed by several partial losses, they made good the
strong mountain-pass of Bruch and other defiles, and, after various
actions, compelled the French general to retreat towards Barcelona, with
a loss both of men and character.[409]
An expedition undertaken by Marshal Moncey against Valencia, was marked
with deeper disaster. He obtained successes, indeed, over the insurgents
as he advanced towards the city; but when he ventured an attack on the
place itself, in hopes of carrying it by a sudden effort, he was opposed
by all the energy of a general popular defence. The citizens rushed to
man the walls--the monks, with a sword in one hand, and a crucifix in
the other, encouraged them to fight in the name of God and their
King--the very women mingled in the combat, bringing ammunition and
refreshments to the combatants.[410] Every attempt to penetrate into the
city was found unavailing; and Moncey, disappointed of meeting with the
reinforcements which Duhesme was to have despatched him from Barcelona,
was obliged to abandon his enterprise, and to retreat, not without being
severely harassed, towards the main French army, which occupied Old and
New Castile.[411]
It was not common in Napoleon's wars for his troops and generals to be
thus disconcerted, foiled, and obliged to abandon a purpose which they
had adopted. But a worse and more decisive fate was to attend the
division of Dupont, than the disappointments and losses which Duhesme
had experienced in Catalonia, and Moncey before Valencia.
So early as Murat's first occupation of Madrid, he had despatched
Dupont, an officer of high reputation, towards Cadiz, of which he named
him governor. This attempt to secure that important city, and protect
the French fleet which lay in its harbours, seems to have been judged by
Napoleon premature, probably because he was desirous to leave the
passage open for Charles IV. to have made his escape from Cadiz to South
America, in case he should so determine. Dupont's march, therefore, was
countermanded, and he remained stationary at Toledo, until the
disposition of the Andalusians, and of the inhabitants of Cadiz, showing
itself utterly inimical to the French, he once more received orders to
advance at all risks, and secure that important seaport, with the French
squadron which was lying there. The French general moved forward
accordingly, traversed the chain of wild mountains called Sierra Morena,
which the tale of Cervantes has rendered classical, forced the passage
of the river Guadalquiver at the bridge of Alcolea, advanced to, and
subdued, the ancient town of Cordoba.[412]
Dupont had thus reached the frontiers of Andalusia; but the fate of
Cadiz was already decided. That rich commercial city had embraced the
patriotic cause, and the French squadron was in the hands of the
Spaniards; Seville was in complete insurrection, and its Junta, the most
active in the kingdom of Spain, were organising large forces, and adding
them daily to a regular body of ten thousand men, under General
Castanos, which had occupied the camp of St. Rocque, near Gibraltar.
If Dupont had ventured onward in the state in which matters were, he
would have rushed on too unequal odds. On the other hand, his situation
at Cordoba, and in the neighbourhood, was precarious. He was divided
from the main French army by the Sierra Morena, the passes of which were
infested, and might almost be said to be occupied, by the insurgent
mountaineers; and he was exposed to be attacked by the Andalusian army,
so soon as their general might think them adequate to the task. Dupont
solicited reinforcements, therefore, as well from Portugal as from the
French army in the Castiles; such reinforcements being absolutely
necessary, not merely to his advancing into Andalusia, but to his
keeping his ground, or even effecting a safe retreat. Junot, who
commanded in Portugal, occupied at once by the insurrection of the
natives of that country, and by the threatened descent of the English,
was, as we shall hereafter see, in no situation to spare Dupont the
succours he desired. But two brigades, under Generals Vedel and Gobert,
joined Dupont from Castile, after experiencing some loss of rather an
ominous character, for it could neither be returned nor avenged, from
the armed peasantry of the Sierra.
[Sidenote: BAYLEN.]
These reinforcements augmented Dupont's division to twenty thousand
men, a force which was thought adequate to strike a decisive blow in
Andalusia, providing Castanos could be brought to hazard a general
action. Dupont accordingly put himself in motion, occupied Baylen and La
Carolina in Andalusia, and took by storm the old Moorish town of Jaen.
The sagacious old Spanish general had, in the meantime, been bringing
his new levies into order, and the French, after they had possessed
themselves of Jaen, were surprised to find themselves attacked there
with great vigour and by superior forces, which compelled them, after a
terrible resistance, to evacuate the place and retire to Baylen. From
thence, Dupont wrote despatches to Savary at Madrid, stating the
difficulties of his situation. His men, he said, had no supplies of
bread, save from the corn which they reaped, grinded, and baked with
their own hands--the peasants, who were wont to perform the country
labour, had left their harvest-work to take up arms--the insurgents were
becoming daily more audacious--they were assuming the offensive, and
strong reinforcements were necessary to enable him either to maintain
his ground, or do any thing considerable to annoy the enemy. These
despatches fell into the hands of Castanos, who acted upon the
information they afforded.
On the 16th July, two large divisions of the Spaniards attacked the
French on different points, and, dislodging them from Baylen, drove them
back on Menjibar; while Castanos, at the head of a large force, overawed
Dupont, and prevented his moving to the assistance of his generals of
brigade, one of whom, Gobert, was killed in the action. On the night of
the 18th, another battle commenced, by an attempt on the part of the
French to recover Baylen. The troops on both sides fought desperately,
but the Spaniards, conscious that succours were at no great distance,
made good their defence of the village. The action continued the greater
part of the day, when, after an honourable attempt to redeem the
victory, by a desperate charge at the head of all his forces, Dupont
found himself defeated on all points, and so enclosed by the superior
force of the Spaniards, as rendered his retreat impossible. He had no
resource except capitulation. He was compelled to surrender himself, and
the troops under his immediate command, prisoners of war. But, for the
division of Vedel, which had not been engaged, and was less hard pressed
than the other, it was stipulated that they should be sent back to
France in Spanish vessels. This part of the convention of Baylen was
afterwards broken by the Spaniards, and the whole of the French army
were detained close prisoners. They were led to this act of bad faith,
partly by an opinion that the French generals had been too cunning for
Castanos in the conditions they obtained--partly from the false idea,
that the perfidy with which they had acted towards Spain, dispensed with
the obligations of keeping terms with them--and partly at the
instigation of Morla, the successor of the unhappy Solano, who scrupled
not to recommend to his countrymen that sacrifice of honour to
interest, which he himself afterwards practised, in abandoning the cause
of his country for that of the intrusive King.[413]
The battle and subsequent capitulation of Baylen, was in itself a very
great disaster, the most important which had befallen the French arms
since the star of Buonaparte arose--the _furcæ Caudinæ_, as he himself
called it, of his military history. More than three thousand Frenchmen
had been lost in the action--seventeen thousand had surrendered
themselves,[414]--Andalusia, the richest part of Spain, was freed from
the French armies--and the wealthy cities of Seville and Cadiz had
leisure to employ a numerous force of trained population, and their
treasures in support of the national cause. Accordingly, the tidings
which Napoleon received while at Bourdeaux, filled him with an agitation
similar to that of the Roman Emperor, when he demanded from Varus his
lost legions. But the grief and anxiety of Buonaparte was better founded
than that of Augustus. The latter lost only soldiers, whose loss might
be supplied; but the battle of Baylen dissolved that idea of
invincibility attached to Napoleon and his fortunes, which, like a
talisman, had so often palsied the councils and disabled the exertions
of his enemies, who felt, in opposing him, as if they were predestined
victims, struggling against the dark current of Destiny itself. The
whole mystery, too, and obscurity, in which Buonaparte had involved the
affairs of Spain, concealing the nature of the interest which he held in
that kingdom, and his gigantic plan of annexing it to his empire, were
at once dispelled. The tidings of Dupont's surrender operated like a
whirlwind on the folds of a torpid mist, and showed to all Europe, what
Napoleon most desired to conceal--that he was engaged in a national
conflict of a kind so doubtful, that it had commenced by a very great
loss on the side of France; and that he was thus engaged purely by his
own unprincipled ambition. That his armies could be defeated, and
brought to the necessity of surrendering, was now evident to Spain and
to Europe. The former gathered courage to persist in an undertaking so
hopefully begun, while nations, now under the French domination, caught
hope for themselves while they watched the struggle; and the spell being
broken which had rendered them submissive to their fate, they cherished
the prospect of speedily emulating the contest, which they at present
only witnessed.
Yet were these inspiriting consequences of the victory of Castanos
attended with some counterbalancing inconveniences, both as the event
affected the Spaniards themselves, and the other nations of Europe. It
fostered in the ranks of Spain their national vice, and excess of
presumption and confidence in their own valour; useful, perhaps, so far
as it gives animation in the moment of battle, but most hazardous when
it occasions inattention to the previous precautions which are always
necessary to secure victory, and which are so often neglected in the
Spanish armies.[415] In short, while the success at Baylen induced the
Spaniards to reject the advice of experience and skill, when to follow
it might have seemed to entertain a doubt of the fortunes of Spain, it
encouraged also the most unreasonable expectations in the other
countries of Europe, and especially in Great Britain, where men's wishes
in a favourite cause are so easily converted into hopes. Without
observing the various concurrences of circumstances which had
contributed to the victory of Baylen, they considered it as a scene
which might easily be repeated elsewhere, whenever the Spaniards should
display the same energy; and thus, because the patriots had achieved one
great and difficult task, they expected from them on all occasions, not
miracles only, but sometimes even impossibilities. When these
unreasonable expectations were found groundless, the politicians who had
entertained them were so much chagrined and disappointed, that, hurrying
into the opposite extreme, they became doubtful either of the zeal of
the Spanish nation in the cause for which they were fighting, or their
power of maintaining an effectual resistance. And thus, to use the
scriptural phrase, the love of many waxed cold, and men of a desponding
spirit were inclined to wish the aid of Britain withdrawn from a contest
which they regarded as hopeless, and that those supplies should be
discontinued, on which its maintenance in a great measure depended.
The event of Baylen was not known at Madrid till eight or ten days after
it had taken place; but when it arrived, Joseph Buonaparte, the
intrusive King, plainly saw that the capital was no longer a safe
residence for him, and prepared for his retreat. He generously gave
leave to the individuals composing his administration, either to follow
his fortunes, or take the national side, if they preferred it;[416] and
leaving Madrid, (3d July,) again retired to Vittoria, where, secured by
a French garrison, and at no great distance from the frontier, he might
in safety abide the events of the war.
[Sidenote: SIEGE OF ZARAGOSSA.]
Another memorable achievement of the Spanish conflict, which served
perhaps better than even the victory of Baylen, to evince the character
of the resistance offered to the French, was the immortal defence of
Zaragossa, the capital of Arragon. This ancient city was defenceless,
excepting for the old Gothic, or Roman or Moorish wall, of ten feet
high, by which it is surrounded, and which is in most places a mere
curtain, without flankers or returning angles of any kind.[417] Its
garrison consisted chiefly of the citizens of the place; and its
governor, a young nobleman, called Don Joseph Palafox, who was chosen
Captain-general because he happened to be in the vicinity, had hitherto
been only distinguished by the share he had taken in the frivolous
gaieties of the court.[418] The city thus possessing no important
advantages of defence, and the French general in Arragon, Lefebvre
Desnouettes, having defeated such of the insurgents as had shown
themselves in the field, he conceived he had only to advance, in
security of occupying the capital of the province. But there never was
on earth a defence in which the patriotic courage of the defenders
sustained so long, and baffled so effectually, the assaults of an enemy
provided with all those military advantages, of which they themselves
were totally destitute.
On the 15th of June, the French attempted to carry the place by a
_coup-de-main_, in which they failed with great loss. On the 27th,
reinforced and supplied with a train of mortars, they made a more
regular effort, and succeeded in getting possession of a suburb, called
the Terrero. They then began to invest the place more closely, showered
bombs on its devoted edifices, and amid the conflagration occasioned by
these missiles of destruction, attempted to force the gates of the city
at different points. All the Zaragossians rushed to man their
defences--condition, age, even sex, made no difference; the monks fought
abreast with the laity, and several women showed more than masculine
courage.[419]
Lefebvre was incensed by a defence of a place, which, according to all
common rules, was untenable. He forgot the rules of war in his turn, and
exposed his troops to immense loss by repeatedly attempting to carry the
place at the bayonet's point. Meanwhile ammunition ran scarce--but the
citizens contrived to manufacture gunpowder in considerable quantities.
Famine came--its pressure was submitted to. Sickness thinned the ranks
of the defenders--those who survived willingly performed the duty of the
absent. It was in vain that the large convent of Santa Engracia,
falling into the hands of the besiegers, enabled them to push their
posts into the town itself. The French general announced this success in
a celebrated summons:--"_Sancta Engracia--Capitulation!_"--"_Zaragossa--war
to the knife's blade_,"[420] was the equally laconic answer. The threat
was made good--the citizens fought from street to street, from house to
house, from chamber to chamber--the contending parties often occupied
different apartments of the same house--the passages which connected
them were choked with dead. After this horrid contest had continued for
several weeks, the gallant defence of Zaragossa excited at once the
courage and sympathy of those who shared the sentiments of its heroic
garrison and citizens, and a considerable reinforcement was thrown into
the place in the beginning of August.[421] After this the citizens
began to gain ground in all their skirmishes with the invaders; the
news of Dupont's surrender became publicly known, and Lefebvre, on the
13th of August, judged it most prudent to evacuate the quarter of the
city which he possessed. He blew up the church of Santa Engracia, and
set fire to several of the houses which he had gained, and finally
retreated from the city which had so valiantly resisted his arms.[422]
The spirit of indomitable courage which the Spaniards manifested on this
occasion, has perhaps no equal in history, excepting the defence of
Numantium by their ancestors. It served, even more than the victory of
Baylen, to extend hope and confidence in the patriotic cause; and the
country which had produced such men as Palafox and his followers, was,
with much show of probability, declared unconquerable.
It is now necessary to trace the effects which this important revolution
produced, as well in England, as in the Portuguese part of the
Peninsula.
FOOTNOTES:
[403] Before Murat had well recovered from a severe attack of the Madrid
cholic an intermittent fever supervened, and when that was removed, he
was ordered by his physicians to the warm baths of Barèges.
[404] "As some person was immediately wanted to supply the place of the
Grand Duke of Berg, he directed me to proceed to Madrid, where I found
myself in a more extraordinary situation than any general officer had
ever been placed in. My mission was for the purpose of perusing all the
reports addressed to the Grand Duke of Berg, to return answers, and
issue orders in every case of emergency; but I was not to affix my
signature to any paper; every thing was to be done in the name of
General Belliard, in his capacity of chief of the staff of the army. The
Emperor adopted this course, because he intended to send the new King
forward in a very short time; and felt it to be unnecessary to make any
alterations until the King's arrival at Madrid, when I was to be
recalled."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 250.
[405] History of the Peninsular War, vol. i., p. 453.
[406] "Filangieri, the Governor of Corunna, being called on by a
tumultuous crowd to exercise the rights of sovereignty, and to declare
war in form against the French, was unwilling to commence such an
important revolution upon such uncertain grounds; the impatient crowd
instantly attempted his life, which was then saved by the courage of an
officer of his staff; but his horrible fate was only deferred. A part of
the regiment of Navarre seized him at Villa Franca del Bierzo, planted
the ground with their bayonets, and then tossing him in a blanket, let
him fall on the points thus disposed, and there leaving him to struggle,
they dispersed and retired to their own homes."--NAPIER, vol. i., p. 37.
[407] Southey, vol. i., p. 481; Napier, vol. i., p. 110.
[408] "King Joseph made his entry into Madrid at four in the afternoon,
with no other escort than the Emperor's guard. Although his suite was
numerous, he was accompanied by no other Spaniard than the
Captain-general of Navarre; the ministers and deputies who had left
Bayonne in his train had already deserted him. The inhabitants
manifested some degree of curiosity, and even gave some signs of
approbation; public decorum, however, was not in the least
interrupted."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 276.
[409] Napier, vol. i., p. 75.
[410] Southey, vol. i., p. 470; Napier, vol. i., p. 94.
[411] Moncey could hardly have expected to succeed against the town of
Valencia; for, to use Napoleon's words, "a city, with eighty thousand
inhabitants, barricadoed streets, and artillery placed at the gates,
cannot be _taken by the collar_."--NAPIER, vol. i., p. 99.
[412] Savary, tom. ii., p. 255; Napier, vol. i., p. 116.
[413] Southey, vol. i., p. 497; Napier, vol. i., p. 125.
[414] "Dupont surrendered an effective force of 21,000 infantry, forty
pieces of cannon, and 2400 cavalry; in short, a full third of the French
forces in Spain."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 273.
[415] "The moral effect of the battle of Baylen was surprising; it was
one of those minor events which, insignificant in themselves, are the
cause of great changes in the affairs of nations. Opening as it were a
new crater for the Spanish fire, the glory of past ages seemed to be
renewed, every man conceived himself a second Cid, and perceived in the
surrender of Dupont, not the deliverance of Spain, but the immediate
conquest of France. 'We are much obliged to our good friends, the
English,' was a common phrase among them, when conversing with the
officers of Sir John Moore's army; 'we thank them for their good-will,
and we shall have the pleasure of escorting them through France to
Calais.' This absurd confidence might have led to great things, if it
had been supported by wisdom, activity, or valour; but it was a 'voice,
and nothing more.'"--NAPIER, vol. i., p. 131.
[416] De Pradt, Mémoire Hist. sur la Rév. de l'Espagne, p. 192.
[417] Napier, vol. i., p. 65.
[418] Southey, vol. i., p. 37.
[419] "Augustina Zaragoza, a handsome woman of the lower class, about
twenty-two years of age, arrived at one of the batteries with
refreshments at the time when not a man who defended it was left alive,
so tremendous was the fire which the French kept up against it. For a
moment the citizens hesitated to re-man the guns. Augustina sprung
forward over the dead and dying, snatched a match from the hand of a
dead artilleryman, and fired off a six-and-twenty pounder; then jumping
upon the gun, made a solemn vow never to quit it alive during the
siege."--SOUTHEY, vol. ii., p. 14.--Lord Byron states, that when he was
at Seville, in 1809, the Maid of Zaragoza was seen walking daily on the
Prado, decorated with medals, and orders, by command of the Junta. She
has further had the honour of being painted by Wilkie.
[420]
"Such be the sons of Spain, and strange her fate
They fight for freedom who were never free;
A kingless people for a nerveless state,
Her vassals combat when their chieftains flee,
True to the veriest slaves of treachery:
Fond of a land which gave them nought but life,
Pride points the path that leads to liberty;
Back to the struggle, baffled in the strife,
War, war is still the cry, '_War even to the knife!_'"
_Childe Harold_, c. i., st. 86.
[421] "Just before the day closed, Don Francisco Palafox, the general's
brother, entered the city with a convoy of arms and ammunition, and
reinforcement of three thousand men."--SOUTHEY, vol. ii., p. 26.
[422] "A hideous and revolting spectacle was exhibited during the
action; the public hospital being taken and fired, the madmen confined
there issued forth among the combatants, muttering, shouting, singing,
and moping, according to the character of their disorder, while
drivelling idiots mixed their unmeaning cries with the shouts of
contending soldiers."--NAPIER, vol. i., p. 70.