_Position of the French Armies--Napoleon advances towards
Vienna--The Emperor Francis leaves his Capital--French enter Vienna
on the 13th November--Review of the French Successes in Italy and
the Tyrol--Schemes of Napoleon to force on a General Battle--Battle
of Austerlitz is fought on the 2d December, and the combined
Austro-Russian Armies completely Defeated--Interview betwixt the
Emperor of Austria and Napoleon--The Emperor Alexander retreats
towards Russia--Treaty of Presburgh signed on the 26th December--Its
Conditions--Fate of the King of Sweden--and of the Two Sicilies._
[Sidenote: POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMIES.]
The tide of war now rolled eastward, having surmounted and utterly
demolished the formidable barrier which was opposed to it. Napoleon
placed himself at the head of his central army.[143] Ney, upon his
right, was ready to repel any descent which might be made from the
passes of the Tyrol. Murat, on his left, watched the motions of the
Austrians, under the Archduke Ferdinand, who, refusing to join in the
unworthy capitulation of Ulm, had cut their way into Bohemia, and there
united themselves with other forces, either stationed in that kingdom,
or who had, like themselves, escaped thither. Lastly, the division of
Augereau, (who had recently advanced from France at the head of an army
of reserve,) occupying part of Swabia, served to protect the rear of the
French army against any movement from the Vorarlberg; and at the same
time menaced the Prussians, in case, acting upon the offence given by
the violation of their territory, they should have crossed the Danube,
and engaged in the war.[144]
If, however, the weight of Prussia had been thrown into the scale with
sufficient energy at this decisive moment, it would not probably have
been any resistance which Augereau could have offered that could have
saved Napoleon from a perilous situation, since the large armies of the
new enemy would have been placed in his rear, and, of course, his
communications with France entirely cut off. It was a crisis of the same
kind which opened to Austria in the year 1813; but she was then taught
wisdom by experience, and availed herself of the golden opportunity
which Prussia now suffered to escape. Buonaparte had reckoned with
accuracy upon the timid and fluctuating councils of that power. The
aggression on their territories of Anspach and Bareuth was learned at
Berlin; but then the news of the calamity sustained by the Austrians at
Ulm succeeded these tidings almost instantly, and while the first
article of intelligence seemed to urge instant hostilities, the next was
calculated to warn them against espousing a losing cause.
Thus, trusting to the vacillating and timid policy of Prussia,[145]
Napoleon, covered on his flank and rear as we have stated, continued to
push forward[146] with his central forces towards Vienna, menaced
repeatedly in the former wars, but whose fate seemed decided after the
disaster of Ulm. It is true, that an army, partly consisting of Russians
and partly of Austrians, had pressed forward to prevent that disgraceful
calamity, and, finding that the capitulation had taken place, were now
retreating step by step in front of the advancing French; but, not
exceeding forty-five thousand men, they were unable to make any
effectual stand upon the Inn, the Traun, the Ens, or in any other
position which might have covered Vienna. They halted, indeed,
repeatedly, made a considerable show of resistance, and fought some
severe though partial actions; but always ended by continuing their
retreat, which was now directed upon Moravia, where the grand Russian,
army had already assembled, under the command of the Emperor Alexander,
and were expecting still further reinforcements under General
Buxhowden.[147]
Some attempts were made to place Vienna in a state of defence, and the
inhabitants were called upon to rise in mass for that purpose. But as
the fortifications were ancient and in disrepair, an effort at
resistance could only have occasioned the destruction of the city. The
Emperor Francis saw himself, therefore, under the necessity of
endeavouring to provide for the safety of his capital by negotiation,
and for that of his person by leaving it. On the 7th November,
accordingly, he departed from Vienna for Brunn in Moravia, in order to
place himself under the protection of the Russian forces.
On the same day, but late in the evening, Count Giulay arrived at
Buonaparte's headquarters, then established at Lintz, with a proposal
for an armistice, previous to a general negotiation for peace. Napoleon
refused to listen to the proposal, unless Venice and the Tyrol were put
into his hands. These terms were too hard to be accepted.[148] Vienna,
therefore, was left to its fate; and that proud capital of the proud
House of Austria remained an unresisting prize to the invader.
[Sidenote: VIENNA TAKEN.]
On the 13th November the French took possession of Vienna, where they
obtained an immense quantity of military stores, arms, and
clothing;[149] a part of which spoils were bestowed by Napoleon on his
ally the Elector of Bavaria, who now witnessed the humiliation of the
Imperial House which had of late conducted itself so haughtily towards
him. General Clarke was appointed Governor of Vienna; and by a change as
rapid as if it had taken place on the stage, the new Emperor of France
occupied Schonbrun, the splendid palace of the long-descended Emperor of
Austria. But though such signal successes had crowned the commencement
of the campaign, it was necessary to defeat the haughty Russians, in
whose aid the Emperor of Austria still confided, before the object of
the war could be considered as attained. The broken and shattered
remnant of the Austrian forces had rallied from different quarters
around the yet untouched army of Alexander; and although the latter
retreated from Brunn towards Olmutz, it was only with the purpose of
forming a junction with Buxhowden, before they hazarded a general
battle.
In the meantime, the French army, following close on their back into
Moravia, fought one or two partial actions, which, though claimed as
victories, were so severely disputed as to make Napoleon aware that he
had to do with a more obstinate enemy than he had of late encountered in
the dispirited Austrians. He waited, therefore, until the result of his
skilful combinations should have drawn around him the greatest force he
could expect to collect, ere venturing upon an engagement, of which, if
he failed to obtain a decisive victory, the consequences were likely to
be fatal to him.
At this period, success had smiled on the French in Italy, and in the
Tyrol, as well as in Germany. In the former country, it may be
remembered that the Archduke Charles, at the head of seventy-five or
eighty thousand men, exclusive of garrisons, was opposed to Massena,
whose forces considerably exceeded that amount. The prince occupied the
left bank of the Adige, with the purpose of maintaining a defensive
warfare, until he should hear news of the campaign in Germany. Massena,
however, after some fighting, succeeded in forcing the passage of the
river at Verona, and in occupying the village of St. Michael. This was
on the 20th October. Soon afterwards, the account of the surrender at
Ulm reached the Frenchman, and determined him on a general attack along
the whole Austrian line, which was strongly posted near Caldiero. The
assault took place on the 30th October, and was followed by a very
desperate action; for the Austrians, confident in the presence of their
favourite commander, fought with the greatest courage. They were,
however, defeated; and a column of five thousand men, under General
Hellinger, detached for the purpose of attacking the French in the rear,
failed in their purpose, and being themselves surrounded, were obliged
to lay down their arms. The victors were joined by General St. Cyr, at
the head of twenty-five thousand men, who had evacuated the kingdom of
Naples, upon a treaty of neutrality entered into with the King, and now
came to join their countrymen in Lombardy.
In the midst of his own misfortunes, the Archduke Charles received the
fatal intelligence of the capitulation of Ulm, and that the French were
advancing in full march towards Vienna. To cover his brother's capital
became a matter of more pressing necessity than to attempt to continue
the defence of Italy, which circumstances rendered almost hopeless. He
commenced his retreat, therefore, on the night of the 1st of November,
determining to continue it through the mountain passes of Carinthia, and
so on into Hungary. If he had marched by the Tyrol, he would have found
Augereau in his front, with Ney and Marmont threatening his flanks,
while Massena, before whom he was now retreating, pressed on his rear.
The archduke commenced this dispiriting and distressing movement, over
nearly the same ground which he had passed while retreating before
Buonaparte himself in 1797. He did not, however, as on that occasion,
avail himself of the Tagliamento, or Palma Nova. His purpose was
retreat, not defence; and, though pursued closely by Massena, he halted
no longer at these strong posts than was necessary to protect his march,
and check the vivacity of the French advance. He effected at length his
retreat upon Laybach, where he received tidings from his brother the
Archduke John, whose situation on the Tyrol was not more agreeable than
his own in Italy; and who, like Charles himself, was desirous to escape
into the vicinity of Hungary with what forces remained to him.
The distress of the Archduke John was occasioned by an army of French
and Bavarians, commanded by Ney, who had penetrated into the Tyrol by
paths deemed impracticable; taken the forts of Schwatz, Neustadt, and
Inspruck itself, and placed the archduke's army in the most precarious
situation. Adopting a determination worthy of his birth, the Austrian
prince resolved at all risks to effect a junction with his brother,
and, though hard pressed by the enemy, he accomplished his purpose. Two
considerable corps of Austrians, being left in an insulated situation by
these movements of the two princes, were obliged to surrender. These
were the divisions of Jellachich, in the Vorarlberg, and of the Prince
of Rohan, in Lombardy. The whole of the north of Italy, with the Tyrol
and all its passes, was left to the undisturbed and unresisted
occupation of the French.[150]
The army of the royal brothers had, however, become formidable by their
junction, and was daily growing stronger. They were in communication
with Hungary, the brave inhabitants of which warlike country were
universally rising in arms. They were also joined by volunteers from
Croatia, the Tyrol, and all those wild and mountainous countries, which
have so long supplied the Austrian army with the finest light troops in
the world.
It might seem to counterbalance these advantages, that Massena had also
entered into communications with the French army of Germany at
Clagenfurt, the capital of Carinthia. But having left great part of his
troops in Italy, he had for the time ceased to be formidable to the
Austrian princes, who now meditated advancing on the French grand army,
which the audacity of its leader had placed in a situation extremely
perilous to any other than French troops acting under the eye of their
Emperor.
[Sidenote: SUCCESSION OF GRAND MANŒUVRES.]
Nothing, it is true, could be more admirably conceived and
satisfactorily accomplished than the succession of grand manœuvres,
which, distinguishing the opening of the campaign, had produced the
great, yet cheaply-purchased success of Ulm, and the capture of Vienna.
Nor was the series of combination less wonderful, by which, clearing the
Vorarlberg, the Tyrol, and the north of Italy of the enemy, Napoleon had
placed almost all the subordinate divisions of his own army at his
disposal, ready to assist him in the grand enterprise against the
Austro-Russian forces. But he has been considered by military critics as
having trusted too great a risk upon the precarious event of battle,
when he crossed the Danube, and plunged into Moravia, where a defeat, or
even a check, might have been attended with the most fatal consequences.
The position of the Archdukes Charles and John; the organisation of the
Hungarian insurrection, which proceeded rapidly; the success of the
Archduke Ferdinand, in raising a similar general levy in Bohemia,
threatened alarming operations in the French rear; while Prussia, with
the sword drawn in her hand, and the word _war_ upon her lips, watched
but the slightest waning of Buonaparte's star, to pronounce the word,
and to strike a blow at the same moment.
Napoleon accordingly, though he had dared the risk, was perfectly
sensible that as he had distinguished the earlier part of this campaign
by some of the most brilliant manœuvres which military history
records, it was now incumbent upon him, without delay, to conclude it by
a great and decisive victory over a new and formidable enemy. He
neglected, therefore, no art by which success could be ensured. In the
first place, it was necessary to determine the allies to immediate
battle; for, situated in the heart of an enemy's country, with
insurrection spreading wide and wider around him, an immediate action
was as desirable on his part, as delay would have been advantageous to
his opponents.
Some attempts at negotiation were made by the Austrians, to aid which
Haugwitz, the Prussian minister, made his appearance in the French camp
with the offer of his master's mediation, but with the alternative of
declaring war in case it was refused. To temporize with Prussia was of
the last consequence, and the French Emperor found a willing instrument
in Haugwitz. "The French and Austrian outposts," said Napoleon, "are
engaged; it is a prelude to the battle which I am about to fight--Say
nothing of your errand to me at present--I wish to remain in ignorance
of it. Return to Vienna, and wait the events of war."[151] Haugwitz, to
use Napoleon's own expression, was no novice, and returned to Vienna
without waiting for another hint; and doubtless the French Emperor was
well pleased to be rid of his presence.[152]
Napoleon next sent Savary[153] to the Russian camp, under pretence of
compliment to the Emperor Alexander, but in reality as a spy upon that
monarch and his generals. He returned, having discovered, or affected to
discover, that the Russian sovereign was surrounded by counsellors, whom
their youth and rank rendered confident and presumptuous, and who, he
concluded, might be easily misguided into some fatal act of
rashness.[154]
Buonaparte acted on the hint, and upon the first movement of the
Austro-Russian army in advance, withdrew his forces from the position
they had occupied. Prince Dolgorucki, aide-de-camp of the Emperor
Alexander, was despatched by him to return the compliments which had
been brought him. He too was, doubtless, expected to use his powers of
observation, but they were not so acute as those of the old officer of
police. Buonaparte, as if the interior of his camp displayed scenes
which he did not desire Dolgorucki to witness, met the prince at the
outposts, which the soldiers were in the act of hastily covering with
field-works, like an army which seeks to shelter conscious weakness
under intrenchments. Encouraged by what he thought he saw of the
difficulties in which the French seemed to be placed, Dolgorucki entered
upon politics, and demanded in plain terms the cession of the crown of
Italy. To this proposal Buonaparte listened with a patience which seemed
to be the effect of his present situation. In short, Dolgorucki carried
back to his imperial master the hastily conceived opinion, that the
French Emperor was retreating, and felt himself in a precarious
posture.[155] On this false ground the Russian council of war determined
to act. Their plan was to extend their own left wing, with the purpose
of turning the right of the French army, and taking them upon the flank
and rear.
[Sidenote: AUSTERLITZ.]
It was upon the 1st December at noon that the Russians commenced this
movement, by which, in confidence of success, they abandoned a chain of
heights where they might have received an attack with great advantage,
descended into ground more favourable to the enemy, and, finally, placed
their left wing at too great a distance from the centre. The French
general no sooner witnessed this rash manœuvre, than he exclaimed,
"Before to-morrow is over, that army is my own." In the meantime,
withdrawing his outposts, and concentrating his forces, he continued to
intimate a conscious inferiority, which was far from existing.
The two armies seem to have been very nearly of the same strength. For
though the bulletin, to enhance the victory, makes the opposite army
amount to 100,000 men, yet there were not actually above 50,000
Russians, and about 25,000 Austrians, in the field of battle.[156] The
French army might be about the same force. But they were commanded by
Napoleon, and the Russians by Kutousof; a veteran soldier indeed, full
of bravery and patriotism, and accustomed to war as it was waged against
the Turks; but deficient in general talent, as well as in the alertness
of mind necessary to penetrate into and oppose the designs of his
adversary, and, as is not unusual, obstinate in proportion to the
narrowness of his understanding, and the prejudices of his education.
Meanwhile Buonaparte, possessed of his enemy's plan by the
demonstrations of the preceding day, passed the night in making his
arrangements.[157] He visited the posts in person, and apparently
desired to maintain an incognito which was soon discovered. As soon as
the person of the Emperor was recognised, the soldiers remembered that
next day [2d December] was the anniversary of his coronation. Bunches of
lighted hay, placed on the end of poles, made an extempore illumination,
while the troops, with loud acclamations, protested they would present
him on the following day with a bouquet becoming the occasion; and an
old grenadier, approaching his person, swore that the Emperor should
only have to combat with his eyes, and that, without his exposing his
person, the whole colours and artillery of the Russian army should be
brought to him to celebrate the festival of the morrow.[158]
In the proclamation which Napoleon, according to his custom, issued to
the army, he promises that he will keep his person out of the reach of
fire; thus showing the full confidence, that the assurance of his
personal safety would be considered as great an encouragement to the
troops, as the usual protestation of sovereigns and leaders, that they
will be in the front, and share the dangers of the day.[159] This is,
perhaps, the strongest proof possible of the complete and confidential
understanding which subsisted between Napoleon and his soldiers. Yet
there have not been wanting those, who have thrown the imputation of
cowardice on the victor of a hundred battles, and whose reputation was
so well established amongst those troops who must be the best judges,
that his attention to the safety of his person was requested by them,
and granted by him, as a favour to his army.
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.]
The Battle of Austerlitz, fought against an enemy of great valour but
slender experience, was not of a very complicated character. The
Russians, we have seen, were extending their line to surround the French
flank. Marshal Davoust, with a division of infantry, and another of
dragoons, was placed behind the convent of Raygern, to oppose the forces
destined for this manœuvre, at the moment when they should conceive
the point carried. Soult commanded the right wing; Lannes conducted the
left, which last rested upon a fortified position called Santon,
defended by twenty pieces of cannon. Bernadotte led the centre, where
Murat and all the French cavalry were stationed. Ten battalions of the
Imperial Guard, with ten of Oudinot's division, were kept in reserve in
the rear of the line, under the eye of Napoleon himself, who destined
them, with forty field-pieces, to act wherever the fate of battle should
render their services most necessary. Such were the preparations for
this decisive battle, where three Emperors, each at the head of his own
army, strove to decide the destinies of Europe. The sun rose with
unclouded brilliancy; it was that sun of Austerlitz which Napoleon, upon
so many succeeding occasions apostrophised, and recalled to the minds of
his soldiers. As its first beams rose above the horizon, Buonaparte
appeared in front of the army, surrounded by his marshals, to whom he
issued his last directions, and they departed at full gallop to their
different posts.[160]
The column detached from the left of the Austro-Russian army was engaged
in a false manœuvre, and it was ill executed. The intervals between
the regiments of which it consisted were suffered to become irregular,
and the communications between this attacking column itself and the main
body were not maintained with sufficient accuracy. When the Russians
thought themselves on the point of turning the right flank of the
French, they found themselves suddenly, and at unawares, engaged with
Davoust's division, of whose position behind the convent of Raygern,
they had not been aware. At the same time, Soult, at the head of the
French right wing, rushed forward upon the interval between the
Austro-Russian centre and left, caused by the march of the latter upon
Raygern, and, completely intersecting their line, severed the left wing
entirely from the centre.
The Emperor of Russia perceived the danger, and directed a desperate
attempt to be made upon Soult's division by the Russian Guards, for the
purpose of restoring the communication with his left. The French
infantry were staggered by this charge, and one regiment completely
routed. But it was in such a crisis that the genius of Buonaparte
triumphed. Bessières had orders to advance with the Imperial Guard,
while the Russians were disordered with their own success. The encounter
was desperate, and the Russians displayed the utmost valour before they
at length gave way to the discipline and steadiness of Buonaparte's
veterans. Their artillery and standards were lost, and Prince
Constantine, the Emperor's brother, who fought gallantly at their head,
was only saved by the speed of his horse.
The centre of the French army now advanced to complete the victory, and
the cavalry of Murat made repeated charges with such success, that the
Emperors of Russia and Austria, from the heights of Austerlitz, beheld
their centre and left completely defeated. The fate of the right wing
could no longer be protracted, and it was disastrous even beyond the
usual consequences of defeat.[161] They had been actively pressed during
the whole battle by Lannes, but now the troops on their left being
routed, they were surrounded on all sides, and, unable to make longer
resistance, were forced down into a hollow, where they were exposed to
the fire of twenty pieces of cannon. Many attempted to escape across a
lake, which was partially frozen; but the ice proving too weak gave way
under them, or was broken by the hostile cannonade. This fatality
renewed, according to Buonaparte's description, the appearance of the
battle with the Turks at Aboukir, where so many thousand men, flying
from the battle, perished by drowning. It was with the greatest
difficulty, that, rallying the remains of their routed forces around
them, and retiring in the best manner they could, the Emperors effected
their personal retreat. Only the devoted bravery of the Russians, and
the loyalty of the Austrian cavalry, who charged repeatedly to protect
the retrograde movement, could have rendered it possible, since the sole
passage to the rear lay along a causeway, extending between two lakes.
The retreat was, however, accomplished, and the Emperors escaped without
sustaining the loss in the pursuit which might have been expected. But
in the battle, at least twenty thousand men had remained, killed,
wounded, and prisoners; and forty standards, with a great proportion of
the hostile artillery, were the trophies of Napoleon, whose army had
thus amply redeemed their pledge. It was, however, at a high rate that
they had purchased the promised bouquet. Their own ranks had lost
probably five thousand men, though the bulletin diminishes the numbers
to two thousand five hundred.[162]
The Austrian Emperor considered his last hope of successful opposition
to Napoleon as extinguished by this defeat, and conceived, therefore,
that he had nothing remaining save to throw himself upon the discretion
of the victor. There, were, indeed some, who accused his councils of
pusillanimity. It was said, that the levies of Prince Charles in
Hungary, and of Prince Ferdinand in Bohemia, were in great
forwardness--that the Emperors had still a considerable army under their
own command--and that Prussia, already sufficiently disposed for war,
would certainly not permit Austria to be totally overwhelmed. But it
ought to be considered, on the other hand, that the new levies, however
useful in a partisan war, could not be expected to redeem the loss of
such a battle as Austerlitz--that they were watched by French troops,
which, though inferior in number, were greatly more formidable in
discipline--and that, as for Prussia, it was scarce rational to expect
that she would interfere by arms, to save, in the hour of distress,
those to whom she had given no assistance, when such would probably have
been decisive of the contest, and that in favour of the allies.
[Sidenote: CONVENTION WITH PRUSSIA.]
The influence of the victory on the Prussian councils was indeed soon
made evident; for Count Haugwitz, who had been dismissed to Vienna till
the battle should take place, now returned to Buonaparte's headquarters,
having changed the original message of defiance of which he was the
bearer, into a handsome compliment to Napoleon upon his victory. The
answer of Napoleon intimated his full sense of the duplicity of
Prussia.--"This," he said, "is a compliment designed for others, but
Fortune has transferred the address to me."[163] It was, however, still
necessary to conciliate a power which had a hundred and fifty thousand
men in the field; and a private treaty with Haugwitz assigned the
Electorate of Hanover to Prussia, in exchange for Anspach, or rather as
the price of her neutrality at this important crisis.[164] Thus all
hopes of Prussian interference being over, the Emperor Francis must be
held justified in yielding to necessity, and endeavouring to secure the
best terms which could be yet obtained, by submitting at discretion. His
ally, Alexander, refused indeed to be concerned in a negotiation, which
in the circumstances could not fail to be humiliating.
A personal interview took place betwixt the Emperor of Austria and
Napoleon, to whose camp Francis resorted almost in the guise of a
suppliant. The defeated prince is represented as having thrown the blame
of the war upon the English. "They are a set of merchants," he said,
"who would set the continent on fire, in order to secure to themselves
the commerce of the world." The argument was not very logical, but the
good prince in whose mouth it is placed, is not to be condemned for
holding at such a moment the language which might please the victor.
When Buonaparte welcomed him to his military hut, and said it was the
only palace he had inhabited for nearly two months, the Austrian
answered with a smile, "You have turned your residence, then, to such
good account, that you ought to be content with it."
The Emperor of Austria, having satisfied himself that he would be
admitted to terms of greater or less severity, next stipulated for that
which Alexander had disdained to request in his own person--the
unmolested retreat of the Russians to their own country.--"The Russian
army is surrounded," said Napoleon; "not a man can escape me. But I wish
to oblige their Emperor, and will stop the march of my columns, if your
Majesty promises me that these Russians shall evacuate Germany and the
Austrian and Prussian parts of Poland."--"It is the purpose of the
Emperor Alexander to do so."[165]
The arrangement was communicated by Savary to the Russian Emperor, who
acquiesced in the proposal to return with his army to Russia by regular
marches.[166] No other engagement was required of Alexander than his
word; and the respectful manner in which he is mentioned in the
bulletins, indicates Buonaparte's desire to cultivate a good
understanding with this powerful and spirited young monarch. On the
other hand, Napoleon has not failed to place in the Czar's mouth such
compliments to himself as the following:--"Tell your master," said he to
Savary, "that he did miracles yesterday--that this bloody day has
augmented my respect for him--He is the predestined of Heaven--it will
take a hundred years ere my army equals that of France." Savary is then
stated to have found Alexander, despite of his reverse of fortune, a man
of heart and head. He entered into details of the battle.
"You were inferior to us on the whole," he said, "yet we found you
superior on every point of action."
"That," replied Savary, "arises from warlike experience, the fruit of
sixteen years of glory. This is the fortieth battle which the Emperor
has fought."
"He is a great soldier," said Alexander; "I do not pretend to compare
myself with him--this is the first time I have been under fire. But it
is enough. I came hither to the assistance of the Emperor of
Austria--he has no farther occasion for my services--I return to my
capital."
Accordingly, he commenced his march towards Russia, in pursuance of the
terms agreed upon. The Russian arms had been unfortunate; but the
behaviour of their youthful Emperor, and the marked deference shown
towards him by Buonaparte, made a most favourable impression upon Europe
at large.[167]
[Sidenote: ARMISTICE WITH AUSTRIA.]
[Sidenote: Dec. 6.]
The Austrian monarch, left to his fate, obtained from Buonaparte an
armistice[168]--a small part of the price was imposed in the shape of a
military contribution of a hundred millions of francs, to be raised in
the territories occupied by the French armies. The cessation of
hostilities was to endure while Talleyrand on the one side, and Prince
John of Lichtenstein on the other, adjusted the terms of a general
pacification. Buonaparte failed not to propitiate the Austrian
negotiator by the most extravagant praises in his bulletins, and has
represented the Emperor of Austria as asking, "Why, possessing men of
such distinguished talent, should the affairs of my cabinet be committed
to knaves and fools?" Of this question we can only say, that if really
asked by Francis, which we doubt, he was himself the only person by whom
it could have been answered.
The compliments to the Prince John of Lichtenstein, were intended to
propitiate the public in favour of the treaty of peace, negotiated by a
man of such talents. Some of his countrymen, on the other hand, accused
him of selfish precipitation in the treaty, for the purpose of removing
the scene of war from the neighbourhood of his own family estates. But
what could the wisdom of the ablest negotiator, or the firmness of the
most stubborn patriot have availed, when France was to dictate terms,
and Austria to receive them. The treaties of Campo Formio and Luneville,
though granted to Austria by Napoleon in the hour of victory, were
highly advantageous compared to that of Presburgh, which was signed on
the 26th of December, 1805, about a fortnight after the battle of
Austerlitz.[169] By this negotiation, Francis ceded to Bavaria the
oldest possession of his house, the mountains of Tyrol and of the
Vorarlberg, filled with the best, bravest, and most attached of his
subjects, and which, by their geographical situation, had hitherto given
Austria influence at once in Germany and Italy. Venice, Austria's most
recent possession, and which had not been very honourably obtained, was
also yielded up, and added to the kingdom of Italy.[170] She was again
reduced to the solitary seaport of Trieste, in the Adriatic.
By the same treaty, the Germanic allies of Buonaparte were to be
remunerated. Wirtemberg, as well as Bavaria,[171] received large
additions at the expense of Austria and of the other princes of the
empire, and Francis consented that both the electors should be promoted
to the kingly dignity, in reward of their adherence to the French cause.
Other provisions there were, equally inconsistent with the immunities of
the Germanic body, for which scarcely a shadow of respect was retained,
save by an illusory clause, or species of protest, by which Austria
declared that all the stipulations to which she consented were under
reservation of the rights of the empire. By the treaty of Presburgh,
Austria is said to have lost upwards of 20,000 square miles of
territory, two millions and a half of subjects, and a revenue to the
amount of ten millions and a half of florins. And this momentous
surrender was made in consequence of one unfortunate campaign, which
lasted but six months, and was distinguished by only one general action.
There were two episodes in this war, of little consequence in
themselves, but important considered with reference to the alterations
they produced in two of the ancient kingdoms of Europe, which they
proved the proximate cause of re-modelling according to the new form of
government which had been introduced by Buonaparte, and sanctioned by
the example of France.
The King of Sweden had been an ardent and enthusiastic member of the
anti-Gallican league. He was brave, enterprising, and chivalrous, and
ambitious to play the part of his namesake and progenitor, Gustavus
Adolphus, or his predecessor, Charles XII.; without, however,
considering, that since the time of those princes, and partly in
consequence of their wars and extensive undertakings, Sweden had sunk
into a secondary rank in the great European family; and without
reflecting, that when great enterprises are attempted without adequate
means to carry them through, valour becomes Quixotic, and generosity
ludicrous. He had engaged to join in a combined effort for the purpose
of freeing Hanover, and the northern parts of Germany, from the French,
by means of an army of English, Russians, and Swedes. Had Prussia
acceded to the confederacy, this might have been easily accomplished;
especially as Saxony, Hesse, and Brunswick, would, under her
encouragement, have willingly joined in the war. Nay, even without the
accession of Prussia, a diversion in the north, ably conducted and
strongly supported, might have at least found Bernadotte sufficient work
in Hanover, and prevented him from materially contributing, by his march
to the Danube, to the disasters of the Austrian army at Ulm. But, by
some of those delays and misunderstandings, which are so apt to
disappoint the objects of a coalition, and disconcert enterprises
attempted by troops of different nations, the forces designed for the
north of Europe did not assemble until the middle of November, and then
only in strength sufficient to undertake the siege of the Hanoverian
fortress of Hamelen, in which Bernadotte had left a strong garrison. The
enterprise, too tardy in its commencement, was soon broken off by the
news of the battle of Austerlitz and its consequences, and, being
finally abandoned, the unfortunate King of Sweden returned to his own
dominions, where his subjects received with unwillingness and terror a
prince, who, on many accounts, had incurred the fatal and persevering
resentment of Buonaparte. Machinations began presently to be agitated
for removing him from the kingdom, as one with whom Napoleon could never
be reconciled, and averting from Sweden, by such sacrifice, the
punishment which must otherwise fall on the country, as well as on the
King.[172]
[Sidenote: NAPLES.]
While the trifling attempt against Hamelen, joined to other
circumstances, was thus preparing the downfall of the ancient dynasty of
Sweden, a descent, made by the Russians and English on the Neapolitan
territories, afforded a good apology to Buonaparte for depriving the
King of the Two Sicilies of his dominions, so far as they lay open to
the power of France. Governed entirely by the influence of the Queen,
the policy of Naples had been of a fickle and insincere character.
Repeatedly saved from the greatest hazard of dethronement, the King or
his royal consort had never omitted an opportunity to resume arms
against France, under the conviction, perhaps, that their ruin would no
longer be deferred than whilst political considerations induced the
French Emperor to permit their possession of their power. The last
interference in their behalf had been at the instance of the Emperor
Paul. After this period we have seen that their Italian dominions were
occupied by French troops, who held Otranto, and other places in
Calabria, as pledges (so they pretended) for the restoration of Malta.
But upon the breaking out of the war of 1805, it was agreed, by a
convention entered into at Paris, 21st of September, and ratified by the
King of Naples on the 8th of October, that the French should withdraw
their forces from the places which they occupied in the Neapolitan
territories, and the King should observe a strict neutrality. Neither of
the contracting parties was quite sincere. The French troops, which were
commanded by St. Cyr, were, as we have seen, withdrawn from Naples, for
the purpose of reinforcing Massena, in the beginning of the campaign of
Austerlitz. Their absence would probably have endured no longer than the
necessity which called them away. But the court of Naples was equally
insincere; for no sooner had St. Cyr left the Neapolitan territories to
proceed northward, than the King, animated by the opportunity which his
departure afforded, once more raised his forces to the war
establishment, and received with open arms an army, consisting of 12,000
Russian troops from Corfu, and 8000 British from Malta, who disembarked
in his dominions.[173]
Had this armament occupied Venice at the commencement of the war, they
might have materially assisted in the campaign of the Archduke Charles
against Massena. The sending them in November to the extremity of the
Italian peninsula, only served to seal the fate of Ferdinand the Fourth.
On receiving the news of the armistice at Austerlitz, the Russians and
the British re-embarked, and not long after their departure a large
French army, commanded by Joseph Buonaparte, approached, once more to
enforce the doom passed against the royal family of Naples, that they
should cease to reign.[174] The King and Queen fled from the storm which
they had provoked. Their son, the prince royal, in whose favour they had
abdicated, only made use of his temporary authority to surrender Gaeta,
Pescara, and Naples itself, with its castles, to the French general. In
Calabria, however, whose wild inhabitants were totally disinclined to
the French yoke, Count Roger de Damas and the Duke of Calabria attempted
to make a stand. But their hasty and undisciplined levies were easily
defeated by the French under General Regnier, and, nominally at least,
almost the whole Neapolitan kingdom was subjected to the power of Joseph
Buonaparte.
[Sidenote: SURRENDER OF GAETA.]
One single trait of gallantry illuminated the scene of universal
pusillanimity. The Prince of Hesse Philipsthal, who defended the strong
fortress of Gaeta in name of Ferdinand IV., refused to surrender it in
terms of the capitulation. "Tell your general," said he, in reply to the
French summons, "that Gaeta is not Ulm, nor the Prince of Hesse General
Mack!" The place was defended with a gallantry corresponding to these
expressions, nor was it surrendered until the 17th of July, 1806, after
a long siege, in which the brave governor was wounded.[175] This heroic
young prince only appeared on the public scene to be withdrawn from it
by an untimely death, which has been ascribed to poison. His valour,
however honourable to himself, was of little use to the royal family of
Naples, whose deposition was determined on by Buonaparte, in order to
place upon the throne one of his own family.
FOOTNOTES:
[143] From Elchingen, Oct. 21, Napoleon issued the following address to
the army:--"Soldiers of the Grand Army! In a fortnight we have finished
a campaign: we have expelled the troops of the house of Austria from
Bavaria, and re-established our ally in the sovereignty of his estates.
That army which, with equal ostentation and imprudence, had posted
itself on our frontiers, is annihilated. Soldiers! you owe this success
to your unbounded confidence in your Emperor; to your patience in
supporting fatigues and privations of every description; and to your
singular intrepidity. But we will not stop here. You are impatient to
commence a second campaign. We are about to make the Russian army, which
the gold of England has transported from the extremities of the
universe, undergo the same fate. Here there are no generals in combating
against whom I can have any glory to acquire. All my care shall be to
obtain the victory with the least possible effusion of blood. My
soldiers are my children."
[144] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 133.
[145] "The conduct of Prussia at this period was conformable to the
wholesome policy which had so long connected this power with France. It
is not for us, Frenchmen, to reproach her inaction at this important
crisis, even while criticising her raising the shield before Jena. Until
then Prussia had showed herself reasonable, in not allowing herself to
be drawn into new coalitions."--LOUIS BUONAPARTE, p. 44.
[146] "Napoleon was always on horseback whatever weather it might be,
travelling in his carriage only when his army was two or three marches
in advance. This was a calculation on his part, the point always entered
into in his combinations, and to him distances were nothing: he
traversed them with the swiftness of eagles."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 103.
[147] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 133; Savary, tom. ii., p. 101. Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Bulletins of the Grand Army.
[148] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 145.
[149] "In the magazines and arsenals of Vienna were found artillery and
ammunition enough for two campaigns: we had no farther occasion to draw
upon our stores at Strasburg or Metz: but could, on the contrary,
despatch a considerable _materiel_ to those two great
establishments."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 107.
[150] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 169; Savary, tom. ii., p. 107
[151] Montholon, tom. ii., p. 241.
[152] "I asked Napoleon, if Haugwitz had been gained by him? he replied
'No; but he was of opinion that Prussia should never play the first
fiddle in the affairs of the continent; that she was only a second-rate
power, and ought to act as such.'"--O'MEARA, vol. i., p. 227.
[153] "Napoleon sent for me at daybreak: he had passed the night over
his maps; his candles were burnt down to the sockets: he held a letter
in his hand; he was silent for some moments, and then abruptly said to
me, 'Be off to Olmutz; deliver this letter to the Emperor of Russia, and
tell him that, having heard of his arrival at his army, I have sent you
to salute him in my name. If he questions you,' added he, 'you know what
answer ought to be given under such circumstances.'"--SAVARY, tom. ii.,
p. 112.
[154] "I saw at Olmutz a great number of young Russians, belonging to
the different ministerial departments of their country, who talked
wildly of the ambition of France; and all of whom, in their plans for
reducing her to a state of harmlessness, made much the same kind of
calculations as the maid with her pail of milk."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p.
113.
[155] Thirtieth Bulletin of the Grand Army.
[156] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 181.
[157] "The Emperor passed the whole day of the 1st December inspecting
his army himself, regiment by regiment. He spoke to the troops, viewed
all the parks, all the light batteries, and gave instructions to all the
officers and gunners. He returned to dine at his bivouac and sent for
all his marshals; he enlarged upon all that they ought to do the next
day, and all that it was possible for the enemy to attempt. He knew his
ground as well as the environs of Paris. It would require a volume to
detail all that emanated from his mind in those twenty-four
hours."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 131.
[158] Thirtieth Bulletin of the Grand Army.
[159] "_Order of the Day. On the Field, Dec. 1._--Soldiers! The Russian
forces are before you, to avenge the Austrian army at Ulm; they are the
same battalions you conquered at Hollabrun, and which you have
constantly pursued. The positions we occupy are formidable, and, whilst
they march to turn my right, they shall present me their flank.
Soldiers! I shall direct myself all your battalions, I shall keep at a
distance from the firing, if, with your accustomed bravery, you carry
confusion and disorder into the enemy's ranks; but should victory be for
a moment doubtful, you shall behold your Emperor expose himself to the
first blow. This victory will finish our campaign, when we shall return
to winter quarters, and be joined by the new armies forming in France;
then the peace which I shall sanction will be worthy of my people, of
you, and of myself."
[160] "In passing along the front of several regiments, the Emperor
said, 'Soldiers! we must finish this campaign by a thunderbolt, which
shall confound the pride of our enemies;' and, instantly, hats were
placed on the points of their bayonets, and cries of 'Vive l'Empereur!'
were the signal for the battle."--_Thirtieth Bulletin._
[161] "The Russians fled and dispersed: Alexander and the Emperor of
Austria witnessed the defeat. Stationed on a height at a little distance
from the field of battle, they beheld the guard, which had been expected
to decide the victory, cut to pieces by a handful of brave men. Their
guns and baggage had fallen into our possession, and Prince Repnin was
our prisoner; unfortunately, however, we had a great number of men
killed and wounded. I had myself received a sabre wound in the head; in
which situation I galloped off to give an account of the affair to the
Emperor. My sabre broken, my wound, the blood with which I was covered,
the decided advantage we had gained with so small a force over the
enemy's chosen troops, inspired Napoleon with the idea of the picture
that was painted by Girard."--_Mémoires du Général RAPP_, p. 62.
[162] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 180-191; Savary, tom. ii., p. 133. Thirtieth
Bulletin of the Grand Army. On the field of battle, Napoleon issued the
following proclamation:--
"Headquarters, Dec. 2, 10 o'clock at night.
"Soldiers of the Grand Army! Even at this hour, before this great day
shall pass away and be lost in the ocean of eternity, your Emperor must
address you, and express how much he is satisfied with the conduct of
all those who have had the good fortune to combat in this memorable
battle. Soldiers! you are the first warriors in the world! The
recollection of this exploit and of your deeds, will be eternal!
thousands of ages hereafter, so long as the events of the universe
continue to be related, will record, that a Russian army, of seventy-six
thousand men, hired by the gold of England, was annihilated by you on
the plains of Olmutz.--The miserable remains of that army, upon which
the commercial spirit of a despicable nation had placed its expiring
hope, are in flight, hastening to make known to the savage inhabitants
of the north what the French are capable of performing; they will,
likewise, tell them, that, after having destroyed the Austrian army, at
Ulm, you told Vienna--'That army is no more!' To Petersburgh you shall
also say--'The Emperor Alexander has no longer an army.'"
[163] Thirty-Fourth Bulletin of the Grand Army; Savary, tom. ii., p.
148.
[164] "The battle of Austerlitz took place on the 2d December, and on
the 15th, Prussia, by the convention of Vienna, renounced the treaty of
Potsdam and the oath of the tomb; she yielded Wesel, Bareuth, and
Neuchatel to France; who, in return, consented to Frederic William's
taking possession of Hanover, and uniting that country to his
dominions."--NAPOLEON, _Montholon_, tom. ii., p. 242.
[165] Thirty-First Bulletin of the Grand Army.
[166] "The Emperors seemed to be both in excellent humour; they laughed,
which seemed to us all to be a good _omen_: accordingly, in an hour or
two, the sovereigns parted with a mutual embrace. We followed Napoleon,
who rode his horse at a foot-pace, musing on what he meant to do. He
called me, and said, 'Run after the Emperor of Austria: tell him that I
have desired you to go and wait at his headquarters for the adhesion of
the Emperor of Russia to what has just been concluded between us. When
you are in possession of this adhesion, proceed to the corps d'armée of
Marshal Davoust, stop his movement, and tell him what has
passed.'"--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 140.
[167] "I could not help feeling a certain timidity on finding myself in
Alexander's presence; he awed me by the majesty and nobleness of his
look. Nature had done much for him; and it would have been difficult to
find a model so perfect and so graceful; he was then twenty-six years
old. He was already somewhat hard of hearing with the left ear, and he
turned the right to hear what was said to him. He spoke in broken
sentences; he laid great stress upon his finals, so that the discourse
was never long. For the rest, he spoke the French language in all its
purity, and always used its elegant academic expression. As there was no
affectation in his language, it was easy to judge that this was one of
the results of an excellent education."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 115.
[168] See Annual Register, vol. xlvii., p. 666.
[169] For a copy of the treaty, see Annual Register, vol. xlvii., p.
668.
[170] "After leaving Vienna, Napoleon, on his way to Munich, passed
through Passau, where he met General Lauriston, who was returning from
Cadiz; he sent him as governor to Venice."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 155.
[171] "The Emperor arrived at Munich, a few hours before New Year's-day,
1806. The Empress had come thither by his order a fortnight before.
There was, as may be supposed, great rejoicing at the court of Bavaria:
not only was the country saved, but almost doubled in extent. The
greatest delight was therefore expressed at seeing us. It was at Munich
that we began to perceive something which we had as yet only heard
vaguely talked of. A courier was sent by the Tyrol with orders to the
Viceroy of Italy to come immediately to Munich: accordingly, five days
afterwards, he arrived. No secret was any longer made of his marriage
with the Princess Augusta of Bavaria. The viceroy was much beloved, and
the greatest pleasure was expressed to see him unite his destiny with
that of a princess so virtuous and so lovely. The nuptials were
celebrated at Munich; after which Napoleon returned to Paris."--SAVARY,
tom. ii., p. 156.
[172] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 196; Las Cases, tom. v., p. 168;
Montgaillard, tom. vi., p. 280.
[173] "Before his departure from Vienna, Napoleon received intelligence
of the entry of the Russians, jointly with some English, into Naples. He
immediately made dispositions for marching troops thither. He had an old
grudge against the Queen of Naples, and on receiving this news, he said,
'Ah! as for her, I am not surprised at it; but woe betide her if I enter
Naples; never shall she set foot there again!' He sent from the staff of
his own army officers to compose that which was about to assemble on the
frontiers of Naples, and ordered Prince Joseph, his brother, whom he had
left at Paris, to go and put himself at the head of it."--SAVARY, tom.
ii., p. 152.
[174] "General St. Cyr is advancing by forced marches towards Naples, to
punish the treason of the Queen, and to precipitate from the throne this
culpable woman, who has violated, in so shameless a manner, all that is
held sacred among men. It was endeavoured to intercede for her with the
Emperor. He replied, 'Were hostilities to recommence, and the nation to
support a thirty years' war, so atrocious an act of perfidy cannot be
pardoned.' _The Queen of Naples has ceased_ to reign."--_Thirty-seventh
Bulletin of the Grand Army_, Dec. 26.
[175] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 237; Annual Register, vol. xlviii., p. 144.