_Relative situations of France and England--Hostilities commenced
with Spain, by the Stoppage, by Commodore Moore, of four Spanish
Galleons, when three of their Escort were taken, and one blew
up--Napoleon's Plan of Invasion stated and discussed--John Clerk of
Eldin's great System of Breaking the Line, explained--The French
Admiral, Villeneuve, forms a junction with the Spanish Fleet under
Gravina--Attacked and defeated by Sir Robert Calder--Nelson
appointed to the Command in the Mediterranean--BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR
fought 21st October, 1805--Death of Nelson--Behaviour of Napoleon on
learning the Intelligence of this signal Defeat--Villeneuve commits
Suicide--Address of Buonaparte to the Legislative Body--Statement of
M. de Champagny on the Internal Improvements of France--Elevation of
Napoleon's Brothers, Louis and Joseph, to the Thrones of Holland and
Naples--Principality of Lucca conferred on Eliza, the eldest Sister
of Buonaparte, and that of Guastalla on Pauline, the youngest--Other
Alliances made by his Family--Napoleon appoints a new Hereditary
Nobility--Converts from the old Noblesse anxiously sought for and
liberally rewarded--Confederation of the Rhine established, and
Napoleon appointed Protector--The Emperor Francis lays aside the
Imperial Crown of Germany, retaining only the Title of Emperor of
Austria--Vacillating and Impolitic Conduct of Prussia._
The triumphs of Napoleon had been greater at this period of his reign,
than had ever before been recorded in history as achieved by a single
man. Yet even these, like every thing earthly, had their limit. Fate,
while she seemed to assign him complete domination over the land, had
vested in other hands the empire of the seas; and it frequently
happened, that when his victorious eagles were flying their highest
pitch upon the continent, some conspicuous naval disaster warned the
nations, that there was another element, where France had a rival and a
superior.
It is true, that the repeated success of England, resembling almost that
of the huntsman over his game, had so much diminished the French navy,
and rendered so cautious such seamen as France had remaining, that the
former country, unable to get opportunities of assailing the French
vessels, was induced to have recourse to strange, and, as it proved,
ineffectual means of carrying on hostilities. Such was the attempt at
destroying the harbour of Boulogne, by sinking in the roads ships loaded
with stones, and another scheme to blow up the French ships, by means of
detonating machines to be affixed to them under water. The one, we
believe, only furnished the inhabitants of Boulogne with a supply of
useful building stone; the other, from the raft on which the machines
were conveyed, was much ridiculed under the name of the catamaran
expedition.[176]
Buonaparte, meanwhile, never lost sight of that combination of naval
manœuvres, through means of which, by the time that the subjugation
of Austria should permit the Grand Army to resume its destination for
England, he hoped to assemble in the Channel such a superior fleet, as
might waft his troops in safety to the devoted shores of Britain. The
unbounded influence which he exercised over the court of Spain, seemed
likely to facilitate this difficult enterprise. Yet, as from Spain the
French Emperor derived large supplies of treasure, it would have been
convenient for him, that, for a time at least, she should retain the
mask of neutrality, while, in fact, she was contributing to serve
France, and prejudice England, more effectually than if she had been in
a state of avowed hostility with the latter power.
The British Government determined to bring this state of things to a
decided point, by stopping four galleons, or vessels loaded with
treasure, proceeding under an escort from the South Sea, and destined
for Cadiz. The purpose of the English was only to detain these ships, as
a pledge for the sincerity of the Government of Spain, in observing a
more strict neutrality than hitherto. But unhappily the British force,
under Commodore Moore, amounted only to four frigates. Spanish honour
rendered the admiral unwilling to strike the national flag to an equal
strength, and an action ensued, in which three of the Spanish vessels
were taken, and one unfortunately blew up--an accident greatly to be
regretted. Mr. Southey observes, with his usual sound sense and
humanity, "Had a stronger squadron been sent, (against the Spaniards,)
this deplorable catastrophe might have been saved--a catastrophe which
excited not more indignation in Spain, than it did grief in those who
were its unwilling instruments, in the British people and in the British
government."
[Sidenote: WAR BETWIXT SPAIN AND ENGLAND.]
This action took place on the 5th of October 1804; and as hostilities
were of course immediately commenced betwixt Spain and Britain,[177]
Buonaparte, losing the advantages he derived from the neutrality of the
former power, had now only to use the naval and military means which she
afforded for the advancement of his own purposes. The Court of Spain
devoted them to his service, with a passive complaisance of which we
shall hereafter see the reward.
Napoleon persisted to the last in asserting, that he saw clearly the
means of utterly destroying the English superiority at sea. This he
proposed to achieve by evading the blockades of the several ports of
France and Spain, which, while weather permitted, were each hermetically
sealed by the presence of a British squadron, and by finally assembling
in the Channel that overwhelming force, which, according to his
statement, was to reduce England to a dependency on France, as complete
as that of the Isle of Oleron.[178] But men of the greatest talents must
necessarily be liable to error, when they apply the principles of a
science with which they are well acquainted upon one element, to the
operations which are to be carried on by means of another. It is evident
that he erred, when calculating his maritime combinations, in not
sufficiently considering two most material differences betwixt them, and
those which had exalted his glory upon land.
In the first place, as a landsman, Napoleon did not make sufficient
allowance for the action of contrary winds and waves; as indeed it was
perhaps his fault, even in land operations, where their influence is
less essential, to admit too little consequence to the opposition of the
elements. He complained, when at St. Helena, that he could never get a
seaman sufficiently emancipated from the technicality of his profession,
to execute or enter into any of his schemes. "If I proposed," he said,
"any new idea, I had Gantheaume and all the marine department to contend
with--Sir, that is impossible--Sir,--the winds--the calms--the currents,
will not permit it; and thus I was stopped short."[179] We believe
little dread could have been entertained of the result of naval
combinations in which the influence of the winds and waves was not
previously and accurately calculated; and that British seamen would have
desired nothing more ardently, than that their enemies should have acted
upon a system in which these casualties were neglected, even if that
system had been derived from the genius of Napoleon.
But, secondly, there was this great difference betwixt the land and the
sea service, to which (the vehemence of his wishes, doubtless,
overpowering his judgment) Buonaparte did not give sufficient weight.
Upon land, the excellence of the French troops, their discipline, and
the enthusiasm arising from uninterrupted success, might be safely
reckoned upon as likely to bear down any obstacle which they might
unexpectedly meet with, in the execution of the movements which they
were commanded to undertake. The situation of the French seamen was
diametrically the contrary. Their only chance of safety consisted in
their being able to elude a rencontre with a British squadron, even of
very inferior force. So much was this the case at the period of which we
treat, that Linois, their admiral in the East Indian seas, commanding an
eighty-four-gun ship, and at the head of a considerable squadron of
ships of war, was baffled and beaten off in the straits of Malacca by a
squadron of merchant vessels belonging to the British East India
Company, although built, of course, for traffic, and not for war, and,
as usual in war time, very imperfectly manned.[180]
Yet, notwithstanding the great and essential difference which we have
pointed out between the French navy and their land forces, and that the
former was even more inferior to that of England than the continental
troops in general were to the French soldiers, it is evident that
Buonaparte, when talking of ships of the line, was always thinking of
battalions. Thus he imagines that the defeat of the Nile might have been
prevented, had the headmost vessels of the French line, instead of
remaining at anchor, slipped their cables, and borne down to the
assistance of those which were first attacked by the British. But in
urging this, the leading principle of the manœuvre of breaking the
line had totally escaped the French Emperor. It was the boast of the
patriotic sage,[181] who illustrated and recommended this most
important system of naval tactics, that it could serve the purpose of a
British fleet only. The general principle is briefly this: By breaking
through the line, a certain number of ships are separated from the rest,
which the remainder must either abandon to their fate by sailing away,
or endeavour to save by bearing down, or doubling as it were, upon the
assailants, and engaging in a close and general engagement. Now, this
last alternative is what Buonaparte recommends,--what he would certainly
have practised on land,--and what he did practise, in order to extricate
his right wing, at Marengo. But the relative superiority of the English
navy is so great, that, while it is maintained, a close engagement with
an enemy in the least approaching to equality, is equivalent to a
victory; and to recommend a plan of tactics which should render such a
battle inevitable, would be, in other words, advising a French admiral
to lose his whole fleet, instead of sacrificing those ships which the
English manœuvre had cut off, and crowding sail to save such as were
yet unengaged.[182]
Under this consciousness of inferiority, the escape of a Spanish or
French squadron, when a gale of wind forced, from the port in which they
lay, the British blockading vessels, was a matter, the ultimate success
of which depended not alone on the winds and waves, but still more upon
the chance of their escaping any part of the hostile navy, with whom
battle, except with the most exorbitant superiority on their side, was
certain and unavoidable defeat. Their efforts to comply with the wishes
of the Emperor of France, were therefore so partially conducted, so
insulated, and so ineffectual, that they rather resembled the children's
game of hide and seek, than any thing like a system of regular
combination. A more hasty and less cautious compliance with Napoleon's
earnest wishes to assemble a predominant naval force, would have only
occasioned the total destruction of the combined fleets at an earlier
period than when it actually took place.
[Sidenote: ROCHEFORT SQUADRON.]
Upon this desultory principle, and seizing the opportunity of the
blockading squadron being driven by weather from the vicinity of their
harbour, a squadron of ten French vessels escaped from Rochefort on the
11th of January, 1805; and another, under Villeneuve, got out of Toulon
on the 18th by a similarly favourable opportunity. The former, after
rendering some trifling services in the West Indies, was fortunate
enough to regain the port from which they had sailed, with the pride of
a party who have sallied from a besieged town, and returned into it
without loss. Villeneuve also regained Toulon without disaster, and,
encouraged by his success, made a second sortie upon the 18th of March,
having on board a large body of troops, designed, it was supposed, for a
descent upon Ireland or Scotland. He made, however, towards Cadiz, and
formed a junction there with the Spanish fleet under Gravina. They
sailed for the West Indies, where the joint squadrons were able to
possess themselves of a rock called Diamond, which is scarce to be
discovered on the map; and with this trophy, which served at least to
show they had been actually out of harbour, they returned with all speed
to Europe. As for executing manœuvres, and forming combinations, as
Napoleon's plans would lead us to infer was the purpose of their hurried
expedition, they attempted none, save of that kind which the hare
executes when the hound is at its heels. Nelson, they were aware, was in
full pursuit of them, and to have attempted any thing which involved a
delay, or gave a chance of his coming up with them, was to court
destruction. They were so fortunate as to escape him, though very
narrowly, yet did not reach their harbours in safety.
On the 22d July, the combined fleets fell in with Sir Robert Calder,
commanding a British squadron. The enemy amounted to twenty sail of the
line, three fifty-gun ships, and four frigates, and the British to
fifteen sail of the line, and two frigates only. Under this disparity of
force, nevertheless, the English admiral defeated the enemy, and took
two ships of the line; yet such was the opinion in both countries of the
comparative superiority of the British navy, that the French considered
their escape as a kind of triumph. Buonaparte alone grumbled against
Villeneuve, for not having made use of his advantages,[183] for so it
pleased him to term an engagement in which two ships of the line were
lost; whilst the English murmured at the inadequate success of Sir
Robert Calder, against an enemy of such superior strength, as if he had
performed something less than his duty. A court-martial ratified, to a
certain extent,[184] the popular opinion; though it may be doubted
whether impartial posterity will concur in the justice of the censure
which was passed upon the gallant admiral. At any other period of our
naval history, the action of the 22d of July would have been rated as a
distinguished victory.
The combined fleets escaped into Vigo, where they refitted; and,
venturing to sail from that port, they proceeded to Ferrol,[185] united
themselves with the squadron which was lying there, and continued their
course for Cadiz, which they entered in safety. This did not consist
with the plans of Buonaparte, who would have had the whole naval force
united at Brest to be in readiness to cover the descent upon England.
"General terror was spread," he said, "throughout that divided nation,
and never was England so near to destruction."[186] Of the general
terror, few of the British, we believe, remember any thing, and of the
imminent danger we were not sensible. Had the combined fleets entered
the British Channel, instead of the Mediterranean, they would have found
the same admiral, the same seamen, nay, in many instances, the same
ships, to which Villeneuve's retreat into Cadiz gave the trouble of
going to seek him there.
[Sidenote: NELSON IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.]
When the certainty was known that the enemy's fleets were actually in
Cadiz, Nelson was put at the head of the British naval force in the
Mediterranean,[187] which was reinforced with an alertness and secrecy
that did the highest honour to the Admiralty. Villeneuve, in the
meantime, had, it is believed, his master's express orders to put to
sea;[188] and if he had been censured for want of zeal in the action off
Cape Finisterre with Calder, he was likely, as a brave man, to determine
on running some risk to prove the injustice of his Emperor's reproaches.
Cadiz also, being strictly blockaded by the English, the fleets of
France and Spain began to be in want of necessaries. But what
principally determined the French admiral on putting to sea, was his
ignorance of the reinforcements received by the English, which, though
they left Nelson's fleet still inferior to his own, yet brought them
nearer to an equality than, had he been aware of it, would have rendered
their meeting at all desirable to Villeneuve. It was another and
especial point of encouragement, that circumstances led him to
disbelieve the report that Nelson commanded the British fleet.[189]
Under the influence of these united motives, and confiding in a plan of
tactics which he had formed for resisting the favourite mode of attack
practised by the English, the French admiral sailed from Cadiz on the
19th October, 1805, in an evil hour for himself and for his country.
The hostile fleets were not long in meeting, and the wind never impelled
along the ocean two more gallant armaments. The advantage of numbers was
greatly on the side of Villeneuve. He had thirty-three sail of the line,
and seven large frigates; Nelson only twenty-seven line-of-battle ships,
and three frigates. The inferiority of the English in number of men and
guns was yet more considerable. The combined fleet had four thousand
troops on board, many of whom, excellent rifle-men, were placed in the
tops. But all odds were compensated by the quality of the British
sailors, and the talents of Nelson.
Villeneuve showed no inclination to shun the eventful action. His
disposition was singular and ingenious. His fleet formed a double line,
each alternate ship being about a cable's length to the windward of her
second a-head and a-stern, and thus the arrangements represented the
chequers of a draught-board, and seemed to guard against the operation
of cutting the line, as usually practised by the British. But Nelson had
determined to practise the manœuvre in a manner as original as the
mode of defence adopted by Villeneuve. His order for sailing was in two
lines, and this was also the order for battle. An advanced squadron of
eight of the fastest sailing two-deckers, was to cut off three or four
of the enemy's line, a-head of their centre; the second in command,
Admiral Collingwood, was to break in upon the enemy about the twelfth
ship from the rear, and Nelson himself determined to bear down on the
centre. The effect of these manœuvres must of course be a close and
general action; for the rest Nelson knew he could trust to the
determination of his officers and seamen. To his admirals and officers
he explained in general, that his object was a close and decisive
engagement; and that if, in the confusion and smoke of the battle,
signals should not be visible, the captain would never do wrong who laid
his ship alongside of the enemy.
With such dispositions on either side, the two gallant fleets met on the
memorable 21st of October. Admiral Collingwood, who led the van, went
down on the enemy with all his sails set, and, disdaining to furl them
in the usual manner, cut the sheets, and let his canvass fly loose in
the wind, as if he needed it no longer after it had borne him amidst the
thickest of the enemy. Nelson run his vessel, the Victory, on board the
French Redoutable; the Temeraire, a second British ship, fell on board
the same vessel on the other side; another enemy's ship fell on board of
the Temeraire, and the action was fiercely maintained betwixt these four
vessels, which lay as close as if they had been moored together in some
friendly harbour. While the Victory thus engaged the Redoutable on the
starboard, she maintained from her larboard guns an incessant fire on
the Bucentaur and the colossal Santa Trinidad, a vessel of four decks.
The example of the admiral was universally followed by the British
captains; they broke into the enemy's line on every side, engaged two or
three ships at the same time, and maintained the battle at the very
muzzles of the cannon. The superiority which we have claimed for our
countrymen was soon made manifest. Nineteen ships of the line were
captured, two were first-rate vessels, none were under seventy-four
guns. Four ships of the line were taken, in a subsequent action, by Sir
Richard Strachan. Seven out of the vessels which escaped into Cadiz were
rendered unserviceable. The whole combined fleet was almost totally
destroyed.
[Sidenote: DEATH OF NELSON.]
It is twenty years and upwards since that glorious day. But the feelings
of deep sorrow mingled with those of exultation, with which we first
heard the tidings of the battle of Trafalgar, still agitate our bosoms,
as we record, that Nelson, the darling of Britain, bought with his life
this last and decided triumph over his country's enemies. A Briton
himself in every word and thought, the discharge of a sailor's duty,
according to his idea, was a debt involving every feat which the most
exalted bravery could perform, and every risk which the extremity of
danger could present. The word to which he attached such an unlimited
meaning, was often in his mouth; the idea never, we believe, absent from
his mind. His last signal intimated that England expected every man to
do his _duty_. His first words on entering the action were, "I thank the
great Disposer of events for this great opportunity of doing my _duty_;"
and with his last departing breath, he was distinctly heard to repeat
the same pious and patriotic sentiment, "I thank God I have done my
duty."[190] That DUTY was indeed performed, even to the utmost extent
of his own comprehensive interpretation of the phrase. The good servant
of his country slept not before his task was fulfilled; for, by the
victory in which he fell, the naval force of the enemy was altogether
destroyed, and the threat of invasion silenced for ever.
It is a remarkable coincidence, that Mack's surrender having taken place
the 20th October, Napoleon was probably entering Ulm in triumph upon the
very day, when the united remains of his maritime force, and the means
on which, according to his own subsequent account, he relied for the
subjugation of England, were flying, striking, and sinking, before the
banners of Nelson. What his feelings may have been on learning the news
we have no certain means of ascertaining. The Memoirs of Fouché say,
upon the alleged authority of Berthier, that his emotion was extreme,
and that his first exclamation was, "I cannot be every where!" implying,
certainly, that his own presence would have changed the scene.[191] The
same idea occurs in his conversations with Las Cases.[192] It may be
greatly doubted, however, whether Napoleon would have desired to have
been on board the best ship in the French navy on that memorable
occasion; and it seems pretty certain, that his being so could have had
no influence whatever on the fate of the day. The unfortunate Villeneuve
dared not trust to his master's forgiveness. "He ought," so Buonaparte
states it, "to have been victorious, and he was defeated." For this,
although the mishap which usually must attend one out of the two
commanders who engage in action, Villeneuve felt there was no apology to
be accepted, or even offered, and the brave but unfortunate seaman
committed suicide.[193] Buonaparte, on all occasions, spoke with
disrespect of his memory; nor was it a sign of his judgment in nautical
matters, that he preferred to this able, but unfortunate admiral, the
gasconading braggart, Latouche Tréville.[194]
The unfortunate event of the battle of Trafalgar was not permitted to
darken the brilliant picture, which the extraordinary campaign of Ulm
and Austerlitz enabled the victor to present to the empire which he
governed, and which detailed his successes in the full-blown pride of
conquest. "His armies," he said, addressing the Legislative Body, the
session of which he opened with great pomp on 2d March, 1806, "had never
ceased to conquer, until he commanded them to cease to combat. His
enemies were humbled and confounded--the royal house of Naples had
ceased to reign _for ever_"--(the term was too comprehensive)--"the
entire peninsula of Italy now made a part of the Great Empire--his
generosity had permitted the return of the defeated Russians to their
own country, and had re-established the throne of Austria, after
punishing her by the privation of a part of her dominions." Trafalgar
was then touched upon. "A tempest," he said, "had deprived him of some
few vessels, after a combat imprudently entered into;"[195]--and thus he
glossed over a calamitous and decisive defeat, in which so many of his
hopes were shipwrecked.
[Sidenote: INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS.]
When a sovereign has not sufficient greatness of mind to acknowledge his
losses, we may, without doing him wrong, suspect him of exaggerating his
successes. Those of France, in her external relations, were indeed
scarcely capable of being over-estimated. But when M. de Champagny, on
the 4th March following, made a relation of the internal improvements of
France under the government of Buonaparte, he seems to have assumed the
merit of those which only existed upon paper, and of others which were
barely commenced, as well as of some that were completed. All was of
course ascribed to the inspiring genius of the Emperor, to whose agency
France was indebted for all her prosperity. The credit of the good city
of Paris was restored, and her revenue doubled--agriculture was
encouraged, by the draining of immense morasses--mendicity was
abolished. Beneficial results, apparently inconsistent with each other,
were produced by his regulations--the expenses of legal proceedings were
abridged, and the appointments of the judges were raised. Immense and
most expensive improvements, which, in other countries, or rather under
other sovereigns, are necessarily reserved for times of peace, were
carried on by Napoleon during the most burdensome wars against entire
Europe. Forty millions had been expended on public works, of which eight
great canals were quoted with peculiar emphasis, as opening all the
departments of the empire to the influence of internal navigation. To
conclude, the Emperor had established three hundred and seventy
schools--had restored the rites of religion--re-inforced public credit
by supporting the Bank--reconciled jarring factions--diminished the
public imposts--and ameliorated the condition of every existing
Frenchman.[196] To judge from the rapturous expressions of M. de
Champagny, the Emperor was already the subject of deserved adoration; it
only remained to found temples and raise altars.
Much of this statement was unquestionably the exaggeration of flattery,
which represented every thing as commenced as soon as it had been
resolved upon by the sovereign, every thing finished as soon as it was
begun. Other measures there were, which, like the support afforded to
the Bank, merely repaired injuries which Napoleon himself had inflicted.
The credit of this commercial establishment had been shaken, because, in
setting off for the campaign, Napoleon had stripped it of the reserve of
specie laid up to answer demands; and it was restored, because his
return with victory had enabled him to replace what he had borrowed.
Considering that there was no small hazard of his being unable to remedy
the evil which he had certainly occasioned,[197] his conduct on the
occasion scarcely deserves the name of a national benefit.
Some part of this exaggeration might even deceive Napoleon. It is one of
the great disadvantages of despotism, that the sovereign himself is
liable to be imposed upon by false representations of this nature; as it
is said the Empress Catherine was flattered by the appearance of distant
villages and towns in the desert places of her empire, which were, in
fact, no more than painted representations of such objects,[198] upon
the plan of those that are exhibited on the stage, or are erected as
points of view in some fantastic pleasure gardens. It was a part of
Buonaparte's character to seize with ready precision upon general ideas
of improvement. Wherever he came, he formed plans of important public
works, many of which never existed but in the bulletin. Having issued
his general orders, he was apt to hold them as executed. It was
impossible to do all himself, or even to overlook with accuracy those to
whom the details were committed. There were, therefore, many magnificent
schemes commenced, under feelings of the moment, which were left
unfinished for want of funds, or perhaps because they only regarded some
points of local interest, and there were many adopted that were
forgotten amid the hurry of affairs, or postponed till the moment of
peace, which was never to appear during his reign.
But with the same frankness with which history is bound to censure the
immeasurable ambition of this extraordinary man, she is bound also to
record that his views towards the improvement of his empire were broad,
clear-sighted, and public-spirited; and we think it probable, that, had
his passion for war been a less predominant point of his character, his
care, applied to the objects of peace, would have done as much for
France, as Augustus did for Rome. Still it must be added, that, having
bereft his country of her freedom, and proposing to transmit the empire,
like his own patrimony, to his heirs, the evil which he had done to
France was as permanent as his system of government, while the benefits
which he had conferred on her, to whatever extent they might have been
realized, must have been dependent upon his own life, and the character
of his successor.
But as such reflections had not prevented Napoleon from raising the
fabric of supreme power, to the summit of which he had ascended, so they
did not now prevent him from surrounding and strengthening it with such
additional bulwarks as he could find materials for erecting, at the
expense of the foes whom he subdued. Sensible of the difficulty, or
rather the impossibility, of retaining all power in his own hands, he
now bent himself so to modify and organise the governments of the
countries adjacent, that they should always be dependent upon France;
and to ensure this point, he determined to vest immediate relations of
his own with the supreme authority in those states, which, under the
name of allies, were to pay to France the same homage in peace, and
render her the same services in war, which ancient Rome exacted from the
countries which she had subdued. Germany, Holland, and Italy, were each
destined to furnish an appanage to the princes born of the Imperial
blood of Napoleon, or connected with it by matrimonial alliances. In
return for these benefits, Buonaparte was disposed to subject his
brothers to the ordinary monarchical restrictions, which preclude
princes nearly connected with the throne from forming marriages,
according to their own private inclinations, and place them in this
respect entirely at the devotion of the monarch, and destined to form
such political alliances as may best suit his views. They belonged, he
said, in the decree creating them, entirely to the country, and must
therefore lay aside every sentiment of individual feeling, when the
public weal required such a sacrifice.[199]
Two of Napoleon's brothers resisted this species of authority. The
services which Lucien had rendered him upon the 18th Brumaire, although
without his prompt assistance that daring adventure might have
altogether failed, had not saved him from falling under the Imperial
displeasure. It is said that he had disapproved of the destruction of
the Republic, and that, in remonstrating against the murder of the Duke
d'Enghien, he had dared to tell his brother, that such conduct would
cause the people to cast himself and his kindred into the common sewer,
as they had done the corpse of Marat.[200] But Lucien's principal
offence consisted in his refusing to part with his wife, a beautiful and
affectionate woman, for the purpose of forming an alliance more suited
to the views of Napoleon.[201] He remained, therefore, long in a private
situation,[202] notwithstanding the talent and decision which he had
evinced on many occasions during the Revolution, and was only restored
to his brother's favour and countenance, when, after his return from
Elba, his support became again of importance. Jerome, the youngest
brother of the family, incurred also for a time his brother's
displeasure, by having formed a matrimonial connexion with an American
lady of beauty and accomplishments.[203] Complying with the commands of
Napoleon, he was at a later period restored to his favour, but at
present he too was in disgrace. Neither Lucien nor Jerome was therefore
mentioned in the species of entail, which, in default of Napoleon's
naming his successor, destined the French empire to Joseph and Louis in
succession; nor were the former called upon to partake in the splendid
provisions, which, after the campaign of Austerlitz, Napoleon was
enabled to make for the other members of his family.
[Sidenote: LOUIS, KING OF HOLLAND.]
Of these establishments, the most princely were the provinces of
Holland, which Napoleon now converted into a kingdom, and conferred upon
Louis Buonaparte. This transmutation of a republic, whose independence
was merely nominal, into a kingdom, which was completely and absolutely
subordinate, was effected by little more than an expression of the
French Emperor's will that such an alteration should take place. The
change was accomplished without attracting much attention; for the
Batavian republic was placed so absolutely at Buonaparte's mercy, as to
have no power whatever to dispute his pleasure. They had followed the
French Revolution through all its phases; and under their present
constitution, a Grand Pensionary, who had the sole right of presenting
new laws for adoption, and who was accountable to no one for the acts of
his administration, corresponded to the First Consul of the French
Consular Government. This office-bearer was now to assume the name of
king, as his prototype had done that of emperor; but the king was to be
chosen from the family of Buonaparte.
On the 18th March, 1806, the secretary of the Dutch Legation at Paris
arrived at the Hague bearing a secret commission. The States-General
were convoked--the Grand Pensionary was consulted--and, finally, a
deputation was sent to Paris, requesting that the Prince Louis
Buonaparte should be created hereditary King of Holland. Buonaparte's
assent was graciously given, and the transaction was concluded.
It is indeed probable, that though the change was in every degree
contradictory of their habits and opinions, the Dutch submitted to it as
affording a prospect of a desirable relief from the disputes and
factions which then divided their government. Louis Buonaparte was of a
singularly amiable and gentle disposition. Besides his near relationship
to Napoleon, he was married to Hortensia,[204] the daughter of
Josephine, step-child of course to the Emperor, and who was supposed to
share a great proportion of his favour. The conquered States of
Holland, no longer the High and Mighty, as they had been accustomed to
style themselves, hoped in adopting a monarch so nearly and intimately
connected with Buonaparte, and received from his hand, that they might
be permitted to enjoy the protection of France, and be secured against
the subaltern oppression exercised over their commerce and their
country. The acceptance of Louis as their King, they imagined, must
establish for them a powerful protector in the councils of that
Autocrat, at whose disposal they were necessarily placed. Louis
Buonaparte was therefore received as King of Holland.[205] How far the
prince and his subjects experienced fulfilment of the hopes which both
naturally entertained, belongs to another page of this history.
Germany also was doomed to find more than one appanage for the
Buonaparte family. The effect of the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz had
been almost entirely destructive of the influence which the House of
Austria had so long possessed in the south-west districts of Germany.
Stripped of her dominions in the Vorarlberg and the Tyrol, as she had
formerly been of the larger portion of the Netherlands, she was flung
far back from that portion of Germany bordering on the right of the
Rhine, where she had formerly exercised so much authority, and often, it
must be confessed, with no gentle hand.
Defeated and humbled, the Emperor of Austria was no longer able to offer
any opposition to the projects of aggrandisement which Napoleon
meditated in those confines of the empire which lay adjacent to the
Rhine and to France, of which that river had been declared the boundary;
nor indeed to his scheme of entirely new-modelling the empire itself.
Prussia, however, remained a party interested, and too formidable, from
her numerous armies and high military reputation, to be despised by
Napoleon. He was indeed greatly dissatisfied with her conduct during the
campaign, and by no means inclined either to forget or to forgive the
menacing attitude which the Court of Berlin had assumed, although
finally determined by the course of events to abstain from actual
hostility. Yet notwithstanding these causes of irritation, Napoleon
still esteemed it more politic to purchase Prussia's acquiescence in his
projects by a large sacrifice to her selfish interests, than to add her
to the number of his avowed enemies. She was therefore to be largely
propitiated at the expense of some other state.
We have already noticed the critical arrival of Haugwitz, the prime
minister of Prussia, at Vienna, and how the declaration of war against
France, with which he was charged, was exchanged for a friendly
congratulation to Napoleon by the event of the battle of Austerlitz.
Napoleon was no dupe to the versatility of the Prussian Cabinet; but the
Archduke Ferdinand had rallied a large army in Bohemia--his brother
Charles was at the head of a yet larger in Hungary--Alexander, though
defeated, refused to enter into any treaty, and retained a menacing
attitude, and, victor as he was, Buonaparte could not wish to see the
great and highly-esteemed military force of Prussia thrown into the
scale against him. He entered, therefore, into a private treaty with
Haugwitz, by which Prussia was to cede to France, or rather to place at
her disposal, the territories of Anspach and Bareuth, and, by way of
indemnification, was to have the countenance of France in occupying
Hanover, from which the French troops had been withdrawn to join the
Grand Army.
The conduct of the Prussian minister--for with him, rather than with his
court, the fault lay--was at once mean-spirited and unprincipled. He
made his country surrender to France that very territory which the
French armies had so recently violated; and he accepted as an
indemnification the provinces belonging to the King of Britain, with
whom Prussia was so far from having any quarrel, that she had been on
the point of making common cause with her against the aggressions of
France; and which provinces had been seized by France in violation of
the rights of neutrality claimed by the Elector of Hanover, as a member
of the Germanic Body. Such gross and complicated violations of national
law and justice, have often carried with them their own punishment, nor
did they fail to do so in the present instance.
[Sidenote: MURAT.]
Those states, Anspach and Bareuth, were united to Bavaria; that kingdom
was also aggrandized by the Tyrol, at the expense of Austria; and it
ceded the Grand Duchy of Berg, which, with other lordships, Napoleon
erected into a Grand Duchy, and conferred as an appanage upon Joachim
Murat. Originally a soldier of fortune,[206] and an undaunted one, Murat
had raised himself to eminence in the Italian campaigns. On the 18th
Brumaire, he commanded the party which drove the Council of Five Hundred
out of their hall. In reward for this service, he obtained the command
of the Consular Guard, and the hand of Marie de l'Annonciade, afterwards
called Caroline, sister of Napoleon.[207] Murat was particularly
distinguished as a cavalry officer; his handsome person, accomplished
horsemanship, and daring bravery at the head of his squadrons, procured
him the title of _Le Beau Sabreur_. Out of the field of battle he was
but a weak man, liable to be duped by his own vanity, and the flattery
of those around him. He affected a theatrical foppery in dress, which
rather evinced a fantastic love of finery than good taste; and hence he
was sometimes called King Franconi, from the celebrated mountebank of
that name.[208] His wife Caroline was an able woman, and well versed in
political intrigue.[209] It will presently be found that they arose to
higher fortunes than the Grand Duchy of Berg. Meantime, Murat was
invested with the hereditary dignity of Grand Admiral of France; for it
was the policy of Buonaparte to maintain the attachment of the new
princes to the Great Nation, were it but by wearing some string or
tassel of his own imperial livery.
The fair territories of Naples and Sicily were conferred upon
Joseph,[210] the former in possession, the latter in prospect. He was a
good man, who often strove to moderate the fits of violence to which his
brother gave way. In society, he was accomplished and amiable, fond of
letters, and, though not possessed of any thing approaching his
brother's high qualifications, had yet good judgment as well as good
inclinations. Had he continued King of Naples, it is probable he might
have been as fortunate as Louis, in conciliating the respect of his
subjects; but his transference to Spain was fatal to his reputation. In
conformity with the policy which we have noticed, the King of Naples was
to continue a high feudatory of the empire, under the title of the
Vice-Grand Elector.
The principality of Lucca had been already conferred on Eliza, the
eldest sister of Buonaparte, and was now augmented by the districts of
Massa-Carara and Garfagnana. She was a woman of a strong and masculine
character, which did not, however, prevent her giving way to the
feminine weakness of encouraging admirers, who, it is said, did not sigh
in vain.[211]
The public opinion was still less favourable to her younger sister
Pauline, who was one of the most beautiful women in France, and perhaps
in Europe. Leclerc, her first husband, died in the fatal expedition to
St. Domingo, and she was afterwards married to the Prince Borghese. Her
encouragement of the fine arts was so little limited by the ordinary
ideas of decorum, that the celebrated Canova was permitted to model from
her person a naked Venus, the most beautiful, it is said, of his
works.[212] Scandal went the horrible length of imputing to Pauline an
intrigue with her own brother; which we willingly reject as a crime too
hideous to be imputed to any one, without the most satisfactory
evidence.[213] The gross and guilty enormities practised by the ancient
Roman emperors, do not belong to the character of Buonaparte, though
such foul aspersions have been cast upon him by those who were willing
to represent him as in all respects the counterpart of Tiberius or
Caligula. Pauline Borghese received the principality of Guastalla, in
the distribution of honours among the family of Napoleon.
[Sidenote: EUGENE, VICEROY OF ITALY.]
At this period, also, Buonaparte began first to display a desire of
engrafting his own family upon the ancient dynasties of Europe, with
whom he had been so long at war, and the ruin of most of whom had
contributed to his elevation. The Elector of Bavaria had to repay the
patronage which raised him to the rank of king, and enlarged his
territories with the fine country of the Tyrol, by forming an alliance
which should mix his ancient blood with that of the family connexions of
the fortunate soldier. Eugene Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, the son of
Josephine by her first husband, and now the adopted son of Napoleon, was
wedded to the eldest daughter of the King of Bavaria. Eugene was
deservedly favoured by his father-in-law, Napoleon. He was a man of
talents, probity, and honour, and displayed great military skill,
particularly during the Russian Campaign of 1812. Stephanie
Beauharnais,[214] the niece of Josephine, was married about the same
time to the Hereditary Prince of Baden, son to the reigning duke, the
neutrality of whose territories had been violated in the seizure of the
Duke d'Enghien.
These various kingdoms and principalities, erected in favour of his
nearest relations, imposed on the mind a most impressive image of
Buonaparte's unlimited authority, who distributed crowns among his
kinsfolk as ordinary men give vails to their domestics. But the sound
policy of his conduct may be greatly doubted. We have elsewhere stated
the obvious objections to the transference of cities and kingdoms from
hand to hand, with as little ceremony as the circulation of a
commercial bill payable to the holder. Authority is a plant of a slow
growth, and to obtain the full veneration which renders it most
effectual, must have arisen by degrees in the place which it overshadows
and protects. Suddenly transferred to new regions, it is apt to pine and
to perish. The theoretical evils of a long-established government are
generally mitigated by some practical remedy, or those who suffer by
them have grown callous from habit. The reverse is the case with a
newly-established domination, which has no claim to the veneration due
to antiquity, and to which the subjects are not attached by the strong
though invisible chains of long habit.
Fox, in his own nervous language, has left his protest against the
principle adopted at this time in Europe, of transferring the subjects
of one prince to another by way of equivalents, and under the pretext of
general arrangement. "The wildest schemes," he remarked, "that were ever
before broached, would not go so far to shake the foundations of all
established government, as this new practice. There must be in every
nation a certain attachment of the people to its form of government,
without which no government could exist. The system, then, of
transferring the subjects of one prince to another, strikes at the
foundation of every government, and the existence of every nation."[215]
These observations apply generally to violent alterations upon the
European system; but other and more special objections arise to
Buonaparte's system of erecting thrones in Holland, in Naples, and all
through Europe, for the members of his own family. It was particularly
impolitic, as marking too strongly his determination to be satisfied
with nothing less than the dominion of the world; for while he governed
France in his own person, the disposing of other countries to his
brothers and near relations feudatories of France, and his dependents as
well by blood as by allegiance, what else could be expected than that
the independence of such kingdoms must be merely nominal, and their
monarchs bound to act in every respect as the agents of Buonaparte's
pleasure? This, indeed, was their most sacred duty, according to his own
view of the matter, and he dilated upon it to Las Cases while at St.
Helena. The following passage contains an express avowal of the
principles on which he desired and expected his brothers to regulate the
governments intrusted to them:--
"At another time the Emperor recurred to the subject of his relations,
the little aid he had received from them, the embarrassment and mischief
which they had caused him. He dwelt especially on that false idea upon
their part, that when once placed at the head of a state, they ought to
identify themselves with it to such an extent, as to prefer its
interests to those of the common country. He agreed, that the source of
this sentiment might be in some degree honourable, but contended that
they made a false and hurtful application of it, when, in their whims of
absolute independence, they considered themselves as in an isolated
posture, not observing that they made only parts of a great system, the
movements of which it was their business to aid, and not to
thwart."[216]
[Sidenote: SUBSIDIARY MONARCHIES.]
This is explaining in few words the principle on which Napoleon
established these subsidiary monarchies, which was not for the benefit
of the people of whom they were respectively composed, but for the
service of France, or more properly of himself, the sole moving
principle by which France was governed. In devolving the crown of
Holland on the son of Louis, after the abdication of Louis, [in July,
1810,] he repeats the same principle as a fundamental condition of its
tenure. "Never forget," he said, "that in the situation to which my
political system, and the interest of my empire have called you, your
_first_ duty is towards ME, your _second_ towards France. All your other
duties, even those towards the people whom I have called you to govern,
rank after these."[217]
When Napoleon censures his delegate princes for preferring the interest
of the kingdoms which he had assigned them, instead of sacrificing it to
him and his government, he degrades them into mere puppets, which might
indeed bear regal titles and regal attendance, but, entirely dependent
on the will of another, had no choice save to second the views of an
ambition, the most insatiable certainly that ever reigned in a human
breast.
This secret did not remain concealed from the Dutch, from the
Neapolitans, or other foreigners, subjected to these pageant monarchs;
and as it naturally incensed them against Napoleon's government, so it
prevented the authority which he had delegated from obtaining either
affection or reverence, and disposed the nations who were subjected to
it to take the first opportunity of casting the yoke aside.
The erection of these kindred monarchies was not the only mode by which
Napoleon endeavoured to maintain an ascendency in the countries which he
had conquered, and which he desired to retain in dependence upon France,
though not nominally or directly making parts of the French empire.
Buonaparte had already proposed to his council the question whether the
creation of Grandees of the Empire, a species of nobility whose titles
were to depend, not on their descents, but on their talents and services
to the state, was to be considered as a violation of the laws of liberty
and equality. He was universally answered in the negative; for, having
now acquired an hereditary monarch, it seemed a natural, if not an
indispensable consequence, that France should have peers of the kingdom,
and great officers of the crown. Such an establishment, according to
Buonaparte's view, would at once place his dignity on the same footing
with those of the other courts of Europe, (an assimilation to which he
attached a greater degree of consequence than was consistent with
policy,) and by blending the new nobles of the empire with those of the
ancient kingly government, would tend to reconcile the modern state of
things with such relics of the old court as yet existed.
From respect, perhaps, to the republican opinions which had so long
predominated, the titles and appanages of these grand feudatories were
not chosen within the bounds of France herself, but from provinces which
had experienced the sword of the ruler. Fifteen dukedoms, grand fiefs,
not of France, but of the French empire, which extended far beyond
France itself, were created by the fiat of the Emperor. The income
attached to each amounted to the fifteenth part of the revenue of the
province, which gave title to the dignitary. The Emperor invested with
these endowments those who had best served him in war and in state
affairs. Princedoms also were erected, and while marshals and ministers
were created dukes, the superior rank of prince was bestowed on
Talleyrand, Bernadotte, and Berthier, by the titles of Beneventum,
Ponte-Corvo, and Neufchatel.
The transformation of Republican generals and ancient Jacobins into the
peerage of a monarchical government, gave a species of incongruity to
this splendid masquerade, and more than one of the personages showed not
a little awkwardness in supporting their new titles. It is true, the
high degree of talent annexed to some of the individuals thus promoted,
the dread inspired by others, and the fame in war which many had
acquired, might bear them out against the ridicule which was unsparingly
heaped upon them in the saloons frequented by the ancient noblesse; but,
whatever claims these dignitaries had to the respect of the public, had
been long theirs, and received no accession from their new honours and
titles.
In this, and on similar occasions, Napoleon overshot his aim, and
diminished to a certain extent his reputation, by seeming to set a value
upon honours, titles, and ceremonies, which, if matters of importance to
other courts, were certainly not such as _he_ ought to have rested his
dignity upon. Ceremonial is the natural element of a long-established
court, and etiquette and title are the idols which are worshipped there.
But Buonaparte reigned by his talents and his sword. Like Mezentius in
the Æneid, he ought to have acknowledged no other source of his
authority.[218] It was imprudent to appear to attach consequence to
points, which even his otherwise almost boundless power could not
attain, since his nobility and his court-ceremonial must still retain
the rawness of novelty, and could no more possess that value, which,
whether real or imaginary, has been generally attached to ancient
institutions and long descent, than the Emperor could, by a decree of
his complaisant Senate, have given his modern coinage the value which
antiquaries attach to ancient medals. It was imprudent to descend to a
strife in which he must necessarily be overcome; for where power rests
in a great measure on public opinion, it is diminished in proportion to
its failure in objects aimed at, whether of greater or less consequence.
This half-feudal half-oriental establishment of grand feudatories, with
which Buonaparte now began to decorate the structure of his power, may
be compared to the heavy Gothic devices with which modern architects
sometimes overlay the front of their buildings, where they always
encumber what they cannot ornament, and sometimes overload what they are
designed to support.[219]
[Sidenote: NEW NOBILITY.]
The system of the new noblesse was settled by an Imperial edict of
Napoleon himself, which was communicated to the Senate 30th March, 1806,
not for the purpose of deliberation or acceptance, but merely that, like
the old Parliament of Paris, they might enter it upon their register.
The court of Buonaparte now assumed a character of the strictest
etiquette, in which these important trifles, called by a writer on the
subject the "Superstitions of Gentlemen Ushers," were treated as matters
of serious import, and sometimes occupied the thoughts of Napoleon
himself, and supplied the place of meditated conquests, and the future
destruction or erection of kingdoms.
The possessors of ancient titles, tempted by revival of the respect paid
to birth and rank, did not fail to mingle with those whose nobility
rested on the new creation. The Emperor distinguished these ancient
minions of royalty with considerable favour, as half-blushing for their
own apostasy in doing homage to Buonaparte in the palace of the
Bourbons, half-sneering at the maladroit and awkward manners of their
new associates, they mingled among the men of new descent, and paid
homage to the monarch of the day, "because," as one of them expressed
himself to Madame de Staël, "one must serve some one or other."[220]
Buonaparte encouraged these nobles of the ancient antechambers, whose
superior manners seemed to introduce among his courtiers some traits of
the former court, so inimitable for grace and for address, and also
because he liked to rank among his retainers, so far as he could, the
inheritors of those superb names which ornamented the history of France
in former ages. But then he desired to make them exclusively his own;
nothing less than complete and uncompromising conversion to his
government would give satisfaction. A baron of the old noblesse, who had
become a counsellor of state, was in 1810 summoned to attend the Emperor
at Fontainbleau.
"What would you do," said the Emperor, "should you learn that the Comte
de Lille was this instant at Paris?"
"I would inform against him, and have him arrested," said the candidate
for favour; "the law commands it."
"And what would you do if appointed a judge on his trial?" demanded the
Emperor again.
"I would condemn him to death," said the unhesitating noble; "the law
denounces him."
"With such sentiments you deserve a prefecture," said the Emperor; and
the catechumen, whose respect for the law was thus absolute, was made
Prefect of Paris.
Such converts were searched for, and, when found, were honoured, and
rewarded, and trusted. For the power of recompensing his soldiers,
statesmen, and adherents, the conquered countries were again the
Emperor's resource. National domains were reserved to a large amount
throughout those countries, and formed funds, out of which
gratifications and annuities were, at Napoleon's sole pleasure, assigned
to the generals, officers, and soldiers of the French army; who might in
this way be said to have all Europe for their paymaster. Thus, every
conquest increased his means of rewarding his soldiers; and that army,
which was the most formidable instrument of his ambition, was encouraged
and maintained at the expense of those states which had suffered most
from his arms.
[Sidenote: CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE.]
We have not yet concluded the important changes introduced into Europe
by the consequences of the fatal campaign of Austerlitz. The
Confederation of the Rhine,[221] which withdrew from the German empire
so large a portion of its princes, and, transferring them from the
influence of Austria, placed them directly and avowedly under the
protection of France, was an event which tended directly to the
dissolution of the Germanic League, which had subsisted since the year
800, when Charlemagne received the Imperial Crown from Pope Leo the
Third.
By the new Federation of the Rhine, the courts of Wirtemberg and
Bavaria, of Hesse d'Armstadt, with some petty princes of the right bank
of the Rhine, formed among themselves an alliance offensive and
defensive, and renounced their dependence upon the Germanic Body, of
which they declared they no longer recognised the constitution. The
reasons assigned for this league had considerable weight. It was urged,
that the countries governed by these princes were, in every case of war
betwixt France and Austria, exposed to all the evils of invasion, from
which the Germanic Body had no longer power to defend them. Therefore,
being obliged to seek for more effectual protection from so great an
evil, they placed themselves directly under the guardianship of France.
Napoleon, on his part, did not hesitate to accept the title of Protector
of the Confederation of the Rhine. It is true, that he had engaged to
his subjects that he would not extend the limits of his empire beyond
that river, which he acknowledged as the natural boundary of France; but
this engagement was not held to exclude the sort of seigniorie attached
to the new Protectorate, in virtue of which he plunged the German states
who composed the Confederacy into every war in which France herself
engaged, and at pleasure carried their armies against other German
states, their brethren in language and manners, or transferred them to
more distant climates, to wage wars in which they had no interest, and
to which they had received no provocation. It was also a natural
consequence, that a number of inferior members of the empire, who had
small tenures under the old constitutions, having no means of defence
excepting their ancient rights, were abolished in their capacity of
imperial feudatories, and reduced from petty sovereigns to the condition
of private nobles. This, though certainly unjust in the abstract
principle, was not in practice an inconvenient result of the great
change introduced.
The military contingents, which the Confederation placed, not perhaps in
words, but certainly in fact, at the disposal of their Protector, not
less than sixty thousand men, were of a character and in a state of
military organisation very superior to those which they had formerly
furnished to the Germanic Body. These last, much fewer in number, were
seldom in a complete state of equipment, and were generally very
inferior in discipline. But Napoleon not only exacted, that the
contingents furnished under this new federation should be complete in
numbers, and perfect in discipline and appointments, but, imparting to
them, and to their officers, a spark of his own military ardour, he
inspired them with a spirit of bravery and confidence which they had
been far from exhibiting when in the opposite ranks. No troops in his
army behaved better than those of the Confederacy of the Rhine. But the
strength which the system afforded to Napoleon was only temporary, and
depended on the continuance of the power by which it was cheated. It was
too arbitrary, too artificial, and too much opposed both to the
interests and national prejudices of the Germans, not to bear within it
the seeds of dissolution. When the tide of fortune turned against
Buonaparte after the battle of Leipsic, Bavaria hastened to join the
allies for the purpose of completing his destruction, and the example
was followed by all the other princes of the Rhine. It fared with
Napoleon and the German Confederation, as with a necromancer and the
demon whom for a certain term he has bound to his service, and who obeys
him with fidelity during the currency of the obligation; but when that
is expired, is the first to tear his employer to pieces.
Francis of Austria, seeing the empire, of which his house had been so
long the head, going to pieces like a parting wreck, had no other
resource than to lay aside the Imperial Crown of Germany, and to declare
that league dissolved which he now saw no sufficient means of enforcing.
He declared the ties dissevered which bound the various princes to him
as Emperor, to each other as allies; and although he reserved the
Imperial title, it was only as the Sovereign of Austria, and his other
hereditary states.[222]
France became therefore in a great measure the successor to the
influence and dignity of the Holy Roman Empire, as that of Germany had
been proudly styled for a thousand years; and the Empire of Napoleon
gained a still nearer resemblance to that of Charlemagne. At least
France succeeded to the Imperial influence exercised by Austria and her
empire over all the south-western provinces of that powerful district of
Europe. In the eastern districts, Austria, stunned by her misfortunes
and her defeats, was passive and unresisting. Prussia, in the north of
Germany, was halting between two very opposite set of counsellors; one
of which, with too much confidence in the military resources of the
country, advised war with France, for which the favourable opportunity
had been permitted to escape; while the other recommended that, like the
jackal in the train of the lion, Prussia should continue to avail
herself of the spoils which Napoleon might permit her to seize upon,
without presuming to place herself in opposition to his will. In either
case, the course recommended was sufficiently perilous; but to
vacillate, as the Cabinet of Berlin did, betwixt the one and the other,
inferred almost certain ruin.
While Napoleon thus revelled in augmented strength, and increased
honours, Providence put it once more, and for the last time, in his
power to consolidate his immense empire by a general peace, maritime as
well as upon the continent.
FOOTNOTES:
[176] These implements of destruction were afterwards used against the
British cruizers in America, and were judged formidable. But such
desperate courage is necessary to attach the machine to the destined
vessel, and the fate of the engineer, if discovered, is so certainly
fatal, that, like fire-ships, petards, and similar inventions, liable to
the same inconvenience, they do not appear likely to get into general
use.--S. See in the Annual Register, vol. xlvi., p. 553, Lord Keith's
account of the failure of the catamaran expedition against the French
flotilla outside the pier of Boulogne.
[177] See declaration of war made by Spain against England, dated
Madrid, Dec. 12, 1804, and also declaration of war with Spain on the
part of the King of England, Annual Register, vol. xlvi., p. 699, and
vol. xlvii., p. 608.
[178] Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 264; O'Meara, vol. i., p. 351.
[179] Las Cases, tom. iii., p. 248.
[180] See Commodore Dance's account of the defeat of Admiral Linois'
squadron in the Indian seas, Annual Register, vol. xlvi., p. 551.
[181] The late JOHN CLERK of Eldin; a name never to be mentioned by
Britons without respect and veneration, since, until his systematic
Essay upon Naval Tactics appeared, the breaking of the line (whatever
professional jealousy may allege to the contrary) was never practised on
decided and defined principle. His suavity, nay, simplicity of manner,
equalled the originality of his genius. This trifling tribute is due
from one, who, honoured with his regard from boyhood, has stood by his
side, while he was detailing and illustrating the system which taught
British seamen to understand and use their own force, at an age so
early, that he can remember having been guilty of abstracting from the
table some of the little cork models by which Mr. Clerk exemplified his
manœuvres; unchecked but by his good-humoured raillery, when he
missed a supposed line-of-battle ship, and complained that the
demonstration was crippled by its absence.--S
[182] "If it were permitted to a man whose only campaign at sea was that
of Egypt in the vessel of Brueyes, to speak of naval tactics, I could
easily refute all that Sir Walter Scott has here said. I shall limit
myself to the relation of the observations made with General Kleber,
when, from the neighbouring coast, we witnessed the battle of Aboukir.
The greater part of our squadron remained inactive, while the English
turned the left; there was not a single spectator who was not irritated
at seeing the six vessels on the right of the squadron, commanded by
Brueyes, keep their line, when, if they had hoisted sail, and fallen
back on the left, they would have put the English between two fires, and
would certainly have gained the victory."--LOUIS BUONAPARTE, p. 46.
[183] "Had Villeneuve manifested more vigour at Cape Finistère, the
attack on England might have been rendered practicable. I had made
arrangements for his arrival, with considerable art and calculation, and
in defiance of the opinions and the routine of the naval officers by
whom I was surrounded. Every thing happened as I had foreseen; when the
inactivity of Villeneuve ruined all."--NAPOLEON, _Las Cases_, tom. iii.,
p. 247.
[184] "The court are of opinion that such conduct on the part of Admiral
Sir Robert Calder was not the result of cowardice or disaffection, but
of error in judgment, for which he deserves to be severely
reprimanded--and he is hereby severely reprimanded accordingly."--See
Annual Register, vol. xlvii., p. 436. And for the Defence of Sir Robert
Calder, see p. 564 of the same volume.
[185] "In 1805, M. Daru was at Boulogne, intendant general of the army.
One morning, Napoleon sent for him into his cabinet: Daru there found
him transported with rage, striding rapidly up and down the apartment,
and breaking a sullen silence only by abrupt and short
exclamations--'What a navy!--What an admiral!--What sacrifices thrown
away!--My hope is destroyed!--This Villeneuve! instead of being in the
Channel, he is gone into Ferrol! It is all over! he will be blockaded.
Daru, sit down, listen, and write!' Napoleon had received early in the
morning the news of Villeneuve's arrival in a Spanish port; he saw
instantly that the conquest of England was abortive, the immense expense
of the fleet and the flotilla lost for a long time, perhaps for ever. At
that moment, in the transport of rage, which permits not other men to
preserve their judgment, he had taken one of those bold resolutions, and
traced out one of the most admirable plans of a campaign, that any other
conqueror could have conceived at leisure and with coolness, without
hesitation, without stopping: he then dictated the whole plan of the
campaign of Austerlitz, the departure of the several corps of the army,
from Hanover and Holland, even to the confines of the west and south of
France."--DUPIN, _Force Naval_, tom. i., p. 244.
[186] Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 263.
[187] Nelson had not been a month in England when Captain Blackwood, on
his way to the Admiralty with despatches, called on him at Merton, at
five in the morning, and found him already dressed. Upon seeing him, he
exclaimed "I am sure you bring me news of the French and Spanish fleets!
I think I shall have yet to beat them!" It was as he had supposed; they
had liberated the squadron from Ferrol, and being now thirty-four sail
of the line, got safely into Cadiz. "Depend on it, Blackwood," he
repeatedly said, "I shall yet give M. Villeneuve a drubbing!"--SOUTHEY.
[188] "Napoleon had, no doubt, ordered the minister of the marine to
take from Admiral Villeneuve the command of his fleets; for the latter
sent Admiral Rosilly to supersede him. He apprised Villeneuve of this by
a courier: whether he added any reproaches I know not; but something of
the kind must have passed, since Villeneuve quitted Cadiz without
occasion, with the French and Spanish fleet, to attack the English
squadron commanded by Nelson."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 112.
[189] "Villeneuve had called a council of war on hearing that Nelson had
taken the command; and their determination was not to leave Cadiz unless
they had reason to believe themselves one-third stronger than the
British force. Many circumstances tended to deceive them into such an
opinion, and an American contributed unintentionally to mislead them, by
declaring that Nelson could not possibly be with the fleet, for he
himself had seen him only a few days before in London."--SOUTHEY.
[190] See, for these and other particulars of the battle of Trafalgar,
Southey's _Life of Nelson_, a work already repeatedly quoted. It is the
history of a hero, in the narrative of which are evinced at once the
judgment and fidelity of the historian, with the imagination of the
poet. It well deserves to be, what already it is, the text-book of the
British navy.--S.
[191] "The disaster of Trafalgar, by the ruin of our navy, completed the
security of Great Britain. It was a few days after the capitulation of
Ulm, and upon the Vienna road, that Napoleon received the despatch
containing the first intelligence of this misfortune. Berthier has since
related to me, that while seated at the same table with Napoleon, he
read the fatal paper, but not daring to present it to him, he pushed it
gradually with his elbows under his eyes. Scarcely had Napoleon glanced
through its contents, than he started up, full of rage, exclaiming, 'I
cannot be every where!' His agitation was extreme, and Berthier
despaired of tranquillizing him."--FOUCHÉ, tom. i., p. 293.
[192] "It used to be remarked in the saloon of the household, that I was
never accessible to any one after I had an audience with the minister of
the marine. The reason was, because he never had any but bad news to
communicate to me. For my part, I gave up every thing after the disaster
of Trafalgar; I could not be every where, and I had enough to occupy my
attention with the armies of the continent."--NAPOLEON, _Las Cases_,
tom. iii., p. 248.
[193] "At Rennes, 26th April, 1806, on his way from England to
Paris.--Villeneuve, when taken prisoner and conveyed to England, was so
much grieved at his defeat, that he studied anatomy on purpose to
destroy himself. For this purpose he bought some anatomical plates of
the heart, and compared them with his own body, in order to ascertain
the exact situation of that organ. On his arrival in France, I ordered
that he should remain at Rennes, and not proceed to Paris. Villeneuve,
afraid of being tried by a court-martial, determined to destroy himself,
and accordingly took his plates of the heart, and compared them with his
breast. Exactly in the shape of the plate, he made a mark with a large
pin, then fixed the pin as near as he could judge in the same spot in
his own breast, shoved it in to the head, penetrated his heart, and
expired. He need not have done it, as he was a brave man, though
possessed of no talent."--NAPOLEON, _Voice_, &c., vol. i., p. 57.
[194] This admiral commanded at Toulon in 1804, and having stolen out of
harbour with a strong squadron, when the main body of the English fleet
was out of sight, had the satisfaction to see three vessels, under
Rear-admiral Campbell, retreat before his superior force. This unusual
circumstance so elated Monsieur Latouche Tréville, that he converted the
affair into a general pursuit of the whole British fleet, and of Nelson
himself, who, he pretended, fled before him. Nelson was so much nettled
at his effrontery, that he wrote to his brother, "You will have seen
Latouche's letter, how he chased me and how I run. I keep it, and if I
take him, by God, he shall eat it." Latouche escaped this punishment by
dying [19th August, 1804] of the fatigue incurred by walking so often up
to the signal-post at Sepet, to watch for the momentary absence of the
blockading squadron, which he pretended dared not face him. This man
Buonaparte considered as the boast of the French navy.--S.--"Napoleon
said, he much regretted Latouche Tréville, whom he regarded as a man of
real talent. He was of opinion that that admiral would have given a
different impulse to affairs. The attack on India, and the invasion of
England, would by him have been at least attempted."--LAS CASES, tom.
iii., p. 247.
[195] Moniteur, 3d March, 1806.
[196] The Exposé also states--"The calendar of the Revolution has been
abolished, because its object was found to be unattainable, and it was
necessary to sacrifice it to commercial and political convenience, which
requires a common system.--Indeed," it adds, "the people of fair Europe
are already divided by too many varieties; they ought only to form one
great family."
[197] "This embarrassment Napoleon had himself caused by carrying off
from the vaults of the bank above fifty millions. Placed upon the backs
of King Philip's mules, these millions had powerfully contributed to the
prodigious success of this unexpected campaign."--FOUCHÉ, tom. i., p.
295.
[198] "A ridiculous story," says the Prince de Ligne, who accompanied
the Empress Catherine during her tour through her southern provinces, in
1787, "has been spread, which affirms that villages of pasteboard, and
paintings representing distant fleets and arsenals, and bodies of
cavalry, have been so disposed as to cheat our eyes during our rapid
journey. I believe, however, that some little contrivance is
occasionally employed: that, for instance, the Empress, who cannot rove
about on foot as we do, is persuaded that some towns, for the building
of which she has paid considerable sums, are really finished; whereas
there are, in fact, many towns without streets, streets without houses,
and houses without roofs, doors, or windows."--_Lettres et Pensées._
[199] "How does Sir Walter make these different assertions agree? The
truth is, Napoleon never wished or pretended to give _appanages_, but to
act as he thought right towards France, and this design was as great as
it was noble and generous; exaggeration only deforms it."--LOUIS
BUONAPARTE, p. 48.
[200] "One day, after a warm despute between the two brothers, Lucien,
taking out his watch, and flinging it violently on the floor, addressed
Napoleon in these remarkable words: 'You will one day be smashed to
pieces as I have smashed that watch; and a time will come, when your
family and friends will not have a resting-place for their
heads.'"--_Mémoires de RAPP_, p. 11.
[201] De Bourrienne, tom. vi., p. 80.
[202] In 1805 he settled at Rome, where the Pope, calling to mind the
active part he had taken in the negotiation relative to the Concordat,
treated him with marked attention and kindness.
[203] Towards the close of 1803, Jerome married Miss Paterson, the
daughter of a rich merchant of Baltimore. In the spring of 1805, he
embarked in a neutral vessel, and landed at Lisbon, whence he set off,
by land, for Paris, directing the ship to proceed to Amsterdam; from
which city he intended his wife should follow him, as soon as he had
obtained the requisite permission from his imperial brother. On the
arrival, however, of the vessel in the Texel, Madame Jerome, not being
permitted to go on shore, landed at Dover, took up her residence during
the summer at Camberwell, and in the autumn returned to America.
[204] "The marriage took place on the 4th January, 1802. Louis became a
husband--never was there a more gloomy ceremony--never had husband and
wife a stronger presentiment of all the horrors of a forced and
ill-assorted union! From this he dates the commencement of his
unhappiness. It stamped on his whole existence a profound
melancholy."--LOUIS BUONAPARTE, _Documens Historiques_, tom. i., p. 126.
[205] Louis pleaded the delicacy of his constitution, and the
unfavourableness of the climate. "Better to die a king than to live a
prince," was Napoleon's reply; and in a day or two after Talleyrand
waited on him at St. Leu, and read aloud to him and Hortensia, the
treaty and constitution. This took place on the 3d of June, 1806; on the
5th Louis was proclaimed King of Holland.--DE BOURRIENNE, tom. viii., p.
126.
[206] Murat's father was the keeper of an humble country inn, and,
having once been a steward of the Talleyrands, enjoyed the protection of
that ancient and wealthy family.
[207] They were married in January, 1800, at the Palace of the
Luxembourg.
[208] Las Cases, tom. iv., p. 357.
[209] M. de Talleyrand said of her, that "she had Cromwell's head on the
shoulders of a pretty woman."
[210] Ferdinand having embarked for Sicily, Joseph Buonaparte, in
February, 1806, made his public entry into Naples, alighting at the
palace which the unfortunate monarch had just quitted. He was proclaimed
King of Naples and the two Sicilies on the 30th of March. The city was
illuminated on the occasion, "amidst every demonstration of joy, even
more on the part of the nobles than of the lower orders."--BOTTA,
_Storia d'Italia_, tom. iv., p. 264.
[211] "She was haughty, nervous, passionate, dissolute, and devoured by
the two passions of love and ambition--influenced, as has been said, by
the poet Fontanes, in whom she was wrapped up."--FOUCHÉ, tom. i., p.
240.
[212] It is said, that being asked by a lady how she could submit to
such an exposure of her person, she conceived that the question only
related to physical inconvenience, and answered it by assuring her
friend that the apartment was properly aired.--S.
[213] Fouché, tom. ii., p. 33. The most ridiculous reports were also
circulated, respecting an improper intercourse between Napoleon and his
step-daughter Hortensia:--"Such a connexion," said he, "would have been
wholly repugnant to my ideas; and those who knew any thing of the
morality of the Tuileries, must be aware that I need not have been
reduced to so unnatural and revolting a choice."--LAS CASES, tom. iii.,
p. 307.
[214] "Stephanie Beauharnais lost her mother in childhood. She was left
in the care of an English lady, who confided her _protegée_ to some old
nuns in the south of France. During the consulship, I had her placed in
the establishment of Madame Campan, at St. Germain; all sorts of masters
were appointed to superintend her education, and on her introduction
into the world, her beauty, wit, accomplishments, and virtues, rendered
her an object of universal admiration. I adopted her as my daughter, and
gave her in marriage to the hereditary Prince of Baden. This union was,
for several years, far from being happy. In course of time, however,
they became attached to each other, and from that moment they had only
to regret the happiness of which they had deprived themselves during the
early years of their marriage."--NAPOLEON, _Las Cases_, tom. iii., p.
317.
[215] Speech on the King's Message, relating to Prussia, April 23, 1806;
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. vi., p. 891.
[216] Las Cases, tom. vii., p. 77.
[217] On the abdication of Louis, Napoleon sent an aide-de-camp for the
minor, to whom he assigned a dwelling in a pavilion in the park of St.
Cloud with his brother, and a few days after made him the above speech,
which he caused to be inserted in the _Moniteur_. "This," says Madame de
Staël, "is no libel, it is not the opinion of a faction: it is the man
himself, it is Buonaparte in person, who brings against himself a
severer accusation than posterity would ever have dared to do. Louis
XIV. was accused of having said in private, '_I am the State;_' and
enlightened historians have with justice grounded themselves upon this
language in condemning his character. But if, when that monarch placed
his grandson on the throne of Spain, he had publicly taught him the same
doctrine that Buonaparte taught his nephew, perhaps even Bossuet would
not have dared to prefer the interests of kings to those of nations."
_Consid. sur la Rév. Franç._, tom. ii., p. 379.
[218]
Dextra mihi Deus, et telum, quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint---- _Æneidos, Lib. X._--S.
"Now! now! my spear, and conquering hand, he cry'd,
(Mezentius owns no deity beside!)
Assist my vows."--PITT.
[219] "I had three objects in view in establishing an hereditary
national nobility: 1st, to reconcile France to the rest of Europe; 2dly,
to reconcile ancient with modern France; 3dly, to banish the remains of
the feudal system from Europe, by attaching the idea of nobility to
services rendered to the state, and detaching it from every feudal
association. The old French nobles, on recovering their country and part
of their wealth, had resumed their titles, not legally, but actually;
they more than ever regarded themselves as a privileged race; all
blending and amalgamation with the leaders of the Revolution was
difficult; the creation of new titles wholly annihilated these
difficulties; there was not an ancient family that did not readily form
alliances with the new dukes. It was not without design that I bestowed
the first title I gave on Marshal Lefebvre, who had been a private
soldier, and whom every body at Paris remembered a sergeant in the
French guards."--NAPOLEON, _Montholon_, tom. ii., p. 239.
[220] Considerations sur la Rév. Franç., tom. ii., p. 331.
[221] For the "Act of Confederation of the Rhenish League, done at
Paris, July 12, 1806," see Annual Register, vol. xlviii., p. 818.
[222] See the "Act of Resignation of the Office of Emperor of Germany,
by Francis, Emperor of Austria, August 6, 1806," Annual Register, vol.
xlviii., p. 824.