_Napoleon addresses a Second Letter to the King of England
personally--Answered by the British Secretary of State to
Talleyrand--Alliance formed betwixt Russia and England--Prussia
keeps aloof, and the Emperor Alexander visits Berlin--Austria
prepares for War, and marches an Army into Bavaria--Her impolicy in
prematurely commencing Hostilities, and in her Conduct to
Bavaria--Unsoldierlike Conduct of the Austrian General
Mack--Buonaparte is joined by the Electors of Bavaria and
Wirtemberg, and the Duke of Baden--Skilful Manœuvres of the
French Generals, and successive losses of the Austrians--Napoleon
violates the Neutrality of Prussia, by marching through Anspach and
Bareuth--Further Losses of the Austrian Leaders, and consequent
Disunion among them--Mack is cooped up in Ulm--Issues a formidable
Declaration on the 16th October--and surrenders on the following
day--Fatal Results of this Man's Poltroonery, want of Skill, and
probable Treachery._
[Sidenote: LETTER TO THE KING OF ENGLAND.]
Buonaparte, Consul, had affected to give a direct testimony of his
desire to make peace, by opening a communication immediately and
personally with the King of Great Britain. Buonaparte, Emperor, had,
according to his own interpretation of his proceedings, expiated by his
elevation all the crimes of the Revolution, and wiped out for ever the
memory of those illusory visions of liberty and equality, which had
alarmed such governments as continued to rest their authority on the
ancient basis of legitimacy. He had, in short, according to his own
belief, preserved in his system all that the Republic had produced of
good, and done away all the memory of that which was evil.
With such pretensions, to say nothing of his absolute power, he hastened
to claim admission among the acknowledged Princes of Europe; and a
second time (2d January 1805,) by a letter addressed to King George
III., personally, under the title of "Sir my Brother," endeavoured to
prove, by a string of truisms,--on the preference of a state of peace
to war, and on the reciprocal grandeur of France and England, both
advanced to the highest pitch of prosperity,--that the hostilities
between the nations ought to be ended.[106]
We have already stated the inconveniences which must necessarily attach
to a departure from the usual course of treating between states, and to
the transference of the discussions usually intrusted to inferior and
responsible agents, to those who are themselves at the head of the
nation. But if Napoleon had been serious in desiring peace, and saw any
reason for directly communicating with the English King rather than with
the English Government, he ought to have made his proposal something
more specific than a string of general propositions, which, affirmed on
the one side, and undisputed on the other, left the question between the
belligerent powers as undecided as formerly. The question was, not
whether peace was desirable, but on what terms it was offered, or could
be obtained. If Buonaparte, while stating, as he might have been
expected to do, that the jealousies entertained by England of his power
were unjust, had agreed, that for the tranquillity of Europe, the weal
of both nations, and the respect in which he held the character of the
monarch whom he addressed, Malta should remain with Britain in
perpetuity, or for a stipulated period, it would have given a serious
turn to his overture, which was at present as vague in its tendency, as
it was unusual in the form.
The answer to his letter, addressed by the British Secretary of
State[107] to M. Talleyrand, declared, that Britain could not make a
precise reply to the proposal of peace intimated in Napoleon's letter,
until she had communicated with her allies on the continent, and in
particular with the Emperor of Russia.
These expressions indicated, what was already well known to Buonaparte,
the darkening of another continental storm, about to be directed against
his power. On this occasion, Russia was the soul of the confederacy.
Since the death of the unfortunate Paul had placed that mighty country
under the government of a wise and prudent prince, whose education had
been sedulously cultivated, and who had profited in an eminent degree by
that advantage, her counsels had been dignified, wise, and moderate. She
had offered her mediation betwixt the belligerent powers, which,
accepted willingly by Great Britain, had been somewhat haughtily
declined by France, whose ruler was displeased, doubtless, to find that
power in the hands of a sharp-sighted and sagacious sovereign, which,
when lodged in those of Paul, he might reckon upon as at his own
disposal, through his influence over that weak and partial monarch.
[Sidenote: THE KING OF SWEDEN.]
From this time, there was coldness betwixt the French and Russian
Governments. The murder of the Duke d'Enghien increased the
misunderstanding. The Emperor of Russia was too high-spirited to view
this scene of perfidy and violence in silence; and as he not only
remonstrated with Buonaparte himself, but appealed to the German Diet on
the violation of the territories of the Empire,[108] Napoleon, unused to
have his actions censured and condemned by others, how powerful soever,
seems to have regarded the Emperor Alexander with personal dislike.[109]
Russia and Sweden, and their monarchs, became the subject of satire and
ridicule in the _Moniteur_;[110] and, as every one knew, such arrows
were never discharged without Buonaparte's special authority. The latter
prince withdrew his ambassador from Paris, and in a public note,
delivered to the French envoy at Stockholm, expressed his surprise at
the "indecent and ridiculous insolences which Monsieur _Napoleon
Buonaparte_ had permitted to be inserted in the _Moniteur_."[111]
Gustavus was, it is true, of an irregular and violent temper, apt to
undertake plans, to the achievement of which the strength of his kingdom
was inadequate;[112] yet he would scarcely have expressed himself with
so little veneration for the most formidable authority in Europe, had he
not been confident in the support of the Czar. In fact, on the 10th of
January, 1805, the King of Sweden had signed a treaty of close alliance
with Russia; and, as a necessary consequence, on the 31st of October
following, he published a declaration of war against France, in terms
personally insulting to Napoleon.[113]
Russia and England, in the meantime, had engaged in an alliance, the
general purpose of which was to form a league upon the continent, to
compel the French Government to consent to the re-establishment of the
balance of Europe. The objects proposed were briefly the independence of
Holland and Switzerland; the evacuation of Hanover and the north of
Germany by the French troops; the restoration of Piedmont to the King of
Sardinia; and the complete evacuation of Italy by the French.[114] These
were gigantic schemes, for which suitable efforts were to be made. Five
hundred thousand men were to be employed; and Britain, besides affording
the assistance of her forces by sea and land, was to pay large subsidies
for supporting the armies of the coalition.
Great Britain and Russia were the animating sources of this new
coalition against France; but it was impossible, considering the insular
situation of the first of those powers, and the great distance of the
second from the scene of action, that they alone, without the
concurrence of the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, should be
able to assail France with any prospect of making a successful
impression. Every effort, therefore, was used to awaken those states to
a sense of the daily repeated encroachments of Buonaparte, and of the
extreme danger to which they, were respectively exposed by the rapidly
increasing extent of his empire.
[Sidenote: PRUSSIA.]
But since the unsuccessful campaign of the year 1792, Prussia had
observed a cautious and wary neutrality. She had seen, not perhaps
without secret pleasure, the humiliation of Austria, her natural rival
in Germany, and she had taken many opportunities to make acquisition of
petty objects of advantage, in consequence of the various changes upon
the continent; so that she seemed to find her own interest in the
successes of France. It is imagined, also, that Buonaparte had found
some of her leading statesmen not altogether inaccessible to influence
of a different kind, by the liberal exercise of which he was enabled to
maintain a strong interest in the Prussian councils.[115] But the
principles of these ministers were far from being shared by the nation
at large. The encroachments on the German Empire intimately concerned
the safety of Prussia, and the nation saw, in the decay of the Austrian
influence, the creation and increase of a strong German party in favour
of France, to whom Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and almost all the petty princes
upon the Rhine, and its vicinity, began now to look up with the devotion
and reverence which had hitherto been paid to the great states of
Austria and Prussia. The subjects of the Great Frederick also remembered
his numerous victories, and, proud of the army which he had created and
bequeathed to his successor, felt neither apprehension nor unwillingness
at the thought of measuring forces with the Dictator of Europe. The
councils, therefore, of Prussia were divided; and though those which
were favourable to France prevailed so far as to prevent her immediately
becoming a member of the coalition, yet, by increasing her army to the
war establishment, and marching forces towards the country which
appeared about to become the scene of hostilities, Prussia gave plain
intimation that the continuance of her neutrality depended upon the
events of war.
[Sidenote: Oct. 25.]
To animate her councils, if possible, with a more decided spirit,
Alexander visited the court of Berlin in person. He was received, with
the utmost distinction, and both the King of Prussia, and his beautiful
and interesting queen, gave manifest tokens of the share they took
personally in the success of the alliance. An oath was taken by the two
sovereigns at the tomb of the Great Frederick, by which they are said to
have devoted themselves to the liberation of Germany,[116]--a vow which,
though at a distant period, they amply redeemed. Still, whatever might
be the personal opinions of the King of Prussia, the counsels of
Haugwitz continued to influence his Cabinet; and the Emperor withdrew
from Berlin, to place himself at the head of his troops, while the
Prussian monarch, assembling an army of observation, assumed the
menacing air of a neutral who feels himself able to turn the scale in
favour of either of the belligerent powers at his pleasure. This was not
the moment for Buonaparte to take offence at these demonstrations, as
the doing so might convert a doubtful friend into an avowed and
determined enemy. But the dubious policy of Prussia was not
forgotten,--it was carefully treasured in Napoleon's memory, as that for
which she was to be called to account at a future period. In the
meantime, he had the full advantage of her hesitating councils and
doubtful neutrality.
Austria was more accessible to the application of the allies.
Notwithstanding the disasters of the last two wars, the loss of a large
portion of Italy, the disasters of Bellegarde, Alvinzi, and Wurmser, and
the disastrous defeats of Marengo and Hohenlinden, the extent and
military character of her population, amongst whom a short interval of
peace was sufficient to recruit the losses of the most bloody
war,--above all, the haughty determination of a Cabinet remarkable for
the tenacity with which they retain and act upon the principles which
they have once adopted, induced her Government to accede to the alliance
betwixt Russia and Great Britain. She had not forgotten the successes
which her generals and armies had obtained when fighting by the side of
Suwarrow, and might hope to see once more renewed the victories of
Trebia and of Novi. She therefore increased her force in every quarter;
and while the Archduke Charles took the command of eighty thousand men
in Italy, on which country Austria always kept a wishful eye, eighty
thousand more, destined to act upon the Lech, and it was hoped upon the
Rhine, were placed under the charge of General Mack, whose factitious
and ill-merited reputation had, unfortunately for Austria, remained
unabated, notwithstanding his miserable Neapolitan campaign in 1799. The
Archduke Ferdinand, a prince of great courage and hopes, was the nominal
commander of the last-mentioned army, while the real authority was
lodged in this old and empty professor of tactics. To conclude this
detail of preparation, the Archduke John was appointed to command in the
Tyrol.[117]
It remained only to try the event of negotiation, ere finally proceeding
to military extremities. It was not difficult to state the causes of the
war, which was now about to break out anew. By the peace of Luneville,
finally concluded between Austria and France, the independence of the
Italian, Helvetian, and Batavian republics had been stipulated; but
instead of such terms being complied with, Napoleon, rendering himself
Grand Mediator of Switzerland and King of Italy, had at the same time
filled Holland with troops, and occupied the whole three countries in
such a manner, as made them virtually, and almost avowedly, the absolute
dependencies of France.
Complaints on these heads, warmly urged by Austria, were sharply
answered by France, who in her turn accused Austria of want of
confidence, and of assuming arms in the midst of peace.[118] The Emperor
of Russia interfered, and sent a special ambassador to Paris, with the
purpose of coming, if possible, to an amicable accommodation, which
might even yet preserve the tranquillity of Europe. But ere Novosiltzoff
had reached his place of destination, the union of Genoa with the French
empire was announced; an encroachment which, joined to Napoleon's
influence in Switzerland, rendered the whole north-western frontier of
Italy completely open for the march of French armies, and precluded the
possible hope of that fine country assuming any character of
independence, even if, at a future time, its crown should be vested in a
person different from the ruler of France.[119]
[Sidenote: AUSTRIA--BAVARIA.]
Upon hearing of this new usurpation, made at the very time when
Napoleon's steps towards the aggrandisement of his power were under
challenge, Russia countermanded her ambassador; and Austria, after the
exchange of some more angry notes, began her daring enterprise by
marching a large army upon Bavaria.[120] It would have been better,
probably, had the Emperor Francis suspended this decisive measure, and
continued to protract, if possible, the negotiation, until the Russian
auxiliary armies, two in number, of fifty thousand men each, could have
advanced to the assistance of their allies; or until a sense of the
approaching crisis had removed the indecision in the Prussian councils,
and induced the King to join the coalition. Either of these events, and
more especially both, might have given a very different turn to this
disastrous campaign.[121]
But Austria was not alone to be blamed for precipitating the war--she
exposed herself to censure by the mode in which she conducted it.
Occupying Bavaria with numerous forces, the elector was required to join
the confederacy. Maximilian of Bavaria was not disinclined to unite his
forces with those which proposed for their object the defence of
Germany; but he pleaded that his son, now travelling in France, would be
made responsible, should he join the coalition. "On my knees," he said,
in a letter [September 8] to the Emperor Francis, "I implore you for
permission to remain neutral."[122] His reasonable request was rejected,
and the elector was required to join the confederacy with a violence of
urgency, both unjust and impolitic. He was farther given to understand,
that his troops would not be permitted to remain as a separate army, but
must be incorporated with those of Austria. These were terms so harsh,
as to render even the precarious alliance of France preferable to
submission. Maximilian, retreating from his capital of Munich to
Wurtzburg, and withdrawing his army into Franconia, again endeavoured
to negotiate for neutrality. It was again imperiously refused; and while
the Austrian Government insisted that the elector should join them with
his whole forces, the Austrian troops were permitted to conduct
themselves as in an enemy's country; requisitions were raised, and other
measures resorted to, tending to show that the invaders remembered the
ancient grudge which had so long subsisted between Bavaria and Austria.
It was natural that the Bavarian prince, incensed at this treatment,
should regard the allies as enemies, and wait the arrival of the French
as liberators.
[Sidenote: UNSOLDIERLIKE CONDUCT OF MACK.]
The military manœuvres of the Austrian army were not more able, than
her conduct towards the neutral state of Bavaria was politic or just.
There are two errors, equally fatal, into which a general of middling or
inferior talent is apt to fall, when about to encounter with an
adversary of genius. If he mixes presumption with his weakness of parts,
he will endeavour to calculate the probable motions of his antagonist;
and having, as he supposes, ascertained what they are likely to be, will
attempt to anticipate and interrupt them, and thereby expose himself to
some signal disaster, by mistaking the principle on which his enemy
designs to act. Or, if intimidated by the reputation of the commander
opposed to him, such a general is apt to remain passive and irresolute,
until the motions of the enemy make his purpose evident, at a time when
it is probably impossible to prevent his attaining it. It was left for
General Mack,[123] within the space of a very brief campaign, to unite
both characters; and fall first into errors of rashness and presumption,
afterwards into those of indecision and cowardice.
It required little experience to know, that, after two singularly
unfortunate wars, every precaution should have been taken to bring the
Austrian troops into contact with their enemy, under such advantages of
position and numbers as might counterbalance the feelings of
discouragement with which the bravest soldiers must be affected, in
consequence of a course of defeat and disaster so uniform, that there
seemed to be a fate in it. In this point of view, the Austrian armies
ought to have halted on their own territories, where the river Inn forms
a strong and excellent line of defence, extending betwixt the Tyrol and
the Danube, into which the Inn empties itself at Passau. Supposing
Mack's large force concentrated, with this formidable barrier in front,
it seems as if the Austrians might have easily maintained a defensive
position until the armies of Russia appeared to support them.
If, determined upon the imperious and unjust aggression on Bavaria, Mack
found it necessary to advance more to the westward than the line of the
Inn, in order to secure the country of the elector, the Lech, in its
turn, offered him a position in which he might have awaited the
Russians, though their junction must necessarily have been protracted,
in proportion to the extent of his advance. But it was the choice of
this unlucky tactician to leave Bavaria also behind him, and,
approaching the frontiers of France, to take possession of Ulm,
Memmingen, and the line of the Iller and Danube, where he fortified
himself with great care, as if to watch the defiles of the Black Forest.
It can only be thought by those who judge most favourably of Mack's
intentions, that, as the passes of that celebrated forest had been
frequently the route by which the French invaded Germany, he had
concluded it must therefore be by that road, and no other, that their
approach on the present occasion was to be expected. Knowing with whom
he had to contend, the Austrian general ought to have suspected the
direct contrary; for Buonaparte's manœuvres were not more
distinguished by talent, than by novelty and originality of design.[124]
It is not to be supposed that this great confederacy took at unawares
one who had so many reasons for being alert. The Austrian forces, though
they had commenced the campaign so hastily, were not more early ready
for the field, than were the immense armies of the French empire. The
camps at Boulogne, so long assembled on the shores of the Channel, were
now to be relieved from their inactivity;[125] and serious as the danger
was in which their assistance was required, Buonaparte was perhaps not
displeased at finding a fair pretext to withdraw from the invasion to
which he had hastily pledged himself. This formidable assemblage of
troops, laying aside the appellation of the Army of England, was
hereafter distinguished by that of the Grand Army. At the same time, the
armies maintained in Holland, and in the North of Germany, were put into
motion.
In this remarkable campaign Buonaparte commenced, for the first time,
the system of issuing official bulletins, for the purpose of announcing
to the French nation his accounts of success, and impressing upon the
public mind what truths he desired them to know, and, at the same time,
what falsehoods he was desirous they should believe. In every country,
such official accounts will naturally have a partial character, as every
government must desire to represent the result of its measures in as
favourable a light as possible. Where there is a free press, however,
the deception cannot be carried to extremity; imposture cannot be
attempted, on a grand scale at least, where it can be contrasted with
other sources of information, or refuted by arguments derived from
evidence. But Buonaparte had the unlimited and exclusive privilege of
saying what he pleased, without contradiction or commentary, and he was
liberal in using a license which could not be checked. Yet his bulletins
are valuable historical documents, as well as the papers in the
_Moniteur_, which he himself frequently composed or superintended. Much
correct information there certainly is; and that which is less accurate
is interesting, since it shows, if not actual truths, at least what
Napoleon desired should be received as such, and so throws considerable
light both on his schemes and on his character.
Buonaparte communicated to the Senate the approach of war, by a report,
dated 23d September,[126] in which, acquainting them with the cause of
quarrel betwixt himself and the allied powers, he asked, and of course
obtained, two decrees; one for ordering eighty thousand conscripts to
the field, another for the organisation of the National Guard.[127] He
then put himself at the head of his forces, and proceeded to achieve the
destruction of Mack's army, not as at Marengo by one great general
battle, but by a series of grand manœuvres, and a train of partial
actions necessary to execute them, which rendered assistance and retreat
alike impossible. These manœuvres we can only indicate; nor can they
perhaps be well understood without the assistance of the map.
[Sidenote: MANŒUVRES OF FRENCH GENERALS.]
While Mack expected the approach of the French upon his front,
Buonaparte had formed the daring resolution to turn the flank of the
Austrian general, cut him off from his country and his resources, and
reduce him to the necessity, either of surrender, or of giving battle
without a hope of success. To execute this great conception, the French
army was parted into six grand divisions. That of Bernadotte, evacuating
Hanover, which it had hitherto occupied, and traversing Hesse, seemed as
if about to unite itself to the main army, which had now reached the
Rhine on all points. But its real destination was soon determined, when,
turning towards the left, Bernadotte ascended the river Maine, and at
Wurtzburg formed a junction with the elector of Bavaria, who, with the
troops which had followed him into Franconia, immediately declared for
the French cause.
The elector of Wirtemberg and the Duke of Baden followed the same line
of politics; and thus Austria had arrayed against her those very German
princes, whom a moderate conduct towards Bavaria might perhaps have
rendered neutral; France, at the outset of the contest, scarce having
the power to compel them to join her standard. The other five columns of
French troops, under Ney, Soult, Davoust, Lannes, and Marmont, crossed
the Rhine at different points, and entered Germany to the northward of
Mack's position; while Murat, who made his passage at Kehl, approaching
the Black Forest, manœuvred in such a manner as to confirm Mack in
his belief that the main attack was to come from that quarter. But the
direction of all the other divisions intimated that it was the object of
the French Emperor to move round the right wing of the Austrians, by
keeping on the north or left side of the Danube, and then by crossing
that river, to put themselves in the rear of Mack's army, and interpose
betwixt him and Vienna. For this purpose, Soult, who had crossed at
Spires, directed his march upon Augsburg; while, to interrupt the
communication betwixt that city and Ulm, the Austrian headquarters,
Murat and Lannes had advanced to Wertingen, where a smart action took
place. The Austrians lost all their cannon, and it was said four
thousand men--an ominous commencement of the campaign. The action would
have been termed a battle, had the armies been on a smaller scale; but
where such great numbers were engaged on either side, it did not rank
much above a skirmish.[128]
With the same purpose of disquieting Mack in his headquarters, and
preventing him from attending to what passed on his left wing and rear,
Ney, who advanced from Stutgard, attacked the bridges over the Danube at
Guntzburg, which were gallantly but fruitlessly defended by the Archduke
Ferdinand, who had advanced from Ulm to that place. The archduke lost
many guns, and nearly three thousand men.[129]
In the meantime, an operation took place, which marked, in the most
striking manner, the inflexible and decisive character of Napoleon's
councils, compared with those of the ancient courts of Europe. To
accomplish the French plan, of interposing betwixt Mack and the supplies
and reinforcements, both Austrian and Russian, which were in motion
towards him, it was necessary that all the French divisions should be
directed upon Nordlingen, and particularly that the division under
Bernadotte, which now included the Bavarian troops, should accomplish a
simultaneous movement in that direction. But there was no time for the
last-mentioned general to get into the desired position, unless by
violating the neutrality of Prussia, and taking the straight road to the
scene of operations, by marching through the territories of Anspach and
Bareuth, belonging to that power. A less daring general, a more timid
politician than Napoleon, would have hesitated to commit such an
aggression at such a moment. Prussia, undecided in her councils, was yet
known to be, in point of national spirit, hostilely disposed towards
France; and a marked outrage of this nature was likely to raise the
indignation of the people in general to a point which Haugwitz and his
party might be unable to stem. The junction of Prussia with the allies
at a moment so critical, might be decisive of the fate of the campaign,
and well if the loss ended there.
Yet, with these consequences before his eyes, Napoleon knew, on the
other hand, that it was not want of pretexts to go to war which
prevented Prussia from drawing the sword, but diffidence in the power of
the allies to resist the arms and fortune of France. If, therefore, by
violating the territory of Prussia, he should be able to inflict a
sudden and terrible blow upon the allies, he reckoned truly, that the
court of Berlin would be more astounded at his success, than irritated
at the means which he had taken to obtain it. Bernadotte received,
therefore, the Emperor's commands to march through the territory of
Anspach and Bareuth, which were only defended by idle protests and
reclamations of the rights of neutrality. The news of this aggression
gave the utmost offence at the Prussian court; and the call for war,
which alone could right their injured honour, became almost unanimous
through the nation. But while the general irritation, which Buonaparte
of course foresaw, was thus taking place on the one side, the success
which he had achieved over the Austrians acted on the other as a
powerful sedative.[130]
[Sidenote: CAPITULATION OF MEMMINGEN.]
The spirit of enterprise had deserted Mack as soon as actual hostilities
commenced. With the usual fault of Austrian generals, he had extended
his position too far, and embraced too many points of defence, rendering
his communications difficult, and offering facilities for Buonaparte's
favourite tactics, of attacking and destroying in detail the divisions
opposed to him. The defeat at Guntzburg induced Mack at length to
concentrate his army around Ulm; but Bavaria and Suabia were now fully
in possession of the French and Bavarians; and the Austrian General
Spangenberg, surrounded in Memmingen, was compelled to lay down his arms
with five thousand men.[131] The French had crossed the Rhine about the
26th September; it was now the 13th October, and they could scarcely be
said to have begun the campaign, when they had made, on various points,
not fewer than twenty thousand prisoners. Napoleon, however, expected
that resistance from Mack's despair, which no other motive had yet
engaged him to offer; and he announced to his army the prospect of a
general action. He called on his soldiers to revenge themselves on the
Austrians for the loss of the plunder of London, of which, but for this
new continental war, they would have been already in possession. He
pointed out to them, that, as at Marengo, he had cut the enemy off from
his reserves and resources, and he summoned them to signalise Ulm by a
battle, which should be yet more decisive.[132]
No general action, however, took place, though several sanguinary
affairs of a partial nature were fought, and terminated uniformly to the
misfortune of the Austrians. In the meantime, disunion took place among
their generals. The Archduke Ferdinand, Schwartzenberg, afterwards
destined to play a remarkable part in this changeful history, with
Collowrath and others, seeing themselves invested by toils which were
daily narrowed upon them, resolved to leave Mack and his army, and cut
their way into Bohemia at the head of the cavalry. The archduke executed
this movement with the greatest gallantry, but not without considerable
loss. Indeed, the behaviour of the Austrian princes of the blood
throughout these wars was such, as if Fate had meant to mitigate the
disasters of the Imperial House, by showing forth the talents and
bravery of their ancient race, and proving, that although Fortune
frowned on them, Honour remained faithful to their line. Ferdinand,
after much fighting, and considerable damage done and received, at
length brought six thousand cavalry in safety to Egra, in Bohemia.[133]
[Sidenote: CAPITULATION OF ULM.]
Meanwhile, Mack found himself, with the remains of his army, cooped up
in Ulm, as Wurmser had been in Mantua. He published an order of the day,
which intimated an intention to imitate the persevering defence of that
heroic veteran. He forbade the word surrender to be used by any one--he
announced the arrival of two powerful armies, one of Austrians, one of
Russians, whose appearance would presently raise the blockade--he
declared his determination to eat horse-flesh rather than listen to any
terms of capitulation. This bravado appeared on the 16th October, and
the conditions of surrender were subscribed by Mack on the next day,
having been probably in the course of adjustment when he was making
these notable professions of resistance.[134]
The course of military misconduct which we have traced, singular as it
is, might be perhaps referred to folly or incapacity on the part of
Mack, though it must be owned it was of that gross kind which civilians
consider as equal to fraud. But another circumstance remains to be told,
which goes far to prove that this once celebrated and trusted general
had ingrafted the traitor upon the fool. The terms of capitulation, as
subscribed on the 17th October, bore, that there should be an armistice
until 26th October at midnight; and that if, during this space, an
Austrian or Russian army should appear to raise the blockade, the army
at Ulm should have liberty to join them, with their arms and baggage.
This stipulation allowed the Austrian soldiers some hope of relief, and
in any event it was sure to interrupt the progress of Buonaparte's
successes, by detaining the principal part of his army in the
neighbourhood of Ulm, until the term of nine days was expired. But Mack
consented to a revision of these terms, a thing which would scarcely
have been proposed to a man of honour, and signed on the 19th a second
capitulation, by which he consented to evacuate Ulm on the day
following;[135] thus abridging considerably, at a crisis when every
minute was precious, any advantage, direct or contingent, which the
Austrians could have derived from the delay originally stipulated. No
reason has ever been alleged for this concession. Buonaparte, indeed,
had given Mack an audience[136] previous to the signing of this
additional article of capitulation, and what arguments he then employed
must be left to conjecture.[137]
The effects of Mack's poltroonery, want of skill, and probable
treachery, were equal to the results of a great victory. Artillery,
baggage, and military stores, were given up to an immense extent. Eight
general officers surrendered upon parole, upwards of 20,000 men became
prisoners of war, and were marched into France. The numbers of the
prisoners taken in this campaign were so great, that Buonaparte
distributed them amongst the agriculturists, that their work in the
fields might make up for the absence of the conscripts, whom he had
withdrawn from such labour. The experiment was successful; and from the
docile habits of the Germans, and the good-humour of their French
employers, this new species of servitude suited both parties, and went
some length to soften the hardships of war. For not the field of battle
itself, with its wounded and dead, is a more distressing sight to
humanity and reflection, than prison-barracks and hulks, in which
hundreds and thousands of prisoners are delivered up to idleness, and
all the evils which idleness is sure to introduce, and not unfrequently
to disease and death. Buonaparte meditated introducing this alteration
into the usages of war upon a great scale, and thought of regimenting
his prisoners for the purpose of labouring on public works. His jurists
objected to the proposal as contrary to the law of nations.[138] This
scruple might have been avoided, by employing only volunteers, which
would also have prevented the appearance of retrograding towards those
barbarous times, when the captive of the sword became the slave of his
victor. But national character would, in most instances, render the
scheme impracticable. Thus, an attempt was afterwards made to dispose of
the Spanish prisoners in a similar way, who in most cases made their
escape, and in some rose upon and destroyed their taskmasters. A French
soldier would, in like manner, make an indifferent serf to an English
farmer, an English prisoner a still more intractable assistant to a
French agriculturist. The advantages of comparative freedom would be in
both cases counterbalanced, by a feeling of degradation in the personal
subjection experienced.
When the general officers of the Austrians[139] were admitted to a
personal interview with the French Emperor, he behaved with courtesy to
Klenau and others of reputation, whose character had become known to him
in the Italian campaigns. But he complained of the politics of their
court, which he said had forced him into war when he knew not what he
was fighting for. He prophesied the fall of the House of Austria, unless
his brother the Emperor hastened to make peace, and reprobated the
policy which brought the uncivilized Russians to interfere in the
decision of more cultivated countries than their own. Mack[140] had the
impudence to reply, that the Emperor of Austria had been forced into the
war by Russia. "Then," said Napoleon, "you no longer exist as an
independent power." The whole conversation appeared in the bulletin[141]
of the day, which also insinuates, with little probability, that the
Austrian officers and soldiers concurred generally in blaming the
alliance between their own Emperor and Alexander.[142] From this we
infer, that the union between those two powerful sovereigns was, even in
the moment of this great success, a subject of apprehension to
Buonaparte; whose official notes are sometimes expressed with generosity
towards the vanquished, who had ceased to struggle, but always with an
eager tone of reproach and offence towards those from whom an animated
resistance was to be apprehended.
FOOTNOTES:
[106] "Sir and Brother,--Called to the throne of France by Providence,
and by the suffrages of the senate, the people, and the army, my first
sentiment is a wish for peace. France and England abuse their
prosperity. They may contend for ages; but do their Governments well
fulfil the most sacred of their duties, and will not so much blood, shed
uselessly and without a view to any end, condemn them in their own
consciences? I consider it as no disgrace to make the first step. I
have, I hope, sufficiently proved to the world, that I fear none of the
chances of war; it, besides, presents nothing that I need to fear: peace
is the wish of my heart, but war has never been inconsistent with my
glory. I conjure your majesty not to deny yourself the happiness of
giving peace to the world, nor to leave that sweet satisfaction to your
children; for certainly there never was a more fortunate opportunity,
nor a moment more favourable, to silence all the passions, and listen
only to the sentiments of humanity and reason. This moment once lost,
what end can be assigned to a war which all my efforts will not be able
to terminate! Your majesty has gained more within ten years, both in
territory and riches, than the whole extent of Europe. Your nation is at
the highest point of prosperity; what can it hope from war? To form a
coalition with some powers of the continent? The continent will remain
tranquil: a coalition can only increase the preponderance and
continental greatness of France. To renew intestine troubles? The times
are no longer the same. To destroy our finances? Finances founded on a
flourishing agriculture can never be destroyed. To take from France her
colonies? The colonies are to France only a secondary object; and does
not your majesty already possess more than you know how to preserve? If
your majesty would but reflect, you must perceive that the war is
without an object, without any presumable result to yourself. Alas! what
a melancholy prospect to cause two nations to fight merely for the sake
of fighting. The world is sufficiently large for our two nations to live
in it, and reason is sufficiently powerful to discover means of
reconciling every thing, when the wish for reconciliation exists on both
sides. I have, however, fulfilled a sacred duty, and one which is
precious to my heart. I trust your majesty will believe in the sincerity
of my sentiments, and my wish to give you every proof of it."--NAPOLEON.
[107] Lord Mulgrave. For the letter see Annual Register, vol. xlvii., p.
616.
[108] See Note presented to M. Talleyrand, by M. d'Oubril, relative to
the seizure of the Duke d'Enghien, April 20, 1804; and also Note of the
Minister Resident of Russia, communicated to the Diet of Ratisbon, May
5; Annual Register, vol. xlvi., pp. 642, 654.
[109] "As to the Emperor of Russia, he possesses wit, grace,
information, is fascinating; but he is not to be trusted; he is a true
Greek of the Lower Empire. Would you believe what I had to discuss with
him? He maintained that inheritance was an abuse of monarchy, and I had
to spend more than an hour, and employ all my eloquence and logic in
proving to him that this right constituted the peace and happiness of
the people. It may be that he was mystifying; for he is cunning, false,
and expert. If I die in St. Helena, he will be my real heir in
Europe."--NAPOLEON, _Las Cases_, tom. i., p. 300.
[110] See Moniteur, 14th August, 1804.
[111] See Note presented by order of the King of Sweden to. M. Caillard,
the French Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm, Sept. 7, 1804; Annual
Register, vol. xlvi., p. 697.
[112] "On my accession to the sovereignty, Gustavus declared himself my
great antagonist; it might have been supposed, that nothing short of
renewing the exploits of the great Gustavus Adolphus would have
satisfied him. He ran over the whole of Germany, for the purpose of
stirring up enemies against me. At the time of the catastrophe of the
Duke d'Enghien, he swore he would exact vengeance in person; and at a
later period, he insolently sent back the black eagle to the King of
Prussia, because the latter had accepted my Legion of Honour."--NAPOLEON,
_Las Cases_, tom. v., p. 168.
[113] See Annual Register, vol. xlvii., p. 717.
[114] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 82.
[115] Montgaillard, tom. vi., p. 165.
[116] Montgaillard, tom. vi., p. 179; Jomini, tom. ii., p. 137.
[117] Jomini, Vie Politique et Militaire, tom. ii., pp. 97-101.
[118] See two Notes, delivered on the 13th and 16th April, by M. de
Talleyrand to Count Cobentzel, Annual Register, vol. xlvii., pp. 644,
648.
[119] Mémoires de Savary, tom. ii., p. 123; Jomini, tom. ii., p. 93.
[120] "The public, who had been solely occupied with the projected
invasion of England, saw, with astonishment, in the _Moniteur_ of the
21st September, the announcement of the invasion of Bavaria by Austria,
without any rupture or previous declaration of war. What a fortunate
diversion for the French Emperor! It saved his maritime honour, and
probably preserved him from a disaster which would have destroyed both
himself and his ancient empire. The army hastened to abandon the
Boulogne coast. It was a magnificent one, and felt the highest
enthusiasm at quitting a state of irksome inaction to march on towards
the Rhine."--FOUCHÉ, tom. i., p. 291.
[121] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 95.
[122] "I pledge," he added, "my most sacred word to your majesty, that
my troops shall not, in the smallest degree, interfere with the
operations of your army. It is a father, a prey to the most frightful
despair, that applies for mercy in favour of his son."--See Annual
Register, vol. xlvii., p. 710.
[123] "The Austrian army was nominally under the command of the Archduke
Ferdinand; but orders had been given him to follow implicitly the advice
of Mack, whom all Germany fancied a great general notwithstanding the
glaring incapacity he had already shown in Flanders and at
Naples."--JOMINI, tom. ii., p. 101.
[124] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 107.
[125] "The Emperor, before he left Boulogne, had in haste sent orders to
the banks of the Rhine to collect draught horses, and to provide as
large a quantity as possible of _materiel_ for artillery. We were taken
quite unawares; and it required all the activity of the Emperor to
supply that army, on the spur of the occasion, with what it needed for
the campaign, into which it was so suddenly forced. He, however, had
already calculated and foreseen every thing. The maps of England had
disappeared: those of Germany alone were admitted into his cabinet. He
made us follow the march of the troops; and one day addressed to us
these remarkable words: 'If the enemy comes to meet me, I will destroy
him before he has repassed the Danube; if he waits for me, I will take
him between Augsburg and Ulm.' He issued the last orders to the navy and
to the army, and set out for Paris."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 91.
[126] "The wishes of the eternal enemies of the continent are
accomplished; war has commenced in the midst of Germany, Austria and
Russia have united with England; and our generation is again involved in
all the calamities of war. But a very few days ago I cherished a hope
that peace would not be disturbed. Threats and outrages only showed that
they could make no impression upon me; but the Austrians have passed the
Inn; Munich is invaded; the Elector of Bavaria is driven from his
capital; _all_ my hopes are therefore vanished. I tremble at the idea of
the blood that must be spilt in Europe; but the French name will emerge
with renovated and increased lustre."
[127] He started next day for Strasburg, and on reaching that city
issued the following proclamation to the army:--
"Soldiers! The war of the third coalition has begun. The Austrian army
has passed the Inn, violated treaties, and has attacked and driven our
ally from his capital. You yourselves have been compelled to advance by
forced marches to the defence of our frontiers. Already you have passed
the Rhine. We will not again make peace without a sufficient guarantee.
Our policy shall no more give way to our generosity. Soldiers, your
Emperor is in the midst of you. You are only the advanced guard of a
great people. If it should be necessary, they will all rise at my voice
to confound and dissolve this new league which has been formed by the
hatred and the gold of England. But, soldiers, we shall have forced
marches to make, fatigues and privations of every kind to endure.
Whatever obstacles may be opposed to us, we will overcome them, and we
shall take no rest until we have planted our eagles on the territory of
our enemy."
[128] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 108; Savary, tom. ii., p. 99.
[129] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 112.
[130] "Sir Walter Scott blames the violation of the territory of
Bareuth; but, how little have these neutralities been respected by
conquerors! Witness the invasion of Switzerland at the end of 1813, so
fatal to France!"--LOUIS BUONAPARTE, p. 43.
[131] "This intelligence reached Napoleon in a wretched bivouac, which
was so wet, that it was necessary to seek a plank for him to keep his
feet out of the water. He had just received this capitulation, when
Prince Maurice Lichtenstein, whom Mack had sent with a flag of truce,
was announced. He came to treat for the evacuation of Ulm: the army
which occupied it demanded permission permission to return to Austria.
The Emperor could not forbear smiling, and said, 'What reason have I to
comply with this demand? in a week you will be in my power, without
conditions?' Prince Maurice protested, that without the conditions which
he demanded, the army should not leave the place. 'I shall not grant
them,' rejoined the Emperor; 'there is the capitulation of Memmingen;
carry it to Marshal Mack, and whatever may be your resolutions in Ulm, I
will never grant him any other terms: besides, I am in no hurry; the
longer he delays, the worse he will render his own situation, and that
of you all. For the rest, I shall have the corps which took Memmingen
here to-morrow, and we shall then see.'"--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 96.
[132] "Soldiers! But for the army which is now in front of you, we
should this day have been in London; we should have avenged ourselves
for six centuries of insults, and restored the freedom of the seas. But
bear in mind to-morrow, that you are fighting against the allies of
England; that you have to avenge yourselves on a perjured prince, whose
own letters breathed nothing but peace, at the moment when he was
marching his army against our ally! Soldiers! to-morrow will be a
hundred times more celebrated than the day of Marengo. I have placed the
enemy in the same position."
[133] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 123.
[134] For the terms of the capitulation of Ulm, see Annual Register,
vol. xlvii., p. 662.
[135] Jomini, tom. ii., p. 126.
[136] "Marshal Mack paid the Emperor a visit at the abbey of Elchingen.
He kept him a long time, and made him talk a great deal. It was on this
interview that he learned all the circumstances which had preceded the
resolution of the Austrian cabinet to make war upon him. He was made
acquainted with all the springs which the Russians had set to work to
decide it; and lastly, with the plans of the coalition."--SAVARY, tom.
ii., p. 98.
[137] "It must be owned, that Napoleon did not think himself justified
in resting his sole dependence upon his excellent troops. He recollected
the saying of Machiavel: that a prudent prince must be both a fox and a
lion at the same time. After having well studied his new field of
battle, (for it was the first time he made war in Germany) he told us,
that we should soon see that the campaigns of Moreau were nothing in
comparison with his. In fact, he acted admirably in order to derange
Mack's plans, who permitted himself to be petrified in his position of
Ulm. All the Emperor's spies were more easily purchased than may be
conceived. Almost all the Austrian staff-officers were virtually gained
over. I had intrusted Savary, who was employed in the management of the
_espoinage_ at the grand headquarters, with all my secret notes upon
Germany, and, with his hands full, he worked quickly and
successfully."--FOUCHÉ, tom. i., p. 291.
[138] "I intended to enrol them in regiments, and to make them labour
under military discipline, at public works and monuments. They should
have received whatever money they earned, and would thus have been
secured against the misery of absolute idleness, and the disorders
arising out of it. They would have been well fed and clothed, and would
have wanted for nothing, without being a burden on the state. But my
idea did not meet the approval of the Council of State, which, in this
instance, was swayed by the mistaken philanthropy, that it would be
unjust and cruel to compel men to labour."--NAPOLEON, _Las Cases_, tom.
vii., p. 45.
[139] "The 19th October arrived. The drums beat--the bands played; the
gates of Ulm opened; the Austrian army advanced in silence, filed off
slowly, and went, corps by corps, to lay down its arms on a spot which
had been prepared to receive them. The ceremony occupied the whole day.
The Emperor was posted on a little hill in front of the centre of his
army; a great fire had been lighted, and by this fire he received the
Austrian generals, to the number of seventeen. They were all very dull:
it was the Emperor who kept up the conversation."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p.
200.
[140] It will be unnecessary again to mention this man's name, of which
our readers are doubtless as much tired as we ourselves are. He was
committed to a state prison, in a remote part of the Austrian dominions;
and whether he died in captivity, or was set at liberty, we have not
learned, nor are we anxious to know.--S.--On his return to Austria, Mack
was arrested, and sent to the citadel of Brunn, in Moravia, whence he
was transferred to the fortress of Josephstadt, in Bohemia. He was tried
by a military commission and condemned to death, but the penalty was
commuted by the Emperor for two years' imprisonment, and the loss of
rank.
[141] Tenth Official Bulletin of the Grand Army.
[142] "This conversation was not lost upon all: none of them, however,
made any reply."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 100.