CHAPTER LX.—_That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome

were given without respect to Age_.

It is seen in the course of the Roman history that, after the

consulship was thrown open to the commons, the republic conceded this

dignity to all its citizens, without distinction either of age or

blood; nay, that in this matter respect for age was never made a ground

for preference among the Romans, whose constant aim it was to discover

excellence whether existing in old or young. To this we have the

testimony of Valerius Corvinus, himself made consul in his

twenty-fourth year, who, in addressing his soldiers, said of the

consulship that it was “_the reward not of birth but of desert_.”

Whether the course thus followed by the Romans was well judged or not,

is a question on which much might be said. The concession as to blood,

however, was made under necessity, and as I have observed on another

occasion, the same necessity which obtained in Rome, will be found to

obtain in every other city which desires to achieve the results which

Rome achieved. For you cannot subject men to hardships unless you hold

out rewards, nor can you without danger deprive them of those rewards

whereof you have held out hopes. It was consequently necessary to

extend, betimes, to the commons the hope of obtaining the consulship,

on which hope they fed themselves for a while, without actually

realizing it. But afterwards the hope alone was not enough, and it had

to be satisfied. For while cities which do not employ men of plebeian

birth in any of those undertakings wherein glory is to be gained, as we

have seen was the case with Venice, may treat these men as they please,

those other cities which desire to do as Rome did, cannot make this

distinction. And if there is to be no distinction in respect of blood,

nothing can be pleaded for a distinction in respect of age. On the

contrary, that distinction must of necessity cease to be observed. For

where a young man is appointed to a post which requires the prudence

which are is supposed to bring, it must be, since the choice rests with

the people, that he is thus advanced in consideration of some noble

action which he has performed; but when a young man is of such

excellence as to have made a name for himself by some signal

achievement, it were much to the detriment of his city were it unable

at once to make use of him, but had to wait until he had grown old, and

had lost, with youth, that alacrity and vigour by which his country

might have profited; as Rome profited by the services of Valerius

Corvinus, of Scipio, of Pompey, and of many others who triumphed while

yet very young.

BOOK II.

PREFACE.

Men do always, but not always with reason, commend the past and condemn

the present, and are so much the partisans of what has been, as not

merely to cry up those times which are known to them only from the

records left by historians, but also, when they grow old, to extol the

days in which they remember their youth to have been spent. And

although this preference of theirs be in most instances a mistaken one,

I can see that there are many causes to account for it; chief of which

I take to be that in respect of things long gone by we perceive not the

whole truth, those circumstances that would detract from the credit of

the past being for the most part hidden from us, while all that gives

it lustre is magnified and embellished. For the generality of writers

render this tribute to the good fortune of conquerors, that to make

their achievements seem more splendid, they not merely exaggerate the

great things they have done, but also lend such a colour to the actions

of their enemies, that any one born afterwards, whether in the

conquering or in the conquered country, has cause to marvel at these

men and these times, and is constrained to praise and love them beyond

all others.

Again, men being moved to hatred either by fear or envy, these two most

powerful causes of dislike are cancelled in respect of things which are

past, because what is past can neither do us hurt, nor afford occasion

for envy. The contrary, however, is the case with the things we see,

and in which we take part; for in these, from our complete acquaintance

with them, no part of them being hidden from us, we recognize, along

with much that is good, much that displeases us, and so are forced to

pronounce them far inferior to the old, although in truth they deserve

far greater praise and admiration. I speak not, here, of what relates

to the arts, which have such distinction inherent in them, that time

can give or take from them but little of the glory which they merit of

themselves. I speak of the lives and manners of men, touching which the

grounds for judging are not so clear.

I repeat, then, that it is true that this habit of blaming and praising

obtains, but not always true that it is wrong applied. For sometimes it

will happen that this judgment is just; because, as human affairs are

in constant movement, it must be that they either rise or fall.

Wherefore, we may see a city or province furnished with free

institutions by some great and wise founder, flourish for a while

through his merits, and advance steadily on the path of improvement.

Any one born therein at that time would be in the wrong to praise the

past more than the present, and his error would be occasioned by the

causes already noticed. But any one born afterwards in that city or

province when the time has come for it to fall away from its former

felicity, would not be mistaken in praising the past.

When I consider how this happens, I am persuaded that the world,

remaining continually the same, has in it a constant quantity of good

and evil; but that this good and this evil shift about from one country

to another, as we know that in ancient times empire shifted from one

nation to another, according as the manners of these nations changed,

the world, as a whole, continuing as before, and the only difference

being that, whereas at first Assyria was made the seat of its

excellence, this was afterwards placed in Media, then in Persia, until

at last it was transferred to Italy and Rome. And although after the

Roman Empire, none has followed which has endured, or in which the

world has centred its whole excellence, we nevertheless find that

excellence diffused among many valiant nations, the kingdom of the

Franks, for example, that of the Turks, that of the Soldan, and the

States of Germany at the present day; and shared at an earlier time by

that sect of the Saracens who performed so many great achievements and

gained so wide a dominion, after destroying the Roman Empire in the

East.

In all these countries, therefore, after the decline of the Roman

power, and among all these races, there existed, and in some part of

them there yet exists, that excellence which alone is to be desired and

justly to be praised. Wherefore, if any man being born in one of these

countries should exalt past times over present, he might be mistaken;

but any who, living at the present day in Italy or Greece, has not in

Italy become an ultramontane or in Greece a Turk, has reason to

complain of his own times, and to commend those others, in which there

were many things which made them admirable; whereas, now, no regard

being had to religion, to laws, or to arms, but all being tarnished

with every sort of shame, there is nothing to redeem the age from the

last extremity of wretchedness, ignominy, and disgrace. And the vices

of our age are the more odious in that they are practised by those who

sit on the judgment seat, govern the State, and demand public

reverence.

But, returning to the matter in hand, it may be said, that if the

judgment of men be at fault in pronouncing whether the present age or

the past is the better in respect of things whereof, by reason of their

antiquity, they cannot have the same perfect knowledge which they have

of their own times, it ought not to be at fault in old men when they

compare the days of their youth with those of their maturity, both of

which have been alike seen and known by them. This were indeed true, if

men at all periods of their lives judged of things in the same way, and

were constantly influenced by the same desires; but since they alter,

the times, although they alter not, cannot but seem different to those

who have other desires, other pleasures, and other ways of viewing

things in their old age from those they had in their youth. For since,

when they grow old, men lose in bodily strength but gain in wisdom and

discernment, it must needs be that those things which in their youth

seemed to them tolerable and good, should in their old age appear

intolerable and evil. And whereas they should ascribe this to their

judgment, they lay the blame upon the times.

But, further, since the desires of men are insatiable, Nature prompting

them to desire all things and Fortune permitting them to enjoy but few,

there results a constant discontent in their minds, and a loathing of

what they possess, prompting them to find fault with the present,

praise the past, and long for the future, even though they be not moved

thereto by any reasonable cause.

I know not, therefore, whether I may not deserve to be reckoned in the

number of those who thus deceive themselves, if, in these Discourses of

mine, I render excessive praise to the ancient times of the Romans

while I censure our own. And, indeed, were not the excellence which

then prevailed and the corruption which prevails now clearer than the

sun, I should proceed more guardedly in what I have to say, from fear

lest in accusing others I should myself fall into this self-deception.

But since the thing is so plain that every one sees it, I shall be bold

to speak freely all I think, both of old times and of new, in order

that the minds of the young who happen to read these my writings, may

be led to shun modern examples, and be prepared to follow those set by

antiquity whenever chance affords the opportunity. For it is the duty

of every good man to teach others those wholesome lessons which the

malice of Time or of Fortune has not permitted him to put in practice;

to the end, that out of many who have the knowledge, some one better

loved by Heaven may be found able to carry them out.

Having spoken, then, in the foregoing Book of the various methods

followed by the Romans in regulating the domestic affairs of their

city, in this I shall speak of what was done by them to spread their

Empire.

CHAPTER I.—_Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to

Valour or to Fortune_.

Many authors, and among others that most grave historian Plutarch, have

thought that in acquiring their empire the Romans were more beholden to

their good fortune than to their valour; and besides other reasons

which they give for this opinion, they affirm it to be proved by the

admission of the Romans themselves, since their having erected more

temples to Fortune than to any other deity, shows that it was to her

that they ascribed their success. It would seem, too, that Titus Livius

was of the same mind, since he very seldom puts a speech into the mouth

of any Roman in which he discourses of valour, wherein he does not also

make mention of Fortune. This, however, is an opinion with which I can

in no way concur, and which, I take it, cannot be made good. For if no

commonwealth has ever been found to grow like the Roman, it is because

none was ever found so well fitted by its institutions to make that

growth. For by the valour of her armies she spread her empire, while by

her conduct of affairs, and by other methods peculiar to herself and

devised by her first founder, she was able to keep what she acquired,

as shall be fully shown in many of the following Discourses.

The writers to whom I have referred assert that it was owing to their

good fortune and not to their prudence that the Romans never had two

great wars on their hands at once; as, for instance, that they waged no

wars with the Latins until they had not merely overcome the Samnites,

but undertook in their defence the war on which they then entered; nor

ever fought with the Etruscans until they had subjugated the Latins,

and had almost worn out the Samnites by frequent defeats; whereas, had

any two of these powers, while yet fresh and unexhausted, united

together, it may easily be believed that the ruin of the Roman Republic

must have followed. But to whatsoever cause we ascribe it, it never so

chanced that the Romans engaged in two great wars at the same time. On

the contrary, it always seemed as though on the breaking out of one

war, another was extinguished; or that on the termination of one,

another broke out. And this we may plainly see from the order in which

their wars succeeded one another.

For, omitting those waged by them before their city was taken by the

Gauls, we find that during their struggle with the Equians and the

Volscians, and while these two nations continued strong, no others rose

against them. On these being subdued, there broke out the war with the

Samnites; and although before the close of that contest the Latin

nations had begun to rebel against Rome, nevertheless, when their

rebellion came to a head, the Samnites were in league with Rome, and

helped her with their army to quell the presumption of the rebels; on

whose defeat the war with Samnium was renewed.

When the strength of Samnium had been drained by repeated reverses,

there followed the war with the Etruscans; which ended, the Samnites

were once more stirred to activity by the coming of Pyrrhus into Italy.

When he, too, had been defeated, and sent back to Greece, Rome entered

on her first war with the Carthaginians; which was no sooner over than

all the Gallic nations on both sides of the Alps combined against the

Romans, by whom, in the battle fought between Populonia and Pisa, where

now stands the fortress of San Vincenzo, they were at last routed with

tremendous slaughter.

This war ended, for twenty years together the Romans were engaged in no

contest of importance, their only adversaries being the Ligurians, and

the remnant of the Gallic tribes who occupied Lombardy; and on this

footing things continued down to the second Carthaginian war, which for

sixteen years kept the whole of Italy in a blaze. This too being

brought to a most glorious termination, there followed the Macedonian

war, at the close of which succeeded the war with Antiochus and Asia.

These subdued, there remained not in the whole world, king or people

who either singly or together could withstand the power of Rome.

But even before this last victory, any one observing the order of these

wars, and the method in which they were conducted, must have recognized

not only the good fortune of the Romans, but also their extraordinary

valour and prudence. And were any one to search for the causes of this

good fortune, he would have little difficulty in finding them, since

nothing is more certain than that when a potentate has attained so

great a reputation that every neighbouring prince or people is afraid

to engage him single-handed, and stands in awe of him, none will ever

venture to attack him, unless driven to do so by necessity; so that it

will almost rest on his will to make war as he likes on any of his

neighbours, while he studiously maintains peace with the rest; who, on

their part, whether through fear of his power, or deceived by the

methods he takes to dull their vigilance, are easily kept quiet.

Distant powers, in the mean time, who have no intercourse with either,

treat the matter as too remote to concern them in any way; and abiding

in this error until the conflagration approaches their own doors, on

its arrival have no resource for its extinction, save in their own

strength, which, as their enemy has by that time become exceedingly

powerful, no longer suffices.

I forbear to relate how the Samnites stood looking on while the Romans

were subjugating the Equians and the Volscians; and, to avoid being

prolix, shall content myself with the single instance of the

Carthaginians, who, at the time when the Romans were contending with

the Samnites and Etruscans, were possessed of great power and held in

high repute, being already masters of the whole of Africa together with

Sicily and Sardinia, besides occupying territory in various parts of

Spain. And because their empire was so great, and at such a distance

from the Roman frontier, they were never led to think of attacking the

Romans or of lending assistance to the Etruscans or Samnites. On the

contrary, they behaved towards the Romans as men behave towards those

whom they see prosper, rather taking their part and courting their

friendship. Nor did they discover their mistake until the Romans, after

subduing all the intervening nations, began to assail their power both

in Spain and Sicily. What happened in the case of the Carthaginians,

happened also in the case of the Gauls, of Philip of Macedon, and of

Antiochus, each of whom, while Rome was engaged with another of them,

believed that other would have the advantage, and that there would be

time enough to provide for their own safety, whether by making peace or

war. It seems to me, therefore, that the same good fortune which, in

this respect, attended the Romans, might be shared by all princes

acting as they did, and of a valour equal to theirs.

As bearing on this point, it might have been proper for me to show what

methods were followed by the Romans in entering the territories of

other nations, had I not already spoken of this at length in my

_Treatise on Princedoms_, wherein the whole subject is discussed. Here

it is enough to say briefly, that in a new province they always sought

for some friend who should be to them as a ladder whereby to climb, a

door through which to pass, or an instrument wherewith to keep their

hold. Thus we see them effect their entrance into Samnium through the

Capuans, into Etruria through the Camertines, into Sicily through the

Mamertines, into Spain through the Saguntans, into Africa through

Massinissa, into Greece through the Etolians, into Asia through Eumenes

and other princes, into Gaul through the Massilians and Eduans; and, in

like manner, never without similar assistance in their efforts whether

to acquire provinces or to keep them.

The nations who carefully attend to this precaution will be seen to

stand in less need of Fortune’s help than others who neglect it. But

that all may clearly understand how much more the Romans were aided by

valour than by Fortune in acquiring their empire, I shall in the

following Chapter consider the character of those nations with whom

they had to contend, and show how stubborn these were in defending

their freedom.

CHAPTER II.—_With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how

stubborn these were in defending their Freedom._

In subduing the countries round about them, and certain of the more

distant provinces, nothing gave the Romans so much trouble, as the love

which in those days many nations bore to freedom, defending it with

such obstinacy as could not have been overcome save by a surpassing

valour. For we know by numberless instances, what perils these nations

were ready to face in their efforts to maintain or recover their

freedom, and what vengeance they took against those who deprived them

of it. We know, too, from history, what hurt a people or city suffers

from servitude. And though, at the present day, there is but one

province which can be said to contain within it free cities, we find

that formerly these abounded everywhere. For we learn that in the

ancient times of which I speak, from the mountains which divide Tuscany

from Lombardy down to the extreme point of Italy, there dwelt numerous

free nations, such as the Etruscans, the Romans, and the Samnites,

besides many others in other parts of the Peninsula. Nor do we ever

read of there being any kings over them, except those who reigned in

Rome, and Porsenna, king of Etruria. How the line of this last-named

prince came to be extinguished, history does not inform us; but it is

clear that at the time when the Romans went to besiege Veii, Etruria

was free, and so greatly rejoiced in her freedom, and so detested the

regal name, that when the Veientines, who for their defence had created

a king in Veii, sought aid from the Etruscans against Rome, these,

after much deliberation resolved to lend them no help while they

continued to live under a king; judging it useless to defend a country

given over to servitude by its inhabitants.

It is easy to understand whence this love of liberty arises among

nations, for we know by experience that States have never signally

increased, either as to dominion or wealth, except where they have

lived under a free government. And truly it is strange to think to what

a pitch of greatness Athens came during the hundred years after she had

freed herself from the despotism of Pisistratus; and far stranger to

contemplate the marvellous growth which Rome made after freeing herself

from her kings. The cause, however, is not far to seek, since it is the

well-being, not of individuals, but of the community which makes a

State great; and, without question, this universal well-being is

nowhere secured save in a republic. For a republic will do whatsoever

makes for its interest; and though its measures prove hurtful to this

man or to that, there are so many whom they benefit, that these are

able to carry them out, in spite of the resistance of the few whom they

injure.

But the contrary happens in the case of a prince; for, as a rule, what

helps him hurts the State, and what helps the State hurts him; so that

whenever a tyranny springs up in a city which has lived free, the least

evil which can befall that city is to make no further progress, nor

ever increase in power or wealth; but in most cases, if not in all, it

will be its fate to go back. Or should there chance to arise in it some

able tyrant who extends his dominions by his valour and skill in arms,

the advantage which results is to himself only, and not to the State;

since he can bestow no honours on those of the citizens over whom he

tyrannizes who have shown themselves good and valiant, lest afterwards

he should have cause to fear them. Nor can he make those cities which

he acquires, subject or tributary to the city over which he rules;

because to make this city powerful is not for his interest, which lies

in keeping it so divided that each town and province may separately

recognize him alone as its master. In this way he only, and not his

country, is the gainer by his conquests. And if any one desire to have

this view confirmed by numberless other proofs, let him look into

Xenophon’s treatise _De Tirannide_.

No wonder, then, that the nations of antiquity pursued tyrants with

such relentless hatred, and so passionately loved freedom that its very

name was dear to them, as was seen when Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero

the Syracusan, was put to death in Syracuse. For when word of his death

reached the army, which lay encamped not far off, at first it was

greatly moved, and eager to take up arms against the murderers. But on

hearing the cry of liberty shouted in the streets of Syracuse, quieted

at once by the name, it laid aside its resentment against those who had

slain the tyrant, and fell to consider how a free government might be

provided for the city.

Nor is it to be wondered at that the ancient nations took terrible

vengeance on those who deprived them of their freedom; of which, though

there be many instances, I mean only to cite one which happened in the

city of Corcyra at the time of the Peloponnesian war. For Greece being

divided into two factions, one of which sided with the Athenians, the

other with the Spartans, it resulted that many of its cities were

divided against themselves, some of the citizens seeking the friendship

of Sparta and some of Athens. In the aforesaid city of Corcyra, the

nobles getting the upper hand, deprived the commons of their freedom;

these, however, recovering themselves with the help of the Athenians,

laid hold of the entire body of the nobles, and cast them into a prison

large enough to contain them all, whence they brought them forth by

eight or ten at a time, pretending that they were to be sent to

different places into banishment, whereas, in fact, they put them to

death with many circumstances of cruelty. Those who were left, learning

what was going on, resolved to do their utmost to escape this

ignominious death, and arming themselves with what weapons they could

find, defended the door of their prison against all who sought to

enter; till the people, hearing the tumult and rushing in haste to the

prison, dragged down the roof, and smothered the prisoners in the

ruins. Many other horrible and atrocious cruelties likewise perpetrated

in Greece, show it to be true that a lost freedom is avenged with more

ferocity than a threatened freedom is defended.

When I consider whence it happened that the nations of antiquity were

so much more zealous in their love of liberty than those of the present

day, I am led to believe that it arose from the same cause which makes

the present generation of men less vigorous and daring than those of

ancient times, namely the difference of the training of the present day

from that of earlier ages; and this, again, arises from the different

character of the religions then and now prevailing. For our religion,

having revealed to us the truth and the true path, teaches us to make

little account of worldly glory; whereas, the Gentiles, greatly

esteeming it, and placing therein their highest good, displayed a

greater fierceness in their actions.

This we may gather from many of their customs, beginning with their

sacrificial rites, which were of much magnificence as compared with the

simplicity of our worship, though that be not without a certain dignity

of its own, refined rather than splendid, and far removed from any

tincture of ferocity or violence. In the religious ceremonies of the

ancients neither pomp nor splendour were wanting; but to these was

joined the ordinance of sacrifice, giving occasion to much bloodshed

and cruelty. For in its celebration many beasts were slaughtered, and

this being a cruel spectacle imparted a cruel temper to the

worshippers. Moreover, under the old religions none obtained divine

honours save those who were loaded with worldly glory, such as captains

of armies and rulers of cities; whereas our religion glorifies men of a

humble and contemplative, rather than of an active life. Accordingly,

while the highest good of the old religions consisted in magnanimity,

bodily strength, and all those other qualities which make men brave,

our religion places it in humility, lowliness, and contempt for the

things of this world; or if it ever calls upon us to be brave, it is

that we should be brave to suffer rather than to do.

This manner of life, therefore, seems to have made the world feebler,

and to have given it over as a prey to wicked men to deal with as they

please; since the mass of mankind, in the hope of being received into

Paradise, think more how to bear injuries than how to avenge them. But

should it seem that the world has grown effeminate and Heaven laid

aside her arms, this assuredly results from the baseness of those who

have interpreted our religion to accord with indolence and ease rather

than with valour. For were we to remember that religion permits the

exaltation and defence of our country, we would see it to be our duty

to love and honour it, and would strive to be able and ready to defend

it.

This training, therefore, and these most false interpretations are the

causes why, in the world of the present day, we find no longer the

numerous commonwealths which were found of old; and in consequence,

that we see not now among the nations that love of freedom which

prevailed then; though, at the same time, I am persuaded that one cause

of this change has been, that the Roman Empire by its arms and power

put an end to all the free States and free institutions of antiquity.

For although the power of Rome fell afterwards into decay, these States

could never recover their strength or resume their former mode of

government, save in a very few districts of the Empire.

But, be this as it may, certain it is that in every country of the

world, even the least considerable, the Romans found a league of

well-armed republics, most resolute in the defence of their freedom,

whom it is clear they never could have subdued had they not been

endowed with the rarest and most astonishing valour. To cite a single

instance, I shall take the case of the Samnites who, strange as it may

now seem, were on the admission of Titus Livius himself, so powerful

and so steadfast in arms, as to be able to withstand the Romans down to

the consulship of Papirius Cursor, son to the first Papirius, a period

of six and forty years, in spite of numerous defeats, the loss of many

of their towns, and the great slaughter which overtook them everywhere

throughout their country. And this is the more remarkable when we see

that country, which once contained so many noble cities, and supported

so great a population, now almost uninhabited; and reflect that it

formerly enjoyed a government and possessed resources making its

conquest impossible to less than Roman valour.

There is no difficulty, therefore, in determining whence that ancient

greatness and this modern decay have arisen, since they can be traced

to the free life formerly prevailing and to the servitude which

prevails now. For all countries and provinces which enjoy complete

freedom, make, as I have said, most rapid progress. Because, from

marriage being less restricted in these countries, and more sought

after, we find there a greater population; every man being disposed to

beget as many children as he thinks he can rear, when he has no anxiety

lest they should be deprived of their patrimony, and knows not only

that they are born to freedom and not to slavery, but that they may

rise by their merit to be the first men of their country. In such

States, accordingly, we see wealth multiply, both that which comes from

agriculture and that which comes from manufactures. For all love to

gather riches and to add to their possessions when their enjoyment of

them is not likely to be disturbed. And hence it happens that the

citizens of such States vie with one another in whatever tends to

promote public or private well-being; in both of which, consequently,

there is a wonderful growth.

But the contrary of all this takes place in those countries which live

in servitude, and the more oppressive their servitude, the more they

fall short of the good which all desire. And the hardest of all hard

servitudes is that wherein one commonwealth is subjected to another.

First, because it is more lasting, and there is less hope to escape

from it; and, second, because every commonwealth seeks to add to its

own strength by weakening and enfeebling all beside. A prince who gets

the better of you will not treat you after this fashion, unless he be a

barbarian like those eastern despots who lay countries waste and

destroy the labours of civilization; but if influenced by the ordinary

promptings of humanity, will, as a rule, regard all his subject States

with equal favour, and suffer them to pursue their usual employments,

and retain almost all their ancient institutions, so that if they

flourish not as free States might, they do not dwindle as States that

are enslaved; by which I mean enslaved by a stranger, for of that other

slavery to which they may be reduced by one of their own citizens, I

have already spoken.

Whoever, therefore, shall well consider what has been said above, will

not be astonished at the power possessed by the Samnites while they

were still free, nor at the weakness into which they fell when they

were subjugated. Of which change in their fortunes Livius often reminds

us, and particularly in connection with the war with Hannibal, where he

relates that the Samnites, being ill-treated by a Roman legion

quartered at Nola, sent legates to Hannibal to ask his aid; who in

laying their case before him told him, that with their own soldiers and

captains they had fought single handed against the Romans for a hundred

years, and had more than once withstood two consuls and two consular

armies; but had now fallen so low, that they were scarce able to defend

themselves against one poor legion.

CHAPTER III.—_That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay

round about her, and by readily admitting strangers to the rights of

Citizenship._

“Crescit interea Roma Albæ ruinis”—_Meanwhile Rome grows on the ruins

of Alba_. They who would have their city become a great empire, must

endeavour by every means to fill it with inhabitants; for without a

numerous population no city can ever succeed in growing powerful. This

may be effected in two ways, by gentleness or by force. By gentleness,

when you offer a safe and open path to all strangers who may wish to

come and dwell in your city, so as to encourage them to come there of

their own accord; by force, when after destroying neighbouring towns,

you transplant their inhabitants to live in yours. Both of these

methods were practised by Rome, and with such success, that in the time

of her sixth king there dwelt within her walls eighty thousand citizens

fit to bear arms. For the Romans loved to follow the methods of the

skilful husbandman, who, to insure a plant growing big and yielding and

maturing its fruit, cuts off the first shoots it sends out, that the

strength remaining in the stem, it may in due season put forth new and

more vigorous and more fruitful branches. And that this was a right and

a necessary course for Rome to take for establishing and extending her

empire, is proved by the example of Sparta and Athens, which, although

exceedingly well-armed States, and regulated by excellent laws, never

reached the same greatness as the Roman Republic; though the latter, to

all appearance, was more turbulent and disorderly than they, and, so

far as laws went, not so perfectly governed. For this we can offer no

other explanation than that already given. For by augmenting the

numbers of her citizens in both the ways named, Rome was soon able to

place two hundred and eighty thousand men under arms; while neither

Sparta nor Athens could ever muster more than twenty thousand; and

this, not because the situation of these countries was less

advantageous than that of Rome, but simply from the difference in the

methods they followed.

For Lycurgus, the founder of the Spartan Republic, thinking nothing so

likely to relax his laws as an admixture of new citizens, did all he

could to prevent intercourse with strangers; with which object, besides

refusing these the right to marry, the right of citizenship, and all

such other social rights as induce men to become members of a

community, he ordained that in this republic of his the only money

current should be of leather, so that none might be tempted to repair

thither to trade or to carry on any art.

Under such circumstances the number of the inhabitants of that State

could never much increase. For as all our actions imitate nature, and

it is neither natural nor possible that a puny stem should carry a

great branch, so a small republic cannot assume control over cities or

countries stronger than herself; or, doing so, will resemble the tree

whose boughs being greater than its trunk, are supported with

difficulty, and snapped by every gust of wind. As it proved with

Sparta. For after she had spread her dominion over all the cities of

Greece, no sooner did Thebes rebel than all the others rebelled

likewise, and the trunk was left stripped of its boughs. But this could

not have happened with Rome, whose stem was mighty enough to bear any

branch with ease.

It was, therefore, by adding to her population, and by, adopting

certain other methods presently to be noticed, that Rome became so

great and powerful. And this is well expressed by Titus Livius, in the

words, “_Crescit interea Roma Albae ruinis_.”

CHAPTER IV.—_That Commonwealths have followed three Methods for

extending their Power_.

Any one who has read ancient history with attention, must have observed

that three methods have been used by republics for extending their

power. One of these, followed by the old Etruscans, is to form a

confederation of many States, wherein none has precedence over the rest

in authority or rank, and each allows the others to share its

acquisitions; as do the States of the Swiss League in our days, and as

the Achaians and Etolians did in Greece in earlier times. And because

the Etruscans were opposed to the Romans in many wars, that I may give

a clearer notion of this method of theirs, I shall enlarge a little in

my account of the Etruscan people.

In Italy, before the Romans became supreme, the Etruscans were very

powerful, both by sea and land; and although we have no separate

history of their affairs, we have some slight records left us of them,

and some indications of their greatness. We know, for instance, that

they planted a colony, to which they gave the name of Hadria, on the

coast of the upper sea; which colony became so renowned that it lent

its name to the sea itself, which to this day by the Latins is called

the Hadriatic. We know, too, that their arms were obeyed from the Tiber

to the foot of the mountains which enclose the greater part of the

Italian peninsula; although, two hundred years before Rome grew to any

great strength, they had lost their supremacy in the province now known

as Lombardy, of which the French had possessed themselves. For that

people, whether driven by necessity, or attracted by the excellence of

the fruits, and still more of the wine of Italy, came there under their

chief, Bellovesus; and after defeating and expelling the inhabitants of

the country, settled themselves therein, and there built many cities;

calling the district Gallia, after the name they then bore: and this

territory they retained until they were subdued by the Romans.

These Etruscans, therefore, living with one another on a footing of

complete equality, when they sought to extend their power, followed

that first method of which I have just now spoken. Their State was made

up of twelve cities, among which were Chiusi, Veii, Friuli, Arezzo,

Volterra, and the like, and their government was conducted in the form

of a league. They could not, however, extend their conquests beyond

Italy; while even within the limits of Italy, much territory remained

unoccupied by them for reasons presently to be noticed.

The second method is to provide yourself with allies or companions,

taking heed, however, to retain in your own hands the chief command,

the seat of government, and the titular supremacy. This was the method

followed by the Romans.

The third method is to hold other States in direct subjection to you,

and not merely associated with you as companions; and this was the plan

pursued by the Spartans and Athenians.

Of these three methods, the last is wholly useless, as was seen in the

case of the two States named, which came to ruin from no other cause

than that they had acquired a dominion greater than they could

maintain. For to undertake to govern cities by force, especially such

cities as have been used to live in freedom, is a difficult and arduous

task, in which you never can succeed without an army and that a great

one. But to have such an army you must needs have associates who will

help to swell the numbers of your own citizens. And because Athens and

Sparta neglected this precaution, whatever they did was done in vain;

whereas Rome, which offers an instance of the second of the methods we

are considering, by attending to this precaution reached a power that

had no limit. And as she alone has lived in this way, so she alone has

attained to this pitch of power. For joining with herself many States

throughout Italy as her companions, who in most respects lived with her

on a footing of equality, while, as has been noted, always reserving to

herself the seat of empire and the titular command, it came about that

these States, without being aware of it, by their own efforts, and with

their own blood, wrought out their own enslavement.

For when Rome began to send armies out of Italy, for the purpose of

reducing foreign kingdoms to provinces, and of subjugating nations who,

being used to live under kings, were not impatient of her yoke, and

who, receiving Roman governors, and having been conquered by armies

bearing the Roman name, recognized no masters save the Romans, those

companions of Rome who dwelt in Italy suddenly found themselves

surrounded by Roman subjects, and weighed down by the greatness of the

Roman power; and when at last they came to perceive the mistake in

which they had been living, it was too late to remedy it, so vast was

the authority which Rome had then obtained over foreign countries, and

so great the resources which she possessed within herself; having by

this time grown to be the mightiest and best-armed of States. So that

although these her companions sought to avenge their wrongs by

conspiring against her, they were soon defeated in the attempt, and

remained in a worse plight than before, since they too became subjects

and no longer associates. This method, then, as I have said, was

followed by the Romans alone; but no other plan can be pursued by a

republic which desires to extend its power; experience having shown

none other so safe and certain.

The method which consists in forming leagues, of which I have spoken

above as having been adopted by the Etruscans, the Achaians, and the

Etolians of old, and in our own days by the Swiss, is the next best

after that followed by the Romans, for as in this way there can be no

great extension of power, two advantages result: first, that you do not

readily involve yourself in war; and, second, that you can easily

preserve any little acquisition which you may make. The reason why you

cannot greatly extend your power is, that as your league is made up of

separate States with distinct seats of government, it is difficult for

these to consult and resolve in concert. The same causes make these

States careless to enlarge their territories; because acquisitions

which have to be shared among many communities are less thought of than

those made by a single republic which looks to enjoy them all to

itself. Again, since leagues govern through general councils, they must

needs be slower in resolving than a nation dwelling within one

frontier.

Moreover, we find from experience that this method has certain fixed

limits beyond which there is no instance of its ever having passed; by

which I mean that some twelve or fourteen communities may league

themselves together, but will never seek to pass beyond that limit: for

after associating themselves in such numbers as seem to them to secure

their safety against all besides, they desire no further extension of

their power, partly because no necessity compels them to extend, and

partly because, for the reasons already given, they would find no

profit in extending. For were they to seek extension they would have to

follow one of two courses: either continuing to admit new members to

their league, whose number must lead to confusion; or else making

subjects, a course which they will avoid since they will see difficulty

in making them, and no great good in having them. Wherefore, when their

number has so increased that their safety seems secured, they have

recourse to two expedients: either receiving other States under their

protection and engaging for their defence (in which way they obtain

money from various quarters which they can easily distribute among

themselves); or else hiring themselves out as soldiers to foreign

States, and drawing pay from this or the other prince who employs them

to carry out his enterprises; as we see done by the Swiss at the

present day, and as we read was done in ancient times by certain of

those nations whom we have named above. To which we have a witness in

Titus Livius, who relates that when Philip of Macedon came to treat

with Titus Quintius Flamininus, and while terms were being discussed in

the presence of a certain Etolian captain, this man coming to words

with Philip, the latter taunted him with greed and bad faith; telling

him that the Etolians were not ashamed to draw pay from one side, and

then send their men to serve on the other; so that often the banner of

Etolia might be seen displayed in two hostile camps.

We see, therefore, that the method of proceeding by leagues has always

been of the same character, and has led always to the same results. We

see, likewise, that the method which proceeds by reducing States to

direct subjection has constantly proved a weak one, and produced

insignificant gains; and that whenever these gains have passed a

certain limit, ruin has ensued. And if the latter of these two methods

be of little utility among armed States, among those that are unarmed,

as is now the case with the republics of Italy, it is worse than

useless. We may conclude, therefore, that the true method was that

followed by the Romans; which is the more remarkable as we find none

who adopted it before they did, and none who have followed it since. As

for leagues, I know of no nations who have had recourse to them in

recent times except the Swiss and the Suevians.

But to bring my remarks on this head to an end, I affirm that all the

various methods followed by the Romans in conducting their affairs,

whether foreign or domestic, so far from being imitated in our day,

have been held of no account, some pronouncing them to be mere fables,

some thinking them impracticable, others out of place and unprofitable;

and so, abiding in this ignorance, we rest a prey to all who have

chosen to invade our country. But should it seem difficult to tread in

the footsteps of the Romans, it ought not to appear so hard, especially

for us Tuscans, to imitate the Tuscans of antiquity, who if, from the

causes already assigned, they failed to establish an empire like that

of Rome, succeeded in acquiring in Italy that degree of power which

their method of acting allowed, and which they long preserved in

security, with the greatest renown in arms and government, and the

highest reputation for manners and religion. This power and this glory

of theirs were first impaired by the Gauls, and afterwards extinguished

by the Romans, and so utterly extinguished, that of the Etruscan

Empire, so splendid two thousand years ago, we have at the present day

barely a record. This it is which has led me to inquire whence this

oblivion of things arises, a question of which I shall treat in the

following Chapter.

CHAPTER V.—_That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of

Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the Memory of the Past_.

To those philosophers who will have it that the world has existed from

all eternity, it were, I think, a good answer, that if what they say be

true we ought to have record of a longer period than five thousand

years; did it not appear that the memory of past times is blotted out

by a variety of causes, some referable to men, and some to Heaven.

Among the causes which have a human origin are the changes in sects and

tongues; because when a new sect, that is to say a new religion, comes

up, its first endeavour, in order to give itself reputation, is to

efface the old; and should it so happen that the founders of the new

religion speak another tongue, this may readily be effected. This we

know from observing the methods which Christianity has followed in

dealing with the religion of the Gentiles, for we find that it has

abolished all the rites and ordinances of that worship, and obliterated

every trace of the ancient belief. True, it has not succeeded in

utterly blotting out our knowledge of things done by the famous men who

held that belief; and this because the propagators of the new faith,

retaining the Latin tongue, were constrained to use it in writing the

new law; for could they have written this in a new tongue, we may

infer, having regard to their other persecutions, that no record

whatever would have survived to us of past events. For any one who

reads of the methods followed by Saint Gregory and the other heads of

the Christian religion, will perceive with what animosity they pursued

all ancient memorials; burning the works of poets and historians;

breaking images; and destroying whatsoever else afforded any trace of

antiquity. So that if to this persecution a new language had been

joined, it must soon have been found that everything was forgotten.

We may believe, therefore, that what Christianity has sought to effect

against the sect of the Gentiles, was actually effected by that sect

against the religion which preceded theirs; and that, from the repeated

changes of belief which have taken place in the course of five or six

thousand years, the memory of what happened at a remote date has

perished, or, if any trace of it remain, has come to be regarded as a

fable to which no credit is due; like the Chronicle of Diodorus

Siculus, which, professing to give an account of the events of forty or

fifty thousand years, is held, and I believe justly, a lying tale.

As for the causes of oblivion which we may refer to Heaven, they are

those which make havoc of the human race, and reduce the population of

certain parts of the world to a very small number. This happens by

plague, famine, or flood, of which three the last is the most hurtful,

as well because it is the most universal, as because those saved are

generally rude and ignorant mountaineers, who possessing no knowledge

of antiquity themselves, can impart none to those who come after them.

Or if among the survivors there chance to be one possessed of such

knowledge, to give himself consequence and credit, he will conceal and

pervert it to suit his private ends, so that to his posterity there

will remain only so much as he may have been pleased to communicate,

and no more.

That these floods, plagues, and famines do in fact happen, I see no

reason to doubt, both because we find all histories full of them, and

recognize their effect in this oblivion of the past, and also because

it is reasonable that such things should happen. For as when much

superfluous matter has gathered in simple bodies, nature makes repeated

efforts to remove and purge it away, thereby promoting the health of

these bodies, so likewise as regards that composite body the human

race, when every province of the world so teems with inhabitants that

they can neither subsist where they are nor remove elsewhere, every

region being equally crowded and over-peopled, and when human craft and

wickedness have reached their highest pitch, it must needs come about

that the world will purge herself in one or another of these three

ways, to the end that men, becoming few and contrite, may amend their

lives and live with more convenience.

Etruria, then, as has been said above, was at one time powerful,

abounding in piety and valour, practising her own customs, and speaking

her own tongue; but all this was effaced by the power of Rome, so that,

as I have observed already, nothing is left of her but the memory of a

name.

CHAPTER VI.—_Of the Methods followed by the Romans in making War_.

Having treated of the methods followed by the Romans for increasing

their power, we shall now go on to consider those which they used in

making war; and in all they did we shall find how wisely they turned

aside from the common path in order to render their progress to supreme

greatness easy.

Whosoever makes war, whether from policy or ambition, means to acquire

and to hold what he acquires, and to carry on the war he has undertaken

in such a manner that it shall enrich and not impoverish his native

country and State. It is necessary, therefore, whether for acquiring or

holding, to consider how cost may be avoided, and everything done most

advantageously for the public welfare. But whoever would effect all

this, must take the course and follow the methods of the Romans; which

consisted, first of all, in making their wars, as the French say,

_great and short_. For entering the field with strong armies, they

brought to a speedy conclusion whatever wars they had with the Latins,

the Samnites, or the Etruscans.

And if we take note of all the wars in which they were engaged, from

the foundation of their city down to the siege of Veii, all will be

seen to have been quickly ended some in twenty, some in ten, and some

in no more than six days. And this was their wont: So soon as war was

declared they would go forth with their armies to meet the enemy and at

once deliver battle. The enemy, on being routed, to save their country

from pillage, very soon came to terms, when the Romans would take from

them certain portions of their territory. These they either assigned to

particular persons, or made the seat of a colony, which being settled

on the confines of the conquered country served as a defence to the

Roman frontier, to the advantage both of the colonists who had these

lands given them, and of the Roman people whose borders were thus

guarded at no expense to themselves. And no other system of defence

could have been at once so safe, so strong, and so effectual. For while

the enemy were not actually in the field, this guard was sufficient;

and when they came out in force to overwhelm the colony, the Romans

also went forth in strength and gave them battle; and getting the

better of them, imposed harder terms than before, and so returned home.

And in this way they came gradually to establish their name abroad, and

to add to their power.

These methods they continued to employ until they changed their system

of warfare, which they did during the siege of Veii; when to enable

them to carry on a prolonged war, they passed a law for the payment of

their soldiers, whom, up to that time they had not paid, nor needed to

pay, because till then their wars had been of brief duration.

Nevertheless, while allowing pay to their soldiers that they might thus

wage longer wars, and keep their armies longer in the field when

employed on distant enterprises, they never departed from their old

plan of bringing their campaigns to as speedy an end as place and

circumstances allowed, nor ever ceased to plant colonies.

Their custom of terminating their wars with despatch, besides being

natural to the Romans, was strengthened by the ambition of their

consuls, who, being appointed for twelve months only, six of which they

had to spend in the city, were eager to bring their wars to an end as

rapidly as they could, that they might enjoy the honours of a triumph.

The usage of planting colonies was recommended by the great advantage

and convenience which resulted from it. In dealing with the spoils of

warfare their practice, no doubt, in a measure changed, so that in this

respect they were not afterwards so liberal as they were at first;

partly, because liberality did not seem so necessary when their

soldiers were in receipt of pay; and, partly, because the spoils

themselves being greater than before, they thought by their help so to

enrich the public treasury as to be able to carry on their wars without

taxing the city; and, in fact, by pursuing this course the public

revenues were soon greatly augmented. The methods thus followed by the

Romans in dividing plunder and in planting colonies had, accordingly,

this result, that whereas other less prudent princes and republics are

impoverished by war, Rome was enriched by it; nay, so far was the

system carried, that no consul could hope for a triumph unless he

brought back with him for the public treasury much gold and silver and

spoils of every kind.

By methods such as these, at one time bringing their wars to a rapid

conclusion by invasion and actual defeat, at another wearing out an

enemy by protracted hostilities, and again by concluding peace on

advantageous terms, the Romans continually grew richer and more

powerful.

CHAPTER VII.—_Of the Quantity of Land assigned by the Romans to each

Colonist_.

It would, I think, be difficult to fix with certainty how much land the

Romans allotted to each colonist, for my belief is that they gave more

or less according to the character of the country to which they sent

them. We may, however, be sure that in every instance, and to whatever

country they were sent, the quantity of land assigned was not very

large: first, because, these colonists being sent to guard the newly

acquired country, by giving little land it became possible to send more

men; and second because, as the Romans lived frugally at home, it is

unreasonable to suppose that they should wish their countrymen to be

too well off abroad. And Titus Livius tells us that on the capture of

Veii, the Romans sent thither a colony, allotting to each colonist

three jugera and seven unciae of land, which, according to our

measurement would be something under two acres.

Besides the above reasons, the Romans may likely enough have thought

that it was not so much the quantity of the land allotted as its

careful cultivation that would make it suffice. It is very necessary,

however, that every colony should have common pasturage where all may

send their cattle to graze, as well as woods where they may cut fuel;

for without such conveniences no colony can maintain itself.

CHAPTER VIII.—_Why certain Nations leave their ancestral Seats and

overflow the Countries of others_.

Having spoken above of the methods followed by the Romans in making

war, and related how the Etruscans were attacked by the Gauls, it seems

to me not foreign to these topics to explain that of wars there are two

kinds. One kind of war has its origin in the ambition of princes or

republics who seek to extend their dominions. Such were the wars waged

by Alexander the Great, and by the Romans, and such are those which we

see every day carried on by one potentate against another. Wars of this

sort have their dangers, but do not utterly extirpate the inhabitants

of a country; what the conqueror seeks being merely the submission of

the conquered people, whom, generally speaking, he suffers to retain

their laws, and always their houses and goods.

The other species of war is when an entire people, with all the

families of which it is made up, being driven out by famine or defeat,

removes from its former seat, and goes in search of a new abode and a

new country, not simply with the view to establish dominion over it,

but to possess it as its own, and to expel or exterminate the former

inhabitants. Of this most terrible and cruel species of warfare Sallust

speaks at the end of his history of the war with Jugurtha, where in

mentioning that after the defeat of Jugurtha the movement of the Gauls

into Italy began to be noticed, he observes that “_in the wars of the

Romans with other nations the struggle was for mastery; but that always

in their wars with the Gauls the struggle on both sides was for life_.”

For a prince or commonwealth, when attacking another State, will be

content to rid themselves of those only who are at the head of affairs;

but an entire people, set in motion in the manner described, must

destroy all who oppose them, since their object is to subsist on that

whereon those whom they invade have hitherto subsisted.

The Romans had to pass through three of these desperate wars; the first

being that in which their city was actually captured by those Gauls

who, as already mentioned, had previously taken Lombardy from the

Etruscans and made it their seat, and for whose invasion Titus Livius

has assigned two causes. First, that they were attracted, as I have

said before, by the fruitful soil and by the wine of Italy which they

had not in Gaul; second, that their population having multiplied so

greatly that they could no longer find wherewithal to live on at home,

the princes of their land decided that certain of their number should

go forth to seek a new abode; and so deciding, chose as leaders of

those who were to go, two Gaulish chiefs, Bellovesus and Siccovesus;

the former of whom came into Italy while the latter passed into Spain.

From the immigration under Bellovesus resulted the occupation of

Lombardy, and, subsequently, the first war of the Gauls with Rome. At a

later date, and after the close of the first war with Carthage, came

the second Gallic invasion, when more than two hundred thousand Gauls

perished in battle between Piombino and Pisa. The third of these wars

broke out on the descent into Italy of the Todi and Cimbri, who, after

defeating several Roman armies, were themselves defeated by Marius.

In these three most dangerous contests the arms of Rome prevailed; but

no ordinary valour was needed for their success. For we see afterwards,

when the spirit of the Romans had declined, and their armies had lost

their former excellence, their supremacy was overthrown by men of the

same race, that is to say by the Goths, the Vandals, and others like

them, who spread themselves over the whole of the Western Empire.

Nations such as these, quit, as I have said, their native land, when

forced by famine, or by defeat in domestic wars, to seek a new

habitation elsewhere. When those thus driven forth are in large

numbers, they violently invade the territories of other nations,

slaughtering the inhabitants, seizing on their possessions, founding

new kingdoms, and giving new names to provinces; as was done by Moses,

and by those tribes who overran the Roman Empire. For the new names

which we find in Italy and elsewhere, have no other origin than in

their having been given by these new occupants; as when the countries

formerly known as Gallia Cisalpina and Gallia Transalpina took the

names of Lombardy and France, from the Lombards and the Franks who

settled themselves there. In the same way Sclavonia was formerly known

as Illyria, Hungary as Pannonia, and England as Britain; while many

other provinces which it would be tedious to enumerate, have similarly

changed their designations; as when the name Judæa was given by Moses

to that part of Syria of which he took possession.

And since I have said above that nations such as those I have been

describing, are often driven by wars from their ancestral homes, and

forced to seek a new country elsewhere, I shall cite the instance of

the Maurusians, a people who anciently dwelt in Syria, but hearing of

the inroad of the Hebrews, and thinking themselves unable to resist

them, chose rather to seek safety in flight than to perish with their

country in a vain effort to defend it. For which reason, removing with

their families, they went to Africa, where, after driving out the

native inhabitants, they took up their abode; and although they could

not defend their own country, were able to possess themselves of a

country belonging to others. And Procopius, who writes the history of

the war which Belisarius conducted against those Vandals who seized on

Africa, relates, that on certain pillars standing in places where the

Maurusians once dwelt, he had read inscriptions in these words: “_We

Maurusians who fled before Joshua, the robber, the son of Nun_;”[7]

giving us to know the cause of their quitting Syria. Be this as it may,

nations thus driven forth by a supreme necessity, are, if they be in

great number, in the highest degree dangerous, and cannot be

successfully withstood except by a people who excel in arms.

[7] Nos Maurusii qui fugimus a facie Jesu latronis filii Navæ.

_Procop. Hist. Bell. Vand. II._

When those constrained to abandon their homes are not in large numbers,

they are not so dangerous as the nations of whom I have been speaking,

since they cannot use the same violence, but must trust to their

address to procure them a habitation; and, after procuring it, must

live with their neighbours as friends and companions, as we find Æneas,

Dido, the Massilians, and others like them to have lived; all of whom

contrived to maintain themselves in the districts in which they

settled, by securing the good will of the neighbouring nations.

Almost all the great emigrations of nations have been and continue to

be from the cold and barren region of Scythia, because from the

population there being excessive, and the soil ill able to support

them, they are forced to quit their home, many causes operating to

drive them forth and none to keep them back. And if, for the last five

hundred years, it has not happened that any of these nations has

actually overrun another country, there are various reasons to account

for it. First, the great clearance which that region made of its

inhabitants during the decline of the Roman Empire, when more than

thirty nations issued from it in succession; and next, the circumstance

that the countries of Germany and Hungary, whence also these nations

came, are now so much improved that men can live there in comfort, and

consequently are not constrained to shift their habitations. Besides

which, since these countries are occupied by a very warlike race, they

serve as a sort of bulwark to keep back the neighbouring Scythians, who

for this reason do not venture to attack them, nor attempt to force a

passage. Nevertheless, movements on a great scale have oftentimes been

begun by the Tartars, and been at once withstood by the Hungarians and

Poles, whose frequent boast it is, that but for them, Italy and the

Church would more than once have felt the weight of the Tartar arms.

Of the nations of whom I have been speaking, I shall now say no more.

CHAPTER IX.—_Of the Causes which commonly give rise to Wars between

States_.

The occasion which led to war between the Romans and Samnites, who for

long had been in league with one another, is of common occurrence in

all powerful States, being either brought about by accident, or else

purposely contrived by some one who would set war a-foot. As between

the Romans and the Samnites, the occasion of war was accidental. For in

making war upon the Sidicinians and afterwards on the Campanians, the

Samnites had no thought of involving themselves with the Romans. But

the Campanians being overpowered, and, contrary to the expectation of

Romans and Samnites alike, resorting to Rome for aid, the Romans, on

whose protection they threw themselves, were forced to succour them as

dependants, and to accept a war which, it seemed to them, they could

not with honour decline. For though they might have thought it

unreasonable to be called on to defend the Campanians as friends

against their own friends the Samnites, it seemed to them shameful not

to defend them as subjects, or as a people who had placed themselves

under their protection. For they reasoned that to decline their defence

would close the gate against all others who at any future time might

desire to submit themselves to their power. And, accordingly, since

glory and empire, and not peace, were the ends which they always had in

view, it became impossible for them to refuse this protectorship.

A similar circumstance gave rise to the first war with the

Carthaginians, namely the protectorate assumed by the Romans of the

citizens of Messina in Sicily, and this likewise came about by chance.

But the second war with Carthage was not the result of chance. For

Hannibal the Carthaginian general attacked the Saguntans, who were the

friends of Rome in Spain, not from any desire to injure them, but in

order to set the arms of Rome in motion, and so gain an opportunity of

engaging the Romans in a war, and passing on into Italy. This method of

picking a quarrel is constantly resorted to by powerful States when

they are bound by scruples of honour or like considerations. For if I

desire to make war on a prince with whom I am under an ancient and

binding treaty, I shall find some colour or pretext for attacking the

friend of that prince, very well knowing that when I attack his friend,

either the prince will resent it, when my scheme for engaging him in

war will be realized; or that, should he not resent it, his weakness or

baseness in not defending one who is under his protection will be made

apparent; either of which alternatives will discredit him, and further

my designs.

We are to note, therefore, in connection with this submission of the

Campanians, what has just now been said as to provoking another power

to war; and also the remedy open to a State which, being unequal to its

own defence, is prepared to go all lengths to ruin its assailant,—that

remedy being to give itself up unreservedly to some one whom it selects

for its defender; as the Campanians gave themselves up to the Romans,

and as the Florentines gave themselves up to King Robert of Naples,

who, after refusing to defend them as his friends against Castruccio of

Lucca by whom they were hard pressed, defended them as his subjects.

CHAPTER X.—_That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the

Sinews of War_.

Since any man may begin a war at his pleasure, but cannot at his

pleasure bring it to a close, a prince before he engages in any warlike

enterprise ought to measure his strength and govern himself

accordingly. But he must be prudent enough not to deceive himself as to

his strength, which he will always do, if he measure it by money, by

advantage of position, or by the good-will of his subjects, while he is

unprovided with an army of his own. These are things which may swell

your strength but do not constitute it, being in themselves null and of

no avail without an army on which you can depend.

Without such an army no amount of money will meet your wants, the

natural strength of your country will not protect you, and the fidelity

and attachment of your subjects will not endure, since it is impossible

that they should continue true to you when you cannot defend them.

Lakes, and mountains, and the most inaccessible strongholds, where

valiant defenders are wanting, become no better than the level plain;

and money, so far from being a safeguard, is more likely to leave you a

prey to your enemy; since nothing can be falser than the vulgar opinion

which affirms it to be the sinews of war.

This opinion is put forward by Quintus Curtius, where, in speaking of

the war between Antipater the Macedonian and the King of Sparta, he

relates that the latter, from want of money, was constrained to give

battle and was defeated; whereas, could he have put off fighting for a

few days the news of Alexander’s death would have reached Greece, and

he might have had a victory without a battle. But lacking money, and

fearing that on that account his soldiers might desert him, he was

forced to hazard an engagement. It was for this reason that Quintus

Curtius declared money to be the sinews of war, a maxim every day cited

and acted upon by princes less wise than they should be. For building

upon this, they think it enough for their defence to have laid up great

treasures; not reflecting that were great treasures all that is needed

for victory, Darius of old had conquered Alexander, the Greeks the

Romans, and in our own times Charles of Burgundy the Swiss; while the

pope and the Florentines together would have had little difficulty in

defeating Francesco Maria, nephew of Pope Julius II., in the recent war

of Urbino; and yet, in every one of these instances, the victory

remained with him who held the sinews of war to consist, not in money,

but in good soldiers.

Croesus, king of Lydia, after showing Solon the Athenian much besides,

at last displayed to him the boundless riches of his treasure-house,

and asked him what he thought of his power. Whereupon Solon answered

that he thought him no whit more powerful in respect of these

treasures, for as war is made with iron and not with gold, another

coming with more iron might carry off his gold. After the death of

Alexander the Great a tribe of Gauls, passing through Greece on their

way into Asia, sent envoys to the King of Macedonia to treat for terms

of accord; when the king, to dismay them by a display of his resources,

showed them great store of gold and silver. But these barbarians, when

they saw all this wealth, in their greed to possess it, though before

they had looked on peace as settled, broke off negotiations; and thus

the king was ruined by those very treasures he had amassed for his

defence. In like manner, not many years ago, the Venetians, with a full

treasury, lost their whole dominions without deriving the least

advantage from their wealth.

I maintain, therefore, that it is not gold, as is vulgarly supposed,

that is the sinews of war, but good soldiers; or while gold by itself

will not gain you good soldiers, good soldiers may readily get you

gold. Had the Romans chosen to make war with gold rather than with iron

all the treasures of the earth would not have sufficed them having

regard to the greatness of their enterprises and the difficulties they

had to overcome in carrying them out. But making their wars with iron

they never felt any want of gold; for those who stood in fear of them

brought gold into their camp.

And supposing it true that the Spartan king was forced by lack of money

to risk the chances of a battle, it only fared with him in respect of

money as it has often fared with others from other causes; since we see

that where an army is in such straits for want of victual that it must

either fight or perish by famine, it will always fight, as being the

more honourable course and that on which fortune may in some way smile.

So, too, it has often happened that a captain, seeing his enemy about

to be reinforced, has been obliged either to trust to fortune and at

once deliver battle, or else, waiting till the reinforcement is

complete, to fight then, whether he will or no, and at whatever

disadvantage. We find also, as in the case of Hasdrubal when beset, in

the March of Ancona, at once by Claudius Nero and by the other Roman

consul, that a captain, when he must either fight or fly, will always

fight, since it will seem to him that by this course, however

hazardous, he has at least a chance of victory, while by the other his

ruin is certain.

There are many circumstances, therefore, which may force a captain to

give battle contrary to his intention, among which the want of money

may sometimes be one. But this is no ground for pronouncing money to be

the sinews of war, any more than those other things from the want of

which men are reduced to the same necessity. Once more, therefore, I

repeat that not gold but good soldiers constitute the sinews of war.

Money, indeed, is most necessary in a secondary place; but this

necessity good soldiers will always be able to supply, since it is as

impossible that good soldiers should lack money, as that money by

itself should secure good soldiers. And that what I say is true is

shown by countless passages in history. When Pericles persuaded the

Athenians to declare war against the whole Peloponnesus, assuring them

that their dexterity, aided by their wealth, was sure to bring them off

victorious, the Athenians, though for a while they prospered in this

war, in the end were overpowered, the prudent counsels and good

soldiers of Sparta proving more than a match for the dexterity and

wealth of Athens. But, indeed, there can be no better witness to the

truth of my contention than Titus Livius himself. For in that passage

of his history wherein he discusses whether if Alexander the Great had

invaded Italy, he would have succeeded in vanquishing the Romans, three

things are noted by him as essential to success in war; to wit, many

and good soldiers, prudent captains, and favourable fortune; and after

examining whether the Romans or Alexander would have had the advantage

in each of these three particulars, he arrives at his conclusion

without any mention of money.

The Campanians, therefore, when asked by the Sidicinians to arm in

their behalf, must have measured their strength by wealth and not by

soldiers; for after declaring in their favour and suffering two

defeats, to save themselves they were obliged to become tributary to

Rome.

CHAPTER XI.—_That it were unwise to ally yourself a Prince who has

Reputation rather than Strength._

To mark the mistake made by the Sidicinians in trusting to the

protection of the Campanians, and by the Campanians in supposing

themselves able to protect the Sidicinians, Titus Livius could not have

expressed himself in apter words than by saying, that “_the Campanians

rather lent their name to the Sidicinians than furnished any

substantial aid towards their defence._”

Here we have to note that alliances with princes who from dwelling at a

distance have no facility, or who from their own embarrassments, or

from other causes, have no ability to render aid, afford rather

reputation than protection to those who put their trust in them. As was

the case in our own times with the Florentines, when, in the year 1479,

they were attacked by the Pope and the King of Naples. For being

friends of the French king they drew from that friendship more

reputation than help. The same would be the case with that prince who

should engage in any enterprise in reliance on the Emperor Maximilian,

his being one of those friendships which, in the words of our

historian, _nomen magis quam praesidium adferunt_.

On this occasion, therefore, the Campanians were misled by imagining

themselves stronger than they really were. For often, from defect of

judgment, men take upon them to defend others, when they have neither

skill nor ability to defend themselves. Of which we have a further

instance in the Tarentines, who, when the Roman and Samnite armies were

already drawn up against one another for battle, sent messengers to the

Roman consul to acquaint him that they desired peace between the two

nations, and would themselves declare war against whichsoever of the

two first began hostilities. The consul, laughing at their threats, in

the presence of the messengers, ordered the signal for battle to sound,

and bade his army advance to meet the enemy; showing the Tarentines by

acts rather than words what answer he thought their message deserved.

Having spoken in the present Chapter of unwise courses followed by

princes for defending others, I shall speak in the next, of the methods

they follow in defending themselves.

CHAPTER XII.—_Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to

anticipate or to await it._

I have often heard it disputed by men well versed in military affairs,

whether, when there are two princes of nearly equal strength, and the

bolder of the two proclaims war upon the other, it is better for that

other to await attack within his own frontier, or to march into the

enemy’s country and fight him there; and I have heard reasons given in

favour of each of these courses.

They who maintain that an enemy should be attacked in his own country,

cite the advice given by Croesus to Cyrus, when the latter had come to

the frontiers of the Massagetæ to make war on that people. For word

being sent by Tomyris their queen that Cyrus might, at his pleasure,

either enter her dominions, where she would await him, or else allow

her to come and meet him; and the matter being debated, Croesus,

contrary to the opinion of other advisers, counselled Cyrus to go

forward and meet the queen, urging that were he to defeat her at a

distance from her kingdom, he might not be able to take it from her,

since she would have time to repair her strength; whereas, were he to

defeat her within her own dominions, he could follow her up on her

flight, and, without giving her time to recover herself, deprive her of

her State. They cite also the advice given by Hannibal to Antiochus,

when the latter was meditating a war on the Romans. For Hannibal told

him that the Romans could not be vanquished except in Italy, where an

invader might turn to account the arms and resources of their friends,

whereas any one making war upon them out of Italy, and leaving that

country in their hands, would leave them an unfailing source whence to

draw whatever reinforcement they might need; and finally, he told him,

that the Romans might more easily be deprived of Rome than of their

empire, and of Italy more easily than of any of their other provinces.

They likewise instance Agathocles, who, being unequal to support a war

at home, invaded the Carthaginians, by whom he was being attacked, and

reduced them to sue for peace. They also cite Scipio, who to shift the

war from Italy, carried it into Africa.

Those who hold a contrary opinion contend that to have your enemy at a

disadvantage you must get him away from his home, alleging the case of

the Athenians, who while they carried on the war at their convenience

in their own territory, retained their superiority; but when they

quitted that territory, and went with their armies to Sicily, lost

their freedom. They cite also the fable of the poets wherein it is

figured that Antæus, king of Libya, being assailed by the Egyptian

Hercules, could not be overcome while he awaited his adversary within

the bounds of his own kingdom; but so soon as he was withdrawn from

these by the craft of Hercules, lost his kingdom and his life. Whence

the fable runs that Antæus, being son to the goddess Earth, when thrown

to the ground drew fresh strength from the Earth, his mother; and that

Hercules, perceiving this, held him up away from the Earth.

Recent opinions are likewise cited as favouring this view. Every one

knows how Ferrando, king of Naples, was in his day accounted a most

wise prince; and how two years before his death there came a rumour

that Charles VIII of France was meditating an attack upon him; and how,

after making great preparations for his defence, he sickened; and being

on the point of death, among other counsels left his son Alfonso this

advice, that nothing in the world should tempt him to pass out of his

own territory, but to await the enemy within his frontier, and with his

forces unimpaired; a warning disregarded by Alfonso, who sent into

Romagna an army, which he lost, and with it his whole dominions,

without a battle.

Other arguments on both sides of the question in addition to those

already noticed, are as follows: He who attacks shows higher courage

than he who stands on his defence, and this gives his army greater

confidence. Moreover, by attacking your enemy you deprive him of many

opportunities for using his resources, since he can receive no aid from

subjects who have been stripped of their possessions; and when an enemy

is at his gates, a prince must be careful how he levies money and

imposes taxes; so that, as Hannibal said, the springs which enable a

country to support a war come to be dried up. Again, the soldiers of an

invader, finding themselves in a foreign land, are under a stronger

necessity to fight, and necessity, as has often been said, is the

parent of valour.

On the other hand, it may be argued that there are many advantages to

be gained by awaiting the attack of your enemy. For without putting

yourself much about, you may harass him by intercepting his supplies,

whether of victual or of whatsoever else an army stands in need: from

your better knowledge of the country you can impede his movements; and

because men muster more willingly to defend their homes than to go on

distant expeditions, you can meet him with more numerous forces, if

defeated you can more easily repair your strength, because the bulk of

your army, finding shelter at hand, will be able to save itself, and

your reserves will have no distance to come. In this way you can use

your whole strength without risking your entire fortunes; whereas, in

leaving your country, you risk your entire fortunes, without putting

forth your whole strength. Nay, we find that to weaken an adversary

still further, some have suffered him to make a march of several days

into their country, and then to capture certain of their towns, that by

leaving garrisons in these, he might reduce the numbers of his army,

and so be attacked at greater disadvantage.

But now to speak my own mind on the matter, I think we should make this

distinction. Either you have your country strongly defended, as the

Romans had and the Swiss have theirs, or, like the Carthaginians of old

and the King of France and the Italians at the present day, you have it

undefended. In the latter case you must keep the enemy at a distance

from your country, for as your strength lies not in men but in money,

whenever the supply of money is cut off you are undone, and nothing so

soon cuts off this supply as a war of invasion. Of which we have

example in the Carthaginians, who, while their country was free from

invasion, were able by means of their great revenues to carry on war in

Italy against the Romans, but when they were invaded could not defend

themselves even against Agathocles. The Florentines, in like manner,

could make no head against Castruccio, lord of Lucca, when he attacked

them in their own country; and to obtain protection, were compelled to

yield themselves up to King Robert of Naples. And yet, after

Castruccio’s death, these same Florentines were bold enough to attack

the Duke of Milan in his own country, and strong enough to strip him of

his dominions. Such valour did they display in distant wars, such

weakness in those that were near.

But when a country is armed as Rome was and Switzerland now is, the

closer you press it, the harder it is to subdue; because such States

can assemble a stronger force to resist attack than for attacking

others. Nor does the great authority of Hannibal move me in this

instance, since resentment and his own advantage might lead him to

speak as he spoke to Antiochus. For had the Romans suffered in Gaul,

and within the same space of time, those three defeats at the hands of

Hannibal which they suffered in Italy, it must have made an end of

them; since they could not have turned the remnants of their armies to

account as they did in Italy, not having the same opportunity for

repairing their strength; nor could they have met their enemy with such

numerous armies. For we never find them sending forth a force of more

than fifty thousand men for the invasion of any province; whereas, in

defending their own country against the inroad of the Gauls at the end

of the first Carthaginian war, we hear of them bringing some eighteen

hundred thousand men into the field; and their failure to vanquish the

Gauls in Lombardy as they had vanquished those in Tuscany arose from

their inability to lead a great force so far against a numerous enemy,

or to encounter him with the same advantages. In Germany the Cimbrians

routed a Roman army who had there no means to repair their disaster;

but when they came into Italy, the Romans could collect their whole

strength, and destroy them. Out of their native country, whence they

can bring no more than thirty or forty thousand men, the Swiss may

readily be defeated; but in their own country, where they can assemble

a hundred thousand, they are well-nigh invincible.

In conclusion, therefore, I repeat that the prince who has his people

armed and trained for war, should always await a great and dangerous

war at home, and never go forth to meet it. But that he whose subjects

are unarmed, and whose country is not habituated to war, should always

carry the war to as great a distance as he can from home. For in this

way each will defend himself in the best manner his means admit.

CHAPTER XIII.—_That Men rise from humble to high Fortunes rather by

Fraud than by Force._

I hold it as most certain that men seldom if ever rise to great place

from small beginnings without using fraud or force, unless, indeed,

they be given, or take by inheritance the place to which some other has

already come. Force, however, will never suffice by itself to effect

this end, while fraud often will, as any one may plainly see who reads

the lives of Philip of Macedon, Agathocles of Sicily, and many others

like them, who from the lowest or, at any rate, from very low

beginnings, rose either to sovereignty or to the highest command.

This necessity for using deceit is taught by Xenophon in his life of

Cyrus; for the very first expedition on which Cyrus is sent, against

the King of Armenia, is seen to teem with fraud; and it is by fraud,

and not by force, that he is represented as having acquired his

kingdom; so that the only inference to be drawn from his conduct, as

Xenophon describes it, is, that the prince who would accomplish great

things must have learned how to deceive. Xenophon, moreover, represents

his hero as deceiving his maternal grandsire Cyaxares, king of the

Medians, in a variety of ways; giving it to be understood that without

such deceit he could not have reached the greatness to which he came.

Nor do I believe that any man born to humble fortunes can be shown to

have attained great station, by sheer and open force, whereas this has

often been effected by mere fraud, such as that used by Giovanni

Galeazzo to deprive his uncle Bernabo of the State and government of

Lombardy.

The same arts which princes are constrained to use at the outset of

their career, must also be used by commonwealths, until they have grown

powerful enough to dispense with them and trust to strength alone. And

because Rome at all times, whether from chance or choice, followed all

such methods as are necessary to attain greatness, in this also she was

not behindhand. And, to begin with, she could have used no greater

fraud than was involved in her method above noticed, of making for

herself companions; since under this name she made for herself

subjects, for such the Latins and the other surrounding nations, in

fact, became. For availing herself at first of their arms to subdue

neighbouring countries and gain herself reputation as a State, her

power was so much increased by these conquests that there was none whom

she could not overcome. But the Latins never knew that they were

enslaved until they saw the Samnites twice routed and forced to make

terms. This success, while it added greatly to the fame of the Romans

among princes at a distance, who were thereby made familiar with the

Roman name though not with the Roman arms, bred at the same time

jealousy and distrust among those who, like the Latins, both saw and

felt these arms; and such were the effects of this jealousy and

distrust, that not the Latins only but all the Roman colonies in

Latium, along with the Campanians whom a little while before the Romans

had defended leagued themselves together against the authority of Rome.

This war was set on foot by the Latins in the manner in which, as I

have already explained, most wars are begun, not by directly attacking

the Romans, but by defending the Sidicinians against the Samnites who

were making war upon them with the permission of the Romans. And that

it was from their having found out the crafty policy of the Romans that

the Latins were led to take this step, is plain from the words which

Titus Livius puts in the mouth of Annius Setinus the Latin prætor, who,

in addressing the Latin council, is made to say, “_For if even now we

can put up with slavery under the disguise of an equal alliance, etc_”

We see, therefore, that the Romans, from the time they first began to

extend their power, were not unfamiliar with the art of deceiving, an

art always necessary for those who would mount to great heights from

low beginnings; and which is the less to be condemned when, as in the

case of the Romans, it is skilfully concealed.

CHAPTER XIV.—_That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by

Humility._

You shall often find that humility is not merely of no service to you,

but is even hurtful, especially when used in dealing with insolent men,

who, through envy or other like cause, have conceived hatred against

you. Proof whereof is supplied by our historian where he explains the

causes of this war between the Romans and the Latins. For on the

Samnites complaining to the Romans that the Latins had attacked them,

the Romans, desiring not to give the Latins ground of offence, would

not forbid them proceeding with the war. But the endeavour to avoid

giving offence to the Latins only served to increase their confidence,

and led them the sooner to declare their hostility. Of which we have

evidence in the language used by the same Latin Prætor, Annius Setinus,

at the aforesaid council, when he said:—“_You have tried their patience

by refusing them, soldiers. Who doubts but that they are offended?

Still they have put up with the affront. They have heard that we are

assembling an army against their allies the Samnites; and yet they have

not stirred from their city. Whence this astonishing forbearance, but

from their knowing our strength and their own weakness_?” Which words

give us clearly to understand how much the patience of the Romans

increased the arrogance of the Latins.

A prince, therefore, should never stoop from his dignity, nor should he

if he would have credit for any concession make it voluntarily, unless

he be able or believe himself able to withhold it. For almost always

when matters have come to such a pass that you cannot give way with

credit it is better that a thing be taken from you by force than

yielded through fear of force. For if you yield through fear and to

escape war, the chances are that you do not escape it; since he to

whom, out of manifest cowardice you make this concession, will not rest

content, but will endeavour to wring further concessions from you, and

making less account of you, will only be the more kindled against you.

At the same time you will find your friends less zealous on your

behalf, since to them you will appear either weak or cowardly. But if,

so soon as the designs of your enemy are disclosed, you at once prepare

to resist though your strength be inferior to his, he will begin to

think more of you, other neighbouring princes will think more; and many

will be willing to assist you, on seeing you take up arms, who, had you

relinquished hope and abandoned yourself to despair, would never have

stirred a finger to save you.

The above is to be understood as applying where you have a single

adversary only; but should you have several, it will always be a

prudent course, even after war has been declared, to restore to some

one of their number something you have of his, so as to regain his

friendship and detach him from the others who have leagued themselves

against you.

CHAPTER XV.—That weak States are always dubious in their Resolves; and

that tardy Resolves are always hurtful.

Touching this very matter, and with regard to these earliest beginnings

of war between the Latins and the Romans, it may be noted, that in all

our deliberations it behoves us to come quickly to a definite resolve,

and not to remain always in dubiety and suspense. This is plainly seen

in connection with the council convened by the Latins when they thought

to separate themselves from the Romans. For the Romans suspecting the

hostile humour wherewith the Latins were infected, in order to learn

how things really stood, and see whether they could not win back the

malcontents without recourse to arms, gave them to know that they must

send eight of their citizens to Rome, as they had occasion to consult

with them. On receiving which message the Latins, knowing that they had

done many things contrary to the wishes of the Romans, called a council

to determine who of their number should be sent, and to instruct them

what they were to say. But Annius, their prætor, being present in the

council when these matters were being discussed, told them “_that he

thought it of far greater moment for them to consider what they were to

do than what they were to say; for when their resolves were formed, it

would be easy to clothe them in fit words_.” This, in truth, was sound

advice and such as every prince and republic should lay to heart.

Because, where there is doubt and uncertainty as to what we may decide

on doing, we know not how to suit our words to our conduct; whereas,

with our minds made up, and the course we are to follow fixed, it is an

easy matter to find words to declare our resolves. I have noticed this

point the more readily, because I have often found such uncertainty

hinder the public business of our own republic, to its detriment and

discredit. And in all matters of difficulty, wherein courage is needed

for resolving, this uncertainty will always be met with, whenever those

who have to deliberate and decide are weak.