Not less mischievous than doubtful resolves are those which are late

and tardy, especially when they have to be made in behalf of a friend.

For from their lateness they help none, and hurt ourselves. Tardy

resolves are due to want of spirit or want of strength, or to the

perversity of those who have to determine, who being moved by a secret

desire to overthrow the government, or to carry out some selfish

purpose of their own, suffer no decision to be come to, but only thwart

and hinder. Whereas, good citizens, even when they see the popular mind

to be bent on dangerous courses, will never oppose the adoption of a

fixed plan, more particularly in matters which do not brook delay.

After Hieronymus, the Syracusan tyrant, was put to death, there being

at that time a great war between the Romans and the Carthaginians, the

citizens of Syracuse fell to disputing among themselves with which

nation they should take part; and so fierce grew the controversy

between the partisans of the two alliances, that no course could be

agreed on, and they took part with neither; until Apollonides, one of

the foremost of the Syracusan citizens, told them in a speech replete

with wisdom, that neither those who inclined to hold by the Romans, nor

those who chose rather to side with the Carthaginians, were deserving

of blame; but that what was utterly to be condemned was doubt and delay

in taking one side or other; for from such uncertainty he clearly

foresaw the ruin of their republic; whereas, by taking a decided

course, whatever it might be, some good might come. Now Titus Livius

could not show more clearly than he does in this passage, the mischief

which results from resting in suspense. He shows it, likewise, in the

case of the Lavinians, of whom he relates, that being urged by the

Latins to aid them against Rome, they were so long in making up their

minds, that when the army which they at last sent to succour the Latins

was issuing from their gates, word came that the Latins were defeated.

Whereupon Millionius, their prætor, said, “_With the Romans this short

march will cost us dear_.” But had the Lavinians resolved at once

either to grant aid or to refuse it, taking a latter course they would

not have given offence to the Romans, taking the former, and rendering

timely help, they and the Latins together might have had a victory. But

by delay they stood to lose in every way, as the event showed.

This example, had it been remembered by the Florentines, might have

saved them from all that loss and vexation which they underwent at the

hands of the French, at the time King Louis XII. of France came into

Italy against Lodovico, duke of Milan. For when Louis first proposed to

pass through Tuscany he met with no objection from the Florentines,

whose envoys at his court arranged with him that they should stand

neutral, while the king, on his arrival in Italy, was to maintain their

government and take them under his protection; a month’s time being

allowed the republic to ratify these terms. But certain persons, who,

in their folly, favoured the cause of Lodovico, delayed this

ratification until the king was already on the eve of victory; when the

Florentines suddenly becoming eager to ratify, the king would not

accept their ratification, perceiving their consent to be given under

constraint and not of their own good-will. This cost the city of

Florence dear, and went near to lose her freedom, whereof she was

afterwards deprived on another like occasion. And the course taken by

the Florentines was the more to be blamed in that it was of no sort of

service to Duke Lodovico, who, had he been victorious, would have shown

the Florentines many more signs of his displeasure than did the king.

Although the hurt which results to republics from weakness of this sort

has already been discussed in another Chapter, nevertheless, since an

opportunity offered for touching upon it again, I have willingly

availed myself of it, because to me it seems a matter of which

republics like ours should take special heed.

CHAPTER XVI.—_That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the

methods of ancient Warfare._

In all their wars with other nations, the most momentous battle ever

fought by the Romans, was that which they fought with the Latins when

Torquatus and Decius were consuls. For it may well be believed that as

by the loss of that battle the Latins became subject to the Romans, so

the Romans had they not prevailed must have become subject to the

Latins. And Titus Livius is of this opinion, since he represents the

armies as exactly equal in every respect, in discipline and in valour,

in numbers and in obstinacy, the only difference he draws being, that

of the two armies the Romans had the more capable commanders. We find,

however, two circumstances occurring in the conduct of this battle, the

like of which never happened before, and seldom since, namely, that to

give steadiness to the minds of their soldiers, and render them

obedient to the word of command and resolute to fight, one of the

consuls put himself, and the other his son, to death.

The equality which Titus Livius declares to have prevailed in these two

armies, arose from this, that having long served together they used the

same language, discipline, and arms; that in disposing their men for

battle they followed the same system; and that the divisions and

officers of their armies bore the same names. It was necessary,

therefore, that as they were of equal strength and valour, something

extraordinary should take place to render the courage of the one army

more stubborn and unflinching than that of the other, it being on this

stubbornness, as I have already said, that victory depends. For while

this temper is maintained in the minds of the combatants they will

never turn their backs on their foe. And that it might endure longer in

the minds of the Romans than of the Latins, partly chance, and partly

the valour of the consuls caused it to fall out that Torquatus slew his

son, and Decius died by his own hand.

In pointing out this equality of strength, Titus Livius takes occasion

to explain the whole system followed by the Romans in the ordering of

their armies and in disposing them for battle; and as he has treated

the subject at length, I need not go over the same ground, and shall

touch only on what I judge in it most to deserve attention, but, being

overlooked by all the captains of our times, has led to disorder in

many armies and in many battles.

From this passage of Titus Livius, then, we learn that the Roman army

had three principal divisions, or battalions as we might now call them,

of which they named the first _hastati_, the second _principes_, and

the third _triarii_, to each of which cavalry were attached. In

arraying an army for battle they set the _hastati_ in front. Directly

behind them, in the second rank, they placed the _principes_; and in

the third rank of the same column, the _triarii_. The cavalry of each

of these three divisions they disposed to the right and left of the

division to which it belonged; and to these companies of horse, from

their form and position, they gave the name wings (_alæ_), from their

appearing like the two wings of the main body of the army. The first

division, the _hastati_, which was in front, they drew up in close

order to enable it to withstand and repulse the enemy. The second

division, the _principes_, since it was not to be engaged from the

beginning, but was meant to succour the first in case that were driven

in, was not formed in close order but kept in open file, so that it

might receive the other into its ranks whenever it was broken and

forced to retire. The third division, that, namely, of the _triarii_,

had its ranks still more open than those of the second, so that, if

occasion required, it might receive the first two divisions of the

_hastati_ and _principes_. These divisions, therefore, being drawn up

in this order, the engagement began, and if the _hastati_ were

overpowered and driven back, they retired within the loose ranks of the

_principes_, when both these divisions, being thus united into one,

renewed the conflict. If these, again, were routed and forced back,

they retreated within the open ranks of the _triarii_, and all three

divisions, forming into one, once more renewed the fight, in which, if

they were overpowered, since they had no further means of recruiting

their strength, they lost the battle. And because whenever this last

division, of the _triarii_, had to be employed, the army was in

jeopardy, there arose the proverb, “_Res redacta est ad triarios_,”

equivalent to our expression of _playing a last stake_.

The captains of our day, as they have abandoned all the other customs

of antiquity, and pay no heed to any part of the ancient discipline, so

also have discarded this method of disposing their men, though it was

one of no small utility. For to insure the defeat of a commander who so

arranges his forces as to be able thrice during an engagement to renew

his strength, Fortune must thrice declare against him, and he must be

matched with an adversary able three times over to defeat him; whereas

he whose sole chance of success lies in his surviving the first onset,

as is the case with all the armies of Christendom at the present day,

may easily be vanquished, since any slight mishap, and the least

failure in the steadiness of his men, may deprive him of victory.

And what takes from our armies the capacity to renew their strength is,

that provision is now no longer made for one division being received

into the ranks of another, which happens because at present an army is

arranged for battle in one or other of two imperfect methods. For

either its divisions are placed side by side, so as to form a line of

great width but of no depth or solidity; or if, to strengthen it, it be

drawn up in columns after the fashion of the Roman armies, should the

front line be broken, no provision having been made for its being

received by the second, it is thrown into complete disorder, and both

divisions fall to pieces. For if the front line be driven back, it

jostles the second, if the second line endeavour to advance, the first

stands in its way: and thus, the first driving against the second, and

the second against the third, such confusion follows that often the

most trifling accident will cause the ruin of an entire army.

At the battle of Ravenna, where M. de Foix, the French commander, was

slain, although according to modern notions this was a well-fought

field, both the French and the Spanish armies were drawn up in the

first of the faulty methods above described; that is to say, each army

advanced with the whole of its battalions side by side, so that each

presented a single front much wider than deep; this being always the

plan followed by modern armies when, as at Ravenna, the ground is open.

For knowing the disorder they fall into on retreat, forming themselves

in a single line, they endeavour, as I have said, as much as possible

to escape confusion by extending their front. But where the ground

confines them they fall at once into the disorder spoken of, without an

effort to prevent it.

Troops traversing an enemy’s country, whether to pillage or carry out

any other operation of war, are liable to fall into the same disorder;

and at S. Regolo in the Pisan territory, and at other places where the

Florentines were beaten by the Pisans during the war which followed on

the revolt of Pisa after the coming of Charles of France into Italy,

our defeat was due to no other cause than the behaviour of our own

cavalry, who being posted in front, and being repulsed by the enemy,

fell back on the infantry and threw them into confusion, whereupon the

whole army took to flight; and Messer Ciriaco del Borgo, the veteran

leader of the Florentine foot, has often declared in my presence that

he had never been routed by any cavalry save those who were fighting on

his side. For which reason the Swiss, who are the greatest proficients

in modern warfare, when serving with the French, make it their first

care to place themselves on their flank, so that the cavalry of their

friends, if repulsed, may not throw them into disorder.

But although these matters seem easy to understand and not difficult to

put in practice, none has yet been found among the commanders of our

times, who attempted to imitate the ancients or to correct the moderns.

For although these also have a tripartite division of their armies into

van-guard, main-body, and rear-guard, the only use they make of it is

in giving orders when their men are in quarters; whereas on active

service it rarely happens that all divisions are not equally exposed to

the same onset.

And because many, to excuse their ignorance, will have it that the

destructive fire of artillery forbids our employing at the present day

many of the tactics used by the ancients, I will discuss this question

in the following Chapter, and examine whether artillery does in fact

prevent us from using the valiant methods of antiquity.

CHAPTER XVII.—_What importance the Armies of the present day should

allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion

concerning it be just._

Looking to the number of pitched battles, or what are termed by the

French _journées_, and by the Italians _fatti d’arme_, fought by the

Romans at divers times, I am led further to examine the generally

received opinion, that had artillery been in use in their day, the

Romans would not have been allowed, or at least not with the same ease,

to subjugate provinces and make other nations their tributaries, and

could never have spread their power in the astonishing way they did.

For it is said that by reason of these fire-arms men can no longer use

or display their personal valour as they could of old; that there is

greater difficulty now than there was in former times in joining

battle; that the tactics followed then cannot be followed now; and that

in time all warfare must resolve itself into a question of artillery.

Judging it not out of place to inquire whether these opinions are

sound, and how far artillery has added to or taken from the strength of

armies, and whether its use lessens or increases the opportunities for

a good captain to behave valiantly, I shall at once address myself to

the first of the averments noticed above, namely, that the armies of

the ancient Romans could not have made the conquests they did, had

artillery then been in use.

To this I answer by saying that, since war is made for purposes either

of offence or defence, we have first to see in which of these two kinds

of warfare artillery gives the greater advantage or inflicts the

greater hurt. Now, though something might be said both ways, I

nevertheless believe that artillery is beyond comparison more hurtful

to him who stands on the defensive than to him who attacks. For he who

defends himself must either do so in a town or in a fortified camp. If

within a town, either the town will be a small one, as fortified towns

commonly are, or it will be a great one. In the former case, he who is

on the defensive is at once undone. For such is the shock of artillery

that there is no wall so strong that in a few days it will not batter

down, when, unless those within have ample room to withdraw behind

covering works and trenches, they must be beaten; it being impossible

for them to resist the assault of an enemy who forces an entrance

through the breaches in their walls. Nor will any artillery a defender

may have be of any service to him; since it is an established axiom

that where men are able to advance in numbers and rapidly, artillery is

powerless to check them.

For this reason, in storming towns the furious assaults of the northern

nations prove irresistible, whereas the attacks of our Italian troops,

who do not rush on in force, but advance to the assault in small knots

of skirmishers (_scaramouches_, as they are fitly named), may easily be

withstood. Those who advance in such loose order, and with so little

spirit, against a breach covered by artillery, advance to certain

destruction, and as against them artillery is useful. But when the

assailants swarm to the breach so massed together that one pushes on

another, unless they be brought to a stand by ditches and earthworks,

they penetrate everywhere, and no artillery has any effect to keep them

back; and though some must fall, yet not so many as to prevent a

victory.

The frequent success of the northern nations in storming towns, and

more particularly the recovery of Brescia by the French, is proof

sufficient of the truth of what I say. For the town of Brescia rising

against the French while the citadel still held out, the Venetians, to

meet any attack which might be made from the citadel upon the town,

ranged guns along the whole line of road which led from the one to the

other, planting them in front, and in flank, and wherever else they

could be brought to bear. Of all which M. de Foix making no account,

dismounted with his men-at-arms from horseback, and, advancing with

them on foot through the midst of the batteries, took the town; nor do

we learn that he sustained any considerable loss from the enemy’s fire.

So that, as I have said, he who has to defend himself in a small town,

when his walls are battered down and he has no room to retire behind

other works, and has only his artillery to trust to, is at once undone.

But even where the town you defend is a great one, so that you have

room to fall back behind new works, artillery is still, by a long way,

more useful for the assailant than for the defender. For to enable your

artillery to do any hurt to those without, you must raise yourself with

it above the level of the ground, since, if you remain on the level,

the enemy, by erecting any low mound or earth-work, can so secure

himself that it will be impossible for you to touch him. But in raising

yourself above the level of the ground, whether by extending yourself

along the gallery of the walls, or otherwise, you are exposed to two

disadvantages; for, first, you cannot there bring into position guns of

the same size or range as he who is without can bring to bear against

you, since it is impossible to work large guns in a confined space;

and, secondly, although you should succeed in getting your guns into

position, you cannot construct such strong and solid works for their

protection as those can who are outside, and on level ground, and who

have all the room and every other advantage which they could desire. It

is consequently impossible for him who defends a town to maintain his

guns in position at any considerable height, when those who are outside

have much and powerful artillery; while, if he place it lower, it

becomes, as has been explained, to a great extent useless. So that in

the end the defence of the city has to be effected, as in ancient

times, by hand to hand fighting, or else by means of the smaller kinds

of fire-arms, from which if the defender derive some slight advantage,

it is balanced by the injury he sustains from the great artillery of

his enemy, whereby the walls of the city are battered down and almost

buried in their ditches; so that when it comes once more to an

encounter at close quarters, by reason of his walls being demolished

and his ditches filled up, the defender is now at a far greater

disadvantage than he was formerly. Wherefore I repeat that these arms

are infinitely more useful for him who attacks a town than for him who

defends it.

As to the remaining method, which consists in your taking up your

position in an entrenched camp, where you need not fight unless you

please, and unless you have the advantage, I say that this method

commonly affords you no greater facility for avoiding an engagement

than the ancients had; nay, that sometimes, owing to the use of

artillery, you are worse off than they were. For if the enemy fall

suddenly upon you, and have some slight advantage (as may readily be

the case from his being on higher ground, or from your works on his

arrival being still incomplete so that you are not wholly sheltered by

them), forthwith, and without your being able to prevent him, he

dislodges you, and you are forced to quit your defences and deliver

battle: as happened to the Spaniards at the battle of Ravenna. For

having posted themselves between the river Ronco and an earthwork, from

their not having carried this work high enough, and from the French

having a slight advantage of ground, they were forced by the fire of

the latter to quit their entrenchments come to an engagement.

But assuming the ground you have chosen for your camp to be, as it

always should, higher than that occupied by the enemy, and your works

to be complete and sufficient, so that from your position and

preparations the enemy dare not attack you, recourse will then be had

to the very same methods as were resorted to in ancient times when an

army was so posted that it could not be assailed; that is to say, your

country will be wasted, cities friendly to you besieged or stormed, and

your supplies intercepted; until you are forced, at last, of necessity

to quit your camp and to fight a pitched battle, in which, as will

presently appear, artillery will be of little service to you.

If we consider, therefore, for what ends the Romans made wars, and that

attack and not defence was the object of almost all their campaigns, it

will be clear, if what I have said be true, that they would have had

still greater advantage, and might have achieved their conquests with

even greater ease, had artillery been in use in their times.

And as to the second complaint, that by reason of artillery men can no

longer display their valour as they could in ancient days, I admit it

to be true that when they have to expose themselves a few at a time,

men run more risks now than formerly; as when they have to scale a town

or perform some similar exploit, in which they are not massed together

but must advance singly and one behind another. It is true, also, that

Captains and commanders of armies are subjected to a greater risk of

being killed now than of old, since they an be reached everywhere by

the enemy’s fire; and it is no protection to them to be with those of

their men who are furthest from the enemy, or to be surrounded by the

bravest of their guards. Still, we do not often find either of these

two dangers occasioning extraordinary loss. For towns strongly

fortified are not attacked by escalade, nor will the assailing army

advance against them in weak numbers; but will endeavour, as in ancient

times, to reduce them by regular siege. And even in the case of towns

attacked by storm, the dangers are not so very much greater now than

they were formerly; for in those old days also, the defenders of towns

were not without warlike engines, which if less terrible in their

operation, had, so far as killing goes, much the same effect. And as

for the deaths of captains and leaders of companies, it may be said

that during the last twenty-four years of war in Italy, we have had

fewer instances of such deaths than might be found in a period of ten

years of ancient warfare. For excepting the Count Lodovico della

Mirandola, who fell at Ferrara, when the Venetians a few years ago

attacked that city, and the Duke de Nemours, slain at Cirignuola, we

have no instance of any commander being killed by artillery. For, at

Ravenna, M. de Foix died by steel and not by shot. Wherefore I say that

if men no longer perform deeds of individual prowess, it results not so

much from the use of artillery, as from the faulty discipline and

weakness of our armies, which being collectively without valour cannot

display it in particular instances.

As to the third assertion, that armies can no longer be brought to

engage one another, and that war will soon come to be carried on wholly

with artillery, I maintain that this allegation is utterly untrue, and

will always be so held by those who are willing in handling their

troops to follow the usages of ancient valour. For whosoever would have

a good army must train it, either by real or by mimic warfare, to

approach the enemy, to come within sword-thrust, and to grapple with

him; and must rely more on foot soldiers than on horse, for reasons

presently to be explained. But when you trust to your foot-soldiers,

and to the methods already indicated, artillery becomes powerless to

harm you. For foot-soldiers, in approaching an enemy, can with more

ease escape the fire of his artillery than in ancient times they could

have avoided a charge of elephants or of scythed chariots, or any other

of those strange contrivances which had to be encountered by the

Romans, and against which they always devised some remedy. And,

certainly, as against artillery, their remedy would have been easier,

by as much as the time during which artillery can do hurt is shorter

than the time during which elephants and chariots could. For by these

you were thrown into disorder after battle joined, whereas artillery

harasses you only before you engage; a danger which infantry can easily

escape, either by advancing so as to be covered by the inequalities of

the ground, or by lying down while the firing continues; nay, we find

from experience that even these precautions may be dispensed with,

especially as against great artillery, which can hardly be levelled

with such precision that its fire shall not either pass over your head

from the range being too high, or fall short from its being too low.

So soon, however, as the engagement is begun, it is perfectly clear

that neither small nor great artillery can harm you any longer; since,

if the enemy have his artillerymen in front, you take them; if in rear,

they will injure him before they injure you; and if in flank, they can

never fire so effectively as to prevent your closing, with the result

already explained. Nor does this admit of much dispute, since we have

proof of it in the case of the Swiss at Novara, in the year 1513, when,

with neither guns nor cavalry, they advanced against the French army,

who had fortified themselves with artillery behind entrenchments, and

routed them without suffering the slightest check from their fire. In

further explanation whereof it is to be noted, that to work artillery

effectively it should be protected by walls, by ditches, or by

earth-works; and that whenever, from being left without such protection

it has to be defended by men, as happens in pitched battles and

engagements in the open field, it is either taken or otherwise becomes

useless. Nor can it be employed on the flank of an army, save in the

manner in which the ancients made use of their warlike engines, which

they moved out from their columns that they might be worked without

inconvenience, but withdrew within them when driven back by cavalry or

other troops. He who looks for any further advantage from artillery

does not rightly understand its nature, and trusts to what is most

likely to deceive him. For although the Turk, using artillery, has

gained victories over the Soldan and the Sofi, the only advantage he

has had from it has been the terror into which the horses of the enemy,

unused to such sounds, are thrown by the roar of the guns.

And now, to bring these remarks to a conclusion, I say briefly that,

employed by an army wherein there is some strain of the ancient valour,

artillery is useful; but employed otherwise, against a brave adversary,

is utterly useless.

CHAPTER XVIII.—_That the authority of the Romans and the example of

ancient Warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than

Horse._

By many arguments and instances it can be clearly established that in

their military enterprises the Romans set far more store on their

infantry than on their cavalry, and trusted to the former to carry out

all the chief objects which their armies were meant to effect. Among

many other examples of this, we may notice the great battle which they

fought with the Latins near the lake Regillus, where to steady their

wavering ranks they made their horsemen dismount, and renewing the

combat on foot obtained a victory. Here we see plainly that the Romans

had more confidence in themselves when they fought on foot than when

they fought on horseback. The same expedient was resorted to by them in

many of their other battles, and always in their sorest need they found

it their surest stay.

Nor are we to condemn the practice in deference to the opinion of

Hannibal, who, at the battle of Cannæ, on seeing the consuls make the

horsemen dismount, said scoffingly, “_Better still had they delivered

their knights to me in chains._” For though this saying came from the

mouth of a most excellent soldier, still, if we are to regard

authority, we ought rather to follow the authority of a commonwealth

like Rome, and of the many great captains who served her, than that of

Hannibal alone. But, apart from authority, there are manifest reasons

to bear out what I say. For a man may go on foot into many places where

a horse cannot go; men can be taught to keep rank, and if thrown into

disorder to recover form; whereas, it is difficult to keep horses in

line, and impossible if once they be thrown into disorder to reform

them. Moreover we find that with horses as with men, some have little

courage and some much; and that often a spirited horse is ridden by a

faint-hearted rider, or a dull horse by a courageous rider, and that in

whatever way such disparity is caused, confusion and disorder result.

Again, infantry, when drawn up in column, can easily break and is not

easily broken by cavalry. This is vouched, not only by many ancient and

many modern instances, but also by the authority of those who lay down

rules for the government of States, who show that at first wars were

carried on by mounted soldiers, because the methods for arraying

infantry were not yet understood, but that so soon as these were

discovered, the superiority of foot over horse was at once recognized.

In saying this, I would not have it supposed that horsemen are not of

the greatest use in armies, whether for purposes of observation, for

harrying and laying waste the enemy’s country, for pursuing a

retreating foe or helping to repulse his cavalry. But the substance and

sinew of an army, and that part of it which ought constantly to be most

considered, should always be the infantry. And among sins of the

Italian princes who have made their country the slave of foreigners,

there is none worse than that they have held these arms in contempt,

and turned their whole attention to mounted troops.

This error is due to the craft of our captains and to the ignorance of

our rulers. For the control of the armies of Italy for the last five

and twenty years resting in the hands of men, who, as having no lands

of their own, may be looked on as mere soldiers of fortune, these fell

forthwith on contriving how they might maintain their credit by being

supplied with the arms which the princes of the country were without.

And as they had no subjects of their own of whom they could make use,

and could not obtain constant employment and pay for a large number of

foot-soldiers, and as a small number would have given them no

importance, they had recourse to horsemen. For a _condottiere_ drawing

pay for two or three hundred horsemen was maintained by them in the

highest credit, and yet the cost was not too great to be met by the

princes who employed him. And to effect their object with more ease,

and increase their credit still further, these adventurers would allow

no merit or favour to be due to foot-soldiers, but claimed all for

their horsemen. And to such a length was this bad system carried, that

in the very greatest army only the smallest sprinkling of infantry was

to be found. This, together with many other ill practices which

accompanied it, has so weakened the militia of Italy, that the country

has easily been trampled upon by all the nations of the North.

That it is a mistake to make more account of cavalry than of infantry,

may be still more clearly seen from another example taken from Roman

history. The Romans being engaged on the siege of Sora, a troop of

horse a sally from the town to attack their camp; when the Roman master

of the knights advancing with his own horsemen to give them battle, it

so chanced that, at the very first onset, the leaders on both sides

were slain. Both parties being thus left without commanders, and the

combat, nevertheless, continuing, the Romans thinking thereby to have

the advantage of their adversaries, alighted from horseback, obliging

the enemy’s cavalry, in order to defend themselves, to do the like. The

result was that the Romans had the victory. Now there could be no

stronger instance than this to show the superiority of foot over horse.

For while in other battles the Roman cavalry were made by their consuls

to dismount in order to succour their infantry who were in distress and

in need of such aid, on this occasion they dismounted, not to succour

their infantry, nor to encounter an enemy contending on foot, but

because they saw that though they could not prevail against the enemy

fighting as horsemen against horsemen, on foot they readily might. And

from this I conclude that foot-soldiers, if rightly handled, can hardly

be beaten except by other soldiers fighting on foot.

With very few cavalry, but with a considerable force of infantry, the

Roman commanders, Crassus and Marcus Antonius, each for many days

together overran the territories of the Parthians, although opposed by

the countless horsemen of that nation. Crassus, indeed, with the

greater part of his army, was left there dead, and Antonius only saved

himself by his valour; but even in the extremities to which the Romans

were then brought, see how greatly superior foot-soldiers are to horse.

For though fighting in an open country, far from the sea-coast, and cut

off from his supplies, Antonius proved himself a valiant soldier in the

judgment even of the Parthians themselves, the whole strength of whose

cavalry never ventured to attack the columns of his army. And though

Crassus perished there, any one who reads attentively the account of

his expedition must see that he was rather outwitted than defeated, and

that even when his condition was desperate, the Parthians durst not

close with him, but effected his destruction by hanging continually on

the flanks of his army, and intercepting his supplies, while cajoling

him with promises which they never kept.

It might, I grant, be harder to demonstrate this great superiority of

foot over horse, had we not very many modern examples affording the

clearest proof of it. For instance, at the battle of Novara, of which

we have already spoken, nine thousand Swiss foot were seen to attack

ten thousand cavalry together with an equal number of infantry, and to

defeat them; the cavalry being powerless to injure them, while of the

infantry, who were mostly Gascons, and badly disciplined, they made no

account. On another occasion we have seen twenty-six thousand Swiss

march on Milan to attack Francis I. of France, who had with him twenty

thousand men-at-arms, forty thousand foot, and a hundred pieces of

artillery; and although they were not victorious as at Novara, they

nevertheless fought valiantly for two days together, and, in the end,

though beaten, were able to bring off half their number. With

foot-soldiers only Marcus Attilius Regulus ventured to oppose himself,

not to cavalry merely, but to elephants; and if the attempt failed it

does not follow that he was not justified by the valour of his men in

believing them equal to surmount this danger.

I repeat, therefore, that to prevail against well-disciplined infantry,

you must meet them with infantry disciplined still better, and that

otherwise you advance to certain destruction. In the time of Filippo

Visconti, Duke of Milan, some sixteen thousand Swiss made a descent on

Lombardy, whereupon the Duke, who at that time had Il Carmagnola as his

captain, sent him with six thousand men-at-arms and a slender following

of foot-soldiers to meet them. Not knowing their manner of fighting,

Carmagnola fell upon them with his horsemen, expecting to put them at

once to rout; but finding them immovable, after losing many of his men

he withdrew. But, being a most wise captain, and skilful in devising

new remedies to meet unwonted dangers, after reinforcing his company he

again advanced to the attack; and when about to engage made all his

men-at-arms dismount, and placing them in front of his foot-soldiers,

fell once more upon the Swiss, who could then no longer withstand him.

For his men, being on foot and well armed, easily penetrated the Swiss

ranks without hurt to themselves; and getting among them, had no

difficulty in cutting them down, so that of the entire army of the

Swiss those only escaped who were spared by his humanity.

Of this difference in the efficiency of these two kinds of troops, many

I believe are aware; but such is the unhappiness and perversity of the

times in which we live, that neither ancient nor modern examples, nor

even the consciousness of error, can move our present princes to amend

their ways, or convince them that to restore credit to the arms of a

State or province, it is necessary to revive this branch of their

militia also, to keep it near them, to make much of it, and to give it

life, that in return, it may give back life and reputation to them. But

as they have departed from all those other methods already spoken of,

so have they departed from this, and with this result, that to them the

acquisition of territory is rather a loss than a gain, as presently

shall be shown.

CHAPTER XIX.—_That Acquisitions made by ill-governed States and such as

follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, tend rather to their Ruin

than to their Aggrandizement_.

To these false opinions, founded on the pernicious example first set by

the present corrupt age, we owe it, that no man thinks of departing

from the methods which are in use. It had been impossible, for

instance, some thirty years ago, to persuade an Italian that ten

thousand foot-soldiers could, on plain ground, attack ten thousand

cavalry together with an equal number of infantry; and not merely

attack, but defeat them; as we saw done by the Swiss at that battle of

Novara, to which I have already referred so often. For although history

abounds in similar examples, none would have believed them, or,

believing them, would have said that nowadays men are so much better

armed, that a squadron of cavalry could shatter a rock, to say nothing

of a column of infantry. With such false pleas would they have belied

their judgment, taking no account that with a very scanty force of

foot-soldiers, Lucullus routed a hundred and fifty thousand of the

cavalry of Tigranes, among whom were a body of horsemen very nearly

resembling our own men-at-arms. Now, however, this error is

demonstrated by the example of the northern nations.

And since what history teaches as to the superiority of foot-soldiers

is thus proved to be true, men ought likewise to believe that the other

methods practised by the ancients are in like manner salutary and

useful. And were this once accepted, both princes and commonwealths

would make fewer blunders than they do, would be stronger to resist

sudden attack, and would no longer place their sole hope of safety in

flight; while those who take in hand to provide a State with new

institutions would know better what direction to give them, whether in

the way of extending or merely of preserving; and would see that to

augment the numbers of their citizens, to assume other States as

companions rather than reduce them to subjection, to send out colonies

for the defence of acquired territories, to hold their spoils at the

credit of the common stock, to overcome enemies by inroads and pitched

battles rather than by sieges, to enrich the public purse, keep down

private wealth, and zealously, to maintain all military exercises, are

the true ways to aggrandize a State and to extend its empire. Or if

these methods for adding to their power are not to their mind, let them

remember that acquisitions made in any other way are the ruin of

republics, and so set bounds to their ambition, wisely regulating the

internal government of their country by suitable laws and ordinances,

forbidding extension, and looking only to defence, and taking heed that

their defences are in good order, as do those republics of Germany

which live and for long have lived, in freedom.

And yet, as I have said on another occasion, when speaking of the

difference between the methods suitable for acquiring and those

suitable for maintaining, it is impossible for a republic to remain

long in the peaceful enjoyment of freedom within a restricted frontier.

For should it forbear from molesting others, others are not likely to

refrain from molesting it; whence must grow at once the desire and the

necessity to make acquisitions; or should no enemies be found abroad,

they will be found at home, for this seems to be incidental to all

great States. And if the free States of Germany are, and have long been

able to maintain themselves on their present footing, this arises from

certain conditions peculiar to that country, and to be found nowhere

else, without which these communities could not go on living as they

do.

The district of Germany of which I speak was formerly subject to the

Roman Empire, in the same way as France and Spain; but on the decline

of the Empire, and when its very name came to be limited to this one

province, its more powerful cities taking advantage of the weakness and

necessities of the Emperors, began to free themselves by buying from

them their liberty, subject to the payment of a trifling yearly

tribute; until, gradually, all the cities which held directly from the

Emperor, and were not subject to any intermediate lord, had, in like

manner, purchased their freedom. While this went on, it so happened

that certain communities subject to the Duke of Austria, among which

were Friburg, the people of Schweitz, and the like, rose in rebellion

against him, and meeting at the outset with good success, by degrees

acquired such accession of strength that so far from returning under

the Austrian yoke, they are become formidable to all their neighbours

These are the States which we now name Swiss.

Germany is, consequently, divided between the Swiss, the communities

which take the name of Free Towns, the Princes, and the Emperor; and

the reason why, amid so many conflicting interests, wars do not break

out, or breaking out are of short continuance, is the reverence in

which all hold this symbol of the Imperial authority. For although the

Emperor be without strength of his own, he has nevertheless such credit

with all these others that he alone can keep them united, and,

interposing as mediator, can speedily repress by his influence any

dissensions among them.

The greatest and most protracted wars which have taken place in this

country have been those between the Swiss and the Duke of Austria; and

although for many years past the Empire and the dukedom of Austria have

been united in the same man, he has always failed to subdue the

stubbornness of the Swiss, who are never to be brought to terms save by

force. Nor has the rest of Germany lent the Emperor much assistance in

his wars with the Swiss, the Free Towns being little disposed to attack

others whose desire is to live as they themselves do, in freedom; while

the Princes of the Empire either are so poor that they cannot, or from

jealousy of the power of the Emperor will not, take part with him

against them.

These communities, therefore, abide contented within their narrow

confines, because, having regard to the Imperial authority, they have

no occasion to desire greater; and are at the same time obliged to live

in unity within their walls, because an enemy is always at hand, and

ready to take advantage of their divisions to effect an entrance. But

were the circumstances of the country other than they are these

communities would be forced to make attempts to extend their dominions,

and be constrained to relinquish their present peaceful mode of life.

And since the same conditions are not found elsewhere, other nations

cannot adopt this way of living, but are compelled to extend their

power either by means of leagues, or else by the methods used by the

Romans; and any one who should act otherwise would find not safety but

rather death and destruction. For since in a thousand ways, and from

causes innumerable, conquests are surrounded with dangers, it may well

happen that in adding to our dominions, we add nothing to our strength;

but whosoever increases not his strength while he adds to his

dominions, must needs be ruined. He who is impoverished by his wars,

even should he come off victorious, can add nothing to his strength,

since he spends more than he gains, as the Venetians and Florentines

have done. For Venice has been far feebler since she acquired Lombardy,

and Florence since she acquired Tuscany, than when the one was content

to be mistress of the seas, and the other of the lands lying within six

miles from her walls. And this from their eagerness to acquire without

knowing what way to take. For which ignorance these States are the more

to be blamed in proportion as there is less to excuse them; since they

had seen what methods were used by the Romans, and could have followed

in their footsteps; whereas the Romans, without any example set them,

were able by their own prudence to shape a course for themselves.

But even to well-governed States, their conquests may chance to

occasion much harm; as when some city or province is acquired abounding

in luxury and delights, by whose manners the conqueror becomes

infected; as happened first to the Romans, and afterwards to Hannibal

on taking possession of Capua. And had Capua been at such a distance

from Rome that a ready remedy could not have been applied to the

disorders of the soldiery, or had Rome herself been in any degree

tainted with corruption, this acquisition had certainly proved her

ruin. To which Titus Livius bears witness when he says, “_Most

mischievous at this time to our military discipline was Capua; for

ministering to all delights, she turned away the corrupted minds of our

soldiers from the remembrance of their country_.” And, truly, cities

and provinces like this, avenge themselves on their conquerors without

blood or blow; since by infecting them with their own evil customs they

prepare them for defeat at the hands of any assailant. Nor could the

subject have been better handled than by Juvenal, where he says in his

Satires, that into the hearts of the Romans, through their conquests in

foreign lands, foreign manners found their way; and in place of

frugality and other admirable virtues—

“Came luxury more mortal than the sword,

And settling down, avenged a vanquished world.”[8]

[8] Sævior armis

Luxuria occubuit victumque ulciscitur orbem.

_Juv. Sat_. vi. 292.

And if their conquests were like to be fatal to the Romans at a time

when they were still animated by great virtue and prudence, how must it

fare with those who follow methods altogether different from theirs,

and who, to crown their other errors of which we have already said

enough, resort to auxiliary and mercenary arms, bringing upon

themselves those dangers whereof mention shall be made in the Chapter

following.

CHAPTER XX.—_Of the Dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort

to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms_.

Had I not already, in another treatise, enlarged on the inutility of

mercenary and auxiliary, and on the usefulness of national arms, I

should dwell on these matters in the present Discourse more at length

than it is my design to do. For having given the subject very full

consideration elsewhere, here I would be brief. Still when I find Titus

Livius supplying a complete example of what we have to look for from

auxiliaries, by whom I mean troops sent to our assistance by some other

prince or ruler, paid by him and under officers by him appointed, it is

not fit that I should pass it by in silence.

It is related, then, by our historian, that the Romans, after defeating

on two different occasions armies of the Samnites with forces sent by

them to succour the Capuans, whom they thus relieved from the war which

the Samnites Were waging against them, being desirious to return to

Rome, left behind two legions to defend the Capuans, that the latter

might not, from being altogether deprived of their protection, once

more become a prey to the Samnites. But these two legions, rotting in

idleness began to take such delight therein, that forgetful of their

country and the reverence due to the senate, they resolved to seize by

violence the city they had been left to guard by their valour. For to

them it seemed that the citizens of Capua were unworthy to enjoy

advantages which they knew not how to defend. The Romans, however,

getting timely notice of this design, at once met and defeated it, in

the manner to be more fully noticed when I come to treat of

conspiracies.

Once more then, I repeat, that of all the various kinds of troops,

auxiliaries are the most pernicious, because the prince or republic

resorting to them for aid has no authority over them, the only person

who possesses such authority being he who sends them. For, as I have

said, auxiliary troops are those sent to your assistance by some other

potentate, under his own flag, under his own officers, and in his own

pay, as were the legions sent by the Romans to Capua. Such troops, if

victorious, will for the most part plunder him by whom, as well as him

against whom, they are hired to fight; and this they do, sometimes at

the instigation of the potentate who sends them, sometimes for

ambitious ends of their own. It was not the purpose of the Romans to

violate the league and treaty which they had made with Capua; but to

their soldiers it seemed so easy a matter to master the Capuans, that

they were readily led into this plot for depriving them of their town

and territories. Many other examples might be given to the same effect,

but it is enough to mention besides this instance, that of the people

of Regium, who were deprived of their city and of their lives by

another Roman legion sent for their protection.

Princes and republics, therefore, should resort to any other expedient

for the defence of their States sooner than call in hired auxiliaries,

when they have to rest their entire hopes of safety on them; since any

accord or terms, however hard, which you may make with your enemy, will

be carefully studied and current events well considered, it will be

seen that for one who has succeeded with such assistance, hundreds have

been betrayed. Nor, in truth, can any better opportunity for usurping a

city or province present itself to an ambitious prince or commonwealth,

than to be asked to send an army for its defence. On the other hand, he

who is so greedy of conquest as to summon such help, not for purposes

of defence but in order to attack others, seeks to have what he can

never hold and is most likely to be taken from him by the very person

who helps him to gain it. Yet such is the perversity of men that, to

gratify the desire of the moment, they shut their eyes to those ills

which must speedily ensue and are no more moved by example in this

matter than in all those others of which I have spoken; for were they

moved by these examples they would see that the more disposed they are

to deal generously with their neighbours, and the more averse they are

to usurp authority over them, the readier will these be to throw

themselves into their arms; as will at once appear from the case of the

Capuans.

CHAPTER XXI.—_That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a

Prætor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make

War._

The great difference between the methods followed by the ancient Romans

in adding to their dominions, and those used for that purpose by the

States of the present time, has now been sufficiently discussed. It has

been seen, too how in dealing with the cities which they did not think

fit to destroy, and even with those which had made their submission not

as companions but as subjects, it was customary with the Romans to

permit them to live on under their own laws, without imposing any

outward sign of dependence, merely binding them to certain conditions,

or complying with which they were maintained in their former dignity

and importance. We know, further, that the same methods continued to be

followed by the Romans until they passed beyond the confines of Italy,

and began to reduce foreign kingdoms and States to provinces: as

plainly appears in the fact that Capua was the first city to which they

sent a prætor, and him from no motive of ambition, but at the request

of the Capuans themselves who, living at variance with one another,

thought it necessary to have a Roman citizen in their town who might

restore unity and good order among them. Influenced by this example,

and urged by the same need, the people of Antium were the next to ask

that they too might have a prætor given them; touching which request

and in connection with which new method of governing, Titus Livius

observes, “_that not the arms only but also the laws of Rome now began

to exert an influence;_” showing how much the course thus followed by

the Romans promoted the growth of their authority.

For those cities, more especially, which have been used to freedom or

to be governed by their own citizens, rest far better satisfied with a

government which they do not see, even though it involve something of

oppression, than with one which standing constantly before their eyes,

seems every day to reproach them with the disgrace of servitude. And to

the prince there is another advantage in this method of government,

namely, that as the judges and magistrates who administer the laws

civil and criminal within these cities, are not under his control, no

decision of theirs can throw responsibility or discredit upon him; so

that he thus escapes many occasions of calumny and hatred. Of the truth

whereof, besides the ancient instances which might be noted, we have a

recent example here in Italy. For Genoa, as every one knows, has many

times been occupied by the French king, who always, until lately, sent

thither a French governor to rule in his name. Recently, however, not

from choice but of necessity, he has permitted the town to be

self-governed under a Genoese ruler; and any one who had to decide

which of these two methods of governing gives the greater security to

the king’s authority and the greater content to the people themselves,

would assuredly have to pronounce in favour of the latter.

Men, moreover, in proportion as they see you averse to usurp authority

over them, grow the readier to surrender themselves into your hands;

and fear you less on the score of their freedom, when they find you

acting towards them with consideration and kindness. It was the display

of these qualities that moved the Capuans to ask the Romans for a

prætor; for had the Romans betrayed the least eagerness to send them

one, they would at once have conceived jealousy and grown estranged.

But why turn for examples to Capua and Rome, when we have them close at

hand in Tuscany and Florence? Who is there but knows what a time it is

since the city of Pistoja submitted of her own accord to the Florentine

supremacy? Who, again, but knows the animosity which down to the

present day exists between Florence and the cities of Pisa, Lucca, and

Siena? This difference of feeling does not arise from the citizens of

Pistoja valuing their freedom less than the citizens of these other

towns or thinking themselves inferior to them, but from the Florentines

having always acted towards the former as brothers, towards the latter

as foes. This it was that led the Pistojans to come voluntarily under

our authority while the others have done and do all in their power to

escape it. For there seems no reason to doubt, that if Florence,

instead of exasperating these neighbours of hers, had sought to win

them over, either by entering into league with them or by lending them

assistance, she would at this hour have been mistress of Tuscany. Not

that I would be understood to maintain that recourse is never to be had

to force and to arms, but that these are only to be used in the last

resort, and when all other remedies are unavailing.

CHAPTER XXII.—_That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss._

How falsely men often judge of things, they who are present at their

deliberations have constant occasion to know. For in many matters,

unless these deliberations be guided by men of great parts, the

conclusions come to are certain to be wrong. And because in corrupt

republics, and especially in quiet times, either through jealousy or

from other like causes, men of great ability are often obliged to stand

aloof, it follows that measures not good in themselves are by a common

error judged to be good, or are promoted by those who seek public

favour rather than the public advantage. Mistakes of this sort are

found out afterwards in seasons of adversity, when recourse must be had

to those persons who in peaceful times had been, as it were, forgotten,

as shall hereafter in its proper place be more fully explained. Cases,

moreover, arise in which those who have little experience of affairs

are sure to be misled, from the matters with which they have to deal

being attended by many deceptive appearances such as lead men to

believe whatsoever they are minded to believe.

These remarks I make with reference to the false hopes which the

Latins, after being defeated by the Romans, were led to form on the

persuasion of their prætor Numitius, and also with reference to what

was believed by many a few years ago, when Francis, king of France,

came to recover Milan from the Swiss. For Francis of Angoulême,

succeeding on the death of Louis XII. to the throne of France, and

desiring to recover for that realm the Duchy of Milan, on which, some

years before, the Swiss had seized at the instance of Pope Julius,

sought for allies in Italy to second him in his attempt; and besides

the Venetians, who had already been gained over by King Louis,

endeavoured to secure the aid of the Florentines and Pope Leo X.;

thinking that were he to succeed in getting these others to take part

with him, his enterprise would be easier. For the forces of the Spanish

king were then in Lombardy, and the army of the Emperor at Verona.

Pope Leo, however, did not fall in with the wishes of Francis, being,

it is said, persuaded by his advisers that his best course was to stand

neutral. For they urged that it was not for the advantage of the Church

to have powerful strangers, whether French or Swiss, in Italy; but that

to restore the country to its ancient freedom, it must be delivered

from the yoke of both. And since to conquer both, whether singly or

together, was impossible, it was to be desired that the one should

overthrow the other, after which the Church with her friends might fall

upon the victor. And it was averred that no better opportunity for

carrying out this design could ever be found than then presented

itself; for both the French and the Swiss were in the field; while the

Pope had his troops in readiness to appear on the Lombard frontier and

in the vicinity of the two armies, where, under colour of watching his

own interests, he could easily keep them until the opposed hosts came

to an engagement; when, as both armies were full of courage, their

encounter might be expected to be a bloody one, and likely to leave the

victor so weakened that it would be easy for the Pope to attack and

defeat him; and so, to his own great glory, remain master of Lombardy

and supreme throughout Italy.

How baseless this expectation was, was seen from the event. For the

Swiss being routed after a protracted combat, the troops of the Pope

and Spain, so far from venturing to attack the conqueror, prepared for

flight; nor would flight have saved them, had not the humanity or

indifference of the king withheld him from pursuing his victory, and

disposed him to make terms with the Church.

The arguments put forward by the Pope’s advisers had a certain show of

reason in their favour, which looked at from a distance seemed

plausible enough; but were in reality wholly contrary to truth; since

it rarely happens that the captain who wins a victory loses any great

number of his men, his loss being in battle only, and not in flight.

For in the heat of battle, while men stand face to face, but few fall,

chiefly because such combats do not last long; and even when they do

last, and many of the victorious army are slain, so splendid is the

reputation which attends a victory, and so great the terror it

inspires, as far to outweigh any loss the victor suffers by the

slaughter of his soldiers; so that an enemy who, trusting to find him

weakened, should then venture to attack him, would soon be taught his

mistake, unless strong enough to give him battle at any time, before

his victory as well as after. For in that case he might, as fortune and

valour should determine, either win or lose; though, even then, the

army which had first fought and won would have an advantage. And this

we know for a truth from what befell the Latins in consequence of the

mistake made by Numitius their prætor, and their blindness in believing

him. For when they had already suffered defeat at the hands of the

Romans, Numitius caused it to be proclaimed throughout the whole

country of Latium, that now was the time to fall upon the enemy,

exhausted by a struggle in which they were victorious only in name,

while in reality suffering all those ills which attend defeat, and who

might easily be crushed by any fresh force brought against them.

Whereupon the Latins believed him, and getting together a new army,

were forthwith routed with such loss as always awaits those who listen

to like counsels.

CHAPTER XXIII.—_That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances

required it the Romans always avoided half-measures._

“Such _was now the state of affairs in Latium, that peace and war

seemed alike intolerable_.” No worse calamity can befall a prince or

commonwealth than to be reduced to such straits that they can neither

accept peace nor support war; as is the case with those whom it would

ruin to conclude peace on the terms offered, while war obliges them

either to yield themselves a spoil to their allies, or remain a prey to

their foes. To this grievous alternative are men led by evil counsels

and unwise courses, and, as already said, from not rightly measuring

their strength. For the commonwealth or prince who has rightly measured

his strength, can hardly be brought so low as were the Latins, who made

war with the Romans when they should have made terms, and made terms

when they should have made war, and so mismanaged everything that the

friendship and the enmity of Rome were alike fatal. Whence it came

that, in the first place, they were defeated and broken by Manlius

Torquatus, and afterwards utterly subdued by Camillus; who, when he had

forced them to surrender at discretion to the Roman arms, and had

placed garrisons in all their towns, and taken hostages from all,

returned to Rome and reported to the senate that the whole of Latium

now lay at their mercy.

And because the sentence then passed by the senate is memorable, and

worthy to be studied by princes that it may be imitated by them on like

occasion, I shall cite the exact words which Livius puts into the mouth

of Camillus, as confirming what I have already said touching the

methods used by the Romans to extend their power, and as showing how in

chastising their subjects they always avoided half-measures and took a

decided course. For government consists in nothing else than in so

controlling your subjects that it shall neither be in their power nor

for their interest to harm you. And this is effected either by making

such sure work with them as puts it out of their power to do you

injury, or else by so loading them with benefits that it would be folly

in them to seek to alter their condition. All which is implied first in

the measures proposed by Camillus, and next in the resolutions passed

on these proposals by the senate. The words of Camillus were as

follows: “_The immortal gods have made you so entirely masters in the

matter you are now considering, that_ _it lies with you to pronounce

whether Latium shall or shall not longer exist. So far as the Latins

are concerned, you can secure a lasting peace either by clemency or by

severity. Would you deal harshly with those whom you have conquered and

who have given themselves into your hands, you can blot out the whole

Latin nation. Would you, after the fashion of our ancestors, increase

the strength of Rome by admitting the vanquished to the rights of

citizenship, here you have opportunity to do so, and with the greatest

glory to yourselves. That, assuredly, is the strongest government which

they rejoice in who obey it. Now, then, is your time, while the minds

of all are bent on what is about to happen, to obtain an ascendency

over them, either by punishment or by benefits._”

Upon this motion the senate resolved, in accordance with the advice

given by the consul, to take the case of each city separately, and

either destroy utterly or else treat with tenderness all the more

important of the Latin towns. To those cities they dealt with

leniently, they granted exemptions and privileges, conferring upon them

the rights of citizenship, and securing their welfare in every

particular. The others they razed to the ground, and planting colonies

in their room, either removed the inhabitants to Rome, or so scattered

and dispersed them that neither by arms nor by counsels was it ever

again in their power to inflict hurt. For, as I have said already, the

Romans never, in matters of moment, resorted to half-measures. And the

sentence which they then pronounced should be a pattern for all rulers,

and ought to have been followed by the Florentines when, in the year

1502, Arezzo and all the Val di Chiana rose in revolt. For had they

followed it, they would have established their authority on a surer

footing, and added much to the greatness of their city by securing for

it those lands which are needed to supply it with the necessaries of

life. But pursuing that half-hearted policy which is most mischievous

in executing justice, some of the Aretines they outlawed, some they

condemned to death, and all they deprived of their dignities and

ancient importance in their town, while leaving the town itself

untouched. And if in the councils then held any Florentine recommended

that Arezzo should be dismantled, they who thought themselves wiser

than their fellows objected, that to do so would be little to the

honour of our republic, since it would look as though she lacked

strength to hold it. Reasons like this are of a sort which seem sound,

but are not really so; for, by the same rule, no parricide should be

put to death, nor any other malefactor, however atrocious his crimes;

because, forsooth, it would be discreditable to the ruler to appear

unequal to the control of a single criminal. They who hold such

opinions fail to see that when men individually, or entire cities

collectively, offend against the State, the prince for his own safety,

and as a warning to others, has no alternative but to make an end of

them; and that true honour lies in being able and in knowing how to

chastise such offenders, and not in incurring endless dangers in the

effort to retain them. For the prince who does not chastise offenders

in a way that puts it out of their power to offend again, is accounted

unwise or worthless.

How necessary it was for the Romans to execute Justice against the

Latins, is further seen from the course took with the men of Privernum.

And here the text of Livius suggests two points for our attention:

first, as already noted, that a subjugated people is either to be

caressed or crushed; and second, how much it is for our advantage to

maintain a manly bearing, and to speak the truth fearlessly in the

presence of the wise. For the senate being met to determine the fate of

the citizens of Privernum, who after rebelling had been reduced to

submission by the Roman arms, certain of these citizens were sent by

their countrymen to plead for pardon. When these had come into the

presence of the senate, one of them was asked by a senator, “_What

punishment he thought his fellow citizens deserved?_” To which he of

Privernum answered, “_Such punishment as they deserve who deem

themselves worthy of freedom._” “_But,_” said the consul, “_should we

remit your punishment, what sort of peace can we hope to have with

you?_” To which the other replied, “_If granted on fair terms, a firm

and lasting peace; if on unfair, a peace of brief duration._” Upon

this, though many of the senators were displeased, the wiser among them

declared “_that they had heard the voice of freedom and manhood, and

would never believe that the man or people who so spoke ought to remain

longer than was needful in a position which gave them cause for shame;

since that was a safe peace which was accepted willingly; whereas good

faith could not be looked for where it was sought to impose

servitude._” So saying, they decided that the people of Privernum

should be admitted to Roman citizenship, with all the rights and

privileges thereto appertaining; declaring that “_men whose only

thought was for freedom, were indeed worthy to be Romans._” So pleasing

was this true and high answer to generous minds, while any other must

have seemed at once false and shameful. And they who judge otherwise of

men, and of those men, especially, who have been used to be free, or so

to think themselves, are mistaken; and are led through their mistake to

adopt courses unprofitable for themselves and affording no content to

others. Whence, the frequent rebellions and the downfall of States.

But, returning to our subject, I conclude, as well from this instance

of Privernum, as from the measures followed with the Latins, that when

we have to pass sentence upon powerful States accustomed to live in

freedom, we must either destroy them utterly, or else treat them with

much indulgence; and that any other course we may take with them will

be unprofitable. But most carefully should we avoid, as of all courses

the most pernicious, such half-measures as were followed by the

Samnites when they had the Romans shut up in the Caudine Forks, and

would not listen to the counsels of the old man who urged them either

to send their captives away with every honourable attention, or else

put them all to death; but adopted a middle course, and after disarming

them and making them pass under the yoke, suffered them to depart at

once disgraced and angered. And no long time after, they found to their

sorrow that the old man’s warning was true, and that the course they

had themselves chosen was calamitous; as shall, hereafter, in its place

be shown.

CHAPTER XXIV.—_That, commonly, Fortresses do much more Harm than Good_

To the wise men of our day it may seem an oversight on the part of the

Romans, that, when they sought to protect themselves against the men of

Latium and Privernum, it never occurred to them to build strongholds in

their cities to be a curb upon them, and insure their fidelity,

especially when we remember the Florentine saying which these same wise

men often quote, to the effect that Pisa and other like cities must be

held by fortresses Doubtless, had those old Romans been like-minded

with our modern sages, they would not have neglected to build

themselves fortresses, but because they far surpassed them in courage,

sense, and vigour, they refrained. And while Rome retained her freedom,

and adhered to her own wise ordinances and wholesome usages, she never

built a single fortress with the view to hold any city or province,

though, sometimes, she may have suffered those to stand which she found

already built.

Looking, therefore, to the course followed by the Romans in this

particular, and to that adopted by our modern rulers, it seems proper

to consider whether or not it is advisable to build fortresses, and

whether they are more likely to help or to hurt him who builds them In

the first place, then, we are to remember that fortresses are built

either as a defence against foreign foes or against subjects In the

former case, I pronounce them unnecessary, in the latter mischievous.

And to state the reasons why in the latter case they are mischievous, I

say that when princes or republics are afraid of their subjects and in

fear lest they rebel, this must proceed from knowing that their

subjects hate them, which hatred in its turn results from their own ill

conduct, and that again from their thinking themselves able to rule

their subjects by mere force, or from their governing with little

prudence. Now one of the causes which lead them to suppose that they

can rule by mere force, is this very circumstance of their people

having these fortresses on their backs So that the conduct which breeds

hatred is itself mainly occasioned by these princes or republics being

possessed of fortresses, which, if this be true, are really far more

hurtful than useful First, because, as has been said already, they

render a ruler bolder and more violent in his bearing towards his

subjects, and, next, because they do not in reality afford him that

security which he believes them to give For all those methods of

violence and coercion which may be used to keep a people under, resolve

themselves into two; since either like the Romans you must always have

it in your power to bring a strong army into the field, or else you

must dissipate, destroy, and disunite the subject people, and so divide

and scatter them that they can never again combine to injure you For

should you merely strip them of their wealth, _spoliatis arma

supersunt_, arms still remain to them, or if you deprive them of their

weapons, _furor arma ministrat_, rage will supply them, if you put

their chiefs to death and continue to maltreat the rest, heads will

renew themselves like those Hydra; while, if you build fortresses,

these may serve in time of peace to make you bolder in outraging your

subjects, but in time of war they will prove wholly useless, since they

will be attacked at once by foes both foreign and domestic, whom

together it will be impossible for you to resist. And if ever

fortresses were useless they are so at the present day, by reason of

the invention of artillery, against the fury of which, as I have shown

already, a petty fortress which affords no room for retreat behind

fresh works, cannot be defended.

But to go deeper into the matter, I say, either you are a prince

seeking by means of these fortresses to hold the people of your city in

check; or you are a prince, or it may be a republic, desirous to

control some city which you have gained in war. To the prince I would

say, that, for the reasons already given, nothing can be more

unserviceable than a fortress as a restraint upon your subjects, since

it only makes you the readier to oppress them, and less scrupulous how

you do so; while it is this very oppression which moves them to destroy

you, and so kindles their hatred, that the fortress, which is the cause

of all the mischief, is powerless to protect you. A wise and good

prince, therefore, that he may continue good, and give no occasion or

encouragement to his descendants to become evil, will never build a

fortress, to the end that neither he nor they may ever be led to trust

to it rather than to the good-will of their subjects. And if Francesco

Sforza, who was accounted a wise ruler, on becoming Duke of Milan

erected a fortress in that city, I say that herein he was unwise, and

that the event has shown the building of this fortress to have been

hurtful and not helpful to his heirs. For thinking that by its aid they

could behave as badly as they liked to their citizens and subjects, and

yet be secure, they refrained from no sort of violence or oppression,

until, becoming beyond measure odious, they lost their State as soon as

an enemy attacked it. Nor was this fortress, which in peace had

occasioned them much hurt, any defence or of any service them in war.

For had they being without it, through thoughtlessness, treated their

subjects inhumanely, they must soon have discovered and withdrawn from

their danger; and might, thereafter, with no other help than that of

attached subjects, have withstood the attacks of the French far more

successfully than they could with their fortress, but with subjects

whom they had estranged.

And, in truth, fortresses are unserviceable in every way, since they

may be lost either by the treachery of those to whom you commit their

defence, or by the overwhelming strength of an assailant, or else by

famine. And where you seek to recover a State which you have lost, and

in which only the fortress remains to you, if that fortress is to be of

any service or assistance to you, you must have an army wherewith to

attack the enemy who has driven you out. But with such an army you

might succeed in recovering your State as readily without a fortress as

with one; nay, perhaps, even more readily, since your subjects, had you

not used them ill, from the overweening confidence your fortress gave

you, might then have felt better disposed towards you. And the event

shows that in times of adversity this very fortress of Milan has been

of no advantage whatever, either to the Sforzas or to the French; but,

on the contrary, has brought ruin on both, because, trusting to it,

they did not turn their thoughts to nobler methods for preserving that

State. Guido Ubaldo, duke of Urbino and son to Duke Federigo, who in

his day was a warrior of much renown, but who was driven from his

dominions by Cesare Borgia, son to Pope Alexander VI., when afterwards,

by a sudden stroke of good fortune, he was restored to the dukedom

caused all the fortresses of the country to be dismantled, judging them

to be hurtful. For as he was beloved by his subjects, so far as they

were concerned he had no need for fortresses; while, as against foreign

enemies, he saw he could not defend them, since this would have

required an army kept constantly in the field. For which reasons he

made them be razed to the ground.

When Pope Julius II. had driven the Bentivogli from Bologna, after

erecting a citadel in that town, he caused the people to be cruelly

oppressed by his governor; whereupon, the people rebelled, and he

forthwith lost the citadel; so that his citadel, and the oppressions to

which it led, were of less service to him than different behaviour on

his part had been. When Niccolo da Castello, the ancestor of the

Vitelli, returned to his country out of exile, he straightway pulled

down the two fortresses built there by Pope Sixtus IV., perceiving that

it was not by fortresses, but by the good-will of the people, that he

could be maintained in his government.

But the most recent, and in all respects most noteworthy instance, and

that which best demonstrates the futility of building, and the

advantage of destroying fortresses, is what happened only the other day

in Genoa. Every one knows how, in 1507, Genoa rose in rebellion against

Louis XII. of France, who came in person and with all his forces to

recover it; and after recovering it built there a citadel stronger than

any before known, being, both from its position and from every other

circumstance, most inaccessible to attack. For standing on the

extremity of a hill, named by the Genoese Codefa, which juts out into

the sea, it commanded the whole harbour and the greater part of the

town. But, afterwards, in the year 1512, when the French were driven

out of Italy, the Genoese, in spite of this citadel, again rebelled,

and Ottaviano Fregoso assuming the government, after the greatest

efforts, continued over a period of sixteen months, at last succeeded

in reducing the citadel by famine. By all it was believed that he would

retain it as a rock of refuge in case of any reverse of fortune, and by

some he was advised to do so; but he, being a truly wise ruler, and

knowing well that it is by the attachment of their subjects and not by

the strength of their fortifications that princes are maintained in

their governments, dismantled this citadel; and founding his authority,

not upon material defences, but on his own valour and prudence, kept

and still keeps it. And whereas, formerly, a force of a thousand

foot-soldiers could effect a change in the government of Genoa, the

enemies of Ottaviano have assailed him with ten thousand, without being

able to harm him.

Here, then, we see that, while to dismantle this fortress occasioned

Ottaviano no loss, its construction gave the French king no sort of

advantage. For when he could come into Italy with an army, he could

recover Genoa, though he had no citadel there; but when he could not

come with an army, it was not in his power to hold the city by means of

the citadel. Moreover it was costly for the king to build, and shameful

for him to lose this fortress; while for Ottaviano it was glorious to

take, and advantageous to destroy it.

Let us turn now to those republics which build fortresses not within

their own territories, but in towns whereof they have taken possession.

And if the above example of France and Genoa suffice not to show the

futility of this course, that of Florence and Pisa ought, I think, to

be conclusive. For in erecting fortresses to hold Pisa, the Florentines

failed to perceive that a city which had always been openly hostile to

them, which had lived in freedom, and which could cloak rebellion under

the name of liberty, must, if it were to be retained at all, be

retained by those methods which were used by the Romans, and either be

made a companion or be destroyed. Of how little service these Pisan

fortresses were, was seen on the coming of Charles VIII. of France into

Italy, to whom, whether through the treachery of their defenders or

from fear of worse evils, they were at once delivered up; whereas, had

there been no fortresses in Pisa, the Florentines would not have looked

to them as the means whereby the town was to be held; the king could

not by their assistance have taken the town from the Florentines; and

the methods whereby it had previously been preserved might, in all

likelihood, have continued sufficient to preserve it; and, at any rate,

had served that end no worse than the fortresses.

These, then, are the conclusions to which I come, namely, that

fortresses built to hold your own country under are hurtful, and that

those built to retain acquired territories are useless; and I am

content to rely on the example of the Romans, who in the towns they

sought to hold by the strong hand, rather pulled down fortresses than

built them. And if any, to controvert these views of mine, were to cite

the case of Tarentum in ancient times, or of Brescia in recent, as

towns which when they rebelled were recovered by means of their

citadels; I answer, that for the recovery of Tarentum, Fabius Maximus

was sent at the end of a year with an army strong enough to retake it

even had there been no fortress there; and that although he availed

himself of the fortress for the recovery of the town, he might, without

it, have resorted to other means which would have brought about the

same result. Nor do I see of what service a citadel can be said to be,

when to recover the city you must employ a consular army under a Fabius

Maximus. But that the Romans would, in any case, have recovered

Tarentum, is plain from what happened at Capua, where there was no

citadel, and which they retook, simply by the valour of their soldiers.

Again, as regards Brescia, I say that the circumstances attending the

revolt of that town were such as occur but seldom, namely, that the

citadel remaining in your hands after the defection of the city, you

should happen to have a great army nigh at hand, as the French had

theirs on this occasion. For M. de Foix being in command of the king’s

forces at Bologna, on hearing of the loss of Brescia, marched thither

without an hour’s delay, and reaching Brescia in three days, retook the

town with the help of the citadel. But here, again, we see that, to be

of any service, the citadel of Brescia had to be succoured by a de

Foix, and by that French army which in three days’ time marched to its

relief. So that this instance cannot be considered conclusive as

against others of a contrary tendency. For, in the course of recent

wars, many fortresses have been taken and retaken, with the same

variety of fortune with which open country has been acquired or lost;

and this not only in Lombardy, but also in Romagna, in the kingdom of

Naples, and in all parts of Italy.

And, further, touching the erection of fortresses as a defence against

foreign enemies, I say that such defences are not needed by the prince

or people who possess a good army; while for those who do not possess a

good army, they are useless. For good armies without fortresses are in

themselves a sufficient defence: whereas, fortresses without good

armies avail nothing. And this we see in the case of those nations

which have been thought to excel both in their government and

otherwise, as, for instance, the Romans and the Spartans. For while the

Romans would build no fortresses, the Spartans not merely abstained

from building them, but would not even suffer their cities to be

enclosed with walls; desiring to be protected by their own valour only,

and by no other defence. So that when a Spartan was asked by an

Athenian what he thought of the walls of Athens, he answered “that they

were fine walls if meant to hold women only.”

If a prince who has a good army has likewise, on the sea-front of his

dominions, some fortress strong enough to keep an enemy in check for a

few days, until he gets his forces together, this, though not

necessary, may sometimes be for his advantage. But for a prince who is

without a strong army to have fortresses erected throughout his

territories, or upon his frontier, is either useless or hurtful, since

they may readily be lost and then turned against him; or, supposing

them so strong that the enemy is unable to take them by assault, he may

leave them behind, and so render them wholly unprofitable. For a brave

army, unless stoutly met, enters an enemy’s country without regard to

the towns or fortified places it leaves in its rear, as we read of

happening in ancient times, and have seen done by Francesco Maria della

Rovere, who no long while ago, when he marched against Urbino, made

little of leaving ten hostile cities behind him.

The prince, therefore, who can bring together a strong army can do

without building fortresses, while he who has not a strong army ought

not to build them, but should carefully strengthen the city wherein he

dwells, and keep it well stored with supplies, and its inhabitants well

affected, so that he may resist attack till an accord be agreed on, or

he be relieved by foreign aid. All other expedients are costly in time

of peace, and in war useless.

Whoever carefully weighs all that has now been said will perceive, that

the Romans, as they were most prudent in all their other methods, so

also showed their wisdom in the measures they took with the men of

Latium and Privernum, when, without ever thinking of fortresses, they

sought security in bolder and more sagacious courses.

CHAPTER XXV.—_That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must

not think to get possession of it through its Divisions._

Violent dissensions breaking out in Rome between the commons and the

nobles, it appeared to the Veientines and Etruscans that now was their

time to deal a fatal blow to the Roman supremacy. Accordingly, they

assembled an army and invaded the territories of Rome. The senate sent

Caius Manlius and Marcus Fabius to meet them, whose forces encamping

close by the Veientines, the latter ceased not to reproach and vilify

the Roman name with every sort of taunt and abuse, and so incensed the

Romans by their unmeasured insolence that, from being divided they

became reconciled, and giving the enemy battle, broke and defeated

them. Here, again, we see, what has already been noted, how prone men

are to adopt wrong courses, and how often they miss their object when

they think to secure it. The Veientines imagined that they could

conquer the Romans by attacking them while they were at feud among

themselves; but this very attack reunited the Romans and brought ruin

on their assailants. For the causes of division in a commonwealth are,

for the most part, ease and tranquillity, while the causes of union are

fear and war. Wherefore, had the Veientines been wise, the more divided

they saw Rome to be, the more should they have sought to avoid war with

her, and endeavoured to gain an advantage over her by peaceful arts.

And the best way to effect this in a divided city lies in gaining the

confidence of both factions, and in mediating between them as arbiter

so long as they do not come to blows; but when they resort to open

violence, then to render some tardy aid to the weaker side, so as to

plunge them deeper in hostilities, wherein both may exhaust their

forces without being led by your putting forth an excess of strength to

suspect you of a desire to ruin them and remain their master. Where

this is well managed, it will almost always happen that you succeed in

effecting the object you propose to yourself.

The city of Pistoja, as I have said already in connection with another

matter, was won over to the Florentine republic by no other artifice

than this. For the town being split by factions, the Florentines, by

now favouring one side and now the other, without incurring the

suspicions of either, brought both to such extremities that, wearied

out with their harassed life, they threw themselves at last of their

own accord into the arms of Florence. The city of Siena, again, has

never made any change in her government which has had the support of

the Florentines, save when that support has been slight and

insignificant; for whenever the interference of Florence has been

marked and decided, it has had the effect of uniting all parties in

support of things as they stood.

One other instance I shall add to those already given. Oftener than

once Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan, relying on their divisions, set

wars on foot against the Florentines, and always without success; so

that, in lamenting over these failures, he was wont to complain that

the mad humours of the Florentines had cost him two millions of gold,

without his having anything to show for it. The Veientines and

Etruscans, therefore, as I have said already, were misled by false

hopes, and in the end were routed by the Romans in a single pitched

battle; and any who should look hereafter to prevail on like grounds

and by similar means against a divided people, will always find

themselves deceived.

CHAPTER XXVI.—_That Taunts and Abuse breed Hatred against him who uses

them, without yielding him any Advantage._

To abstain from threats and injurious language, is, methinks, one of

the wisest precautions a man can use. For abuse and menace take nothing

from the strength of an adversary; the latter only making him more

cautious, while the former inflames his hatred against you, and leads

him to consider more diligently how he may cause you hurt.

This is seen from the example of the Veientines, of whom I spoke in the

last Chapter, who, to the injury of war against the Romans, added those

verbal injuries from which all prudent commanders should compel their

soldiers to refrain. For these are injuries which stir and kindle your

enemy to vengeance, and yet, as has been said, in no way disable him

from doing you hurt; so that, in truth, they are weapons which wound

those who use them. Of this we find a notable instance in Asia, in

connection with the siege of Amida. For Gabade, the Persian general,

after besieging this town for a great while, wearied out at last by its

protracted defence, determined on withdrawing his army; and had

actually begun to strike his camp, when the whole inhabitants of the

place, elated by their success, came out upon the walls to taunt and

upbraid their enemies with their cowardice and meanness of spirit, and

to load them with every kind of abuse. Stung by these insults, Gabade,

changing his resolution, renewed the siege with such fury that in a few

days he stormed and sacked the town. And the very same thing befell the

Veientines, who, not content, as we have seen, to make war on the

Romans with arms, must needs assail them with foul reproaches,

advancing to the palisade of their camp to revile them, and molesting

them more with their tongues than with their swords, until the Roman

soldiers, who at first were most unwilling to fight, forced the consuls

to lead them to the attack. Whereupon, the Veientines, like those

others of whom mention has just now been made, had to pay the penalty

of their insolence.

Wise captains of armies, therefore, and prudent governors of cities,

should take all fit precautions to prevent such insults and reproaches

from being used by their soldiers and subjects, either amongst

themselves or against an enemy. For when directed against an enemy they

lead to the mischiefs above noticed, while still worse consequences may

follow from our not preventing them among ourselves by such measures as

sensible rulers have always taken for that purpose.

The legions who were left behind for the protection of Capua having, as

shall in its place be told, conspired against the Capuans, their

conspiracy led to a mutiny, which was presently suppressed by Valerius

Corvinus; when, as one of the conditions on which the mutineers made

their submission, it was declared that whosoever should thereafter

upbraid any soldier of these legions with having taken part in this

mutiny, should be visited with the severest punishment. So likewise,

when Tiberius Gracchus was appointed, during the war with Hannibal, to

command a body of slaves, whom the Romans in their straits for soldiers

had furnished with arms, one of his first acts was to pass an order

making it death for any to reproach his men with their servile origin.

So mischievous a thing did the Romans esteem it to use insulting words

to others, or to taunt them with their shame. Whether this be done in

sport or earnest, nothing vexes men more, or rouses them to fiercer

indignation; “_for the biting jest which flavours too much of truth,

leaves always behind it a rankling memory._”[9]

[9] Nam facetiæ asperæ, quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem sui

memoriam relinquunt. _Tacit. An._ xv. 68.

CHAPTER XXVII.—_That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to

have obtained a Victory; for, commonly, when they are not,

theft-Victory turns to Defeat._

The use of dishonouring language towards an enemy is mostly caused by

an insolent humour, bred by victory or the false hope of it, whereby

men are oftentimes led not only to speak, but also to act amiss. For

such false hopes, when they gain an entry into men’s minds, cause them

to overrun their goal, and to miss opportunities for securing a certain

good, on the chance of obtaining some thing better, but uncertain. And

this, being a matter that deserves attention, because in deceiving

themselves men often injure their country, I desire to illustrate it by

particular instances, ancient and recent, since mere argument might not

place it in so clear a light.

After routing the Romans at Cannæ, Hannibal sent messengers to Carthage

to announce his victory, and to ask support. A debate arising in the

Carthaginian senate as to what was to be done, Hanno, an aged and wise

citizen, advised that they should prudently take advantage of their

victory to make peace with the Romans, while as conquerors they might

have it on favourable terms, and not wait to make it after a defeat;

since it should be their object to show the Romans that they were

strong enough to fight them, but not to peril the victory they had won

in the hope of winning a greater. This advice was not followed by the

Carthaginian senate, but its wisdom was well seen later, when the

opportunity to act upon it was gone.

When the whole East had been overrun by Alexander of Macedon, the

citizens of Tyre (then at the height of its renown, and very strong

from being built, like Venice, in the sea), recognizing his greatness,

sent ambassadors to him to say that they desired to be his good

servants, and to yield him all obedience, yet could not consent to

receive either him or his soldiers within their walls. Whereupon,

Alexander, displeased that a single city should venture to close its

gates against him to whom all the rest of the world had thrown theirs

open, repulsed the Tyrians, and rejecting their overtures set to work

to besiege their town. But as it stood on the water, and was well

stored with victual and all other munitions needed for its defence,

after four months had gone, Alexander, perceiving that he was wasting

more time in an inglorious attempt to reduce this one city than had

sufficed for most of his other conquests, resolved to offer terms to

the Tyrians, and to make them those concessions which they themselves

had asked. But they, puffed up by their success, not merely refused the

terms offered, but put to death the envoy sent to propose them. Enraged

by this, Alexander renewed the siege, and with such vigour, that he

took and destroyed the city, and either slew or made slaves of its

inhabitants.

In the year 1512, a Spanish army entered the Florentine territory, with

the object of restoring the Medici to Florence, and of levying a

subsidy from the town; having been summoned thither by certain of the

citizens, who had promised them that so soon as they appeared within

the Florentine confines they would arm in their behalf. But when the

Spaniards had come into the plain of the Arno, and none declared in

their favour, being in sore need of supplies, they offered to make

terms. This offer the people of Florence in their pride rejected, and

so gave occasion for the sack of Prato and the overthrow of the

Florentine Republic.

A prince, therefore, who is attacked by an enemy much more powerful

than himself, can make no greater mistake than to refuse to treat,

especially when overtures are made to him; for however poor the terms

offered may be, they are sure to contain some conditions advantageous

for him who accepts them, and which he may construe as a partial

success. For which reason it ought to have been enough for the citizens

of Tyre that Alexander was brought to accept terms which he had at

first rejected; and they should have esteemed it a sufficient triumph

that, by their resistance in arms, they had forced so great a warrior

to bow to their will. And, in like manner, it should have been a

sufficient victory for the Florentines that the Spaniards had in part

yielded to their wishes, and abated something of their own demands, the

purport of which was to change the government of Florence, to sever her

from her allegiance to France, and, further, to obtain money from her.

For if of these three objects the Spaniards had succeeded in securing

the last two, while the Florentines maintained the integrity of their

government, a fair share of honour and contentment would have fallen to

each. And while preserving their political existence, the Florentines

should have made small account of the other two conditions; nor ought

they, even with the possibility and almost certainty of greater

advantages before them, to have left matters in any degree to the

arbitration of Fortune, by pushing things to extremes, and incurring

risks which no prudent man should incur, unless compelled by necessity.