CHAPTER XVII.—_That a corrupt People obtaining Freedom can hardly

preserve it._

I believe that if her kings had not been expelled, Rome must very soon

have become a weak and inconsiderable State. For seeing to what a pitch

of corruption these kings had come, we may conjecture that if two or

three more like reigns had followed, and the taint spread from the head

to the members, so soon as the latter became infected, cure would have

been hopeless. But from the head being removed while the trunk was

still sound, it was not difficult for the Romans to return to a free

and constitutional government.

It may be assumed, however, as most certain, that a corrupted city

living under a prince can never recover its freedom, even were the

prince and all his line to be exterminated. For in such a city it must

necessarily happen that one prince will be replaced by another, and

that things will never settle down until a new lord be established;

unless, indeed, the combined goodness and valour of some one citizen

should maintain freedom, which, even then, will endure only for his

lifetime; as happened twice in Syracuse, first under the rule of Dion,

and again under that of Timoleon, whose virtues while they lived kept

their city free, but on whose death it fell once more under a tyranny.

But the strongest example that can be given is that of Rome, which on

the expulsion of the Tarquins was able at once to seize on liberty and

to maintain it; yet, on the deaths of Cæsar, Caligula, and Nero, and on

the extinction of the Julian line, was not only unable to establish her

freedom, but did not even venture a step in that direction. Results so

opposite arising in one and the same city can only be accounted for by

this, that in the time of the Tarquins the Roman people were not yet

corrupted, but in these later times had become utterly corrupt. For on

the first occasion, nothing more was needed to prepare and determine

them to shake off their kings, than that they should be bound by oath

to suffer no king ever again to reign in Rome; whereas, afterwards, the

authority and austere virtue of Brutus, backed by all the legions of

the East, could not rouse them to maintain their hold of that freedom,

which he, following in the footsteps of the first Brutus, had won for

them; and this because of the corruption wherewith the people had been

infected by the Marian faction, whereof Cæsar becoming head, was able

so to blind the multitude that it saw not the yoke under which it was

about to lay its neck.

Though this example of Rome be more complete than any other, I desire

to instance likewise, to the same effect, certain peoples well known in

our own days; and I maintain that no change, however grave or violent,

could ever restore freedom to Naples or Milan, because in these States

the entire body of the people has grown corrupted. And so we find that

Milan, although desirous to return to a free form of government, on the

death of Filippo Visconti, had neither the force nor the skill needed

to preserve it.

Most fortunate, therefore, was it for Rome that her kings grew corrupt

soon, so as to be driven out before the taint of their corruption had

reached the vitals of the city. For it was because these were sound

that the endless commotions which took place in Rome, so far from being

hurtful, were, from their object being good, beneficial to the

commonwealth. From which we may draw this inference, that where the

body of the people is still sound, tumults and other like disorders do

little hurt, but that where it has become corrupted, laws, however well

devised, are of no advantage, unless imposed by some one whose

paramount authority causes them to be observed until the community be

once more restored to a sound and healthy condition.

Whether this has ever happened I know not, nor whether it ever can

happen. For we see, as I have said a little way back, that a city which

owing to its pervading corruption has once begun to decline, if it is

to recover at all, must be saved not by the excellence of the people

collectively, but of some one man then living among them, on whose

death it at once relapses into its former plight; as happened with

Thebes, in which the virtue of Epaminondas made it possible while he

lived to preserve the form of a free Government, but which fell again

on his death into its old disorders; the reason being that hardly any

ruler lives so long as to have time to accustom to right methods a city

which has long been accustomed to wrong. Wherefore, unless things be

put on a sound footing by some one ruler who lives to a very advanced

age, or by two virtuous rulers succeeding one another, the city upon

their death at once falls back into ruin; or, if it be preserved, must

be so by incurring great risks, and at the cost of much blood. For the

corruption I speak of, is wholly incompatible with a free government,

because it results from an inequality which pervades the State and can

only be removed by employing unusual and very violent remedies, such as

few are willing or know how to employ, as in another place I shall more

fully explain.

Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius · 第 17 / 64 章