preserved, or not existing may be created._
I think it neither out of place, nor inconsistent with what has been
said above, to consider whether a free government existing in a corrupt
city can be maintained, or, not existing, can be introduced. And on
this head I say that it is very difficult to bring about either of
these results, and next to impossible to lay down rules as to how it
may be done; because the measures to be taken must vary with the degree
of corruption which prevails.
Nevertheless, since it is well to reason things out, I will not pass
this matter by, but will assume, in the first place, the case of a very
corrupt city, and then take the case of one in which corruption has
reached a still greater height; but where corruption is universal, no
laws or institutions will ever have force to restrain it. Because as
good customs stand in need of good laws for their support, so laws,
that they may be respected, stand in need of good customs. Moreover,
the laws and institutions established in a republic at its beginning,
when men were good, are no longer suitable when they have become bad;
but while the laws of a city are altered to suit its circumstances, its
institutions rarely or never change; whence it results that the
introduction of new laws is of no avail, because the institutions,
remaining unchanged, corrupt them.
And to make this plainer, I say that in Rome it was first of all the
institutions of the State, and next the laws as enforced by the
magistrates, which kept the citizens under control. The institutions of
the State consisted in the authority of the people, the senate, the
tribunes, and the consuls; in the methods of choosing and appointing
magistrates; and in the arrangements for passing laws. These
institutions changed little, if at all, with circumstances. But the
laws by which the people were controlled, as for instance the law
relating to adultery, the sumptuary laws, the law as to canvassing at
elections, and many others, were altered as the citizens grew more and
more corrupted. Hence, the institutions of the State remaining the same
although from the corruption of the people no longer suitable,
amendments in the laws could not keep men good, though they might have
proved very useful if at the time when they were made the institutions
had likewise been reformed.
That its original institutions are no longer adapted to a city that has
become corrupted, is plainly seen in two matters of great moment, I
mean in the appointment of magistrates and in the passing of laws. For
the Roman people conferred the consulship and other great offices of
their State on none save those who sought them; which was a good
institution at first, because then none sought these offices save those
who thought themselves worthy of them, and to be rejected was held
disgraceful; so that, to be deemed worthy, all were on their best
behaviour. But in a corrupted city this institution grew to be most
mischievous. For it was no longer those of greatest worth, but those
who had most influence, who sought the magistracies; while all who were
without influence, however deserving, refrained through fear. This
untoward result was not reached all at once, but like other similar
results, by gradual steps. For after subduing Africa and Asia, and
reducing nearly the whole of Greece to submission, the Romans became
perfectly assured of their freedom, and seemed to themselves no longer
to have any enemy whom they had cause to fear. But this security and
the weakness of their adversaries led them in conferring the
consulship, no longer to look to merit, but only to favour, selecting
for the office those who knew best how to pay court to them, not those
who knew best how to vanquish their enemies. And afterwards, instead of
selecting those who were best liked, they came to select those who had
most influence; and in this way, from the imperfection of their
institutions, good men came to be wholly excluded.
Again, as to making laws, any of the tribunes and certain others of the
magistrates were entitled to submit laws to the people; but before
these were passed it was open to every citizen to speak either for or
against them. This was a good system so long as the citizens were good,
since it is always well that every man should be able to propose what
he thinks may be of use to his country, and that all should be allowed
to express their views with regard to his proposal; so that the people,
having heard all, may resolve on what is best. But when the people grew
depraved, this became a very mischievous institution; for then it was
only the powerful who proposed laws, and these not in the interest of
public freedom but of their own authority; and because, through fear,
none durst speak against the laws they proposed, the people were either
deceived or forced into voting their own destruction.
In order, therefore, that Rome after she had become corrupted might
still preserve her freedom, it was necessary that, as in the course of
events she had made new laws, so likewise she should frame new
institutions, since different institutions and ordinances are needed in
a corrupt State from those which suit a State which is not corrupted;
for where the matter is wholly dissimilar, the form cannot be similar.
But since old institutions must either be reformed all at once, as soon
as they are seen to be no longer expedient, or else gradually, as the
imperfection of each is recognized, I say that each of these two
courses is all but impossible. For to effect a gradual reform requires
a sagacious man who can discern mischief while it is still remote and
in the germ. But it may well happen that no such person is found in a
city; or that, if found, he is unable to persuade others of what he is
himself persuaded. For men used to live in one way are loath to leave
it for another, especially when they are not brought face to face with
the evil against which they should guard, and only have it indicated to
them by conjecture. And as for a sudden reform of institutions which
are seen by all to be no longer good, I say that defects which are
easily discerned are not easily corrected, because for their correction
it is not enough to use ordinary means, these being in themselves
insufficient; but recourse must be had to extraordinary means, such as
violence and arms; and, as a preliminary, you must become prince of the
city, and be able to deal with it at your pleasure. But since the
restoration of a State to new political life presupposes a good man,
and to become prince of a city by violence presupposes a bad man, it
can, consequently, very seldom happen that, although the end be good, a
good man will be found ready to become a prince by evil ways, or that a
bad man having become a prince will be disposed to act virtuously, or
think of turning to good account his ill-acquired authority.
From all these causes comes the difficulty, or rather the
impossibility, which a corrupted city finds in maintaining an existing
free government, or in establishing a new one. So that had we to
establish or maintain a government in that city, it would be necessary
to give it a monarchical, rather than a popular form, in order that men
too arrogant to be restrained by the laws, might in some measure be
kept in check by a power almost absolute; since to attempt to make them
good otherwise would be a very cruel or a wholly futile endeavour.
This, as I have said, was the method followed by Cleomenes; and if he,
that he might stand alone, put to death the Ephori; and if Romulus,
with a like object, put to death his brother and Titus Tatius the
Sabine, and if both afterwards made good use of the authority they thus
acquired, it is nevertheless to be remembered that it was because
neither Cleomenes nor Romulus had to deal with so corrupt a people as
that of which I am now speaking, that they were able to effect their
ends and to give a fair colour to their acts.