Government as would have composed the Differences between the Commons
and the Senate._
I have spoken above of the effects produced in Rome by the
controversies between the commons and the senate. Now, as these lasted
down to the time of the Gracchi, when they brought about the overthrow
of freedom, some may think it matter for regret that Rome should not
have achieved the great things she did, without being torn by such
disputes. Wherefore, it seems to me worth while to consider whether the
government of Rome could ever have been constituted in such a way as to
prevent like controversies.
In making this inquiry we must first look to those republics which have
enjoyed freedom for a great while, undisturbed by any violent
contentions or tumults, and see what their government was, and whether
it would have been possible to introduce it into Rome. Of such
republics we have an example in ancient times in Sparta, in modern
times in Venice, of both which States I have already made mention.
Sparta created for herself a government consisting of a king and a
limited senate. Venice has made no distinction in the titles of her
rulers, all qualified to take part in her government being classed
under the one designation of “Gentlemen,” an arrangement due rather to
chance than to the foresight of those who gave this State its
constitution. For many persons, from causes already noticed, seeking
shelter on these rocks on which Venice now stands, after they had so
multiplied that if they were to continue to live together it became
necessary for them to frame laws, established a form of government; and
assembling often in their councils to consult for the interests of
their city, when it seemed to them that their numbers were sufficient
for political existence, they closed the entrance to civil rights
against all who came afterwards to live there, not allowing them to
take any part in the management of affairs. And when in course of time
there came to be many citizens excluded from the government, to add to
the importance of the governing body, they named these “Gentlemen”
(_gentiluomini_), the others “Plebeians” (_popolani_). And this
distinction could grow up and maintain itself without causing
disturbance; for as at the time of its origin, whosoever then lived in
Venice was made one of the governing body, none had reason to complain;
while those who came to live there afterwards, finding the government
in a completed form, had neither ground nor opportunity to object. No
ground, because nothing was taken from them; and no opportunity,
because those in authority kept them under control, and never employed
them in affairs in which they could acquire importance. Besides which,
they who came later to dwell in Venice were not so numerous as to
destroy all proportion between the governors and the governed; the
number of the “Gentlemen” being as great as, or greater than that of
the “Plebeians.” For these reasons, therefore, it was possible for
Venice to make her constitution what it is, and to maintain it without
divisions.
Sparta, again, being governed, as I have said, by a king and a limited
senate, was able to maintain herself for the long period she did,
because, from the country being thinly inhabited and further influx of
population forbidden, and from the laws of Lycurgus (the observance
whereof removed all ground of disturbance) being held in high esteem,
the citizens were able to continue long in unity. For Lycurgus having
by his laws established in Sparta great equality as to property, but
less equality as to rank, there prevailed there an equal poverty; and
the commons were less ambitious, because the offices of the State,
which were held to their exclusion, were confined to a few; and because
the nobles never by harsh treatment aroused in them any desire to usurp
these offices. And this was due to the Spartan kings, who, being
appointed to that dignity for life, and placed in the midst of this
nobility, had no stronger support to their authority than in defending
the people against injustice. Whence it resulted that as the people
neither feared nor coveted the power which they did not possess, the
conflicts which might have arisen between them and the nobles were
escaped, together with the causes which would have led to them; and in
this way they were able to live long united. But of this unity in
Sparta there were two chief causes: one, the fewness of its
inhabitants, which allowed of their being governed by a few; the other,
that by denying foreigners admission into their country, the people had
less occasion to become corrupted, and never so increased in numbers as
to prove troublesome to their few rulers.
Weighing all which circumstances, we see that to have kept Rome in the
same tranquility wherein these republics were kept, one of two courses
must have been followed by her legislators; for either, like the
Venetians, they must have refrained from employing the commons in war,
or else, like the Spartans, they must have closed their country to
foreigners. Whereas, in both particulars, they did the opposite, arming
the commons and increasing their number, and thus affording endless
occasions for disorder. And had the Roman commonwealth grown to be more
tranquil, this inconvenience would have resulted, that it must at the
same time have grown weaker, since the road would have been closed to
that greatness to which it came, for in removing the causes of her
tumults, Rome must have interfered with the causes of her growth.
And he who looks carefully into the matter will find, that in all human
affairs, we cannot rid ourselves of one inconvenience without running
into another. So that if you would have your people numerous and
warlike, to the end that with their aid you may establish a great
empire, you will have them of such a sort as you cannot afterwards
control at your pleasure; while should you keep them few and unwarlike,
to the end that you may govern them easily, you will be unable, should
you extend your dominions, to preserve them, and will become so
contemptible as to be the prey of any who attack you. For which reason
in all our deliberations we ought to consider where we are likely to
encounter least inconvenience, and accept that as the course to be
preferred, since we shall never find any line of action entirely free
from disadvantage.
Rome might, therefore, following the example of Sparta, have created a
king for life and a senate of limited numbers, but desiring to become a
great empire, she could not, like Sparta, have restricted the number of
her citizens. So that to have created a king for life and a limited
senate had been of little service to her.
Were any one, therefore, about to found a wholly new republic, he would
have to consider whether he desired it to increase as Rome did in
territory and dominion, or to continue within narrow limits. In the
former case he would have to shape its constitution as nearly as
possible on the pattern of the Roman, leaving room for dissensions and
popular tumults, for without a great and warlike population no republic
can ever increase, or increasing maintain itself. In the second case he
might give his republic a constitution like that of Venice or Sparta;
but since extension is the ruin of such republics, the legislator would
have to provide in every possible way against the State which he had
founded making any additions to its territories. For these, when
superimposed upon a feeble republic, are sure to be fatal to it: as we
see to have been the case with Sparta and Venice, the former of which,
after subjugating nearly all Greece, on sustaining a trifling reverse,
betrayed the insufficiency of her foundations, for when, after the
revolt of Thebes under Pelopidas, other cities also rebelled, the
Spartan kingdom was utterly overthrown. Venice in like manner, after
gaining possession of a great portion of Italy (most of it not by her
arms but by her wealth and subtlety), when her strength was put to the
proof, lost all in one pitched battle.
I can well believe, then, that to found a republic which shall long
endure, the best plan may be to give it internal institutions like
those of Sparta or Venice; placing it in a naturally strong situation,
and so fortifying it that none can expect to get the better of it
easily, yet, at the same time, not making it so great as to be
formidable to its neighbours; since by taking these precautions, it
might long enjoy its independence. For there are two causes which lead
to wars being made against a republic; one, your desire to be its
master, the other the fear lest it should master you; both of which
dangers the precaution indicated will go far to remove. For if, as we
are to assume, this republic be well prepared for defence, and
consequently difficult of attack, it will seldom or never happen that
any one will form the design to attack it, and while it keeps within
its own boundaries, and is seen from experience not to be influenced by
ambition, no one will be led, out of fear for himself, to make war upon
it, more particularly when its laws and constitution forbid its
extension. And were it possible to maintain things in this equilibrium,
I veritably believe that herein would be found the true form of
political life, and the true tranquility of a republic. But all human
affairs being in movement, and incapable of remaining as they are, they
must either rise or fall; and to many conclusions to which we are not
led by reason, we are brought by necessity. So that when we have given
institutions to a State on the footing that it is to maintain itself
without enlargement, should necessity require its enlargement, its
foundations will be cut from below it, and its downfall quickly ensue.
On the other hand, were a republic so favoured by Heaven as to lie
under no necessity of making war, the result of this ease would be to
make it effeminate and divided which two evils together, and each by
itself, would insure its ruin. And since it is impossible, as I
believe, to bring about an equilibrium, or to adhere strictly to the
mean path, we must, in arranging our republic, consider what is the
more honourable course for it to take, and so contrive that even if
necessity compel its enlargement, it may be able to keep what it gains.
But returning to the point first raised, I believe it necessary for us
to follow the method of the Romans and not that of the other republics,
for I know of no middle way. We must, consequently, put up with those
dissensions which arise between commons and senate, looking on them as
evils which cannot be escaped if we would arrive at the greatness of
Rome.
In connection with the arguments here used to prove that the authority
of the tribunes was essential in Rome to the guardianship of freedom,
we may naturally go on to show what advantages result to a republic
from the power of impeachment; which, together with others, was
conferred upon the tribunes; a subject to be noticed in the following
Chapter.