Right to accuse._
To those set forward in a commonwealth as guardians of public freedom,
no more useful or necessary authority can be given than the power to
accuse, either before the people, or before some council or tribunal,
those citizens who in any way have offended against the liberty of
their country.
A law of this kind has two effects most beneficial to a State: _first,_
that the citizens from fear of being accused, do not engage in attempts
hurtful to the State, or doing so, are put down at once and without
respect of persons: and _next,_ that a vent is given for the escape of
all those evil humours which, from whatever cause, gather in cities
against particular citizens; for unless an outlet be duly provided for
these by the laws, they flow into irregular channels and overwhelm the
State. There is nothing, therefore, which contributes so much to the
stability and permanence of a State, as to take care that the
fermentation of these disturbing humours be supplied by operation of
law with a recognized outlet. This might be shown by many examples, but
by none so clearly as by that of Coriolanus related by Livius, where he
tells us, that at a time when the Roman nobles were angry with the
plebeians (thinking that the appointment of tribunes for their
protection had made them too powerful), it happened that Rome was
visited by a grievous famine, to meet which the senate sent to Sicily
for corn. But Coriolanus, hating the commons, sought to persuade the
senate that now was the time to punish them, and to deprive them of the
authority which they had usurped to the prejudice of the nobles, by
withholding the distribution of corn, and so suffering them to perish
of hunger. Which advice of his coming to the ears of the people,
kindled them to such fury against him, that they would have slain him
as he left the Senate House, had not the tribunes cited him to appear
and answer before them to a formal charge.
In respect of this incident I repeat what I have just now said, how
useful and necessary it is for republics to provide by their laws a
channel by which the displeasure of the multitude against a single
citizen may find a vent. For when none such is regularly provided,
recourse will be had to irregular channels, and these will assuredly
lead to much worse results. For when a citizen is borne down by the
operation of the ordinary laws, even though he be wronged, little or no
disturbance is occasioned to the state: the injury he suffers not being
wrought by private violence, nor by foreign force, which are the causes
of the overthrow of free institutions, but by public authority and in
accordance with public ordinances, which, having definite limits set
them, are not likely to pass beyond these so as to endanger the
commonwealth. For proof of which I am content to rest on this old
example of Coriolanus, since all may see what a disaster it would have
been for Rome had he been violently put to death by the people. For, as
between citizen and citizen, a wrong would have been done affording
ground for fear, fear would have sought defence, defence have led to
faction, faction to divisions in the State, and these to its ruin. But
the matter being taken up by those whose office it was to deal with it,
all the evils which must have followed had it been left in private
hands were escaped.
In Florence, on the other hand, and in our own days, we have seen what
violent commotions follow when the people cannot show their displeasure
against particular citizens in a form recognized by the laws, in the
instance of Francesco Valori, at one time looked upon as the foremost
citizen of our republic. But many thinking him ambitious, and likely
from his high spirit and daring to overstep the limits of civil
freedom, and there being no way to oppose him save by setting up an
adverse faction, the result was, that, apprehending irregular attacks,
he sought to gain partisans for his support; while his opponents, on
their side, having no course open to them of which the laws approved,
resorted to courses of which the laws did not approve, and, at last, to
open violence. And as his influence had to be attacked by unlawful
methods, these were attended by injury not to him only, but to many
other noble citizens; whereas, could he have been met by constitutional
restraints, his power might have been broken without injury to any save
himself. I might also cite from our Florentine history the fall of
Piero Soderini, which had no other cause than there not being in our
republic any law under which powerful and ambitious citizens can be
impeached. For to form a tribunal by which a powerful citizen is to be
tried, eight judges only are not enough; the judges must be numerous,
because a few will always do the will of a few. But had there been
proper methods for obtaining redress, either the people would have
impeached Piero if he was guilty, and thus have given vent to their
displeasure without calling in the Spanish army; or if he was innocent,
would not have ventured, through fear of being accused themselves, to
have taken proceedings against him. So that in either case the bitter
spirit which was the cause of all the disorder would have had an end.
Wherefore, when we find one of the parties in a State calling in a
foreign power, we may safely conclude that it is because the defective
laws of that State provide no escape for those malignant humours which
are natural to men; which can best be done by arranging for an
impeachment before a sufficient number of judges, and by giving
countenance to this procedure. This was so well contrived in Rome that
in spite of the perpetual struggle maintained between the commons and
the senate, neither the senate nor the commons, nor any single citizen,
ever sought redress at the hands of a foreign power; for having a
remedy at home, there was no need to seek one abroad.
Although the examples above cited be proof sufficient of what I affirm,
I desire to adduce one other, recorded by Titus Livius in his history,
where he relates that a sister of Aruns having been violated by a
Lucumo of Clusium, the chief of the Etruscan towns, Aruns being unable,
from the interest of her ravisher, to avenge her, betook himself to the
Gauls who ruled in the province we now name Lombardy, and besought them
to come with an armed force to Clusium; showing them how with advantage
to themselves they might avenge his wrongs. Now, had Aruns seen that he
could have had redress through the laws of his country, he never would
have resorted to these Barbarians for help.
But as the right to accuse is beneficial in a republic, so calumny, on
the other hand, is useless and hurtful, as in the following Chapter I
shall proceed to show.