hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to
acquire Power or they who seek to maintain it are the greater cause of
Commotions._
Of the provisions made by wise founders of republics, one of the most
necessary is for the creation of a guardianship of liberty; for
according as this is placed in good or bad hands, the freedom of the
State will be more or less lasting. And because in every republic we
find the two parties of nobles and commons, the question arises, to
which of these two this guardianship can most safely be entrusted.
Among the Lacedæmonians of old, as now with the Venetians, it was
placed in the hands of the nobles, but with the Romans it was vested in
the commons. We have, therefore, to determine which of these States
made the wiser choice. If we look to reasons, something is to be said
on both sides of the question; though were we to look to results, we
should have to pronounce in favour of the nobles, inasmuch as the
liberty of Sparta and Venice has had a longer life than that of Rome.
As touching reasons, it may be pleaded for the Roman method, that they
are most fit to have charge of a thing, who least desire to pervert it
to their own ends. And, doubtless, if we examine the aims which the
nobles and the commons respectively set before them, we shall find in
the former a great desire to dominate, in the latter merely a desire
not to be dominated over, and hence a greater attachment to freedom,
since they have less to gain than the others by destroying it.
Wherefore, when the commons are put forward as the defenders of
liberty, they may be expected to take better care of it, and, as they
have no desire to tamper with it themselves, to be less apt to suffer
others to do so.
On the other hand, he who defends the method followed by the Spartans
and Venetians, may urge, that by confiding this guardianship to the
nobles, two desirable ends are served: first, that from being allowed
to retain in their own hands a weapon which makes them the stronger
party in the State, the ambition of this class is more fully satisfied;
and, second, that an authority is withdrawn from the unstable multitude
which as used by them is likely to lead to endless disputes and
tumults, and to drive the nobles into dangerous and desperate courses.
In instance whereof might be cited the case of Rome itself, wherein the
tribunes of the people being vested with this authority, not content to
have one consul a plebeian, insisted on having both; and afterwards
laid claim to the censorship, the prætorship and all the other
magistracies in the city. Nor was this enough for them, but, carried
away by the same factious spirit, they began after a time to pay court
to such men as they thought able to attack the nobility, and so gave
occasion to the rise of Marius and the overthrow of Rome.
Wherefore one who weighs both sides of the question well, might
hesitate which party he should choose as the guardian of public
liberty, being uncertain which class is more mischievous in a
commonwealth, that which would acquire what it has not, or that which
would keep the authority which it has already. But, on the whole, on a
careful balance of arguments we may sum up thus:—Either we have to deal
with a republic eager like Rome to extend its power, or with one
content merely to maintain itself; in the former case it is necessary
to do in all things as Rome did; in the latter, for the reasons and in
the manner to be shown in the following Chapter, we may imitate Venice
and Sparta.
But reverting to the question which class of citizens is more
mischievous in a republic, those who seek to acquire or those who fear
to lose what they have acquired already, I note that when Marcus
Menenius and Marcus Fulvius, both of them men of plebeian birth, were
made the one dictator, the other master of the knights, that they might
inquire into certain plots against Rome contrived in Capua, they had at
the same time authority given them by the people to investigate
whether, in Rome itself, irregular and corrupt practices had been used
to obtain the consulship and other honours of the city. The nobles
suspecting that the powers thus conferred were to be turned against
them, everywhere gave out that if honours had been sought by any by
irregular and unworthy means, it was not by them, but by the plebeians,
who, with neither birth nor merit to recommend them, had need to resort
to corruption. And more particularly they accused the dictator himself.
And so telling was the effect of these charges, that Menenius, after
haranguing the people and complaining to them of the calumnies
circulated against him, laid down his dictatorship, and submitted
himself to whatever judgment might be passed upon him. When his cause
came to be tried he was acquitted; but at the hearing it was much
debated, whether he who would retain power or he who would acquire it,
is the more dangerous citizen; the desires of both being likely to lead
to the greatest disorders.
Nevertheless, I believe that, as a rule, disorders are more commonly
occasioned by those seeking to preserve power, because in them the fear
of loss breeds the same passions as are felt by those seeking to
acquire; since men never think they hold what they have securely,
unless when they are gaining something new from others. It is also to
be said that their position enables them to operate changes with less
effort and greater efficacy. Further, it may be added, that their
corrupt and insolent behaviour inflames the minds of those who have
nothing, with the desire to have; either for the sake of punishing
their adversaries by despoiling them, or to obtain for themselves a
share of those riches and honours which they see the others abuse.