THE "SO-CALLED" SIEGE BEGINS
When the Communists launched their TET Offensive on 30 January, they
struck in force almost everywhere in South Vietnam except Khe Sanh.
Their prime targets were not military installations but the major
population centers--36 provincial capitals, 64 district capitals, and
5 autonomous cities. The leaders in Hanoi were apparently becoming
dissatisfied with their attempts to win in the South by a protracted
war of attrition and decided on one massive stroke to tip the scales in
their favor. Consequently, the enemy unleashed some 62,000 troops, many
of whom infiltrated the cities disguised as civilians, in hopes that
they could foster a public uprising against the central government and
encourage mass defections among the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
Virtually all available VC main and local force units were thrown into
the initial attacks. With the exception of Hue and Da Nang, NVA units
were generally committed a few days later to reinforce the assault
troops.(73)
The sudden onslaught initially achieved surprise but, in the final
analysis, the overall military effort failed miserably. Allied forces
reacted quickly and drove the invaders from the cities and towns,
killing approximately 32,000 (as of 11 February) hard-core guerrillas
and North Vietnamese soldiers in the process. Many Viet Cong units,
with no other orders than to take their initial objectives and hold
until reinforcements arrived, were wiped out completely. Ironically,
these elite cadres were the backbone of the guerrilla infrastructure
in the South which the Communists, up to that point, had tried so hard
to preserve. In Saigon and Hue, die-hard remnants held out for several
weeks but, for the most part, the attacks were crushed within a few
days. The general uprising and mass desertions never materialized;
on the contrary, the offensive tended to galvanize the South
Vietnamese.(74)
Even though he paid an exorbitant price, the enemy did achieve
certain gains. If the Communists' goal was to create sensational
headlines which would stun the American people--they succeeded. To the
strategists in Hanoi, an important byproduct of any military operation
was the associated political ramifications in the United States;
namely, how much pressure would certain factions put on their leaders
to disengage from the struggle in South Vietnam. To the delight of the
Communists, no doubt, the TET Offensive had a tremendous psychological
impact in the U. S. and, as usual, the response of the dissidents was
vociferous. Much of the reaction was completely out of proportion to
the actual military situation but it had a definite demoralizing effect
on the American public--the long-range implications of which are still
undetermined.(75)
Another casualty of these nation-wide attacks was the pacification
program in rural communities. When the Allies pulled back to clear the
cities, they temporarily abandoned portions of the countryside to the
enemy. Upon return, they found that progress in the so-called "battle
for the hearts and minds of the people" had received a temporary set
back.(76)
To achieve these ends, however, the enemy troops brought senseless
destruction to Vietnamese cities and heaped more suffering upon an
already war-weary populace. Thousands of innocent civilians were killed
and hundreds of thousands made homeless--mostly in Saigon/Cholon and
Hue. Four days after the initial attacks, the central government
formed the Central Recovery Committee which, with U. S. assistance,
launched Project RECOVERY to help alleviate the misery of the people.
Had this program not been implemented, the Communists might have come
much closer to achieving their goal of overthrowing the government. In
addition to the destruction in the cities, the enemy violated a sacred
religious holiday and, what's worse, actually desecrated a national
shrine by turning the majestic Hue Citadel into a bloody battlefield.
For these acts, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese earned the
deep-seated hatred of many South Vietnamese who in the past had been,
at best, neutral.(77)
Whether or not Khe Sanh was, in fact, the ultimate enemy objective
or merely a diversion for the TET Offensive has not yet been
established with certainty. The U. S. command in Saigon believed that
the Communists' goal was to create a general uprising, precipitate
mass defections in the RVN armed forces, and then seize power. The
concentration of NVA regular forces in the northern two provinces was
primarily to support this overall objective but it was also possible
that the enemy had a secondary aspiration of shearing off and seizing
the Quang Tri-Thua Thien area should his primary effort fail. Thus
Khe Sanh was envisioned as an integral part of the master plan, or as
General Westmoreland called it "an option play."
Subsequent events tended to vindicate that evaluation. Since the
initial nation-wide attacks had been conducted primarily by Viet Cong
guerrillas and main force units, the NVA regular forces remained
relatively unscathed and, with two of the four North Vietnamese
divisions known to be in I Corps poised around the 26th Marines, there
was little doubt as to where the next blow would fall. Furthermore, the
enemy's extensive preparations around the base reinforced the belief
that this effort was a major offensive and not just a feint. Before
investing the garrison, the North Vietnamese dug positions for their
long-range artillery pieces. Later, they emplaced countless smaller
supporting weapons, established numerous supply depots, and began the
ant-like construction of their intricate siege-works. This intensive
build-up continued long after most of the fighting associated with the
TET Offensive was over.(78)
The enemy had much to gain by taking Khe Sanh. If they could seize
any portion of Quang Tri Province, the Communists would have a much
stronger bargaining position at any future conference table. In
addition, the spectre of Dien Bien Phu which was constantly raised in
the American press undoubtedly led the enemy to believe that the coming
battle could not only prove successful but decisive. If the garrison
fell, the defeat might well turn out to be the =coup de grace= to
American participation in the war. At first, the Marines anticipated
a major pitched battle, similar to the one in 1967, but the enemy
continued to bide his time and the battle at Khe Sanh settled into one
of supporting arms.(79)
At Khe Sanh, the periodic showers of enemy artillery shells were,
quite naturally, a major source of concern to General Tompkins and
Colonel Lownds and they placed a high priority on the construction
of stout fortifications. Understandably, not every newcomer to Khe
Sanh immediately moved into a thick bunker or a six-foot trench
with overhead cover. The colonel had spent most of his tour with a
one-battalion regiment and had prepared positions for that battalion;
then, almost overnight, his command swelled to five battalions. The
new units simply had to build their own bunkers as quickly as they
could.(80)
[Illustration: Marines at the combat base run for cover when warning of
enemy rocket or artillery attack is sounded. (USMC Photo A190245)]
[Illustration: Machine gunners lie on top of trench cover while they
search for enemy movement. (USMC Photo A190929)]
The regimental commander placed a minimum requirement on his
subordinates of providing overhead cover for the troops that would
stop, at least, an 82mm mortar round. The FSCC determined that one
strip of runway matting and two or three layers of sandbags would
fill the requirement. The average bunker usually started as an 8x8
foot dugout with one 6x6 inch timber inserted in each corner and the
center for support. The overhead consisted of planks, a strip of runway
matting, sandbags, loose dirt, and more sandbags. Some enterprising
Marines piled on more loose dirt, then took discarded 105mm casings
and drove them into the top of the bunker like nails. These casings
often caused pre-detonation of the heavier-caliber rounds. The combat
engineers attached to the 26th Marines could build one of these bunkers
in three or four days; the average infantrymen took longer. Overhead
cover for the trenchlines consisted of a strip of matting placed across
the top of the trench at intervals and reinforced with sandbags. The
defenders could stand up in the trench during periods of inactivity and
duck under the matting when enemy rounds started to fall.(81)
The Marines were also faced with another question concerning their
defenses: "How large an artillery round could you defend against
and still remain within the realm of practicality?" Since the 26th
Marines was supplied solely by air, building material was a prime
consideration. Matting and sandbags were easy enough to come by but
lumber was at a premium. Fortifications which could withstand a hit
from an 82mm mortar were a must because the North Vietnamese had an
ample supply of these weapons but the base was also being pounded, to
a lesser degree, by heavier-caliber guns. With the material available
to the 26th Marines, it was virtually impossible to construct a shelter
that was thick enough or deep enough to stop the heavy stuff.(82)
This fact was borne out when Colonel Lownds decided to build a new
regimental CP bunker. The engineers supplied the specifications for an
overhead that would withstand a 122mm rocket; to be on the safe side,
the colonel doubled the thickness of the roof. The day before the CP
was to be occupied, a 152mm round landed squarely on top of the bunker
and penetrated both layers.(83)
The massing of enemy artillery made the hill outposts that much
more important. Had they been able to knock the Marines from those
summits, the North Vietnamese would have been able to fire right down
the throats of the base defenders and make their position untenable.
As it was, the companies on Hills 881S, 861, 861A, and 558 not only
denied the enemy an unobstructed firing platform from which to pound
the installation, they also served as the eyes for the rest of the
regiment in the valley which was relatively blind to enemy movement.
For observation purposes, Hill 881S was the most strategically located
and a discussion of the enemy's heavy weaponry will point out why.
While the 60mm and 82mm mortars were scattered around in proximity
of the combat base (roughly within a 2,000-3,000 meter radius), the
NVA rocket sites and artillery pieces were located well to the west,
southwest, and northwest, outside of friendly counterbattery range. One
particularly awesome and effective weapon was the Soviet-built 122mm
rocket, the ballistic characteristics of which had a lot to do with
the way the North Vietnamese employed it. When fired, the projectile
was fairly accurate in deflection but, because it was powered by a
propellant, the biggest margin of error was in range. Consequently,
the North Vietnamese preferred to position their launching sites so
the gunners could track along the long axis of a given target; thus,
longs and shorts would land "in the ballpark." The KSCB hugged the
airstrip and was roughly in the shape of a rectangle with the long axis
running east and west. This made the optimum firing positions for the
122mm rocket either to the east or west of the base on line with the
runway. There was really only one logical choice because the eastern
site would have placed the rockets within range of the Americans' 175s
and extended the enemy's supply lines from Laos. To the west, Hills
881S or 861 would have been ideal locations because in clear weather
those vantage points provided an excellent view of Khe Sanh and were
almost directly on line with the airstrip. Unfortunately for the NVA,
the Marines had squatters' rights on those pieces of real estate and
were rather hostile to claim jumpers. As an alternative, the North
Vietnamese decided on 881N but this choice had one drawback since the
line of sight between that northern peak and the combat base was masked
by the top of Hill 861. Nevertheless, the enemy emplaced hundreds of
launching sites along its slopes and throughout the siege approximately
5,000 122mm rockets rained on Khe Sanh from 881N.(84)
Because of their greater range, the enemy's 130mm and 152mm artillery
batteries were located even further to the west. These guns were
cleverly concealed in two main firing positions. One was on Co Roc
Mountain which was southwest of where Route 9 crossed the Laotian
border; the other area was 305, so called because it was on a
bearing of 305 degrees (west-northwest) from Hill 881S at a range
of about 10,000 meters. While the heavy caliber artillery rounds
which periodically ripped into the base were usually referred to as
originating from Co Roc, 305 was the source of about 60-70 percent
of this fire, probably because it was adjacent to a main supply
artery. Both sites were vulnerable only to air attack and were
extremely difficult to pinpoint because of the enemy's masterful job
of camouflage, his cautious employment, and the extreme distance from
friendly observation posts. The NVA gunners fired only a few rounds
every hour so that continuous muzzle flashes did not betray their
positions and, after each round, quickly scurried out to cover the guns
with protective nets and screens. Some pieces, mounted on tracks,
were wheeled out of caves in Co Roc Mountain, fired, and returned
immediately. Though never used in as great a quantity as the rockets
and mortars, these shells wreaked havoc at Khe Sanh because there was
very little that they could not penetrate; even duds went about four
feet into the ground.(85)
The 3/26 elements on Hill 881S were a constant thorn in the enemy's
side because the men on that most isolated of the Marine outposts could
observe all three of the main NVA firing positions--881N, 305, and Co
Roc. When rockets lifted off of 881N or the guns at Co Roc lashed out,
the men of Company I could see the flashes and provided advance warning
to the base. Whenever possible they directed retaliatory air strikes
on the offenders.[25] Whenever the enemy artillery at 305 opened up,
the muzzle flashes were hard to see because of the distance and the
everpresent dust from air strikes, but the rounds made a loud rustling
noise as they arched directly over 881S on the way to Khe Sanh. When
the Marines heard the rounds streak overhead, they passed a warning to
the base over the 3d Battalion tactical radio net, provided the net was
not clogged with other traffic. The message was short and to the point:
"Arty, Arty, Co Roc" or "Arty, Arty, 305."(86)
At the base the Marines had devised a crude but effective early warning
system for such attacks. Motor transport personnel had mounted a horn
from a two-and-a-half ton truck in the top of a tree and the lead wires
were attached to two beer can lids. When a message was received from
881S, a Marine, who monitored the radio, pressed the two lids together
and the blaring horn gave advanced warning of the incoming artillery
rounds. The radio operator relayed the message over the regimental net
and then dived into a hole. Men in the open usually had from five to
eighteen seconds to find cover or just hit the deck before "all hell
broke loose." When poor visibility obscured the view between 881S and
the base, the radio operator usually picked himself up, dusted off, and
jokingly passed a three-word message to Company I which indicated that
the rounds had arrived on schedule--"Roger India ... Splash."(87)
[Illustration: A Marine forward observer keeps a watchful eye on enemy
trenches. (USMC Photo A190933)]
[Illustration: "Arty, Arty, Co Roc" was the title of a popular folksong
in 3/26. (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)]
[Illustration: Colors over Hill 881S. (Photo courtesy Major William H.
Dabney)]
[Illustration: Water on Hill 881S was scarce and beards flourished.
2dLt Richard M. Foley, XO of India, 3/26. (Photo courtesy Major William
H. Dabney)]
The fact that Company I on 881S was the fly in the enemy's ointment
was no secret, especially to the enemy. As a result, North Vietnamese
gunners made the Marines' existence there a veritable nightmare.
Although no official tally of incoming rounds was recorded, Captain
Dabney's position took a much more severe pounding than any of the
other hill outposts. Volume, however, was only part of the story
because the incoming was almost always the heavier stuff. The hill
received little 60mm or 82mm mortar fire but a deluge of 120mm mortar
and 100mm artillery rounds. There was also a smattering of 152mm shells
from Co Roc. The shelling was the heaviest when helicopters made
resupply runs.
The firing position which plagued the Marines the most was located to
the southwest of the hill in a U-shaped draw known as "the Horseshoe."
There were at least two NVA 120mm mortars in this area which, in
spite of an avalanche of American bombs and artillery shells, were
either never knocked out or were frequently replaced. These tubes
were registered on the hill and harassed Company I constantly. Anyone
caught above ground when one of the 120s crashed into the perimeter
was almost certain to become a casualty because the explosion produced
an extremely large fragmentation pattern. Captain Dabney figured that
it took one layer of runway matting, eight of sandbags, and one of
either rocks or 105mm casings to prevent penetration of a 120mm with
a quick fuze--nothing the Marines had on 881S could stop a round with
a delayed fuze. Because of the shape of the hill, the summit was the
only defendable terrain and thus provided the enemy with a compact
target; this often resulted in multiple casualties when the big rounds
landed within the perimeter. The only thing that the Marines had going
for them was that they could frequently spot a tell-tale flash of an
artillery piece or hear the "thunk" when a mortar round left the tube
but the heavy shells took their toll. On Hill 881S alone, 40 Marines
were killed throughout the siege and over 150 were wounded at least
once.(88)
Considering the sheer weight of the bombardment, enemy shells caused a
relatively small number of fatalities at the base. Besides the solid
fortifications, there were two factors which kept casualties to a
minimum. The first was the flak jacket--a specially designed nylon
vest reinforced with overlapping fiberglass plates. The jacket would
not stop a high-velocity bullet but it did protect a man's torso and
most vital organs against shell fragments. The bulky vest was not
particularly popular in hot weather when the Marines were on patrol
but in a static, defensive position the jacket was ideal. The second
factor was the high quality of leadership at platoon and company level.
Junior officers and staff noncommissioned officers (NCOs) constantly
moved up and down the lines to supervise the younger, inexperienced
Marines, many of whom had only recently arrived in Vietnam. The
veteran staff NCOs, long known as the "backbone of the Corps," knew
from experience that troops had to be kept busy. A man who was left to
ponder his problems often developed a fatalistic attitude that could
increase his reaction time and decrease his life time. The crusty NCOs
did not put much stock in the old cliche: "If a round has your name on
it, there's nothing you can do." Consequently, the Marines worked; they
dug trenches, filled sandbags, ran for cover, and returned to fill more
sandbags. Morale remained high and casualties, under the circumstances,
were surprisingly low.(89)
Although the NVA encircled the KSCB and applied constant pressure,
the defenders were never restricted entirely to the confines of the
perimeter. The term "siege," in the strictest sense of the word, was
somewhat of a misnomer because the Allies conducted a number of daily
patrols, often as far as 500 meters from their own lines.[26](90) These
excursions were primarily for security and reconnaissance purposes
since General Tompkins did not want his men engaged in a slugging match
with the enemy outside the defensive wire. If the North Vietnamese were
encountered, the Marines broke contact and withdrew, while supporting
arms were employed.(91)
One vital area was the drop zone. When the weather turned bad in
February, the KSCB was supplied primarily by parachute drops. Colonel
Lownds set up his original zone inside the FOB-3 compound but later
moved it several hundred meters west of Red Sector because he was
afraid that the falling pallets might injure someone. Lieutenant
Colonel Mitchell's 1/9 was given responsibility for security of the
drop zone and his patrols conducted daily sweeps along the periphery of
the drop area to flush out enemy troops who might try to disrupt the
collection of supplies. In addition, combat engineers swept through the
zone each morning and cleared out any mines the enemy set in during the
night. Thus the defenders at Khe Sanh were never
completely hemmed-in, but the regimental commander
admitted that any expedition beyond sight of the base was an invitation
to trouble.(92)
The Allies did more than prepare defenses and conduct patrols because
the NVA launched three of its heaviest ground attacks during the
first week in February. In the predawn hours of 5 February, the North
Vietnamese lashed out at the Marine base and adjacent outposts with
nearly 200 artillery rounds while a battalion from the =325C NVA
Division= assaulted Hill 861A. Colonel Lownds immediately placed all
units on Red Alert and, within minutes, 1/13 was returning fire in
support of E/2/26.
The fight on Hill 861A was extremely bitter. At 0305 the North
Vietnamese opened up on Captain Breeding's positions with a tremendous
82mm mortar barrage. This was followed by continuous volleys of RPG
rounds which knocked out several Marine crew-served weapons and
shielded the advance of the NVA sappers and assault troops. The North
Vietnamese blew lanes through the barbed wire along the northern
perimeter and slammed into the Company E lines. Second Lieutenant
Donald E. Shanley's 1st Platoon bore the brunt of the attack and reeled
back to supplementary positions. Quickly the word filtered back to the
company CP that the enemy was inside the wire and Captain Breeding
ordered that all units employ tear gas in defense but the North
Vietnamese were obviously "hopped up" on some type of narcotic and the
searing fumes had very little effect. Following the initial assault
there was a brief lull in the fighting. The NVA soldiers apparently
felt that, having secured the northernmost trenchline, they owned the
entire objective and stopped to sift through the Marine positions for
souvenirs. Magazines and paperbacks were the most popular. Meanwhile,
the temporary reversal only served to enrage the Marines. Following a
shower of grenades, Lieutenant Shanley and his men charged back into
their original positions and swarmed all over the surprised enemy
troops.(93)
The counterattack quickly deteriorated into a melee that resembled a
bloody, waterfront barroom brawl--a style of fighting not completely
alien to most Marines. Because the darkness and ground fog drastically
reduced visibility, hand-to-hand combat was a necessity. Using their
knives, bayonets, rifle butts, and fists, the men of the 1st Platoon
ripped into the hapless North Vietnamese with a vengeance. Captain
Breeding, a veteran of the Korean conflict who had worked his way up
through the ranks, admitted that, at first, he was concerned over how
his younger, inexperienced Marines would react in their first fight.
As it turned out, they were magnificent. The captain saw one of his
men come face to face with a North Vietnamese in the inky darkness;
the young American all but decapitated his adversary with a crushing,
round-house right to the face, then leaped on the flattened soldier
and finished the job with a knife. Another man was jumped from behind
by a North Vietnamese who grabbed him around the neck and was just
about to slit his throat, when one of the Marine's buddies jabbed
the muzzle of his M-16 between the two combatants. With his selector
on full automatic, he fired off a full magazine; the burst tore huge
chunks from the back of the embattled Marine's flak jacket but it also
cut the North Vietnamese in half. Since the fighting was at such close
quarters, both sides used hand grenades at extremely short-range. The
Marines had the advantage because of their armored vests and they would
throw a grenade, then turn away from the blast, hunch up, and absorb
the fragments in their flak jackets and the backs of their legs. On
several occasions, Captain Breeding's men used this technique and "blew
away" enemy soldiers at less than 10 meters.(94)
No one engaged in the donnybrook was exactly sure just how long it
lasted--all were too busy fighting to check their watches. More than
likely, the enemy was inside the wire less than a half hour. During
the fighting, Captain Breeding fed fire team-sized elements from the
2d and 3d Platoons into the fray from both flanks of the penetration.
The newcomers appeared to be afraid that they might miss all the action
and tore into the enemy as if they were making up for lost time. Even
though the E/2/26 company commander was no newcomer to blood and gore,
he was awed by the ferocity of the attack. Captain Breeding later said:
"It was like watching a World War II movie. Charlie didn't know how to
cope with it ... we walked all over them."(95) Those dazed NVA soldiers
who survived the vicious onslaught retreated into another meatgrinder;
as they ran from the hill, they were blasted by recoilless rifle fire
from 2/26 which was located on Hill 558.
At approximately 0610, the North Vietnamese officers rallied the
battered remnants and tried again, but the second effort was also
stopped cold. By this time, Captain Breeding, who was busier than the
proverbial one-armed paper hanger, was assisting in the coordination
of fire support from five separate sources (i.e. Hills 861A, 881S,
558, the KSCB, and the 175mm gun bases). The Marines of Captain
Dabney's I/3/26, located on Hill 881S provided extremely effective and
enthusiastic support throughout the attack. In three hours, Captain
Dabney's men pumped out close to 1,100 rounds from only three 81mm
mortars, and the tubes became so hot that they actually glowed in the
dark.[27] Again, the bulk of the heavy artillery fire, along with radar
controlled bombing missions, was placed on the northern avenues leading
to the hill positions. The enemy units, held in reserve, were thus
shredded by the bombardment as they moved up to continue the attack.(96)
After the second assault fizzled out, the North Vietnamese withdrew,
but enemy gunners shelled the base and outposts throughout the day.
At 1430, replacements from 2/26 were helilifted to Hill 861A. Captain
Breeding had lost seven men, most of whom were killed in the opening
barrage, and another 35 were medevaced so the new arrivals brought
E/2/26 back up to normal strength. On the other hand, the NVA suffered
109 known dead; many still remained in the 1st Platoon area where they
had been shot, slashed, or bludgeoned to death. As near as Captain
Breeding could tell, he did not lose a single man during the fierce
hand-to-hand struggle; all American deaths were apparently the result
of the enemy's mortar barrage and supporting fire. The Marines never
knew how many other members of the =325C NVA Division= had fallen
as a result of the heavy artillery and air strikes but the number
was undoubtedly high. All in all, it had been a bad day for the
Communists.(97)
The North Vietnamese took their revenge in the early morning hours of
7 February; their victims were the defenders of the Special Forces
camp at Lang Vei. At 0042, an American advisor reported that the
installation was under heavy attack by enemy tanks. This was the first
time that the NVA had employed its armor in the south and, within 13
minutes, 9 PT-76 Soviet-built tanks churned through the defensive wire,
rumbled over the anti-personnel minefields, and bulled their way into
the heart of the compound.[28](98) A battalion from the =66th Regiment,
304th NVA Division=, equipped with satchel charges, tear gas, and
flame-throwers, followed with an aggressive infantry assault that was
coordinated with heavy attacks by fire on the 26th Marines. Colonel
Lownds placed the base on Red Alert and the FSCC called in immediate
artillery and air in support of the beleaguered Lang Vei garrison.
Although the Marines responded quickly, the defensive fires had little
effect because, by that time, the enemy had overrun the camp.[29](99)
The defenders who survived buttoned themselves up in bunkers and, at
0243, called for artillery fire to dust off their own positions.(100)
Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's artillerymen responded with scores of
deadly air bursts which peppered the target area with thousands of
fragments. The 1/13 batteries fired over 300 rounds that morning and
the vast fire superiority was echoed in the radio transmission of one
Lang Vei defender who said: "We don't know what you're using but for
God's sake keep it up." That was one of the last transmissions to
Khe Sanh because, at 0310, the Marines lost communications with the
camp.(101).
Part of Colonel Lownds' mission as coordinator of all friendly forces
in the Khe Sanh area was to provide artillery support for Lang Vei
and, if possible, to reinforce the camp in case of attack. Under the
circumstances, a relief in strength was out of the question. In early
January, when M/3/26 was in reserve, Lieutenant Colonel Alderman and
Major Caulfield had conducted a personal reconnaissance of Route 9
between the KSCB and Lang Vei to determine the feasibility of moving
a large unit overland. Their opinion was that any such attempt would
be suicidal because the terrain bordering Route 9 was so well suited
for an ambush it was an "NVA dream." Any column moving down the road,
especially at night, would undoubtedly have been ambushed.[30](102)
If the Marines went directly over the mountains, they would have to
hack through the dense growth and waste precious hours.[31](103) A
large-scale heliborne effort was ruled out because the North Vietnamese
apparently anticipated such a move and withdrew their tanks to the only
landing zones near the camp which were suitable for such an operation.
Even with tactical aircraft providing suppressive fire, a helo assault
into the teeth of enemy armor was ill-advised. The most important
factor, however, was that NVA units in the area greatly outnumbered any
force Colonel Lownds could commit.(104)
Since a relief in force was undesirable, plans for a hit and run rescue
attempt were quickly drawn up at General Cushman's headquarters. Once
General Westmoreland had given the green light, Major General Norman J.
Anderson, commanding the 1st MAW and Colonel Jonathan F. Ladd of the U.
S. Army Special Forces, worked out the details. Two major points agreed
upon were that the helicopters employed in the operation would be those
which were not essential to the 26th Marines at the moment and that
Marine fixed-wing support would be provided.(105)
As soon as it was light, the survivors of the Lang Vei garrison managed
to break out of their bunkers and work their way to the site of an
older camp some 400-500 meters to the east. Later that same day, a
raiding party composed of 40 CIDG personnel and 10 U. S. Army Special
Forces advisors from FOB-3 boarded Quang Tri-based MAG-36 helicopters
and took off for Lang Vei. A flight of Huey gunships, led by Lieutenant
Colonel William J. White, Commanding Officer of Marine Observation
Squadron 6, as well as jet aircraft escorted the transport choppers.
While the jets and Hueys covered their approach, the helicopters
swooped into a small strip at the old camp and took on survivors,
including 15 Americans. In spite of the heavy suppressive fire provided
by the escorts, three transport helos suffered battle damage during the
evacuation. One overloaded chopper, flown by Captain Robert J. Richards
of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262, had to make the return trip
to Khe Sanh at treetop level because the excess weight prevented the
pilot from gaining altitude.[32](106)
There was a large number of indigenous personnel--both military and
civilian--who could not get out on the helicopters and had to move
overland to Khe Sanh. A portion of these were members of the Laotian
Volunteer Battalion 33 which on 23 January had been overrun at Ban
Houei San, Laos (near the Laotian/South Vietnam border) by three NVA
battalions. The remnants fled across the border and took refuge at Lang
Vei and when the Special Forces camp fell, the Laotians continued their
trek to the east with a host of other refugees. At 0800 on the 8th,
about 3,000 approached the southern perimeter at Khe Sanh and requested
admittance. Colonel Lownds, fearing that NVA infiltrators were in their
midst, denied them entrance until each was searched and processed. This
took place near the FOB-3 compound after which some of the refugees
were evacuated. The Laotians were eventually returned to their own
country.(107)
Also on the morning of 8 February, elements of the =101D Regiment=,
=325C Division= launched the first daylight attack against the 26th
Marines. At 0420, a reinforced battalion hit the 1st Platoon, A/1/9,
which occupied Hill 64 some 500 meters west of the 1/9 perimeter.
Following their usual pattern, the North Vietnamese tried to disrupt
the Marines' artillery support with simultaneous bombardment of the
base. To prevent friendly reinforcements from reaching the small hill
the enemy also shelled the platoon's parent unit and, during the fight,
some 350 mortar and artillery rounds fell on the 1/9 positions. The NVA
assault troops launched a two-pronged attack against the northwestern
and southwestern corners of the A/1/9 outpost and either blew the
barbed wire with bangalore torpedoes or threw canvas on top of the
obstacles and rolled over them. The enemy soldiers poured into the
trenchline and attacked the bunkers with RPGs and satchel charges. They
also emplaced machine guns at the edge of the penetrations and pinned
down those Marines in the eastern half of the perimeter who were trying
to cross over the hill and reinforce their comrades.(108)
The men in the northeastern sector, led by the platoon commander,
Second Lieutenant Terence R. Roach, Jr., counterattacked down the
trenchline and became engaged in savage hand-to-hand fighting. While
rallying his troops and directing fire from atop an exposed bunker,
Lieutenant Roach was mortally wounded. From sheer weight of numbers,
the North Vietnamese gradually pushed the Marines back until the enemy
owned the western half of the outpost. At that point, neither side was
able to press the advantage. Pre-registered mortar barrages from 1/9
and artillery fire from the KSCB had isolated the NVA assault units
from any reinforcements but at the same time the depleted 1st Platoon
was not strong enough to dislodge the enemy.(109)
One Marine had an extremely close call during the fight but lived to
tell about it. On the northern side of the perimeter, Private First
Class Michael A. Barry of the 1st Squad was engaged in a furious hand
grenade duel with the NVA soldiers when a ChiCom grenade hit him on
top of the helmet and landed at the young Marine's feet. PFC Barry
quickly picked it up and drew back to throw but the grenade went off
in his hand. Had it been an American M-26 grenade, the private would
undoubtedly have been blown to bits but ChiCom grenades frequently
produced an uneven frag pattern. In this case, the bulk of the blast
went down and away from the Marine's body; Barry had the back of his
right arm, his back, and his right leg peppered with metal fragments
but he did not lose any fingers and continued to function for the rest
of the battle.(110)
In another section of the trenchline, Lance Corporal Robert L. Wiley
had an equally hair-raising experience. Wiley, a shell-shock victim,
lay flat on his back in one of the bunkers which had been overrun by
the enemy. His eardrums had burst, he was temporarily paralyzed and
his glazed eyes were fixed in a corpse-like stare but the Marine was
alive and fully aware of what was going on around him. Thinking that
Wiley was dead, the North Vietnamese were only interested in rummaging
through his personal effects for souvenirs. One NVA soldier found the
Marine's wallet and took out several pictures including a snapshot of
his family gathered around a Christmas tree. After pocketing their
booty, the North Vietnamese moved on; Lance Corporal Wiley was later
rescued by the relief column.(111)
At 0730, Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell committed a second platoon,
headed by the Company A commander, Captain Henry J. M. Radcliffe, to
the action. By 0900, the relief force had made its way to the eastern
slope of the small hill and established contact with the trapped
platoon. During the advance, Companies B and D, along with one section
of tanks, delivered murderous direct fire to the flanks and front
of Captain Radcliffe's column, breaking up any attempt by the enemy
to interdict the linkup. After several flights of strike aircraft
had pasted the reverse slope of the hill, the company commander led
his combined forces in a frontal assault over the crest and, within
15 minutes, drove the North Vietnamese from the outpost. Automatic
weapons chopped down many North Vietnamese as they fled from the hill.
The battered remnants of the enemy force retreated to the west and,
once in the open, were also taken under fire by the rest of the Marine
battalion. In addition, the artillery batteries at KSCB contributed to
the slaughter and, when the smoke cleared, 150 North Vietnamese were
dead. Although the platoon lines were restored, Colonel Lownds decided
to abandon the position and, at 1200, the two units withdrew with their
casualties. Marine losses that morning on the outpost were 21 killed
and 26 wounded; at the base, 5 were killed and 6 wounded.(112)
During the next two weeks, the NVA mounted no major ground attack but
continued to apply pressure on the KSCB. There were daily clashes along
the Marine lines but these were limited to small fire fights, sniping
incidents, and probes against the wire. A decrease in activity along
the various infiltration routes indicated that the enemy had completed
his initial buildup and was busily consolidating positions from which
to launch an all-out effort. The Allies continued to improve their
defenses and by mid-February most units occupied positions with three
or four layers of barbed wire, dense minefields, special detection
devices, deep trenches, and mortar-proof bunkers. The battle reverted
to a contest of supporting arms and the North Vietnamese stepped up
their shelling of the base, especially with direct fire weapons.
Attempts to silence the enemy guns were often frustrated because the
Marines were fighting two battles during February--one with the NVA,
the other with the weather.(113)