Mr. Spencer in admitting that “the general drift of the passages quoted
makes it tolerably clear that Kant must have believed in the operation of
natural causes ... in producing organic forms,” adds:
“He does not, however, extend the theory of natural genesis to
the exclusion of the theory of supernatural genesis.”
How does Mr. Spencer prove his statement? Does he quote a passage from
Kant which expresses his belief in supernaturalism? No, Mr. Spencer does
not quote Kant, and it would be difficult to find a passage to suit that
purpose. Mr. Spencer adduces a few unmeaning phrases gleaned at random
and torn out of their context, and from these phrases he concludes
that Kant believed in the supernatural. Kant spoke somewhere of “the
wisdom of nature” who has things so arranged that the species might be
preserved. If the wisdom of nature in preserving the species is to be
taken literally, the phrase might prove that Kant believed nature to be a
wise old woman. Kant spoke further of “the germ of reason placed in man
whereby he is destined to social intercourse.” Does the usage of the word
“destined” really “imply divine intervention,” as Mr. Spencer says? Mr.
Spencer adds:
“And this [viz. Kant’s usage of these phrases] shows that I was
justified in ascribing to him the belief that Space and Time,
as forms of thought [sic!], are supernatural endowments.”
What might we not prove by this kind of loose argumentation!
Kant did not introduce any supernatural explanations; on the contrary, he
proposed to exclude “supernatural genesis.” He says e. g. in a passage of
the “Critique of Judgment” quoted on page 41 of the appendix:
“If we assume occasionalism for the production of organised
beings, nature is thereby wholly discarded ... therefore it
cannot be supposed that this system is accepted by anyone who
has had to do with philosophy.”
And furthermore Kant rejects the partial admission of the supernatural,
saying:
“As though it were not the same to make the required forms
arise in a supernatural manner at the beginning of the world as
during its progress.”
Mr. Spencer charges Kant with inconsistency. We do not intend to say that
Kant was in all the phases of his development consistent with himself.
But we do say that the charge of Mr. Spencer against Kant consists in
this: the real Kant has said things which are incompatible with Mr.
Spencer’s view of Kant.
This settles the sixth point.