VII.

Mr. Spencer’s reply to my criticism is a very strange piece of

controversy and I have actually been at a loss, how to account for it.

The situation can be explained only by assuming that Mr. Spencer,

being an impatient reader, when finding out that he disagreed with my

propositions, could go no further and wrote his reply to me without

having read my articles. This is very hard on a critic who, carefully

avoiding everything that might look like fault-finding, is painstakingly

careful in giving to the author criticised every means of investigating

the truth himself and helps him in a friendly way to correct his errors.

There is only one consolation for me, which is, that I am in good

company. The great thinker of Koenigsberg is very severely censured in

almost all of Mr. Spencer’s writings for ideas which he never held. And

now Mr. Spencer confesses openly and with ingenuous sincerity, that his

knowledge of Kant’s writings is extremely limited. But why he condemns a

man of whom he knows so little Mr. Spencer does not tell us.

Mr. Spencer says:

“My knowledge of Kant’s writings is extremely limited. In 1844

a translation of his “Critique of Pure Reason” (then I think

lately published) fell into my hands, and I read the first few

pages enunciating his doctrine of Time and Space: my peremptory

rejection of which caused me to lay the book down.

“Twice since then the same thing has happened; for, being

an impatient reader, when I disagree with the cardinal

propositions of a work I can go no further.

“One other thing I knew. By indirect references I was made

aware that Kant had propounded the idea that celestial bodies

have been formed by the aggregation of diffused matter. Beyond

this my knowledge of his conceptions did not extend; and my

supposition that his evolutionary conception had stopped short

with the genesis of sun, stars, and planets was due to the

fact that his doctrine of Time and Space, as forms of thought

[sic] anteceding experience, implied a supernatural origin

inconsistent with the hypothesis of natural genesis.”

Kant has been a leader in thought for the last century. It is very

important to criticise his ideas wherever they are wrong, but his errors

cannot be conquered by _ex cathedra_ denunciations.

Darwin’s habits in investigating and weighing the pro and con of a

question were very different from Mr. Spencer’s, and Darwin’s success is

in no small degree due to the sternness with which he adhered to certain

rules of reading and studying. We find in his “Autobiography” certain

reminiscences labeled “important” from which the following is most

instructive:

“I had also, during many years, followed a golden rule, namely,

that whenever a published fact, a new observation or a thought,

came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to

make a memorandum of it without fail, for I had found by

experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to

escape from the memory than favorable ones.”

Experience teaches that we can learn most from those authors with whom we

do not agree. The ethics of reading and studying demand other habits than

laying a book down when we disagree with its cardinal propositions. Such

habits prevent progress and create prejudices.

* * * * *

Mr. Spencer has not answered my criticism at all. Mr. Spencer did

not even take into consideration the passages quoted from Kant. He

republished all the false statements of Kant’s views, so inconsiderately

made, together with all the perverse opinions based upon them. The

assurance with which Mr. Spencer makes statements which have no

foundation whatever is really perplexing even to a man who is well

informed on the subject, and it will go far to convince the unwary

reader. What, however, shall become of the general tenor of philosophical

criticism and controversy if a man of Mr. Spencer’s reputation is

so indifferent about being informed concerning the exact views of

his adversary, if he is so careless in presenting them, if he makes

positively erroneous statements on confessedly mere “supposition,” and

finally, if in consequence thereof he is flagrantly unjust in censuring

errors which arise only from his own too prolific imagination?

We feel confident that Mr. Spencer will explain his side of the question

satisfactorily. His mistakes being undeniable, we do not believe that he

will seek to deny them. Yet we trust that Mr. Spencer as soon as he finds

himself at fault, will not even make an attempt at palliation, that he

will not blink the frank acknowledgment of his misstatements and also of

having treated Kant with injustice. A man who has devoted his life to the

search for truth will not suffer any blot to remain on his escutcheon.

The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 · 第 294 / 390 题