Mr. Spencer commenting upon his criticism of Kant’s idea of a Good Will,
says:
“I find that in the above three paragraphs I have done Kant
less than justice and more than justice—less, in assuming
that his evolutionary view was limited to the genesis of
our sidereal system, and more, in assuming that he had not
contradicted himself.
“Clearly, I am indebted to Dr. Carus for enabling me to prove
that Kant’s defence of his theory of ‘a good will’ is, by his
own showing, baseless.”
Kant’s idea of a good will has nothing to do with evolution, and we can
abstain here from discussing whether or not Kant was an evolutionist.
Whether evolution is true or not, what difference does it make to the
proposition, that a good will is the only thing which can be called good
without further qualification (_ohne Einschränkung_)? Pleasure is good,
but it is not absolutely good, there are cases in which pleasure is a
very bad thing. We must qualify our statement and limit it to special
cases. A good will, however, says Kant, is in itself good under all
circumstances.
Did Mr. Spencer prove the baselessness of Kant’s proposition by proving
evolution? Is it inconsistent to believe in evolution and at the same
time to regard a good will as absolutely good, as good without reserve or
limitation? I think not!