Formal Logic its legitimate place among the essentials of scientific
procedure, Sir W. Hamilton was at the same time enlarging it on its
technical side, in two modes which are highly esteemed both by himself
and by others: 1. The recognition of two kinds of Syllogisms; one in
Extension, the other in Comprehension: 2. The doctrine of the
Quantification of the Predicate.--Both these novelties are here
criticised by Mr Mill in chapter xxii., which we recommend the reader to
peruse conjointly with Lectures 15 and 16 of Sir W. Hamilton on Logic.
Now whereas the main objection, by which the study of the syllogistic
logic has been weighed down and discredited in modern times, is this,
that it encumbers the memory with formal distinctions, having no useful
application to the real process and purposes of reasoning--the procedure
of Sir W. Hamilton might almost lead us to imagine that he himself was
trying to aggravate that objection to the uttermost. He introduces a
variety of new canons (classifying Syllogisms as Extensive and
Intensive, by a distinction founded on the double quantity of notions,
in Extension and in Comprehension) which he intimates that all former
logicians have neglected--while it plainly appears, even on his own
showing, that the difference between syllogisms, in respect to these two
sorts of quantity, is of no practical value; and that 'we can always
change a categorical syllogism of the one quantity into a categorical
syllogism of the other, by reversing the order of the two premises, and
by reversing the meaning of the copula' (Lect. xvi. p. 296); nay, that
every syllogism is already a syllogism in both quantities (Mill, p.
431). Against these useless ceremonial reforms of Sir W. Hamilton, we
may set the truly philosophical explanation here given by Mr Mill of the
meaning of propositions.
'All judgments' (he says--p. 423), 'except where both the
terms are proper names, are really judgments in
Comprehension; though it is customary, and the natural
tendency of the mind, to express most of them in terms of
Extension. In other words, we never really predicate
anything but attributes; though, in the usage of language,
we commonly predicate them by means of words which are names
of concrete objects--because' (p. 426)--'we have no other
convenient and compact mode of speaking. Most attributes,
and nearly all large bundles of attributes, have no names of
their own. We can only name them by a circumlocution. We are
accustomed to speak of attributes, not by names given to
themselves, but by means of the names which they give to the
objects they are attributes of.' 'All our ordinary
judgments' (p. 428) 'are in Comprehension only; Extension
not being thought of. But we may, if we please, make the
Extension of our general terms an express object of thought.
When I judge that all oxen ruminate, I have nothing in my
thoughts but the attributes and their co-existence. But when
by reflection I perceive what the proposition implies, I
remark that other things may ruminate besides oxen, and that
the unknown multitude of things which ruminate form a mass,
with which the unknown multitude of things having the
attributes of oxen is either identical or is wholly
comprised in it. Which of these two is the truth I may not
know, and if I did, took no notice of it when I assented to
the proposition, all oxen ruminate; but I perceive, on
consideration, that one or other of them must be true.
Though I had not this in my mind when I affirmed that all
oxen ruminate, I can have it now; I can make the concrete
objects denoted by each of the two names an object of
thought, as a collective though indefinite aggregate; in
other words, I can make the Extension of the names (or
notions) an object of direct consciousness. When I do this,
I perceive that this operation introduces no new fact, but
is only a different mode of contemplating the very fact
which I had previously expressed by the words, all oxen
ruminate. The fact is the same, but the mode of
contemplating it is different. There is thus in all
Propositions a judgment concerning attributes (called by Sir
W. Hamilton a Judgment in Comprehension) which we make as a
matter of course; and a possible judgment in or concerning
Extension, which we _may_ make, and which will be true if
the former is true.'
From the lucid explanation here cited (and from a following paragraph
too long to describe p. 433), we see that there is no real distinction
between Judgments in Comprehension and Judgments in Extension; that the
_appearance_ of distinction between them arises from the customary mode
of enunciation, which custom is here accounted for; that the addition to
the theory of the Syllogism, for which Sir W. Hamilton takes credit, is
alike troublesome and unprofitable.
The like may also be said about his other innovation, the Quantification
of the Predicate. Still more extensive are the changes (as stated by
himself) which this innovation would introduce in the canons of
Syllogism. Indeed, when we read his language (Appendix to 'Lectures on
Logic,' pp. 291--297) censuring generally the prior logicians from
Aristotle downwards, and contending that 'more than half the value of
logic had been lost' by their manner of handling it--we may appreciate
the magnitude of the reform which he believed himself to be introducing.
The larger the reform, the more it behoved him to be sure of the ground
on which he was proceeding. But on this point we remark a serious
deficiency. After laying down, with appropriate emphasis, the valuable
logical postulate, _to state explicitly what is thought implicitly_, on
which, Sir W. Hamilton says,
'Logic ever insists, but which logicians have never fairly
obeyed--it follows that logically we ought to take into
account the quantity, _always understood in thought_, but
usually, and for manifest reasons, elided in expression, not
only of the _subject_, but also of the _predicate_, of a
judgment.'--('Discussions on Philos.,' p. 614.)
Here Sir W. Hamilton assumes that the quantity of the predicate is
always understood in thought; and the same assumption is often repeated,
in the Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' p. 291 and elsewhere, as if
it was alike obvious and incontestable. Now it is precisely on this
point that issue is here taken with Sir W. Hamilton. Mr Mill denies
altogether (p. 437) that the quantity of the predicate is always
understood or present in thought, and appeals to every reader's
consciousness for an answer:--
'Does he, when he judges that all oxen ruminate, advert even
in the minutest degree to the question, whether there is
anything else that ruminates? Is this consideration at all
in his thoughts, any more than any other consideration
foreign to the immediate subject? One person may know that
there are other ruminating animals, another may think that
there are none, a third may be without any opinion on the
subject; but if they all know what is meant by ruminating,
they all, when they judge that every ox ruminates, mean
precisely the same thing. The mental process they go
through, _as far as that one judgment is concerned_, is
precisely identical; though some of them may go on farther,
and _add other judgments_ to it.'
The last sentence cited from Mr Mill indicates the vice of Sir W.
Hamilton's proceeding in quantifying the predicate, and explains why it
was that logicians before him declined to do so. Sir W. Hamilton, in
this proceeding, insists on stating explicitly, not merely all that is
thought implicitly, but a great deal more;[14] adding to it something
else, which _may_, indeed, be thought conjointly, but which more
frequently _is not_ thought at all. He requires us to pack two distinct
judgments into one and the same proposition: he interpolates the meaning
of the Propositio Conversa _simpliciter_ into the form of the Propositio
Convertenda (when an universal Affirmative), and then claims it as a
great advantage, that the proposition thus interpolated admits of being
converted _simpliciter_, and not merely _per accidens_. Mr Mill is,
nevertheless, of opinion (pp. 439-443) that though 'the quantified
syllogism is not a true expression of what is in thought, yet writing
the predicate with a quantification may be sometimes a real help to the
Art of Logic.' We see little advantage in providing a new complicated
form, for the purpose of expressing in one proposition what naturally
throws itself into two, and may easily be expressed in two. If a man is
prepared to give us information on one Quaesitum, why should he be
constrained to use a mode of speech which forces on his attention at the
same time a second and distinct Quaesitum--so that he must either give
us information about the two at once, or confess himself ignorant
respecting the second?
The two next chapters of Mr Mill, noticing some other minor
peculiarities (all of them unfortunate, and one, p. 447, really
unaccountable) of Sir W. Hamilton's Formal Logic; and some Fallacious
Modes of Thought countenanced by Sir W. Hamilton (chs. xxiii.,
xxiv.--pp. 446, 478), we are compelled to pass over. We must find space,
however, for a few words on the Freedom of the Will (ch. xxv.), which
(in Mr Mill's language, pp. 488--549), 'was so fundamental with Sir W.
Hamilton, that it may be regarded as the central idea of his system--the
determining cause of most of his philosophical opinions.' Prior to Sir
W. Hamilton, we find some writers who maintain the doctrine of
Free-will, others who maintain that of Necessity: each supporting their
respective conclusions by reasons which they deem sufficient. Sir W.
Hamilton declares that both the one doctrine and the other are
inconceivable and incomprehensible; yet that, by the law of Excluded
Middle, one or other of them must be true: and he decides in favour of
Free-will, of which he believes himself to be distinctly conscious;
moreover, Free-will is essential (he thinks) to moral responsibility, of
which also he feels himself conscious. He confesses himself, however,
unable to explain the possibility of Free-will; but he maintains that
the same may be said about Necessity also. 'The champions of both the
two opposite doctrines are at once resistless in attack, and impotent in
defence'--(Hamilton's 'Footnotes on Reid,' p. 602.) Mr Mansel also
asserts, even more confidently than Sir W. Hamilton, that we are
directly conscious of Free-will--(p. 503).
Sir W. Hamilton has himself given some of the best arguments against the
doctrine of Free-will, in refutation of Reid: arguments, some of which
are here cited by Mr Mill with praise which they well deserve--(pp. 497,
498). But Mr Mill's own reasoning on the same side is of a still higher
order, enlarging the grounds previously urged in the last book of his
'System of Logic,' He protests against the term _Necessity_; and
discards the idea of Necessity, if it be understood to imply anything
more than invariability of antecedence and consequence. If it mean
_that_, experience proves thus much about antecedents in the world of
mind, as in the world of matter: if it mean more, experience does not
prove more, either in the world of matter or in the world of mind: nor
have we any grounds for affirming it in either--(p. 501.) If it were
true, therefore, that consciousness attested Free-will, we should find
the testimony of consciousness opposed to a full proof from experience
and induction. But does consciousness really attest what is called
Free-will? Mr Mill analyzes the case, and declares in the negative.
'To be conscious of Free-will, must mean to be conscious,
before I have decided, that I am able to decide either way;
exception may be taken _in limine_ to the use of the word
_consciousness_ in such an application. Consciousness tells
me what I do or feel. But what I am _able_ to do, is not a
subject of consciousness. Consciousness is not prophetic; we
are conscious of what is, not of what will or can be. We
never know that we are able to do a thing, except from
having done it, or something similar to it. Having acted, we
know, as far as that experience reaches, how we are able to
act; _and this knowledge, when it has become familiar, is
often confounded with, and called by, the name of
consciousness._ But it does not derive any increase of
authority from being misnamed: its truth is not supreme
over, but depends upon, experience. If our so-called
consciousness is not borne out by experience, it is a
delusion. It has no title to credence, but as an
interpretation of experience; and if it is a false
interpretation, it must give way.'--pp. 503, 504
After this salutary and much-needed warning against the confusion
between consciousness as an infallible authority, and belief upon
experience, of which we are conscious as a belief--Mr Mill proceeds to
sift the alleged self-evident connection between Free-will and
Accountability. He shows, not merely that there is no connection, but
that there is a positive repugnance, between the two. By Free-will is
meant that a volition is not determined by motives, but is a spontaneous
mental fact, neither having a cause, nor admitting of being predicted.
Now, the very reason for giving notice that we intend to punish certain
acts, and for inflicting punishment if the acts be committed, is, that
we trust in the efficacy of the threat and the punishment as deterring
motives. If the volition of agents be not influenced by motives, the
whole machinery of law becomes unavailing, and punishment a purposeless
infliction of pain. In fact, it is on that very ground that the madman
is exempted from punishment; his volition being presumed to be not
capable of being acted upon by the deterring motive of legal sanction.
The _free_ agent, thus understood, is one who can neither feel himself
accountable, nor be rendered accountable, to or by others. It is only
the _necessary_ agent (the person whose volitions are determined by
motives, and, in case of conflict, by the strongest desire or the
strongest apprehension) that can be held really accountable, or can
feel himself to be so.
'The true doctrine of the Causation of human actions (says
Mr Mill, p. 516) maintains, in opposition both to pure and
to modified Fatalism, that not only our conduct, but our
character, is in part amenable to our will: that we can, by
employing the proper means, improve our character: and that
if our character is such that, while it remains what it is,
it necessitates us to do wrong--it will be just to apply
motives which will necessitate us to strive for its
improvement. We shall not indeed do so unless we desire our
improvement, and desire it more than we dislike the means
which must he employed for the purpose.'
It thus appears that of the two propositions, 1, volitions are
necessary, or depend on causes; 2, volitions are free, or do not depend
on causes--neither the one nor the other is inconceivable or
incomprehensible, as Sir W. Hamilton supposed them to be. That the first
is true, and the second false, we learn by experience, and by that
alone; just as we learn the like in regard to the phenomena of the
material world. Indeed, the fact that human volitions are both
predictable and modifiable, quite as much as all those physical
phenomena that depend upon a complication of causes--which is only a
corollary from what has just been said--is so universally recognized and
acted upon by all men, that there would probably be little difference of
opinion about this question, if the antithesis were not obscured and
mystified by the familiar, but equivocal, phrases of Free-will and
Necessity.
Passing over chapter xxvii., in which Mr Mill refutes Sir W. Hamilton's
opinion that the study of mathematics is worthless, or nearly so, as an
intellectual discipline--we shall now call attention to the concluding
remarks which sum up the results of the volume. After saying that he
'differs from almost everything in Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy, on
which he particularly valued himself, or which is specially his own,'
Mr Mill describes Sir W. Hamilton's general merits as follows:--
'They chiefly consist in his clear and distinct mode of
bringing before the reader many of the fundamental questions
of metaphysics: some good specimens of psychological
analysis on a small scale: and the many detached logical and
psychological truths which he has separately seized, and
which are scattered through his writings, mostly applied to
resolve some special difficulty, and again lost sight of. I
can hardly point to anything he has done towards helping the
more thorough understanding of the greater mental phenomena,
unless it be his theory of Attention (including
Abstraction), which seems to me the most perfect we have;
but the subject, though a highly important, is comparatively
a simple one.'--p. 547.
Agreeing in this general view of Sir W. Hamilton's merits, we should be
disposed to describe them in language stronger and more emphatic as to
degree, than that which has just been cited. But what is stated in the
pages immediately following (pp. 550, 551)--That Sir W. Hamilton's
doctrines appear to be usually taken up under the stimulus of some
special dispute, and often afterwards forgotten; That he did not think
out subjects until they were thoroughly mastered, or until consistency
was attained between the different views which the author took from
different points of observation; That accordingly, his philosophy seems
made up of scraps from several conflicting metaphysical systems--All
this is literally and amply borne out by the many inconsistencies and
contradictions which Mr Mill has brought to view in the preceding
chapters. It would appear that the controversial disposition was
powerful with Sir W. Hamilton, and that a present impulse of that sort
(as has been said respecting Bayle, Burke, and others) not only served
to provoke new intellectual combinations in his mind, but also
exercised a Lethæan influence in causing obliviscence of the old. But we
can hardly follow Mr Mill in ascribing the defect to 'excessive
absorption of time and energy by the study of old writers' (p. 551). If
this study did no other good, it at least kept the memory in exercise.
Now, what surprises us most in Sir W. Hamilton's inconsistencies, is the
amount of self-forgetfulness which they imply.
While the laborious erudition of Sir W. Hamilton cannot be fairly
regarded as having produced any of his intellectual defects, it
undoubtedly stamped upon him his special title of excellence as a
philosopher. This is fully recognized by Mr Mill; though he treats it as
belonging not so much to a philosopher as to an historian of philosophy.
He concludes (pp. 552--554):--
'It is much to be regretted that Sir W. Hamilton did not
write the history of philosophy, instead of choosing, as
the direct object of his intellectual exertions, philosophy
itself. He possessed a knowledge of the materials such as no
one, probably for many generations, will take the trouble of
acquiring again. Independently of the great interest and
value attaching to a knowledge of the historical development
of speculation, there is much in the old writers on
philosophy, even those of the middle ages, really worth
preserving for its scientific value. But this should be
extracted, and rendered into the phraseology of modern
thought, by persons as familiar with that as with the
ancient, and possessing a command of its language: a
combination never yet so perfectly realized as in Sir W.
Hamilton. This, which no one but himself could have done, he
has left undone, and has given us, instead, a contribution
to mental philosophy, which has been more than equalled by
many not superior to him in powers, and wholly destitute of
erudition. Of all persons in modern times entitled to the
name of philosophers, the two, probably, whose reading on
the subject was the scantiest, in proportion to their
intellectual capacity, were Archbishop Whately and Dr Brown.
Accordingly they are the only two of whom Sir W. Hamilton,
though acknowledging their abilities, speaks with some
tinge of superciliousness. It cannot be denied that both Dr
Brown and Whately would have thought and written better than
they did, if they had been better read in the writings of
previous thinkers; but I am not afraid that posterity will
contradict me when I say, that either of them has done far
greater service to the world in the origination and
diffusion of important thought, than Sir W. Hamilton with
all his learning; because, though indolent readers, they
were both of them active and fertile thinkers.
'It is not that Sir W. Hamilton's erudition is not
frequently of real use to him on particular questions of
philosophy. It does him one valuable service: it enables him
to know all the various opinions which can be held on the
questions he discusses, and to conceive and express them
clearly, leaving none of them out. This it does, though even
this not always; but it does little else, even of what might
be expected from erudition when enlightened by philosophy.
He knew, with extraordinary accuracy, the [Greek: hoti] of
each philosopher's opinions, but gave himself little trouble
about the [Greek: dihoti]. With one exception, I find no
remark bearing upon that point in any part of his writings.
I imagine he would have been much at a loss if he had been
required to draw up a philosophical estimate of the mind of
any great thinker. He never seems to look at any opinion of
a philosopher in connection with the same philosopher's
other opinions. Accordingly he is weak as to the mutual
relations of philosophical doctrines. One of the most
striking examples of this inability is in the case of
Leibnitz,' &c.
Here we find in a few sentences the conclusion which Mr Mill conceives
to be established by his book. We shall state how far we are able to
concur with it. He has brought the matter to a direct issue, by weighing
Sir W. Hamilton in the balance against two other actual cotemporaries;
instead of comparing him with some unrealized ideal found only in the
fancy of critics and reviewers.
Comparing Sir W. Hamilton with Dr Brown, we cordially subscribe to the
opinion of Mr Mill. We think that Dr Brown has 'done far greater
service to the world than Sir W. Hamilton, in the origination and
diffusion of important thought.' To speak only of two chief subjects in
the field of important thought--Causality and the Freedom of the
Will--we not only adopt the conclusions of Dr Brown, but we admire both
his acuteness and his originality in vindicating and illustrating the
first of the two, while we dissent entirely from the views of Sir W.
Hamilton. This alone would be sufficient to make us approve the
superiority assigned by Mr Mill to Dr Brown. We discover no compensating
item to be placed to the credit of Sir W. Hamilton: for the great
doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, which is our chief point of
philosophical brotherhood with him, was maintained by Brown also.