of his (Sir W. Hamilton's) achievements in metaphysics, he
had a greater capacity for the subject than many
metaphysicians of high reputation; and particularly than
his two distinguished predecessors in the same school of
thought--"Reid and Stewart."'--p. 131.
This is one of the greatest compliments to Sir W. Hamilton that the book
contains, and as such we are glad to cite it.
On the subject of Consciousness, Mr Mill has cited from Sir W. Hamilton
other good observations besides the one last alluded to; but,
unfortunately, these are often neutralized by opposite or inconsistent
opinions also cited from other parts of his works. The number of such
inconsistencies produced is indeed one remarkable feature in Sir W.
Hamilton's philosophical character. He seems to follow out energetically
(as Plato in his various dialogues) the vein of thought pervading his
mind at each particular moment, without troubling himself to look back
upon his own prior speculations. Even compared with the best views of
Sir W. Hamilton, however, Mr Mill's mode of handling the subject of
Consciousness exhibits signal improvement. To some of his observations
we shall call particular attention.
All philosophers agree that what Consciousness testifies is to be
believed; but they differ much on the question--To what points
Consciousness does testify? and even on the still deeper question--How
shall we proceed to ascertain what _are_ these attested points? What is
the proper method of studying or interrogating Consciousness? Upon this
Mr Mill remarks (pp. 145--147):--
'Here emerges the distinction between two different methods
of studying the problems of metaphysics; forming the radical
difference between the two great schools into which
metaphysicians are divided. One of these I shall call for
distinction, the _introspective_ method; the other, the
_psychological_. M. Cousin observes that Locke went wrong
from the beginning, by placing before himself, as the
question to be first resolved, the origin of our ideas.
This (he says) was commencing at the wrong end. The proper
course would have been to begin by determining what the
ideas now are; to ascertain what it is that Consciousness
now tells us; postponing till afterwards the attempt to
frame a theory concerning the origin of any of the mental
phenomena.
'I accept the question as M. Cousin states it; and I contend
that no attempt to determine what are the direct revelations
of Consciousness can be successful, or entitled to any
regard, unless preceded by what M. Cousin says ought only to
follow it--an inquiry into the origin of our acquired ideas.
For we have it not in our power to ascertain, by any direct
process, what Consciousness told us at the time when its
revelations were in their pristine purity. It only offers
itself to our inspection, as it exists now, when those
original revelations are overlaid and buried under a
mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions.
'It seems to M. Cousin, that if we examine with care and
minuteness our present states of Consciousness,
distinguishing and defining every ingredient which we find
to enter into them--every element that we seem to recognize
as real, and cannot "by merely concentrating our attention
upon it analyze into anything simpler--we reach the ultimate
and primary truths, which are the sources of all our
knowledge, and which cannot be denied or doubted without
denying or doubting the evidence of Consciousness
itself--that is, the only evidence that there is for
anything. I maintain this to be a misconception of the
condition imposed on inquirers by the difficulties of
psychological investigation. To begin the inquiry at the
point where M. Cousin takes it up is, in fact, to beg the
question. For he must be aware, if not of the fact, at least
of the belief of his opponents, that the laws of the
mind--the Laws of Association, according to one class of
thinkers, the Categories of the Understanding, according to
another--are capable of creating, out of those data of
Consciousness which are uncontested, purely mental
conceptions, which become so identified in thought with all
our states of Consciousness, that _we seem, and cannot but
seem, to receive them by direct intuition_. For example, the
belief in matter in the opinion of these thinkers is, or at
least may be, thus produced:--
'"The proof that any of the alleged Universal Beliefs, or
Principles of Common Sense, are affirmations of
Consciousness--supposes two things: that the beliefs exist,
and that they cannot possibly have been acquired. The first
is, in most cases, undisputed; but the second is a subject
of inquiry which often taxes the utmost resources of
psychologists. Locke was therefore right in believing that
'the origin of our ideas' is the main stress of the problem
of mental science, and the subject which must be first
considered in forming the theory of the Mind."'
This citation from Mr Mill's book is already almost too long, yet we
could have wished to prolong it still more, from the importance of some
of the succeeding paragraphs. It presents, in clear discrimination and
contrast, two opposite points of view according to which the phenomena
of mind are regarded by different philosophers, and the method of
studying them determined: the _introspective_ method, adopted by M.
Cousin and others--the _psychological_ or analytical method, pursued by
Locke and by many other eminent men since Locke--'the known and approved
method of physical science, adapted to the necessities of
psychology'--(p. 148).
There are passages of Sir W. Hamilton's writings in which he appears to
feel that the _introspective_ method alone is insufficient for the
interpretation of Consciousness, and that the analytical method must be
employed to reinforce it. But on this as on other points he is not
always consistent with himself. For in laying down the principle upon
which the primary truths of Consciousness, the original data of
intelligence, are to be ascertained and distinguished from
generalizations out of experience and custom, he declares that the one
single and certain mark is Necessity--they must be beliefs which we are
under the necessity of believing--of which we cannot get rid by any
mental effort. He decides this, of course, for himself, by the
_introspective_ method alone. He (with M. Cousin and other philosophers
who take the same view) does not apply the analytical method to inquire
whether his necessity of belief may not be a purely acquired necessity
and nowise congenital. It is, indeed, remarkable that these philosophers
do not even seek to apply the introspective method as far as that method
will really go. They are satisfied with introspection of their own
present minds; without collecting results of the like process as applied
to other minds, in different times and places. They declare various
beliefs to be necessary to the human mind universally, merely because
such is the actual fact with their own minds and with those immediately
around them; sometimes even in defiance of proof that there are (or have
been) persons not sharing such beliefs, and occasionally even believing
the contrary; therefore, when even the introspective method really
disallows their affirmative instead of sustaining it. This is, in
truth, an abuse of the introspective method; yet even if that method
were employed in its fullest extent--if the same incapability of
believing otherwise could be shown as common to all mankind--it might
still be only the effect of a strong association. The analytical method
must still be called in to ascertain whether we are forced to suppose
such incapability to be an original fact of consciousness, or whether it
may not have been generated in the mind by circumstances under the
natural working of the laws of association. It is certain that these
laws not only may, but must, give birth to artificial inconceivabilities
in the mind--and that some of these may be equal in strength to such, if
any, as are natural.
'The History of Science' (says Mr Mill, following out the
same train of reasoning which we read in the third Book of
his 'System of Logic') 'teems with inconceivabilities which
have been conquered; and with supposed necessary truths,
which have first ceased to be thought necessary, then to be
thought true, and have finally come to be deemed
impossible.'--p. 150.
After various observations, chiefly exhibiting the rashness of many
censures bestowed by Sir W. Hamilton on Brown, Mr Mill gives us three
valuable chapters (xi., xii., xiii.), wherein he analyzes the belief in
an External World, the Belief in Mind as a separate substance or
Noumenon, and the Primary Qualities of Matter. To each of these topics
he applies what he calls the _psychological_ method, as contrasted with
the simply _introspective_ method of Sir W. Hamilton (the Ego and
Non-Ego affirmed to be given together in the primary deliverance of
Consciousness) and so many other philosophers. He proves that these
beliefs are no way intuitive, but acquired products; and that the known
laws of Association are sufficient to explain how they are acquired;
especially the Law of Inseparable Association, together with that of
_Obliviscence_--a very useful, discriminating phrase, which we first
find employed in this volume--(p. 259 et passim). He defines Matter to
be a _permanent possibility of Sensation_; he maintains that this is
really all which (apart from philosophical theories) mankind in general
mean by it; he shows that mere possibilities of sensation not only may,
but must, according to the known Laws of Association, come to present
'to our artificialized Consciousness' a character of objectivity--(pp.
198, 199). The correlative subject, though present in fact and
indispensable, is eliminated out of conscious notice, according to the
Law of Obliviscence.
These chapters will well repay the most careful perusal. We can only
find room for one passage (pp. 214, 215):--
'Throughout the whole of our sensitive life, except its
first beginnings, we unquestionably refer our sensations to
a _me_ and _not-me_. As soon as I have formed, on the one
hand, the notion of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation,
and on the other, of that continued series of feelings which
I call my life--both these notions are, by an irresistible
association, recalled by every sensation I have. They
represent two things, with both of which the sensation of
the moment, be it what it may, stands in relation; and I
cannot be conscious of the sensation without being conscious
of it as related to these two things. They have accordingly
received relative names, expressive of the double relation
in question. The thread of consciousness which I apprehend
the relation as a part of, is called the _Subject_; the
group of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation to which I
refer it, and which is partially realized and actualized in
it, is called the _Object_ of the sensation. The sensation
itself ought to have a correlative name, or rather ought to
have two such names--one denoting the sensation as opposed
to its Subject, the other denoting it as opposed to its
Object; but it is a remarkable fact that this necessity has
not been felt, and that the need of a correlative name to
every relative one has been considered to be satisfied by
the terms Object and Subject themselves. It is true that
these two are related to one another, but only through the
sensation. We have no conception of either Subject or
Object, either Mind or Matter, except as something to which
we refer our sensations, and whatever other feelings we are
conscious of. _The very existence of them both, so far as
cognizable by us, consists only in the relation they
respectively bear to our states of feeling._ Their relation
to each other is only the relation between those two
relations. The immediate correlatives are, not the pair,
_Object, Subject,_ but the two pairs, Object, _Sensation
objectively considered_--Subject, _Sensation subjectively
considered_. The reason why this is overlooked might easily
be shown, and would furnish a good illustration of that
important part of the Laws of Association, which may be
termed the Laws of Obliviscence.'
This chapter, on the Primary Qualities of Matter, controverts the
opinion of Sir W. Hamilton, that extension, as consisting of
co-existent _partes extra partes_, is immediately and necessarily
apprehended by our consciousness. It cites, as well as confirms, the
copious proof given by Professor Bain (in his work on the Senses and the
Intellect) that our conception of extension is derived from our muscular
sensibility: that our sensation of _muscular motion impeded_ constitutes
that of filled space: that our conception of extension, as an aggregate
of co-existent parts, arises from the sense of sight, which comprehends
a great number of parts in a succession so rapid as to be confounded
with simultaneity--and which not only becomes the symbol of muscular and
tactile succession, but even acquires such ascendancy as to supersede
both of them in our consciousness. Confirmation is here given to this
important doctrine, not merely by observations from Mr Mill himself, but
also from the very curious narrative, discovered and produced by Sir W.
Hamilton, out of a work of the German philosopher, Platner. Platner
instituted a careful examination of a man born blind, and ascertained
that this man did not conceive extension as an aggregate of simultaneous
parts, but as a series of sensations experienced or to be experienced in
succession--(pp. 232, 233). The case reported from Platner both
corroborates the theory of Professor Bain, and receives its proper
interpretation from that theory; while it is altogether adverse to the
doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton--as is also another case, which he cites
from Maine de Biran:--
'It gives a very favourable idea of Sir W. Hamilton's
sincerity and devotion to truth (remarks Mr Mill, p. 247),
that he should have drawn from obscurity, and made generally
known, two cases so unfavourable to his own opinions.'
We think this remark perfectly just; and we would point out besides, in
appreciating Sir W. Hamilton's merits, that his appetite for facts was
useful to philosophy, as well as his appetite for speculation. But the
person whose usefulness to philosophy we prefer to bring into the
foreground, is Platner himself. He spent three weeks in patient
examination of this blind man, and the tenor of his report proves that
his sagacity in interpreting facts was equal to his patience in
collecting them. The rarity of all such careful and premeditated
observation of the facts of mind, appears to us one main reason why
(what Mr Mill calls) the _psychological_ theory finds so little
acceptance; and why those who maintain that what now seems a mental
integer was once a multiplicity of separate mental fragments, can
describe the antecedent steps of the change only as a _latens
processus_, which the reader never fully understands, and often will not
admit. Every man's mind is gradually built up from infancy to maturity;
the process is always going on before our eyes, yet the stages of
it--especially the earliest stages, the most pregnant with
instruction--are never studied and put on record by observers trained in
inductive logic, knowing beforehand what they ought to look for as the
_sine quâ non_ for proving or disproving any proposed theory. Such cases
as that cited by Platner--cases of one marked congenital defect of
sense, enabling us to apply the Method of Difference--are always within
reach; but few Platners are found to scrutinize and record them.
Historians of science describe to us the laborious and multiplied
observations, and the elaborate precaution for ensuring accuracy of
observation, which recent chemical and physical inquirers have found
indispensable for the establishment of their results. We cannot,
therefore, be surprised that mental philosophers, dealing with facts
even more obscure, and careless about enlarging, varying,
authenticating their records of particular facts, should have had
little success in establishing any results at all.
But if even those, who adopt the psychological theory, have been remiss
in the observation of particular mental facts,--those who deny the
theory have been far more than remiss; they have been blind to obvious
facts contradicting the principles which they lay down. Mr Mill, in
chap, xiv., deals with this denial, common to Mr Mansel with Sir W.
Hamilton. That philosophers so eminent as both of them should declare
confidently--'what I cannot but think must be _à priori_, or original to
thought; it cannot be engendered by experience upon custom' (p.
264)--appears to us as extraordinary as it does to Mr Mill. Though no
one ever surpassed Sir W. Hamilton in large acquaintance with the actual
diversities of human belief, and human incapacities of believing--yet he
never seems to have thought of bringing this acquaintance into account,
when he assured the students in his lecture-room, that custom,
experience, indissoluble association, were altogether insufficient to
engender a felt necessity of believing. Such forgetfulness of well-known
mental facts cannot be reproached to the advocates of the psychological
theory.
In chap. xv. Mr Mill examines Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine on unconscious
mental modifications. He points out the confused manner in which Sir W.
Hamilton has conceived _mental latency_, as well as the inconclusive
character of the reasoning whereby he refutes the following doctrine of
Dugald Stewart--That in the most rapid trains of association, each
separate item must have been successively present to consciousness,
though for a time too short to leave any memory. Sir W. Hamilton thinks
that the separate items may pass, and often do pass, unconsciously;
which opinion Mr Mill also, though not approving his reasons, is
inclined to adopt.
'I am myself inclined (p. 285) to admit unconscious mental
modifications, in the only sense in which I can attach any
very distinct meaning to them--namely, unconscious
modifications of the nerves. It may well be believed that
the apparently suppressed links in a chain of association,
those which Sir W. Hamilton considers as latent, really are
so: that they are not even momentarily felt, the chain of
causation being continued only physically--by one organic
state of the nerves succeeding another so rapidly, that the
state of mental consciousness appropriate to each is not
produced.'
Mr Mill gives various illustrations in support of this doctrine. He at
the same time calls attention to a valuable lecture of Sir W.
Hamilton's, the thirty-second lecture on Metaphysics; especially to the
instructive citation from Cardaillac contained therein, noting the
important fact, which descriptions of the Law of Association often keep
out of sight--that the suggestive agency of Association is carried on,
not by single antecedents raising up single consequents, but by a mass
of antecedents raising up simultaneously a mass of consequents, among
which attention is very unequally distributed.
We shall say little upon Mr Mill's remarks on Sir W. Hamilton's Theory
of Causation--(chap. xvi.). This theory appears to Mr Mill absurd; while
the theory of Mr Mill (continued from Hume, Brown, and James Mill) on
the same subject, appears to Sir W. Hamilton insufficient and
unsatisfactory--'professing to explain the phenomenon of causality, but,
previously to explanation, evacuating the phenomenon of all that
desiderates explanation'--(p. 295). For ourselves we embrace the theory
of Mr Mill:[13] yet we are aware that the remark just cited from Sir W.
Hamilton represents the dissatisfaction entertained towards it by many
objectors. The unscientific and antiscientific yearnings, prevalent
among mankind, lead them to put questions which no sound theory of
Causation will answer; and they are ready to visit and trust any oracle
which professes to deliver a confident affirmative solution of such
questions. Among all the terms employed by metaphysicians, none is used
in a greater variety of meanings than the term Cause.
In Mr Mill's next chapter (xvi.) he comments on Sir W. Hamilton's
doctrine of Concepts or General Notions. There are portions of this
chapter with which we agree less than with most other parts of the
volume; especially with his marked hostility to the term _Concept_, and
the reasons given for it, which reasons appear to us not very consistent
with what he has himself said in the 'System of Logic,' Book IV. chap.
ii. § 1--3. The term _Concept_ has no necessary connection with the
theory called Conceptualism. It is equally available to designate the
idea called up by a general name, as understood either by Mr Bailey or
by James Mill. We think it useful as an equivalent to the German word
_Begriff_, which sense Sir W. Hamilton has in view when he introduces
it, though he does not always adhere to his profession. And when Mr Mill
says (p. 331)--
'I consider it nothing less than a misfortune, that the
words Concept, General Notion, or any other phrase to
express the supposed mental modification corresponding to a
general name, should ever have been invented.'
we dissent from his opinion. To talk of 'the Concept of an individual,'
however, as Mr Mansel does (pp. 338, 339), is improper and inconsistent
with the purpose for which the name is given.
We are more fully in harmony with Mr Mill in his two next chapters
(xviii. et seq.) on Judgment and Reasoning; which are among the best
chapters in this volume. He there combats and overthrows the theory of
Reasoning laid down by Sir W. Hamilton; but we doubt the propriety of
his calling this 'the Conceptualist theory' (pp. 367, 368); since it has
nothing to do with Conceptualism, in the special sense of antithesis to
Realism and Nominalism,--but is, in fact, the theory of the Syllogism as
given in the Analytics of Aristotle, and generally admitted since. Not
merely Conceptualists, but (to use Mr Mill's own language, p. 366)
'nearly all the writers on logic, taught a theory of the science too
small and narrow to contain their own facts.' Such, indeed, was the
theory constantly taught until the publication of Mr Mill's 'System of
Logic;' the first two books of which corrected it, by arguments which
are reinforced and amplified in these two chapters on Judgment and
Reasoning, as well as in the two chapters next following--chaps, xx. and
xxi.--('Is Logic the Science of the Forms of Thought--On the
Fundamental Laws of Thought.') The contrast which is there presented, in
many different ways, between the limited theory of logic taught by Sir
W. Hamilton and Mr Mansel, and the enlarged theory of Mr Mill, is
instructive in a high degree. We consider Mr Mill as the real preserver
of all that is valuable in Formal Logic, from the unfortunate
consequences of an erroneous estimate, brought upon it through the
exaggerated pretensions of logicians. When Sir W. Hamilton contrasts it
pointedly with physical science (of which he talks with a sort of
supercilious condescension, in one of the worst passages of his
writings, p. 401)--when all its apparent fruits were produced in the
shape of ingenious but barren verbal technicalities--what hope could be
entertained that Formal Logic could hold its ground in the estimation of
the recent generation of scientific men? Mr Mill has divested it of that
assumed demonstrative authority which Bacon called 'regere res per
syllogismum;' but he has at the same time given to it a firm root amidst
the generalities of objective science. He has shown that in the great
problem of Evidence or Proof, the Laws of Formal Logic, though bearing
only on one part of the entire procedure, yet bear upon one essential
part, proper to be studied separately: and that the maintenance of
consistency between our affirmations (which is the only special province
of Formal Logic), has great importance and value as a part of the
process necessary for ascertaining and vindicating their truth, or
exposing their character when false or uncertified--but no importance or
value except as a part of that larger exigency.