cannot consent to admit him as a superior, or even as an equal, to Sir
W. Hamilton, 'in the origination and diffusion of important thought.' He
did much service by reviving an inclination and respect for Logic, and
by clearing up a part of the technical obscurity which surrounded it:
but we look upon him as an acute and liberal-minded English theologian,
enlarging usefully, though timidly, the intellectual prison in which
many orthodox minds are confined--rather than as a fit aspirant to the
cosmopolitan honours of philosophy. 'An active and fertile thinker,' Mr
Mill calls Whately; and such he undoubtedly was. But such also we
consider Sir W. Hamilton to have been in a degree, at least equal. If
the sentence which we have quoted above be intended to deny the
predicate, 'active and fertile thinker,' of Sir W. Hamilton, we cannot
acquiesce in it. His intellect appears to us thoroughly active and
fertile, even when we dissent from his reasonings--nay, even in the
midst of his inconsistencies, when a new growth of opinions is
unexpectedly pushed up on ground which we supposed to be already
pre-occupied by another both older and different. And we find this same
judgment implied in the discriminating remarks upon his philosophical
procedure made by Mr Mill himself--(pp. 271, 272). For example,
respecting Causality and the Freedom of the Will, we detect no want of
activity and fertility, though marked evidence of other
defects--especially the unconditional surrender of a powerful mind to
certain privileged inspirations, worshipped as 'necessities of thought.'
While thus declaring how far we concur in the parallel here drawn of Sir
W. Hamilton with Brown and Whately, we must at the same time add that
the comparison is taken under circumstances unduly favourable to these
two last. There has been no exposure of _their_ errors and
inconsistencies, equal in penetration and completeness to the crushing
volume which Mr Mill has devoted to Sir W. Hamilton. To make the odds
fair, he ought to furnish a similar systematic examination to Brown and
Whately; enabling us to read their works (as we now do those of Sir W.
Hamilton) with the advantage of his unrivalled microscope, which detects
the minutest breach or incoherence in the tissue of reasoning--and of
his large command of philosophical premisses, which brings into full
notice what the author had overlooked. Thus alone could the competition
between the three be rendered perfectly fair.
We regret, as Mr Mill does, that Sir W. Hamilton did not undertake the
composition of a history of philosophy. Nevertheless we must confess
that we should hardly feel such regret, if we could see evidence to
warrant Mr Mill's judgment (p. 554) that Sir W. Hamilton was
'indifferent to the [Greek: dihoti] of a man's opinions, and that he was
incompetent to draw up an estimate of the opinions of any great
thinker,' &c. Such incompetence, if proved to be frequent and
considerable, would deprive an author of all chance of success in
writing a history of philosophy. But the study of Sir William Hamilton's
works does not prove it to us, though Mr Mill has convicted him of an
erroneous estimate of Leibnitz. We say _frequent_ and _considerable_,
because no historian of philosophy is exempt from the defect more or
less; or rather (to pass out of the self-confidence of the Absolute into
the modesty of the Relative) we seldom find any historian whose estimate
of great philosophical thinkers does not often differ from our own.
Hence we are glad when ample original extracts are produced, enabling us
to test the historian, and judge for ourselves--a practice which Sir W.
Hamilton would have required no stimulus to enforce upon him. There
ought, indeed, to be various histories of philosophy, composed from
different points of view; for the ablest historian cannot get clear of
a certain exclusiveness belonging to himself. But, so far as we can
conjecture what Sir W. Hamilton _would_ or _could_ have done, we think
that a history of philosophy composed by him would have surpassed any
work of the kind in our language.
We trust that Sir W. Hamilton's works will long continue to be read,
along with Mr Mill's examination of them; and we should be glad if the
works of other philosophers could be read along with a comment of equal
acuteness and impartiality. Any point of view which could command the
adherence of such a mind as Sir W. Hamilton's, deserves to be fully
considered. Moreover, the living force of philosophy, as directress of
human intelligence, depends upon keeping up in each of her devotees a
full mastery of many divergent and opposite veins of reasoning--a
knowledge, negative and affirmative, of the full case of opponents as
well as of his own.
It is to Philosophy alone that _our_ allegiance is sworn; and while we
concur mostly with Mr Mill's opinions, we number both him and Sir W.
Hamilton as a noble pair of brethren, serving alike in her train.
_Amicus Hamilton; magis amicus Mill; amica ante omnes Philosophia._
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: Mr Mansel and Mr Veitch, the editors of Sir W. Hamilton's
Lectures on Metaphysics, posthumously published, say in their preface
(p. xiii.)--
'For twenty years--from 1836 to 1856--the courses of logic and
metaphysics were the means through which Sir William Hamilton sought to
discipline and imbue with his philosophical opinions the numerous youth
who gathered from Scotland and other countries to his classroom; and
while, by these prelections, the author supplemented, developed, and
moulded the national philosophy, leaving thereon the ineffaceable
impress of his genius and learning, he, at the same time and by the same
means, exercised over the intellects and feelings of his pupils an
influence which, for depth, feeling, and elevation, was certainly never
surpassed by that of any philosophical instructor. Among his pupils
there are not a few who, having lived for a season under the
constraining power of his intellect, and been led to reflect on those
great questions regarding the character, origin, and bounds of human
knowledge, which his teaching stirred and quickened, bear the memory of
their beloved and revered instructor inseparably blended with what is
highest in their present intellectual life, as well as in their
practical aims and aspirations.']
[Footnote 2: We are happy to find such high authorities as Dr Whewell,
Mr Samuel Bailey, and Sir John Herschel concurring in this estimation of
the new logical point of view thus opened by Mr Mill. We will not call
it a _discovery_, since Sir John Herschel thinks the expression
unsuitable.--See the recent sixth edition of the 'System of Logic,' vol.
i. p. 229.]
[Footnote 3: See Sir William. Hamilton's 'Lectures on Logic' (Lect.
xvii. p. 320, 321; also Appendix to those Lectures, p. 361). He here
distinguishes also formal induction from, material induction, which
latter he brings under the grasp of syllogism, by an hypothesis in
substance similar to that of Whately. There is, however, in Lecture xix.
(p. 380), a passage in a very different spirit, which one might almost
imagine to have been written by Mr Mill: 'In regard to simple
syllogisms, it was an original dogma of the Platonic school, and an
early dogma of the Peripatetic, that science, strictly so called, was
only conversant with, and was exclusively contained in, universals; and
the doctrine of Aristotle, which taught that all our general knowledge
is only an induction from an observation of particulars, was too easily
forgotten or perverted by his followers. It thus obtained almost the
force of an acknowledged principle that everything to be known must be
known under some general form or notion. Hence the exaggerated
importance attributed to definition and deduction; it not being
considered that we only take out of a general notion what we had
previously placed therein, and that the amplification of our knowledge
is not to be sought for from above but from below--not from speculation
about abstract generalities, but from the observation of concrete
particulars. Bat however erroneous and irrational, the persuasion had
its day and influence, and it perhaps determined, as one of its effects,
the total neglect of one half, and that not the least important half of
the reasoning process.'
These very just observations are suggested to Sir William Hamilton by a
train of thought which has little natural tendency to suggest them,
viz., by the distinction upon which he so much insists, between the
logic of comprehension and the logic of extension, and by his anxiety to
explain why the former had been exclusively cultivated and the latter
neglected.
That which Sir William Hamilton calls here truly the doctrine of
Aristotle (enunciated especially at the close of the Analyt. Post.), and
which he states to have been forgotten by Aristotle's followers, was not
always remembered by Aristotle himself.]
[Footnote 4: The distinction is given by Stier and other logicians. 1.
Infinitum simpliciter. 2. Infinitum secundum quid, sive in certo
genere.]
[Footnote 5: This doctrine has been affirmed (so far as reason is
concerned, apart from revelation) not merely by Mr Mansel, but also by
Pascal, one of the most religious philosophers of the seventeenth
century, in the 'Pensées':--
'Parlons selon les lumieres naturelles. S'il y a un Dieu, il est
infiniment incompréhensible; puisque, n'ayant ni principes ni bornes, il
n'a nul rapport à nous; nous sommes done incapables de connâitre ni ce
qn'il est, ni s'il est.'--(See Arago, Biographie de Condorcet, p.
lxxxiv., prefixed to his edition of Condorcet's works.)]
[Footnote 6: The indictment under which Socrates was condemned at
Athens, as reported by Xenophon at the commencement of the Memorabilia,
ran thus--'Socrates is guilty of crime, inasmuch as he does not believe
in those Gods in whom the City believes, but introduces other novelties
in regard to the Gods; he is guilty also, inasmuch as he corrupts the
youth.'
These words express clearly a sentiment entertained not merely by the
Athenian people, but generally by other societies also. They all agree
in antipathy to free, individual, dissenting reason; though that
antipathy manifests itself by acts, more harsh in one place, less harsh
in another. The Hindoo who declares himself a convert to Christianity,
becomes at the same time an outcast ([Greek: _aphrhêtôr, athhemistos,
anhestios_]) among those whose Gods he has deserted. As a general fact,
the man who dissents from his fellows upon fundamentals of religion,
purchases an undisturbed life only by being content with that
'semi-liberty under silence and concealment,' for which Cicero was
thankful under the dictatorship of Julius Cæsar. 'Obsecro--abiiciamus
ista et semi-liberi saltern, simus; quod assequemur _et tacendo et
latendo'_ (Epist. ad Attic, xiii. 31). Contrast with this the memorable
declaration of Socrates, in the Platonic Apology, that silence and
abstinence from cross-examination were intolerable to him; that life
would not be worth having under such conditions.]
[Footnote 7: Aeschyl. Prometh., 996-1006--
pros tauta, rhipthesthô men aithaloussa phlox,
leykoptherps de niphadi kai bronthêmasin
chthonhiois kykhatô phanta kahi tarasshetô
gnhampsei gar ouden tôndhe m'----
eiselthetô se mhêpot, hôs egô, Dios
gnhômên phobêtheis, thêlhynoys genhêsomai,
kai liparhêsô ton mhega stygohymenon
gynaikomhimois hyptihysmasin cherhôn,
lyshai me dhesmôn tônde toy pantos oheô.
Also v. 1047, et seq. The memorable ode of Goethe, entitled
_Prometheus_, embodies a similar vein of sentiment in the finest
poetry.]
[Footnote 8: Euripid Hippol., 10--
(Aph) oh gar me thaeseos pais, 'Amazonos tokos
monos politon taesde gaes Troizaenias
legei kakistaen daimonon pephukenai
Phoibou d' adelphaen Artemin,--
tima, megiotaen daimonon aegoumenos--
(Hipp.) taen saen dhe Khyprin pholl' hegô Chairein lhego--
(112.)
See also v. 1328--1402.]
[Footnote 9: Herodot. t. 32. O Kroise, epistumenon me to theion pan eohn
phthonerohn te kai taraxodes, epeirotas ahnthropaeion pragmhaton pheri;
also iii. 40]
[Footnote 10: See Eurip. Hipp., 6-96-149. The language of the attendant,
after his affectionate remonstrance to Hippolytus had been disregarded,
supplicating Aphroditê to pardon the recalcitrancy of that virtuous but
obstinate youth, is characteristic and touching (114-120.)]
[Footnote 11: See especially his chapter ii. on the Sensations of Sight,
pp. 222, 241--247, in the second edition of this work.]
[Footnote 12: Descartes says, in his 'Principia Philosophiæ,' i 51--'Et
quidem substantia quæ nullâ planè re indigeat, unica tantum potest
intelligi--nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope concursûs Dei
existere posse perspicimus. Atque ideo nomen substantiæ non convenit Deo
et illis _univocè_, ut dici solet in scholis, hoc est, nulla ejus
nominis significatio potest distinctè intelligi, quæ Deo et creaturis
sit communis.']
[Footnote 13: At the same time, we cannot go along with Mr Mill in the
following affirmation (p. 201):--
'This natural probability is converted into certainty when we take into
consideration that universal law of our experience which is termed the
Law of Causation, and which makes us _unable to conceive the beginning
of anything without_ an antecedent condition, _or cause.'_ Such
'inability to conceive' appears to us not in correspondence with facts.
First, it cannot be properly either affirmed or denied, until agreement
is obtained what the word _cause_ means. If three persons, A, B, and C,
agree in affirming it--A adopting the meaning of Aristotle, B that of
Sir William Hamilton, and C that of Mr Mill--the agreement is purely
verbal; or rather, all three concur in having a mental exigency pressing
for satisfaction, but differ as to the hypothesis which satisfies it.
Next, if we reason upon Mr Mill's theory as to Cause, certainly those
who deny his theory can have no difficulty in conceiving events without
any cause (in that sense): nor have those who adopt this theory any
greater difficulty. These latter _believe_ that there are, throughout,
constant and uniform conditions on which the occurrence of every event
depends; but they can perfectly _conceive_ events as occurring without
any such uniform sequence. In truth, the belief in such causation, as
pervading _all nature_, is an acquired result of scientific training.
The greater part of mankind believe that some events occur in regular,
others in irregular succession. Moreover, a full half of the
metaphysical world espouse the doctrine of free-will, and consider that
all volitions occur without any cause at all.]
[Footnote 14: Among the various authorities (upon this question of
quantifying the predicate) collected by Sir W. Hamilton in the valuable
Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' we find one (p. 311) which takes
the same ground of objection as Mr Mill, in these words:--'The cause why
the quantitative note is not usually joined with the predicate, is, that
there would thus be two _quæsita_ at once; to wit, whether the predicate
were affirmed of the subject, and whether it were denied of everything
beside. For when we say, _all man is all rational_, we judge that _all
man is rational_, and judge likewise _that rational is denied of
everything but man_. But these are, in reality, two different _quæsita_;
and therefore it has become usual to state them, not in one, but in two
several propositions. And this is self-evident, seeing that a
_quæsitum_, in itself, asks only--_Does or does not this inhere in
that?_ and _not_ Does or does not this inhere in that, _and at the same
time inhere in nothing else?_'
The author of this just and sagacious remark--much surpassing what the
other writers quoted in the Appendix say--was a Jew who died at
Perpignan in or near 1370, named Levi Ben Gerson or Gersonides. An
interesting account of this man, eminent as a writer and thinker in his
age, will be found in a biography by Dr Joel, published at Breslau in
1862, 'Levi Ben Gerson als Religions--philosoph.' He distinguished
himself as a writer on theology, philosophy, and astronomy; he was one
of the successors to the free speculative vein of Maimonides, and one of
the continuators of the Arabic Aristotelian philosophy. He both
commented on and combated the doctrines of Averroes. Dr Joel thinks that
he died earlier than 1370.]