CHAPTER XIX

THE KING-STADHOLDER, 1688-1702

The accession of William III to the throne of England was an event

fraught with important consequences to European politics and to the

United Provinces. The king was enabled at last to realise the formation

of that Grand Alliance for which he had so long been working. The treaty

of Vienna, signed on May 12, 1689, encircled France with a ring of

enemies, and saw the Emperor and Spain united with the Protestant

powers, England, the States and many of the German princes in a bond of

alliance for the maintenance of the treaties of Westphalia and the

Pyrenees. It was not without some difficulty that William succeeded in

inducing the States to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance

with England. A special embassy consisting of Witsen, Odijk, Dijkveld

and others was sent to London early in 1689 to endeavour to bring about

some mutually advantageous arrangement of the various conflicting

maritime and commercial interests of the two countries. But they could

effect nothing. The English government refused either to repeal or

modify the Navigation Act or to reduce the toll for fishing privileges;

and it required all the personal influence of William to secure the

signing of a treaty (September 3), which many leading Hollanders

considered to be a subordinating of Dutch to English interests. And

they were right; from this time began that decline of Dutch commercial

supremacy which was to become more and more marked as the 18th century

progressed. The policy of William III, as Frederick the Great remarked

most justly, placed Holland in the position of a sloop towed behind the

English ship-of-the-line.

The carrying trade of the world was still, however, in the reign of

William III practically in the hands of the Dutch, despite the losses

that had been sustained during the English wars and the French invasion.

The only competitor was England under the shelter of the Navigation Act.

The English had, under favourable conditions, their staple at Dordrecht,

the Scots their staple at Veere; and the volume of trade under the

new conditions of close alliance was very considerable. But the imports

largely exceeded the exports; and both exports and imports had to be

carried in English bottoms. The Baltic (or Eastern) trade remained a

Dutch monopoly, as did the trade with Russia through Archangel. Almost

all the ships that passed through the Sound were Dutch; and they

frequented all the Baltic ports, whether Russian, Scandinavian or

German, bringing the commodities of the South and returning laden with

hemp, tallow, wood, copper, iron, corn, wax, hides and other raw

products for distribution in other lands. The English had a small number

of vessels in the Mediterranean and the Levant, and frequented the

Spanish and Portuguese harbours, but as yet they hardly interfered with

the Dutch carrying-trade in those waters. The whole trade of Spain with

her vast American dominions was by law restricted to the one port of

Cadiz; but no sooner did the galleons bringing the rich products of

Mexico and Peru reach Cadiz than the bulk of their merchandise was

quickly transhipped into Dutch vessels, which here, as elsewhere, were

the medium through which the exchange of commodities between one country

and another was effected. It was a profitable business, and the

merchants of Amsterdam and of the other Dutch commercial centres grew

rich and prospered.

The position of the Dutch in the East Indies at the close of the 17th

century is one of the marvels of history. The East India Company, with

its flourishing capital at Batavia, outdistanced all competitors. It was

supreme in the Indian archipelago and along all the shores washed by the

Indian Ocean. The governor-general was invested with great powers and,

owing to his distance from the home authority, was able to make

unfettered use of them during his term of office. He made treaties and

conducted wars and was looked upon by the princes and petty rulers of

the Orient as a mighty potentate. The conquest of Macassar in 1669, the

occupation of Japara and Cheribon in 1680, of Bantam in 1682, of

Pondicherry in 1693, together with the possession of Malacca and of the

entire coast of Ceylon, of the Moluccas, and of the Cape of Good Hope,

gave to the Dutch the control of all the chief avenues of trade

throughout those regions. By treaties of alliance and commerce with the

Great Mogul and other smaller sovereigns and chieftains factories were

established at Hooghly on the Ganges, at Coelim, Surat, Bender Abbas,

Palembang and many other places. In the Moluccas they had the entire

spice trade in their hands. Thus a very large part of the products of

the Orient found its way to Europe by way of Amsterdam, which had become

increasingly the commercial emporium and centre of exchange for the

world.

The West India Company, on the other hand, had been ruined by the loss

of its Brazilian dominion followed by the English wars. Its charter came

to an end in 1674, but it was replaced by a new Company on a more

moderate scale. Its colonies on the Guiana coast, Surinam, Berbice and

Essequibo were at the end of the 17th century in an impoverished

condition, but already beginning to develop the sugar plantations which

were shortly to become a lucrative industry; and the island of Curaçoa

had the unenviable distinction of being for some years one of the chief

centres of the negro slave trade.

In the United Provinces themselves one of the features of this period

was the growth of many new industries and manufactures, largely due to

the influx of Huguenot refugees, many of whom were skilled artisans. Not

only did the manufacturers of cloth and silk employ a large number of

hands, but also those of hats, gloves, ribbons, trimmings, laces, clocks

and other articles, which had hitherto been chiefly produced in France.

One of the consequences of the rapid increase of wealth was a change in

the simple habits, manners and dress, which hitherto travellers had

noted as one of the most remarkable characteristics of the Hollanders.

Greater luxury began to be displayed, French fashions and ways of life

to be imitated, and the French language to be used as the medium of

intercourse among the well-to-do classes. Another sign of the times was

the spread of the spirit of speculation and of gambling in stocks and

shares, showing that men were no longer content to amass wealth by the

slow process of ordinary trade and commerce. This state of prosperity,

which was largely due to the security which the close alliance with

England brought to the Republic, explains in no small measure the

acquiescence of the Dutch in a state of things which made the smaller

country almost a dependency of the larger. They were proud that their

stadholder should reign as king in Britain; and his prolonged absences

did not diminish their strong attachment to him or lessen his authority

among them. So much greater indeed was the power exercised by William in

the Republic than that which, as a strictly constitutional sovereign, he

possessed in the kingdom, that it was wittily said that the Prince of

Orange was stadholder in England and king in Holland.

It must not be supposed, however, that William in his capacity as

stadholder was free from worries and trials. He had many; and, as usual,

Amsterdam was the chief centre of unrest. After the expedition set sail

for Torbay, William was continuously absent for no less than two and a

half years. It is no wonder therefore that during so long a period, when

the attention of the king was absorbed by other pressing matters,

difficulties should have arisen in his administration of the affairs of

the Republic. It was very unfortunate that his most able and trusted

friend and adviser, the Council-Pensionary Fagel, should have died, in

December, 1688, just when William's enterprise in England had reached

its most critical stage. Fagel was succeeded, after a brief interval, in

his most important and influential office by Antony Heinsius. Heinsius,

who had been for some years Pensionary of Delft, was a modest, quiet

man, already forty-five years of age, capable, experienced and

business-like. His tact and statesmanlike qualities were of the greatest

service to William and scarcely less to his country, at a time when

urgent duties in England made it so difficult for the stadholder to give

personal attention to the internal affairs of the Republic. No other

Prince of Orange had ever so favourable an opportunity as William III

for effecting such changes in the system of government and

administration in the Dutch Republic as would simplify and co-ordinate

its many rival and conflicting authorities, and weld its seven

sovereign provinces into a coherent State with himself (under whatever

title) as its "eminent head." At the height of his power his will could

have over-ridden local or partisan opposition, for he had behind him the

prestige of his name and deeds and the overwhelming support of popular

opinion. But William had little or no interest in these constitutional

questions. Being childless, he had no dynastic ambitions. The nearest

male representative of his house was Henry Casimir, the stadholder of

Friesland, with whom his relations had been far from friendly. In his

mind, everything else was subordinate to the one and overruling purpose

of his life, the overthrow of the power of Louis XIV and of French

ascendancy in Europe.

The great coalition which had been formed in 1689 by the treaty of

Vienna was, in the first years of the war which then broke out,

attended with but mediocre success. The French armies laid waste the

Palatinate with great barbarity, and then turned their attentions to the

southern Netherlands. The attempted invasion was, however, checked by an

allied force (August 25) in a sharp encounter near Charleroi. The next

year, 1690, was particularly unfortunate for the allies. William was

still absent, having been obliged to conduct an expedition to Ireland.

He had placed the aged Marshal Waldeck in command of the Coalition

forces. Waldeck had the redoubtable Luxemburg opposed to him and on July

1 the two armies met at Fleurus, when, after a hard-fought contest, the

allies suffered a bloody defeat. An even greater set-back was the

victory gained by Admiral Tourville over the combined Anglo-Dutch fleet

off Beachy Head (July 10). The Dutch squadron under Cornelis Evertsen

bore the brunt of the fight and suffered heavily. They received little

help from the English contingent; and the English Admiral Torrington was

accused of having wilfully sacrificed his allies. The effect was

serious, for the French enjoyed for a while the rare satisfaction of

holding the command of the Channel. The complete triumph of King William

at the battle of the Boyne (July 12) relieved somewhat the consternation

felt at this naval disaster, and set him free to devote his whole

attention to the Continental war. His return to the Hague early in 1691

caused general rejoicing, and he was there able to concert with his

allies the placing of a large force in the field for the ensuing

campaign. The operations were, however, barren of any satisfactory

results. Luxemburg advanced before the allies were ready, and burnt and

plundered a large tract of country. William, acting on the defensive,

contented himself with covering the capital and the rest of Flanders and

Brabant from attack; and no pitched battle took place.

Great preparations were made by Louis XIV in the spring of 1692 for the

invasion of England. Troops were collected on the coast, and the

squadron under D'Estrées at Toulon was ordered to join the main fleet of

Tourville at Brest. Contrary winds delayed the junction; and Tourville

rashly sailed out and engaged off La Hogue a greatly superior allied

fleet on May 29. The conflict this time chiefly fell upon the English,

and after a fierce fight the French were defeated and fled for refuge

into the shoal waters. Here they were followed by the lighter vessels

and fire-ships of the allies; and the greater part of the French

fleet was either burnt or driven upon the rocks (June 1). The maritime

power of France was for the time being destroyed, and all fears of

invasion dissipated. On land ill-success continued to dog the footsteps

of the allies. The strong fortress of Namur was taken by the French;

and, after a hotly contested battle at Steinkirk, William was compelled

by his old adversary Luxemburg to retreat. William, though he was rarely

victorious on the field of battle, had great qualities as a leader. His

courage and coolness won the confidence of his troops, and he was never

greater than in the conduct of a retreat. This was shown conspicuously

in the following year (1693), when, after a disastrous defeat at

Neerwinden (July 29), again at the hands of Luxemburg, he succeeded at

imminent personal risk in withdrawing his army in good order in face of

the superior forces of the victorious enemy.

In 1694 the allies confined themselves to defensive operations. Both

sides were growing weary of war; and there were strong parties in favour

of negotiating for peace both in the Netherlands and in England. Some of

the burgher-regents of Amsterdam, Dordrecht and other towns even went so

far as to make secret overtures to the French government, and they had

the support of the Frisian Stadholder; but William was resolutely

opposed to accepting such conditions as France was willing to offer,

and his strong will prevailed.

The position of the king in England was made more difficult by the

lamented death of Queen Mary on January 2,1695. William had become

deeply attached to his wife during these last years, and for a time he

was prostrated by grief. But a strong sense of public duty roused him

from his depression; and the campaign of 1695 was signalised by the most

brilliant military exploit of his life, the recapture of Namur. That

town, strong by its natural position, had been fortified by Vauban with

all the resources of engineering skill, and was defended by a powerful

garrison commanded by Marshal Boufflers. But William had with him the

famous Coehoorn, in scientific siege-warfare the equal of Vauban

himself. At the end of a month the town of Namur was taken, but

Boufflers withdrew to the citadel. Villeroy, at the head of an army of

90,000 men, did his utmost to compel the king to raise the siege by

threatening Brussels; but a strong allied force watched his movements

and successfully barred his approach to Namur. At last, on September 5,

Boufflers capitulated after a gallant defence on the condition that

he and his troops should march out with all the honours of war.

The campaign of 1696 was marked by no event of importance; indeed both

sides were thoroughly tired out by the protracted and inconclusive

contest. Moreover the failing health of Charles II of Spain threatened

to open out at any moment the vital question of the succession to the

Spanish throne. Louis XIV, William III and the emperor were all keenly

alive to the importance of the issue, and wished to have their hands

free in order to prepare for a settlement, either by diplomatic means or

by a fresh appeal to arms. But peace was the immediate need, and

overtures were privately made by the French king to each of the allied

powers in 1696. At last it was agreed that plenipotentiaries from all

the belligerents should meet in congress at Ryswyck near the Hague with

the Swedish Count Lilienrot as mediator. The congress was opened on May

9, 1697, but many weeks elapsed before the representatives of the

various powers settled down to business. Heinsius and Dijkveld were the

two chief Dutch negotiators. The emperor, when the other powers had

come to terms, refused to accede; and finally England, Spain and the

United Provinces determined to conclude a separate peace. It was signed

on September 20 and was based upon the treaties of Nijmwegen and

Münster. France, having ulterior motives, had been conciliatory.

Strasburg was retained, but most of the French conquests were given up.

William was recognised as King of England, and the Principality of

Orange was restored to him. With the Dutch a commercial treaty was

concluded for twenty-five years on favourable terms.

It was well understood, however, by all the parties that the peace of

Ryswyck was a truce during which the struggle concerning the Spanish

Succession would be transferred from the field of battle to the field of

diplomacy, in the hope that some solution might be found. The question

was clearly of supreme importance to the States, for it involved the

destiny of the Spanish Netherlands. England, too, had great interests at

stake, and was determined to prevent the annexation of the Belgic

provinces by France. With Charles II the male line of the Spanish

Habsburgs became extinct; and there were three principal claimants in

the female line of succession. The claim of the Dauphin was much the

strongest, for he was the grandson of Anne of Austria, Philip III's

eldest daughter, and the son of Maria Theresa of Austria, Charles

II's eldest sister. But both these queens of France had on their

marriage solemnly renounced their rights of succession. Louis XIV,

however, asserted that his wife's renunciation was invalid, since the

dowry, the payment of which was guaranteed by the marriage contract, had

never been received. The younger sister of Maria Theresa had been

married to the emperor; and two sons and a daughter had been the fruit

of the union. This daughter in her turn had wedded the Elector of

Bavaria, and had issue one boy of ten years. The Elector himself,

Maximilian Emmanuel, had been for five years Governor of the Spanish

Netherlands, where his rule had been exceedingly popular. William knew

that one of the chief objects of the French king in concluding peace was

to break up the Grand Alliance and so prepare the way for a masterful

assertion of his rights as soon as the Spanish throne was vacant; and

with patient diplomatic skill he set to work at once to arrange for such

a partition of the Spanish monarchy among the claimants as should

prevent the Belgic provinces from falling into the hands of a

first-class power and preserve Spain itself with its overseas

possessions from the rule of a Bourbon prince. He had no difficulty in

persuading the States to increase their fleet and army in case diplomacy

should fail, for the Dutch were only too well aware of the seriousness

of the French menace to their independence. In England, where jealousy

of a standing army had always been strong, he was less successful, and

Parliament insisted on the disbanding of many thousands of seasoned

troops. The object at which William aimed was a partition treaty; and a

partition was actually arranged (October 11, 1698). This arrangement,

according to the ideas of the time, paid no respect whatever to the

wishes of the peoples, who were treated as mere pawns by these

unscrupulous diplomatists. The Spanish people, as might be expected,

were vehemently opposed to any partition of the empire of Charles V and

Philip II; and, in consequence of the influences that were brought to

bear upon him, Charles II left by will the young electoral prince,

Joseph Ferdinand, heir to his whole inheritance. By the secret terms of

the partition treaty the crown of Spain together with the Netherlands

and the American colonies had been assigned to the Bavarian claimant,

but the Spanish dominions in Italy were divided between the two other

claimants, the second son of the Dauphin, Philip, Duke of Anjou,

receiving Naples and Sicily; the second son of the emperor, the Archduke

Charles, the Milanese. Unfortunately, Joseph Ferdinand fell sick of the

small-pox and died (March, 1699). With William and Heinsius the main

point now was to prevent the French prince from occupying the Spanish

throne; and in all secrecy negotiations were again opened at the Hague

for a second partition treaty. They found Louis XIV still willing to

conclude a bargain. To the Duke of Anjou was now assigned, in addition

to Naples and Sicily, the duchy of Lorraine (whose duke was to receive

the Milanese in exchange); the rest of the Spanish possessions were to

fall to the Archduke Charles (March, 1700). The terms of this

arrangement between the French king and the maritime powers did not long

remain a secret; and when they were known they displeased the emperor,

who did not wish to see French influence predominant in Italy and his

own excluded, and still more the Spanish people, who objected to any

partition and to the Austrian ruler. The palace of Charles II became a

very hot-bed of intrigues, and finally the dying king was persuaded to

make a fresh will and nominate Anjou as his universal heir. Accordingly

on Charles' death (November 1, 1700) Philip V was proclaimed king.

For a brief time Louis was doubtful as to what course of action

would be most advantageous to French interests, but not for long.

On November 11 he publicly announced to his court at Versailles

that his grandson had accepted the Spanish crown. This step was

followed by the placing of French garrisons in some of the frontier

fortresses of the Belgic Netherlands by consent of the governor,

the Elector of Bavaria. The following months were spent in the vain

efforts of diplomacy to obtain such guarantees from the French

king as would give security to the States and satisfaction to England

and the emperor, and so avoid the outbreak of war. In the States

Heinsius, who was working heart and soul with the stadholder in this

crisis, had no difficulty in obtaining the full support of all parties,

even in Holland, to the necessity of making every effort to be ready

for hostilities. William had a more difficult task in England, but he

had the support of the Whig majority in Parliament and of the

commercial classes; and he laboured hard, despite constant and

increasing ill-health, to bring once more into existence the Grand

Alliance of 1689. In July negotiations were opened between the

maritime powers and the emperor at the Hague, which after lengthy

discussions were brought to a conclusion in September, in no small

degree through the tact and persuasiveness of Lord Marlborough,

the English envoy, who had now begun that career which was shortly

to make his name so famous. The chief provisions of the treaty of

alliance, signed on September 7, 1701, were that Austria was to have

the Italian possessions of Spain; the Belgic provinces were to

remain as a barrier and protection for Holland against French

aggression; and England and the States were to retain any conquests

they might make in the Spanish West Indies. Nothing was said

about the crown of Spain, a silence which implied a kind of

recognition of Philip V. To this league were joined Prussia, Hanover,

Lüneburg, Hesse-Cassel, while France, to whom Spain was now

allied, could count upon the help of Bavaria. War was not yet

declared, but at this very moment Louis XIV took a step which was

wantonly provocative. James II died at St Germain on September 6;

and his son was at once acknowledged by Louis as King of England,

by the title of James III. This action aroused a storm of indignation

among the English people, and William found himself supported

by public opinion in raising troops and obtaining supplies for war.

The preparations were on a vast scale. The emperor undertook to

place 90,000 men in the field; England, 40,000; the German states,

54,000; and the Republic no less than 100,000. William had

succeeded at last in the object of his life; a mighty confederation

had been called into being to maintain the balance of power in

Europe, and overthrow the threatened French domination. This

confederation in arms, of which he was the soul and the acknowledged

head, was destined to accomplish the object for which it was formed,

but not under his leadership. The king had spent the autumn in

Holland in close consultation with Heinsius, visiting the camps, the

arsenals and the dockyards, and giving instructions to the admirals

and generals to have everything in readiness for the campaign of

the following spring. Then in November he went to England to

hurry on the preparations, which were in a more backward condition

than in the States. But he had overtaxed his strength. Always

frail and ailing, William had for years by sheer force of will-power

conquered his bodily weakness and endured the fatigue of campaigns

in which he was content to share all hardships with his

soldiers. In his double capacity, too, of king and stadholder, the

cares of government and the conduct of foreign affairs had left him

no rest. Especially had this been the case in England during the

years which had followed Queen Mary's death, when he found

himself opposed and thwarted and humiliated by party intrigues

and cabals, to such an extent that he more than once thought of

abdicating. He was feeling very ill and tired when he returned, and

he grew weaker, for the winter in England always tried him. His

medical advisers warned him that his case was one for which

medicine was of no avail, and that he was not fit to bear the strain

of the work he was doing. But the indomitable spirit of the man

would not give way, and he still hoped with the spring to be able

to put himself at the head of his army. It was not to be; an accident

was the immediate cause by which the end came quickly. He was

riding in Bushey Park when his horse stumbled over a mole-hill

and the king was thrown, breaking his collar-bone (March 14,1702).

The shock proved fatal in his enfeebled state; and, after lingering

for four days, during which, in full possession of his mental faculties,

he continued to discuss affairs of state, he calmly took leave of his

special friends, Bentinck, Earl of Portland and Keppel, Earl of

Albemarle, and of the English statesmen who stood round his death-bed,

and, after thanking them for their services, passed away.

For four generations the House of Orange had produced great

leaders of men, but it may be said without disparagement to his

famous predecessors that the last heir-male of that House was the

greatest of them all. He saved the Dutch Republic from destruction;

and during the thirty years of what has well been called his reign

he gave to it a weighty place in the Councils of Europe and raised

it to a height of great material prosperity. But even such services

as these were dwarfed by the part that he played in laying the

foundation of constitutional monarchy in England, and of the

balance of power in Europe. It is difficult to say whether Holland,

England or Europe owed the deepest debt to the life-work of

William III.

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History of Holland · 第 19 / 35 章