THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION AND THE TREATIES OF UTRECHT, 1702-1715
William III left no successor to take his place. The younger branch of
the Nassau family, who had been, from the time of John of Nassau,
stadholders of Friesland and, except for one short interval, of
Groningen, and who by the marriage of William Frederick with Albertina
Agnes, younger daughter of Frederick Henry, could claim descent in the
female line from William the Silent, had rendered for several
generations distinguished services to the Republic, but in 1702 had as
its only representative a boy of 14 years of age, by name John William
Friso. As already narrated, the relations between his father, Henry
Casimir, and William III had for a time been far from friendly; but a
reconciliation took place before Henry Casimir's untimely death, and the
king became god-father to John William Friso, and by his will left him
his heir. The boy had succeeded by hereditary right to the posts of
stadholder and captain-general of Friesland and Groningen under the
guardianship of his mother, but such claims as he had to succeed William
III as stadholder in the other provinces were, on account of his youth,
completely ignored. As in 1650, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland
and Overyssel reverted once more to a stadholderless form of government.
Fortunately this implied no change of external policy. The men who had
for years been fellow-workers with King William and were in complete
sympathy with his aims continued to hold the most important posts in the
government of the Republic, and to control its policy. That policy
consisted in the maintenance of a close alliance with England for the
purpose of curbing the ambitious designs of Louis XIV. Foremost among
these statesmen were Antony Heinsius, the council-pensionary of Holland,
Simon van Slingelandt, secretary of the Council of State since 1690, and
Jan Hop, the treasurer-general of the Union. In England the recognition
by Louis of the Prince of Wales as King James III had thoroughly
aroused the popular feeling against France; and Anne the new queen
determined to carry out her predecessor's plans. The two maritime
powers, closely bound together by common interests, and the ties which
had arisen between them during the thirteen years of the reign of the
king-stadholder, were to form the nucleus of a coalition with Austria
and a number of the German states, including Prussia and Hanover (to
which Savoy somewhat later adhered), pledged to support the claims of
the Archduke Charles to the Spanish throne. For the Dutch it was an
all-important question, for with Philip V reigning at Madrid the
hegemony of France in Europe seemed to be assured. Already French troops
were in possession of the chief fortresses of the so-called Spanish
Netherlands. Face to face with such a menace it was not difficult for
Heinsius to obtain not only the assent of the States-General, but of the
Estates of Holland, practically without a dissenting voice, to declare
war upon France and Spain (May 8, 1702); and this was quickly followed
by similar declarations by England and Austria.
The Grand Alliance had an outward appearance of great strength, but in
reality it had all the weaknesses of a coalition, its armies being
composed of contingents from a number of countries, whose governments
had divergent aims and strategic objects, and it was opposed by a power
under absolute rule with numerous and veteran armies inspired by a long
tradition of victory under brilliant leaders. In 1702, however, the
successors of Turenne and Luxemburg were by no means of the same calibre
as those great generals. On the other hand, the allies were doubly
fortunate in being led by a man of exceptional gifts. John Churchill,
Earl (and shortly afterwards Duke) of Marlborough, was placed in supreme
command of the Anglo-Dutch armies. Through the influence of his wife
with the weak Queen Anne, the Whig party, of which Marlborough and his'
friend Godolphin the lord-treasurer were the heads, was maintained in
secure possession of power; and Marlborough thus entered upon his
command in the full confidence of having the unwavering support of the
home government behind him. Still this would have availed little but for
the consummate abilities of this extraordinary man. As a general he
displayed a military genius, both as a strategist and a tactician, which
has been rarely surpassed. For ten years he pursued a career of victory
not marred by a single defeat, and this in spite of the fact that his
army was always composed of heterogeneous elements, that his
subordinates of different nationalities were jealous of his authority
and of one another, and above all, as will be seen, that his bold and
well-laid plans were again and again hindered and thwarted by the
timidity and obstinacy of the civilian deputies who were placed by the
States-General at his side. Had Marlborough been unhampered, the war
would probably have ended some years before it did; as it was, the
wonderful successes of the general were made possible by his skill and
tact as a diplomatist. He had, moreover, the good fortune to have at his
side in the Imperialist general, Prince Eugene of Savoy, a commander
second only to himself in brilliance and leadership. In almost all wars
the Austrian alliance has proved a weak support on which to trust; but
now, thanks to the outstanding capacity of Eugene, the armies of Austria
were able to achieve many triumphs. The vigorous participation of the
emperor in this war, in support of the claims of his second son, was
only made possible by the victories of the Italian general over the
Turks, who had overrun Hungary and threatened Vienna. And now, in the
still more important sphere of operations in the West in which for a
series of years he had to co-operate with Marlborough, it is to the
infinite credit of both these great men that they worked harmoniously
and smoothly together, so that at no time was there even a hint of any
jealousy between them. In any estimate of the great achievements of
Marlborough it must never be forgotten that he not only had Eugene at
his right hand in the field, but Heinsius in the council chamber.
Heinsius had always worked loyally and sympathetically with William III;
and it was in the same spirit that he worked with the English duke, who
brought William's life-task to its triumphant accomplishment. Between
Marlborough and Heinsius, as between Marlborough and Eugene, there was
no friction--surely a convincing tribute to the adroit and tactful
persuasiveness of a commanding personality.
In July, 1702, Marlborough at the head of 65,000 men faced Marshal
Boufflers with a French army almost as strong numerically, the one in
front of Nijmwegen, the other in the neighbourhood of Liège. Leaving a
force of 25,000 Dutch and Brandenburgers to besiege Kaiserswerth,
Marlborough by skilful manoeuvring prevented Boufflers from attempting a
relief, and would on two occasions have been able to inflict a severe
defeat upon him had he not been each time thwarted by the cautious
timidity of the Dutch deputies. Kaiserswerth, however, fell, and in turn
Rheinberg, Venloo, Roeremonde and Liège; and the campaign ended
successfully, leaving the allies in command of the lower Rhine and lower
Meuse.
That of 1703 was marred even more effectually than that of the previous
year by the interference of the deputies, and the ill-concealed
opposition to Marlborough of certain Dutch generals, notably of
Slangenburg. The duke was very angry, and bitter recriminations ensued.
In the end Slangenburg was removed from his command; and the appointment
of Ouwerkerk, as field-marshal of the Dutch forces, relieved the
tension, though the deputies were still present at headquarters, much to
Marlborough's annoyance. The campaign resulted in the capture of Bonn,
Huy and Limburg, but there was no general action.
The year 1704 saw the genius of Marlborough at length assert itself. The
French had placed great armies in the field, Villeroy in the
Netherlands, Tallard in Bavaria, where in conjunction with the Bavarian
forces he threatened to descend the Danube into the heart of Austria.
Vienna itself was in the greatest danger. The troops under Lewis of
Baden and under Eugene were, even when united, far weaker than their
adversaries. In these circumstances Marlborough determined by a bold
strategical stroke to execute a flank march from the Netherlands right
across the front of the Franco-Bavarian army and effect a junction with
the Imperialists. He had to deceive the timid Dutch deputies by feigning
to descend the Meuse with the intention of working round Villeroy's
flank; then, leaving Ouwerkerk to contain that marshal, he set out on
his daring adventure early in May and carried it out with complete
success. His departure had actually relieved the Netherlands, for
Villeroy had felt it necessary with a large part of his forces to follow
Marlborough and reinforce the Franco-Bavarians under Marshal Tallard and
the Elector. The two armies met at Blenheim (Hochstädt) on August 13.
The battle resulted in the crushing victory of the allies under
Marlborough and Eugene. Eleven thousand prisoners were taken, among them
Tallard himself. The remnant of the French army retired across the
Rhine. Vienna was saved, and all Bavaria was overrun by the
Imperialists.
Meanwhile at sea the Anglo-Dutch fleet was incontestably superior to the
enemy; and the operations were confined to the immediate
neighbourhood of the Peninsula. William III had before his death been
preparing an expedition for the capture of Cadiz. His plan was actually
carried out in 1702, when a powerful fleet under the supreme command of
Admiral Sir George Rooke sailed for Cadiz; but the attack failed owing
to the incompetence of the Duke of Ormonde, who commanded the military
forces. In this expedition a strong Dutch squadron under Philip van
Almonde participated. Almonde was a capable seaman trained in the
school of Tromp and De Ruyter; and he took a most creditable part in the
action off Vigo, October 23, in which a large portion of the silver
fleet was captured, and the Franco-Spanish fleet, which formed its
escort, destroyed. The maritime operations of 1703 were uneventful, the
French fleet being successfully blockaded in Toulon harbour.
The accession of Portugal in the course of this year to the Grand
Alliance was important in that it opened the estuary of the Tagus as a
naval base, and enabled the Archduke Charles to land with a body of
troops escorted by an Anglo-Dutch fleet under Rooke and Callenberg. This
fleet later in the year (August 4) was fortunate in capturing Gibraltar
without much loss, the defences having been neglected and inadequately
garrisoned. In this feat of arms, which gave to the English the
possession of the rock fortress that commands the entrance into the
Mediterranean, the Dutch under Callenberg had a worthy share, as also in
the great sea-fight off Malaga on August 24, against the French fleet
under the Count of Toulouse. The French had slightly superior numbers,
and the allies, who had not replenished their stores after the siege of
Gibraltar, were short of ammunition. Though a drawn battle, so far as
actual losses were concerned, it was decisive in its results. The French
fleet withdrew to the shelter of Toulon harbour; and the allies'
supremacy in the midland sea was never again throughout the war
seriously challenged. The Dutch ships at the battle of Malaga were
twelve in number and fought gallantly, but it was the last action of any
importance in which the navy of Holland took part. There had been
dissensions between the English and Dutch commanders, and from this time
forward the admiralties made no effort to maintain their fleet in the
state of efficiency in which it had been left by William III. The cost
of the army fell heavily upon Holland, and money was grudged for the
maintenance of the navy, whose services, owing to the weakness of the
enemy, were not required.
The military campaign of 1705 produced small results, the plans of
Marlborough for an active offensive being thwarted by the Dutch
deputies. The duke's complaints only resulted in one set of deputies
being replaced by another set of civilians equally impracticable. There
was also another reason for a slackening of vigour. The Emperor Leopold
I died on May 5. His successor Joseph I had no children, so that the
Archduke Charles became the heir-apparent to all the possessions of the
Austrian Habsburgs. Louis XIV therefore seized the opportunity to make
secret overtures of peace to some of the more influential Dutch
statesmen through the Marquis D'Allègne, at that time a prisoner in the
hands of the Dutch. The French were willing to make many concessions in
return for the recognition of Philip V as King of Spain. In the autumn
conversations took place between Heinsius, Buys the pensionary of
Amsterdam, and others, with D'Allègne and Rouillé, an accredited agent
of the French government. Matters went so far that Buys went to London
on a secret mission to discuss the matter with the English minister. The
English cabinet, however, refused to recognise Philip V; and, as the
Dutch demand for a strong barrier of fortresses along the southern
frontier of the Netherlands was deemed inadmissible at Versailles, the
negotiations came to an end.
In 1706 Marlborough's bold proposal to join Eugene in Italy, and with
their united forces to drive the French out of that country and to march
upon Toulon, failed to gain the assent of the Dutch deputies. The duke,
after much controversy and consequent delay, had to content himself with
a campaign in Belgium. It was brilliantly carried out. On Whit Sunday,
May 23, at Ramillies the allies encountered the enemy under the command
of Marshal Villeroi and the Elector of Bavaria. The French were utterly
defeated with very heavy loss; and such was the vigour of the pursuit
that the shattered army was obliged to retire to Courtrai, leaving
Brabant and Flanders undefended. In rapid succession Louvain, Antwerp,
Ghent, Bruges and other towns surrendered to Marlborough, and a little
later Ostend, Dendermonde, Menin and Ath; and the Archduke Charles was
acknowledged as sovereign by the greater part of the southern
Netherlands. In Italy and Spain also things had gone well with the
allies. This series of successes led Louis XIV to make fresh
overtures of peace to the States-General, whom the French king hoped to
seduce from the Grand Alliance by the bait of commercial advantages both
with Spain and France and a good "barrier." He was even ready to yield
the crown of Spain to the Archduke Charles on condition that Philip of
Anjou were acknowledged as sovereign of the Spanish possessions in
Italy. Heinsius however was loyal to the English alliance; and, in face
of the determination of the English government not to consent to any
division of the Spanish inheritance, the negotiations again came to
nothing.
The year 1707 saw a change of fortune. Austria was threatened by the
victorious advance of Charles XII of Sweden through Poland into Saxony.
A French army under Villars crossed the Rhine (May 27) and advanced far
into south-eastern Germany. The defence of their own territories caused
several of the German princes to retain their troops at home instead of
sending them as mercenaries to serve in the Netherlands under
Marlborough. The duke therefore found himself unable to attack the
superior French army under Vendôme, and acted steadfastly on the
defensive. An attempt by Eugene, supported by the English fleet, to
capture Toulon ended in dismal failure and the retreat of the
Imperialists with heavy loss into Italy. In Spain the victory of Berwick
at Almanza (April 27) made Philip V the master of all Spain, except a
part of Catalonia.
But, though Marlborough had been reduced to immobility in 1707, the
following campaign was to witness another of his wonderful victories. At
the head of a mixed force of 80,000 men he was awaiting the arrival of
Eugene with an Imperialist army of 35,000, when Vendôme unexpectedly
took the offensive while he still had superiority in numbers over his
English opponent. Rapidly overrunning western Flanders he made himself
master of Bruges and Ghent and laid siege to Oudenarde. By a series of
brilliant movements Marlborough out-marched and out-manoeuvred his
adversary and, interposing his army between him and the French frontier,
compelled him to risk a general engagement. It took place on July 11,
1708, and ended in the complete defeat of the French, who were only
saved by the darkness from utter destruction. Had the bold project of
Marlborough to march into France forthwith been carried out, a deadly
blow would have been delivered against the very vitals of the enemy's
power and Louis XIV probably compelled to sue for peace on the allies'
terms. But this time not only the Dutch deputies, but also Eugene, were
opposed to the daring venture, and it was decided that Eugene should
besiege Lille, while Marlborough with the field army covered the
operations. Lille was strongly fortified, and Marshal Boufflers made a
gallant defence. The siege began in mid-August; the town surrendered on
October 22, but the citadel did not fall until December 9. Vendôme did
his best to cut off Eugene's supplies of munitions and stores, and at
one time the besiegers were reduced to straits. The French marshal did
not, however, venture to force an engagement with Marlborough's covering
army, a portion of which under General Webb, after gaining a striking
victory over a French force at Wynendael, (September 30), conducted at a
critical moment a large train of supplies from Ostend into Eugene's
camp. As a consequence of the capture of Lille, the French withdrew from
Flanders into their own territory, Ghent and Bruges being re-occupied by
the allies with a mere show of resistance.
The reverses of 1708 induced the French king to be ready to yield much
for the sake of peace. He offered the Dutch a strong barrier, a
favourable treaty of commerce and the demolition of the defences of
Dunkirk; and there were many in Holland who would have accepted his
terms. But their English and Austrian allies insisted on the restoration
of Louis' German conquests, and that the king should, by force if
necessary, compel his grandson to leave Spain. Such was the exhaustion
of France that Louis would have consented to almost any terms however
harsh, but he refused absolutely to use coercion against Philip V. The
negotiations went on through the spring nor did they break down until
June, 1709, when the exorbitant demands of the allies made further
progress impossible. Louis issued a manifesto calling upon his subjects
to support him in resisting terms which were dishonouring to France.
He met with a splendid response from all classes, and a fine army of
90,000 men was equipped and placed in the field under the command of
Marshal Villars. The long delay over the negotiations prevented
Marlborough and Eugene from taking the field until June. They found
Villars had meanwhile entrenched himself in Artois in a very strong
position. Marlborough's proposal to advance by the sea-coast and
outflank the enemy being opposed both by Eugene and the Dutch
deputies as too daring, siege was laid to Tournay. Campaigns in those
days were dilatory affairs. Tournay was not captured until September 3;
and the allies, having overcome this obstacle without any active
interference, moved forward to besiege Mons. They found Villars posted
at Malplaquet on a narrow front, skilfully fortified and protected on
both flanks by woods. A terrible struggle ensued (September 11, 1709),
the bloodiest in the war. The Dutch troops gallantly led by the Prince
of Orange attacked the French right, but were repulsed with very heavy
losses. For some time the fight on the left and centre of the French
line was undecided, the attacking columns being driven back many times,
but at length the allies succeeded in turning the extreme left and also
after fearful slaughter in piercing the centre; and the French were
compelled to retreat. They had lost 12,000 men, but 23,000 of the allies
had fallen; the Dutch divisions had suffered the most severely, losing
almost half their strength. The immediate result of this hard-won
victory was the taking of Mons, October 9. The lateness of the season
prevented any further operations. Nothing decisive had been achieved,
for on all the other fields of action, on the Rhine, on the Piedmont
frontier and in Spain, the advantage had on the whole been with the
French and Spaniards. Negotiations proceeded during the winter
(1709-10), Dutch and French representatives meeting both at the Hague
and at Geertruidenberg. The States were anxious for peace and Louis was
willing to make the concessions required of him, but Philip V refused to
relinquish a crown which he held by the practically unanimous approval
of the Spanish people. The emperor on the other hand was obstinate in
claiming the undivided Spanish inheritance for the Archduke Charles. The
maritime powers, however, would not support him in this claim; and the
maritime powers meant England, for Holland followed her lead, being
perfectly satisfied with the conditions of the First Barrier Treaty,
which had been drawn up and agreed upon between the States-General and
the English government on October 29, 1709. By this secret treaty the
Dutch obtained the right to hold and to garrison a number of towns along
the French frontier, the possession of which would render them the real
masters of Belgium. Indeed it was manifest that, although the Dutch did
not dispute the sovereign rights of the Archduke Charles, they intended
to make the southern Netherlands an economic dependency of the
Republic, which provided for its defence.
The negotiations at Geertruidenberg dragged on until July, 1710, and
were finally broken off owing to the insistence of the Dutch envoys,
Buys and Van Dussen, upon conditions which, even in her exhausted state,
France was too proud to concede. Meanwhile Marlborough and Eugene,
unable to tempt Villars to risk a battle, contented themselves with a
succession of sieges. Douay, Béthune, St Venant and Aine fell, one after
the other, the French army keeping watch behind its strongly fortified
lines. This was a very meagre result, but Marlborough now felt his
position to be so insecure that he dared not take any risks. His wife,
so long omnipotent at court, had been supplanted in the queen's favour;
Godolphin and the Whig party had been swept from power; and a Tory
ministry bent upon peace had taken their place. Marlborough knew that
his period of dictatorship was at an end, and he would have resigned his
command but for the pressing instances of Eugene, Heinsius and other
leaders of the allies.
The desire of the Tory ministry to bring the long drawn-out hostilities
to an end was accentuated by the death, on April 17, 1711, of the
Emperor Joseph, an event which left his brother Charles heir to all the
possessions of the Austrian Habsburgs. The Grand Alliance had been
formed and the war waged to maintain the balance of power in Europe. But
such a result would not be achieved by a revival of the empire of
Charles V in the person of the man who had now become the head of the
House of Austria. Even had the Whigs remained in office, they could
hardly have continued to give active support to the cause of the
Habsburg claimant in Spain.
One of the consequences of the death of Joseph I, then, was to render
the Tory minister, Henry St John, more anxious to enter into
negotiations for peace; another was the paralysing of active operations
in the field. Eugene had been summoned to Germany to watch over the
meeting of the Imperial Diet at Frankfort, and Marlborough was left with
an army considerably inferior in numbers to that of his opponent
Villars. Thus the only fruit of the campaign was the capture of
Bouchain. Meanwhile the French minister Torcy entered into secret
communications with St John, intimating that France was ready to
negotiate directly with England, but at first without the cognisance
of the States. The English ministry on their part, under the influence
of St John, showed themselves to be ready to throw over their allies, to
abandon the Habsburg cause in Spain, and to come to an agreement with
France on terms advantageous to England. For French diplomacy, always
alert and skilful, these proceedings were quite legitimate; but it was
scarcely honourable for the English government, while the Grand Alliance
was still in existence, to carry on these negotiations in profound
secrecy.
In August matters had so far advanced that Mesnager was sent over from
Paris to London entrusted with definite proposals. In October the
preliminaries of peace were virtually settled between the two powers.
Meanwhile the Dutch had been informed through Lord Strafford, the
English envoy at the Hague, of what was going on; and the news aroused
no small indignation and alarm. But great pressure was brought to bear
upon them; and, knowing that without England they could not continue the
war, the States-General at last, in fear for their barrier, consented,
on November 21, to send envoys to a peace congress to be held at Utrecht
on the basis of the Anglo-French preliminaries. It was in vain that the
Emperor Charles VI protested both at London and the Hague, or that
Eugene was despatched on a special mission to England in January, 1712.
The English ministry had made up their minds to conclude peace with or
without the emperor's assent; and the congress opened at the beginning
of the year 1712 without the presence of any Austrian plenipotentiaries,
though they appeared later. The Dutch provinces sent two envoys each.
The conferences at Utrecht were, however, little more than futile
debates; and the congress was held there rather as a concession to save
the _amour propre_ of the States than to settle the terms of peace. The
real negotiations were carried on secretly between England and France;
and after a visit by St John, now Viscount Bolingbroke, in person to
Paris in August, all points of difference between the two governments
were amicably arranged. Spain followed the lead of France; and the
States, knowing that they could not go on with the war without England,
were reluctantly obliged to accept the Anglo-French proposals. Their
concurrence might not have been so easily obtained, but for the
unfortunate course of the campaign of 1712. Marlborough had now been
replaced in the chief command by the Duke of Ormonde. Eugene, counting
upon English support, had taken Quesnoy on July 4, and was about to
invest Landrecies, when Ormonde informed him that an armistice had been
concluded between the French and English governments. On July 16 the
English contingent withdrew to Dunkirk, which had been surrendered by
the French as a pledge of good faith. Villars seized the opportunity to
make a surprise attack on the isolated Dutch at the bridge of Denain
(July 24) and, a panic taking place, completely annihilated their whole
force of 12,000 men with slight loss to himself. Eugene had to retreat,
abandoning his magazines; and Douay, Quesnoy and Bouchain fell into the
hands of the French marshal.
These disasters convinced the Dutch of their helplessness when deprived
of English help; and instructions were given to their envoys at Utrecht,
on December 29, to give their assent to the terms agreed upon and indeed
dictated by the governments of England and France. Making the best of
the situation, the Dutch statesmen, confronted with the growing
self-assertion of the French plenipotentiaries, concluded, on January
30, 1713, a new offensive and defensive alliance with England. This
treaty of alliance is commonly called the Second Barrier Treaty, because
it abrogated the Barrier Treaty of 1709, and was much more favourable to
France. It was not until all these more or less secret negotiations were
over that the Congress, after being suspended for some months, resumed
its sittings at Utrecht. The Peace of Utrecht which ensued is really a
misnomer. No general treaty was agreed upon and signed, but a series of
separate treaties between the belligerent powers. This was what France
had been wishing for some time and, by the connivance of England, she
achieved it. The treaty between these two countries was signed on April
11, 1713; and such was the dominant position of England that her allies,
with the single exception of the emperor, had to follow her lead.
Treaties with the States-General, with Savoy, Brandenburg and Portugal,
were all signed on this same day.
Louis XIV had good right to congratulate himself upon obtaining far more
favourable terms than he could have dared to hope in 1710 or 1711.
Philip V was recognised as King of Spain and the Indies, but had
solemnly to renounce his right of succession to the French throne and
his claim to the Spanish possessions in the Netherlands and in Italy.
The treaty between England and Spain was signed on July 13, 1713; that
between the States-General and Spain was delayed until June 26, 1714,
owing to the difficulties raised by the emperor, who, though deserted
by his allies, continued the war single-handed, but with signal lack of
success. He was forced to yield and make peace at Rastatt in a treaty,
which was confirmed by the Imperial Diet at Baden in Switzerland on
September 7, 1714. By this treaty the French king retained practically
all his conquests, while Charles VI, though he did not recognise the
title of Philip V, contented himself with the acquisition of the
"Spanish" Netherlands, and of the Milanese and Naples. Into the details
of these several treaties it is unnecessary here to enter, except in so
far as they affected the United Provinces. The power that benefited more
than any other was Great Britain, for the Peace of Utrecht laid the
foundation of her colonial empire and left her, from this time forward,
the first naval and maritime power in the world. Holland, though her
commerce was still great and her colonial possessions both rich and
extensive, had henceforth to see herself more and more overshadowed and
dominated by her former rival. Nevertheless the treaties concluded by
the States-General at this time were decidedly advantageous to the
Republic.
That with France, signed on April 11, 1713, placed the Spanish
Netherlands in the possession of the States-General, to be held by
them in trust for Charles VI until such time as the emperor came to
an agreement with them about a "Barrier." France in this matter
acted in the name of Spain, and was the intermediary through whose
good offices Spanish or Upper Gelderland was surrendered to
Prussia. Most important of all to the Dutch was the treaty with
the emperor concluded at Antwerp, November 15, 1715. This is
generally styled the Third Barrier Treaty, the First being that of
1709, the Second that of 1713 at Utrecht. The States-General
finally obtained what was for their interest a thoroughly satisfactory
settlement. They obtained the right to place garrisons amounting
in all to 35,000 men in Furnes, Warneton, Ypres, Knocke, Tournay,
Menin and Namur; and three-fifths of the cost were to be borne by
the Austrian government, who pledged certain revenues of their
newly-acquired Belgic provinces to the Dutch for the purpose. The
strong position in which such a treaty placed the Republic against
aggression, either from the side of France or Austria, was made
stronger by being guaranteed by the British government.
* * * * *