THE STADHOLDERATE OF WILLIAM III, 1672-1688
In the early summer of 1672, when William resolved to concentrate all
his available forces for the defence of Holland covered by its
water-line, the military situation was apparently hopeless. Had Turenne
and Luxemburg made a united effort to force this line at the opening of
the campaign the probability is that they would have succeeded. Instead
of doing so they expended their energies in the capture of a number of
fortified places in Gelderland, Overyssel and North Brabant; and in the
meantime the stadholder was week by week strengthening the weak points
in his defences, encouraging his men, personally supervising every
detail and setting an example of unshaken courage and of ceaseless
industry. He had at his side, as his field-marshal, George Frederick,
Count of Waldeck, an officer of experience and skill who had entered the
Republic's service, and Van Beverningh as Commissioner of the
States-General. With their help and counsel he had before autumn an
efficient army of 57,000 men on guard behind entrenchments at all
assailable points, while armed vessels patrolled the waterways. Outside
the line Nijmwegen, Grave, Coevorden, Steenwijk and other smaller places
had fallen; but the Münster-Cologne forces, after a siege lasting from
July 9 to August 28, had to retire from Groningen. The French armies
were all this time being constantly weakened by having to place
garrisons in the conquered provinces; and neither Turenne nor Luxemburg
felt strong enough to attack the strongly-protected Dutch frontiers
behind the water-line.
The prince, however, was not content with inaction. Assuming the
offensive, he ventured on a series of attacks on Naarden and on Woerden,
raised the siege of Maestricht, and finally made an attempt to cut the
French communications by a march upon Charleroi. All these raids were
more or less failures, since in each case William had to retreat without
effecting anything of importance. Nevertheless the enterprise shown by
the young general had the double effect of heartening his own troops and
of undermining the overweening confidence of the enemy. A hard frost
in December enabled Luxemburg to penetrate into Holland, but a rapid
thaw compelled a hasty withdrawal. The only road open to him was blocked
by a fortified post at Nieuwerbrug, but Colonel Vin et Pain, who was in
command of the Dutch force, retired to Gouda and left the French a free
passage, to the stadholder's great indignation. The colonel was tried on
the charge of deserting his post, and shot.
The year 1673 was marked by a decisive change for the better in the
position of the States. Alarm at the rapid growth of the French power
brought at last both Spanish and Austrian assistance to the hard-pressed
Netherlands; and the courage and skill of De Ruyter held successfully
at bay the united fleets of England and France, and effectually
prevented the landing of an army on the Dutch coast. Never did De Ruyter
exhibit higher qualities of leadership than in the naval campaign of
1673. His fleet was greatly inferior in numbers to the combined
Anglo-French fleet under Prince Rupert and D'Estrées. A stubborn action
took place near the mouth of the Scheldt on June 7, in which the English
had little assistance from the French squadron and finally retired to
the estuary of the Thames. Another fierce fight at Kijkduin on August 21
was still more to the advantage of the Dutch. Meanwhile on land the
French had scored a real success by the capture of the great fortress of
Maestricht with its garrison of 6000 men, after a siege which lasted
from June 6 to July 1. All attempts, however, to pass the water-line and
enter Holland met with failure; and, as the summer drew to its close,
the advance of Imperial and Spanish forces began to render the position
of the French precarious. William seized his opportunity in September to
capture Naarden before Luxemburg could advance to its relief. He then
took a bolder step. In October, at the head of an army of 25,000 men, of
whom 15,000 were Spanish, he marched to Cologne and, after effecting a
junction with the Imperial army, laid siege to Bonn, which surrendered
on November 15. This brilliant stroke had great results. The French,
fearing that their communications might be cut, withdrew from the Dutch
frontier; and at the same time the Münster-Cologne forces hastily
evacuated the eastern provinces. The stadholder before the end of the
year entirely freed the country from its invaders. Once more a Prince of
Orange had saved the Dutch Republic in its extremity.
The effect of this was to place almost supreme power in his hands. Had
the prince at this moment set his heart upon obtaining the title of
sovereign, he would have had but little difficulty in gratifying his
ambition. Leading statesmen like the Council-Pensionary Fagel, the
experienced Van Beverningh, and Valckenier, the most influential man in
Amsterdam, would have supported him. But William was thoroughly
practical. The freeing of the Provinces from the presence of the enemy
was but the beginning of the task which he had already set before
himself as his life-work, _i.e._ the overthrow of the menacing
predominance of the French power under Louis XIV. His first care was the
restoration of the well-nigh ruined land. The country outside the
water-line had been cruelly devastated by the invaders, and then
impoverished by having for a year and a half to maintain the armies of
occupation. Large tracts on the borders of Holland, Utrecht and
Friesland, submerged by the sea-waters through the cutting of the dams,
had been rendered valueless for some years to come, while those parts of
Holland and Zeeland on which the enemy had not set foot had been crushed
beneath heavy taxes and the loss of commerce.
The position of the three provinces, Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel,
which had been overrun by the French at the opening of hostilities and
held by them ever since, had to be re-settled. They had, during this
period, paid no taxes, and had no representation in the States-General.
Holland was in favour of reducing them to the status of Generality-lands
until they had paid their arrears. The prince was opposed to any
harshness of treatment, and his will prevailed. The three provinces were
re-admitted into the Union, but with shorn privileges; and William was
elected stadholder by each of them with largely increased powers. The
nomination, or the choice out of a certain number of nominees, of the
members of the Town-Corporations, of the Courts of Justice and of the
delegates to the States-General, was granted to him. The Dutch Republic
was full of anomalies. In Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel we have the
curious spectacle in the days of William III of the stadholder, who was
nominally a servant of the Sovereign Estates, himself appointing his
masters. As a matter of fact, the voice of these provinces was his
voice; and, as he likewise controlled the Estates in Zeeland, he could
always count upon a majority vote in the States-General in support of
his foreign policy. Nor was this all.
Holland itself, in gratitude for its deliverance, had become
enthusiastically Orangist. It declared the stadholdership hereditary in
the male-line, and its example was followed by Zeeland, Utrecht,
Gelderland and Overyssel, while the States-General in their turn made
the captain-and admiral-generalship of the Union hereditary offices. Nor
was gratitude confined to the conferring of powers and dignities which
gave the prince in all but name monarchical authority. At the proposal
of Amsterdam, the city which so often had been and was yet to be the
stubborn opponent of the Princes of Orange, William II's debt of
2,000,000 fl. was taken over by the province of Holland; Zeeland
presented him with 30,000 fl.; and the East India Company with a grant
of 1/33 of its dividends.
From the very first William had kept steadily in view a scheme of
forming a great coalition to curb the ambitious designs of Louis XIV;
and for effecting this object an alliance between England and the United
Provinces was essential. The first step was to conclude peace. This was
not a difficult task. The English Parliament, and still more the English
people, had throughout been averse from fighting on the side of the
French against the Dutch. Charles II, with the help of French money, had
been carrying on the war in opposition to the wishes of his subjects,
who saw their fleets but feebly supported by their French allies, their
trade seriously injured, and but little chance of gaining any
advantageous return for the heavy cost. Charles himself had a strong
affection for his nephew, and began to turn a favourable ear to his
proposals for negotiations, more especially as his heroic efforts to
stem the tide of French invasion had met with so much success. In these
circumstances everything was favourable to an understanding; and peace
was concluded at Westminster on February 19,1674. The terms differed
little from those of Breda, except that the Republic undertook to pay a
war indemnity of 2,000,000 fl. within three years. The striking of the
flag was conceded. Surinam remained in Dutch hands. New York, which had
been retaken by a squadron under Cornelis Evertsen, August, 1673, was
given back to the English crown. Negotiations were likewise opened with
Münster and Cologne; and peace was concluded with Münster (April 22) and
with Cologne (May 11) on the basis of the evacuation of all conquered
territory. France was isolated and opposed now by a strong coalition,
the Republic having secured the help of Austria, Spain, Brandenburg and
Denmark. The campaign of the summer of 1674 thus opened under favouring
circumstances, but nothing of importance occurred until August 11, when
William at the head of an allied force of some 70,000 men encountered
Condé at Seneff in Hainault. The battle was fought out with great
obstinacy and there were heavy losses on both sides. The French,
however, though inferior in numbers had the advantage in being a more
compact force than that of the allies; and William, poorly supported by
the Imperialist contingents, had to retire from the field. He was never
a great strategist, but he now conducted a retreat which extracted
admiration from his opponents. His talents for command always showed
themselves most conspicuously in adverse circumstances. His coolness and
courage in moments of peril and difficulty never deserted him, and,
though a strict disciplinarian, he always retained the confidence and
affection of his soldiers. On October 27 Grave was captured, leaving
only one of the Dutch fortresses, Maestricht, in the hands of the
French.
The war on land dragged on without any decisive results during 1675. The
stadholder was badly supported by his allies and reduced to the
defensive; but, though tentative efforts were made by the English
government to set on foot negotiations for peace, and a growing party in
Holland were beginning to clamour for the cessation of a war which was
crippling their trade and draining the resources of the country, the
prince was resolutely opposed to the English offer of mediation, which
he regarded as insincere and premature. He was well aware that there was
in England a very strong and widespread opposition to the succession of
James Duke of York, who made no secret of his devoted attachment to the
Roman Catholic faith. So strong was the feeling that he had been
compelled to resign his post of Lord-High-Admiral. The dislike and
distrust he aroused had been accentuated by his second marriage to Mary
of Modena, a zealous Catholic. William was the son of the eldest
daughter of Charles I, and to him the eyes of a large party in England
were turning. The prince was keenly alive to the political advantages of
his position. He kept himself well informed of the intrigues of the
court and of the state of public opinion by secret agents, and entered
into clandestine correspondence with prominent statesmen. Charles II
himself, though he had not the smallest sympathy with his nephew's
political views, was as kindly disposed to him as his selfish and
unprincipled nature would allow, and he even went so far as to encourage
in 1674 an alliance between him and his cousin Mary, the elder daughter
of the Duke of York. But William had at that time no inclination for
marriage. He was preoccupied with other things, and the age of Mary--she
was only twelve--rendered it easy for him to postpone his final
decision.
Events were to force his hand. In 1676 the French king, fearing the
power of the coalition that was growing in strength, endeavoured to
detach the republic by offering to make a separate peace on generous
terms. Despite the opposition of the stadholder, Dutch and French
representatives met at Nijmwegen; but William by his obdurate attitude
rendered any settlement of the points in dispute impossible. In 1677,
however, the capture of Valenciennes by the French and their decisive
defeat of the allied army under William's command at Mont-Cassel (April
11) made it more difficult for him to resist the growing impatience of
the burgher-class in Holland and especially of the merchants of
Amsterdam at his opposition to peace. He was accused of wishing to
continue the war from motives of personal ambition and the desire of
military glory. In February of this year, however, Charles II after a
period of personal rule was through lack of resources compelled to
summon parliament. It no sooner met than it showed its strong sympathy
with the Netherlands; and the king speedily saw that he could no longer
pursue a policy opposed to the wishes of his people. When, therefore,
William sent over his most trusted friend and counsellor, Bentinck, to
London on a secret mission in the summer, he met with a most favourable
reception; and the prince himself received an invitation to visit his
uncle with the special object of renewing the proposal for his marriage
with the Princess Mary. William accordingly arrived in London on October
19; and, the assent of the king and the Duke of York being obtained, the
wedding was celebrated with almost indecent haste. It was a purely
political union; and when, early in December, the Prince and Princess of
Orange set sail for Holland, the young girl wept bitterly at having to
leave her home for a strange land at the side of a cold, unsympathetic
husband. The weeks he spent in England had been utilised by the prince
to good purpose. He persuaded Charles to promise his support by land
and sea to the Netherlands in case the terms of peace offered by the
allies were rejected by the French. A treaty between the States and
Great Britain giving effect to this promise was actually signed on
January 29, 1678. The results, however, did not answer William's
expectations. The English Parliament and the States alike had no trust
in King Charles, nor was the English match at first popular in Holland.
A strong opposition arose against the prince's war policy. The
commercial classes had been hard hit by the French invasion, and they
were now suffering heavy losses at sea through the Dunkirk privateers
led by the daring Jean Bart. The peace party included such tried and
trusted statesmen as Van Beverningh, Van Beuningen and the
Council-Pensionary Fagel, all of them loyal counsellors of the
stadholder. So resolute was the attitude of Amsterdam that the leaders
of both municipal parties, Valckenier and Hooft, were agreed in
demanding that the French offers of a separate peace should be accepted.
On the same side was found Henry Casimir, Stadholder of Friesland, who
was jealous of his cousin's autocratic exercise of authority.
The _pourparlers_ at Nijmwegen were still going on, but made no progress
in face of William's refusal to treat except in concert with his allies.
Louis XIV, however, fully informed of the state of public opinion and of
the internal dissensions both in the United Provinces and in England,
was not slow to take advantage of the situation. A powerful French army
invaded Flanders and made themselves masters of Ypres and Ghent and
proceeded to besiege Mons. William, despite the arrival of an English
auxiliary force under Monmouth, could do little to check the enemy's
superior forces. Meanwhile French diplomacy was busy at Amsterdam and
elsewhere in the States, working against the war parties; and by the
offer of favourable terms the States-General were induced to ask for a
truce of six weeks. It was granted, and the Dutch and Spanish
representatives at Nijmwegen (those of the emperor, of Brandenburg and
of Denmark refusing to accede) speedily agreed to conclude peace on the
following terms: the French to restore Maestricht and to evacuate all
occupied Dutch territory, and to make a commercial treaty. Spain to
surrender an important slice of southern Flanders, but to be left in
possession of a belt of fortresses to cover their Netherland possessions
against further French attack. But, though these conditions were
accepted, the French raised various pretexts to delay the signature of
the treaty, hoping that meanwhile Mons, which was closely beleaguered
by Luxemburg, might fall into their hands, and thus become an asset
which they could exchange for some other possession. The States and the
Spanish Government were both anxious to avoid this; and the Prince of
Orange, who steadily opposed the treaty, returned towards the end of
July to his camp to watch the siege of Mons and prevent its falling into
the hands of the enemy. At the same time (July 26) King Charles, who had
been working through Sir William Temple for the conclusion of peace, now
declared that, unless the treaty was signed before August 11, he would
assist the allies to enforce it. The French diplomatists at Nijmwegen
had hitherto declared that their troops would not evacuate Maestricht
and the other places which they had agreed to restore to the States,
until Brandenburg and Denmark had evacuated the territory they had
conquered from Sweden. On August 10, just before time for resuming
hostilities had been reached, they tactfully conceded this point and
promised immediate evacuation, if the treaty were at once concluded. Van
Beverningh and his colleagues accordingly, acting on their instructions,
affixed their signatures just before midnight.
They fell into the trap laid for them, for the treaty between France and
Spain was not yet signed, and it was the intention of the French to make
further pretexts for delay in the hope that Mons meanwhile would fall.
The report of the conclusion of peace reached the stadholder in his camp
on August 13, but unofficially. On the morning of August 14 D'Estrades
came personally to bring the news to Luxemburg; and the French marshal
was on the point of forwarding the message to the Dutch camp, when he
heard that Orange was advancing with his army to attack him, and he felt
that honour compelled him to accept the challenge. A sanguinary fight
took place at St Denis, a short distance from Mons. William exposed his
life freely, and though the result was nominally a drawn battle, he
achieved his purpose. Luxemburg raised the siege of Mons, and the
negotiations with Spain were pressed forward. The treaty was signed on
September 17, 1678. The peace of Nijmwegen thus brought hostilities to
an end, leaving the United Provinces in possession of all their
territory. It lasted ten years, but it was only an armed truce. Louis
XIV desired a breathing space in which to prepare for fresh aggressions;
and his tireless opponent, the Prince of Orange, henceforth made it the
one object of his life to form a Grand Alliance to curb French
ambition and uphold in Europe what was henceforth known as "the Balance
of Power."
In setting about this task William was confronted with almost
insuperable difficulties. The Dutch people generally had suffered
terribly in the late invasions and were heartily sick of war. The
interest of the Hollanders and especially of the Amsterdammers was
absorbed in the peaceful pursuits of commerce. The far-reaching plans
and international combinations, upon which William concentrated his
whole mind and energies, had no attraction for them, even had they
understood their purpose and motive. The consequence was that the prince
encountered strong opposition, and this not merely in Holland and
Amsterdam, but from his cousin Henry Casimir and the two provinces of
which he was stadholder. In Amsterdam the old "States" party revived
under the leadership of Valckenier and Hooft; and in his latter days Van
Beuningen was ready to resist to the utmost any considerable outlay on
the army or navy or any entangling alliances. They held that it was the
business of the Republic to attend to its own affairs and to leave Louis
to pursue his aggressive policy at the expense of other countries, so
long as he left them alone. The ideal which William III had set before
him was the exact reverse of this; and, unfortunately for his own
country, throughout his life he often subordinated its particular
interests to the wider European interests which occupied his attention.
The work of building up afresh a coalition to withstand the ever-growing
menace of the formidable French power could scarcely have been more
unpromising than it now appeared. Spain was utterly exhausted and
feeble. Brandenburg and Denmark had been alienated by the States
concluding a separate peace at Nijmwegen and leaving them in the lurch.
The attention of the emperor was fully occupied in defending Hungary and
Vienna itself against the Turks. England under Charles II was
untrustworthy and vacillating, almost a negligible quantity. A visit
made by William to London convinced him that nothing was at present to
be hoped for from that quarter. At the same time the very able French
ambassador at the Hague, D'Avaux, did his utmost to foment the divisions
and factions in the Provinces. He always insisted that he was accredited
to the States-General and not to the Prince of Orange, and carried on
correspondence and intrigues with the party in Amsterdam opposed to
the stadholder's anti-French policy. The cumbrous and complicated system
of government enabled him thus to do much to thwart the prince and to
throw obstacles in his way. The curious thing is, that William was so
intent on his larger projects that he was content to use the powers he
had without making any serious attempt, as he might have done, to make
the machine of government more workable by reforms in the direction of
centralisation. Immersed in foreign affairs, he left the internal
administration in the hands of subordinates chosen rather for their
subservience than for their ability and probity; and against several of
them, notably against his relative Odijk, serious charges were made.
Odijk, representing the prince as first noble in Zeeland, had a large
patronage; and he shamelessly enriched himself by his venal traffic in
the disposal of offices without a word of rebuke from William, in whose
name he acted. On the contrary, he continued to enjoy his favour.
Corruption was scarcely less rife in Holland, though no one practised it
quite on the same scale as Odijk in Zeeland. William indeed cared little
about the domestic politics of the Republic, except in so far as they
affected his diplomatic activities; and in this domain he knew how to
employ able and devoted men. He had Waldeck at his side not merely as a
military adviser, but as a skilful diplomatist well versed in the
intricate politics of the smaller German states; Everhard van Weede,
lord of Dijkveld, and Godard van Rheede, lord of Amerongen, proved
worthy successors of Van Beverningh and Van Beuningen. Through the
Council-Pensionary Fagel he was able to retain the support of the
majority in the Estates of Holland, despite the strong opposition he
encountered at Amsterdam and some other towns, where the interests of
commerce reigned supreme. The death of Gillis Valckenier, the ablest of
the leaders of the opposition in Amsterdam, in 1680 left the control of
affairs in that city in the hands of Nicolaes Witsen and Johan Hudde,
but these were men of less vigour and determination than Valckenier.
Louis XIV meanwhile had been actively pushing forward his schemes of
aggrandisement. Strasburg was seized in August, 1681; Luxemburg was
occupied; claims were made under the treaty of Nijmwegen to certain
portions of Flanders and Brabant, and troops were despatched to take
possession of them. There was general alarm; and, with the help of
Waldeck, William was able to secure the support of a number of the
small German states in the Rhenish circle, most of them always ready to
hire out their armed forces for a subsidy. Sweden also offered
assistance. But both England and Brandenburg were in secret collusion
with France, and the emperor would not move owing to the Turkish menace.
In these circumstances Spain was compelled (1684) by the entry of the
armies of Louis into the southern Netherlands to declare war upon
France, and called upon the States for their military aid of 8000 men in
accordance with the terms of the treaty of Nijmwegen. Orange at once
referred the matter to the Council of State, and himself proposed that
16,000 should be sent. As this, however, could only mean a renewal of
the war with France, the proposal met with strong opposition in many
quarters, and especially in Amsterdam. Prosperity was just beginning to
revive, and a remembrance of past experiences filled the hearts of many
with dread at the thought of the French armies once more invading their
land. The Amsterdam regents even went so far as to enter into secret
negotiations with D'Avaux; and they were supported by Henry Casimir, who
was always ready to thwart his cousin's policy. William was checkmated
and at first, in his anger, inclined to follow his father's example and
crush the opposition of Amsterdam by force. He possessed however, which
William II had not, the support of a majority in the Estates of Holland.
He used this with effect. The raising of the troops was sanctioned by
the Estates (January 31, 1684), an intercepted cipher-letter from
D'Avaux being skilfully used to discredit the Amsterdam leaders, who
were accused of traitorous correspondence with a foreign power.
Nevertheless the prince, although he was able to override any active
opposition at home, did not venture, so long as England and Brandenburg
were on friendly relations with France, to put pressure upon the
States-General. The French troops, to the prince's chagrin, overran
Flanders; and he had no alternative but to concur in the truce for
twenty years concluded at Ratisbon, August 15, 1684, which left the
French king in possession of all his conquests.
No more conclusive proof of the inflexible resolve of William III can be
found than the patience he now exhibited. His faith in himself was never
shaken, and his patience in awaiting the favourable moment was
inexhaustible. To him far more appropriately than to his
great-grandfather might the name of William the Silent have been
given. He had no confidants, except Waldeck and William Bentinck; and
few could even guess at the hidden workings of that scheming mind or at
the burning fires of energy and will-power beneath the proud and frigid
reserve of a man so frail in body and always ailing. Very rarely could a
born leader of men have been more unamiable or less anxious to win
popular applause, but his whole demeanour inspired confidence and,
ignoring the many difficulties and oppositions which thwarted him, he
steadfastly bided his time and opportunity. It now came quickly, for the
year 1685 was marked by two events--the accession of James II to the
throne of England, and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes--which were
to have far-reaching consequences.
The new King of England was not merely a strong but a bigoted Roman
Catholic. Had he been a wise and patriotic prince, he would have tried
by a studiously moderate policy to win the loyal allegiance of his
subjects, but he was stubborn, wrong-headed and fanatical, and from the
first he aimed at the impossible. His attempts to establish absolute
rule, to bring back the English nation to the fold of the Catholic
Church and, as a means to that end, to make himself independent of
Parliament by accepting subsidies from the French king, were bound to
end in catastrophe. This was more especially the case as Louis XIV had,
at the very time of King James' accession, after having for a number of
years persecuted the Huguenots in defiance of the Edict of Nantes, taken
the step of revoking that great instrument of religious toleration on
November 17, 1685. The exile of numerous families, who had already been
driven out by the _dragonnades_, was now followed by the expulsion of
the entire Huguenot body, of all at least who refused to conform to the
Catholic faith. How many hundreds of thousands left their homes to find
refuge in foreign lands it is impossible to say, but amongst them were
great numbers of industrious and skilled artisans and handicraftsmen,
who sought asylum in the Dutch Republic and there found a ready and
sympathetic welcome. The arrival of these unhappy immigrants had the
effect of arousing a strong feeling of indignation in Holland, and
indeed throughout the provinces, against the government of Louis XIV.
They began to see that the policy of the French king was not merely one
of territorial aggression, but was a crusade against Protestantism. The
governing classes in Holland, Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen were
stirred up by the preachers to enforce more strictly the laws against
the Catholics in those provinces, for genuine alarm was felt at the
French menace to the religion for which their fathers had fought and
suffered. The cause of Protestantism was one with which the Princes of
Orange had identified themselves; but none of his ancestors was so keen
an upholder of that cause as was William III. The presence in their
midst of the Huguenot refugees had the effect of influencing public
opinion powerfully in the States in favour of their stadholder's warlike
policy. Nor was the Dutch Republic the only State which was deeply moved
by the ruthless treatment of his Protestant subjects by the French king.
The Elector of Brandenburg, as head of the principal Protestant State in
Germany, had also offered an asylum to the French exiles and now
reverted once more to his natural alliance with the United Provinces. He
sent his trusted councillor, Paul Fuchs, in May, 1685, to offer to his
nephew, the Prince of Orange, his friendly co-operation in the formation
of a powerful coalition against France. Fuchs was a skilled diplomatist,
and by his mediation an understanding was arrived at between the
stadholder and his opponents in Amsterdam. At the same time strong
family influence was brought to bear upon Henry Casimir of Friesland,
and a reconciliation between the two stadholders was effected. William
thus found himself, before the year 1685 came to an end, able to pursue
his policy without serious let or hindrance. He was quite ready to seize
his opportunity, and by tactful diplomacy he succeeded by August, 1686,
in forming an alliance between the United Provinces, Brandenburg,
Sweden, Austria, Spain and a number of the smaller Rhenish states, to
uphold the treaties of Westphalia and Nijmwegen against the
encroachments of French military aggression. But the design of William
was still incomplete. The naval power and financial resources of England
were needed to enable the coalition to grapple successfully with the
mighty centralised power of Louis XIV.
In England the attempt of James II to bring about a Catholic reaction
by the arbitrary use of the royal prerogative was rapidly alienating the
loyalty of all classes, including many men of high position, and even
some of his own ministers. William watched keenly all that was going on
and kept himself in close correspondence with several of the principal
malcontents. He was well aware that all eyes were turning to him (and he
accepted the position) as the natural defender, should the need
arise, of England's civil and religious liberties. The need arose and
the call came in the summer of 1688, and it found William prepared. The
climax of the conflict between King James and his people was reached
with the acquittal of the Seven Bishops in May, 1688, amidst public
rejoicings, speedily followed on June 10 by the birth of a Prince of
Wales. The report was spread that the child was supposititious and it
was accepted as true by large numbers of persons, including the Princess
Anne, and also, on the strength of her testimony, by the Prince and
Princess of Orange.
The secret relations of William with the leaders of opposition had for
some time been carried on through his trusted confidants, Dijkveld, the
State's envoy at the English Court, and William of Nassau, lord of
Zuilestein. A bold step was now taken. Several Englishmen of note signed
an invitation to the prince to land in England with an armed force in
defence of the religion and liberties of the country; and it was brought
to him by Admiral Russell, one of the signatories. After some hesitation
William, with the consent and approval of the princess, decided to
accept it. No man ever had a more loyal and devoted wife than William
III of Orange, and he did not deserve it. For some years after his
marriage he treated Mary with coldness and neglect. He confessed on one
occasion to Bishop Burnet that his churlishness was partly due to
jealousy; he could not bear the thought that Mary might succeed to the
English throne and he would in that country be inferior in rank to his
wife. The bishop informed the princess, who at once warmly declared
that she would never accept the crown unless her husband received not
merely the title of king, but the prerogatives of a reigning sovereign.
From that time forward a complete reconciliation took place between
them, and the affection and respect of William for this loyal,
warm-hearted and self-sacrificing woman deepened as the years went on.
Mary's character, as it is revealed in her private diaries, which have
been preserved, deserves those epithets. Profoundly religious and a
convinced Protestant, Mary with prayers for guidance and not without
many tears felt that the resolve of her husband to hazard all on armed
intervention in England was fully justified; and at this critical
juncture she had no hesitation in allowing her sense of duty to her
husband and her country to override that of a daughter to her father.
Already in July vigorous preparations in all secrecy began to be made
for the expedition. The naval yards were working at full pressure with
the ostensible object of sending out a fleet to suppress piracy in the
Mediterranean. The stadholder felt that he was able to rely upon the
willing co-operation of the States in his project. His difficulty now,
as always, was to secure the assent of Amsterdam. But the opposition of
that city proved less formidable than was anticipated. The peril to
Protestantism should England under James II be leagued with France, was
evident, and scarcely less the security of the commerce on which
Amsterdam depended for its prosperity. The support of Amsterdam secured
that of the Estates of Holland; and finally, after thus surmounting
successfully the elements of opposition in the town and the province,
where the anti-Orange party was most strongly represented, the prince
had little difficulty in obtaining, on October 8, the unanimous approval
of the States-General, assembled in secret session, to the proposed
expedition. By that time an army of 14,000 men had been gathered
together and was encamped at Mook. Of these the six English and Scottish
regiments, who now, as throughout the War of Independence, were
maintained in the Dutch service, formed the nucleus. The force also
comprised the prince's Dutch guards and other picked Dutch troops, and
also some German levies. Marshal Schomberg was in command. The pretext
assigned was the necessity of protecting the eastern frontier of the
Republic against an attack from Cologne, where Cardinal Fürstenberg, the
nominee and ally of Louis XIV, had been elected to the archiepiscopal
throne.
Meanwhile diplomacy was active. D'Avaux was far too clear-sighted not to
have discerned the real object of the naval and military preparations,
and he warned both Louis XIV and James II. James, however, was obdurate
and took no heed, while Louis played his enemy's game by declaring war
on the Emperor and the Pope, and by invading the Palatinate instead of
the Republic. For William had been doing his utmost to win over to his
side, by the agency of Waldeck and Bentinck, the Protestant Princes of
Germany, with the result that Brandenburg, Hanover, Saxony, Brunswick
and Hesse had undertaken to give him active support against a French
attack; while the constant threat against her possessions in the Belgic
Netherlands compelled Spain to join the anti-French league which the
stadholder had so long been striving to bring into existence. To
these were now added the Emperor and the Pope, who, being actually at
war with France, were ready to look favourably upon an expedition which
would weaken the common enemy. The Grand Alliance of William's dreams
had thus (should his expedition to England prove successful) come within
the range of practical politics; and with his base secured Orange now
determined to delay no longer, but to stake everything upon the issue of
the English venture.
The prince bade farewell to the States-General on October 26, and four
days later he set sail from Helvoetsluis, but was driven back by a heavy
storm, which severely damaged the fleet. A fresh start was made on
November 11. Admiral Herbert was in command of the naval force, which
convoyed safely through the Channel without opposition the long lines of
transports. Over the prince's vessel floated his flag with the words
_Pro Religione et Libertate_ inscribed above the motto of the House of
Orange, _Je maintiendray_. Without mishap a landing was effected at
Torbay, November 14 (5 o.s.), which was William's birthday, and a rapid
march was made to Exeter. He met with no armed resistance. James'
troops, his courtiers, his younger daughter the Princess Anne, all
deserted him; and finally, after sending away his wife and infant son to
France, the king himself left his palace at Whitehall by night and fled
down the river to Sheerness. Here he was recognised and brought back to
London. It was thought, however, best to connive at his escape, and he
landed on the coast of France at Christmas. The expedition had achieved
its object and William, greeted as a deliverer, entered the capital at
the head of his army.
On February 13,1689, a convention, specially summoned for the
purpose, declared that James by his flight had vacated the throne;
and the crown was offered to William and Mary jointly, the
executive power being placed in the hands of the prince.
* * * * *