A CHALLENGE DECLINED—A BLOW MEDITATED—A CAUTIOUS COUNCIL OF
WAR—PREPARATION FOR THE QUEBEC EXPEDITION—BENEDICT ARNOLD THE
LEADER—ADVICE AND INSTRUCTIONS—DEPARTURE—GENERAL SCHUYLER ON THE
SOREL—RECONNOITRES ST. JOHNS—CAMP AT ISLE AUX NOIX—ILLNESS OF
SCHUYLER—RETURNS TO TICONDEROGA—EXPEDITION OF MONTGOMERY AGAINST ST.
JOHNS—LETTER OF ETHAN ALLEN—HIS DASH AGAINST MONTREAL—ITS CATASTROPHE—A
HERO IN IRONS—CORRESPONDENCE OF WASHINGTON WITH SCHUYLER AND ARNOLD—HIS
ANXIETY ABOUT THEM.
The siege of Boston had been kept up for several weeks without any
remarkable occurrence. The British remained within their lines,
diligently strengthening them; the besiegers having received further
supplies of ammunition, were growing impatient of a state of inactivity.
Towards the latter part of August there were rumors from Boston, that
the enemy were preparing for a sortie. Washington was resolved to
provoke it by a kind of challenge. He accordingly detached fourteen
hundred men to seize at night upon a height within musket shot of the
enemy’s line on Charlestown Neck, presuming that the latter would sally
forth on the following day to dispute possession of it, and thus be
drawn into a general battle. The task was executed with silence and
celerity, and by daybreak the hill presented to the astonished foe, the
aspect of a fortified post.
The challenge was not accepted. The British opened a heavy cannonade
from Bunker’s Hill, but kept within their works. The Americans, scant of
ammunition, could only reply with a single nine-pounder; this, however,
sank one of the floating batteries which guarded the neck. They went on
to complete and strengthen this advanced post, exposed to daily
cannonade and bombardment, which, however, did but little injury. They
continued to answer from time to time with a single gun; reserving their
ammunition for a general action. “We are just in the situation of a man
with little money in his pocket,” writes Secretary Reed; “he will do
twenty mean things to prevent his breaking in upon his little stock. We
are obliged to bear with the rascals on Bunker’s Hill, when a few shot
now and then in return, would keep our men attentive to their business
and give the enemy alarms.”[12]
The evident unwillingness of the latter to come forth was perplexing.
“Unless the ministerial troops in Boston are waiting for
reinforcements,” writes Washington, “I cannot devise what they are
staying there for, nor why, as they affect to despise the Americans,
they do not come forth and put an end to the contest at once.”
Perhaps they persuaded themselves that his army, composed of crude,
half-disciplined levies from different and distant quarters, would
gradually fall asunder and disperse, or that its means of subsistence
would be exhausted. He had his own fears on the subject, and looked
forward with doubt and anxiety to a winter’s campaign; the heavy expense
that would be incurred in providing barracks, fuel and warm clothing;
the difficulty there would be of keeping together, through the rigorous
season, troops unaccustomed to military hardships, and none of whose
terms of enlistment extended beyond the 1st of January: the supplies of
ammunition, too, that would be required for protracted operations; the
stock of powder on hand, notwithstanding the most careful husbandry,
being fearfully small. Revolving these circumstances in his mind, he
rode thoughtfully about the commanding points in the vicinity of Boston,
considering how he might strike a decisive blow that would put an end to
the murmuring inactivity of the army, and relieve the country from the
consuming expense of maintaining it. The result was, a letter to the
major and brigadier-generals, summoning them to a council of war to be
held at the distance of three days, and giving them previous intimation
of its purpose. It was to know whether, in their judgment, a successful
attack might not be made upon the troops at Boston by means of boats, in
co-operation with an attempt upon their lines at Roxbury. “The success
of such an enterprise,” adds he, “depends, I well know, upon the Allwise
Disposer of events, and it is not within the reach of human wisdom to
foretell the issue; but if the prospect is fair, the undertaking is
justifiable.”
He proceeded to state the considerations already cited, which appeared
to justify it. The council having thus had time for previous
deliberation, met on the 11th of September. It was composed of
Major-generals Ward, Lee, and Putnam, and Brigadier-generals Thomas,
Heath, Sullivan, Spencer, and Greene. They unanimously pronounced the
suggested attempt inexpedient, at least for the present.
It certainly was bold and hazardous, yet it seems to have taken strong
hold on the mind of the commander-in-chief, usually so cautious. “I
cannot say,” writes he to the President of Congress, “that I have wholly
laid it aside; but new events may occasion new measures. Of this I hope
the honorable Congress can need no assurance, that there is not a man in
America who more earnestly wishes such a termination of the campaign, as
to make the army no longer necessary.”
In the mean time, as it was evident the enemy did not intend to come
out, but were only strengthening their defences and preparing for
winter, Washington was enabled to turn his attention to the expedition
to be sent into Canada by the way of the Kennebec River.
A detachment of about eleven hundred men, chosen for the purpose, was
soon encamped on Cambridge Common. There were ten companies of New
England infantry, some of them from General Greene’s Rhode Island
regiments; three rifle companies from Pennsylvania and Virginia, one of
them Captain Daniel Morgan’s famous company; and a number of volunteers;
among whom was Aaron Burr, then but twenty years of age, and just
commencing his varied, brilliant, but ultimately unfortunate career.
The proposed expedition was wild and perilous, and required a hardy,
skilful and intrepid leader. Such a one was at hand. Benedict Arnold was
at Cambridge, occupied in settling his accounts with the Massachusetts
committee of safety. These were nearly adjusted. Whatever faults may
have been found with his conduct in some particulars, his exploits on
Lake Champlain had atoned for them; for valor in time of war, covers a
multitude of sins. It was thought too, by some, that he had been treated
harshly, and there was a disposition to soothe his irritated pride.
Washington had given him an honorable reception at head-quarters, and
now considered him the very man for the present enterprise. He had shown
aptness for military service, whether on land or water. He was
acquainted, too, with Canada, and especially with Quebec, having, in the
course of his checkered life, traded in horses between that place and
the West Indies. With these considerations he intrusted him with the
command of the expedition, giving him the commission of
lieutenant-colonel in the continental army.
As he would be intrusted with dangerous powers, Washington, beside a
general letter of instructions, addressed a special one to him
individually, full of cautious and considerate advice. “Upon your
conduct and courage, and that of the officers and soldiers detailed on
this expedition, not only the success of the present enterprise, and
your own honor, but the safety and welfare of the whole continent, may
depend. I charge you, therefore, and the officers and soldiers under
your command, as you value your own safety and honor, and the favor and
esteem of your country, that you consider yourselves as marching, not
through the country of an enemy, but of our friends and brethren; for
such the inhabitants of Canada and the Indian nations have approved
themselves, in this unhappy contest between Great Britain and America;
and that you check by every motive of duty and fear of punishment every
attempt to plunder or insult the inhabitants of Canada. Should any
American soldier be so base and infamous as to injure any Canadian or
Indian in his person or property, I do most earnestly enjoin you to
bring him to such severe and exemplary punishment as the enormity of the
crime may require. Should it extend to death itself, it will not be
disproportioned to its guilt at such a time and in such a cause. * * * *
I also give in charge to you, to avoid all disrespect to the religion of
the country and its ceremonies. * * While we are contending for our own
liberty, we should be very cautious not to violate the rights of
conscience in others, ever considering that God alone is the judge of
the hearts of men, and to him only, in this case, are they answerable.”
In the general letter of instructions, Washington inserted the following
clause. “If Lord Chatham’s son should be in Canada, and in any way fall
into your power, you are enjoined to treat him with all possible
deference and respect. You cannot err in paying too much honor to the
son of so illustrious a character and so true a friend to America.”
Arnold was, moreover, furnished with handbills for distribution in
Canada, setting forth the friendly objects of the present expedition, as
well as of that under General Schuyler; and calling on the Canadians to
furnish necessaries and accommodations of every kind; for which they
were assured ample compensation.
On the 13th of September, Arnold struck his tents, and set out in high
spirits. More fortunate than his rival, Ethan Allen, he had attained the
object of his ambition, the command of an expedition into Canada; and
trusted in the capture of Quebec, to eclipse even the surprise of
Ticonderoga.
Washington enjoined upon him to push forward, as rapidly as possible,
success depending upon celerity; and counted the days as they elapsed
after his departure, impatient to receive tidings of his progress up the
Kennebec, and expecting that the expedition would reach Quebec about the
middle of October. In the interim came letters from General Schuyler,
giving particulars of the main expedition.
In a preceding chapter we left the general and his little army at the
Isle aux Noix, near the Sorel River, the outlet of the lake. Thence, on
the 5th of September, he sent Colonel Ethan Allen and Major Brown to
reconnoitre the country between that river and the St. Lawrence, to
distribute friendly addresses among the people and ascertain their
feelings. This done, and having landed his baggage and provisions, the
general proceeded along the Sorel River the next day with his boats,
until within two miles of St. Johns, when a cannonade was opened from
the fort. Keeping on for half a mile further, he landed his troops in a
deep, close swamp, where they had a sharp skirmish with an ambuscade of
tories and Indians, whom they beat off with some loss on both sides.
Night coming on, they cast up a small intrenchment, and encamped,
disturbed occasionally by shells from the fort, which, however, did no
other mischief than slightly wounding a lieutenant.
In the night the camp was visited secretly by a person, who informed
General Schuyler of the state of the fort. The works were completed, and
furnished with cannon. A vessel pierced for sixteen guns was launched,
and would be ready to sail in three or four days. It was not probable
that any Canadians would join the army, being disposed to remain
neutral. This intelligence being discussed in a council of war in the
morning, it was determined that they had neither men nor artillery
sufficient to undertake a siege. They returned, therefore, to the Isle
aux Noix, cast up fortifications, and threw a boom across the channel of
the river to prevent the passage of the enemy’s vessels into the lake,
and awaited the arrival of artillery and reinforcements from
Ticonderoga.
In the course of a few days the expected reinforcements arrived, and
with them a small train of artillery. Ethan Allen also returned from his
reconnoitring expedition, of which he made a most encouraging report.
The Canadian captains of militia were ready, he said, to join the
Americans, whenever they should appear with sufficient force. He had
held talks, too, with the Indians, and found them well disposed. In a
word, he was convinced that an attack on St. Johns, and an inroad into
the province, would meet with hearty co-operation.
Preparations were now made for the investment of St. Johns by land and
water. Major Brown, who had already acted as a scout, was sent with one
hundred Americans, and about thirty Canadians towards Chamblee, to make
friends in that quarter, and to join the army as soon as it should
arrive at St. Johns.
To quiet the restless activity of Ethan Allen, who had no command in the
army, he was sent with an escort of thirty men to retrace his steps,
penetrate to La Prairie, and beat up for recruits among the people whom
he had recently visited.
For some time past, General Schuyler had been struggling with a
complication of maladies, but exerting himself to the utmost in the
harassing business of the camp, still hoping to be able to move with the
army. When every thing was nearly ready, he was attacked in the night by
a severe access of his disorder, which confined him to his bed, and
compelled him to surrender the conduct of the expedition to General
Montgomery. Since he could be of no further use, therefore, in this
quarter, he caused his bed, as before, to be placed on board a covered
bateau, and set off for Ticonderoga, to hasten forward reinforcements
and supplies. An hour after his departure, he met Colonel Seth Warner,
with one hundred and seventy Green Mountain Boys, steering for the camp,
“being the first,” adds he, “that have appeared of that boasted corps.”
Some had mutinied and deserted the colonel, and the remainder were at
Crown Point; whence they were about to embark.
Such was the purport of different letters received from Schuyler; the
last bearing date September 20th. Washington was deeply concerned when
informed that he had quitted the army, supposing that General Wooster,
as the eldest brigadier, would take rank and command of Montgomery, and
considering him deficient in the activity and energy required by the
difficult service in which he was engaged. “I am, therefore,” writes he
to Schuyler, “much alarmed for Arnold, whose expedition was built upon
yours, and who will infallibly perish, if the invasion and entry into
Canada are abandoned by your successor. I hope by this time the
penetration into Canada by your army is effected; but if it is not, and
there are any intentions to lay it aside, I beg it may be done in such a
manner that Arnold may be saved, by giving him notice; and in the mean
time, your army may keep such appearances as to fix Carleton, and to
prevent the force of Canada being turned wholly upon Arnold.
“Should this find you at Albany, and General Wooster about taking the
command, I entreat you to impress him strongly with the importance and
necessity of proceeding, or so to conduct, that Arnold may have time to
retreat.”
What caused this immediate solicitude about Arnold, was a letter
received from him, dated ten days previously from Fort Western, on
the Kennebec River. He had sent reconnoitring parties ahead in light
canoes, to gain intelligence from the Indians, and take the courses
and distances to Dead River, a branch of the Kennebec, and he was
now forwarding his troops in bateaux in five divisions, one day’s
march apart; Morgan with his riflemen in the first division,
Lieutenant-colonel Roger Enos commanding the last. As soon as the
last division should be under way, Arnold was to set off in a light
skiff to overtake the advance. Chaudiere Pond on the Chaudiere
River, was the appointed rendezvous, whence they were to march in a
body towards Quebec.
Judging from the date of the letter, Arnold must at this time be making
his way, by land and water, through an uninhabited and unexplored
wilderness; and beyond the reach of recall; his situation, therefore,
would be desperate should General Wooster fail to follow up the campaign
against St. Johns. The solicitude of Washington on his account was
heightened by the consciousness, that the hazardous enterprise in which
he was engaged had chiefly been set on foot by himself, and he felt in
some degree responsible for the safety of the resolute partisan and his
companions.
Fortunately, Wooster was not the successor to Schuyler in the command of
the expedition. Washington was mistaken as to the rank of his
commission, which was one degree lower than that of Montgomery. The
veteran himself, who was a gallant soldier, and had seen service in two
wars, expressed himself nobly in the matter, in reply to some inquiry
made by Schuyler. “I have the cause of my country too much at heart,”
said he, “to attempt to make any difficulty or uneasiness in the army,
upon whom the success of an enterprise of almost infinite importance to
the country is now depending. I shall consider my rank in the army what
my commission from the Continental Congress makes it, and shall not
attempt to dispute the command with General Montgomery at St. Johns.” We
shall give some further particulars concerning this expedition against
St. Johns, towards which Washington was turning so anxious an eye.
On the 16th of September, the day after Schuyler’s departure for
Ticonderoga, Montgomery proceeded to carry out the plans which had been
concerted between them. Landing on the 17th at the place where they had
formerly encamped, within a mile and a half of the fort, he detached a
force of five hundred men, among whom were three hundred Green Mountain
Boys under Colonel Seth Warner, to take a position at the junction of
two roads leading to Montreal and Chamblee, so as to intercept relief
from those points. He now proceeded to invest St. Johns. A battery was
erected on a point of land commanding the fort, the ship yards and the
armed schooner. Another was thrown up in the woods on the east side of
the fort, at six hundred yards distance, and furnished with two small
mortars. All this was done under an incessant fire from the enemy,
which, as yet, was but feebly returned.
St. Johns had a garrison of five or six hundred regulars and two hundred
Canadian militia. Its commander, Major Preston, made a brave resistance.
Montgomery had not proper battering cannon; his mortars were defective;
his artillerists unpractised, and the engineer ignorant of the first
principles of his art. The siege went on slowly, until the arrival of an
artillery company under Captain Lamb, expedited from Saratoga by General
Schuyler. Lamb, who was an able officer, immediately bedded a
thirteen-inch mortar, and commenced a fire of shot and shells upon the
fort. The distance, however, was too great, and the positions of the
batteries were ill chosen.
A flourishing letter was received by the general from Colonel Ethan
Allen, giving hope of further reinforcement. “I am now,” writes he, “at
the Parish of St. Ours, four leagues from Sorel to the south. I have two
hundred and fifty Canadians under arms. As I march, they gather fast.
You may rely on it, that I shall join you in about three days, with five
hundred or more Canadian volunteers I could raise one or two thousand in
a week’s time; but I will first visit the army with a less number, and,
if necessary, go again recruiting. Those that used to be enemies to our
cause, come cap in hand to me; and I swear by the Lord, I can raise
three times the number of our army in Canada, provided you continue the
siege. * * * The eyes of all America, nay, of Europe, are or will be on
the economy of this army and the consequences attending it.”[13]
Allen was actually on his way toward St. Johns, when, between Longueil
and La Prairie, he met Colonel Brown with his party of Americans and
Canadians. A conversation took place between them. Brown assured him
that the garrison at Montreal did not exceed thirty men, and might
easily be surprised. Allen’s partisan spirit was instantly excited. Here
was a chance for another bold stroke equal to that at Ticonderoga. A
plan was forthwith agreed upon. Allen was to return to Longueil, which
is nearly opposite Montreal, and cross the St. Lawrence in canoes in the
night, so as to land a little below the town. Brown, with two hundred
men, was to cross above, and Montreal was to be attacked simultaneously
at opposite points.
All this was arranged and put in action without the consent or knowledge
of General Montgomery; Allen was again the partisan leader, acting from
individual impulse. His late letter also to General Montgomery, would
seem to have partaken of fanfaronade; for the whole force with which he
undertook his part of this inconsiderate enterprise, was thirty
Americans, and eighty Canadians. With these he crossed the river on the
night of the 24th of September, the few canoes found at Longueil having
to pass to and fro repeatedly, before his petty force could be landed.
Guards were stationed on the roads to prevent any one passing and giving
the alarm in Montreal. Day dawned, but there was no signal of Major
Brown having performed his part of the scheme. The enterprise seems to
have been as ill concerted, as it was ill-advised. The day advanced, but
still no signal; it was evident Major Brown had not crossed. Allen would
gladly have recrossed the river, but it was too late. An alarm had been
given to the town, and he soon found himself encountered by about forty
regular soldiers, and a hasty levy of Canadians and Indians. A smart
action ensued; most of Allen’s Canadian recruits gave way and fled, a
number of Americans were slain, and he at length surrendered to the
British officer, Major Campbell, being promised honorable terms for
himself and thirty-eight of his men, who remained with him, seven of
whom were wounded. The prisoners were marched into the town and
delivered over to General Prescott, the commandant. Their rough
appearance, and rude equipments, were not likely to gain them favor in
the eyes of the military tactician, who doubtless considered them as
little better than a band of freebooters on a maraud. Their leader,
albeit a colonel, must have seemed worthy of the band; for Allen was
arrayed in rough frontier style; a deer-skin jacket, a vest and breeches
of coarse serge, worsted stockings, stout shoes, and a red woollen cap.
We give Allen’s own account of his reception by the British officer. “He
asked me my name, which I told him. He then asked me whether I was that
Colonel Allen who took Ticonderoga, I told him I was the very man. Then
he shook his cane over my head, calling me many hard names, among which,
he frequently used the word rebel, and put himself in a great rage.”[14]
Ethan Allen, according to his own account, answered with becoming
spirit. Indeed he gives somewhat of a melodramatic scene, which ended by
his being sent on board of the Gaspee schooner of war, heavily ironed,
to be transported to England for trial; Prescott giving him the parting
assurance, sealed with an emphatic oath, that he would grace a halter at
Tyburn.
Neither Allen’s courage nor his rhetorical vein deserted him on this
trying occasion. From his place of confinement, he indited the following
epistle to the general:—
“HONORABLE SIR,—In the wheel of transitory events I find myself
prisoner, and in irons. Probably your honor has certain reasons to me
inconceivable, though I challenge an instance of this sort of economy of
the Americans during the late war to any officers of the crown. On my
part, I have to assure your honor, that when I had the command and took
Captain Delaplace and Lieutenant Fulton, with the garrison of
Ticonderoga, I treated them with every mark of friendship and
generosity, the evidence of which is notorious, even in Canada. I have
only to add, that I expect an honorable and humane treatment, as an
officer of my rank and merit should have, and subscribe myself your
honor’s most obedient servant,
“ETHAN ALLEN.”
In the British publication from which we cite the above, the following
note is appended to the letter, probably on the authority of General
Prescott: “N. B.—The author of the above letter is an outlaw, and a
reward is offered by the New York Assembly for apprehending him.”[15]
The reckless dash at Montreal, was viewed with concern by the American
commander. “I am apprehensive of disagreeable consequences arising from
Mr. Allen’s imprudence,” writes General Schuyler. “I always dreaded his
impatience of subordination, and it was not until after a solemn promise
made me in the presence of several officers, that he would demean
himself with propriety, that I would permit him to attend the army; nor
would I have consented then, had not his solicitations been backed by
several officers.”
The conduct of Allen was also severely censured by Washington. “His
misfortune,” said he, “will, I hope, teach a lesson of prudence and
subordination to others who may be ambitious to outshine their general
officers, and, regardless of order and duty, rush into enterprises which
have unfavorable effects on the public, and are destructive to
themselves.”
Partisan exploit had, in fact, inflated the vanity and bewildered the
imagination of Allen, and unfitted him for regular warfare. Still his
name will ever be a favorite one with his countrymen. Even his
occasional rhodomontade will be tolerated with a good-humored smile,
backed as it was by deeds of daring courage; and among the hardy
pioneers of our Revolution whose untutored valor gave the first earnests
of its triumphs, will be remembered, with honor, the rough Green
Mountain partisan, who seized upon the “Keys of Champlain.”
In the letters of Schuyler, which gave Washington accounts, from time to
time, of the preceding events, were sad repinings at his own illness,
and the multiplied annoyances which beset him. “The vexation of spirit
under which I labor,” writes he, “that a barbarous complication of
disorders should prevent me from reaping those laurels for which I have
unweariedly wrought since I was honored with this command; the anxiety I
have suffered since my arrival here (at Ticonderoga), lest the army
should starve, occasioned by a scandalous want of subordination and
inattention to my orders, in some of the officers that I left to command
at the different posts; the vast variety of disagreeable and vexatious
incidents that almost every hour arise in some department or other,—not
only retard my cure, but have put me considerably back for some days
past. If Job had been a general in my situation, his memory had not been
so famous for patience. But the glorious end we have in view, and which
I have confident hope will be attained, will atone for all.” Washington
replied in that spirit of friendship which existed between them. “You do
me justice in believing that I feel the utmost anxiety for your
situation, that I sympathize with you in all your distresses, and shall
most heartily share in the joy of your success. My anxiety extends
itself to poor Arnold, whose fate depends upon the issue of your
campaign. * * * * * The more I reflect upon the importance of your
expedition, the greater is my concern, lest it should sink under
insuperable difficulties. I look upon the interests and salvation of our
bleeding country in a great degree as depending upon your success.”
Shortly after writing the above, and while he was still full of
solicitude about the fate of Arnold, he received a despatch from the
latter, dated October 13th, from the great portage or carrying-place
between the Kennebec and Dead River.
“Your Excellency,” writes Arnold, “may possibly think we have been tardy
in our march, as we have gained so little; but when you consider the
badness and weight of the bateaux, and large quantities of provisions,
&c., we have been obliged to force up against a very rapid stream, where
you would have taken the men for amphibious animals, as they were a
great part of the time under water: add to this the great fatigue in the
portage, you will think I have pushed the men as fast as they could
possibly bear.”
The toils of the expedition up the Kennebec River had indeed been
excessive. Part of the men of each division managed the boats—part
marched along the banks. Those on board had to labor against swift
currents; to unload at rapids; transport the cargoes, and sometimes the
boats themselves, for some distance on their shoulders, and then to
reload. They were days in making their way round stupendous cataracts;
several times their boats were upset and filled with water, to the loss
or damage of arms, ammunition, and provisions.
Those on land had to scramble over rocks and precipices, to struggle
through swamps and fenny streams; or cut their way through tangled
thickets, which reduced their clothes to rags. With all their efforts,
their progress was but from four to ten miles a day. At night the men of
each division encamped together.
By the time they arrived at the place whence the letter was written,
fatigue, swamp fevers and desertion had reduced their numbers to about
nine hundred and fifty effective men. Arnold, however, wrote in good
heart. “The last division,” said he, “is just arrived; three divisions
are over the first carrying-place, and as the men are in high spirits, I
make no doubt of reaching the river Chaudiere in eight or ten days, the
greatest difficulty being, I hope, already past.”
He had some days previously despatched an Indian, whom he considered
trusty, with a letter for General Schuyler, apprising him of his
whereabouts, but as yet had received no intelligence either of, or from
the general, nor did he expect to receive any until he should reach
Chaudiere Pond. There he calculated to meet the return of his express,
and then to determine his plan of operations.