Events on 203 Metre Hill from November 23 to 30.
By about November 23 the saps made by the Japanese against the left
flank of 203 Metre Hill had reached nearly as far as the lower line of
the wire entanglement, but those in front were still very far off. We
thus concluded that there was no likelihood of an attack on the hill
yet awhile; and as to an attack on the centre of our positions, in
General Gorbatovski’s section, we certainly anticipated none, since
it would be more advantageous for the Japanese, having such vast
superiority in numbers, to attack the fortress along the whole of its
front at the same moment.
[Illustration: PORT ARTHUR
Map No. 3.
London: Hugh Rees, Ltd.
_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._]
However, notwithstanding our deductions, we noticed from our
observation points that on November 23, 24, and 25 some unusual
movement was being carried out on the enemy’s side. Apparently new
troops were arriving. The same was observed from our positions and
batteries.
Troops were being sent across to 174 Metre Hill. “They are meant for
_us_,” we said to ourselves. The bombardment of all our positions
by heavy guns became fiercer, and our left flank on 203 Metre Hill
suffered severely. The enemy made a trench extending away to the right
from his first sap, and as from there he could very probably see into
the harbour we decided to make a sortie to destroy it.
On the 26th the bombardment of 203 Metre Hill and of the central forts
of our position became heavier still, so that it became clear that an
attack was imminent, and we made preparations accordingly. From this
moment we kept our stormers, _i.e._ the troops detailed to resist the
assault, in the trenches. Those suffering from scurvy were detailed for
this duty, and as it was very hard on men afflicted with this disease
to have to remain in the trenches, we used to send them away to the
rear, out of danger, where they could bask in the sun. As soon as an
attack was anticipated, the order was sent down: “Stormers to their
posts!” upon which they had to leave their place of concealment and
climb up the hill into the trenches.
A telephone message came through to the effect that our centre was
being attacked.[107]
I went to Akasaka Yama, and found that the earth-works on its left
flank had been badly damaged and the fortifications in front had been
wrecked as well. I recognized at once that, in spite of the solidity of
our works on 203 Metre Hill, they would not protect our men from the
destructive force of the 11-inch shell.
On November 26 the enemy fired twenty-five 11-inch shells, eight
6-inch, 60 mines,[108] and 300 shells of small calibre. The redoubt on
the left flank of 203 Metre Hill was much damaged.
From the right flank of 203 Metre Hill we watched a terrific
bombardment directed against Forts Erh-lung and Sung-shu. We heard the
rattle of rifle fire from all sides, but I saw no signs of an assault.
On returning to the staff headquarters, I heard the good news that
all the attacks had been repulsed with enormous losses to the enemy.
This news I immediately telephoned to all our hills, and ordered
the garrisons to be prepared for attack. In order to further secure
our line from being broken through, I called up the non-combatant
companies[109] of the 5th, 13th, and 28th Regiments, and with them
occupied a second line of defence.
The enemy literally swept 203 Metre and the other hills with fire.
From various signs on November 26, we concluded that the Japanese were
preparing to attack my front, so I moved up the reserve, and gave
orders for all to be ready to meet the impending assault.
Early on the morning of the 27th,[110] 203 Metre Hill resembled a
volcano in eruption. Apparently the enemy wished to sweep it off the
face of the earth with his shells. Telephone messages were received
from the commandant every minute, reporting the fearful damage done by
the 11-inch projectiles.
Finally, by about 8 a.m., all the telephones were out of action, and at
about 9 a.m. an orderly galloped up and reported that the hill was in
the hands of the Japanese. This was apparently a mistake, as we could
see no signs of our retirement from the hill, and everything there
appeared to be as before. As a matter of fact, the works on the hill
had been almost completely wrecked, but the losses had been small, as
only sentries and small reliefs were in the trenches.
At 5 p.m. the Japanese attacked, but were repulsed. The commandant,
however, sent for reinforcements and more officers, of whom very few
were left. I sent up some reinforcements, and with them Naval Ensign
Deitchman, already known to us as an exceedingly brave officer, whom,
with the approval of Colonel Irman, I appointed orderly officer to the
commandant.
It was already dark when Deitchman reached the hill, and on his arrival
he found that all was not well. It transpired that the attack had not
been entirely beaten back, and that a small body of Japanese was lodged
in a blindage near the central battery, there awaiting reinforcements.
The commandant immediately summoned a council of war, which at once
decided to drive the Japanese out of this stronghold. Acting Ensign
Yermakov, being thoroughly acquainted with the positions of all the
fortifications, was detailed to organize the counter-attack. He
formed three groups of volunteers with which to carry out his plans.
The first, under Fleet Ensign Morosov, was to attack the Japanese
from the right flank; the second, under an officer whose name I have
not learned, was to do the same from the left flank; and the third,
under Deitchman, was to rush the enemy from the front. On the signal
being given, all the columns made a rush on the blindage, but Ensign
Deitchman was shot in the head and killed on the spot. However,
grenades were thrown into the blindage and annihilated the Japanese.
Fleet Ensign Morosov was the first to rush in.
That day the enemy discharged thirty 11-inch, about three hundred
6-inch, and a great number of shell of smaller calibre at 203 Metre
Hill.
At daybreak on November 28 the Japanese continued to bombard the hill,
and destroyed everything that had been repaired during the night. From
early morning the firing increased, and eventually the Japanese moved
to the attack.
By midday they had completely wrecked the trenches on the hill with
their shells, and as General Kondratenko had come to the staff
headquarters, I prepared to go to 203 Metre Hill personally to direct
affairs. During the day we repulsed two attacks and I sent up all my
reserves in support—the 6th Company of sailors and the non-combatant
companies of the 14th and 16th Regiments.
A number of officers of various corps had collected at headquarters,
all eagerly watching the course of the fighting on 203 Metre Hill
through their glasses.
At 4.30 p.m. on the 28th the Japanese again attacked the ill-fated
hill. Our decimated remnant was cut to pieces, and the enemy captured
both the upper breastworks.[111]
On Akasaka Yama also things were not going well, and at about 2 p.m.
I sent up the 7th Company of the 27th Regiment, which had only just
arrived.
At 5 p.m. I mounted my horse and rode to 203 Metre Hill. Father Vasili
gave me a small silver crucifix as a charm, which I put on.
I reached the foot of the hill. In the ravine near the dressing station
was a countless crowd of wounded and unwounded men. The rear slopes of
the hill were covered with men lying in different postures, wounded men
who had died on their way back. The reserve company was standing under
arms, the men flattening themselves close up against the cliff, while
shells were exploding all around. The top of the hill was wreathed in
smoke from the bursting of every kind of projectile.
Having left my horse near the dressing station, and called up all the
unwounded men who were taking shelter under the hill, I started to
climb up, and reached the top of the road without a scratch.
Here a truly awful scene of ruin met my eyes. The light plank
bomb-proofs, which were built out from the steep side of the cutting
along which the road ran, were almost all destroyed and were choked
with mangled bodies and torn fragments of human limbs. The whole road
was simply blocked with broken beams and dead bodies.
Stepping over all this, and slipping about on the planks, which were
saturated with blood, I reached the telephone bomb-proof, which had
by some marvel been left untouched. Here I found the commandant and
several officers, all apparently at a loss as to what action to take.
[Illustration: BLINDAGES ON 203 METRE HILL WRECKED BY SHELL FIRE.
THE MEN ARE SITTING AMONGST THE RUINS OF A BLINDAGE
COMPLETELY DESTROYED BY A 11-INCH SHELL.
p. 236]
In a few words the commandant explained the situation to me. It was
even worse than I had anticipated, and something had to be done
instantly.
All the reserves had been used up, so we formed one out of the men I
had brought with me. Although both breastworks were in the hands of the
Japanese, our men were holding on like grim death to the ground in rear
of them, the blindages, narrow passages, and communication trenches.
The whole of the space between the two breastworks was still in our
possession. The lower, circular trench was almost completely wrecked,
but our men were still firmly lodged in the few untouched parts of
it. It thus seemed to me that we must drive out the Japanese by one
well-directed blow, and that, moreover, this would not be a difficult
matter.
In order to put my plan into execution, I formed the men I had brought
with me into one command, had hand grenades served out to each man,
and, having given them a short harangue, sent them off, some against
the left breastwork, and some against the right. Seeing that all was
not yet lost, and led by young officers, the gallant fellows rushed
upon the works with a wild cheer. This was about 7 p.m.
The left one was taken in a single rush. The other did not fall at
once, and the men came to a standstill before it, but again rushed
forward on their own initiative and drove the enemy out, many officers,
including Lieutenant Yermakov, witnessing their action. Hand grenades
were freely used and once again proved themselves invaluable.
I immediately sent a report to General Stessel and General Kondratenko.
The former had given orders to me personally to let him know by
telephone all that happened on 203 Metre Hill, and I now received a
message of congratulation from him. As soon as the Japanese had been
driven out of the breastworks, the enemy’s artillery fire became
fiercer, and was directed mainly on the left flank of the circular
trench and on the breastwork above it.
In order not to expose needlessly those of my men who were holding the
now completely wrecked lower line of trenches, I ordered them to make
their way round to the upper road at the rear, and form the reserve.
We abandoned the ruined circular trench, with the exception of its
left flank, but the enemy, unaware of this, continued to complete its
destruction, expending thousands of shell.
I sent for sand-bags and reinforcements to make good at once the damage
done to the trenches and breastworks on the top of the hill. A few
hours later two companies of sailors and a two-wheeled cart with hand
grenades arrived. I placed the sailors in the reserve dug-outs (deep
ditches—one above and one below the lower road), which were practically
immune from fire.
Lieutenant Fenster, a sapper, arrived on the hill, and proposed to
repair the trenches and the breastworks during the night. The north
face of the left breastwork, and the bomb-proof in it, were so ruined,
that I could not climb across them to its western face, and the left
end of the trench connecting the breastwork was levelled to the ground,
but the rear face of the work remained intact.
It was imperative that all this damage should be at once repaired with
sand-bags, provided there was no attack meanwhile.
All the enemy’s trenches round the hill were full of Japanese.
Night was falling on November 28, when hand grenades began to burst
in the left breastwork, and a soldier ran up with the report that
the Japanese were attacking. We rushed out on to the road where the
reserves were. The communication passages from all the fortifications
on the hill met there, and there was also a hollow in the ground, used
as a dressing station. But the explosions of hand grenades suddenly
ceased and all grew quiet, save for the roar of the cannon; our hand
grenades seem to have driven the Japanese back into their trenches. But
how would it be at dead of night when it was impossible to see how far
off the enemy was? I was afraid there would be a panic. In repulsing
the enemy’s attack so easily, we had had great assistance from the
detachments led by Lieutenants Siromiatnikov and Nejentsev which
had taken the enemy in rear from the direction of Major Soloveiev’s
position.
* * * * *
That night (November 28) was a dark one, and everything was apparently
quiet since the last attack, only the occasional roar of an exploding
hand grenade breaking the stillness. I could not sleep all night, but
kept sending out orderlies in all directions, and conversing with the
staff over the telephone wires. Every one wanted to know what was
happening on the hill. During the night several two-wheeled carts came
up with hand grenades, which I ordered to be stored in the bomb-proofs
near the dressing station.
At about 4 a.m. gun fire again commenced, and the stream of wounded
began to come down from the crest to the foot of the hill and beyond.
The Japanese had made many vain attacks, and we could live through
everything but heavy gun fire. But the moral effect had to be
considered; our men were accustomed to the shells and to heavy losses,
and to these they had become quite indifferent, but the infantry
attacks upset their nerves. And now one of them was in progress: hand
grenades were bursting in the left breastwork, and an orderly ran up
asking for reinforcements, officers, and hand grenades. Grenades then
began to burst on the right breastwork, and our men there also sent for
a supply. I sent up all they required, and asked Colonel Irman to send
me officers from the staff. In response Captain Bielozerov was sent to
me. Serious work was at hand, for the roll of rifle fire broke out,
foretelling an impending attack. I ordered the company at the foot
of the hill to come up to the upper road, and asked for yet another
company by telephone. The reply came that there was none available.
I then telephoned for our 5th Company to leave its lines on Division
Hill near Fort Yi-tzu Shan, to which it had only just returned, and to
come up at once to 203 Metre Hill. The firing and bursting of grenades
increased, while the bombardment ceased—truly a bad sign.
[Illustration: THE LAST RESERVES FOR 203 METRE HILL DURING
THE FIGHTING IN NOVEMBER.
p. 240]
Indeed, our men were already flying out of the left breastwork. I
brought up my company of sailors, sent it to meet the fugitives, and
shouted myself hoarse, “Stop, stop! reinforcements!” Nevertheless,
they would not stop, and the sailors also wavered and came to a
standstill. There was a good deal of confusion, and what I cried out,
what I actually did, I do not now quite remember. It seems, however,
I succeeded in rallying the men, for those of my own regiment began
to gather round me; and when I found that I was at the head of a
considerable number of men I led them against the left breastwork.
Riflemen and sailors rushed forward and swarmed on to the work with
Captain Bielozerov, who was the first in. Much the same happened as
regards the breastwork on the right, but the state of affairs was not
quite so bad there, as no panic had occurred, and they had simply sent
me word that the Japanese had taken it, but that our men were still
holding the rear rampart. With the other officers I led a detachment
of sailors up through the communication passages into the work. The
Japanese made a poor resistance, and in a few minutes we had captured
the place at the point of the bayonet.
I sent off a long written report, shell fire having destroyed the
telephone wires, which, however, our sappers connected up again within
ten minutes.
Here I should like to say a word or two about our sappers. I had
only very few of them, either on 203 Metre Hill, or in my section
of defence, but they were all fearless and beyond reproach.
Notwithstanding constant danger, they worked with perfect unconcern.
Many of them were placed _hors de combat_. One shell fell into a
bomb-proof where they were working and severely wounded eight of them,
in spite of which the energy and daring of those left were in no way
diminished. They were always seeking opportunities to make themselves
useful, and, indeed, their services to their country and their Tsar had
a great effect on the soldiers with whom they came in contact.
* * * * *
Having taken command on 203 Metre Hill, I could not, of course,
exercise control over the other defended hills, so Colonel Irman
undertook this duty. Being thus in ignorance of what was going on
beyond 203 Metre Hill, I felt very uneasy about Akasaka Yama, which the
enemy was again attacking. Sapping up as far as the ravine in front of
203 Metre Hill, the Japanese had driven one sap-head from this ravine
straight towards the foot of Akasaka Yama, then, stopping work about 70
feet from it, they had run across in groups to a small stretch of dead
ground under the cliff facing Namako Yama and had begun to do something
there, as we could plainly see. Although I had had abattis constructed
above this cliff, and our trench ran along behind the abattis, this
point was the most vulnerable in the whole of the defences of Akasaka
Yama, and my fears were realized, for the enemy chose this very point
for his attack.
I was the more concerned about Akasaka Yama because, if it fell into
the hands of the enemy, communication with 203 Metre Hill from the
rear would be interrupted, the latter could then be enfiladed from
all sides, and it would become impossible to hold it any longer. On
the other hand, as long as Akasaka Yama remained ours, it gave strong
support to 203 Metre Hill and prevented the enemy from attacking it
from the front and right flank. The Japanese made one attempt to do
this and suffered very severely, several hundreds of men falling on
the northern slopes of 203 Metre Hill under the fire of the rifles and
machine guns on Akasaka Yama.
* * * * *
Having received a severe check, the enemy ceased attacking, but
continued to work at his parallels and to make a zigzag to the right.
This was very serious for us, as it brought the Japanese up to a point
on the hill from which they could observe the fall of their shell
within the harbour area. Without doubt, we should have to make a sortie
in force.
By hurling at least three companies on the enemy in the night, we could
drive him out of his parallel and destroy it. The casualties would be
heavy, but the success gained would be large in proportion. As it was,
we were only just able to hold the hill, and our losses were severe.
We could only get reinforcements with the greatest difficulty, as they
were wanted for General Gorbatovski’s section, which was also being
attacked. But it was impossible to hold the hill without reserves;
either several companies a day would have to be sacrificed, or else the
hill abandoned.
The fearful effect of the 11-inch shell made us think it expedient to
dig caves out of the hill-sides to give the men cover, and we began to
do so, but it was then too late. Those we had time to make were only
large enough to shelter a few men.
Evening was already drawing in on November 29. The bombardment
slackened (the Japanese must have run out of ammunition), and curls of
smoke were to be seen in places covered from fire under the hill, where
the men were making fires for their tea. Everything seemed to point
to the day ending quietly, and I felt quite satisfied, not having the
least suspicion of what a trick the sailors in the left breastwork were
going to play upon me. I had sent my orderly there (I do not remember
what for); ten minutes later he came running back to me and reported
that there was not a single man in the breastwork—it was absolutely
empty.
“But where are the sailors?” I cried.
“I don’t know, sir! They must have gone away.”
I immediately sent for the naval officers and ordered them to find
their men and send them back to their post, and in the meantime I sent
to the breastwork all the men near me—about ten riflemen and scouts,
who were acting as my orderlies.
I always kept near me a few men thoroughly acquainted with the
fortifications on the hill. This was essential, as a man who did not
know every feature might very easily lose himself in the labyrinth of
trenches and communication passages, and thus fail to take my orders to
those for whom they were intended.
An hour later the sailors were all collected, and I only forgave them
their foolish action in consideration of their splendid previous
attack, and the way they had driven the Japanese out of the breastwork.
I ordered the naval officers to be always with their men and not to
stay in the bomb-proofs, reminding them that this was the second time
the sailors had been guilty of leaving their post.
Night had already fallen—for me always a trying time, as it is
impossible to exercise effective control in the darkness—and the only
thing I could do was to walk about the hill and encourage my men by
talking to them. But my voice had almost entirely gone, from constantly
shouting in the daytime.
When it had got quite dark, some sappers arrived, bringing sand-bags.
Reinforcements—two companies—also came up. I decided to let those
actually in the fighting line sleep, and to make those who had just
arrived work; but what sleep and what work were possible under a hail
of every kind of shell? We had available for night work, besides
Lieutenant Fenster and Acting Ensign Yermakov, Lieutenant Reinbott of
the Fortress Mining Company. Though I was really dog-tired those last
two days, still I did not feel as if I wanted either to eat or sleep.
As soon as day broke on the 30th, the firing increased in volume,
and we witnessed the utter destruction of the right face of the left
breastwork by the agency of several well-aimed 11-inch projectiles.
Luckily, the enemy failed to do much damage to the side which was open
to his constant attacks, but the inner ditch was completely filled with
dead bodies, both of our own men and the Japanese, which we were unable
to remove. It was impossible to do so, as in the daytime this face of
the work was swept by shrapnel from the flank and rear, and at night
our men there were always on the “qui vive” for an attack, and could
not leave the cover of the breastwork; besides which a great many men
would be needed to carry away the dead, and we had no one to spare.
At 8 a.m. the Japanese suddenly attacked the left breastwork, captured
the front portion, and raised their flag. The sight of this flag always
filled our men with fury. I knew this, and, pointing to it, shouted
to the reserve: “Go and take it down, my lads!” and, like one man,
our sailors rushed into the work. I led them for some distance, and
a moment after there was no sign of the Japanese or their flag to be
seen. Twice more the hostile flag made its appearance on top of the
hill, but each time it was torn down by my handful of reserves.
At about 11 a.m., or a little earlier, I was in the telephone
bomb-proof with the commandant, Major Stempnevski, Acting Ensign
Yermakov, and several naval officers. Suddenly we heard shouts and
irregular rifle firing. I rushed out on to the road, and this is what
I saw. Our men were in full flight from the centre of the hill and
the left flank, and many of them were simply tumbling head over heels
in their hurry to get away. Not far from the bomb-proof I had to jump
over the body of a Japanese, apparently just killed. I began to shout
“Stop, stop!” and in order to enforce my words I drew my sword and hit
one after another (with the flat, of course), Lieutenant Podgourski and
the other officers with me doing the same. The men heeded my voice,
and, stopping where they were, opened a straggling fire on the top of
the hill. I was then anxious to go to the reserve, as, owing to the
firing, my voice could not carry so far, but fearing that my men might
follow after me, I did not myself go back, but sent Yermakov.
By this time we could see Japanese soldiers springing up on to the
top, and they began at once to fire along the road. At the same moment
several dozen men scrambled up to me from below, and, standing round
me, began to fire and shout hoarsely “Hurrah!” In the midst of all this
noise and firing I felt that matters had passed beyond my control,
while all the time the number of the Japanese on the hill was growing
and growing. Luckily, the reserves were not more than 10 paces from
me now, and I already saw Yermakov and Fenster ahead of me; they both
had rifles. The only thing to be done now was to make a rush with the
new-comers and the men I had round me, and this we did. Those who
had retreated, finding they were reinforced, threw themselves on the
Japanese with a deafening shout, and we were once again masters of the
hill.
Had not the reserve come up at the critical moment, we should have been
driven off the hill, and then, indeed, it would have been impossible to
retake it, as the Japanese were being strongly reinforced. Once on
the summit again it was quite easy for us to throw down hand grenades.
They rolled down and caused fearful havoc among the retreating enemy.
Our rifles and artillery, which both opened a heavy fire on the foot of
the hill and the neighbouring ravines, were a helpful addition to the
grenades. In less than ten minutes the Japanese had disappeared into
their trenches, and once more we breathed freely.
Without waiting for the enemy’s guns to open fire, I took my men back
into the reserve bomb-proofs; and it was fortunate I did so, as almost
immediately shells began to burst over the top, covering it with a
cloud of poisonous black smoke. Once again our slightly and badly
wounded men began to hobble, or be carried, away from the summit.
It was a terrible sight; still it was wonderful to behold how these
heroes died fearlessly or suffered without complaint.
The number of corpses on the road rapidly increased, and in consequence
it was difficult to breathe, from the offensive smell.
The time had certainly come to ask for men to collect the dead.
[Illustration: RUSSIAN DEAD ON 203 METRE HILL AWAITING INTERMENT.
p. 247]
I sent a report of all that had taken place, and then went with the
commandant and some other officers to our observation position near
the dressing station, where there was an enormous number of wounded,
keeping the surgeons hard at work.
I remember as if it were to-day that I had turned with my face to
the rear and was looking at the crowd of men who were standing near
the lower dressing station, and wondering where they all came from.
Suddenly there was a fearful explosion, and I was thrown with terrific
force to the ground. The shock was so great, that for a time I was
stunned. When I at last got up, scattering the earth which covered me,
there in front was a great pile of bodies, and beneath them all lay
the commandant, Major Stempnevski. All were motionless, but ghastly
gasping sounds and heartrending groans filled the air. I turned round.
At my feet were several dead, and on them, face downwards, lay Acting
Ensign Reishetov and the sergeant-major of the 2nd Company, while a
young naval mechanic was sitting on the ground, crying aloud with pain
and clutching with both hands his left side. Others, like myself, were
now coming to themselves, and we began to separate the dead from the
wounded. An assistant-surgeon ran up to the young mechanic and carried
him down, and we put Major Stempnevski into the splinter-proof. He was
conscious. Blood was pouring from his head and face.
“Where are you hurt, Stanislav Youlianovitch?” I said to him; and he
replied: “My back is injured, and I can’t breathe.”
“They will take you down below,” I said.
“No, no; wait till the firing has slackened.”
So I left him lying in the splinter-proof. Probably the shell had
struck the cliff near which we were standing, but I, luckily, was a
little farther off, and had only received a bad blow on the right
shoulder. An hour later they carried our gallant commandant away to the
lower dressing station, and I felt myself very much alone.
I reported what had happened, and asked for one of the other
officers to be sent up to take the place of the commandant. Although
the Japanese had had more than one good lesson from us, they were
not satisfied, and here and there came out of their trenches in
considerable numbers, but were immediately driven back again by rifle
and machine-gun fire from 203 Metre Hill and Akasaka Yama. However,
with demoniacal persistence, they twice crawled through our wire
entanglements, and on the left flank even got as far as the breastwork,
but, decimated by hand grenades, they broke and fled, strewing the
slopes of the hill with their dead.
This was a red-letter day, both for us and for the Japanese. At about 8
p.m. I had just gone up to a bomb-proof to have some food, when I heard
shouts of “Hurrah!” and renewed bomb explosions, which told me of yet
another attack. I rushed out of the bomb-proof, and saw our sailors and
riflemen crowding on the parapet near the gorge of the breastwork, and
throwing hand grenades down into it. This looked bad, as the Japanese
must have driven them out of the work. I told the other officers to
place the few dozen men who were on the road behind the stones and
boulders near the breastwork, so as to prevent the enemy from seizing
the road, and to mark at the same time the extreme point beyond which
our men must not on any account retreat.
I immediately sent for the reserve, which consisted at that time of
our 1st Scout Detachment. It was not an easy matter to climb such a
hill as 203 Metre, nor could it be done in a moment, so a considerable
time elapsed before Captain Vaseeliev came up with his men. The
handful defending the gorge of the breastwork above had dwindled away
considerably, and I reported that the Japanese had got as far as the
left flank of the connecting trench, now completely wrecked, and had
established themselves there. But apparently they had not secured
a very firm foothold, and the interior of the work was unoccupied.
That meant that our men, surprised by the suddenness of the attack,
had evacuated the work, the front face of which had been captured by
the enemy. I shouted to the defenders ordering them not to retreat
another step, but to hold on for all they were worth, as I was coming
immediately with the scouts to their support. An officer, who had
remained in the bomb-proof in the centre of the work, sent an orderly
to tell me that the enemy had occupied the parapet, but were afraid to
come down into the work. Unfortunately, I was not able to find out this
officer’s name.
Having told Captain Vaseeliev where to make his attack, and the
necessary dispositions being made, I addressed the men briefly, and
then set out with them against the point which I had decided to
attack—the right flank of the left breastwork, and the left flank of
the connecting trench. Of course, the gallant fellows outstripped me,
and the rush of these men, together with the few left who had defended
the gorge of the breastwork, and some other riflemen who appeared from
somewhere on the right, drove the Japanese out of their trenches. It
does not take long to tell this, but it was not done quite so quickly.
The detachment under Captain Vaseeliev, and all those who rushed
forward with him, for a long time kept on shouting “Hurrah!” firing,
and throwing hand grenades. The Japanese on the parapet made a stubborn
resistance. Together with some other officers I remained in the gorge
of the breastwork, and heard our men shouting “Hurrah!” and saw them
running along the narrow trenches to the front face, which the Japanese
still held. Then two explosions were heard, followed by others, and
the next moment our men were on the parapet. Dozens of hand grenades
were hurled after the retreating enemy, so that the very hill seemed to
quiver from their violent explosions. I immediately went down to the
road to give orders that all those who had descended the hill should be
brought up at once. Whenever the alarm went a fair number of men were
always there.
But I had anticipated matters, for a whole company—about a hundred
men—were coming up the hill towards me, sailors and riflemen, led by
their field-cornet, who received the St. George’s Cross from me on the
spot. This was a pleasant surprise for him; but a disagreeable one was
awaiting me.
Feeling that the hill was now safe again, I was standing on the road in
the centre of my positions, when Captain Vaseeliev came quickly up to
me and reported: “I am badly wounded, Colonel, and I can’t command any
longer. Allow me to go down to the dressing station.”
“Very well,” I said. “From my heart I wish you rapid recovery. The
Cross of St. George is yours.”
The regiment had lost yet another gallant officer, but God grant! not
for ever.
Everything being now quiet on the hill, I sent a report to Colonel
Irman and desired him to ask General Kondratenko to give me permission
to leave the hill to get some rest and have my wound dressed. I also
asked for sand-bags and men to repair damages. Everything I asked for
was sent up, and three engineer officers also arrived. There was no
need to show them where the work was to be done, and I had just sat
down to rest—it was now about midnight—when I saw Colonel Irman and my
adjutant, Lieutenant Kostoushko-Valeejinitch, arriving. Having made a
full report and explained the present situation, I took them into the
commandant’s bomb-proof, where Colonel Irman at once expressed the wish
to inspect the hill and thank the men for repelling the attacks.
He disappeared into the trench with Lieutenant Kostoushko, and I lay
down to rest, as I was worn out through want of sleep. Loud talking
in the bomb-proof awoke me. Opening my eyes I saw a crowd of naval
officers, some of them old friends, but some new arrivals, who had been
sent to the hill from headquarters.
Here I may mention that the naval detachments were frequently commanded
by heads of the Naval Department or by ensigns of the fleet. Many
of these were splendid fellows, among whom Losev and Morosov were
particularly distinguished for their unsurpassed bravery.
I had eaten hardly anything for four days, and had scarcely slept.
[Illustration: MAP OF THE WESTERN DEFENCES OF PORT ARTHUR.
Map No. 4.
Enlarged from a Russian Map. London: Hugh Rees, Ltd.
_Reproduced at Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._]
FOOTNOTES:
[107] The third Japanese general assault, mainly directed against
Chi-kuan, Ehr-lung, and Sung-shu forts. (See Map III.)
[108] This must refer to the missiles from the wooden mortars used by
the Japanese. These Japanese wooden 5-inch and 7-inch mortars threw
“mines” (really large hand grenades), weighing 4-1/2 and 16-1/2 lb.
respectively.
[109] There is in every regiment a certain number of men not armed with
rifles—transport drivers, joiners, carpenters, clerks, harness-makers,
wheelers, and shoeing-smiths—and to these are added assistant-surgeons
and hospital orderlies under battalion and regimental doctors. The
company thus formed is commanded by the regimental Quarter-Master.
For inspection purposes these men are formed into one company, but on
service the clerks and medical assistants form two separate companies
and act independently, the former under the command of the Adjutant,
and the latter under one who has passed the “Okolodok” (_i.e._ the
lower standard in the Medical School of Instruction), so that the
Quarter-Master has the transport drivers and joiners, etc., left in his
charge.
All the men of the non-combatant companies are armed with revolvers,
with the exception of the transport drivers, who are unarmed, but have
to go through a course of rifle practice and instruction.
[110] The operations here described were evidently preliminary to the
main assault, which, according to our Official History, opened at 8.30
a.m. on November 28.
[111] General Tretyakov speaks of “redoubts,” but according to our
Official History the works on 203 Metre Hill were really of the
less formidable nature of “breastworks,” which term is, therefore,
substituted in this translation.