The fighting round 174 Metre Hill—Capture of 174 Metre Hill and
evacuation of Connecting Ridge—Fortifying 203 Metre Hill—Defence
and capture of Extinct Volcano.
We had to work absolutely under the enemy’s very nose, mostly at night,
although we took the opportunity of working in the daytime whenever the
enemy’s fire slackened a little.
It was a good thing that the 5th Regiment had learnt something about
trench-making, so that the officers, and even the non-commissioned
officers, knew exactly how to go to work without any instruction from
sapper specialists, of whom we did not possess a single man.
General Kondratenko did not propose recapturing the advanced hills, as
they were not exceptionally important positions, and it would have cost
us dearly to hold on to them.
After August 15, things were fairly quiet on our side, but bullets,
and even shell, rather frequently passed over the quarters of the
regimental staff. We had, therefore, to move them farther back, to a
small river running along the road from the town towards 203 Metre
Hill, and as a large mess tent would have been visible from a great
distance, we decided not to pitch one.
The Japanese had not got off lightly in their attacks on the advanced
hills, and their losses must have been reckoned in thousands. They
lost particularly heavily in storming Height 426, where they stumbled
blindly upon the wire entanglements and made repeated attacks. There
were piles of dead heaped up round these entanglements. The fact must
be noted that we were driven out of these positions by gun fire, and
not by the Japanese infantry.
Events here made it clear to every one what preponderance in artillery
really means. The side that silences the enemy’s guns can capture his
positions without particularly hard fighting, for, having once got
the enemy’s fire under control, one can choose a point of attack,
concentrate the whole of one’s artillery on it, and then take it by
storm with comparatively small numbers. For this, however, a numerous,
well-trained, and efficient artillery is essential. To win a battle
with badly trained or inefficient artillery is now a matter of extreme
difficulty. I will not venture to lay down the exact proportion of guns
necessary per 1,000 infantry, but there must be, at any rate, not less
than 6 guns per 1,000 (_i.e._ one battery to each complete battalion).
What an error we committed in posting our artillery on the crests of
the hills! The Japanese punished us very severely for the mistake, but
it was too late then to change our dispositions.
The Japanese batteries were completely concealed, and fired on our
skirmishers as deliberately as if they were at practice on their
artillery ranges. They had a lot of work in front of them yet, of
course, as we could still hold on to those positions we had spent some
time in fortifying, and the 5th Regiment had yet many trying moments to
live through.
Much had to be done on 203 Metre Hill in order to enable our troops to
hold out under a veritably hellish fire, with which our gunners were
powerless to cope.
From the capture of the advanced hills until the morning of August
19 we worked on our positions almost without molestation, the enemy
devoting all his attention to 174 Metre Hill (See Map II.). Being
convinced that the next serious attack would be made on that hill, we
did all in our power to put it into a good state of defence. The left
flank was covered by a wire entanglement, the front was strengthened by
a 3-foot revetment, and the right flank had a double line of trenches,
the upper tier of which was blinded.
On the top of the hill solid shelters were built for the gunners and a
round trench was made, with a considerable number of blinded traverses,
which were not, however, very solidly constructed.
The summit of the hill on the left flank (which we called the
Connecting Ridge) was lined with trenches. On the reverse slopes of the
hill a magazine, very solidly made, was constructed for gun and rifle
ammunition, and cover was also provided there, sufficient for a whole
reserve company. In rear of the hill (174 Metre Hill) there were four
field mortars, and on the crest, for long-range firing, two long naval
guns (I do not remember their exact calibre, but I think it was 150
mm.) with steel shields, in a well-constructed battery, and behind the
crest four field quick-firers. On the saddle between 174 Metre Hill
and Connecting Ridge were Lieutenant Tsvietkov’s two quick-firers.
The garrison of 174 Metre Hill consisted of the 5th and 9th Companies
of the 5th Regiment (about 300 men), while the 6th, 10th, 11th, and
12th Companies of the same, and one company of the 24th Regiment were
on Connecting Ridge.
There were on Namako Yama at this time: on the left flank, the 1st
Company of the 28th Regiment under Major Sakatski, the 11th Company
of the 13th Regiment, the 5th and 6th Companies of the Kuang-tung
Battalion, and the 12th Company of the 13th Regiment. It must be
admitted that the trenches here were not sufficiently strong to afford
much protection against the Japanese Shimose and shrapnel, and heavy
losses were expected. But what could be done? We had neither the time
nor the tools necessary to deal with that rocky soil, and thus to
improve matters.
A battery had been placed on the top of 174 Metre Hill, instead of an
infantry redoubt. This battery was in position before the 5th Regiment
occupied the hill. I wanted to convert it into a redoubt, but my senior
officers refused to sanction the proposal, as, in General Bieli’s[61]
opinion, there was no other position for long-range guns. How much
time and trouble we spent on completing this battery, while the real
defenders had to crowd into the small unfinished trenches! I may add
that the guns posted in this battery had a large area of dead ground,
and drew on themselves the fire of the Japanese heavy artillery, which
considerably interfered with our work. I was nearly killed by a shell
bursting near me, and escaped by a miracle with no greater hurt than a
blow in the side from a large clod of earth.
On the fall of the advanced positions the garrison of 174 Metre Hill
had to live in the trenches, whereas before they had been encamped on
the reverse slope of the hill. Field kitchens had been well built in a
ravine, and others on the reverse slope.
The men lived in large field tents, and the officers in an improvised
barrack, built of planks.
Strenuous efforts had been made to construct a road leading from the
top of the hill, and an enormous amount of energy had likewise been
expended in making roads to the principal hills—203 Metre, Namako Yama,
and Akasaka Yama. To this end we had been working hard ever since the
arrival of the 5th Regiment at 174 Metre Hill, at which time there
existed only one small path over 203 Metre Hill.
[Illustration: CONSTRUCTING THE ROAD ON THE REVERSE SLOPE
OF 203 METRE HILL.
p. 116]
By its fire, and by the posting of a detachment to prevent Height 426
from being outflanked from the left, 174 Metre Hill was a source of
considerable annoyance to the Japanese, so, in attacking the advanced
hills, they did not forget it.
On August 14,[62] at 4.15 a.m., the enemy opened a tremendous fire
on 174 Metre Hill, and kept it up till 5 o’clock in the evening. On
this day Captain Andreiev, commanding the artillery on the hill, was
wounded by four splinters.
At 1.15 a.m. on August 15 the enemy advanced on 174 Metre Hill from the
front and from the left flank. Firing continued till 3.15 a.m., when
the Japanese retreated, but a heavy bombardment broke out again at 4.30
a.m. and continued till 9 o’clock.
This bombardment was renewed at 4 p.m., continuing till 7 p.m. As a
result some of our splinter-proofs were destroyed and also part of our
trenches.
On August 16 the Japanese did not fire at all, possibly through want of
ammunition, we ourselves taking advantage of the occasion to rebuild
our trenches. About 9 p.m. desultory rifle fire broke out under the
hill, and the enemy’s skirmishing line appeared about 1,200 paces away,
while behind, in complete silence, marched the storming columns. The
defenders of the hills threw down their digging tools, stood to their
posts, and opened fire in volleys.
The storming columns moved away, now to the right, now to the left,
and finally took cover in the defile on the left. This was at about
11 p.m., and our men sat in the trenches all night expecting another
attack. We expended 12,000 rounds of ammunition.
On August 17 and 18 our men rebuilt the trenches under heavy rifle fire.
On the 17th the trenches were completed to the required profile, but a
heavy bombardment was then opened on the hill. Our guns tried to answer
the fire from the hills, but could not locate the batteries that were
destroying them, and the Japanese soldiers only showed themselves when
out of range. Our field guns were therefore put under cover, and I
still regret that it was impossible to put those 150-mm. guns under
cover as well.
On August 18 the firing upon the hill increased considerably in
volume, and our trenches and splinter-proofs began to suffer severely.
Lieutenant-Colonel Leesaevski, who was commandant of the hill, reported
that he expected an attack, so I moved our reserves to 203 Metre Hill.
At night fierce hand-to-hand fighting took place round the base of the
hill between the Japanese and our patrols who were forming the outpost
line—a sure sign of a coming attack.
On the night of August 18–19 the Japanese moved in great strength up to
174 Metre Hill and lay down behind the crests of the nearest hillocks.
Lieutenant-Colonel Leesaevski had the whole garrison on the alert, and
opened fire as soon as the columns showed themselves over the crests
beyond. The enemy made several attempts to come to close quarters, but
without avail. On the alarm sounding, star-rockets were fired from
203 Metre and Division Hills, and our search-lights came into play
for the first time. The scene was a terrible, but, at the same time,
an exhilarating one. Discovered by the beams of light, the Japanese
hastily retired over the crest, leaving a great number of dead in front
of 174 Metre Hill. After several attempts they ceased their attacks,
and the rest of the night passed in petty encounters and outpost
skirmishes.
Early on the morning of August 19, just as day was breaking, I was
awakened by a fearful cannonade. Running out of my room, I saw a
pall of smoke from bursting shrapnel hanging over 174 Metre Hill.
In order to find out what was happening, I galloped over to Akasaka
Yama. However, when I got there, I was no better off than before, so
I went to the left flank of Namako Yama. A dense skirmishing line was
advancing on the right of 174 Metre Hill, and lines of skirmishers and
columns of troops were moving towards the centre, occasionally taking
cover in the valleys and then again appearing on the ridges. The rattle
of rifle fire from our companies on Connecting Ridge could be heard on
the left flank. The main attack was delivered against the left of 174
Metre Hill, but it was not within my field of view. The lines advanced
so skilfully that our guns were unable to range on them, though they
suffered heavily from rifle fire. Orderlies with reports were galloping
away from 174 Metre Hill.
In order to meet them, I again returned to Akasaka Yama, where Colonel
Irman joined me.
Wishing to be at the centre of the hills attacked, and within easy
reach of orderlies, we changed our position to a hillock situated
between Namako Yama and Connecting Ridge. We also thought that this
would be a favourable point for making observations, but, as a matter
of fact, it was rather the reverse, because all shell falling “over”
landed in this very locality. We posted the reserve (the 7th Company of
the 28th Regiment) behind the left flank of Namako Yama.
From 203 Metre Hill we sent a telephone message to the officer
commanding the artillery, directing him to concentrate every available
gun on the slopes in front of 174 Metre Hill.
In a quarter of an hour our guns boomed forth, and shells of every size
began to fall on the ground indicated by us. The Japanese gun fire
smothered 174 Metre Hill, and a continuous stream of wounded flowed
back towards 203 Metre Hill, where the chief dressing station was
situated. This fierce bombardment continued until about four o’clock.
We had lost heavily. The whole of the rear of the hill attacked was
literally strewn with shell. I was rather badly hit in the left side by
a stone thrown up by a bursting shell.
Seeing that the right flank of Connecting Ridge was the most probable
point of attack (there was a good deal of dead ground from our guns
in front of it), and that a very heavy artillery fire was now being
directed there, I sent the 7th Company of the 28th Regiment, under
Major Frantz, to stand in reserve behind it.
About four o’clock the firing reached its zenith. The Japanese advanced
to the attack, not in columns but in large groups, but they failed
to get up to the trenches. Hundreds of them were mown down, and it
seemed to me that the attack had failed everywhere. What was our
surprise, when we received a report from Major Astafiev, commanding
the 10th Company,[63] that his half-company had been wiped out, save
ten men, and that the Japanese had occupied his empty trenches during
the attack. The remaining ten men, however, had not retreated (they
were separated from the captured trench by a cliff), but had stuck to
their trench. I then and there made a mental vow that the deeds of
these heroes should eventually be put on record in letters of gold as a
perpetual memorial to the 10th Company, and I now redeem my pledge.
The trench occupied by the Japanese was under the cliff, and it was
a very difficult matter to climb down into it. As we had no further
reserves available, I sent to 203 Metre Hill for two half-companies
(2nd and 4th of our regiment), hoping to drive the Japanese out of
the trench with these men. I also sent to General Kondratenko for
reinforcements.
Lieutenant-Colonel Leesaevski reported from 174 Metre Hill that the
Japanese had run up one by one, had established themselves within a few
paces of the trenches, and were throwing stones at our riflemen, who
returned the missiles.
At about six o’clock we collected two companies of the 13th Regiment,
and made an attack on about 100 Japanese then in the trenches of the
10th Company. The companies quickly reached the top of the cliff,
but got no farther, as it was a big drop down below. The Japanese
artillery, noticing them, at once opened a heavy fire, and as it thus
became impossible to remain there in the open the companies retreated
again into the valley.
At about seven o’clock General Kondratenko joined us, and four
companies of the 13th Regiment arrived, the 2nd, 6th, 7th, and 9th,
under the command of the battalion commanders Majors Goosakovski and
Gavreelov.
We decided that the Japanese must be driven out of the 10th Company’s
trenches, and, with that object in view, I reinforced these men, who
had already resisted several attacks, with one more company. The
attack was repeated, but with the same result (it was a big jump down,
right on to the bayonets of the Japanese, who were invisible from the
top, while the guns from the heights beyond mowed down the attackers).
This time half of the men lodged themselves behind stones on the top,
and I now felt sure that the Japanese would not take the hill, as it
would be very difficult for them to climb up the cliff. In order to
minimize our losses from gun fire, I decided on a night attack, and
sent one company, under Major Goosakovski, to carry it out.
I ordered back half a company of the 5th Regiment to its original
position.
It transpired that the 7th Company of the 28th Regiment was not in its
correct place, having for some reason retired behind 174 Metre Hill. I
did not see when Major Frantz carried out this movement.
All this time the firing and bombardment on 174 Metre Hill continued,
and our forces dwindled away rapidly.
Reinforcements being demanded, a Scout Detachment under Captain
Osmanov, which had only just come up, was sent there. This detachment,
with its commander at its head, steadily and quietly ascended the hill,
five men excepted, who tailed off at the foot of the hill, evidently
afraid to go on. I did not order them to ascend the hill, knowing from
experience that the presence of a few cowards may unsettle the very
bravest company.
The stream of wounded from the hill increased, and many of these poor
sufferers expired while being carried across the shell-strewn ground.
We saw one wounded man, who was being carried by two of our clerks,
killed by a shell falling right on top of him. One of his bearers was
killed too, but the other escaped as by a miracle. A large group of
wounded now went past me, and behind them an officer on a stretcher. He
was a very young gunner, and he kept waving his sword in a frenzy and
muttering something. I do not remember what he said, as my attention
was attracted by another stretcher, on which was an officer whom I
thought I knew.
When the stretcher came close, I recognized in the wounded man
Lieutenant-Colonel Leesaevski, who had been commandant of the hill. He
was covered with blood and dust. A bullet had shattered his lower jaw
and tongue, and another had struck his hand. He could not speak from
loss of blood.
In his absence things might go badly on the hill.
This seasoned warrior had always shown extraordinary energy combined
with method. He was nicknamed “General Fock” in the regiment, which for
some reason displeased the real general, so, instead of commanding a
regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Leesaevski was given the command of the
2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment. General Fock never recognized the
great spirit animating this man, which showed up so prominently in
the defence of 174 Metre Hill. The old Colonel was indeed a far finer
soldier than many of the younger ones.
He fearlessly walked about the hill, encouraging the men and directing
their fire, closely following the movements of the enemy, and then,
bringing up his small reserve just at the right moment, he scattered
the thick columns of attackers like chaff before the wind by a few
well-directed volleys. When the men wanted to take him to the dressing
station, he said: “Leave me alone, my lads; I want to die with you.”
With a heavy heart I accompanied the stretcher, fearing that a stray
bullet or shell might end the career of this magnificent old soldier.
But, thank God! he got safely across the pass to 203 Metre Hill, which
meant that he was out of harm’s way. In his place I appointed Captain
Bielozerov, commanding the 9th Company of the 5th Regiment, one of the
bravest of our officers.
Towards evening more reinforcements were called for from 174 Metre
Hill. The defenders were so worn out that they could not repair the
damage done, which was considerable. The upper battery was destroyed,
all the field guns were dismounted, and the gun-pits reduced to ruins.
Nearly all the splinter-proofs in the trenches were destroyed, as
well as half of the parapet. The whole of the overhead cover against
shrapnel was also wrecked by shell fire.
It is difficult to defend such places without casemated works. On
a hill commanded from all sides what can riflemen do against heavy
artillery, and the high-explosive shell of field guns? During this day
the 5th and 9th Companies of the 5th Regiment lost half their strength.
Gun fire slackened. The stream of wounded also ceased, and we breathed
more freely. Our party on the central hillock was joined by some
reserve officers, and eventually we even had something to eat.
Meat, bread, and hot tea were supplied to the men in the lines, and the
field kitchen on the other side of 174 Metre Hill, which had escaped
untouched, got to work.
General Kondratenko brought up two more companies to the reserve and
sent two companies of the 13th Regiment to the hill to work at the
trenches.
We laughed at the Japanese who had taken the 10th Company’s trench, and
must by now be feeling like rats in a trap. The half of the 1st Company
of the 13th Regiment who had been left there, and the ten men of the
10th Company, prevented them from spreading along the trench, while in
front their road was barred by those standing on the hill, so that it
appeared inevitable that they must all be killed that night.
Meanwhile night had already fallen. The usual night firing had started
between the outposts at the foot of the hills, and the resulting noise
would cover the advance of our attacking companies. I sent to ask why
the attack had not commenced, and was kept waiting for an answer for
a very long time. The night was very dark. Everything was quiet, till
now and again the enemy’s bullets, like birds of the night, hummed high
overhead, or our star-rockets, strange hissing monsters, like fiery
snakes shot up into the sky and burst into a thousand dazzling stars,
brilliantly illuminating the dark hills and valleys.
“The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak.” This proverb was
exemplified in us and in our men. How many times have we not been
witnesses of the truth of it! how many times have not the Japanese
taken advantage of the utter exhaustion of our troops, fallen upon them
when they lay asleep, and captured important points in our position
(as at Ta-ku Shan, Miortvaia Sopka,[64] and other places)!
We realize now what it means to defend a fortress lacking a main line
of defence and having an insufficient number of permanently fortified
positions. Now I can clearly see that open field works, even though
prepared for some time in advance, and with trenches strengthened with
glacis parapets (as Glinka-Yarnchevski proposed at one time), will not
give the defenders facilities for sufficient rest; and rest is a very
important factor.
We were so tired that day—a fact not to be wondered at—that we lay down
where we were and went to sleep. Heavy rifle firing brought us to our
feet again. Star-rockets shot into the air and lit up the place, and
caused the firing to die down once more. We received word from those on
the hill that they had been firing on the Japanese, who had destroyed
some of the wire entanglements. There were not many of them, but they
had nevertheless caused a good deal of damage, and then had crouched
down near the line of wires. It was unfortunate that they had succeeded
to such an extent. I sent orders for the damage to be repaired as far
as possible, but I knew our men on the hill were handicapped owing to
lack of barbed wire.
This barbed wire was literally worth its weight in gold, and I was
always delighted when we succeeded in getting some for the defence of
this or that point, but there was great need of it everywhere.
There were several of these alarms during the night, but all this time
Major Goosakovski’s attack on the Japanese failed to come off.
However, I received a note at last, saying that he had decided to
attack at daybreak.
Having quietly thought the matter out, I came to the conclusion that
the Japanese might be left in the trench. These 100 men could not climb
up and take the hill, which was defended by a whole company, neither
could they be reinforced, as any reinforcements would be annihilated
before they reached them. I told Colonel Irman, who was sitting near
me, what I thought, and as he quite agreed with me, I sent an order
cancelling the attack, and withdrew the companies, except the one
behind the rocks, to a more sheltered spot between 174 Metre Hill and
Connecting Ridge. One of these companies I placed in reserve behind
174 Metre Hill, so that there were now three companies in the reserve,
_i.e._ at the immediate disposal of the officer in command on the hill.
The two companies which had arrived in the evening I assigned to the
general reserve. There were a few hours left till dawn, of which we
took advantage to get some sleep, repairing to Namako Yama, so as not
to be disturbed by the groans of the badly wounded men as they were
being carried along the road.
Our bearers (bandsmen, regimental clerks, and volunteers from the town)
sought them out during the night in the ravines, trenches, and ruined
blindages,[65] and carried them to 203 Metre Hill.
Before the sun had risen, the enemy’s guns began their work of
destruction, the worst of it being that they did it without receiving
any punishment in return.
Little by little, rifle firing broke out. When it was quite light,
the companies on Connecting Ridge noticed a Japanese battery coming
into action at very close range. They opened fire in volleys, and the
battery retired with heavy loss. Second-Lieutenant Bitzouk, who was for
the second time wounded in the leg, was chiefly responsible for the
destruction of this battery.
After this battery had retired, the infantry commenced their attack,
and towards seven o’clock there was very heavy rifle firing.
All the company commanders on Connecting Ridge were placed _hors de
combat_, and the three companies were commanded by Acting Ensign
Agapov. I called for volunteers from the staff for the command of
these companies, and in response to my call Lieutenant Vaseeliev and
Second-Lieutenant Galileiev at once stepped forward.
At 8 a.m. General Kondratenko arrived, and found that everything was
satisfactory. But the firing and bombardment had not slackened.
About 11 a.m. it was reported from the hill that the enemy was
attacking from the left flank, and that Acting Ensign Shishkin had been
killed.
I immediately telephoned to the officer commanding the artillery to
again concentrate his fire on the valley in front of 174 Metre Hill,
and soon our shells were streaming in the required direction. But still
the Japanese guns vomited death.
A report now came in from the troops on the hill that their trenches
were absolutely destroyed. They asked for not less than one company
to reinforce them, as there were very few of the original defenders
left. I myself saw that their last reserves had been used, and a long
line of wounded streamed down from the hill, amongst whom was the new
commandant, Captain Bielozerov. When brought to my vicinity, he was in
a fearful condition; a bullet had struck him on the right side of the
chest and passed right through, his shirt being soaked with blood. He
passed quite close to me and whispered to me: “Send up a company at
once. Put Second-Lieutenant Ivanov in command.”
Second-Lieutenant Ivanov was one of my bravest officers. When
volunteers were called for to collect the wounded on Height 426, he
said he would go with twenty-five men who had also volunteered under
Lieutenant Alalikin of the battleship _Poltava_. When they reached
the Japanese outpost line, they saw that it was impossible for the
whole detachment to get through, whereupon Second-Lieutenant Ivanov
crawled through the enemy’s lines alone and found a wounded artillery
non-commissioned officer, whom he hoisted upon his shoulder and brought
back. On his way back he met Serpukov, a lance-corporal of the 9th
Company, who had got through safely, and between them they carried the
wounded man to their detachment, and thence to 174 Metre Hill.
I immediately sent an order to Second-Lieutenant Ivanov to consider
himself in command on the hill.
The loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Leesaevski and Captain Bielozerov was
irreparable. The latter was a real hero. On August 20 there was
a moment on 174 Metre Hill when the sections of the 28th and 13th
Regiments[66] on the left flank wavered and turned their backs. Captain
Bielozerov rushed in amongst the fugitives, and with a few impassioned
words, pointing out to them the shame they would bring on their
regiments, made them return to their posts. Captain Bielozerov was
wounded when he sprang out of the trench to see where the enemy was and
what he was doing.
It was only possible to hold the hill at the price of heavy losses, but
we decided that it was worth it. Hence I resolved to go myself to the
hill, and to send up our last reserves.
At this moment E. P. Balashov, the medical officer in charge of the
hospital, rode up with his assistant, M. Tordan, a French subject, and
accompanied by General Fock. These unexpected arrivals put new spirit
into us.
We were all struck with the bravery and coolness of E. P. Balashov, who
was a great favourite in the regiment. Bullets were whistling by in
sufficient numbers to try the nerves of any man who had not previously
been under fire, in spite of which our civilian general[67] and his
companion did not appear to experience the slightest sensation of fear.
General Fock did not fail to give us his opinion on the position of
affairs, and he declared that the hill _must_ be held anyhow till
nightfall. This was already quite obvious to all of us. It is a very
nasty thing to retreat by day under the fire of an enemy who is only a
few paces off. But General Kondratenko expressed the wish to hold the
hill for an indefinite length of time, notwithstanding the fact that it
would be more than difficult to remain there under a hail of large and
small shells without any cover from their murderous effect.
About twelve o’clock a rifleman ran down from the hill with a note from
Second-Lieutenant Ivanov. He demanded immediate reinforcements, and as
many as possible, saying that both officers and men were beginning to
waver; hence it was obviously necessary to send up help at once.
I knew that Second-Lieutenant Ivanov would not ask for reinforcements
without good reason. I reported this to General Kondratenko (we had one
company left in the reserve), and it was decided to send the required
reinforcements. But General Fock heard the order given, and fired up at
our “inexperience.”
“What does this mean?” said he. “You want to hold on until nightfall,
and yet you send up your last reserve?”
“It is absolutely necessary,” I answered.
“It is not at all necessary,” declared General Fock.
“All right, Nicholai Alexandrovitch,” said General Kondratenko, turning
to me; “we will wait a little longer.”
I saw that General Fock’s assurance had overruled General Kondratenko’s
judgment, and I had not the moral courage myself to contradict him and
insist on the despatch of the last company, the more so, as Colonel
Irman, my immediate superior, did not give me any support.
About half an hour passed since the reinforcements had been asked for.
Balashov and M. Tordan departed saying that they had had quite enough
of it, and General Fock also rode off. Meanwhile the struggle grew
fiercer and fiercer, and now the first signs of wavering became evident.
I noticed three riflemen running away from the hill, and three men
without rifles behind them. I drew General Kondratenko’s attention to
them, and he evidently realized his mistake, for he said to me: “Ah!
now it is too late!” Then behind the second group of three men there
quickly followed about twenty others, and soon an entire company poured
down the hill after them.
On the hill itself men were running in all directions, like ants whose
hill has been disturbed, but a group of about fifty men rushed into
the upper battery, stood upon the breastwork, and fired straight down
on the enemy below. In front of this group, holding his naked sword in
his hand, I saw our Acting Ensign Shchenakin, and my heart swelled with
pride for the 5th Regiment. All these men belonged to the 5th Regiment,
and they had not lost hope of holding the hill, although every one else
had fled.
At this moment the enemy opened a hellish fire on this group of heroes,
wreathing the hill in clouds of smoke; the Japanese, by the way, never
thought twice about firing over the heads of their own men. I did not
see what was the end, for we all—General Kondratenko, Colonel Irman,
and myself—galloped off to stop the retreat, and, though the task was
not an easy one, we nevertheless succeeded. I placed the reserve near
our central hill, and the troops who had retreated occupied a position
in touch with this reserve, from Namako Yama to Connecting Ridge. A
telephone message was sent off at once, ordering the artillery to
direct as many guns as possible on 174 Metre Hill.
The yellow-caps had already shown themselves on the crest and opened a
fairly heavy, though not very accurate, fire on us.
At this moment the crest of the hill was swept by such a terrific storm
of our shells, that everything living was destroyed in a few seconds,
and the Japanese did not dare to show themselves even after the firing
had ceased.
It is a very difficult matter to hold ordinary field trenches against
siege artillery placed at short range.
With the fall of 174 Metre Hill we saw that it was impossible to hold
on to Connecting Ridge, which had, therefore, to be evacuated. General
Kondratenko gave the order to do so, and then went home, as he was
utterly worn out and could hardly stand, Colonel Irman going away with
him.
Taking advantage of the fact that the Japanese did not dare to show
themselves on 174 Metre Hill, I quietly withdrew the companies from
Connecting Ridge, and posted them for the time being behind Namako Yama
and Division Hill.
On August 19 and 20 the 5th Company lost 62 killed and wounded, about
half its then strength. The 9th lost 120 men, and had only 48 left in
the ranks. Our companies were the last to retreat.
Our losses during the defence of 174 Metre Hill amounted to 1,000 men,
of whom about one-third were killed.
Considering that this loss was incurred chiefly on 174 Metre Hill and
Connecting Ridge, where only four companies (800 men at the most) could
act at a time, the loss of 1,000 men at one point will give some idea
of the volume of fire developed at this spot by the Japanese.
If we had decided to retake the hill, it would not have been a
difficult matter, but it would have cost us more than 500 men a day to
hold it, as we should not have been able to reconstruct the trenches
to keep pace with the amount of damage done day after day; my regiment
would only have sufficed for four days, since, including the details
from the 28th Regiment, our strength was no more than 1,800 men.
As is evident from the foregoing narrative, when necessity arose, units
from other regiments were sent to me, but they were often required for
other positions of the defensive line.
Besides 1,000 casualties, we lost 2 long 150-mm. guns, 4 field guns,
2 machine guns, and 4 field mortars. However, two of these were
recaptured by us during the final attacks at the foot of 174 Metre Hill.
With the fall of 174 Metre Hill it became immediately necessary to
strengthen the trenches on Division Hill, Namako Yama, Akasaka Yama,
and 203 Metre Hill.
These trenches were far from complete, except those on 203 Metre Hill,
where they were made with splinter-proofs and light cover from shrapnel
shell, and were furnished with wire entanglements.
But our experience on 174 Metre Hill had taught us how weak our
earth-works were in comparison with the destructive power of the
enemy’s shells, and so it was evidently necessary to strengthen
considerably all the fortifications on 203 Metre Hill.
All this should have been done earlier, but want of tools and men had
prevented us during the defence from working at any but the advanced
positions. 203 Metre Hill was an exception, as, being one of the most
important points if not _the_ most important, on the defensive line, it
had received my special attention.
We had to set to work again night and day. This is what I proposed to
do: to throw the four trenches on Namako Yama into one long trench
the whole length of the hill; to make several communication trenches
back to the rear of the hill, where splinter-proofs were to be built
and tents erected for those defending the hill; to build kitchens and
establish a dressing station at the foot of the hill close to the
battery of long 6-inch guns; to construct a magazine for small-arm
ammunition, shell, and cartridges, and also make a dug-out for the
commandant. I furthermore proposed to convert the trench on the top of
Akasaka Yama into a redoubt, and to make several trenches in front of
it along the hill; to strengthen all the splinter-proofs on 203 Metre
Hill; and to place solid timber baulks to hold up the head-cover, so
that the splinter-proofs would remain standing, even though the parapet
was blown away.
We set to work on our task the first night after the capture of 174
Metre Hill.
The troops on the positions occupied by us were disposed as follows:
On Division Hill, the 5th, 7th, and 11th Companies of the 5th
Regiment, with the 2nd and 3rd Scout Detachments of the 5th Regiment
and the 9th Company of the 27th Regiment, under Major Beedenko.
On Namako Yama, two companies of Marines, under our own officers,
Afanaisev and Siedelnitski, both companies under the command of
Lieutenant Shcherbachev; the 7th Company of the 28th Regiment and the
2nd Scout Detachment of the same regiment, under Major Sokkatski;
also one company of the 13th Regiment and the 9th Company of the 5th
Regiment.[68] A section of Marines defended Extinct Volcano. On 203
Metre Hill, as before, there were the 2nd and 4th Companies of the 5th
Regiment, and I had three companies of the 4th Reserve Battalion in
reserve. All worked at night, and slept during the day.
We were very much stronger now that our defensive line was so much
smaller, and I no longer feared sudden attacks. But the following
regrettable incident again disturbed my peace of mind.
Early on the morning of August 23, I was awakened to hear a report that
the Japanese had taken Extinct Volcano in the night.
[Illustration: EXTINCT VOLCANO: TAKEN FROM THE
RIGHT FLANK OF NAMAKO YAMA.
p. 136]
I would not at first believe it, as the firing must have been heard,
and the night had passed absolutely quietly.
When I said so to the orderly, he told me that there had been no
firing, as the Marines had been caught asleep.
It turned out afterwards that they were not asleep, but were working,
and had been taken by surprise because they had failed to put out
outposts. Extinct Volcano had two trenches on it—one near the foot, for
a half-company, and the other on the crest, for a section. Three days
before, I had sent half a company of Marines to this hill for work and
defence.
Owing to their ignorance of outpost work, they had put out no standing
sentries by night, but were content with a few sentries on the trenches
themselves.
Noticing their negligence, a small body of Japanese had crept up to the
drowsy sentries, surprised them, and sprung into the trench.
Our Marines only grasped the situation when the majority of them had
already been killed. The remainder fled to the upper trench, where
there was one sub-division of riflemen (I do not now remember to whom
they belonged—possibly the 7th Company of the 28th Regiment, as they
occupied the right flank of Namako Yama). The Japanese ran up behind
them and burst into the trench at their very heels, thus taking Extinct
Volcano without noise or firing.
Major Zimmermann—a hero in the true sense of the word—in command
on Namako Yama, hearing what had happened, immediately organized a
counter-attack, and when the men had somewhat recovered themselves,
set them an example by rushing forward with drawn sword. The soldiers
followed him to a man, and Extinct Volcano was retaken. Unfortunately,
Major Zimmermann was wounded in the arm and breast, and had to
relinquish his command.
Ten minutes after the recapture of the hill, the enemy’s artillery
opened a terrific fire on it.
By this time I had reached the scene of action, having with me one of
the reserve companies, which I ordered to remain on the site of the
former bivouacs of the regimental staff, near the graves of Colonel
Petrov and Major Schiller.
Reaching the top of Namako Yama, the nearest point to Extinct Volcano,
I saw that the yellow-peaked caps were on its summit. This meant that
the enemy’s fire had driven us off the hill, which proved, indeed, to
be the case.
I sent a report to that effect.
At this moment Colonel Irman arrived with his adjutant, and told me
that he had sent for three companies from the general reserve.
But at least an hour would pass before they could arrive, and in that
time the enemy would be able to dig himself in, and it would be very
difficult to drive him out again.
We therefore decided to attack the hill without delay, and with this
object I ordered the 1st Scout Detachment to come to me immediately (it
was stationed near Fort Yi-tzu Shan). Everything was quiet there, and I
felt I could withdraw troops from that position without the fear of any
hostile attacks.
Colonel Irman telephoned to the officer commanding the fortress
artillery to open fire on the top of Extinct Volcano with as many guns
as he could get to bear.
Our guns thundered out, and a hail of shell swept the top of the hill.
In a moment the hill was wreathed in smoke, and the yellow-peaks
disappeared.
In order to see what was happening on the reverse side of the hill, I
went into a ravine in front of the left flank of Division Hill. Our
cannonade continued.
Just as I reached my new point of observation, I had a very alarming
experience. I heard the shriek of a heavy shell over my head, and a
moment later it fell about 10 paces from me; the earth shook from the
deafening reverberation of the explosion, and I was thrown heavily
to the ground, covered with sand and lumps of clay. It was some time
before I recovered from the shock and could continue my way.
This was due to one of our own 11-inch guns on the coast forts. It was
laid on the hill occupied by the enemy, but the shell dropped near
me—by no means the first instance of our coast-defence guns giving
us an unpleasant surprise. An 11-inch shell once landed in the 6th
Company’s trench on Division Hill. Luckily, there were no serious
consequences from these mishaps.[69]
On reaching the left flank of Division Hill, I found that the valley
was not visible to me. I shouted up to Division Hill, telling those
there to inform me if there was anything to be seen behind Extinct
Volcano, and soon received the answer that there were no hostile troops
in the valley.
The Japanese, however, caught sight of me from their trenches and lost
no time in firing at me, which was pleasant indeed. They even started
shelling me with their field guns; they had, seemingly, an enormous
supply of rifle and gun ammunition, and certainly used it freely.
When I returned to Colonel Irman, our scouts had already arrived,
and we decided to attack without delay. The scouts, with one company
from the reserve (the 5th of the 27th Regiment), were to advance
directly on the hill, while one company from the garrison of Namako
Yama moved from the flank. It was a hard climb up the high steep hill,
and continued for some time without the enemy firing a shot, our guns
meanwhile sweeping the summit. When, however, the scouts got close up,
and likewise the company from Namako Yama, our guns ceased firing, upon
which the yellow-peaks immediately again crowned the hill.
The companies rushed forward. They reached the parapet under a very
heavy fire, but went no farther, and lay down near it among the hollows
in the ground.
The opposing forces were so close to each other, that they could easily
throw stones across. The yellow-peaks took cover behind the parapet,
and our men began to throw stones, as there was no possibility of
reaching them with bullets. The Japanese replied in like fashion, and
this continued for some time.
We were quite accustomed to rifle and gun fire, and it did not have
much effect on us now, but this stone-throwing produced a most
childish impression; it was annoying to think that there was not one
man sufficiently brave to show his comrades an example by mounting
the parapet, and the whole procedure appeared futile to one anxiously
awaiting an assault.
Eventually our men stopped throwing stones, and were evidently
preparing for a bayonet charge.
Several men dashed forward—an officer and some non-commissioned
officers.
“Now, God with you!” said I to myself. “At last they have pulled
themselves together and are swarming over the parapet.”
The yellow-peaks showed for a moment over the crest of the parapet,
then they were hidden by our fellows, and with a wild “Hurrah” our
companies poured into the trench. Then all was silent.
“They’ve got it,” said Colonel Irman.
“Yes, we had it once before,” I answered, “but nothing came of it,
as their artillery drove us off again. I reported Major Zimmermann’s
success that time; but now we will wait and see.” I had scarcely
finished speaking, when the Japanese began to sweep the top of the hill
with fire from their heavy artillery.
We felt that nothing could be achieved until these cursed guns were
destroyed. But, forced to husband their ammunition, our artillery
hardly put up any fight against the hostile batteries.
Shells of every calibre literally covered the top of the hill, but
our men did not come out of the trench. It seemed strange indeed, as
there were no splinter-proofs in the small trench, and such a fire must
destroy all the defenders.
Ten minutes passed and there was no sign of movement. Another ten
minutes and no retreat.
At last the enemy’s artillery ceased fire.
“Now,” I thought to myself, “the hill is ours.” But a Japanese soldier
with a flag suddenly appeared on the parapet.
“What’s the meaning of that? Surely our men are not all killed?” But
it was practically so. The few that were left broke their way through
to Namako Yama. And the Japanese stood on the parapet and waved his
flag.
Just then reinforcements came in sight—a scout detachment of some
regiment. At their head was Lieutenant Evstratov, a strongly built,
tall, fair fellow with a reddish beard. The men marched quickly and
joyously; but there were not more than eighty of them.
“How is it you are so few—they promised me three companies?”
“Here are the three companies, Colonel,” said the Lieutenant.
“Where?” I asked.
“Here,” and he pointed to his men. “These are worth more than three
companies!”
We decided to add another small detachment that came up behind the
scouts, and attack as before, sending yet another company from Namako
Yama on the flank. We accordingly sent an orderly to Namako Yama with
the necessary instructions. The men who had just arrived did not know
the ground, so I took them on to the hill myself, and went with them
until they could all see how and where they were to attack.
Our artillery again opened fire on Extinct Volcano, and we saw the
man with the flag jump down from the parapet, while the summit of
the volcano was wreathed in smoke from our bursting shells. We were
evidently getting our revenge. After this I returned to Colonel Irman.
There were very few attackers, and we impatiently awaited
reinforcements, but none arrived, and already the scouts had nearly
reached the top, and firing had commenced. The officer leapt on the
parapet and fired at some one with his revolver. All his men followed
him, and lay down on the glacis without jumping down into the trench.
Obviously the Japanese were there.
No reinforcements had yet reached us. I could not stand it, and ran to
a hill lying behind us to see if the companies were coming up, or if
they had halted anywhere.
To reach this hill I had to run across a fairly broad ravine. As I went
down into it, I heard the Japanese firing on the hill, and as I reached
my point of observation I saw the reinforcing companies hurrying
towards us.
I returned to Colonel Irman with the good news, but he soon put a
damper on my spirits. “It’s no good now, our men are all killed by
shell fire.” Looking towards the hill, I saw nothing but the dead
bodies of our gallant comrades.
The reserve companies reached us completely tired out. Colonel Irman
and I could not help acknowledging that it was now impossible to retake
the hill.
Having come to this conclusion, Colonel Irman sent a report to that
effect to General Kondratenko.
I heard afterwards that that splendid officer, Lieutenant Evstratov,
was wounded by a fragment of shell and died in hospital.
Extinct Volcano remained in the hands of the Japanese, and the piles of
bodies, both Russian and Japanese, served for the rest of the siege as
a reproach to our gunners, who were not strong enough to prevent the
enemy from coming into action at decisive ranges.
The defence of this hill was shorter than that of 174 Metre Hill; of
course, there were reasons for this. In the first place, the top of the
hill was ten times smaller than that of 174 Metre Hill, the trenches
only accommodating one section; and, secondly, there was not a single
splinter-proof on it, and the line of trenches was beyond our general
line of defence, and had a certain amount of dead ground in front.
Our riflemen had no cover from artillery fire, and if they did not
retreat, were destroyed to a man. But if we gave up this hill to
the Japanese, we hoped that they would not occupy it, because our
artillery could sweep them off, as theirs did our troops when we were
in possession. However, it did not turn out so.
When we told our gunners to drive the Japanese from this hill, they
answered that they had very few shell and must keep them for more
important targets.
So the Japanese held our trenches unpunished, and repaired them, making
communication trenches and cover from our bullets.
Colonel Irman gave me the companies that had come up at the finish for
strengthening the defences on Namako Yama, and they were badly needed
by me.
What an enormous influence one man, whether officer or private, can
have on the issue of a battle!
In many battles I have noticed and studied the psychological effect
produced on an ordinary man who is brought face to face with death.
The desire to escape from the danger threatening him is so great, that
he is scarcely able to exhibit the strength of will of even the average
individual.
Overcome by this feeling, a man loses his power of weighing
circumstances, and he either acts from force of habit, or else follows
the example of his commander or his neighbour. (This is a well-known
phenomenon, but it is brought home only to the man who has been among
soldiers during a fight.) Now, supposing this neighbour loses his head
and runs, there are very few who will not follow his example; the
average man will take to his heels too, his neighbour follows him, and
so on, until the whole detachment is retreating in disorder.
A disorderly retreat is always started by one man, and in most cases
this man is physically weak and sometimes, though rarely, an obvious
funk. Therefore it is essential to recruit soldiers from men who are
physically strong, for almost every weak man will be a cause of retreat
and, consequently, of defeat. A hundred picked men are preferable to
two or three hundred weak ones, even though the latter are equally well
trained.
I would add that men must learn how to husband their strength. On a
long march fatigued soldiers are worse than useless. So I say that we
must discard most of what our soldiers now carry in their knapsacks,
and retain only the following articles: 1 shirt, 1 pair of trousers,
1 pair of putties, 1 pair of socks, a ball of lint, a butter-tin,
some needles and thread, and sugar for two days. All the other things
are absolutely superfluous. Have your supply columns perfect; but the
soldier must go as light as possible, and must, moreover, look smart,
so that an enemy will not dare to call him a “ragged beggar.”[70] Make
a soldier so smart that even a sloven will become a rather fine-looking
fellow. A smart outward appearance raises the spirits of the troops.
It is also indispensable to teach the infantry soldier field
fortification thoroughly, so that he becomes the equal of a sapper and
needs no supervision in war time. In the 5th Regiment, not only the
non-commissioned officers, but the men also, could point out where
trenches should be constructed, and of what depth and length they
should be.
Our men blamed the sappers for making trenches with elbow rests, as
they knew by experience what the loss of that width of earth meant
along the firing line. They said that the sappers did it because they
had not themselves been under shrapnel fire, and did not know how to
take aim from behind cover.
[Illustration: RED HILL ON THE RIGHT, WITH THE TOWN AND BAY IN THE
VALLEY. IN THE FOREGROUND ARE SEEN THE HEADQUARTERS
OF THE 5TH REGIMENT.
p. 146]
FOOTNOTES:
[61] Commander of the Fortress Artillery.
[62] Our Official History states that “mist and rain prevented an
effectual bombardment on this day,” and no real assault took place. The
bombardment of 174 Metre Hill on the 15th was evidently only done to
cover the attack on Height 426 (described in the last chapter), as no
serious attack was made on 174 Metre Hill till the 19th.
[63] This company was on Connecting Ridge and had been sent to
reinforce the 5th and 9th Companies on 174 Metre Hill.
[64] Meaning “Extinct Volcano”; situated about midway between 174 Metre
and Division Hills.
[65] A blindage is a covered trench with a roofing at least
sufficiently strong to afford protection against rifle and shrapnel
bullets.
[66] Sent up from Namako Yama to reinforce 174 Metre Hill.
[67] Officials in Government employ in Russia have civil “rank” just as
officers in the army have military rank. Hence the term “general” here.
[68] Consisting of 101 men.
[69] These shells must have come either from Golden Hill Battery
or No. 7 Battery on the Tiger Peninsula, each of which had 11-inch
_howitzers_. (See Map III.)
[70] The average Russian soldier of the infantry of the line, with
his loose jacket, loose breeches, battered peaked cap, and invariable
slouch, does not look what we call smart, and this is what General
Tretyakov is probably referring to.