Retreat from Feng-huang Shan, July 30—Fortifying 174 Metre
Hill—Capture of Kan-ta Shan—Attacks on the advanced hills,
August 13, 14, and 15—Retreat to Namako Yama and Division
Hills—Losses.
Early on the morning of July 31, I learnt that our men on Feng-huang
Shan had hurriedly retreated into the fortress without offering any
serious resistance to the enemy. This was extremely unwelcome news, for
now we should have to come into direct touch with the enemy round the
fortress itself.
Major Saratski’s force had to occupy the crest of Pan-lung Shan from
Headquarter Hill to the redoubts of the 26th Regiment near Fort Yi-tzu
Shan. As this detachment proved insufficient for the defence of this
section, I sent up our 11th and 12th Companies, with some volunteers
from our non-combatant company under Sergeant-Major Bashchenko.[48] I
posted Midshipman Doudkin’s four small naval guns there, and disposed
the remainder of the regiment as follows: on 203 Metre Hill the 2nd
and 4th Companies, on 174 Metre Hill the 5th and 9th Companies, and
on Height 426 the 2nd Scout Detachment, with the 3rd Detachment in an
advanced position; on Division Hill the two Q.F. batteries of Colonels
Petrov and Romanovski (which had arrived from Kiev) were posted with
our 5th, 6th, and 7th Companies; on Headquarter Hill the 1st Scout
Detachment. The remaining companies were in reserve.
Since, however, the line occupied exceeded 6 versts in length, we had
all too few men for such a wide extent of front.
I now return to our retreat from Feng-huang Shan.
The hill and the position near 11th Verst, like that on Ta-ku Shan, had
been very weakly fortified by us. I was well acquainted with the works
on Feng-huang Shan and those in continuation towards the right flank,
having gained this knowledge during, and before, the fighting on the
“Position of the Passes.”
These fortifications consisted of deep trenches with hardly any
parapet, placed at the very foot of the hills which lay behind them,
in accordance with General Fock’s system. Right close up to the
trenches grew high _kao-liang_,[49] which completely blocked the
field of view from the trenches, and, like the plan of the trenches
themselves, the positions selected for them afforded an example of
the blind application of a principle[50] in itself sound enough. The
man responsible for the defence of the right flank of Feng-huang Shan
unhappily failed to apply this principle correctly.
In his anxiety to adhere to the principle of a flat trajectory he
entirely lost sight of the fact that every small mound, if only two
or three feet high, presents an impenetrable barrier to a low-flying
bullet. He also quite forgot that the slope of the hill of itself
affords an obstacle difficult to surmount; and he, moreover, ignored
the difficulties of an eventual retreat from the trenches up the side
of the hill, sometimes a very steep one, as was the case at Feng-huang
Shan.
So the trenches on the right flank of Feng-huang Shan were placed at
the foot of its northern side. In front of them grew _kao-liang_ to the
height of 5 feet. The regiments occupying this position were disposed
throughout the trenches in question.
One of the officers of the 13th Regiment described what happened thus:
“Having retreated from the Shipinsin Pass, the regiment occupied
part of the trenches on Feng-huang Shan, and began to cut down the
_kao-liang_, but only had time to destroy a belt of about 50 yards
of it in front of the trenches. They had supper and spent the night
comparatively quietly. Very early in the morning there was a stir among
the _kao-liang_, and before the men had time to seize their rifles,
the Japanese were 20 paces from the trenches. Our troops, spread out
over a wide front, were unable to withstand the rush of the Japanese
columns and retreated up the hill and beyond. There were no trenches on
the top of the hill. Seeing the retreat of the troops in the centre and
the Japanese in possession of their trenches, the other regiments also
began to retire on thus finding their flanks exposed. Thanks to our
artillery, the Japanese were prevented from advancing any farther and
stopped behind the hills which they had occupied. Only Ta-ku Shan and
Hsiao-ku Shan[51] were left in our hands.”
Another officer of the 13th Regiment gave the following description of
the fight:
“After the battle round Lao-tso Shan our men had to occupy another
position, of which the left flank was Feng-huang Shan. The 13th
Regiment occupied the section from the Great Mandarin road to 11th
Verst on the railway. We had the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and
8th Companies in the first line, and the 9th, 11th, and 12th in the
reserve, the 10th Company forming the artillery escort. The whole of
the 14th Regiment was in reserve behind the 13th. The position occupied
by us was fortified according to General Fock’s system, _i.e._ the
trenches were dug at the very foot of the hill, so that they afforded
but a very poor field of fire, and the Japanese could take advantage
of cover behind every clump or mound on the ground in front. Besides
this, in front of the trenches was _kao-liang_ of such a height that
the whole of the foreground was completely hidden from our men sitting
in the trenches. We did all we could to destroy this vile stuff, but we
had no time to cut it down for more than 50 paces from the trenches,
and in some places to even a less extent.
“Colonel Prince Machabeli, commanding the left, considering that his
reserve was too weak, decided to strengthen it by one company, and
despatched accordingly the following order to the firing line: ‘Send
back one of the companies from the position to the reserve.’[52]
Captain R—— received this order. On either side of him was Major
G——, commanding the 2nd Company, and Lieutenant L——, commanding the
3rd Company. Captain R—— decided that he would join the reserve.
Unfortunately, Lieutenant L—— came to the same conclusion, so they both
went back to the reserve. It is not known what Major G—— decided to do,
but he also disappeared somewhere.
“The Japanese saw these companies going away, and, springing up to the
attack, hurled themselves into the gap without firing a shot, the high
_kao-liang_ allowing them to come right up to our trenches unobserved.
Having gained this unoccupied point, they worked round to the flank,
and even the rear, of the other companies, and poured in a murderous
fire. The 4th Company hurriedly evacuated its position, but the 1st and
5th held on for some time. At last, the 1st Company having lost 101 men
and the 5th 105, they began to retire, and, following them, all the
other companies climbed up the hill under a hail of bullets from the
Japanese now occupying our trenches. There were no trenches at the top
of the hill, so our men went on into the town. Colonel Machabeli was
held responsible, and was removed from the command of the regiment in
consequence.”
This gallant field officer was afterwards killed on the West Pan-lung
Redoubt under the following circumstances. The Japanese attacked the
redoubt and took the front glacis. Our men were lodged in the rear.
Colonel Machabeli stopped those who were retreating and, having
inspired them with a fiery speech, rushed forward, calling on his men
to follow him. Another moment and the Japanese were driven out of the
redoubt.
After this exploit Colonel Machabeli went back to the rear face of the
redoubt, and had only just sat down to get his breath, when one of the
men ran up and reported that the Japanese had again captured the front
glacis. Once again Colonel Machabeli collected his men round him and
threw himself on the Japanese, but just as he was jumping across the
inner ditch a bullet struck him. Our men hesitated, wavered, and then
evacuated the whole redoubt, which remained from that time, together
with the body of the gallant colonel, in the hands of the Japanese.
* * * * *
After the capture of Feng-huang Shan the Japanese took a rest, being
contented with reconnaissance work only; while, in the meantime, we
strengthened our positions, built kitchens, and made communication
trenches between the fortifications.
The companies bivouacked in places screened from the enemy’s view.
Luckily we had a good deal of rain, which gave us water in abundance.
The soldiers dug out ponds near their bivouacs, and not only washed
their clothes, but even indulged in the luxury of bathing.
Our scout detachments fared worst of all in this respect, for they were
far out in front, and had no water.
We were much delayed in our work by the rocky nature of the soil and
the want of tools, especially picks, good axes, and shovels, of which
implements we needed a very large number. There was a sufficient
quantity of wood in the town, but we required an enormous amount of it
on the position itself.
[Illustration: VIEW FROM THE SADDLE BETWEEN 203 METRE HILL AND
AKASAKA YAMA TOWARDS 174 METRE HILL, UP WHICH A
ZIGZAG ROAD IS SEEN. ON THE RIGHT IS SHOWN NAMAKO
YAMA. THE TRENCHES ON THE EXTREME RIGHT OF THE
PHOTO ARE ON THE RIGHT FLANK OF AKASAKA YAMA.
p. 91]
We had to make provision for dug-outs at the rate of 50 per cent.
for each company for the winter, besides kitchens and baths for the
battalions, and shelters for the officers. Supplies of wood were
brought up on our baggage animals to all points on the position, but
there was scarcely a sufficiency for all the needs of the companies.
We worked day and night for a long time, dividing our men into three
reliefs; nevertheless, our trenches were far from being completed.
Besides the enormous amount of spade work we had to do, we were
handicapped by having to furnish a very strong outpost line.
We had no fortifications on 174 Metre Hill capable of resisting a
direct attack, and a night attack might always be crowned with success,
so that our men did not get much sleep. I very much feared night
attacks, and so determined to strengthen our trenches by building
redoubts. We had, however, as already stated, but few tools and little
time, and there was so much work to be done, that it was absolutely
impossible to prepare for every contingency.
The enemy was at close quarters and could attack at any moment. We had
thus to watch his every movement, the more so, as we had no definite
line of obstacles barring the way to the fortress, and even a slight
advantage gained at night might give the enemy an open road into the
New Town and, perhaps, even farther. For this reason I felt extremely
uneasy.
Throughout the siege a third of the regiment was always on the alert.
This would not have been necessary if we had had a better line of
defences and obstacles, or at least twice as many forts as we actually
did have. There would have been no moral and physical wastage, and
scurvy would not have hampered the defence of Port Arthur.
Although our own primary object was the fortification of 174 Metre
Hill, we could not do very much work on the positions during our stay
in Port Arthur, being constantly sent to the reserves stationed at
Ying-cheng-tzu,[53] or to the right flank, or to the centre near the
pass.
We began to work seriously at the fortifications only from the moment
of the general retreat into Port Arthur, but even then we were sadly
handicapped by the want of tools. It was lucky that the enemy did not
worry us much, but turned his attention mainly to the right and centre.
The first shell fell into the town on Sunday, August 7.
On the 8th, the Japanese captured Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan. A
number of the assaults were beaten back by the troops holding the
hills, who fought day and night several days running. But there is a
limit to human strength. On the third night the Japanese captured the
hills, finding most of the defenders asleep. I was told this afterwards
by men who had taken part in the defence.[54]
After the capture of Ta-ku Shan we noticed (from the observing
stations we had organized) signs of a Japanese concentration near
Louisa Bay. With a view to obtaining better observations, I was ordered
to occupy Kan-ta Shan with a section under an officer. A ring trench
had been made on this hill (I do not know who constructed it), but
_kao-liang_ surrounded the hill, and its defence was therefore a very
difficult matter, as it was possible to get close up to the top under
cover of the millet. Besides this, Kan-ta Shan was nearer to the enemy
than to us, and was, moreover, in front of Colonel Semenov’s section,
and not mine. Steeling my heart, however, I sent a section there under
Acting Ensign Shishkin. This section could easily be cut off and
destroyed, for which reason I posted at night a strong piquet behind
Kan-ta Shan for its support. From the moment we occupied this hill we
had nightly skirmishes with the Japanese.
The enemy began to press us on all sides until, on August 10, they
captured Kan-ta Shan by a night attack, but abandoned it in the day,
when we again took possession—only for a day, however, for the Japanese
recaptured the hill on the following night, and this time fortified
themselves strongly on it.
* * * * *
However much we longed to see our fleet cruising on the flanks of the
enemy’s line of investment, our desire remained unsatisfied, for the
ships did not dare to leave the harbour,[55] the enemy’s fleet being
vastly superior, both in the number of ships, and in their quality.
We now had the pleasure of seeing five large Japanese battleships
appearing every day on the horizon before Port Arthur.
On August 11, 12, and 13 we saw considerable signs of movement on the
enemy’s part in the direction of our left flank. Trains of baggage and
bodies of troops were on the move. They carried out their manœuvre very
cleverly, making full use of all the cover afforded by the unevenness
of the ground. However, they showed themselves occasionally to our
observers posted on the hills, and at night our sentries, who were
posted far out in front, could plainly detect the sounds of moving
wagons and marching men.
It was evident that the enemy was preparing to attack 174 Metre Hill.
In view of this contingency we were reinforced by two companies of
young sailors under the command of two of our officers, Lieutenants
Afanaisev and Siedelnitski.
In order to prevent the enemy from breaking through between Height 426
and Headquarter Hill, I ordered the sailors to make a trench connecting
Height 426 with the fortifications on Headquarter Hill.
Two companies of the 14th Reserve Battalion were sent up to strengthen
our reserve. I placed Major Ivanov in command of the firing line. The
reserve was posted near the bivouacs of the regimental staff of the 5th
Regiment, behind Division Hill.
In view of the fact that Peredovaya (Advanced) Hill[56] was very
far in front, and held only as an observation post by the 3rd Scout
Detachment, this detachment had orders, in case of a very determined
attack, or a turning of its flanks, to retire to Headquarter Hill,
where a position had been prepared for it.
I was very much afraid that the Japanese would take advantage of their
superiority in numbers, make a night attack, and capture our weak
trenches, the more so, as we had prepared practically no obstacles,
not having had time to do so. We had only succeeded in putting up
wire entanglements across the front of the trenches on Height 426 and
Headquarter Hill.
We had been supplied with some star-rockets for use at night, and
batteries for these had been stationed on Division, 203 Metre, and 174
Metre Hills.
Events turned out as I had expected. On the night of August 13–14 (I
do not remember at what time exactly) a mounted orderly reported that
large bodies of the enemy were moving up the road to Headquarter Hill,
and a few minutes afterwards I heard heavy firing near Advanced Hill.
I got up and went with my orderlies to Division Hill, to the reserve,
finding every one at his post.
A report was now brought in that all our scout detachments had been
driven back on to 174 Metre Hill and had occupied a line extending from
that hill in the direction of Pigeon Bay.
A terrific fire broke out and spread along the whole front. Our
star-rockets hissed, speeding high into the air, and their brilliant
light showed the whole ground in front.
Another orderly galloped up with a report from the commander of the
1st Scout Detachment to the effect that the 3rd Scout Detachment had
evacuated Advanced Hill and joined him, and that in conjunction, thanks
to the star-rockets, they had beaten back the Japanese, who had fallen
foul of the wire entanglement on the right flank of Headquarter Hill.
The enemy’s losses had been very heavy.
I at once sent a report of what had occurred to Colonel Irman,[57] but
he himself came up to Division Hill shortly afterwards.
Rain began to fall and soaked us to the skin. At daybreak the firing
somewhat slackened, but shortly afterwards the enemy’s artillery
re-opened, causing heavy losses to our companies.
Rifle and gun fire continued all day from both sides. The enemy swept
174 Metre and Division Hills with his guns, while our own artillery
in turn swept the plains below, as the enemy offered no good target
anywhere.
Having suffered considerably from our rifle fire, the enemy lay low
and did not attempt to make a general assault. A Japanese column had
worked round our left flank and essayed to attack Height 426, but the
hostile troops were held up by the wire entanglements and were entirely
annihilated by our 2nd Scout Detachment, which had been strengthened by
two sections of the 3rd Company from 174 Metre Hill.
We suffered severely from the enemy’s artillery fire.
Thus passed the whole of that day (August 14). The two batteries of
Colonel Petrov and Colonel Romanovski, posted on Division Hill, sought
in vain for targets, but the enemy kept under cover with remarkable
skill.
There were constant alarms during the following night, and firing
continued without ceasing. The enemy again attacked our trenches, but
retreated after losing heavily. In order to be ready to beat back a
night attack, we had moved the reserve nearer to the firing line.
Knowing every inch of the ground, at about 10 p.m. I started off with
Colonel Irman and two companies towards Headquarter Hill. There was
fairly heavy firing in front of us.
We went on full of assurance, but in the darkness we lost the road. We
took our bearings by the features of well-known hills, yet these same
hills seemed now to be quite different from those we knew so well by
day, and the sound of shots rang out from all sides more loudly the
farther we advanced.
Now we must have reached Headquarter Hill—but no! it was not there. The
firing was soon heard, not only in front and from the flanks, but also
far in rear. We found ourselves in a very unpleasant position. “Do you
think we have gone beyond our firing line?” I said to Colonel Irman.
He answered that he had not the faintest idea where he was. Then I
proposed that we should halt and send out scouts.
What if we were taken for Japanese by our own people and met by a
volley! That would be awkward indeed. So we halted and had a good look
round, but the place was absolutely unfamiliar. Still, firing was
going on all around. It was the most stupid position I have ever been
in. “Let us turn back, Vladimir Nicholaievitch,” I said to Colonel
Irman; “we shall certainly reach some place that we can recognize, and
then we shall be all right.”
Colonel Irman agreed, and we turned “right-about.” Some time passed,
and at last we made out the silhouette of Namako Yama, and once more
breathed freely.
We decided to leave the reserve behind the slopes of 174 Metre Hill,
where the men lay down under arms on a ploughed field. Major Ivanov
came up to us, and we gave the reserve into his charge, we ourselves
starting off for Division Hill to try to get a little sleep.
It had only just begun to grow light, when I was inundated with reports
from the hills attacked, the Japanese having continued their various
attacks all night. They had come up to the wire entanglements, but,
failing everywhere to get through, they slipped away again in the
darkness. Our star-rockets did sterling service throughout.
The dawn had not fully broken before the enemy’s artillery thundered
forth. I came out of the dug-out of the commander of the 6th Company,
and began to observe over the top of the breastwork. Our three hills
were wreathed in smoke from the enemy’s high-explosive and shrapnel
shells, and looked like veritable volcanoes in eruption. Though our men
had sufficient cover from shrapnel, the high-explosive shells, filled
with Shimose, caused fearful havoc.
A stream of wounded, on foot and in stretchers, was moving along the
road from the hills. It was evident that the enemy was determined to
drive us off Advanced Hill, and our position was a serious one. I
consequently sent a report to that effect.
A message came in from Headquarter Hill asking for reinforcements, and,
pending the arrival of the reserves, I sent one section of the 6th
Company out of the trenches. General Kondratenko saw that here was no
child’s play, and sent us two additional companies—the 2nd (Rotaiski’s)
and the 3rd (Levitski’s) of the 13th Regiment.
It was a difficult thing to hold on to Advanced Hill, as it had been
the last to be fortified. The depth of the trenches was normal, but
their finish left much to be desired. We had made shrapnel-proof
head-cover, but had had no time to trace traverses or make cover for
the reserves, so that our men suffered severely from the enemy’s shell
fire, which was very heavy.
Before seven o’clock on the morning of August 15 all three hills
had sent in requests for reinforcements, in compliance with which I
immediately sent forward the two companies of the 13th Regiment, as
I saw companies of other regiments coming to our assistance. General
Kondratenko arrived on the scene at about 8 a.m. Having explained how
matters stood, I drew his attention to the dangerous position of our
present observation post. Bullets were whistling around us from all
directions.
At this time Colonel Petrov’s and Colonel Romanovski’s batteries,
stationed on Division Hill, prepared to open fire, although they had
little hope of success, as the enemy’s batteries were not visible and
his infantry was attacking from points which were only within reach
of the batteries far away behind Fort Yi-tzu Shan. The consequence
was that our men had to fight the Japanese infantry under a murderous
artillery fire without the support of their own guns.
The situation was an impossible one, as it had been at Nan Shan.
About 11 a.m. Colonel Irman rode up. Reinforcements arrived also. The
enemy’s gun fire was so terrific at this time, that I wondered how
our men could continue to make any defence. But they were putting
up a gallant fight, for we could see how they dashed out of their
trenches, now to the right, now to the left, how the reserves posted
in rear of the hills reinforced the men in the trenches, and how they
again charged out of the trenches and then retired behind their scanty
cover. The majority of our officers were wounded and officers of other
units took command, but, judging from the enormous losses of the 5th
Regiment, one could not help feeling that there were but few left in
the trenches at all.
Major Ivanov had used all his reserves, and sent in asking for more.
Reports were received from every quarter stating that the trenches
had been absolutely wrecked by the enemy’s shells, and that it was
impossible to hold on under such artillery fire. The fire was indeed
terrific, and General Kondratenko felt inclined to order a retreat;
but I sent up two more companies to the left flank, one of them (a
company of the Reserve Battalion) to the reserve behind the left flank,
as the enemy was devoting his main energy towards that side. And now,
at midday, it seemed as if the Japanese had concentrated the whole
of their artillery, not only to utterly destroy the defenders, but to
level the very hills themselves.
Our guns were still inactive, being unable to locate the positions
of the enemy’s batteries. As I have mentioned before, however, two
batteries standing near us were preparing to open fire. This drew the
enemy’s attention, and he began to pour a stream of shell upon us as
well as bullets. One of them burst close to Major Schiller, and killed
him outright, and also wounded Colonel Petrov, the battery commander.
The former was struck by a large splinter in the left breast and the
latter in the left eye (he died the following day in hospital).
A little before this we saw unmistakable signs of a speedy retirement.
In order not to be taken at a disadvantage, I had arranged for a second
line of defence (174 Metre Hill, Namako Yama, and Division Hill).
When I had done this, and inspected our trenches with Captain Sichev,
commanding the 6th Company, I noticed that the enemy’s rifle fire was
especially directed on our trenches on Division Hill. We had not long
to wait for confirmation of this fact (if it were needed), for Captain
Sichev was wounded in the leg—luckily, not seriously, as the bullet did
not touch the bone.
Having completed my round, I returned to General Kondratenko, and saw
that our men were streaming away from Headquarter Hill, like powder
spilling out of a barrel, and shortly afterwards from Height 426 also.
An exclamation of annoyance escaped the general. “See! surely it is
easier for them there than it is on Height 426. What are they running
for? They _must_ be stopped!” Colonel Irman, who was standing near,
took the general’s words as an order and hurried off to carry it out,
taking Captain Iolshin of the general staff with him.[58]
“And you, Nicholai Alexandrovitch,” said General Kondratenko, turning
to me, “take a company, and attack their left flank when they come
down the hill in pursuit.” There was a company waiting not far behind
us, and I should very soon have carried out the order given me, but
I had scarcely gone half a verst with the company, when a mounted
orderly galloped up and gave me an order to return immediately to
General Kondratenko and hand over the command to Lieutenant-Colonel
Naoomenko, who was close to me at the time. When I again reached
Division Hill, I saw our army in full retreat from the three advanced
hills. On the crest of the hills that had been occupied by us (Height
426, Headquarter Hill, and Advanced Hill) appeared lines of the enemy’s
skirmishers. Our men retreated without haste, returning the enemy’s
fire, but strewing the ground they were passing over with bodies.
Three mounted men were seen galloping along the retreating line; they
were Colonel Irman, Captain Iolshin, and Colonel Zoobov, the latter
commanding the 4th Reserve Battalion. But their efforts were in vain
and the retreat continued without check.
When Colonel Irman returned, he reported that he had been unable to
stop the retreating line, and the only men who paid any attention to
him were a few scouts of the 5th Regiment and the 1st Company of the
reserve battalion under Lieutenant Sadykov, whom he recommended for a
St. George’s Cross.
I consider it my duty to state here that Major Ivanov acted in the most
heroic manner during the battle. When the 6th Company refused to go up
Headquarter Hill to the help of their comrades, Major Ivanov said to
the men: “If you don’t come with me I shall lie down here to be shot”;
and, running out on to an open space that was swept by bullets, he
lay down on the ground. Then the commander of the company rushed up
with his men, lifted him up, and said that the company would follow
him wherever he liked to lead them. However, on reaching the hill,
they found that it had been evacuated and was now strongly held by the
Japanese. Major Ivanov then took the company back to Division Hill.
General Kondratenko ordered me to stop the retreat and to form a
reserve for our subsequent defensive line, and I set out to do my best.
When the Japanese appeared on Height 426 and Headquarter Hill, our
artillery swept these heights with shrapnel, and cleared the summits of
yellow-peaked caps in a moment.
This was timely relief, as the Japanese began to bring a flanking
fire to bear from the trenches on Headquarter Hill on the lines at
Pan-lung Shan, and our 11th Company suffered severely from this fire.
Things were already going badly at Pan-lung Shan, and it was of vital
importance to know what was to be done next. To decide this, General
Kondratenko summoned all the commanders to come to Division Hill. I
also went there the moment I had formed my reserves and posted them in
a safe place.
Colonel Irman, Colonel Zoobov, and others were already there. The noise
of battle had become less, and for the moment the Japanese showed no
signs of advancing any farther.
Our artillery ceased firing, as its targets had disappeared over the
top of the hills and taken cover in the _kao-liang_. This was about 2
p.m.
Before undertaking anything further it was decided to make an
inspection of the positions behind us on Pan-lung Shan, which
General Kondratenko ordered Colonel Naoomenko and myself to do. We
immediately went to Pan-lung Shan, from which our 11th Company, under
Second-Lieutenant Lobyrev, had already retreated. I asked: “Who ordered
you to retreat?” and he answered: “Major Katishev [commanding the 11th
Company; he had been wounded in the arm and had been taken to the field
hospital]. He told us to retreat, as it was impossible to remain in the
trenches, for Headquarter Hill was in the hands of the Japanese.” On
hearing this, I said: “You are never to retreat without orders from a
senior commander. Go back again!”
Second-Lieutenant Lobyrev, a quiet, brave fellow, answered: “It is all
the same to us—we will go back”; then, turning quickly to his men, he
shouted out: “Company, about turn, to the old position—march!” and the
company turned round and reoccupied its trenches.
Having made an inspection of these trenches, we came to the conclusion
that it was, indeed, impossible to remain in them, as their left flank
rested on Headquarter Hill and there was hardly any cover from fire
from that side.
We informed General Kondratenko of the result of our inspection, and he
decided to evacuate Pan-lung Shan entirely as far as the redoubts on
the right flank of Division Hill. This was done at about 7 p.m.
Between Pan-lung Shan and Division Hill there was a position favourable
for defence, and I had already had some work done on it and commenced
the construction of a large lunette. We should have occupied this
position with the companies which retreated from Pan-lung Shan, but as
we had no tools for completing the works we had to abandon the idea of
holding it, and all the companies were taken from Pan-lung Shan and
placed in reserve behind Division Hill and Namako Yama. The three scout
detachments were posted between 203 Metre Hill and Fort Ta-yang-kou
North, where they could get some rest.
I will now give a detailed account of the fighting on each of the hills
attacked.
ON TRIOK-GOLOVY HILL (THREE-HEADED HILL)[59]
About 10 p.m. on August 13 the outposts were driven back by the enemy
on to their supports. The 1st Scout Detachment was surrounded, but
fought its way through at the point of the bayonet, bringing along two
badly wounded men and two Japanese rifles.
At eleven o’clock the Japanese attacked Advanced Hill, which was
held by one section (the 3rd) of the 3rd Infantry Scout Detachment,
consisting of 36 men. Favoured by darkness, the enemy completely
surrounded the hill on all sides. The non-commissioned officer in
charge, Nazarov, seeing that there was no escape, attacked the enemy,
and at this moment a star-rocket burst, and by its light the men on
Headquarter Hill saw the Japanese, and at once poured a hail of bullets
into them, thus enabling Nazarov to fight his way back to Headquarter
Hill.
Having taken Advanced Hill, the Japanese climbed up Headquarter Hill,
but were beaten back with heavy losses. Half an hour later they raised
the cry of “Banzai!” and again stormed our trenches from the right
flank, but in doing so they fell foul of the wire entanglements and
were nearly all wiped out.
About 2 a.m. the enemy repeated the attack in great force; but only
a few reached the trenches, where they were bayoneted by our men. In
this attack the darkness greatly assisted the enemy, as the supply of
rockets being exhausted, no more could be sent up.
Towards morning on August 14, covered by fog and rain, the enemy
tried to overwhelm our scouts, but without success. In this attack
Acting Ensign Zakrejevski was wounded, the sergeant-major of the 1st
Detachment killed, and several scouts wounded.
I must mention a very fine piece of work on the part of Corporal
Vagin of the 3rd Scout Detachment. Entirely on his own initiative, he
occupied with his section a hill that had been left unfortified, and
by enfilade fire afforded great relief from pressure on Headquarter
Hill and Height 426, whilst at the same time beating back the Japanese
attacking his own party.
All the non-commissioned officers acted like true heroes, and one of
them, Lance-Corporal Khaidoulin (a Tartar) of the 1st Scout Detachment,
seeing that the men of his section had expended all their ammunition
during the third attack, jumped up out of the trench and shouted out,
“Let us die, lads, for the Czar and our Faith!” and prepared for a
bayonet charge. Just at that moment ammunition was brought up, and the
Japanese were driven off by rifle fire.
In the morning it was seen that the Japanese had captured Advanced
Hill, Kan-ta Shan, and a small hill in front of the 12th Company at
Pan-lung Shan, from which they opened rifle fire, but the Baranovski
guns on Height 426 drove them under cover.
On account of sickness (dysentery) Lieutenant Choulkov had been sent to
hospital, and Acting Ensign Elechevski was sent to take his place.
On the night of August 14 the supply of ammunition began to run short
and firing was stopped. Thinking that we had abandoned the trenches,
the enemy tried to capture them. He was met at the very edge of the
trenches by some volleys which almost annihilated him, only one
officer and five men, who had hidden behind some stones, being left.
At daybreak Sergeant Zmoushko, noticing that the men behind the stones
were not dead, began to watch, and as soon as the officer showed his
head, he shot him. Seeing their officer killed, the soldiers ran back,
but were all shot down.
The ground in front of the trenches was strewn with the bodies of
the Japanese. In the morning (August 15) the men of the 1st Scout
Detachment left the trenches in order to clean their rifles, which had
become choked from continual firing, and their place was being taken
by a company of the 4th Reserve Battalion; at this moment, however,
the trenches were swept by such a terrible fire that the new arrivals
gave way and began to retreat. The men of the Scout Detachment rushed
up towards the trenches, but, being unable to stem the retreat, they
themselves retired behind the slopes of the hills lying in rear, and
thence (when Headquarter Hill had been occupied by the Japanese) to
Division Hill.
Colonel Irman galloped up to the retreating men and compelled them to
turn back; but the Japanese opened such a deadly fire from the machine
guns and rifles, that again they turned their backs. At this time our
field artillery swept the captured hills with shrapnel, upon which the
Japanese took cover, and ceased firing on the retreating columns.
I consider it my duty here to mention the names of two of our heroes.
When our men were stopped by Colonel Irman, they suffered such heavy
losses that they again began to retreat, except two men of the 5th
Regiment, Corporal Trusov and Private Molchanov, who got right into the
Japanese trenches; but finding that they were only two, while the enemy
filled the trench, they beat a retreat—not, however, before Molchanov
had killed a Japanese officer. They were both wounded slightly on their
way back, but nevertheless remained in the ranks.
ON BOKOVY HILL (SIDE HILL)[60]
At 10 p.m. on August 13, the sentries on Height 426 reported that
four columns, each two companies strong, were advancing on the hill.
Second-Lieutenant Andreiev immediately sent some sentries out to the
wire entanglement to give him warning when the enemy had descended the
opposite slope and reached the wires.
At eleven o’clock the sentries reported that the Japanese were close at
hand. Volley firing was immediately opened, and Midshipman Doudkin’s
small guns also commenced firing, upon which the Japanese, after
suffering considerable losses, retreated behind the hill.
At midnight they again attacked the hill, but were again repulsed, and
up to 5 a.m. they attacked seven times without any success whatever.
They left piles of bodies in front of and amongst the wire
entanglements.
During the third attack it was seen that a column of two companies had
got through the wire on the right flank. A section of the 2nd Scout
Detachment was immediately sent against them under the command of
Lance-Corporal Noskov, and this section, together with the Baranovski
guns, posted on that flank, and two sections of the 9th Company sent
from 174 Metre Hill, put them to flight.
When day broke, 432 Japanese bodies were counted round the wire
entanglements.
By 7 a.m. half the trenches had been destroyed by the enemy’s
artillery, so that one section had to be withdrawn and posted on the
opposite slope of the hill.
At 9.30 a.m. the Japanese broke through the wire entanglements and got
half-way up the hill, but they were met by fire from the trenches—from
the left flank by volleys from the section of the 2nd Infantry Scout
Detachment, and from the right by volleys from the sailors under the
command of Lieutenant Afanaisev; and, not being able to make any
headway, they retired. At 11 a.m. Second-Lieutenant Andreiev was
wounded, and the command devolved on Lance-Corporal Kobrintsev. Captain
Rotaiski was sent to reinforce, but he did not occupy the trenches,
remaining instead behind their left flank.
During the day the enemy began to increase his efforts against Height
426, and in consequence the reserve was sent for, but did not arrive,
though two companies of the 4th Reserve Battalion were supposed to have
been sent up.
About midday, when the 1st and 2nd sections of the 1st Detachment
were annihilated by artillery fire, a half-company of the reserve
battalion, under a second-lieutenant of the 27th Regiment, arrived and
occupied the right trench, and in the night another half-company, with
a sergeant-major, was sent up with orders to occupy the saddle between
Headquarter Hill and a small hill to the left of it. Firing went on the
whole day, and on the night of August 14–15 the enemy made two attacks,
but only succeeded in one case in getting up to the wire entanglement,
where more than two-thirds of the attacking party were lost.
The hill was captured at midday on August 15. We retreated from the
advanced positions, but were in consequence considerably stronger on
Division Hill, Namako Yama, and 174 Metre Hill, on account of the
reserves concentrated there.
In view of the anticipated attack on these hills, we had to work hard
on them, the more so, as Namako Yama was very weakly fortified. The
trenches were small and unfinished, and the ground solid rock.
If only these trenches had been prepared beforehand, it would have
been quite a different matter. How many lives would have been saved,
and how many attacks beaten back! It is always necessary in a fortress
to prepare defensive positions in peace time, and this can be done
conveniently as part of the training of the troops in garrison.
The fighting on Headquarter Hill cost us somewhat dearly. The Scout
Detachments of the 5th Regiment lost more than half their strength—160
men and one officer (Second-Lieutenant Andreiev); the two naval
companies suffered a loss of 30 men each; the remainder, represented
by companies of the 13th Regiment and of the 4th Reserve Battalion,
were reduced by quite 15 per cent. of their strength. The 11th and
12th Companies at Pan-lung Shan did not have many losses, but three
officers were placed _hors de combat_—Major Katishev being wounded, and
Second-Lieutenant Merkoulev and Ensign Moukin killed.
FOOTNOTES:
[48] See footnote, page 232.
[49] Millet.
[50] “The flatter the trajectory, the better.”
[51] These two forts were on the _Eastern Front_. The author probably
refers to these here as being the only two points in _advance_ of the
main defensive line now left in Russian hands.
[52] A forceful example of the consequences of a badly worded order.
[53] Situated at the extreme left flank of the “Position of the Passes.”
[54] This plea of utter prostration from constant fighting seems to
be a poor excuse for the capture of the forts by the Japanese. The
resistance was, in reality, _most_ stubborn.
[55] It may be noticed that General Tretyakov makes no mention of the
disastrous sortie made by the Russian fleet on August 10.
[56] The Russian name for a knoll at the northern end of Headquarter
Hill. Subsequent reference will be by the name of Advanced Hill.
[57] General Tretyakov’s immediate superior.
[58] Our Official History (Part III.) states that Headquarter Hill was
captured on the 13th, and Height 426 (Bokovy) on the 15th. From this
account it is evident that the former also was not occupied until the
15th.
[59] The Russian name for Headquarter Hill.
[60] The Russian name for Height 426.