Continuing the work of fortifying the various hills—End of the
first general assault, August 22 and 23—Attacks on Namako Yama
from August 24 to September 19.
As soon as Extinct Volcano had been surrendered to the Japanese, I
determined to strengthen our present defences by means of trenches and
wire entanglements, and had the trenches on Namako Yama and Division
Hill extended and deepened accordingly.
I placed the 10th Company in the valley between Extinct Volcano and
Division Hill, hoping thereby to fill up the gap between the hills
occupied by us.
This done, we had next to set to work to fortify Akasaka Yama, taking
the task in hand without a moment’s delay.
I had already commenced a redoubt capable of accommodating one company
on the top of Akasaka Yama, which now required finishing, and, in
addition, it was necessary to build trenches round the hill for five
companies.
Keeping in view the possibility of the enemy breaking through across
Extinct Volcano, I fortified the ground between Fort Yi-tzu Shan
and Riji Hill[71] and made Division Hill and Namako Yama into two
independent commands. We also had to safeguard our communications with
Division Hill and Namako Yama which might be exposed to attack. For all
this work we wanted tools, material, and men, and we were again short
of all three. Luckily, at this difficult time Major Gemmelmann of the
Engineers, as well as several non-commissioned officers, was attached
to me, so I was able to get some sleep at night. I collected a large
store of _matériel_ near the regimental headquarter camp.
After many urgent messages the authorities concerned began to send us
wire, bags (for sand), all sorts of iron and steel, and a few tools,
and, as before, we procured whatever else was wanted from the stores in
the town and from the railway people.
Our regimental horses became quite worn out from hauling heavy
materials, such as beams, planks, rails, etc. We had very few carts and
wagons for carrying these things, as our baggage wagons were mainly
required for bringing up regimental necessaries and stores needed to
meet our daily wants.
It is an extraordinary thing how an important fortress like Port Arthur
could have been left almost without any vehicles for general service,
a want which must be seen and felt to enable one to understand rightly
what sufficient transport means in a fortress, and how indispensable it
is.
Towards the end of the siege a light railway was laid as far up as
my headquarters, but was never worked, probably owing to the want of
trucks. I saw the rails, but trucks were conspicuous by their absence.
A fortress, like an army, must have its own transport and the horses
necessary for it, or, preferably, be provided with good powerful motor
vehicles.
I wanted to construct a splinter-proof observation post for myself and
Colonel Irman on one of our hills, but again for want of transport we
had to remain throughout the siege at an observation station exposed
to the enemy’s fire. We always spent the night at the regimental
headquarters, where Colonel Irman’s staff (he was in command of the
whole of the western front) also stayed. Our quarters were buildings
belonging to the Artillery Headquarters Offices on Red Hill, and a
large marquee pitched there served as a mess-room, in which quite a
number of us sat down to dinner.
We seldom received any official visits from the town, as we were not
out of range of the enemy’s bullets and shell. Two bandsmen were killed
near the building, and two wounded, as was also my orderly, Private
Ravinski.
However, General Nikizhin rode out fairly frequently to sup with
us, and we always looked forward with pleasure to his visits. At
all times in the best of spirits, he was a clever and entertaining
conversationalist, and invariably brought us some piece of interesting
news, so that while he was with us we forgot the monotony of our
existence. From him we learned how things were going on in the other
sections of the fortress, what attacks had been beaten back, and the
latest news of Kuropatkin’s Army.
We used to get through an extraordinary amount of tea, of which the
officers, both regimental and staff, had a plentiful supply, thank God!
Our dinners were, however, becoming somewhat meagre—rice soup and
roast horse-flesh, with rice garnished with rancid butter or tallow.
Supper was of much the same type. Occasionally when the men brought
us up a canteen full of “goltsies” (small, dark fish), which they had
caught in the horse-ponds, we had a regular banquet.
When I went up to take observations from Red Hill I often shot small
birds sitting in the bushes on the slopes of the hill, which we
ate with great relish. I think night-hawks, particularly, are most
delicious, and I do not know why we do not eat more of them in the
ordinary way of living.
There was a small fir-wood behind Red Hill, towards its northern
side, which became my favourite place for resting, and was a splendid
observation point. One could walk through this wood and breathe the
air, heavy with the odour of firs, and at the same time see all the
positions. On a bright sunny day every man on the hills round could be
seen, and the occupations of the various units defending the positions
could be clearly observed. There, on Division Hill, they would be
preparing dinner in the kitchens of the 7th Company; a little to the
left, the dinners of the 6th Company had already been served out; and
along the communication trench a whole company was moving in relief of
our scout detachments on the left flank of Division Hill, who were in
constant touch with the Japanese.
Under Red Hill was a row of small ponds, used as watering places for
the artillery horses. They were a source of real pleasure to our men,
who frequently bathed in them and fished, in spite of bullets and
shells constantly splashing into them.
Everything was quiet on 203 Metre Hill, and I was thankful that the
Japanese were giving us time to fortify it.
There was a harmless bombardment of Forts Yi-tzu Shan and Ta-an-tzu
Shan, all the shells falling short of the former and passing over the
latter.
With what terrific force they burst! The gases are not very noticeable,
nor do they collect in one large puff, but are whirled away in little
streaks scarcely visible to the eye, and then above a cloud of black
smoke is seen.
It was a remarkable thing that where the first shell fell “short,” the
others all fell short likewise; if “over,” then the remainder fell over.
There was a road between Forts Chi-kuan and Ehr-lung. Standing on this
road, one could watch the practice of a certain Japanese gun. The
shells, coming across the road from behind the hill, always struck
in exactly the same place, which was fought shy of by every one, and
this continued throughout the siege, from the beginning to the end.
The soldiers used to joke about it, and say that it was some gunner
calibrating his gun.
Very few shells burst near my walk through the wood. They all fell on
the battery on Red Hill, where Lieutenant Kornilovitch, a most gallant
officer, who came from Kiev to Colonel Petrov’s battery, was killed.
I spent much time in the wood on Red Hill, living again through all
that had passed, and trying not to think of either the present or the
future. I always used to say to the men: “Never think about what is
_going_ to happen to you, but only about what _has_ passed.”
I was frequently accompanied in my walks by our doctor, Theodore
Troitski. He was ever in good spirits and full of jokes, could always
find something interesting to talk about, and so was much sought after.
In my spare time, when everything was quiet, I often used to go to the
dressing station and drink a bottle of stout with Troitski, which he
had managed to get by secret means from some treasured spot. Though
many envied him his privileged position, no one could ever find out
whence he got his stout.
* * * * *
In order to strengthen the positions, we had to construct, in addition
to the trenches, various kinds of obstacles at the most important
points.
The favourite device, and the most effective one, was the wire
entanglement, but there was very little barbed wire in the fortress.
Certainly, an enormous quantity of barbed wire had necessarily been
used for strengthening the main inner defensive line, but when it came
to blocking the intervals between the forts (before our arrival in Port
Arthur) no one seemed to have thought of fortifying 174 Metre Hill.
I do not say this in any spirit of criticism of those who fortified
Port Arthur. Naturally they had to strengthen the main line of defence
first, and they had not sufficient material for 174 Metre Hill as well.
[Illustration: THEODORE SEMENOVITCH TROITSKI, REGIMENTAL DOCTOR,
5TH REGIMENT.
p. 152]
The following were covered by wire entanglements: 203 Metre Hill, the
left flank of Akasaka Yama (a very short piece), the left flank of
Division Hill, and the right flank of Namako Yama. (The space between
Extinct Volcano and Namako Yama was strengthened by planks with spikes
in them.[72]) To prevent the enemy breaking through between Falshivy
Hill[73] and 203 Metre Hill, fougasses were laid, as also between
Akasaka Yama and Namako Yama, and on the left flank of Division Hill.
These fougasses were much dreaded by the Japanese, and for that reason,
perhaps, they did not once attempt to force any of the valleys, but
always elected to climb up the most impossible cliffs.
* * * * *
We had suffered many defeats from August 14, and continued to do
so until September, the Japanese, thanks to their superiority in
artillery, taking hill after hill from us.
Nevertheless, I did not despair, and often consoled General
Kondratenko, pointing out to him that the nearer we drew towards our
main defensive line, the more effective would become our defence, by
reason of the greater facility of communication between the defenders
of the various positions.
Anyway, in the centre,[74] where the main Japanese attacks were
directed, we successfully defended ourselves, and our successes there
raised our spirits considerably.
* * * * *
There were no sheep left. We had eaten them all. We had lamb
occasionally for dinner, cut up into very small portions and served as
tit-bits, but we lived mainly on rice soup.
It was always very hard to get hay for the horses, and very soon it
would become impossible to buy any, and we should have to indent for
it. The Government forage stores had not yet been touched.
We sent Lieutenant Bogdanovitch to Pigeon Bay to get us some fish. He
brought back a good many, but all were rockfish, which none of us would
have looked at a few months before.
As I have already said, on the capture of 174 Metre Hill, we evacuated
Connecting Ridge, which the Japanese immediately occupied and began to
fortify. They also constructed a strong line of trenches designed to
sweep the rear of Namako Yama.
On August 15, I was placed in command of the forts and batteries in the
defensive line from Fort Yi-tzu Shan to Fort Ta-yang-kou North.
I had constantly been on all these positions and forts. Fort Ta-an-tzu
Shan was the only one completed, while Fort Yi-tzu Shan was finished
in the interior, but there were no traverses, and the garrison had to
construct some with the help of sand-bags. There were also no caponiers
in the ditches, and one could come out on to the gorge[75] from the
ditch on the left flank and climb up on to the parapet.
Therefore the men composing the garrison themselves made an open
caponier at the front corner (chief salient), blocking the approach to
it by iron gratings.
Fort Ta-yang-kou North was worked by the garrison throughout the siege.
All that the enemy could see was a gigantic pile of hewn stone, in
front of which was a ditch about 4 sagenes[76] deep, with vertical
escarp and counterscarp cut out of the rock. A bare slope ran down into
this ditch from the entrance of the fort. It was intended to have made
a gate, but, as there was not time to cut it out, any one was free to
come up out of the deep ditch on to this slope, and so, from both sides
of the ditch, straight up through the entrance of the fort. Casemates
or splinter-proofs were entirely wanting. There was also no defence on
the right flank, so that the interior of the fort was plainly visible
from the enemy’s artillery positions. The front face and entrance were
splendidly flanked, but the left flank was taken completely in reverse
by very many Japanese batteries.
With the assistance of some workmen sent up by us the garrison
strengthened the right flank with blindages. In the centre of, and
behind, the entrance a strong bomb-proof was built, sufficiently large
to accommodate the entire garrison. The roof of this bomb-proof was
specially made to withstand shells of large calibre (I myself saw the
damage caused by an 11-inch shell on the right front of a corner of
it, but the bomb-proof itself was not touched). Splinter-proofs for
officers and gun detachments were built under the ramparts, and near
the right flank a large search-light, with a big steam engine, was
placed without any cover whatever.
The space between Forts Yi-tzu Shan and Ta-yang-kou North was covered
by an unbroken line of wire entanglements, supplemented by a large
number of fougasses, and above them again a line of trenches, which
were, however, very shallow and had very thin parapets. We were only
able to complete them after our retreat from 174 Metre Hill to our main
positions.
Threatened from the side of Extinct Volcano, and enfiladed from
Connecting Ridge, Namako Yama was in a dangerous position, the more so,
as the trenches on it were absolutely devoid of overhead cover from
shrapnel fire. It was a good thing that after the capture of 174 Metre
Hill we had constructed long traverses the whole breadth of the hill,
so that the enfilade fire from Connecting Ridge had little effect.
When the rear of Namako Yama began to suffer from the firing from
Connecting Ridge, I posted two quick-firing guns near the road leading
up the hill. They demolished the trenches on Connecting Ridge and
caused the Japanese to stop their annoying and dangerous fusillade. In
order to ensure Namako Yama against night attacks, I blocked the road
running along its rear with a row of fougasses, wire entanglements,
and _chevaux de frise_ made out of planks (an excellent obstacle when
there is no artillery to demolish it). To prevent a turning movement
on the right flank, I laid fougasses there, and extended the trenches
on the right flank of Akasaka Yama, where I posted two companies in
well-constructed trenches.
In spite of all these measures Namako Yama was very weak, as the
trenches were very shallow and unprotected by head cover from shrapnel.
Besides that drawback the near slopes of the hill could not everywhere
be swept by the fire of the defenders, a serious failing when one had
to deal with an enemy such as the Japanese. All this showed me that
Namako Yama was in a very precarious state, although defended by six
companies.
Taking everything into account, I set to work to strengthen the
defences on Akasaka Yama, but want of tools and men delayed the work,
more especially so as we had at the same time to strengthen the
left flank of Division Hill, which was sadly in need of it. It was
possible to see, not only the heads, but even the heels of the riflemen
defending the trenches from the direction of Extinct Volcano. It was
also impossible for us to reach the hill, so we had to dig at least
two long communication trenches. All this required an enormous number
of tools and men, and the difficulty of making fortifications was
increased by the scarcity of everything needed.
It was fortunate that we had an abundance of rain, yielding streams
full of clean, cold, fresh water, and providing bathing and washing
places for nearly every company on the position.
203 Metre Hill and Namako Yama were worse off in this respect. The men
had to go from there to the artillery horse-ponds near the headquarters
of the staff, not accessible without some danger. Second-Lieutenant
Ivanov was wounded in the leg there by a stray bullet. There was,
however, no other less exposed place available.
On August 22 and 23 the Japanese main assault[77] on the centre of
our defensive line was beaten back, the enemy losing very heavily. We
were told that all the slopes of the hills attacked were piled up with
Japanese bodies, and that the stench was becoming unbearable, from
which cause we also suffered, owing to the number of dead on Extinct
Volcano.
When Major Zimmermann was wounded on August 22, I appointed Major
Moskvin, who had been in charge of administration, to command on Namako
Yama. I had great faith in this gallant, energetic officer, and felt
assured that the defence of Namako Yama would be safer in his hands
than in those of any other man, all our own officers being utterly worn
out and requiring immediate rest. Apart from that consideration, they
were nearly all wounded.
About this time the following occurrence took place. Lieutenant Frost,
our paymaster, Captain Felitzin, and Father Vasili Slounin were put
up in my former quarters near the bazaar in the New Town. In the
morning (I do not remember at what time) they had only just got up and
were drinking tea, when a shell burst in the room in which they were
sitting. Captain Felitzin was wounded in the head, as was also Father
Slounin (he had some of his hair singed off), and Lieutenant Frost was
severely wounded in the head, besides receiving several other minor
wounds in the face. Thank God! none of them were killed, and all were
soon quite well again.
[Illustration: FATHER VASILI SLOUNIN, CHAPLAIN OF THE 5TH REGIMENT.
p. 158]
Very many of our horses were killed in our two-wheeled carts and
company wagons while taking supplies up to the positions. The horses
killed were eaten, thus helping to keep up the physical strength of the
rank and file. Many of them did not fancy horse-flesh, but, following
the example of others, they ate it, and felt all the better for it. The
following incident will serve to prove that horse-flesh was eventually
much sought after. I do not remember exactly when it was, but a horse
was killed on one occasion near our staff headquarters. That day, for
want of men, we did not remove the carcass, and in the morning the
horse had gone, a few bloodstains only showing where it had lain. We
learnt afterwards that the men on Red Hill had come over, cut it up
into chunks, and divided it amongst themselves.
* * * * *
I got up very early on August 24, drank a cup of tea, and, seeing that
all was quiet, went to take my constitutional in the wood on Red Hill.
It was a glorious morning, and I could plainly see the men on the
positions going down to wash.
The smoke of the field kitchens rose up into the clear air; it promised
to be a magnificent day.
I cannot remember how long I sat there amongst the fragrant green
trees, but I should have stayed some considerable time if I had not
been hailed from below. Some one called to me to go with Colonel Irman
to Fort Ta-yang-kou North, upon which I quickly descended the hill,
found my horse already saddled, and in a few minutes we had reached the
fort mentioned by the town road. It would not have been safe to have
gone straight across.
About half-way we passed a battery of 42-mm. guns (No. 4 Redoubt).
I pointed out to the commander of this battery the end of a Japanese
trench, where our scouts said there were some Japanese machine guns
which interfered with our sorties. The embrasures for these guns were
plainly visible through glasses.
Our guns were quickly laid on the target, and after a few ranging shots
the shells began to fall with extraordinary accuracy.
The dangerous end of the trench was destroyed, but I think the guns
remained untouched, perhaps because the Japanese, anticipating the
impending bombardment, had removed them to another spot. It would,
however, give them a whole night’s work to put them into position
again. The 42-mm. gun is a very accurate weapon, and it is a pity that
the effect of its high-explosive shell is so slight as to render it
good only for dismounting the enemy’s pieces. The gun is sufficiently
mobile to be capable of quick and sudden concentration on any fully
exposed hostile battery, a contingency which would, however, rarely
occur, as nowadays all batteries are carefully hidden from the enemy’s
view. Pieces, however, of this type are incapable of coping with heavy
guns, and one would not advocate having many of them in a fortress.
Their real place is in reserve, and not in batteries on the main
fighting positions.
The enemy did not fire a single shot in reply to the 42-mm. guns and
we quietly rode on to Fort Ta-yang-kou North, which we reached a few
minutes later.
Everything was quiet at the fort. The men worked steadily and without
hindrance, but there was an enormous amount to be done, the task
undertaken by the garrison being to construct a covered trench as well
as some splinter-proofs. Splinter-proofs for the gun detachments and
officers had already been constructed, so the fort became more or less
self-contained and able to put up a good defence.
Our riflemen had originally been posted outside the fort, but, with the
completion of a large bomb-proof and covered way with traverses inside,
it was possible for them to occupy the real defensive line and live in
the fort. As always, the officers received us gladly, gave us tea, and
then took us on a tour of inspection. Every one was at his post. The
work was going on apace, and Captain Versi, of the Naval Construction
Department, who was superintending the work on the fort, displayed
great energy and resource. The exits from the ditch were covered, and
the flank ditches well enfiladed from both sides.
A large bomb-proof, impervious alike to rifle and shell fire, was being
constructed for the reserve, but the ground was solid rock, and so the
work was slow. We had finished our inspection and were talking to the
commandant in a splinter-proof, when we heard a loud crash, caused by
the bursting of a large Japanese shell somewhere near.
We all followed Colonel Irman out of the shelter. The gun detachments
were working at their guns, laying them on some far-distant point
from which the enemy’s shell had come. It was dangerous to stand in
the open, so with Colonel Irman I ran to the nearest gun, where the
signaller could always give warning of the coming of a shell. Ere the
guns had been correctly laid, the signaller shouted: “Look out!” I
ran quickly down into a traverse with some sailors. The enemy’s shell
screamed over our heads, and burst with a tremendous report on the
traverse of No. 2 gun. In the twinkling of an eye, the sailors were at
their places and the two 6-inch Canet guns[78] roared forth. I jumped
up to see where our shells fell, and clearly saw two puffs of smoke
on a very far-distant hill, right behind the Japanese positions. “Do
you mean to say there is anything there?” I said to the gun captain
of No. 1 gun. “Yes, sir, it is there all right, we noticed it a long
time ago.” Again the signaller shouted: “Look out!” and we again rushed
under cover while the shell shrieked over us, but this time it went a
long way over and burst somewhere behind the fort. Almost before it had
struck, the sailors were at their guns and two more shells were sent
towards the same spot, and then other forts joined in adding to the
death and destruction.
This artillery duel continued for a long time. We alternately came
out to observe and ran back under cover. Colonel Irman was much more
indifferent to danger than I was. It seemed to me that my position
behind the traverse was not a particularly safe one, and I decided to
change it for a bomb-proof. At the next shout of “Look out!” I put my
idea into execution, but with unfortunate results. A number of men
rushed with me towards the point of safety, we tumbled one on top of
the other, and I found myself among those who had not time to get into
the bomb-proof before the enemy’s shell fell behind us, burst with a
deafening report, and buried us in smoke, stones, and dust.
Luckily, none of us were badly hurt, but I had a large bruise on my
back to carry away with me as a memento of the occasion.
We had paid no attention to the other hills during this bombardment,
but now we saw that the Japanese were evidently preparing for something
very important.
When peace reigned again on Fort Ta-yang-kou North, we noticed that
203 Metre Hill was wreathed in smoke from bursting shell. Apparently,
instead of the usual daily allowance of two or three dozen shell, the
Japanese had already expended more than a hundred rounds on it. This
caused us much anxiety, and we galloped off as hard as we could go to
the position of the staff. When we arrived, we received a message from
203 Metre Hill from Major Stempnevski to the effect that the enemy
was sweeping the hill with artillery, and that the left flank of our
trenches had suffered severely from shell fire.
Namako Yama was also being heavily bombarded, and it was evident that
an assault was imminent. It would be difficult to hold this hill, as
it was swept from front to rear and from flank to flank. We could
hear very heavy firing from the north-eastern section too, where the
situation was evidently even more serious than with us. Namako Yama
was fairly strongly held by six companies.[79] On the right flank were
two 6-inch guns and one quick-firing gun, with Lieutenant Kolmakov in
command. On 203 Metre Hill there were only two companies, the 2nd and
4th of the 5th Regiment, and two quick-firing guns (I do not count the
two short 6-inch guns, as they had been silenced long before). Fearing
for the safety of 203 Metre Hill, I sent another company there from the
reserve.
Compared with other points, the position of the defenders there was
serious. Food could only be taken up to them at night, and there being
no water at all on the hill, that had to be carried up at night also.
It was impossible for any one to show himself on the skyline. As the
enemy was within a stone’s-throw of the defenders, eight patrols of six
men each had to be furnished at night. There were no junior officers in
the companies, and gun ammunition was very scarce.
Foreseeing the capture of 174 Metre Hill, we had actually begun to
fortify Namako Yama on August 11. The work itself was very heavy,
besides which the rocky nature of the soil and the want of tools
hampered us greatly. A battery for two long 6-inch guns had been
previously constructed on the hill and a road made leading up to
it. The men only worked at night, as it would have been madness to
do so in the daytime in face of the enemy’s heavy fire. It was even
dangerous to move about, and every day we had several men killed there.
The total number of defenders amounted to about 500 men. By day one
section out of each company was in the trenches and furnished sentries
for observation purposes, while three sections slept behind the slope
of the road, which ran the whole length of the hill, where small
splinter-proofs had been made out of planks. After dinner at night the
garrison of the post started work, covering itself with a line of
outposts.
On the night of August 25–26 I was awakened by heavy rifle firing in
the direction of Division Hill. Soon an orderly galloped up with the
report that the Japanese were climbing up Namako Yama. I threw on my
clothes and galloped off towards Namako Yama, ordering two reserve
companies, posted near the regimental staff quarters, to proceed there
immediately.
Having reached a spur of Akasaka Yama, I began to watch the battle.
The weather was as bad as it could be, a strong wind was blowing, and
it was raining as well. I felt quite confident, knowing that if the
enemy had not succeeded in coming up unobserved and taking our men by
surprise, he would certainly be beaten back.
At this time our batteries opened fire, at Colonel Irman’s orders, on
the valley in front of Namako Yama, and the whole foreground was lit up
by our star-rockets. In another half-hour our reserve companies came
up, and Colonel Irman also arrived.
Several wounded men who were being carried back from the hill told us
that the Japanese had not climbed up any farther, but were firing from
below, which meant they had been driven off.
In half an hour the firing ceased, and Major Moskvin reported that the
assault had been beaten back with heavy losses to the enemy, who tried
to take us by surprise, but was discovered in good time by the standing
sentries, whose warnings had given our men time to get to their posts.
We had 4 men killed and 16 wounded.
After this attack we made a communication trench from the road above
along the hill to the advanced trenches, because all our casualties had
occurred as our men were running to occupy their trenches.
On the night of September 1–2 the Japanese again tried to take Namako
Yama by surprise, but were driven off by rifle fire and retreated
behind 174 Metre Hill after suffering heavily. We had Lieutenant
Afanaisev and 6 sailors wounded.
For the repulse of these two night attacks, Major Moskvin received the
thanks of the General Officer Commanding, in General Orders, and he and
a number of other officers were recommended for rewards, but they never
got them, owing to the list of rewards recommended being lost.
After these attacks Colonel Irman and I proceeded to Namako Yama on a
visit of inspection, as the Japanese had evidently chosen it as their
point of attack.
This inspection left me with a very bad impression. The trenches were
still very shallow, of overhead cover there was practically none, and
the enemy had posted some batteries behind 174 Metre Hill and on the
slopes of the hills in front of it at a very short range from us; but
our men were in splendid spirits, in spite of the constant heavy fire.
On September 8 the company of Marines on the right flank was relieved
by No. 7 Company of the 28th Regiment. This company had not shown up
very well during the fighting on 174 Metre Hill, but I had no other
unit to send up, and I thought that it would be anxious to redeem its
reputation.
From September 8 to 17, things were fairly quiet on Namako Yama, but
at the dinner hour, about twelve o’clock, on the 17th, the Japanese
(about one company) made a rush from Extinct Volcano against the right
flank of Namako Yama, and captured the trench occupied by the 7th
Company of the 28th Regiment without firing a shot. The men of the
company were having their dinners at the moment, and had not time to
seize their arms before the Japanese were in the trench. Hearing of
this by telephone from Division Hill, I immediately telephoned an order
that the Japanese were to be driven out of the trench, and received an
answer to the effect that Major Moskvin had ordered the 7th Company
to reoccupy their trench without delay. This company, however, proved
unequal to the task.
An attack by the 1st Company of Marines was also not wholly successful,
as, though a part of the right flank of the trench was retaken, the
Japanese held the other end, and blocked it with rocks and sand-bags.
Alarmed at such a state of affairs, I went with Colonel Irman to the
hill. I personally inspected the place where the Japanese were lodged.
They did not show themselves at all, and there was not a sign of life
anywhere. They had built up a strong barricade, so high that a man
could not climb up it without the help of another.
We could easily have dislodged them with hand grenades, but we had
none. It was absolutely essential that we should drive them out, and as
it seemed to me that it could best be done at night, I gave orders to
that effect accordingly. For some reason, however, the attack did not
come off, the commandant contenting himself with fortifying a small
knoll on the right flank of the Japanese.
On the morning of September 18 the enemy opened such a terrific fire
on the hill with rifles and five guns that came into action at a very
short range, that all our trenches were knocked to pieces, and we
suffered heavy losses.
On this day that splendid officer, Captain Saltovski, commanding the
9th Company, was killed, and the company itself lost 26 killed and 49
wounded.
The enemy attacked the hill during the day and captured the advanced
trenches of our 9th Company, but the gallant fellows, quite unaided,
reassembled on the crest-line, charged with the bayonet, and recaptured
their ruined trenches. The hill was in a hopeless plight. Surrounded on
all sides, it was an impossible position.
Colonel Irman and I sent a report to this effect to General
Kondratenko, and then rode off to Akasaka Yama to observe and discuss
the chances of holding the hill if it continued to be deluged with such
a fearful fire from all sides.
Apparently there were sufficient men to defend the hill. To send up
reinforcements only meant subjecting them to the enemy’s deadly fire,
as all cover had been demolished, and, moreover, the commandant did not
ask for help, although expecting an attack every moment.
The Japanese concentrated under the hill in considerable numbers,
concealing themselves very cleverly in the folds of the ground.
However, we moved the reserve nearer the hill, but kept the 10th
Company, which was placed on the right flank of Akasaka Yama, in its
former position. Thus the whole day passed. Our 9th Company fought
minus officers. The _moral_ of the troops under this deadly fire was
extraordinary. Towards evening the firing died down, dinners were sent
up to the men, and one company (the 12th of the 13th Regiment, I think)
was sent as a reinforcement to help to hold the place during the night.
Early on the morning of September 19 Colonel Irman and I proceeded
to our observation station. Firing had already commenced, especially
against 203 Metre Hill and Namako Yama. We received a report that the
Japanese were moving in force against these hills, so we expected an
attack on both of them simultaneously. I therefore moved my reserves
to the hollow behind Akasaka Yama, so that they should be under my
hand and easily despatched to either 203 Metre Hill or Namako Yama.
The situation was unchanged, but our men were suffering severely from
the artillery fire. Hence we came to the conclusion that the Japanese
intended to leave things as they were, and compel us to evacuate the
hill without making an attack.
Towards evening Colonel Irman and I became convinced that the Japanese
did not intend to attack, as I had received no reports to the contrary
from the hills. The only report sent in by Major Moskvin was to the
effect that he was organizing an attack on the trenches occupied by the
Japanese, and that, by enfilade fire from the left of the hill, he had
annihilated 1,000 Japanese who had been lying down under 203 Metre Hill.
I was delighted at this success. About 6 p.m. Captain Sirotko, of the
Frontier Guard, who was attached to my regiment, joined me on Akasaka
Yama. I immediately sent him to command our 9th Company on Namako Yama.
In the evening the firing again slackened, dinners were sent up, and
a reinforcement of one company of the Reserve Battalion detailed for
assisting in the night’s work. That night I inspected the works on
203 Metre Hill and Namako Yama. Those on the former were practically
undamaged, but on the latter all were destroyed. I spent the night with
my orderlies in a ravine behind the 10th Company, in the dug-out of the
officer commanding the 10th Company, and slept for three hours.
FOOTNOTES:
[71] Meaning Red Hill; situated right in the rear of 203 Metre Hill.
[72] Compare with Official History, Part III., p. 31.
[73] Meaning False Hill (south-east of and closely adjoining 203 Metre
Hill).
[74] This refers to the north-eastern section of the defence. The
Japanese captured the East and West Pan-lung Redoubts, but obtained no
other advantage for a total loss of 15,000 men. Hence the “successfully
defended.” (See Map III.)
[75] Rear part of work.
[76] A sagene is about 7 feet.
[77] Chiefly directed against the East and West Pan-lung Redoubts. (See
Map III.)
[78] These guns were taken from the ships of the fleet, and were manned
by naval gunners.
[79] See p. 136.