Night alarm during the march to Nan-kuan-ling—Disappearance
of the baggage train—Continuation of the retreat towards Port
Arthur—Occupation and fortification of the “Position of the
Passes”—Japanese attacks on the position on July 26, 27, and
28—Capture of Yu-pi-la-tzu and Lao-tso Shan—General retirement
to new positions, July 29.
I had hardly gone two versts from the bivouac, when we heard firing
behind us. A moment afterwards a vague noise reached us, soon
distinctly recognized as the rumbling of a baggage wagon. In another
minute it had rattled past us at full speed. Behind it galloped a field
battery scattering or destroying all that came in its way, and after
the battery came a hurtling mass of wagons, mounted men, riderless
horses, and unarmed men, and, to make matters worse, somebody raised
the alarming cry of “Japanese cavalry! Japanese cavalry!”
The din and confusion were awful, and from the bivouacs behind us shots
and volleys were heard. Together with the other officers near me I
rushed to the rear of the column to restore order. I also ordered our
band to strike up a march, and, thank God, its martial strains restored
confidence among the fugitives—the noise ceased, and the men became
quite calm and collected.
The band played all the way to Nan-kuan-ling,[32] and we were saved
further panics in consequence.
Having been shown where to bivouac, I sent to the baggage train for
bread, tea, and sugar, but alas! the baggage was not to be found. What
was to be done? Our men had had neither food nor drink all day. Tents
and great-coats had been left on the field of battle, so that the men
had nothing but their rifles and cartridges with them. We started to
hunt for food.
I sent, of course, to the railway station. We saw through the window
that all the rooms were packed with officers of every regiment, and the
staff of the 4th Division was there too. Having forced my way into the
buffet, I approached Lieutenant-Colonel Dmetrevski, the chief of staff
of the 4th Division, who, in answer to my question, “Where has our
baggage train been sent?” told me that it had been sent straight into
Port Arthur by General Fock’s order, and he could not say where it was
now. The commanders of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Regiments were there
too. I asked the first of these for 200 poods[33] of bread, a quantity
of which I saw loaded up on some wagons standing close at hand. In an
hour we had unloaded them and distributed the bread, each man getting
about 4 lb. I had a piece about that weight, as had also all the other
officers; of meat, there was absolutely none to be had.
All available articles of food in the buffet had been eaten before our
arrival, but I succeeded in getting some salt wherewith to flavour my
bread.
Having slept for three hours on the bare ground, we got up to resume
our march. No one molested us during the night; the morning broke cold
and foggy.
According to the “order of march” we should have been at the head of
the column, but some regiment forestalled us, and we had to wait nearly
an hour before making a start.
At about midday we reached a pass in the hills, well lined with
trenches, and, after making a short halt in the pass itself, we pushed
on, marching at a good pace.
At the instance of General Fock the mountain road had been repaired
at an earlier date, and now did us sterling service, but, hard as we
went, we did not overtake our baggage, and the whole of that day we had
nothing but the bread procured at Nan-kuan-ling from the 14th Regiment.
We spent the night in a picturesque defile, and perforce lay down to
sleep on empty stomachs.
On May 28 we overtook an enormous train of baggage from Dalny,[34]
accompanied by the male inhabitants of the town, with their women,
children, and household goods. As the horses in the wagons were
wretchedly small, the train had to come to a standstill, blocking the
road from end to end.
We went round by a narrow side road, and in the evening reached the
great Shipinsin Pass,[35] where at last we overtook our baggage.
Now in high spirits, we bivouacked, cooked our suppers, ate them
ravenously, and slept the sleep of the just.
On the following day, May 29, we began to ascend the pass, which,
thanks to our excellent horses, our baggage train speedily traversed,
and although at midnight we lost our way, owing to bad maps, we
eventually reached the outskirts of Port Arthur and halted at the
village of Pa-li-chuang, where we had been ordered to rest for three
days.
General Stessel visited the regiment the following day. The companies
quickly formed up near the bivouacs, and the general rode round them
all and thanked them for their splendid behaviour. The men felt
tremendously encouraged, many of them having laboured under the dire
impression that we had committed a crime by surrendering Nan Shan to
the enemy.
General Stessel called to the front all those wounded who had remained
in the ranks, in order to address them, and to bestow praise and
rewards in the shape of the Cross of St. George. There were, however,
so many of them (more than 300) that the general thought it was
impossible to get so many crosses; he therefore ordered the doctor to
inspect them and separate the badly from the slightly wounded. There
were sixty of the former category, and they were given St. George’s
crosses accordingly. These were the sole recipients of rewards for the
Nan Shan battle, those slightly wounded receiving nothing for their
bravery—and the number of such was great.
I have already mentioned the fact that our men came away with only
their rifles, most of the tents and great-coats having been left on the
field of battle. It was fortunate that just before the battle we had
transported the bulk of our stores into Port Arthur, where they had
been deposited in Captain Preegorovski’s house, which had been hired
for the purpose. We brought all we wanted out of Port Arthur without
delay, and distributed the necessaries among the men. At the same time
we drove out with us a large herd of cattle, amounting to about 200
head.
I forgot to mention that our ordinary military anxieties on the Nan
Shan position had been augmented by the worry due to an order to
collect all the cattle belonging to the inhabitants and to drive them
to the rear of the position. Some officials, supplied with money, were
sent out for this purpose, but as they could not effect their object
without the assistance of the regiment, the whole burden of the work
fell upon us.
Unfortunately, the order was given when the enemy was already in touch
with us, but we managed to collect about 1,000 head and drove them to
the rear of the army, almost into Port Arthur.
After three days’ rest we moved into Port Arthur and stopped in a
village near Serotka Hill,[36] forming the reserve of the 4th Division,
which took up the position Shuang-tai-kou, Yu-pi-la-tzu, Chien Shan,
and Lao-tso Shan.[37]
[Illustration: VIEW OF THE COUNTRY AT THE POSITION OF THE PASSES.
IN THE DISTANCE ON THE LEFT ARE SEEN THE PEAKS OF
CHIEN SHAN.
p. 66]
The 4th Division had been reinforced by a detachment of mixed companies
of the 7th Division, under the command of Colonel Semenov, and it was
this detachment that occupied Lao-tso Shan. I do not know exactly what
they had done amiss, but I remember it was commonly said that the mixed
companies were not to be depended upon, which is not to be wondered at,
seeing that they had no stiffening of seasoned troops. The commanders
of the companies did not know their own men, nor had the men any
knowledge of their commanders. No one felt responsible for the actions
of the different units. This organization was considered a huge mistake
on General Kondratenko’s part; but, however that may be, the position
in question was held by us from the time of its occupation, on May 31,
till July 28, in spite of the fact that it had not previously been
fortified.
During this time the 5th Regiment was divided into two parts, and I was
put in command of the left flank of the defence, and began to fortify
the position on 174 Metre Hill and the country in front of it, as also
the western side of Feng-huang Shan[38] from the Great Mandarin road to
Eight Ships’ Bay. Stationed along the shore of the latter was Captain
Sakatski’s detachment, and two other detachments were on the banks of
Louisa Bay, both under my command, the former having with it four small
naval guns under Midshipman Doudkin.
Our 6th and 7th Companies occupied and fortified Feng-huang Shan from
the Great Mandarin road up to Major Sakatski’s detachment. Our three
scout detachments occupied and fortified the 174 Metre and Headquarter
Hills, and also Height 426.[39] The 3rd and 9th Companies occupied 174
Metre Hill, while the 2nd and 4th held 203 Metre Hill. They all worked
hard at their fortifications under the supervision of their officers,
in accordance with orders given by me.
174 Metre Hill had to be fortified as strongly as possible, as, having
once captured that, the enemy could sweep our extremely weak western
front, occupy the valley stretching in the direction of the New Town,
and command the latter and the bay.
The other companies of the regiment were quartered in various positions
near. At times when the advanced regiments behind Feng-huang Shan were
threatened, the 5th Regiment served as the reserve for the different
sections of the advanced line.
Our work advanced slowly, because we had very few tools.
Besides fortifying the position, I had to build shelters for the
reserves and stores for small-arm ammunition in the fortress itself.
I detailed two companies of the 7th Division for this work, utilizing
all the material we could find in the town. Having no sapper officer
with me, I had personally to supervise everywhere—on the advanced
positions as well as in the town. It was a great help that the officers
of the 5th Regiment were, thanks to constant practice, excellent
sappers.
We could only obtain tools with great difficulty and from various
sources. Most of them we got from Colonel Grigorenko, commanding the
Engineers in the fortress, and from the railway authorities.
The number of men given me to carry out the work which I had been
ordered to do was insufficient, so I asked if I could employ the whole
of my regiment. I received permission early in June, and moved the
regimental staff to Division Hill, where we made ourselves very snug,
pitching a huge marquee and getting our field kitchen into working
order.
Generals Kondratenko, Smirnov, and Stessel came out to us fairly
frequently. Our work progressed rapidly, as we had got over the tool
difficulty, but we had very few barrows, etc., for transporting the
earth.
A stubborn defence having been determined upon, it was necessary to
construct a great number of splinter-proofs as well as shelters for
ourselves and our kitchens; and for this we needed an abundant supply
of beams and planks.
Besides this activity we had constantly to send detachments to the
advanced positions held by the regiments of the 4th Division.
Other regiments continually borrowed the tools I had collected, but did
not return them.
I frequently went on long personal reconnoitring tours, during which
I made myself acquainted with the advanced positions and their
fortifications.
It seems that General Fock expected that the Japanese would most
probably attack our position across the flat stretch of country
between the hills and the sea. In any case, he paid most attention to
fortifying this particular part of the position. To me, however, it was
very clear how difficult it would be to attack a fortified position
across the open under effective gun and rifle fire. Not even taking
into account the Japanese love of hill-fighting, it was obvious that
the hills were by far the best point of attack, and these General Fock
wished to have defended only by the scout detachments.
Here the defenders were deprived of their strongest weapon, viz.
distant, and even close, rifle and artillery fire. As to the
assailants, numerical superiority and the power of initiative gave
the Japanese tremendous advantage in the hills, the more so, as our
position was very much extended, covering about 8 versts for five
regiments of three battalions each (about 10,000 men). The Japanese
guns could, moreover, demolish our trenches, whereas our artillery
could not find any targets.
When I inspected the position at the beginning of July, I noticed that
the position at Shuang-tai-kou (between the hills and the sea) was
splendidly fortified (the trenches were deep, with a magnificent field
of fire), but the hills were left entirely without fortifications.
I rode down into Yu-pi-la-tzu, where there were two scout
detachments-of what regiment, I do not remember. There were no trenches
and, above all, no cover from gun fire. This was a great mistake,
as the whole of the enemy’s artillery fire might be directed on
Yu-pi-la-tzu, and our men driven out of it, after which the Japanese
could occupy the hill without loss.
Having ascended the hill, a magnificent panorama met the eye. The whole
country as far as Dalny and the bay beyond lay before one as the lines
on the palm of the hand, and in the daytime every single movement of
the enemy could be noted.
[Illustration: THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF YU-PI-LA-TZU.
p. 70]
Yu-pi-la-tzu Hill was a very important point. If we lost it, we should
have to retreat to the Shipinsin Pass.[40] But the enemy did not hurry
matters. Having come within long-range rifle fire from the hills (as
was to have been expected, he paid no attention to the low-lying
ground), he dug trenches and set to work to lay his plans with
deliberation. From the moment of his first coming into touch with
us, at the beginning of May, till July 26, he pressed our right flank,
and compelled us to change our position, and on the 26th commenced his
attack on the entire hill section.
The 5th Regiment was moved up to act in support. Some time before
this our 3rd Battalion had been sent to the right flank to Lao-tso
Shan, where we lost two excellent officers, Captain Koudriavtsev and
Lieutenant Popov.
The 3rd Battalion had to bear the brunt of the retreat from Lao-tso
Shan, since, as had been expected, the mixed companies on the right
flank did not distinguish themselves when it came to fighting.
On July 20 my 2nd Battalion was directed to go to 11th Verst
station[41] to the headquarters of the 4th Division, and there it went
accordingly, under the command of Major Stempnevski (jun.).
When the enemy began his decisive attack on the 26th, I was moved up
with the 1st Battalion, which was then commanded by Major Stempnevski
(sen.), a splendid all-round officer. I arrived with my battalion
in the morning and found all our commanders with the divisional
staff—Generals Stessel, Fock, and Kondratenko. The battle was raging
along the whole line.
As all the positions were divided into sections, and each section had
its commander, I was free to become a spectator of all that was going
on. We went by train to 11th Verst, and had only just got down out
of the carriages, when the 1st Scout Detachment, under Lieutenant
Kostoushko, was ordered to move on Yu-pi-la-tzu Hill, where the
defenders had been decimated by the ceaseless artillery fire.
The 1st Battalion was then moved to the Shipinsin Pass, where, judging
by the artillery fire, a determined attack was in preparation, and only
our 7th and 8th Companies were left with the regimental staff.
General Fock directed the whole defence.
The fighting of July 26 and 27 did not cost us very dearly, except for
severe wounds received by Lieutenant Kostoushko (a wound in the chest,
and a number of other wounds in the left shoulder and side). This
officer had thrown himself, with a part of his scouts, on the enemy,
who had already seized some of our trenches on Yu-pi-la-tzu Hill. This
was on the night of July 27–28.
Towards evening on the 26th, General Stessel had sent a telegram to the
town saying that all the attacks of the Japanese had been unsuccessful
that day.
On the 27th the battle was again renewed along the whole line. Lao-tso
Shan was swept by the fire of very heavy guns—probably 6-inch, judging
from the size of the shell bursts. It was very difficult for our
artillery to cope with these guns, as they were not only very far off,
but also well concealed.
Having nothing to do, I went to my 1st Battalion, which was drawn up as
a reserve on the declivity of the Shipinsin Pass. Scarcely any shells
burst near us; they all went “over,” shattering the rocky sides of a
ravine lying behind.
Our battery on the pass itself was literally swept with Japanese shell,
and there was a continuous roar of musketry fire, under which our men
were, however, perfectly calm, and even joked about the bad shooting of
the Japanese gunners. Though this went on all day, the defence stood
firm the whole time.
[Illustration: TRIPLE PEAK, WHERE THE MEN ARE STANDING. IN THE
DISTANCE ON THE LEFT IS YU-PI-LA-TZU HILL.
p. 73]
However, things went badly for us on Yu-pi-la-tzu Hill. The Japanese
crawled up its abnormally steep sides on to the hill-top itself.
All shelter had been destroyed by artillery fire, and a corner
of a casemate had fallen in and crushed the officer commanding,
Lieutenant-Colonel Goosakov, whose loss every one felt keenly. (It is
opportune to mention here that he was the only staff officer who helped
me to organize the defence of the rearward position which covered our
retreat from Nan Shan.) At this period of the conflict the defenders
concentrated behind stones and ruined trenches, with the enemy only a
few paces from them.
The staff officers shouted out that Yu-pi-la-tzu had to be abandoned,
as its further defence would only cause us enormous losses, because the
trenches no longer gave cover from the effects of Shimose and shrapnel.
Since, however, the majority were against giving up this important
hill, which was such an excellent observation point, the commanders
decided to rebuild the trenches during the night and continue the
defence.
At four o’clock in the afternoon our 8th Company was sent to
Yu-pi-la-tzu Hill with as many tools as could be found, to reconstruct
the old, and make new, trenches. Captain Sakarov, late commandant of
Dalny, who built the railway and port there, was put in command.
(After leaving Dalny, this excellent officer decided to leave
the Port Arthur Fortress Sapper Company, which was commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Jerebtsov.) The Japanese met with practically no
success on this day, and we held on to all our positions.
Very early on the morning of the 28th, being awakened by a terrific
cannonade, I got up and went to headquarters, where I found all the
staff officers already up. In order the better to watch the course of
the action, General Stessel, with some of his staff, had gone to the
top of the nearest hill, and thither I repaired also. General Fock
remained with the telephones, keeping all his staff with him (he had
new adjutants; the old ones, Captain Kvitkin and, subsequently, Captain
Yarsevitch, had rejoined their units).
On reaching the top of the hill, a magnificent panorama of the hill
country lay before us. The crest nearest us, which was occupied by
our troops, was completely wreathed with puffs of white smoke. In
some places the smoke spread over an enormous extent and curled high
up into the air. It lay thickest over Lao-tso Shan, for the heaviest
types of shell were constantly bursting there, and the sky was dotted
with little round white clouds from bursting shrapnel. At the same time
the attentive and well-trained ear could distinguish the ceaseless
far-distant roll of rifle fire, due to the rattle of musketry along the
line occupied by us.
Our 1st Battalion had not yet come into action, but was to be seen as a
black spot near a zigzag in the road leading to the Shipinsin Pass.
We stayed about a quarter of an hour on the hill, and then went down
to the telephones (one can follow an action better from near the
telephones, even though they are placed lower down, as in this case).
It is a pity that they did not think of putting them in a place where
it was possible to see the battle with one’s own eyes as well as hear
reports, as, for example, on the top of the hill we had just left.
General Fock met us below, and at once gave General Stessel full
details of all that had taken place. Our men had stood firm everywhere,
except on Yu-pi-la-tzu Hill, where things were going badly with us.
It was a physical impossibility to hold on there, in spite of the new
trenches, on account of the artillery fire concentrated on the hill.
Hence it was decided to abandon Yu-pi-la-tzu, and orders were sent
there accordingly.
When this decision had been arrived at, General Fock said, in his
short, sharp way of speaking: “Well, it is impossible to hold on to
Yu-pi-la-tzu. It would entail too heavy losses. Even if the companies
there left it of their own accord, it would be nothing serious; but to
give up Lao-tso Shan, that would be a disgrace, almost amounting to
treachery.” He had only just said this, when news came that Lao-tso
Shan had been evacuated by the troops holding it. “Now we shall have
to make a general retreat,” said General Fock, and he gave orders to
retire and to take up a new position with the right flank at Ta-ku
Shan—the centre near 11th Verst, and the left on Feng-huang Shan.
In order to give the line cohesion, my left flank (Captain Sakatski’s
detachment) was put at the disposal of the officer commanding the 15th
Regiment. I had to occupy without delay the spur of 174 Metre Hill, as
well as that hill itself and 203 Metre Hill, and also Division Hill
and the crest of Pan-lung Shan lying in front of it. The 5th Regiment
thus filled up the gap between Forts Yi-tzu Shan and Ta-yang-kou North,
which had long ago been prepared by us. The staff, with General Stessel
at its head, collected in the building occupied by the staff of the 4th
Division (a station at 11th Verst) and quietly waited there until the
regiments had taken up their allotted positions.
Notwithstanding the statements of certain war-correspondents, I saw no
signs of any panic or disorder during this retirement. Every one was
perfectly calm, and the army withdrew to its new positions correctly
and without any confusion.
Suddenly there appeared in the valley to our right a Red-Cross train
full of wounded, a sight which always impresses one; there was a long
stream of wagons, accompanied by bearer-company men, doctors, and those
of the wounded who were able to walk. Behind this train appeared a
reserve column. At that depressing moment I remembered how our band had
put new spirit into us during the night alarm near the Nan-kuan-ling
Hills, and felt a desire to repeat the experiment.
So, having obtained permission from General Stessel, I sent for the
band, which was bivouacked near the railway station, and soon the
strains of a stirring march crashed out over those hills, dark with
death and blood. The retreating army formed into columns, and, picking
up the step by the band, swung past General Stessel. This march-past
continued for nearly an hour under the very eyes of the enemy. Our
splendid 3rd Battalion was the last to go past, bearing with it the
body of Captain Kvitkin, General Fock’s former A.D.C. The 5th Regiment
had lost altogether 2 officers and 60 men. They had borne the whole
brunt of the Japanese final attacks, and had covered the retreat of
the other regiments, presenting an impregnable front throughout every
attack.
It is obvious from the foregoing details that the retreat from Lao-tso
Shan was made in perfect order.
The following is a description of the action of our companies on
Lao-tso Shan:
The positions occupied[42] by the regiment were as follows:
The detachment of Colonel Dounin, commanding the 3rd Battalion 5th
Regiment, consisting of the 5th, 6th, 9th, 11th, and 12th Companies,
and the 2nd and 3rd Scout Detachments of the 5th Regiment and the 1st
Company of the 27th, was posted before the battle on Lao-tso Shan, and
occupied the section from the valley (near the small hill occupied by
the 11th Company of the 27th Regiment) to a spur 3/4 verst from the
village of Vodymin[43] and touching the foot of Chien Shan.
The various companies occupied the following sections:
1. The 9th Company and 3rd Scout Detachment 5th Regiment, on the right
flank in the valley.
2. Next to these the 2nd Scout Detachment, to the left of the valley
and covering Lieutenant Naoomov’s battery.
3. Farther to the left, the 12th Company 5th Regiment.
4. On the extreme left flank, near Vodymin, the 11th Company 5th
Regiment and, as a reserve, the 1st Company 27th Regiment.
5. The 5th and 6th Companies 5th Regiment formed the general reserve.
On the morning of the 26th the Japanese opened a heavy gun fire on our
positions, followed by a vigorous attack, but they obtained no hold
anywhere that day, as our men held on to their positions and beat them
back at every point.
On the 27th the Japanese repeated their attacks, but had no more
success than on the preceding day, whereupon they proceeded to make a
night attack.
Some companies to the right of Colonel Dounin retreated without firing
a shot, and so hurriedly, that they failed to inform the companies on
either side of them.
The Japanese rushed into the gap thus created, and, working round to
the rear, began to pour a flanking fire into the other companies,
who were ignorant of what had happened, and had remained in their
positions. Taken by surprise, these companies lost their heads in turn
and retreated, also without informing their neighbours. In this manner
the gap grew rapidly until it extended to Colonel Dounin’s troops, when
the following became the position of affairs:
The 9th Company and 3rd Scout Detachment of the 5th Regiment occupied
the valley, being in touch on the right with the 11th Company 27th
Regiment. The 3rd Scout Detachment formed the outpost line, with the
9th in reserve behind it.
About three o’clock[44] on the morning of the 28th the piquet on the
right, which was keeping touch with the 11th Company, reported that a
retreat was in progress on that side.
Captain Koudriavtsev, commanding the 9th Company, sent an orderly to
the hill occupied by the 11th Company to find out what was going on
there. The orderly returned immediately and reported that the 11th
Company had gone, that a small body of Japanese was occupying the
hill, and that reinforcements were coming up to them. At first Captain
Koudriavtsev did not believe this, and wanted to send a more reliable
man, but just at that moment shots rang out from the hill in the
direction of the 9th Company and 3rd Scout Detachment, and Captain
Koudriavtsev’s doubts were dispelled. He consulted with Lieutenant
Choulkov, commanding the 3rd Scout Detachment, and they came to the
conclusion that it would be unreasonable to try and hold the position
and defend the valley with the Japanese on the hill above. They
therefore determined to go up with the 9th Company before daybreak,
while there were not many Japanese on the hill, retake it, and, having
got possession of it, re-establish communication with the troops on the
right, and thus fill in the gap that had been left in the line. Arrived
at this decision, Captain Koudriavtsev arranged with Lieutenant
Choulkov that they should support each other, and if either had to
retreat, he would immediately inform the other, and, in order to avoid
misunderstandings, written messages only were to be accepted. Captain
Koudriavtsev then told Lieutenant Choulkov to remain in his present
position with the 3rd Scout Detachment and await his orders, while he
himself, with half the 9th Company, started to make the attack, the
other half of the 9th Company being left meanwhile under Acting Ensign
Shishkin with orders to follow him as a reserve.
In spite of the terrible fire with which the Japanese met the attackers
Captain Koudriavtsev with his half-company reached the trenches, and
with a wild “hurrah” rushed in with the bayonet. The blow fell partly
on the Japanese flank. A hand-to-hand fight ensued. Unfortunately,
Captain Koudriavtsev was killed, and Sergeant-Major Evlanov wounded
as he was mounting the hill; many of the men also were placed _hors
de combat_, and the remainder, not feeling themselves strong enough
to overpower the enemy, began to retreat, carrying with them the body
of their dead captain. In the darkness our men did not retreat back
along the line of their advance, nor towards the 3rd Scout Detachment
and the reserve, but in the direction in which the other companies had
retreated previously. The reserve half of the 9th Company, not knowing
what had happened, but guessing from the direction of the firing and
the noise of moving men that the 1st half-company had retired, and
being met, moreover, by a heavy rifle fire themselves, began to
retreat in the same direction. Acting Ensign Shishkin, unfortunately,
did not think of telling Lieutenant Choulkov what had happened, and the
latter awaited word from Captain Koudriavtsev, as had been arranged. In
this way twenty minutes or half an hour passed. Then, as day broke, the
Japanese fire from the hill became still heavier and more vicious.
Lieutenant Choulkov learnt of the failure of the 9th Company from some
of the rank and file who had got left behind in the retreat, and who
stumbled upon the 3rd Scout Detachment in the darkness. Fully alive to
the danger of being surrounded, he ordered the outposts to come in,
and sent word of the position of affairs to a company extended to his
left. Fearing for the fate of the machine guns, which were behind him,
Lieutenant Choulkov sent one section to them as escort, but the guns
were gone. As soon as the outpost line had come in, Lieutenant Choulkov
began to retreat with his command in a compact body, and soon joined
up with the reserve, behind which Colonel Dounin concentrated the
retreating troops and brought them into a state of order.
The reserve was in the valley, and, hearing of the retreat of the
companies to his right, Colonel Dounin ordered what reserves he had
to occupy a neighbouring hill on the right, in order to hold up the
enemy’s advance while he formed a new defensive line from the village
of Vodymin across Riji Hill,[45] through Lieutenant Naoomov’s battery
of 57-mm. guns, and farther on to some unnamed hills. Thanks to Colonel
Dounin’s dispositions, and to the courage of the officers of the
detachment, they succeeded in forming the new defensive line at the
point mentioned, and in cooling the ardour of the Japanese in their
fiery advance.
A short time afterwards the order to retreat was received from General
Fock.
While Colonel Dounin was giving the necessary orders, another order
came in from General Fock to retire on Height No. 86.[46]
Colonel Dounin retreated in splendid order, in some cases personally
conducting the skirmishing line, and, covering one company with
another, occupied the positions ordered by General Fock—namely,
Height No. 86, next a position near the village of Hou-chia-tun, then
Saidjashalin,[47] and finally 11th Verst. Having covered the retreat of
parts of the 13th, 14th, and other regiments, the companies themselves
passed behind Feng-huang Shan.
The whole of the force, and especially the officers, acted in a manner
worthy of the highest praise. In holding back the victorious Japanese,
all the companies displayed remarkable bravery; for instance, the 11th
Company of the 5th Regiment with the 1st Company of the 27th Regiment
held Vodymin for two-and-a-half hours, though surrounded on three
sides. Nevertheless, they broke their way through, taking with them a
machine gun that had been left on the road and three wounded men of
the 26th Regiment. The 6th Company, which held back the Japanese with
rapid fire in order to allow its comrades to get away, continued to
hold its ground under a heavy cross-fire from rifles and guns, and,
amongst others, lost its gallant commander, Lieutenant Popov, who set
an example of unparalleled bravery to the whole of his company.
After the evacuation of Lao-tso Shan the army took up the new positions
assigned to it, and we remained near the station (11th Verst—the
headquarters of the 4th Division) and prepared to cook our breakfasts.
But suddenly a bullet whistled past, followed by another, and this
reminded us that no one was covering our rear. The staff got into
some confusion, wagons were hastily horsed, and two companies (I do
not remember which regiment they belonged to) were ordered to move in
the direction of the enemy and hold him back. These companies quickly
occupied a height close by, covering the staff from the enemy, and the
firing became general. The whistling of bullets became more frequent,
and the horsing of the wagons of the staff was hurried on. We saw that
it was useless to try to breakfast in such an unpleasant place, and the
staff, with fifty Cossacks and accompanied by General Stessel, began
to move into the fortress, stopping every now and then to see what was
going on in front. I rode off to 174 Metre Hill, and on the way climbed
a fairly high eminence to see what was happening in rear. I found our
own battery there placed in some well-constructed trenches, and the
guns directing their fire on the station at 11th Verst. Everything
was soon put in order, and nothing further happened to prevent our
men occupying their new positions, on which could already be seen the
rising smoke of the field kitchens.
Towards the evening of July 29 the 5th Regiment had settled down in
its new positions, had supper, and turned in for the night, except the
outposts, whom I had sent out far in front in the direction of the
enemy. (I always did this, even when our own troops were in front of
us, as on this occasion.) I placed my staff on Division Hill, and built
an office, and a mess-room for the officers.
The situation was a very picturesque one. In front were the ridges of
Division Hill, with two neighbouring eminences, all crowned with our
trenches, to the left wooded slopes, and towards Fort Yi-tzu Shan a
small but glistening stream, with banks covered with slender, waving
grasses. (See Map IV.)
[Illustration: GENERAL MAP OF THE KUAN-TUNG PENINSULA
Map No. 2.
London: Hugh Rees, Ltd.
_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._]
FOOTNOTES:
[32] See Maps II. and VI.
[33] 1 pood = 38 lb.
[34] The inhabitants of Dalny received the news of the battle of Nan
Shan on the evening of the 26th, and were ordered to proceed to Port
Arthur at eleven that night (see Official History, Part III., p. 12).
[35] That between Triple Peak and An-tzu Ling (see Map VI.).
[36] Better known as Orphan Hill; shown on British official maps as
Kan-ta Shan, that being its Chinese name.
[37] Called by the Russians the Green Hills.
[38] Known by the Russians as the Wolf Hills.
[39] The Russian name is Bokovi (Side) Hill.
[40] Near Lieh-shu-fang.
[41] As its name implies, the station 11 versts from Port Arthur.
[42] Our Official History states that only three companies of the 5th
Regiment were allotted to this section, but adds later that the 5th and
6th Companies were brought up and absorbed in the fighting line. They
are here given as being in reserve.
[43] A village 1-1/2 miles north-east of Hou-chia-tun.
[44] Ta-po Shan had actually been captured by the Japanese the previous
evening about ten o’clock, two counter-attacks afterwards failing.
[45] Not to be confused with a hill of the same name on the Western
Front of the Port Arthur defences.
[46] Probably a hill between Vodymin and Hou-chia-tun.
[47] A village midway between Vodymin and 11th Verst station.