Further account of the actions at Chang-chia-tun and
Shih-san-li-tai—Preliminary skirmishes round Chin-chou
—The battle of Nan Shan, May 26, 1904.
Our regiments went on to Ta-fang-shen, while the enemy’s troops found
themselves facing the Nan Shan position, all ready and prepared to
meet them with a hail of shell and bullets. However, they did not show
themselves as yet, and everything retained its usual aspect. On the
night of May 17 it was reported at the advanced posts that the enemy
had occupied the pass near the railway bridge and was forcing back our
advanced detachments with small bodies of infantry, a cross fire being
kept up all that night. Next, a report came in from the left flank to
the effect that the enemy was pressing the outpost line on that side;
in proof of which a few wounded were brought in. It thus became evident
that the Japanese were drawing closer round the Nan Shan position.
Reports received in the morning made it clear that the Japanese had
occupied all the heights lying in front of the Nan Shan position and
were engaged in fortifying themselves on them. We could not, however,
see any definite signs of them, as they were careful not to venture out
from the shelter of the hills in front, save that towards midday we
were able to locate earth-works on the hill near Shih-san-li-tai about
7 versts from our position. On closer examination we discerned certain
works somewhat nearer, which were without doubt infantry trenches, and
on which our long-range guns immediately opened fire. Our shells did
not reach the more distant line, but at once succeeded in stopping work
on the nearer trenches. Fire on the enemy’s works was kept up, off and
on, all that day.
In view of the fact that one regiment was insufficient to defend the
whole position, as well as the ground lying to the front of it, I asked
General Fock to send me two infantry scout detachments from the 13th
and 14th Regiments. My request being granted, the outpost line, on
the following night, consisted of four infantry detachments and one
mounted. All this night a cross fire was kept up with the Japanese
posts, which pressed our men so hard that I had to strengthen the line
on the right flank by a half-company (supplied by No. 2 Company). Our
outpost line ran as follows: from the shores of Chin-chou Bay to the
town wall of Chin-chou, with patrols out to some distance in advance of
the wall, from the town to Nan Shan railway station, and from there to
Hand Bay. During the night the Japanese drove us out of the old Chinese
fortifications beyond Kerr Bay, inflicting some losses—a few killed and
many wounded. Our opponents threw out such a strong screen that our
men were not able to penetrate it at any point so as to see what they
were doing behind, and, as we were thus left in complete ignorance as
to their numbers and dispositions, I had to be guided by the knowledge
gained at the time of the action of Chang-chia-tun, which information
I cannot do better than give in the words of Lieutenant-Colonel
Saifoolin, who commanded a portion of our right flank, and from whom I
had the following story of the engagement:
[Illustration: LIEUT.-COLONEL SAIFOOLIN, COMMANDING 2ND BATTALION,
5TH REGIMENT.
p. 34]
“Our companies were disposed in the following order: I, with the 8th
Company, occupied a hill near a ruined tower on the left side of
the nullah along which runs the road to Godzarlin; the 6th Company
occupied the crest on the right side of this nullah; and the 3rd Scout
Detachment, under Captain Koudriavtsev, occupied a hill on the extreme
right flank of the line and somewhat in front of the 6th Company.
The mounted scouts were sent out in front as skirmishers. Hardly had
day broken, when our scouts reported that the enemy was moving in
considerable force along the road from Godzarlin and nearer; following
hard upon this report there came in view, in front of out right flank,
dense Japanese lines, with their left flank resting on Mount Sampson,
and firing commenced at once at very long range. The enemy did not
hurry in his advance, but developed such a terrific rifle fire that
a great number of our men were placed _hors de combat_. Not having
any companies in reserve, I sent for help to a battalion of the 14th
Regiment, which was formed up in our rear, and one company of this
battalion (commanded by Suvorov), posted by itself behind our right
flank, started to move up to us, but halted and commenced firing
without joining our line. This continued for an hour, during which
time the enemy’s troops advanced without check until they were 400
paces, or less, from our scouts and the 6th Company; their strength
being about fifteen companies. Meanwhile about forty Japanese companies
were turning our left flank. Our losses in the 6th Company and among
the scouts were already considerable. In the former the commander was
wounded and the sergeant-major and thirty men were killed; while of the
latter about one-half were _hors de combat_, including the commander.
Not seeing any sign of reinforcements, we sent to ask what was to be
done. At this time the enemy began to turn our right flank also. No
one came to our assistance, our companies were melting away, and the
enemy was continuing to advance. I gave the order to retire, and, under
a terrific fire, we got back almost to the railway bridge, where our
artillery covered us, opening such a deadly fire on the enemy’s lines
that they came to a standstill and then took cover in the folds of the
ground. The order was then given for a general retreat, whereupon we
retired behind the town and ultimately to the main position.”
At Shih-san-li-tai, on the left flank, a fearful artillery fight took
place with rather disastrous results for us. In Romanovski’s battery
all the officers were put out of action, and he himself was wounded, as
were also nearly all the men of the gun detachments, so that there was
no one to bring up ammunition, and volunteers from the 3rd Company had
to be called for. Things reached such a pass that Romanovski himself
loaded a gun; the adjutant of the brigade, who had been sent off with
an order, was killed by a shell. But the enemy not being strong in
infantry on that flank, did not press an advance, so that our losses in
the 12th Company were only four men, and in the 3rd but a few more.[21]
There seems to have been some misunderstanding about this retreat. The
following day I went to the divisional headquarters with my report,
and, while there, General Fock sent for General Nadyein, who commanded
the detachment engaged at Shih-san-li-tai.[22]
“Why did you retire?” said General Fock, turning to him.
“On your order, your Excellency,” replied General Nadyein.
“What order? I never gave any order.”
General Nadyein thereupon produced a note, signed by Lieutenant-Colonel
Romanovski, in which it was clearly stated that General Fock had
himself ordered the retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel Romanovski, having been
sent for, stated that General Fock had actually ordered him to write
the note. General Fock was quite at a loss to understand this, but gave
orders that for the future, on important occasions, only orders signed
by him in person were to be obeyed.
[Illustration: GENERAL STESSEL INSPECTING ONE OF THE FORTS.
p. 36]
On May 21 General Stessel came out to the position. He was apparently
very dissatisfied with the result of the late engagement, and when he
heard that Major Gomsiakov, the commander of the 6th Company, had been
left wounded on the field of battle, his displeasure knew no bounds;
he addressed the 6th Company in severe terms, removed the next senior
officer, Captain Sichev, from the command of the company, and said that
he was not to be recommended for any reward.
As a matter of fact, neither the company nor the officer was at all
deserving of this rebuke. Major Gomsiakov had been taken away in a
Chinese cart, and subsequently a horse had been procured for him on
which to ride to the dressing station. Being, however, unable to mount,
an ambulance wagon was sent for, but meanwhile he sent back the men
who had brought him, saying that they were needed in the firing line,
and he awaited the arrival of the wagon with a soldier of the Medical
Corps. About this time the retreat commenced, and Major Gomsiakov gave
his sword to the man and told him to go away, saying: “You can’t help
me, and if you remain they will kill you, and perhaps they want you in
your company.” Major Gomsiakov was taken prisoner by the Japanese, and
died from his wounds.
The engagements at Shih-san-li-tai and Chang-chia-tun cost us about 100
men in killed and wounded.
Having inspected the position, General Stessel went on to Chin-chou,
which was already being attacked by the enemy from the northern side.
When we rode into the gates bullets had begun to whistle along the
streets, but the general, having gone as far as the old Chinese temple,
turned back and reached the position again without hurt.
Our men slept in the trenches and batteries, the outpost line
consisting of a screen of scouts and a line of sentries detailed from
the companies occupying the trenches. I dreaded a night attack, which
might very well be successful owing to our lack of defenders, and I was
the more afraid because the enemy did not hurry himself, but seemed
to be minutely studying the defences. We thus had to be keenly on the
alert.
Early in the morning of May 22 we heard heavy rifle fire opening
under the walls of the town.[23] We could not see the enemy from the
position, but the town commandant informed me by telephone that the
Japanese were preparing for an assault. I had no fear of the town being
taken, since we had 400 men there and had filled sixty sand-bags with
powder ready to explode when the enemy got close to the walls. Besides
this, at the request of the commandant, I had reinforced the garrison
with half the 9th Company under its commander, Major Sokolov. Though
it would be impracticable to take the town without a heavy artillery
preparation, it would be quite feasible to pass round it and proceed
to attack the adjoining position from the right flank. So we quietly
followed the course of the action and watched for targets for our
artillery, but none appeared. The first attack on the town was beaten
back easily, but the enemy effected a lodgment on the north-western
side, where he was completely covered by the town wall from fire from
the direction of the position. From this time the rattle of rifle fire
round the town did not cease. As an advanced point of the position the
town certainly began to fulfil its intended rôle in the operations.
It is a great pity that we did not take steps with a view to the
stubborn defence of the Nan Shan position. Even assuming that such
determined defence was risky, as the enemy’s troops could effect a
landing to the south of the position, and so cut us off from Port
Arthur, they would, on the other hand, have had to run considerable
risk themselves in landing under our very eyes. They had, indeed,
already thrown considerable forces against us from the north, and it
would, perhaps, have been difficult for them to have sent another force
(about two divisions) against the Port Arthur garrison. Therefore, I
say with the greatest assurance that, had we decided to defend the
Nan Shan position stubbornly and had armed our batteries with heavy
guns, supplementing our guns of position with, say, a brigade of
field artillery, we should have held the enemy before Nan Shan for a
long time and perhaps have compelled him to have recourse to sapping
operations. During the time thus gained, the garrison of the fortress
would have been enabled to put its works into a better state of defence
than that in which they actually were left in consequence of lack of
time.
The enemy made constant assaults on the town, but always without
success.[24] Once the Japanese sappers brought up a huge charge of
gun-cotton to the gates, but our marksmen killed those who tried
to place it, and brought the charge into the town. Continuing his
operations, the enemy placed a battery on the slopes of the hills
overlooking the town, and fortified the heights near Shih-san-li-tai.
The care displayed in doing this surprised us. We tried to impede the
work by fire, but the range was far too great for our guns.
On the evening of May 22, a 6-inch Schneider-Canet gun was brought on
to the position, and I decided to place it in the central redoubt,
where it would command the bays on both flanks. Starting at once to get
it into its allotted position, a whole company worked day and night on
the 23rd and 24th mounting the gun, and on the 25th it was just ready
to be placed on its carriage, when a heavy bombardment commenced and
greatly hindered the work.
From the time of our retreat from the positions at Shih-san-li-tai and
Chang-chia-tun to the Nan Shan position we hardly had a moment’s peace;
constant small night affairs in the outpost line, and the nightly
expectation of a big attack, compelled us to have half our men on the
alert. I never once undressed, or took off my boots; messages kept on
coming in, and hardly gave me a chance of closing my eyes. Such was the
strain that we were quite worn out.
On the morning of the 25th the enemy began a terrific bombardment.
We were all at our posts, and replied with heavy artillery fire,
suffering, however, little damage during this bombardment; none of our
guns were touched, though it was impossible to work at mounting our big
gun of position. We had several hit, including Boochatski, commanding
the 11th Company, who was severely wounded.
I must mention an incident with a kite. Why it was brought on to the
position, I do not know, as we could observe the movements of the
enemy perfectly from the top of our hill, and without incurring the
risk of being dashed to the ground. The party who brought it, with Mr.
Kourelov, a very brave man, decided to fly it at the very height of
the bombardment. The kite reached a great altitude, and, of course,
immediately attracted the attention of the Japanese, with the result
that a hail of shrapnel burst over the heads of the daring detachment,
and, to avoid unnecessary losses, I ordered them to bring the kite
down. Thank God! neither a man of the detachment nor Mr. Kourelov was
touched.
THE BATTLE OF NAN SHAN[25]
I spent the night of the 25th–26th with my adjutant and orderly officer
on Battery No. 13 in a bomb-proof, which was placed high up, but
nevertheless capable of protecting us from the enemy’s field-artillery
fire. Everything was quiet in the evening, but at about midnight
the enemy began to move; our outposts reported that they heard guns
moving, and our posts on the right flank were driven back by advancing
infantry. The weather was shocking—it was pouring with rain and there
was thunder in the air. Foreseeing that the enemy would make an attack
on our right flank and, if successful, would surround the town, and
not wishing to make him a present of the four hundred men in it, who
were indispensable to me on the position, I sent an order to the
commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Yermeiev, not to allow himself to be
surrounded, but to retreat from the town on to the position while the
southern gates were free, and to man the trenches on our left flank.
The enemy attacked the town about 3 a.m., but, being unsuccessful,
began to surround it, when the commandant passed out through the south
gate and fought his way back to the position. One section, which
was late in getting through the gate, jumped down from the wall, a
height of 9 feet, and effected its retreat. But in the darkness the
men did not reach the positions to which they had been assigned, and,
instead of the whole of the 10th Company, only two sections, under
Second-Lieutenant Merkoulev, reached the point they had been ordered to
defend. The remaining half-company,[26] under Major Goosov, and half of
No. 9 Company, under Major Sokolov, occupied the empty trenches near
Redoubt No. 8. Some of the 3rd Scout Detachment occupied the lower tier
of trenches of this redoubt, but the majority of them got to their
proper positions on the left flank.
Our dispositions were as follows: the 2nd Company held the extreme
right flank from No. 2 Redoubt; the 2nd Scout Detachment was near
the railway and in Redoubt No. 1; the corner beyond was unoccupied;
the 12th Company was near the quarry, and the 3rd farther on in the
trenches; behind them the 8th and 4th Companies and the 1st Scout
Detachment, and the 6th Company in Redoubt No. 8; farther behind the
ravine were the 5th, 7th, and half the 10th Companies; and towards
the shores of Chin-chou Bay two Scout Detachments of the 13th and
14th Regiments were in trenches. Near No. 15 Battery were the 3rd
Company 14th Regiment, and a section of our 7th Company; the ground
between the scout detachments and No. 15 Battery was absolutely
undefended. Four machine guns under Second-Lieutenant Lobyrev were at
the disposal of the 7th Company on the cliffs near the shore, and four
naval machine guns, under Midshipman Shimanski, were placed behind
our 1st Scout Detachment. The forts inside the position, which could
have been fought individually, and so have increased the obstinacy
of the defence, were without defenders: the central redoubt, Battery
No. 13, and many trenches were absolutely unoccupied for want of
men. I had in the reserve the 11th Company 5th Regiment, and two
companies of the 13th Regiment, while I had detached the following
officers to command sections of the position: right flank up to No.
1 Battery, Major Stempnevski; the centre—12th, 3rd, 8th, and 4th
Companies;—Lieutenant-Colonel Bielozor; left flank—6th Company, 1st
Scout Detachment, 5th and 7th Companies, and the whole of the left
flank—Lieutenant-Colonel Saifoolin. The artillery consisted of guns
placed in fifteen batteries, as on Map I.; No. 1 Battery being armed
with eight 8·7-cm. field guns.
[Illustration: MAJOR STEMPNEVSKI (SEN.), COMMANDING 2ND COMPANY,
5TH REGIMENT.
p. 43]
From daybreak on the 26th the enemy began to bombard the position; and
shells flew thick and fast, more especially on No. 13. When it was
light enough, I looked at the enemy through my glasses. His batteries
extended in an unbroken line from Chin-chou Bay to Hand Bay, and
some batteries—apparently of heavy guns—stood on the slopes of the
hills behind the town. The enemy did not husband his ammunition. Four
gunboats, and perhaps destroyers with them, came close inshore in
Chin-chou Bay, and two large ships lay near the entrance to the bay in
the rear of our position. These ships fired very heavy shell. There was
no sign yet of the enemy’s infantry, but the gun fire was so terrific
as to compel us to retire into our bomb-proofs. Near by stood a bucket
of water; being afraid of its being blown to bits, I ordered it to be
placed under cover, and one of the men had just reached it, when a
shrapnel burst close to him, and the water poured out over the floor,
Bombardier Ptooski being wounded in the head, and I myself getting
a scratch on my leg. As the shelter was filled with smoke, we found
some difficulty in breathing in it, and the majority of us therefore
went out into the redoubt. From there I saw the lines of the enemy’s
skirmishers round our right flank; our 4th and 8th Companies had opened
fire, but the lines nevertheless advanced slowly on us, leaving on
the ground behind them small black dots. Our fire was apparently very
effective; we had not measured all our ranges in vain. At eight o’clock
a large ship appeared in the bay on our own right flank; “Well,” I
thought, “the 2nd Company will be able to reach her.” Imagine my joy
when I saw that she was firing on the enemy and I recognized our
_Bobr_, though, unfortunately, she did not keep up firing for long, but
put out to sea again. It was about 9 a.m. when the enemy’s skirmishing
line was seen near Nan Shan station and behind the mounds close to the
nearest villages, right in front of all the companies from the 2nd to
the 8th. The rifle fire resolved itself into one continual rattle and
roar. An orderly from Lieutenant-Colonel Bielozor came to me with a
report, in which he had written as follows:
“The enemy is in front of us and is attacking, but do you know that
there are 700 yards of trenches near us absolutely unoccupied? We must
have help.”
I myself saw that the Japanese were directing their attack on our
8th Company. The line had come to a standstill before all the other
companies, so I sent half of the 11th Company to the threatened point.
At this time I had three companies in reserve, the 11th of my own
regiment, and two companies of the 13th. The enemy’s companies got up
to the wire entanglements in front of the 8th and 4th Companies, but,
finding their advance barred, they retired in disorder, taking cover
in the folds of the ground and thence opening a tremendous fire. I was
now certain that we had nothing to fear from the Japanese infantry.
Just then another orderly arrived from Lieutenant-Colonel Bielozor,
asking for immediate reinforcements, but, having already sent him half
the 11th Company, I felt sure that that was sufficient. At this moment
the enemy’s skirmishing line in front of the 2nd Company occupied the
southern extremities of a small village, and as this place afforded
excellent cover, I saw that there was a danger of the enemy collecting
considerable forces behind it and overwhelming the 2nd Company, the
more so, as it was only 400 paces from the village to the position. On
seeing, however, that such an attack would be taken in flank by the
fire of the 2nd Company, I felt somewhat easier. The enemy’s infantry
was now spread out round the whole position in a semicircle, like his
artillery, and the crackle of rifle fire was absolutely incessant.
Besides this, we saw that the troops composing his right flank had
gone down into the water in the Bay of Chin-chou and were effecting
a turning movement through the water; but this advance was checked
after the lapse of a few moments by our gun and rifle fire (at very
long ranges, however). In all probability the men of this column were
nearly all killed, as no movement could be detected among the Japanese
bodies lying in the water—all were still.[27] The enemy’s skirmishers
kept closing in and then again retiring; but meanwhile our men, after
beating back the infantry attack, suffered severely from artillery
fire. I received word that Lieutenant-Colonel Radetski had been killed.
About eleven o’clock the commander of the 6th Company reported to me
that his advanced trench was completely wrecked by artillery fire
from the sea and from the front, and that it was impossible to obtain
any cover in it. This was grave news. I noticed considerable movement
among the enemy’s troops before our left flank, and a mass of men began
to move from the centre to the left flank. The troops of the enemy’s
right flank, which had been sitting in the water of Chin-chou Bay for
some time, began to move forward. To defend this (left) flank I had:
the 7th Company, half of the 10th Company, the larger half of the 3rd
Scout Detachment of our regiment (the remainder had retreated into
the trenches near No. 8 Redoubt), two Scout Detachments of the 13th
and 14th Regiments, under the command of Lieutenants Bandaletov and
Roosoi, and near No. 15 Battery the 3rd Company of the 14th Regiment,
under Captain Ushakov, with one section of the 7th Company. We had
sufficient men to beat back an attack, but the losses of the 5th
Company had caused me some anxiety. In order, therefore, to reinforce
the 5th Company, I sent the remaining half of the 11th Company into
the trenches to the left of No. 8 Redoubt, so as to enfilade the
troops of the enemy attacking the 5th Company, and earlier still I
had sent Captain Rotaiski’s company into a so-called deep trench near
by. These measures were sufficient to prevent the enemy from breaking
through at the point held by the 5th Company. I built great hopes on
our four machine guns, posted behind the 7th Company’s left flank (see
page 43). They constituted a tremendous power, practically equalling
a whole company, and they were, moreover, cleverly concealed in some
small pits. I immediately sent in a report. (I had forwarded reports of
everything that had taken place on the field and also the reports of
the different commanders.)
About twelve o’clock the enemy’s rifle fire suddenly ceased, and his
artillery also grew silent. Taking advantage of this, I went down
to the road from No. 13 Battery to meet two gunners coming from the
position. We noticed General Fock and his adjutant on the road. Major
Visoki reported that the gunners had suffered severely, and that the
ammunition supply was exhausted. As they had no rifles, I sent them
away from the position, and thus, from twelve o’clock, we were left
without artillery. Just before this sudden temporary cessation of fire
I had already noticed from the hill how our artillery fire was dying
down and how cruelly the enemy’s shells blew our gunners to pieces;
indeed, the helplessness of our guns became apparent as soon as the
enemy’s cannonade commenced.
It is impossible to imagine what such a fire is like. An unceasing
stream of shells burst over each battery and over No. 13 Battery, where
it was only possible to sit right up against the earth-work, now and
then venturing to glance over it to observe what was going on. When
the fire had become positively fiendish we took cover in the upper
bomb-proof, a relic of the Chinese war. It gave us sufficient cover
from small shell, and it was possible to write there, send reports, and
receive reports from orderlies, but the fire from the ships made us
fear for our safety. A single shell would have been sufficient to bury
us all under the ruins of our shelter. All the ravines were literally
pitted with shell splinters. Our unfortunate artillery was so occupied
in its struggle with the enemy’s guns that it paid no attention to
the ships threatening the fortifications on our left flank. However,
this was not surprising, as the batteries did not themselves feel the
fire of the enemy’s ships. From their front guns roared also, so from
a feeling of self-preservation they returned that fire at first as
energetically as they could. The order I had sent to No. 4 Battery to
direct its fire on the enemy’s ships had evidently not got through to
the battery commander. Our fire began to slacken, and finally ceased,
owing to losses and, in many batteries, for want of ammunition. In
No. 9 Battery every man was killed but one, and he continued to fire
by himself from each gun in rotation. He loaded the guns in turn and
fired them until a shell put an end to this hero. In spite of all my
efforts I have been unable to learn his name. “Peace to your ashes,
unknown hero, the pride and glory of your regiment!”[28]
The greater number of our guns was unharmed, though two pieces in the
centre of the position were dismounted, as were also all the guns of
No. 15 Battery, against which the enemy’s ships were firing.
A deathlike stillness now reigned along the whole position for an hour.
Going down to the lower line of trenches, I tried to get to General
Fock, who had been seen, as I have said, on the road to No. 10 Battery,
but he had gone off somewhere, and I did not see him again; possibly he
went along the ravines to Ta-fang-shen station.
Soldiers of the 5th Company who had fallen to the rear said that it
had gone badly with that company, and that it had vacated the advanced
trench and occupied No. 9 Redoubt and the ravines near it. The men
in all the other trenches and forts gallantly stuck to their posts.
After an hour of silence, firing began again, rifles cracked, and guns
roared. I went to my observing station. The enemy literally swept us
with a hail of shrapnel. One shell burst right over the heads of two
of my orderlies standing behind me, killing one outright and wounding
the other in the head. A short time after, our small-arm ammunition
magazine near No. 10 Battery caught fire.
Soon after there were some distressing signs of disorder on the left
flank (the section defended by the 5th Company)—men were retiring
and going back, without stopping, to the rear of the position; but
I received no report from the commander of the 5th Company. I then
noticed that the enemy’s fire was concentrated on the 5th and 7th
Companies. Though I had foreseen an attack on these points I was
not afraid that the enemy would break through there, as Rotaiski’s
company and Redoubt No. 8, with its trenches, made it impracticable.
Nevertheless, I felt the need of a larger reserve, and I reported
to General Fock that I should have no men with which to renew the
battle if the enemy should beat us back out of our advanced positions.
I earnestly asked for reinforcements; but General Fock, guided, I
suppose, by the general supposition that reinforcements are always
asked for before they are needed, and thinking, perhaps, that I was
making mountains out of molehills, did not pay any attention to my
request, or else did not wish to satisfy it, and our position became
critical. Our scouts on the left flank, as also the 5th and 7th
Companies, were demoralized, especially the 5th.
Captain Lubeemov’s company of the 13th Regiment, which was with me in
the reserve, had disappeared somewhere, so that Captain Teemoshenko,
who was sent by me to take it to the place where I had decided it
should go (on the left flank, in the interval between our 7th Company
and Captain Ushakov’s company, near No. 15), could not find it, and
came back. Thus I now had not a single company under my hand.[29]
Afterwards it became known that Lubeemov’s company had received by
an orderly an order purporting to come from me, and had taken up a
position near our 5th and 7th Companies on the left flank. It had
failed to reach its _correct_ position (see last page), as no one was
there to direct it. I do not, however, blame Captain Lubeemov; he had
obeyed his orders, but went to the right, instead of the left, flank of
Captain Ushakov. Captain Teemoshenko should have pointed out the right
place, but he failed to find the company. Where Captain Lubeemov was
wrong, was in altering his position without my orders.
Shortly after, about four o’clock, an officer came up and reported
that the 6th and 7th Companies of the 14th Regiment were coming to my
assistance. I received a note from General Fock, in which he ordered
me to use these companies only to cover a retreat, and not to employ
them in the trenches. Then I understood that General Fock was not going
to help me to hold the position, which he might have done without much
difficulty, since I only required one additional battalion in reserve.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bielozor now sent to ask for reinforcements.
Although I could see no attack on his side, in view of the urgency of
the request, and so as to be quite safe on our right flank (where an
adjoining village was strongly held by the Japanese, and the railway
embankment could screen large numbers of the enemy), I decided to send
half a company of the 14th Regiment under Captain Kousmin, an excellent
officer, well known to me.
About six o’clock bullets began to whistle over our heads in No. 13,
and, my trumpeter being wounded, I took him myself into the bomb-proof
to be attended to. On the left flank men in yellow jackets[30]
were moving about in groups, and five minutes had not passed before
Second-Lieutenant Sadykov came into the shelter and reported that the
left flank was retreating. I rushed out and saw that the yellow-coats
were streaming up, and shrapnel bursting over the 7th and 5th
Companies, while a heavy cross fire was being kept up. The Japanese
skirmishers had lain down in their places and there was no warning of
their sudden advance. Seeing that our scouts were retreating, and that
all the others might retreat with them, I, not having any orders to
retreat from the position, galloped off to the reserve and ordered the
one-and-a-half companies of the 14th Regiment, sent by General Fock, to
move against the Japanese appearing near Work No. 10. As we rode down,
we came into a hot fire from the neighbouring hills.
I thought that I could arrest the retreat and deliver a counter-attack
from behind the reserve, and then, having taken No. 10 Battery,
re-organize the left flank.
At the subsequent court-martial General Fock declared that I could not
have ordered the reserve to meet the Japanese; but he was mistaken,
being misled by Captain Rotaiski, who, giving evidence, declared that
he saw the Japanese pursuing me and saw me escape from them through
the window of a shed. I never got through any window, but I mounted
my horse and galloped off to stop those retreating. The Japanese then
fired on me from the hills above the shed. It was not I, but a Japanese
officer, who jumped through the window, and was overtaken by four men
from the reserve and killed in the shed, as a proof of which his sword
was presented to the commander of the 14th Regiment.
The order to attack _was_ given by me, for the commander of the
reserve rushed up to me and asked: “What are we to do?” “Attack,” I
answered, and pointed out to him whom to attack and where. After that I
galloped after the retreating soldiers and made myself hoarse shouting
“Stop, stop, my men!” But they in their turn shouted out to me: “Your
Excellency, we have been ordered to retreat.” I could not imagine who
had given this order. As, however, at this moment the Japanese saw
us retreating from behind the Nan Shan hills, and opened a terrific
shrapnel fire, it was absolutely impossible to stop the men. A shrapnel
bullet struck my mare’s ear and wellnigh maddened her. I managed to
rally my men in a position in rear, chosen earlier by me, about a
verst from the Nan Shan hills, and when they had halted, I looked back
towards the hills and saw two bodies of men running down into the
valley; they were probably the 5th and 7th Companies.
No. 13 was in the hands of the Japanese, who were to be seen on the
heights above, firing down on the retreating men, who quickly hid
themselves in the deep ravines. I now occupied the above-mentioned
position in rear, brought up a battalion of the 14th Regiment, and
lengthened the line as far as Ta-fang-shen station. I found the
battalion in question in a ravine behind the position. Of the rest of
the 14th Regiment I saw no signs; probably they were somewhere in rear
under cover. The commander of our scouts came in to me here with our
colours.
Awaiting on this spot the enemy’s attack, we heard heavy firing on the
right of the Nan Shan position, and the enemy’s guns ranged on us and
on the right flank. Our companies on that flank passed across towards
Ta-fang-shen, and I ordered them to concentrate 1 verst in rear of
Ta-fang-shen on the road. For some reason the Japanese decided not
to attack us. It was already quite dark when I went to the burning
station of Ta-fang-shen to see to the dispositions of our troops
there. Suddenly there was a terrific explosion, and I was covered
with fragments of burning planks, beams, and hot bricks. How I and my
comrades escaped death passes my understanding. The station was blown
up at the instance of General Fock’s staff—probably by his orders. One
officer—Major Saliarski—and twenty men were killed by this senseless
explosion.
Night had set in, when the 14th and 5th Regiments received the order
to retire, and I, leaving some mounted patrols to watch the enemy’s
movements, went with the Mounted Scouts to Nan-kuan-ling. While moving
along the road, I met our 7th Company and saw the whole of the 4th
Division encamped in the wide valley. There I found the companies
of the 5th Regiment which had retreated, and ordered them to report
their losses. Very many of our comrades did not answer the roll-call,
the first return showing a loss in killed and wounded of 75 officers
and 1,500 men. It was awful to see the thinned ranks of my gallant
regiment; my heart bled for my officers, who had brought up the rear
in the retreat, but the spirit of those left seemed to be as fine as
ever. I feel bound to pay tribute to our comrades who fell in the
battle and mention some of their heroic deeds.
Lieutenant Kragelski refused to retreat, and bade each one of his men
farewell as they passed him. Captain Makoveiev, commanding the 8th
Company, had declared that he would never retreat, and he was true to
his word, for he remained in the trenches, and was killed only when
he had expended all the cartridges in his revolver. Major Sokolov,
commanding the 9th Company, also refused to retreat, and sabred several
Japanese before being bayoneted to death.
The whole of the left flank attributed the retirement to the receipt
of an order, and consequently I set to work to sift the matter to
the bottom. About six o’clock General Fock sent an officer with the
order to retire. Though he did not come to me personally, this officer
probably sent an orderly—who failed to reach me—and himself went to the
left flank and conveyed the order to retire to the scout detachments
of the 13th and 14th Regiments. This order reached the commander of
the 7th Company through Second-Lieutenant Merkoulev, besides which the
former saw the orderly on a black horse shouting and waving his sword
towards the rear, and only then ordered his company to retire. The fact
that this order to retreat was given, was confirmed by all the officers
and men, and also by Ensign Kaminar (5th Regiment).
I placed the letter sent to me by Lieutenant Sadykov relating to
this point before the commission which assembled to investigate
General Stessel’s conduct. It was there shown that Second-Lieutenant
Moosalevski was present and heard General Fock give the order to
retreat to my orderly officer, Lieutenant Glieb-Koshanski, who
galloped back with the orderly on the black horse to see the general’s
order carried out. When I stopped the retreating scouts, Lieutenant
Glieb-Koshanski and his orderly galloped as far as the Nan Shan hills,
and the latter reached No. 10 Battery by a ravine when the Japanese
were already in the position (this hero never returned). Our 7th
Company and Captain Rotaiski’s company were still at their posts, and
began to retire only after the receipt of the order.
When those who had been in Port Arthur were assembled in St. Petersburg
from all over the Empire to give evidence at General Stessel’s
trial, I only gave details of the Nan Shan fight in answering the
questions put to me. The conclusion arrived at was this: the scout
detachments of the 14th Regiment, shaken by the hasty retirement of
those of the 13th Regiment at that moment, began to abandon their
trenches about four o’clock, the time when I saw them retreating in a
body. Lieutenant Roosoi had only ten men left in the trench, but the
other companies—_i.e._, the 7th and 5th of our regiment, and Captain
Rotaiski’s company—remained on the position. Lieutenant Glieb-Koshanski
and the orderly galloped up with a report to General Fock just as I
was leaving No. 13 and had mounted my horse, and it was thus quite
possible for the orderly on the black horse to have really galloped
up to the position and given the order to retire before I had stopped
the retreating scouts. Anyway, it was proved conclusively that the
Japanese appeared in No. 10 Battery, and the other inner works of the
position before the 7th and 5th Companies began their retreat.
And it was in this way. When the Scout Detachment of the 13th Regiment,
under Second-Lieutenant Bandaletov, and part of the Scouts of the 14th
Regiment began to retire (in consequence of the flanking fire from the
gunboats, and _not_ because of the rifle fire of the Japanese, whose
skirmishers did not come closer than 600 yards), the enemy, taking
advantage of natural cover, pursued them and, passing along the ravines
and watercourses, occupied the trenches we had vacated, together with
No. 10 Battery and farther points. As, however, the Japanese were
not in great numbers, they could not break through the centre, the
5th Company being in the deep ravine, the 6th in No. 8 Redoubt, and
Rotaiski’s company in a deep valley. These companies could not have let
the Japanese pass, and I repeat that the Japanese lines were in full
view from where I was and did not move until the scouts appeared in our
rear.
From accounts given by officers, this is what happened on the right
flank. After the attack on the 8th and 4th Companies had failed, the
enemy kept up a furious gun and rifle fire, but did not approach
our trenches. This continued until the retreat of the 5th and 7th
Companies had actually begun. When the retreat of the left flank was
noticed from No. 8 Redoubt, and the Japanese began to sweep our right
flank from No. 5, Major Goosov assembled all the officers there for
a consultation as to what should be done. After some hesitation it
was decided to retreat; and word of that decision was sent to other
companies. However, the 4th and 8th Companies, remembering the order
that there would be no retreat, refused to act on the decision. Our
gallant Colonel Bielozor was in command, the company commanders
being Captain Shastin of the 4th Company, and Captain Makoveiev of
the 8th. On the retirement of the 6th Company from No. 8 Redoubt,
the 3rd, 4th, 8th, and part of the 12th Companies, found themselves
in a hopeless position. There were Japanese in their rear, Japanese
machine guns on No. 5, and a large body of Japanese in front, ready
to attack, which they soon did. Seeing their comrades on the heights,
where our batteries had been, and also in No. 8 Redoubt, the enemy in
front advanced to the attack, but our gallant companies momentarily
stopped their desperate rush by a volley, which covered the ground
with hundreds of the enemy’s killed and wounded. Then, facing round
on the enemy who was attacking their rear, they compelled him to take
cover behind the hills. The Japanese on the hill signalled with white
handkerchiefs to the companies to surrender, but they only received
volleys in reply. Taking advantage of the indecisive action of the
Japanese in their rear, Lieutenant-Colonel Bielozor decided to try
and extricate his men from this unequal fight, and gave the order to
retire. Under a heavy fire the men moved along the trenches to the rear
of the position, suffering severely from the marksmen on the hills.
In some places the men had to come up out of the trenches, which were
filled with dead and dying, but eventually the companies succeeded
in reaching No. 1 Battery. From that point, too, Lieutenant-Colonel
Bielozor and Captain Shastin saw some Japanese columns trying to cut
off our companies retreating from the centre of the position.
The enemy was advancing from the shores of Hand Bay. Our brave officers
at once thought of covering our men by preventing this turning
movement, in spite of the enemy posted on the hills, and to this end
they collected their men, stopped them, and opened volley fire on the
Japanese. The latter retaliated, and in their turn poured in a hot
fire from rifles and machine guns. This fearful struggle continued for
some time until not a single one of our men was left alive. They all
fell in this unequal fight, defending themselves finally not only with
their bayonets, but even with their fists. Lieutenant-Colonel Bielozor
lost consciousness from loss of blood, and fell; while Captain Shastin
also fell, dangerously wounded in the chest. Both were picked up by
the Japanese Red-Cross men, and saved, thanks to a Japanese officer,
who gave orders that they were not to be killed.[31] Our right flank
retreated simultaneously with our left at the moment when the Japanese
began to enfilade them from the hills.
Having received the order to follow the regiment to Nan-kuan-ling,
I bivouacked with the 4th Rifle Division, leaving my mounted scout
detachment there. This was at 10 or 11 p.m.
On my way I learnt from certain artillery officers that General
Nadyein had, at the critical moment, sent me two battalions (if only
they had reached me!), but that General Fock had ordered them to
return. At the court-martial this fact was not proved.
If, however, General Fock had decided to attack the left flank of the
enemy, where they were already running out of shell and were engaged
with our companies, with even his two regiments, and had brought up the
whole of his artillery against this flank, the enemy would, without
doubt, have been checked and the victory might have been on our side.
It is said that at the court-martial General Fock stated that he wished
to attack. What a pity that this wish came too late!
One must watch for the first sign of wavering in the soldier in
order to be able to judge the proper moment for throwing in the
reserves, instead of keeping them miles behind the firing line, as
seems necessary according to General Fock’s principle—“Keep back your
reserves as long as you possibly can, as they are always asked for
and sent up too early.” That is all right as far as it goes, but at
the same time reserves must be used exactly at the right moment. I
understand the meaning of this principle, but in order not to be misled
in adopting it, it is essential to follow the course of the action very
closely.
[Illustration: MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE NAN SHAN POSITION
Map No. 1.
Enlarged from a Russian Map. London: Hugh Rees, Ltd.
_Reproduced at Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._]
It was stated at the court-martial that the whole of Lieutenant-Colonel
Golitsinski’s battalion of the 14th Regiment was sent to the position,
by General Nadyein, but never reached it, occupying instead the
trenches made by me beyond Ta-fang-shen on the seashore, in case the
enemy tried to make a turning movement through the water of Hand
Bay. This was more than a verst from the position, in rear of its
right flank. What they wanted a battalion there for, I really do not
understand. I know nothing about this strange manœuvre, and I never saw
the battalion, but it would have played a great part if I had had it
with me in the centre.
There cannot be two commanders in one part of a field of battle, and we
had three—General Fock, General Nadyein, and myself.
FOOTNOTES:
[21] In Part II. of the Official History (p. 43, par. 2) the estimated
losses were 150 officers and men killed and wounded. For the Russian
estimate, see following page.
[22] The Official History gives General Nadyein as the commander during
the battle, but General Fock himself conducted the action, General
Nadyein being in command of the left flank.
[23] The attack on Chin-chou here mentioned as taking place on May 22
is not given in any of the official accounts, the first mentioned being
that of May 25, which is _also_ described here. These two may, however,
be one and the same, owing to confusion of dates.
[24] See Official History (Part II., p. 20).
[25] See Map I.
[26] A footnote in the Official History states that half the 10th
Company was cut off by the Japanese, but evidently this was not so.
[27] See Note No. 4 at end of book.
[28] Usual form of address to the dead.
[29] It is not stated what happened to the other company of the 13th
Regiment, which was in reserve. A reference to the Official History
will show that only one company out of these two is mentioned there
also.
[30] At this stage the Japanese were clothed in khaki.
[31] General Tretyakov appears to have been under the impression that
the Japanese were giving no quarter.